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FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

ILLUSTRATION OF REPORTING UNDER SEBI LODR
WITH DISCLAIMER OPINION AND REPORTING UNDER SECTION 143(12) TO THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT

 

8K
MILES SOFTWARE SERVICES LTD. (31st March, 2019)

 

From
Independent Auditors’ Report on Consolidated Financial Results

 

DISCLAIMER OF OPINION

 

1.       We were engaged to audit
the accompanying Statement of Consolidated Financial Results of 8K Miles
Software Services Limited (‘the Parent’ / ‘the Holding Company’ / ‘the
Company’) and its subsidiaries (refer paragraph 16 below, for the subsidiaries
that are considered in these consolidated financial results), (the Parent and
its subsidiaries together referred to as ‘the Group’) for the year ended 31st
March, 2019 (‘the statement’), being submitted by the Parent pursuant to
the requirement of Regulation 33 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and
Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, as modified by Circular No.
CIR/CFD/FAC/62/2016 dated 5th July, 2016.

 

2.       This Statement, which is the
responsibility of the Parent’s management and approved by the Board of
Directors, has been compiled from the related consolidated financial statements
which has been prepared in accordance with the Indian Accounting Standards prescribed
u/s 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act), read with relevant rules issued
thereunder (Ind AS) and other accounting principles generally accepted in India.

 

3.       Our responsibility is to conduct an audit
of the Statement in accordance with Standards on Auditing specified u/s 143(10)
of the Act and to issue an auditor’s report. However, because of the matters
described in Paragraphs 4 to 15 below, we were not able to obtain sufficient
appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for an audit opinion on the
Statement.


BASIS FOR DISCLAIMER OF OPINION

 

4.       Report u/s 143 (12) of the Act

During the
course of our audit of the Statement for the year ended 31st March,
2019 we came across certain transactions that gave us reason to believe that
suspected offences involving fraud have been committed in the Group. Such
transactions with regard to the Statement, inter alia, pertained to:

(a)      Several instances of inconsistencies
between the initial bank statements and the subsequent bank statements provided
for verification in certain subsidiaries. Also see paragraphs 6.3 and 7 below.

 

(b)     Several instances of inconsistencies between
declarations provided by Directors and information available in the public
forum which demonstrated existence of probable related parties which were not
disclosed previously, including certain transactions with such parties which
were not disclosed or approved by the Audit Committee / Board of Directors.
Also see paragraphs 6.3 and 12.1(a) below.

 

(c)      Several instances of transactions with
certain customers, wherein the Company was not able to provide us with the
particulars of the services rendered and acknowledged by the customer, the
details of employees actually rendering such service, the appropriateness and
source of the monies received from such customers. Also see paragraph 7 below.

 

(d)     Several inconsistencies with the names of
the parties / customers mentioned in the bank statements of some of the
subsidiaries and the books of accounts maintained by those subsidiaries. Also
see paragraph 4(a) above and paragraphs 6.3 and 7 below.

 

(e)      Several instances of multiple addresses
being considered in various communications with certain customers in the
invoices, website of the customer, on cheques received from customers, including
instances wherein some of the communication addresses coincided with the
residential address of certain employees of the Company or its subsidiaries,
which impacted our ability to establish the authenticity of the customer. Also
see paragraph 7 below.

 

(f)      Several instances of communications with a
vendor, wherein there were multiple
communications using
different email ids, documents with varying
signatures and differences in the spelling of the common signatory of the
vendor, etc., which impacted our ability to establish the authenticity of the
vendor. Also see paragraph 8.1 below.

 

(g)     Several instances of transactions with
vendors, wherein there were inconsistencies between the nature of services as
mentioned in the invoices and the basis of recording in the books of accounts
as consultancy expenses and intangible assets, multiple federal tax
identification against the same vendor, contracts signed by employees post
cessation of their employment, etc. Also see paragraph 8.2 below.

 

(h)      Appropriate approvals and concerns over
recovery of advances made to a related party, by the Group. Also see paragraph
6 below.

 

Pursuant, inter
alia
, to the above observations, we requested the Audit Committee of the
Company to provide us with their replies or observations to the aforesaid
matters for us to consider the same as part of our audit.

 

Subsequent
to our reporting of such matters to the Audit Committee vide our letter dated
15th July, 2019, the Audit Committee in its meeting held on 18th
July, 2019 appointed an external firm of Chartered Accountants to carry out an
investigation. We are informed that as on the date of this report, the
investigation report of the external firm of Chartered Accountants has not yet
been received by the Company and, hence, the same has not been made available
to us.

 

Further,
we also included the aforesaid matters in our report dated 13th
September, 2019 to the Central Government in accordance with the requirements
of section 143(12) of the Act.

 

Pending
receipt of the report on the findings of such investigation and pending receipt
of information and explanations and evidence relating to the aforesaid matters
from the management of the Company, we have been unable to obtain sufficient
and appropriate audit evidence in respect of the above matters / transactions
that gave us reasons to believe that suspected offences involving fraud may
have been committed in the company and / or its subsidiaries.

 

In view of
the above, we are unable to comment on the consequential adjustments, if any,
that may be required to the Statement in this regard.

 

5.   Access to books of accounts of a
subsidiary and information on subsidiaries

5.1.    Our terms of engagement for the audit of the
Statement included the management’s responsibility to provide us access, at all
times, to the records of all the subsidiaries of the Company insofar as it
relates to the consolidation of its financial statements as envisaged in the
Act.

 

However,
the Company did not provide us the access to the records and books of accounts
of 8K Miles Software Services FZE, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,
which represents total assets of Rs. 11,635.68 lakhs as at 31st
March, 2019, total revenues of Rs. 7,560.23 lakhs, profit after tax of Rs.
789.65 lakhs and net cash outflows amounting to Rs. 96 lakhs for the year ended
on that date, as considered in the Statement.

 

These
balances have been included in the Statement by the management based on
financial statements of the subsidiary, prepared in accordance with the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), wherein the auditor of the
subsidiary has issued an unmodified report.

 

We were
unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the state of
affairs of the subsidiary as at 31st March, 2019 and the results of
its operations for the year then ended, in the absence of access to the records
and books of accounts of the subsidiary.

 

5.2.    Based on information in the public domain, 8K
Miles Cloud Solutions Pte. Limited, Singapore has stated itself to be a
subsidiary of the Holding Company. This entity appears to have been
incorporated on 8th May, 2017. Further, 8K Miles Software Services
Pte. Ltd, Singapore and 8K Miles Software Services UK Limited, United Kingdom
exist with the promoter directors appearing as shareholders / directors. The
incorporation of wholly-owned subsidiaries in these countries was approved by
the Board of Directors of the Holding Company on 30th May, 2018.

 

However,
all these three entities have not been considered by the management of the
Holding Company as subsidiaries in the preparation of the consolidated
financial statements. We are informed by the management that these entities are
not subsidiaries of the Holding Company and the information in the public
domain, including with the regulatory authorities in those geographies, is not
correct.

 

We have
not been provided with the audited financial statements of these entities and /
or any other verifiable evidence to ascertain the relationship of these
entities with the Holding Company. Hence, we are unable to comment on the
relationship of these entities and the impact the financial statements of these
entities may have on the Statement.

 

6.    8K Miles Media Private Limited (8K Miles
Media)

6.1.    Around the last week of September, 2018 we
were made aware of the resignation of the statutory auditor of 8K Miles Media,
a company promoted by the promoter directors of the Company, vide their
resignation letter dated 30th April, 2018. As per the said letter,
the resignation was due to the misuse of that Audit Firm’s letterhead and
signature of their partner through forgery in certain ODI certificates
submitted by 8K Miles Media to its bankers for transfer of funds of USD 71.51
lakhs (Rs. 4,612.91 lakhs) to 8K Miles Media Holdings Inc. USA, a subsidiary of
8K Miles Media. 8K Miles Media and its subsidiaries (together ‘8K Miles Media
Group’) were identified as a related party in the consolidated financial
statements of the Company for the year ended 31st March, 2018.

 

During the period ended 31st December, 2018 the management of
8K Miles Media initiated an independent forensic review to evaluate the
authenticity of the signatures in the ODI certificates referred above. 8K Miles
Media has submitted a copy of the forensic report to the Company. We understand
that the aforesaid forensic report states that the writer of the signature in
the ODI certificates is the same as that of the specimen signatures of the
audit partner as provided to the forensic auditor, thereby concluding that there
was no forgery in the ODI certificates.

 

Since this
matter relates to a company where another firm is the statutory auditor and
since the financial statements of that company are not included in the
consolidated financial statements of the Company, we have not been able to
perform any procedures related to the allegation or the forensic report.

 

6.2.    Further, during the last week of September,
2018,

(a)      the CEO and Managing Director of the
Company, who was also a promoter director in 8K Miles Media, resigned as a
director in 8K Miles Media.

 

(b)     the CFO and Executive Director of the
Company, who was the other promoter director in 8K Miles Media, resigned from
his role as CFO of the Company stating that his resignation was to have the
necessary time to clear all the baseless allegations and unsubstantiated
allegations relating to 8K Miles Media. However, he continues to be a director
in both the Company as well as 8K Miles Media.

 

6.3.    The Company has trade and other receivables
aggregating Rs. 3,309.10 lakhs as at 31st March, 2019 receivable
from 8K Miles Software Services Inc., a subsidiary. It may be noted that this
subsidiary had loans receivable from entities of 8K Miles Media Group in the
USA aggregating USD 89.61 lakhs (Rs. 5,808.44 lakhs) as at 31st
March, 2018.

 

We are informed by the management of the Holding Company that such
amounts due, including interest as accrued, have been fully recovered as at 31st
March, 2019 by that subsidiary. However, in the absence of appropriate workings
for the interest, documentation regarding loan agreements and due to
inconsistencies noted between the transactions as per the bank statements of
the subsidiary with the transactions as recorded in the books of accounts of
the subsidiary, as mentioned in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(d) above, we were unable
to confirm the management’s assertion on the said collections made by the
subsidiary.

 

6.4.    We are unable to conclude if the above
events in 8K Miles Media have any effect on:

(a)      the Group and its operations, in view of
the allegations in the aforesaid resignation letter of the statutory auditor of
that company and the nature of the Group’s relationship with 8K Miles Media, as
described in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 above, respectively;

(b)     the status of the Group’s receivables from
such related party, as described in paragraph 6.3 above; and

(c)      the consequential impact, if any, of the
same on the operations of the Group.

 

 7.      Revenue
from contracts with customers and related outstanding receivables

During the
year ended 31st March, 2019 the Group initially recognised revenue
aggregating to Rs. 54,789 lakhs (including Rs. 2,428.69 lakhs relating to the
Company) from the customers referred to in paragraphs 4(c), 4(d) and 4(e)
above.

The management has, subsequently, based on our report u/s 143(12) of the
Act, reversed and derecognised revenue aggregating to Rs. 16,940.66 lakhs
(including Rs. Nil relating to the Company) and the consequent receivables.
Accordingly, the net revenues recognised from these customers during the year
aggregated to Rs. 37,848.34 lakhs and the outstanding receivables as at 31st
March, 2019 is Rs. 9,382.13 lakhs (includes balances of Rs. 1,022.36
lakhs outstanding even as at 31st March, 2018).

 

In the
absence of complete information regarding the proof of services rendered,
efforts expended, basis of revenue recognition and reversal / derecognition,
and in view of our observations in paragraphs 4(c), 4(d) and 4(e) above in
respect of these customers, and inconsistencies in the bank statements referred
in paragraph 4(a) above, we are unable to conclude on the appropriateness /
correctness / completeness / validity of the net revenue recognised, compliance
with the recognition and measurement of revenue required under the Indian
Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 115 – Revenue from Contracts with Customers and
the corresponding receivables in the Statement.

 

The Group
has also not carried out an evaluation of the expected credit loss required
under Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 109 – Financial Instruments
for the outstanding trade receivables as at 31st March, 2019 and
therefore we are unable to comment on the adequacy and appropriateness of the
provision made against the trade receivable balances as at 31st
March, 2019.

 

8.       Procurement of services and trade
payables

8.1.    Based on the master service
agreement with the external service provider, referred to in paragraph 4(f)
above, for technical and referral services to be rendered towards certain
customers, referred to in paragraphs 4(c) and 4(e) above, the Company has recorded
consultancy charges of Rs. 1,706.40 lakhs for the year ended 31st March,
2019 with an outstanding liability of Rs. 1,709.16 lakhs.

 

In the
absence of complete information regarding proof of the services being rendered
by the vendor, and in view of our observations in paragraph 4(f) above in
respect of this vendor, we are unable to conclude on the appropriateness /
correctness / completeness / validity of the expense and the corresponding
liability recorded in the Statement.

 

Further,
the Company has not evaluated the applicability or coverage of such services
under the Goods and Services Tax Regulations and has not accrued / paid the
same. However, in our opinion such tax is payable on those services. The
management has not determined the amount of Goods and Services Tax payable and
any interest thereon. We are unable to conclude on the consequential impact of
the same on the Statement.

 

8.2.    Based on the invoices received from certain vendors, referred to in
paragraph 4(g) above, the Group has for the year ended 31st March,
2019 recorded consultancy charges aggregating Rs. 26,689.45 lakhs, intangible
assets / assets under development of Rs. 22,267.29 lakhs, with an outstanding
liability of Rs. 2,224.43 lakhs as at that date.

 

In the
absence of complete information regarding nature of the services being
rendered, the customers for whom these services were rendered and the nature of
intangible assets being developed, and in view of our observations in paragraph
4(g) above in respect of these vendors, we are unable to conclude on the
appropriateness / correctness / completeness / validity of the expense, the
intangible asset / asset under development and the corresponding liability /
payment recorded in the Statement.

 

9.       Income Taxes

The Group
has recorded tax expenses (net) of Rs. 1,270.57 lakhs during the year ended 31st
March, 2019 and has a net tax asset as at that date of Rs. 3,155.17 lakhs and a
net deferred tax liability of Rs. 731.91 lakhs relating to certain of its
foreign subsidiaries.

 

We have not
been provided with the tax returns filed with regard to its foreign
subsidiaries, reconciliation of the balances considered in the tax returns so
filed with the audited financial statements of the subsidiaries, the tax
position and status of assessments of such subsidiaries, a roll forward to the
deferred tax position as at 31st March, 2019 from 31st
March, 2018 and the workings for the tax provision for the current year.

 

We are
accordingly unable to conclude on the carrying amounts of tax assets and liabilities,
including deferred tax balances, as at 31st March, 2019 as
considered in the Statement. Further, in the absence of the tax returns we have
also not been able to validate if the profits of these subsidiaries considered
in the tax returns and as per the books of accounts provided to us were the
same.

 

10.     Intangible asset capitalisation and
evaluation of impairment, including for goodwill

10.1. The Group has during the year capitalised costs
towards internally generated intangible assets and internally generated
intangible assets under development amounting to Rs. 32,393.80 lakhs (also
refer paragraphs 4(g) and 8.2 above).

 

In the
absence of appropriate documentation as to the nature of these intangible
assets, data to demonstrate the appropriateness of the timing to commence
capitalisation of costs associated with such intangible assets as well as the
basis to demonstrate the costs capitalised in fact were associated with the
intangibles being developed, we are unable to comment on the carrying value of
such intangible assets as at 31st March, 2019.

 

10.2.  The Group has goodwill and acquired
intangibles (net of amortisation) of Rs. 62,800.11 lakhs as at 31st March, 2019.

 

The
management has not provided us with their assessment of any impairment to the
carrying value of such goodwill and other intangible assets. Accordingly, we
are unable to comment on the appropriateness of the carrying value and the
recoverability of such goodwill and other intangible assets as at 31st March,
2019.

 

11.     Business Combinations

The Group
had in the previous year ended 31st March, 2018 completed certain
acquisitions or had paid advances towards proposed acquisitions, wherein we
noted that:

11.1. During the previous year ended 31st
March, 2018, the Group had recorded an amount of USD 3,304,557 (INR 2,142.01
lakhs) as contingent consideration due to the erstwhile owners of Cornerstone
Advisors Group LLC (‘Cornerstone’) payable upon satisfaction of conditions as
specified in the acquisition agreement. During the current year an amount of
USD 1,747,198 (INR 1,218.85 lakhs) has been paid by the Group to the erstwhile
members of Cornerstone. In the absence of details with respect to satisfaction
of conditions as specified in the acquisition agreement, we are unable to comment
on the amount of contingent consideration that has been paid during the year
and the carrying amount of USD 1,557,359 (Rs. 1,079.56 lakhs) as the liability
towards contingent consideration as at 31st March, 2019. Further,
such consideration has not been fair valued as required under Ind AS 109.

 

11.2. An advance of USD 6,500,000 was paid by one of
the subsidiaries of the Company, during the previous year ended 31st
March, 2018, consequent to a share purchase agreement entered into with a
Seller and a Corporation for acquiring the entire outstanding shares of the
Corporation. In accordance with the said agreement, in the event the closing of
acquisition doesn’t occur within 15 months (i.e., before February, 2019) from
the date of agreement, Seller will retain USD 500,000 as penalty and balance
USD 6,000,000) shall be refunded to the Group within five calendar days.

 

As at 31st
March, 2019 the acquisition as planned was not completed and the management of
the Company has represented that the term of the share purchase agreement has
been extended. In the absence of supporting convincing evidence and our
inability to send direct confirmation request to the Seller and the Corporation
on the revision of the terms including waiver of the penalty, due to not receiving
the communication address to which the confirmation requests were to be sent,
we are unable to comment on the recoverability of the amount of Rs. 4,505.80
lakhs (equivalent to USD 6,500,000) included under Note 9 as ‘advances towards
acquisition’, as at 31st March, 2019 and the consequential impact,
if any, on the Statement.

 

12.     Regulatory compliances

12.1. We are unable to conclude on the consequential
impact, if any, on the operations and the financial performance of the Group
arising out of the following matters pertaining to non-compliance with the
provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and notifications issued by the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), as applicable:

(a)      In the absence of appropriate processes for
identifying related parties in view of the matters reported in paragraph 4(b)
above, we are unable to comment on the accuracy and completeness of the related
parties identified and disclosed by the Company including compliance with
obtaining necessary approvals, as required, from those charged with governance.

 

(b)     It was noted that in the case of two of the
directors who were re-appointed at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) held on 18th
September, 2015 and designated as independent directors (one was also the
Chairman of the Audit Committee and the other a member of the Nomination and
Remuneration Committee and also the Chairman of the Stakeholder Relationship
Committee), they may have ceased to be independent directors under the Act with
effect from 17th November, 2015 and 12th August, 2015, respectively, being the date from when their
relatives were employed either with the Company or its subsidiary. These
directors have been designated as non-independent directors by the Company from
6th September, 2019 and 13th February, 2019,
respectively.

 

Considering
the above, we are unable to opine on the validity of the meetings of the Board
of Directors, Audit Committee, Stakeholder Relationship Committee and
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, in regards to the quorum in such meetings
and the resolutions approved in those meetings from the aforesaid AGM date
until the dates when the Company designated them as non-independent directors.

 

12.2. We are unable to conclude on the consequential
impact, if any, on the Statement arising out of the matters pertaining to
non-compliance by the Holding Company with the applicable master directions /
notifications issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and provisions of the
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, as amended, in respect of the following:

 

(a)      The Holding Company has export trade
receivables and foreign currency interest receivable aggregating Rs. 3,037.28
lakhs and Rs. 336.13 lakhs, respectively, including intra-group receivables
which amounts, as at 31st March, 2019, were outstanding for more
than nine months from the invoice date, which is beyond the time limit
stipulated under the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods &
Services) Regulations, 2015, for repatriation of foreign currency receivables.

 

(b)     As at 31st March, 2019 the
Company had not made the necessary intimations to the authorised dealer / RBI
as required under the Master Directions provided by the RBI on Foreign
Investment in India for loan / collaterals / pledge received from the promoter
of the Company, being a resident outside India, amounting to Rs. 1,395.02 lakhs
during the year ended 31st March, 2019.

 

However,
subsequent to the year-end, the Company has made an intimation to the
authorised dealer on 12th July, 2019 and is yet to make an
application for condonation of delay.

 

(c)      It appears that the Holding Company has
provided a corporate guarantee to Columbia Bank for a line of credit availed by
two of the subsidiaries in the Group aggregating USD 5,000,000 on 12th
September, 2018. As per the loan sanction document issued by Columbia Bank, the
line of credit was approved by Columbia Bank, based on a representation by the
Managing Director of the Holding Company that the corporate guarantee was
approved by the shareholders of the Holding Company.

 

We have not been provided with minutes of the meeting of the
shareholders referred above approving such corporate guarantee. Further, the
Company has also not intimated the authorised dealer for providing such
corporate guarantee as required under the Master Directions provided by the RBI
on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly-Owned
Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad.

 

12.3. Further, the Holding Company has not carried
out a comprehensive review of compliance with laws and regulations and
therefore we are unable to comment if there are any other instances of
non-compliance with laws and regulations and any consequential impact thereof.

 

13.     Information / clarifications requested
but not provided

During the
course of our audit, we have requested from the management various information
and clarifications that were required for the purposes of our audit. In
addition to the information and clarifications pending in respect of the
matters described in paragraphs 4 to 12 above, information, inter alia,
relating to assessment of how the revenue recognised by the Group was in
compliance with the provisions of Ind AS 115, documentation supporting
evaluation of expected credit losses as at 31st March, 2019,
information of payroll costs recognised in some of the subsidiaries,
confirmation of balances from customers, vendors and other parties, etc., are
also pending to be provided to / received by us. In view of such pending
information, we have not been able to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to
conclude on those matters to express an opinion on the Statement.

 

14.     Book Entries

In view of
the matters described in paragraphs 4, 6.3, 7, 8, 10 and 13 of the Basis for
Disclaimer of Opinion section of our report, we are unable to state if any of
the transactions referred to in those paragraphs were represented by mere book
entries.

 

15.     Use of going concern assumption

In view of
the matters reported in paragraphs 4 to 14 above, and in the absence of
reliable cash flow projections by the management, and any consequential impact
of those matters on the Statement and operations of the Group, we are unable to
comment on the appropriateness of the going concern assumption adopted by the
management in the preparation of the Statement.

16.     The Statement includes the results of the
following entities:

(i)     8K Miles Software Services Limited (‘the
Parent’)

(ii)     8K Miles Software Services Inc. USA, the
Subsidiary

(iii)    8K Miles Health Cloud Inc. USA, the
Wholly-Owned Subsidiary

(iv)    8K Miles Software Services FZE UAE, the
Wholly-Owned Subsidiary

(v)   Mentor
Minds Solutions & Services Inc. USA, the Wholly-Owned Subsidiary

(vi)    Nexage Technologies USA Inc., the Step-down
Subsidiary

(vii)   Cornerstone Advisors Group LLC, the Step-down Subsidiary

(viii) Serj Solutions Inc. USA, the Step-down
Subsidiary

 

17.     Because of the significance
of the matters described in paragraphs 4 to 15 above, we have not been able to
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for an audit
opinion as to whether the Statement:

a.       is
presented in accordance with the requirements of Regulation 33 of the SEBI
(Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, as
modified by Circular No. CIR/CFD/FAC/62/2016 dated 5th July, 2016;
and

b.      gives a true and fair view in conformity with the aforesaid Indian
Accounting Standards and other accounting principles generally accepted in
India of the net profit, total comprehensive income and other financial
information of the Group for the year ended 31st March, 2019.

 

The BCAJ
reader can read Management Response on Auditor’s Opinion in the annual report
of the company.

 

 

 

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Members,

A lot has been written and said about the impact of technology on our
lives. We often read about how technology will influence every aspect of our
lives. Technology used in a positive way leads to innovations, which in turn
result in an improved and enhanced lifestyle and better standard of living.
This improves the quality of life, fuels investments and if handled wisely
could even create employment opportunities. Technology has changed the way we
live, behave and interact, both at work and at home. It has changed the way we
communicate, the way we entertain ourselves, the way we seek information and
much more. On the flip side, technology has made a number of traditional jobs
redundant, raising a fear that machines and automation will replace low and
semi-skilled workers and newer technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI)
will be a threat to skilled workers. The new advancements are forcing people to
continuously update their knowledge to stay relevant and productive in this
competitive world.

 

In the midst of all the debates on the influence of technology, I was
very happy to come across a very comforting report about the Chicago-based
aircraft maker Boeing. Boeing is said to be dumping one of its most ambitious
automation projects of using advanced and sophisticated robot technology to
build two main fuselage sections for its 777 jetliners and an upgraded version,
the 777X. Boeing will now rely on skilled mechanics to manually insert
fasteners into holes drilled along the circumference of the airplanes. This is
so because the manual solution has proven more reliable, requiring less work by
hand and less rework, than what the robots were capable of doing. This proves a
point, that however tempting it may be to trust automation and technology,
there are and always will be certain areas where technology can’t match the
dexterity, creativity and precision of the human mind, hand and eye. This
debate will always go on, but I strongly believe that humans, human skills and
emotions can never be replaced by technology. Humans remain one up against
machines!

 

Mistakes: A mistake ‘is an action,
decision, or judgement that produces an unwanted or unintentional result.’ We
are all humans and we all make mistakes. So the best solution is not to try and
hide or disown your mistake, but to face it head on. Depending on the nature of
a mistake, it is more important to acknowledge this fact and apologise (if
needed), introspect over the reasons, learn from it and ensure that it does not
happen again.

Everyone makes mistakes and everyone deserves a second chance. Some
mistakes have little or no significance and can actually be a great learning
experience. But some mistakes may have huge ramifications and may involve a
huge cost not just financially but on relationships and on emotional
well-being. As mentioned earlier it is vital to learn from mistakes and have
the courage to own up to them. Here are examples of some well-known
personalities who have spoken about and owned up mistakes made by them:

 

a)   Bill Gates has said that ‘his
greatest mistake ever’, reportedly worth US$400 billion, was not to create
Android at Microsoft.

b)   Mark Zuckerberg said that ‘one
of the biggest mistakes’ of Facebook was not digging deeper into the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, in which the data mining firm misused data to try and
influence the elections, which caused a huge public outcry and more than US$100
billion was knocked off Facebook’s market capitalisation.

c)   Ace investor Warren Buffett
admitted that his decision to take control of Berkshire Hathaway was a
‘monumentally stupid decision’ taken only because it was available cheap. He
kept on investing in Berkshire’s textile mills, which eventually shut
operations in 1985.

d)   Chinese e-commerce giant
Alibaba’s founder and CEO Jack Ma reportedly said ‘My biggest mistake was I
made Alibaba’. He was just trying to do a small business but it grew and
brought on greater responsibility and more trouble. He became so busy that he
did not have personal time.

e)   Ratan Tata, Chairman of Tata
Trusts and former head of Tata Sons, said his greatest mistake was branding the
Nano car as the cheapest instead of the ‘most affordable’, which was the
intention of the company. Branding it as the cheapest created negative impact on
the market.

 

Well, we must learn from the mistakes of others because we can’t live
long enough to make them all ourselves!

 

With
Best Regards,

 

 

 

CA Manish Sampat

President

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

4.  Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (New Delhi) vs.
Maruti Suzuki India Limited (2019) 416 ITR 613 (SC)

 

Assessment
– Notice to non-existing person – Despite the fact that the AO was informed of
the amalgamating company having ceased to exist as a result of the approved
scheme of amalgamation, the jurisdictional notice was issued only in its name –
The basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was fundamentally at odds with the
legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved
scheme of amalgamation – Participation in the proceedings by the appellant in
the circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel against law – Not a
procedural violation of the nature adverted to in section 292B

 

The assessee was a joint
venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation and Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL)
in which the shareholding was 70% and 30%, respectively. It was known upon
incorporation as Suzuki Metal India Limited. Subsequently, with effect from 8th
June, 2005, its name was changed to Suzuki Powertrain India Limited (SPIL).

 

Some time later, on 28th
November, 2012, the assessee filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2012-13
declaring an income of Rs. 212,51,51,156. The return of income was filed in the
name of SPIL (no amalgamation having taken place on the relevant date).

 

On 29th
January, 2013, a scheme for amalgamation of SPIL and MSIL was approved by the
High Court with effect from 1st April, 2012. The terms of the
approved scheme provided that all liabilities and duties of the transferor
company would stand transferred to the transferee company without any further
act or deed. On the scheme coming into effect, the transferor was to stand
dissolved without winding up. The scheme stipulated that the order of
amalgamation would not be construed as an order granting exemptions from the
payment of stamp duty or taxes or any other charges, if payable, in accordance
with the law.

 

Accordingly,
on 2nd April 2013, MSIL intimated the AO about the amalgamation. The
case was selected for scrutiny with the issuance of a notice u/s 143(2) on 26th
September, 2013 followed by a notice u/s 142(1) to the amalgamating
company.

 

On 22nd
January, 2016, the Transfer Pricing Officer passed an order u/s 92CA(3)
determining the Arm’s Length Price of royalty at 3% and making an adjustment of
Rs. 78.97 crores in respect of royalty paid by the assessee for the relevant
previous year.

 

A draft
assessment order was then passed on 11th March, 2016 in the name of
Suzuki Powertrain India Limited (amalgamated with Maruti Suzuki India Limited).
The draft assessment order sought to increase the total income of the assessee
by Rs. 78.97 crores in accordance with the order of the TPO in order to ensure
that the international transaction with regard to the payment of royalty to the
associated enterprises is at arm’s length.

 

MSIL
participated in the assessment proceedings of the erstwhile amalgamating
entity, SPIL, through its authorised representatives and officers.

 

On 12th
April, 2016, MSIL filed an appeal before the Dispute Resolution Panel as
successor in interest of the erstwhile SPIL, since amalgamated. Form 35A was
verified by Mr. Kenichi Ayukawa, MD and CEO of MSIL. The grounds of appeal did
not allude to the objection that the draft assessment order was passed in the
name of SPIL (amalgamated with MSIL), or that this defect would render the
assessment proceedings invalid.

 

The DRP, on 14th
October, 2016, issued its order in the name of MSIL (as successor in interest
of the erstwhile SPIL, since amalgamated).

But the final assessment
order was passed on 31st October, 2016 in the name of SPIL
(amalgamated with MSIL), making an addition of Rs. 78.97 crores to the total
income of the assessee. While preferring an appeal before the Tribunal, the
assessee raised the objection that the assessment proceedings were continued in
the name of the non-existent or merged entity SPIL and that the final assessment
order which was also issued in the name of a non-existent entity, would thus be
invalid.

 

By its decision dated 6th
April, 2017 the Tribunal set aside the final assessment order on the ground
that it was void ab initio, having been passed in the name of a
non-existent entity by the AO. The decision of the Tribunal was affirmed in an
appeal u/s 260A by the Delhi High Court on 9th January, 2018
following its earlier decision in the case of the assessee for the A.Y.
2011-12.

 

On further appeal by the Revenue,
the Supreme Court observed that while assessing the merits of the rival
submissions, it was necessary at the outset to advert to certain significant
facets of the present case:

 

First, the income which is
sought to be subjected to the charge of tax for A.Y. 2012-13 was the income of
the erstwhile entity (SPIL) prior to amalgamation. This was on account of a
transfer pricing addition of Rs. 78.97 crores;

Second, under the approved
scheme of amalgamation, the transferee had assumed the liabilities of the
transferor company including tax liabilities;

Third, the consequence of
the scheme of amalgamation approved u/s 394 of the Companies Act 1956 was that
the amalgamating company ceased to exist (Saraswati Industrial Syndicate
Ltd. [282 ITR 186]);

Fourth, upon the
amalgamating company ceasing to exist, it cannot be regarded as a person u/s
2(31) of the Act, 1961 against whom assessment proceedings can be initiated or
an order of assessment passed;

Fifth, a notice u/s 143(2)
was issued on 26th September, 2013 to the amalgamating company,
SPIL, which was followed by a notice to it u/s 142(1);

Sixth, prior to the date on
which the jurisdictional notice u/s 143(2) was issued, the scheme of
amalgamation had been approved on 29th January, 2013 by the High
Court of Delhi under the Companies Act, 1956 with effect from 1st April,
2012;

Seventh, the AO assumed
jurisdiction to make an assessment in pursuance of the notice u/s 143(2). The
notice was issued in the name of the amalgamating company in spite of the fact
that on 2nd April, 2013 the amalgamated company MSIL had addressed a
communication to the AO intimating to him the fact of the amalgamation.

 

According
to the Supreme Court, in the above conspectus of the facts, the initiation of
assessment proceedings against an entity which had ceased to exist was void ab
initio
.

 

The
Court noted that in Spice Entertainment, a Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court (2012) 280 ELT 43 (Delhi) dealt with the
question as to whether an assessment in the name of a company which has been
amalgamated and has been dissolved is null and void, or whether the framing of
an assessment in the name of such company is merely a procedural defect which
can be cured. The High Court held that upon a notice u/s 143(2) being
addressed, the amalgamated company had brought the fact of the amalgamation to
the notice of the AO. Despite this, the AO did not substitute the name of the
amalgamated company and proceeded to make an assessment in the name of a
non-existent company which rendered it void. This, in the view of the High
Court, was not merely a procedural defect. Moreover, the participation by the
amalgamated company would have no effect since there could be no estoppel against law.

 

Following
the decision in Spice Entertainment, the Delhi High Court quashed
the assessment orders which were framed in the name of the amalgamating company
in (i) Dimension Apparels; (ii) Micron Steels; and (iii) Micra India. The Supreme
Court noted the facts in all these three cases.

 

The
Supreme Court further noted that a batch of civil appeals was filed before it
against the decisions of the Delhi High Court, the lead appellant being Spice
Enfotainment.
On 2nd November, 2017 the Supreme Court
dismissed the civil appeals and tagged Special Leave Petitions.

 

It
observed that the doctrine of merger results in the settled legal position that
the judgement of the Delhi High Court stands affirmed by the above decision in
the civil appeals.

 

The
Supreme Court further noted that the order of assessment in the case of the
respondent for A.Y. 2011-12 was set aside on the same ground. This resulted in
a Special Leave Petition by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax – 6,
Delhi. The SLP was dismissed on 16th July, 2018 in view of the order
dated 2nd November, 2017 governing Civil Appeal No. 285 of 2014 in Spice
Enfotainment
and the connected batch of cases. According to the Supreme
Court, although leave was not granted by it, reasons had been assigned by the
Supreme Court for rejecting the SLP. The law declared would attract the
applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution (Kunhayammed, 381 ITR
245).

 

After
considering the contention urged on behalf of the Revenue that a contrary
position emerges from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Skylight
Hospitality LLP (405 ITR 296)
which was affirmed on 6th April,
2018 by the Supreme Court, it held that there was no conflict between the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Spice Enfotainment (dated 2nd
November, 2017) and in Skylight Hospitality LLP (dated 6th April,
2018).

 

Referring
to the provisions of section 292B of the Income-tax Act, the Supreme Court held
that in this case the notice u/s 143(2) under which jurisdiction was assumed by
the AO was issued to a non-existent company. The assessment order was issued
against the amalgamating company. This was a substantive illegality and not a
procedural violation of the nature adverted to in section 292B.

 

The
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that in the present case, despite the fact
that the AO was informed of the amalgamating company having ceased to exist as
a result of the approved scheme of amalgamation, the jurisdictional notice was
issued only in its name. The basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was
fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity
ceases to exist upon approval of the scheme of amalgamation. Participation in
the proceedings by the appellant in the circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel
against law. This position now holds the field in view of the judgement of a
Co-ordinate Bench which dismissed the appeal of the Revenue in Spice
Enfotainment
on 2nd November, 2017. The decision in Spice
Enfotainment
had been followed in the case of the respondent while
dismissing the Special Leave Petition for A.Y. 2011-12. Thus, there was no
reason to take a different view.

 

For the
above reasons, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and accordingly
dismissed it. 

 

Section 37 of the Act and Rule 9A of IT Rules, 1962 – Business expenditure – capital or revenue expenditure – Expenditure incurred on account of abandoned teleserial – Revenue expenditure

23. CIT vs. Prasad Productions; 407 ITR
541 (Mad):
  Date of order: 4th April,
2018
A. Y. 2002-03


Section 37 of the Act and Rule 9A of IT
Rules, 1962 – Business expenditure – capital or revenue expenditure –
Expenditure incurred on account of abandoned teleserial – Revenue expenditure


The following question was
raised before the Madras High Court in appeal filed by the Revenue:


“Whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the write off
of expenditure incurred in respect of a teleserial that was abandoned could be
treated as business expenditure during the relevant assessment year, contrary
to the provisions of rule 9A of the Income-tax Rules?”
 


The Madras High Court
decided the appeal in favour of the assessee and held as under:


“i)    The issue as to whether the cost of production of an abandoned
teleserial/feature film shall be treated as revenue expenditure or capital
expenditure has to be decided as per the circular issued by the CBDT in
Circular No. 16 of 2015 dated 06/10/2015, wherein it is stated that the cost of
production of an abandoned feature film is to be treated as revenue expenditure
and allowed as per the provisions of section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.


ii)    This circular was taken note of by the Division Bench of this
court in Tiruvengadam Investments Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (2016) 95 CCH 24 (Mad).
Though the circular pertains to a feature film, we find that there cannot be
any distinction between teleserial and feature film as the circular deals with
the aspects regarding to the cost of production of a film. Hence, Circular No.
16 of 2015 dated 06/10/2015 has full application to the facts of the present
case.


iii)    The appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the substantial
question of law as framed is answered in favour of the assessee and against the
Revenue.”

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear Members,


Immediately after the
completion of the deadline for transfer pricing audits, we now have one more
deadline for uploading of GST Audit Reports by end of December. This would be
the first time that the members would be undertaking the assignments for GST Audit
for their clients. While the statutorily prescribed GST Audit Report primarily
anchors itself around the auditors providing a true and correct view of various
reconciliations listed in the Format, the Technical Guide suggests a much
larger involvement / expectation from the GST Auditors in terms of compliance
with various legal provisions. It is therefore important that the scope of
audit be clearly understood and communicated to the clients at the outset. It
would also be fruitful to have proper engagement letter spelling out this scope
and the inherent limitations of any assurance assignment. Last but not the
least, the fees charged should be commensurate to the work done and the
complexity of the assignment and the risks involved.


While as professionals, we
would gear up for the new responsibility cast upon us, it is also important for
the Government to act fast. Though the formats are prescribed since quite some
time, the portal is still not ready to receive the reports. It would be
appropriate for the Government to expedite this process and also announce an
extension well in advance since the time left for uploading is obviously very
limited.


In a recent judgement, the
Supreme Court held that action can be taken against chartered accountants if their
conduct brings ‘disrepute’ to the profession even if such an action was not
related to professional work. This decision reinforces the extensive regulatory
powers of the Disciplinary Committee of the ICAI in handling various complaints
against the members. At the same time, it acts as a wakeup call for
professionals who are expected to not only ensure that their behavior in the
profession or otherwise is in compliance with laws but also follow accepted
norms of social behaviour.


The year 2018 was a crucial
one for the profession. In the earlier months, the Nirav Modi Scam brought to
forefront the expectations of various stakeholders from the profession. As more
and more financial failures came to limelight, the role of chartered
accountants was widely discussed in the media reports. In the meantime, NFRA as
an independent regulator to oversee the auditing profession was also set up.
While we may have our own lines of defence, it is also time to wake up to the
expectations of the stakeholders.


It is in the above context
that the Council Elections become very important. I am sure that each one of
you will go out to vote for ICAI elections. It may also be useful to make the
best use of the preferential voting mechanism and vote for as many deserving
candidates in orders of preference.


The year 2018 is about to
end, it’s time to take stock of all that was good and relish those memories. It
is also time to take stock of all that did not end up well and analyse the
reasons for the same. If required, it could also be an opportunity to
strategise and find solutions for improvements in the future. Here’s wishing
You All a Merry Christmas and a Happy and Joyous New Year-2018! I urge members
to take a well-deserved break and spend quality time with their near and dear
ones to start afresh with renewed vigour for the New Year.


Yours truly

 


 

CA.
Sunil Gabhawalla

President

 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GST

NOTIFICATIONS

(a) Extension of filing GSTR9/9C – Notification No. 80/2020-Central
Tax dated 28th October, 2020

By the above
Notification the due dates for filing GSTR9/9C for the year 2018-2019 have been
extended till 31st December, 2020.

 

(b) Implementation of amendment – Notification No. 81/2020-Central
Tax dated 10th November, 2020

The Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019 has made changes in section 39 of the CGST Act which relate to prescribing
of requirements about filing returns. The changes are made by section 97(2)(b)
of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 and the said section provided for prescribing
the date for activating amendments. By the above Notification the amendments
effected by section 97 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 are brought in
operation from 10th November, 2020.

 

(c) New Rules for inward / outward supplies and returns –
Notification No. 82/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020, read
with corrigendum dated 13th November, 2020

The GST Department
now wants to implement certain new provisions / requirements for return filing,
particularly for persons having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores. The
overall scheme is that registered persons having turnover up to Rs. 5 crores
can file quarterly returns in Form GSTR3B, with invoice furnishing facility.
However, they will be required to pay tax for the first two months of the
quarter as per the scheme of payment. This is known as the QRMP scheme. The
amendments in Rules by the above Notification are mainly to accommodate the
requirements of the above scheme, with other general amendments. By this
Notification, new Rules are inserted / changes in existing Rules are effected.
An indicative gist of changes in Rules can be noted as under:

 

(i) Rule 59 – An invoice furnishing facility (IFF) is introduced
for the persons liable to file quarterly returns under the QRMP scheme. Now
such quarterly return filers can file selective invoice-wise outward supply to
registered persons on monthly basis for the first two months of a quarter. The
said details can be filed for cumulative portal up to Rs. 50 lakhs in each
month and it can be filed till the 13th of the respective succeeding
month. The supplies included in IFF should not again be included in the
quarterly GSTR1. The details uploaded by IFF should include invoice-wise
interstate and intra-state supplies made to registered persons and debit or
credit notes issued during the relevant month for invoices issued previously.
The above changes are effective from 1st January, 2021.

 

(ii) Rule 60 is substituted. The Rule now provides the manner of
ascertaining inward supplies by recipients. Accordingly, the details of outward
supplies furnished by the suppliers in Form GSTR1 or using IFF, etc., will be
made available to recipients in respective Part A of GSTR2A, Form GSTR4A or
GSTR6A, as the case may be. Sub-Rules are also provided for submitting details
by various categories of suppliers or tax deducted at source or tax collected
at source.

 

After input as
above from various sources, an auto-drafted statement containing details of ITC
eligible to recipients will be generated in Form GSTR2B. GSTR2B is newly
inserted by this amendment and it is in the form of a statement. The whole
mechanism will apply from 1st January, 2021.

 

(iii)  Sub-Rule (6) has
been inserted in Rule 61. Normally, registered persons are liable to file
returns within 20 days from the end of return period; however, relaxation is
provided in case of persons having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores in the
previous financial year and whose principal place of business is in the state
of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, the Union Territories of Daman and Diu
and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry, Andaman and Nicobar islands or
Lakshadweep. Such persons can file returns in Form GSTR3B for the period from
October, 2020 to March, 2021 within 22 days from the end of the respective
month.

Similarly, persons
having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores in previous year but whose
principal place of business is situated in the states of Himachal Pradesh,
Punjab, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West
Bengal, Jharkhand or Odisha, or the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir,
Ladakh, Chandigarh and Delhi, can file such returns in Form GSTR3B for the
period from October, 2020 to March, 2021 within 24 days from the end of the
respective month.

 

The above splitting
appears to be with the intention of avoiding of load on the last date on the
GST Network.

 

(iv)  From 1st January,
2021, Rule 61 is substituted. The return in Form GSTR3B is required to be filed
within 20 days from the end of the respective month. However, for quarterly
filers it can be filed within 22 days or 24 days as per the state in which the
principal place of business is situated. The Table of such segregation
is as under:

 

Sr. No.

Class of registered persons

Due date

1.

Registered persons whose principal place
of business is in the states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh,
the Union Territories of Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry,
Andaman and Nicobar Islands or Lakshadweep

Within the 22nd day of the
month succeeding such quarter

2.

Registered persons whose principal place
of business is in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand,
Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West Bengal, Jharkhand
or Odisha, the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh, Chandigarh or
Delhi

Within the 24th day of the
month succeeding such quarter

 

The registered
person filing Form 3B on monthly basis or quarterly basis should also discharge
tax liability in such return within such time as applicable to filing of
return.

 

However, as
mentioned above, there will now be a QRMP scheme for persons having aggregate
turnover up to Rs. 5 crores wherein for first two months
payment of amounts stated in section 39(7) of the CGST Act will be
required to be made within 25 days of the respective month. The payments are
required to be made in PMT-06.

Any claim of refund
will be considered only after the return in Form GSTR3B of the respective
quarter is filed.

 

(v)   New Rule
61A
is inserted. As per
proviso to section 39(1), persons opting for QRMP should indicate their
preference electronically on common portal within the first day of the second
month of the previous quarter and the last day of the first month of the
current quarter concerned. The option so conveyed should continue till he
becomes ineligible under the scheme or opts to file monthly returns. The
registered person will be eligible to file his option of quarterly return only
if he has filed last due monthly return on date of furnishing the option. The
option can also be exercised quarter–wise.

 

The person crossing
the turnover of Rs. 5 crores in the current year will be out of the scheme and
such person should start filing monthly returns from the first month of the
quarter succeeding the quarter in which the turnover so exceeds.

 

Though the stated
object of providing the new QRMP scheme is to simplify the return filing for
small dealers having aggregate turnover up to Rs. 5 crores, but the scheme
appears to be much more complex and complicated. The full details of the scheme
are explained in Circular 143/2020 referred below.

 

(d)   Due date for filing GSTR1
– Notification No. 83/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020

The due date for
filing GSTR1 by a person filing quarterly return will be the 13th
day from the end of the respective tax period. The above amended position will
apply from 1st January, 2021.

 

(e)   Deeming periodicity –
Notification No. 84/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November, 2020

This Notification provides that registered person/s having aggregate
turnover up to Rs. 5 crores and who have opted for the QRMP scheme shall file
quarterly return in Form GSTR3B from the quarter starting January, 2021.

 

It is again
reiterated that once the limit of aggregate turnover of Rs. 5 crores is
exceeded, such person would not be eligible to file quarterly returns from the
first month of the succeeding quarter.

 

Under this Rule the
following periodicity will be auto-decided.

Sr. No.

Class of registered persons

Due date

1.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of up to Rs. 1.5 crores who have furnished Form GSTR1 on quarterly
basis in the current financial year

Quarterly return

2.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of up to Rs. 1.5 crores who have furnished Form GSTR1 on monthly
basis in the current financial year

Monthly return

3.

Registered persons having aggregate
turnover of more than Rs. 1.5 crores and up to Rs. 5 crores in the preceding
financial year

Quarterly return

 

The person referred
to in column (2) above may change the above default option electronically
during the period from 5th December, 2020 to 31st
January, 2021. If no change is made, then the above periodicity will be final.

 

(f)    Manner of payment for
first two months – Notification No. 85/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By the above Notification,
the Authority seeks to provide the manner of payment in case of registered
persons who opt for the QRMP scheme. In such a case the payment of tax can be
by any of the two methods as under:

(a)   (i) For the first month of the quarter, 35%
of tax liability paid by debiting electronic cash ledger in the return for
previous quarter where quarterly return is furnished. Similarly, 35% for the
second month of the quarter.

       (ii) Tax liability paid by debiting
electronic cash ledger for the last month immediately preceding the quarter
where the return is furnished monthly.

(b)   The other option is of self-assessment
payment. In such a case no payment required in the first month of the quarter
if tax liability of the said month is below the credit available in the
electronic cash / credit ledger or the liability is Nil and in the second month
also if the balance in cash / credit is adequate to cover cumulative tax
liability of the first two months or liability is Nil. The above provisions are
applicable from 1st January, 2021.

 

(g)   Rescinding of
Notification No. 76/2020 – Notification No. 86/2020-Central Tax dated 10th
November, 2020 read with corrigendum dated 13th November, 2020

By this
Notification, the earlier Notification No. 76/2020-Central Tax dated 15th
October, 2020 is rescinded. The Notification No. 76/2020 was regarding
extension of due date for persons situated in different states. Since the said
issue is now covered by Rule 61(6) above, the Notification No. 76/2020 is
rescinded.

(h)   Extension of due date for
GSTR04 – Notification No. 87/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By the above
Notification the due date for filing GSTR04 about job work for the quarter
July, 2020 to September, 2020 is extended till 30th November, 2020.

 

(i)    Reduction in monetary
limit for E-invoicing – Notification No. 88/2020-Central Tax dated 10th November,
2020

By this
Notification the monetary limit for following E-invoicing is reduced from Rs.
500 crores to Rs. 100 crores from 1st January, 2021. Thus, the
E-invoicing scheme is now applicable, with effect from 1st January,
2021, to persons having aggregate annual turnover of Rs. 100 crores.

 

CIRCULARS

Clarification about QRMP scheme – Circular No. 143/13/2020-GST dated
10th November, 2020

The CBIC has issued
the above Circular in which detailed clarifications about the provisions
related to the quarterly return monthly payment scheme (QRMP) are explained.

 

ADVANCE RULINGS

Co-operative Housing Society – Liability under GST

M/s Apsara Co-operative Housing Society (MAH/GST/AAAR/RS-SK/28/2020-21
Dated 5th November, 2020) (Mah.)

This was an appeal
from an advance ruling order dated 17th March, 2020. The above
society was administrating the property and for this it collected contributions
from the members. The society filed an advance ruling application before the
AAR contesting that it is not in business and that the contribution collected
is not consideration in response to any supply, hence it is not liable under
the GST provisions. It was contended that the society is run on the common
principle of mutuality. There are no two entities to constitute supply. Recent
judgments were also cited. However, rejecting all arguments, the AAR held that
the society is liable to GST.

 

The society had
also presented a sample invoice regarding collecting contributions and further
posed a question about the correctness of charging GST in the invoice. The
learned AAR had refrained from giving a ruling on the said question on the
ground that it was not within the scope of section 97(2) of the CGST Act.

 

In its appeal before the AAAR, the society made the following
arguments:

  •    That the AAR has failed to
    consider the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State
    of West Bengal vs. Calcutta Club Limited Civil Appeal No. 4189 of 2009 dated 3rd
    October, 2019
    , though it was cited before the AAR.
  •     That the AAR has based its
    ruling merely on the Circulars and Notifications issued by the CBIC and wrongly
    arrived at the conclusion that the Government intends to levy tax on societies.
    There is no independent finding and correct determination.
  •     The contention that the
    society is not covered within the definition of ‘business’ and ‘consideration’
    was reiterated. It was again emphasised that there are no two distinct persons
    to constitute supply.
  •     Citing the AAR in the case
    of M/s Lions Club of Poona Kothrud and M/s Rotary Club of
    Mumbai Western Elite
    , it was contended that the contribution collected
    from members is for meeting administrative expenses and hence, as held in the
    above ruling, the society is also not liable under GST.
  •     Various judgments were
    cited to further support the contention of applicability of the principle of
    mutuality in the case of the society.
  •     An attempt was made to
    distinguish between commercial and housing societies. Since charges in case of
    a housing society are not optional, it was contended that such society cannot
    be covered under GST.
  •     In respect of non-deciding
    of the question about correctness of liability in the sample invoice, it was
    contended that the said question is covered by section 97(2) of the CGST Act.
    The said section provides about deciding liability under GST and hence the
    question posed is well covered within the scope of the said section.

 

Submission by
respondents:

  •    On behalf of the Revenue it
    was submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club Ltd.
    is not applicable as the facts and the provisions are different.
  •     It was further submitted
    that all forms of supply are covered in the definition of ‘supply’ and hence
    the scope is wide.
  •     Revenue submitted that the
    society charges are towards providing different facilities as given in the
    objects and bye-laws and hence there is supply as well as consideration.
  •     The members of the society
    and the society itself are two distinct entities and the contention put forth
    by the appellant society that it is one entity is fallacious.
  •     Similarly, the
    applicability of other rulings cited by the appellant society were disputed.
  •     It was also submitted that
    profit motive or pecuniary benefits are immaterial for deciding the issue.
  •     The ruling of the AAR about
    non-deciding of liability was also defended on the ground that the AR is not
    supposed to compute the liability.

 

Observations of
the AAAR:

The AAAR considered
the above cross-submission. The main issue about mutuality has been rejected by
the AAAR with the following observations:

 

‘20. The
appellant has filed a rejoinder and in it has again referred to the
Calcutta Club judgment (Supra). We
have already in detail distinguished the judgment. The appellant has referred
to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of
Laghu
Udyog Bharti [1999-6-SCC (418)(SC)]
to
drive home the point that Notifications and Circulars cannot go beyond the
charging provision. It has already been discussed in this order as to how the
definition of “business” covers supply by a club to its members. The definition
of “supply” under the CGST Act section 7(1) refers to the words “supply by a
person” and the definition of “person” under the CGST Act includes at 9(f) “an
association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not,
in India or outside India”. Thus, as said earlier, the provisions are adequate
enough to say that the supply by clubs / society is taxable. The appellant has
further attempted to distinguish between a commercial society and a
co-operative society and has argued that the appellant society is not charging
any charges to its members for allowing the use of any of the facilities and
the payment of the charges is not optional but obligatory. We do not see how
this argument can be of any help to the appellant. The society takes
maintenance from its members as it provides a service. The fact that the
payment is obligatory does not change the nature of the consideration. The
society maintains the premises, looks after the day-to-day maintenance of –
lifts, stairwell, security, car parking, manages the staff / property in order
to ensure the smooth functioning and charges for it. It cannot be therefore
said that no services are provided.’

 

Further, for the
reference made to the intention of the Legislature, the following observation
is made:

 

‘22. We would
also like to explore the intention of the Legislature on this aspect as to
whether the society charges are liable to GST or not. For this purpose, we
would refer to the clause (c) of SI. 77 of the Notification No. 12/2017-CT
(Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 as amended by the Notification No.
2/2018-CT (Rate) dated 25th January, 2018, which stipulates that the
service by an unincorporated body or a non-profit entity registered under any
law for the time being in force, to its own members by way of reimbursement of
charges or share of contribution up to an amount of Rs. 7,500 per month per
member for sourcing of goods or services from a third party for the common use
of its members in a housing society or a residential complex is exempt from the
levy of GST. Thus, it can clearly be inferred from the provisions of the
aforesaid Notification that any amount, exceeding Rs. 7,500 per month per
member, charged by the housing society from its members for the supply of goods
or services for the common use of its members, would be subject to GST provided
that the aggregate turnover of such society in a financial year exceeds Rs. 20
lakhs. It is noteworthy that the said exemption limit of Rs. 7,500 would not
include the statutory dues / taxes, such as property tax, water tax,
electricity charges, collected by the society from its members on behalf of the
statutory authorities.’

 

The AAAR rejected
the other contentions based on specific provisions about ‘society’ in the CGST
Act, including for ‘business’, ‘consideration’, ‘supply’ and ‘person’.

 

Accordingly, the
AAAR confirmed the order of the AAR on the above issue.

 

The other question
about non-deciding liability as per the sample invoice is also approved by the
AAAR observing that the scope u/s 97(2) of CGST Act is to decide the liability
to GST but not computation thereof.

 

Thus, the AAAR
confirmed the order of the AAR in toto and rejected the appeal.

 

Penal
interest – liability under GST

Bajaj Finance Ltd. (Order No. MAH/AAAR/SS-RJ/24A/2018-19 dated 12th December, 2019.

The issue in the
above Rectification order passed by the AAAR was from the original AAAR order
dated 24th March, 2019. The appeal before the Maharashtra AAAR arose
from the Advance Ruling order passed by the Maharashtra AAR dated 6th
August, 2018.

 

The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant company is engaged in
the finance business. Finance is provided by way of an agreement and it is
recovered from customers by monthly equated instalments or EMIs. The EMI
consists of principal loan amount and interest. The agreement also provides for
levy of interest for late payment of EMIs. This is referred to as penal
interest.

The question posed
before the AAR was whether such penal interest is liable to tax under GST. The
argument was that such penal interest is additional interest and of the same
nature as original interest. In view of this, it was contended before the AAR
that it is exempt vide entry at Serial No. 27 in Notification No.
12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. However, the learned AAR
held that penal interest is for tolerating an act and covered as a separate
service under entry 5(e) of Schedule II of the CGST Act and as such liable to
GST.

 

The matter was
taken to the AAAR which in its original order dated 24th March, 2019
upheld that order of the AAR dated 6th August, 2018.

 

Thereafter, the
appellant company M/s Bajaj Finance Ltd. filed a Rectification application
bearing number as quoted above. The main plank of argument for Rectification of
appeal order was that subsequent to the above appeal order dated 24th
March, 2019, the CBIC has issued Circular bearing No. CBEC-102-21/2019-GST
dated 28th June, 2019.

 

In the said
Circular, issues about taxability of interest in different situations had been
clarified. The contents of the Circular are reproduced in the Rectification
order which are also reproduced below for ready reference.

 

‘Various
representations have been received from the trade and industry regarding
applicability of GST on delayed payment charges in case of late payment of Equated
Monthly Instalments (EMI). An EMI is a fixed amount paid by a borrower to a
lender at a specified date every calendar month. EMIs are used to pay off both
interest and principal every month, so that over a specified period the loan is
fully paid off along with interest. In cases where the EMI is not paid at the
scheduled time, there is a levy of additional / penal interest on account of
delay in payment of EMI.

 

2.    Doubts have been raised regarding the
applicability of GST on additional / penal interest on the overdue loan, i.e.,
whether it would be exempt from GST in terms of Sl. No. 27 of Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 or such penal
interest would be treated as consideration for liquidated damages [amounting to
a separate taxable supply of services under GST covered under entry 5(e) of
Schedule II of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter
referred to as the CGST Act), i.e., “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from
an act, or to tolerate an act or a situation, or to do an act”].
In order to ensure uniformity in the implementation of the
provisions of the law, the Board, in exercise of its powers conferred by
section 168(1) of the CGST Act, hereby issues the following clarification.

 

3.    Generally, the following
two transaction options involving EMI are prevalent in the trade:

Case – 1: X sells a mobile phone to Y. The cost of
the mobile phone is Rs. 40,000. However, X gives Y an option to pay in
instalments, Rs. 11,000 every month before the 10th day of the following month,
over the next four months (Rs. 11,000 *4 = Rs. 44,000). Further, as per the
contract, if there is any delay in payment by Y beyond the scheduled date, Y
would be liable to pay additional / penal interest amounting to Rs. 500 per
month for the delay. In some instances, X is charging Y Rs. 40,000 for the
mobile and is separately issuing another invoice for providing the service of
extending loan to Y, the consideration for which is the interest of 2.5% per
month and an additional / penal interest amounting to Rs. 500 per month for
each delay in payment.

Case – 2: X
sells a mobile phone to Y. The cost of the mobile phone is Rs. 40,000. Y has
the option to avail a loan at an interest of 2.5% per month for purchasing the
mobile from M/s ABC Ltd. The terms of the loan from M/s ABC Ltd. allow Y a
period of four months to repay the loan and an additional / penal interest @
1.25% per month for any delay in payment.

 

4.    As per the provisions of sub-clause (d) of
sub-section (2) of section 15 of the CGST Act, the value of supply shall
include “interest or late fee or penalty for delayed payment of any
consideration for any supply”. Further, in terms of Sl. No. 27 of Notification
No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 “services by
way of (a) extending deposits, loans or advances insofar as the consideration
is represented by way of interest or discount (other than interest involved in
credit card services)” is exempted. Further, as per clause 2(zk) of the
Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017,
“‘interest’ means interest payable in any manner in respect of any moneys
borrowed or debt incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar right or
obligation) but does not include any service fee or other charge in respect of
the moneys borrowed or debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility which
has not been utilised;”

 

5.    Accordingly,
based on the above provisions, the applicability of GST in both cases listed in
paragraph 3 above would be as follows:

Case 1: As per the provisions of sub-clause (d) of
sub-section (2) of section 15 of the CGST Act, the amount of penal interest is
to be included in the value of supply. The transaction between X and Y is for
supply of taxable goods, i.e., a mobile phone. Accordingly, the penal interest
would be taxable as it would be included in the value of the mobile,
irrespective of the manner of invoicing.

Case 2: The additional / penal interest is charged
for a transaction between Y and M/s ABC Ltd. and the same is getting covered
under Sl. No. 27 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th
June, 2017. Accordingly, in this case the “penal interest” charged thereon on a
transaction between Y and M/s ABC Ltd. would not be subject to GST as the same
would not be covered under Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th
June, 2017. The value of supply of the mobile by X to Y would be Rs. 40,000 for
the purpose of levy of GST.

 

6.    It is
further clarified that the transaction of levy of additional / penal interest
does not fall within the ambit of entry 5(e) of Schedule II of the CGST Act,
i.e., “agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act
or a situation, or to do an act”, as this levy of additional / penal interest
satisfies the definition of “interest” as contained in Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. It is further
clarified that any service fee / charge or any other charges that are levied by
M/s ABC Ltd. in respect of the transaction related to extending deposits, loans
or advances does not qualify to be interest as defined in Notification No.
12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 and accordingly
will not be exempt.

 

7.    It is requested that suitable trade
notices may be issued to publicise the contents of this Circular.’

 

Thus, it was argued
that the Case 2 above covers the case of the appellant. It was further argued
that the above Circular is clarificatory and being beneficial applies
retrospectively. For the said purpose various judgments including in the case
of Suchitra Components Ltd. (208) ELT-321 (SC) were cited before
the AAAR.

 

The learned AAAR
considered the above facts and legal position cited by the appellant and
concurred that the Circular is clarificatory and applies retrospectively. In
light of the clarification given in the above Circular, the AAAR observed that
such penal interest is not intended to be covered by entry 5(e) of Schedule II,
i.e., in the nature of tolerating an act but it is additional interest of the
same nature as original interest.

 

The AAAR modified the appeal order and declared that the penal
interest is not liable to tax under GST.
 

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX

 

1. Extension of deadline
for filing declaration and payment of tax under Vivaad Se Vishwas
Scheme. [Notification No. 85 of 2020 dated 27th October,
2020.]

 

2. Clarifications in
respect of the Direct Tax Vivaad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. [Circular
No. 18/2020 dated 28th October, 2020.]

 

3. CBDT notifies Equalisation
Levy (Amendment) Rules, 2020
; revises Forms for filing statements and
appeals. [Notification No. 87 of 2020 dated 28th October, 2020.]

 

4. Extension of deadline
for filing Income Tax Return, Tax Audit Report and Transfer Pricing Report. [Notification
No. 88 of 2020 dated 29th October, 2020.]

 

5. CBDT authorises CIT to condone the delay in
filing audit report
in Form No. 10BB. [Circular
No. 19/2020 dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

COMPANY LAW

 

I.   COMPANIES ACT, 2013

 

(I) MCA extends minimum residency requirement
relaxation for directors for F.Y. 2020-21
– MCA
relaxes minimum residency requirement of 182 days in a year for resident
directors for F.Y. 2020-21 as well, in view of Covid-19. Clarifies that
‘…non-compliance of minimum residency in India for a period of at least 182
days in a year, by at least one director in every company, under section 149 of
the Companies Act, 2013 shall not be treated as non-compliance for the
financial year 2020-2021 also.’ [MCA General Circular No. 36/2020 dated 20th
October, 2020.]

 

(II)        MCA extends LLP Settlement Scheme, 2020
applicability to documents having due dates 30th November
– MCA extends the date of applicability of the LLP Settlement
Scheme, 2020 to defaulting LLPs to 30th November, 2020 owing to the
large-scale disruption caused by the pandemic. Accordingly, it states that ‘any
“defaulting LLP” is permitted to file belated documents, which were due for
filing till 30th November, 2020 in accordance with the provisions of
this Scheme.’ It adds that if a statement of account and solvency for the F.Y.
2019-2020 has been signed beyond the period of six months from the end of the
financial year but not later than 30th November, 2020, the same
shall not be deemed as non-compliance. [MCA General Circular No. 37/2020
dated 9th November, 2020.]

 

II. SEBI

 

(III) SEBI requires
listed debt security issuers to contribute towards ‘Recovery Expense Fund’
– In order to enable the Debenture Trustee(s) to take prompt action
for enforcement of security in case of ‘default’ in listed debt securities,
SEBI has required the creation of a ‘Recovery Expense Fund’ (REF) by issuers of
debt securities. The REF shall be used in the manner as decided in the meeting
of the holders of debt securities. SEBI has also prescribed the norms for the
manner of creation and operation of REF, utilisation and provision for refund
to the issuer. These provisions shall come into force w.e.f. 1st
January, 2021.
[Circular No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/CRADT/CIR/P/2020/207, dated
22nd October, 2020.]

 

(IV) SEBI
streamlines process for approval of draft Schemes of Arrangement by SEs
– SEBI streamlines the processing of draft Schemes of Arrangement
filed by listed entities with stock exchanges (SEs) to ensure that the
recognised SEs refer the draft Schemes to SEBI only upon being fully convinced
that the listed entity is in compliance with the requisite SEBI norms. SEBI
further states that the amended provisions will be applicable for all the
Schemes filed with the stock exchanges after 17th November, 2020. It
highlights that w.e.f. 3rd November, 2020 steps for listing and
trading in specified securities in relation to the Scheme of Arrangement must
commence within 60 days of receiving the NCLT order approving the Scheme. SEBI
further requires Audit Committees to comment on the viability of the Scheme
from the company’s perspective. SEBI also requires submission of a report from
the Committee of Independent Directors that the draft Scheme is not detrimental
to the shareholders of the listed entity. [SEBI/HO/CFD/DIL1/CIR/P/2020/215
dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

(V) SEBI issues guidelines for Debenture Trustees
(DTs) to perform due diligence for creation of security
– SEBI issues guidelines for
strengthening of DTs’ role to safeguard the interest of investors in debt
securities, for new issues proposed to be listed on or after 1st January,
2021. SEBI further states that to enable the DTs to exercise due diligence
w.r.t. creation of security, the issuer, at the time of entering into the DT
agreement, shall provide information as prescribed. SEBI has cast the duty for
due diligence on DTs. SEBI provides that the DTs shall maintain records and
documents pertaining to due diligence for a minimum period of five years from
redemption of debt securities. SEBI also requires issuers of debt securities to
create charge in favour of the DTs before making application for listing of
debt securities and specifies, ‘The Stock Exchange(s) shall list the debt
securities only upon receipt of a due diligence certificate… from the Debenture
Trustee confirming creation of charge and execution of Debenture Trust Deed.’ [SEBI/HO/MIRSD/CRADT/CIR/P/2020/218
dated 3rd November, 2020.]

 

(VI) SEBI issues
Standard Operating Procedure with respect to imposition of fine and initiation
of action in case of non-compliance of continuous disclosures by issuers of listed
debt securities
– In order to align the SOP for
imposition of fine and initiation of action in case of non-compliance of
continuous disclosures by issuers of the listed securities, SEBI has laid down
that the fine is to be levied by the Stock Exchange (SE) for violation of
various regulations as listed in the Circular. The SE shall disclose on their
website the action(s) taken against the entities for non-compliance(s),
including the details of the respective requirement, amount of fine levied /
action taken, etc. The Circular shall come into effect for compliance period
ending on or after 31st December, 2020. [SEBI/HO/DDHS/DDHS/CIR/P/2020/231
dated 13th November, 2020.]

 

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

 

(A) Guidance
Note on Accounting for Share-based Payments (Revised 2020)
– This is the Revised Guidance Note (GN) applicable for enterprises
that are not required to follow Indian Accounting Standards. The revised GN
deals with share-based payment transactions with employees as well as
non-employees and deals extensively with group-wide share-based payment
transactions. [ICAI Guidance Note issued on 4th November, 2020.]

 

(B) Guidance
Note on Applicability of AS 25 and Measurement of Income Tax Expense for
Interim Financial Reporting (Revised)
– The revised
GN incorporates updated references used in earlier GNs and relevant examples.
It also enlightens about the impact of opinions issued by ICAI on the
preparation of interim financial reports. Pursuant to this revision, ‘Guidance
Note on Applicability of AS 25 to Interim Financial Results’
and ‘Guidance
Note on Measurement of Income Tax Expense for Interim Financial Reporting in
the Context of AS 25’
stand withdrawn. [ICAI Guidance Note issued on 4th
November, 2020.]

 

FEMA

 

(i) The FDI Policy Framework is put up periodically by the Government through the Department for
Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) under the Ministry of Commerce
& Industry. The DPIIT makes these pronouncements on FDI through the
Consolidated FDI Policy Circular. These pronouncements are separately notified
by the Ministry of Finance by amending the FEM(NDI) Rules, 2019 under FEMA. DPIIT
has released a Consolidated FDI Policy which is effective from 15th
October, 2020.
This Policy subsumes and supersedes all past Press Releases
/ Press Notes, Circulars on FDI, Clarifications, etc. In case of any conflict
between the Consolidated FDI Policy and the NDI Rules, the Notifications issued
under FEMA will prevail. [DPIIT File Number 5(2)/2020-FDI Policy dated 15th
October, 2020.]

 

(ii)        DPIIT had vide ‘Press Note 4’
dated 18th September, 2019 brought entities engaged in the news
digital media sector under the FDI regime.

Accordingly, entities engaged in uploading or streaming of news and current
affairs through digital media platforms were permitted to receive FDI up to 26%
under the government approval route. This was a new requirement which resulted
in a few concerns among such entities, chief among which were: that no window
was provided to bring the investment as per the FDI regime; and it was not
clear whether or not entities which are digital news aggregators are covered
because ‘digital media’ was not defined.

 

In response to representations received on these and other concerns,
DPIIT has released a clarification stating that the FDI Policy will apply to
the following Indian entities:

(a)        digital media entities streaming /
uploading news and current affairs on websites, apps or other platforms;

(b)        news agency which gathers, writes and
distributes / transmits news, directly or indirectly, to digital media entities
and / or news aggregators; and

(c)        news aggregator, being an entity which,
using software of web application, aggregates news content from various sources
such as news websites, blogs, podcasts, video blogs, user submitted links,
etc., in one location.

 

A window is now
provided for entities covered in (a) above of one year from the date of this
clarification to align their FDI to the 26% level with approval of the Central
Government.

 

The following
additional conditions have been prescribed:

i)   The majority of the Directors on the Board of
the investee company shall be Indian citizens;

ii)   The CEO shall be an Indian citizen; and

iii) The investee company is
required to obtain security clearance of all foreign personnel likely to be
deployed for more than 60 days in a year by way of appointment, contract or
consultancy or in any other capacity for functioning of the entity prior to
their deployment. In the event of the security clearance of any foreign
personnel being denied or withdrawn for any reasons whatsoever, the investee
entity needs to ensure that the person concerned resigns or his / her services
are terminated forthwith after receiving such directives from the government.

 

Further, it is also
stated that the investee entities, i.e., the Indian entities receiving FDI,
would be responsible to comply with Press Note 4. [DPIIT File No.
5(4)/2019-FDI Policy dated 16th October, 2020.]

 

(iii) RBI has
issued a Notification for regulating posting and collection of margin on specified
derivative contracts.
By this regulation:

A. RBI has prohibited any person other than
Authorised Dealers (ADs) to post and collect margin and receive and pay
interest on margin, posted and collected on their own account or on behalf of
their customers for permitted derivative contracts entered into with a person
resident outside India.

B. Permitted derivative contracts have been
defined to mean Foreign Exchange Derivative Contracts, Interest Rate Derivative
Contracts and Credit Derivative Contracts undertaken in line with their
respective Regulations / Directions. The definition can also cover any other
derivative contract as specified by RBI.

C. Other important terms including ‘Margin’,
‘Derivative’, etc., have been defined specifically for this Notification. [Foreign
Exchange Management (Margin for Derivative Contracts) Regulations, 2020, No.
FEMA 399/RB-2020, dated 23rd October, 2020.]

 

(iv) There are several reports to be filed with RBI under FEMA. RBI
has decided to discontinue 17 returns / reports with a view to improve the ease
of doing business and reduce the cost of compliance.
The discontinued
reports are those that are to be submitted periodically by the AD Banks,
Custodians and FFMCs and are listed in the Annexure to the Circular. [A.P. (DIR
Series) Circular No. 05 dated 13th November, 2020.]

 

(v)        The RBI has now
issued a Circular in respect of Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA

whereby the following changes have been made:

(a)        The power to compound certain
contraventions under Notifications dealing with investment in India – FEMA 20
and FEMA 20(R) – was delegated to the Regional Offices / Sub-offices of the
RBI. This delegation of powers was superseded by the introduction of the NDI
Rules in October, 2019. The Circular now updates the reference to various
regulations as per the earlier Notifications to bring it in line with the NDI
Rules.

(b)        Contraventions under FEMA are classified
into ‘technical’ or ‘material’ or ‘sensitive / serious in nature’. Technical
contraventions are dealt with by administrative / cautionary advice without
levying of a compounding fee. The Circular now does away with this practice and
will regularise such contraventions by levying a minimum compounding amount as
per the Compounding Matrix.

(c)        Compounding Orders
issued by RBI have been made available on its website as a measure of public
disclosure. However, by this Circular, for orders issued after 1st
March, 2020 only a summary will now be put up on the RBI website in the
prescribed format. Complete orders will no longer be available for downloading
from the RBI website.

(d)         Appropriate amendments would also be made in
the Master Direction on Compounding.

[A.P. (DIR
Series) Circular No. 06 dated 17th November, 2020.]

 

(vi)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its interim orders dated 4th
July, 2012 and 14th September, 2015 passed in the case of the Bar
Council of India vs. A.K. Balaji & Ors.
had directed RBI not to
grant any permission to any foreign law firm on or after the date of the said
interim order for opening of Liaison Office (LO) in India. RBI had issued a
Circular to that effect dated 29th October, 2015. The Supreme Court
has held in the same case that advocates enrolled under the Advocates Act, 1961
alone are entitled to practise law in India and that foreign law firms /
companies or foreign lawyers cannot practise the profession of law in India.
RBI, in line with this decision, has directed AD Banks not to grant any
approval to any branch office, project office, liaison office or other place of
business in India under FEMA for the purpose of practising legal profession in
India. Further, AD Banks have been directed to bring any violation of the
Advocates Act to the notice of the RBI. [A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 07
dated 23rd November, 2020.]

 

 

 

SOCIETY NEWS

FEMA STUDY CIRCLE MEETINGS

 

In October, 2020, the FEMA
Study Circle of the BCAS organised three meetings, details of which are
as follows:

 

1. Downstream investments

 

The virtual meeting was led
by Kartik Badiani, Aarti Karwande and Sneh Bhuta and was held on
17th October, 2020.

 

The speakers started by
explaining the basics of Foreign Direct Investment and Indirect Foreign
Investment. Next, they delved into the types of entities that are eligible to
undertake Indirect Foreign Investment and the manner of calculating Direct as
well as Indirect Foreign Investment. This was followed by a detailed
explanation on the various compliance and reporting requirements – as well as
consequences of non-compliance.

 

The presentation was
replete with case studies that not only made it interesting but also evoked
questions from members.

 

2. Amendments to the Foreign Contributions
(Regulation) Act, 2010

 

This virtual meeting was
held on 19th October and was led by Isha Sekhri.

 

It was
held in light of the recent amendments to the Act that came into force on 29th
September. Isha discussed various amendments pertaining to the
restriction on acceptance of foreign contributions by public servants,
prohibition on transfer of funds and the cap on administrative expenses at 20%,
amongst others, in a very crisp, eloquent manner.

 

The session was indeed
helpful as members felt they were better equipped to handle queries from their
clients on the manner in which they need to adapt to the recent amendments.


3. Structuring of
investments in Startups

Ganesh
Ramaswamy
led this meeting which was held on 31st October.

 

The
speaker explained the concept of a Startup and the various facets associated
with it, viz., investments by Foreign Venture Capital Investors (FVCI), issuance of Convertible Notes, FDI in Startups, amongst others.

 

He
explained in detail tax aspects pertaining to various jurisdictions, viz.,
Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the
Netherlands to name a few. The presentation was made more interesting with
anecdotes about his experiences with clients of different countries and the
people there.

 

COVID IMPACT ON ECONOMY AND CAPITAL MARKETS

 

A virtual panel discussion
on ‘Post-Covid Impact on Economy and Capital Markets’ was organised on 28th
October. The panellists were Dr. B.K. Bhoir (ex-RBI and an Economist), T.N.
Manoharan
(Past President of the ICAI) and George Joseph (CEO of an
ITI AMC). The panel was moderated by Dipan Mehta.

 

President
Suhas Paranjpe welcomed the panellists and spoke about the devastating
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on industries, businesses – small and large,
the financial markets and the speculation about the V/U/L/H-shaped recovery in
the economy post the devastating contraction in the Indian economy. Speaking
about the expectations of stimulus packages, he also discussed the need for a
direction as to where the economy was headed and said that this was the theme
for the lecture meeting.

 

Vice-President Abhay
Mehta
introduced the panel members and handed over the proceedings to
moderator Dipan Mehta.

Each of the panellists gave
a brief overview. In his presentation, Dr. Bhoir pointed out that the
public at large is only discussing the impact of Covid on the GDP; however, its
impact had been far more devastating and far-reaching. It had impacted the
social fabric and the personal and mental well-being of the people at large.

 

He also noted the GDP
forecasts being made by various agencies and contrasted the same with his own
forecast and the reasons for the same. He also gave his prescription for the
way forward and the challenges that the government is likely to face in the
coming days.

 

T.N.
Manoharan
highlighted the positives from the pandemic and how virtual
webinars were helping increase the spread of knowledge. At the same time,
despite the pandemic, several sectors had been growing, such as telecom,
healthcare, drugs and pharma, financial services, agriculture, food processing,
agricultural implements like tractors, automobiles, power generation, etc.

 

He pointed out how some
sectors had adapted to the scenario and grown despite the challenges – a case
in point being resorts. He ended his talk by hoping that the worst was over and
prayed that the vaccine would be available soon.

 

George
Joseph
started his overview by pointing out that there were no
precedents to the current situation and the closest he could cite was in the
1820s; he remarked that it was surprising that 100 years later the manner in
which the extreme situation was being dealt with was strikingly similar.
Covid-19 had been a traumatic experience for the people at large but now they
were venturing out.

 

Referring to the historical
data, he said that by 2010 the economy had started to slow down; various
factors had contributed to that; and then there were a series of steps taken by
the government such as demonetisation, GST implementation, etc., which had
their impact on the economy – all these followed by a series of crises such as
the NBFC and other crises. But despite these negatives he was optimistic that
the Indian economy would rise and start growing since the protracted down-cycle
had ended and he expected a boom considering that the manufacturing cycle was
gathering momentum, and both the Chinese and the American economies were showing
positive indications. He expected the Indian economy to grow at a phenomenal
pace in the foreseeable future. If a stimulus package came through, it would
further assist in the growth of the economy.

Dipan
Mehta
then proceeded with questions to each of the panellists. These
ranged from aspects such as interest rates, thrust of the stimulus, impact of
moratorium on loans on the banks, increase in bank deposits and slowing down in
the investment cycle, recognition of NPAs, restructuring of failing businesses,
how to attract fresh investments, need for a fiscal stimulus, movement in
interest rates, likelihood of a second wave of Covid-19 and its impact, and the
way forward.

 

Joint Secretary Mihir
Sheth
proposed the vote of thanks.

 

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCE,
ACCOUNTING & AUDITING

 

An unusual Zoom meeting was
organised on 4th November. It was a 
virtual lecture on ‘Artificial Intelligence – Developments in Finance,
Accounting & Auditing’. The faculty was Mr. Rohit Gupta who
delivered his talk live from the USA.

 

In his opening remarks,
President Suhas Paranjpe presented an overview of the increasing
prevalence and growing importance of Artificial Intelligence in the finance
world in general and in the field of financial accounting in particular.

 

Mr. Gupta
covered the following areas of interest:

 

  •    What is AI and why is it
    relevant today?
  •    The opportunities with AI
    in corporate finance;
  •    The journey to AI-driven
    Digital Transformation; and
  •    Practical approaches to
    adopting AI-driven Digital Transformation
    for Finance.

 

In the course of his
lecture, he discussed various concepts such as Natural Language Processing,
Computer Vision, Machine Learning and Deep Learning.

 

At the end of his talk, Mr.
Gupta
answered the queries of the participants such as the first steps to
learning and adopting AI, various avenues for learning about AI, the
opportunities and so on.

 

The virtual lecture meeting
was attended by 250 participants (both on Zoom and on YouTube).

 

PRIMARY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (PFS) PROJECT

Another virtual lecture
meeting, this time on the Primary Financial Statements (PFSs) Project of IASB,
was held on 11th November.

 

The
keynote speaker was M.P. Vijay Kumar (ICAI Council Member) and the faculty
comprised Ms Aida Vatrenjak (Member of the Technical team and leader of
the PFS project) and Ms Nili Shah (Executive Technical Director).

 

President Suhas Paranjpe
gave the opening remarks and presented an overview about the PFS, including the
fact that the initiative aimed at reducing the variations in financial
reporting by standardising the presentation and the form of the reports and
making financial statements more comparable.

 

Immediate Past President Manish
Sampat
, giving the background of the subject, highlighted the hurdles faced
by various stakeholders while reading financial statements and the pressing
need for conformity.

 

M.P. Vijay
Kumar
started his keynote address by acknowledging the efforts of
various contributors to the project. He emphasised that he was a firm believer
in the dictum that the concept of accounting was to be accountable and
financial reporting was all about communication.

Financial reporting had to
focus on the three Cs – it had to be Clear, Complete and Candid, he added.

 

On her
part, Ms Nili Shah introduced the project and said that it had resulted
in the exposure draft on general presentation and disclosures. She also spoke
about the developments leading to the project and its current stage.

 

Ms Shah
stressed on the need for interaction and discussion on the subject since this
would assist in framing the standard. She spoke in detail about the project,
the terms used and their relevance in financial reporting.

 

Ms Aida Vatrenjak, on the
other hand, discussed the need for having rules related to sub-totals and
categories that would help in achieving consistency and how the lack of such
rules was a disadvantage. The importance of various categories such as
operating profits, income and expense from integral associations and joint
ventures, profit before financing and tax, application to financial entities,
unusual expense, management performance measures, etc., were also highlighted
by her.

 

The lecture meeting was attended by several seniors in the
profession and members in practice.

REPRESENTATION

Dated: 02nd
December, 2020

Subject:
Pre-budget Memorandum for the Finance Act, 2021, covering the Direct Tax Law
provisions

To: Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Hon. Union Minister of Finance, Ministry of
Finance, Government of India, North Block,New Delhi 110 001

Representation by: Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I.          HIGH COURT

 

16. [2020-TIOL-1858-(Madras HC)] M/s Sun Dye Chem. WP 29676 of 2019 Date
of order: 6th October, 2020

 

Sections 37, 38, 39 of CGST Act, 2017 –
Supplier permitted to rectify genuine mistake in GSTR1 to enable customers to
avail credit to which they were legitimately entitled

 

FACTS

The petitioner as
supplier, while submitting its GSTR1 inadvertently reflected tax amounts in the
IGST column instead of the CGST and SGST columns for the period from August,
2017 to December, 2017. The mistake was brought to its notice by a customer
after 31st March, 2019 when the mechanism to rectify GSTR1 of 2017-18
had lapsed. Hence, the present petition was filed requesting permission to
enable the petitioner to amend its GSTR1.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble Court held that it was a
case of genuine mistake, the error was not deliberate, nor intended to gain any
profit. The forms through filing which the petitioner might have noticed the
error and sought amendment, viz. GSTR2A and GSTR1A, were not yet notified. In
the absence of an enabling mechanism, the Court was of the view that the
customers of the petitioner should not be prejudiced from availing credit to
which they were otherwise legitimately entitled.

The petitioner was allowed to rectify
the error. Consequently, the petitioner was permitted to re-submit annexures to
GSTR3B with correct distribution of credit between IGST, CGST and SGST.

 

17. [2020 (41) GSTL 440 (Madras HC)] Urbanclap Technologies India Pvt.
Ltd. WP 9270, 9275, 9287 of 2020 Date of order: 13th August, 2020

 

Finalisation of assessment on same day
when matter was listed for hearing amounts to violation of natural justice

 

FACTS

The petitioner was issued personal
hearing notice on 13th February, 2020, the matter was listed on the
very next day (14th February, 2020) and the order was passed on the
hearing date itself. The petitioner challenged the assessment order passed by
the A.O. on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court, referring to
its own decision, held that whenever an opportunity is given to explain or
submit objections, such opportunity must be realistic and not notional. A
particular hour of the day may be fixed as an outer limit for making such
submission for administrative convenience, but for reasons of equity and justice
the person aggrieved should be provided an opportunity till the expiry of
working hours of the date to state its objection. The Court was of the view
that the A.O. should wait till the end of the working day when the personal
hearing was fixed for finalisation of assessment. It directed issuance of fresh
notices to the petitioner to appear whereby the new order could be passed
within eight weeks from the date of the first hearing.

 

18. [2020 (41) GSTL 442 (Guj.)] Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. vs. UOI
15607 of 2019 Date of order: 5th March, 2020

 

Sections 107 and 108 of CGST Act, Rule
108 of CGST Rules – The period of limitation to file appeal electronically
commences after aggrieved order uploaded on the GST portal

 

FACTS

A part of the refund application filed
by the petitioner for refund of IGST paid on supplies made to an SEZ was
rejected due of non-availability of invoices issued by the SEZ jurisdictional
Authority. The petitioner, being aggrieved, was unable to file the appeal
electronically as the refund order was not uploaded on the GST portal by the
adjudicating Authority. The petitioner had approached the Authority on various
occasions but due to certain technical issues the Authority was unable to
upload the order. After exhausting all avenues, the petitioner filed an appeal
manually; however, the same was rejected on the grounds of limitation, i.e.,
being time-barred. The respondent was of the view that the electronic filing of
appeal required only details of the adjudicating order which was available with
the petitioner. Uploading an order on the portal and filing of an appeal
electronically are two completely different processes.

 

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court, on the basis of
the provisions of the GST Act, held that the appeal was required to be filed in
electronic mode only unless any other mode was prescribed in the notification.
And no notification had been issued for manual filing of an appeal.

 

GST law being newly introduced, there
was no clarity with regard to the procedure to be followed for filing of
appeal. Further, filing of appeal and uploading of the order are intertwined
activities. In such a situation even though the physical copy of the
adjudication order was handed over to the petitioner, the time period to file
the appeal will start only after the said order is uploaded on the GST portal.
Therefore, the delay in filing appeal manually was condoned.

 

II.         TRIBUNAL

           

19. [2020 (41) GSTL 467 (Tri.-Del.)] Quick Heal Technologies Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi 50022/2020 Date of order:9th  January, 2020

 

Sections 65B(28), 65B(44), 65B(51),
65(105)(zzzze), 66B of Finance Act, 1994 – Supply of packed anti-virus software
to the end-user by charging license fee amounts to deemed sale and not
chargeable to service tax

 

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in the
business of research and development of anti-virus software. A unique key,
provided along with the CD in which the software was supplied, was required to
be entered to start the software. The appellant was of the view that software
supplied in CD form, being a canned software, was goods and it was paying sales
tax / VAT on the sale of such quick-heal anti-virus software. The adjudicating
Authority alleged that under the supply of packed anti-virus software to the
end-user by charging license fee, the end-user was provided with a temporary /
non-exclusive right to use the anti-virus software as per the conditions
contained in the End User License Agreement and would, therefore, amount to a
provision of service and not sale.

 

HELD

The learned
Authority, on perusal of the facts of the case and relevant provisions of the
Finance Act, 1994 observed that the ‘information technology software’ was
defined as any representation of instructions, data, sound or image, including
source code and object code, recorded in a machine-readable form, and capable
of being manipulated or providing interactivity to a user
by means of a
computer or an automatic data processing machine or any other device or
equipment. The software developed by the appellant could not be manipulated,
nor did it provide any interactivity to a user and, therefore, did not satisfy
the requirement specified under definition. The software developed by the
appellant was complete in itself to prevent virus in the computer system. Once
the computer system was booted, the anti-virus software began the function of
detecting the virus which continued till the time the computer system remained
booted. No interactivity took place nor was there any requirement of giving any
command to the software to perform its function.

 

Further, the
Authority relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Consultancy
Services wherein it was held that intellectual property, once it is put on the
media and marketed, would become ‘goods’ and that software was an intellectual
property and such intellectual property contained in a medium was purchased and
sold in various forms including CDs. The Authority was of the view that if the
pre-packaged or canned software was not sold but was transferred under a
license to use such software, the terms and conditions of the license to use
such software should be seen. In case a license to use pre-packaged software
imposed restrictions on the usage of such licenses and such restriction did not
interfere with the free enjoyment of the software, then such a license would
result in transfer of ‘right to use’ the software within the meaning of clause
29(A) of Article 366 of the Constitution.

 

The agreement entered into by the
appellant provided the licensee the right to use the software subject to the
terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. The licensee was entitled to
use the software from the date of license activation until the expiry date of
the same. The licensee was also entitled to the updates and to technical
support. The conditions set out in the agreement did not interfere with the
free enjoyment of the software by the licensee. Merely because the appellant
retained the title and ownership of the software, it did not mean that it
interfered with the right of the licensee to use the software. On the basis of
the above discussion, it was held that the appellant had merely given the right
to use the software and the same would amount to ‘deemed sale’ and hence the
contention of the Department was not accepted and the order was set aside.

 

20. [2020 (41) GSTL 516 (Tri.-Hyd.)] Virtusa (India) Pvt. Ltd.
A/30588/220Date or order: 24th February, 2020

 

Rules 5, 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004 – Rejection of refund claim on the ground that there was no nexus between
input and output services not sustainable

 

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in providing
Technology Software Services and was registered as an export-oriented unit
under the Software Technology Parks of India (STPI) Scheme. The refund application
for unutilised CENVAT credit filed by the appellant was rejected by the
Authority holding that input services, rent-a-cab operator services, outdoor
catering services, pest control services, custom house agents, gym / health
club services, business or management consultant services and tour operator
services, used in factory had no nexus with the exported services.

 

HELD

The Authority held that it was a
well-settled legal position that CENVAT credit may or may not be allowed;
however, the refund of the credit cannot be denied. The refund should be
allowed on the basis of the formula prescribed, i.e., ratio of export turnover
to the total turnover multiplied by the CENVAT credit utilised. The formula for
proportionate credit for calculating refund of CENVAT credit holds no scope for
determining such nexus while allowing or disallowing refund of CENVAT credit.
Consequently, the rejection of refund claim was held unsustainable as there was
no requirement to establish nexus of individual services specifically for
refund. If any credit was to be held inadmissible, it must be done by issuing
notice under Rule 14 of the CENVAT credit Rules.

 

 

III.       AUTHORITY OF ADVANCE RULING

 

21. [2020-TIOL-275-AAR-GST] MFAR Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. Date of
order: 12th May, 2020 [AAR-Chennai]

 

Supply of soft beverages as a room
service from the restaurant located in the premises will be a restaurant
service – Supply of cigarettes independently is not a composite supply and will
be taxable as a mixed supply if supplied at a single price – Supply of liquor
is a non-taxable supply – Supply of food to employees free of cost is a deemed
supply under GST

 

FACTS

The applicant owns
and manages hotels and resorts. The question before the Authority is what rate
of tax to apply to the supply of soft beverages and tobacco when these items
are supplied independently, say as a room service, and not as composite supply
in the restaurant. The next question is whether the supply of liquor is considered
to be an exempt supply for the purpose of reversal of credit under Rule 42 of
the CGST Rules, 2017. The last question before the Authority is whether free
food supplied to the employees is liable for reversal of credit under Rule 42.

HELD

The Authority noted that the
Notification 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 was
amended by Notification 46/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 14th
November, 2017 and subsequently amended by Notification No. 20/2019-Central
Tax(Rate) dated 30th September, 2019, and held that supply of soft
beverages / aerated water, whether in person or as room service by the
restaurant located in the premises of the hotel, will be taxable at 9% CGST and
9% SGST since the declared tariff of the hotel is greater than Rs. 7,500.
However, in the case of sale of cigarettes it is held that they are not
naturally bundled together with restaurant service. Further, it is also held
that when cigarettes are supplied at a single price along with the restaurant
service, such supply is a mixed supply as restaurant service involves serving
of food and beverages alone. With respect to supply of alcoholic liquor, the
Authority held that it is a non-taxable supply under GST, and with respect to
supply of food to employees in a canteen, it is held that supply of service to
employees without consideration is a deemed supply under Schedule I and
therefore is liable to GST.

           

22. [2020-TIOL-282-AAR-GST] M/s Jinmangal Corporation Date of order: 17th
September, 2020 [AAR-Gujarat]

           

One-time premium / salami paid
irrespective of the duration of the lease is liable to GST and the recipient is
required to discharge tax under reverse charge

 

FACTS

The applicant submitted that Ahmedabad
Urban Development Authority had carried out e-auction for leasing certain plots
for a period of 99 years. The plots so auctioned could be used only for the
purpose of construction of commercial projects. They were required to pay a
one-time lease premium. The applicant is of the view that a long-term lease for
a period exceeding 30 years was tantamount to sale of immovable property since
the lessor is deprived of the right to use, enjoy and possess the property once
the said lease has been granted. It was stated that only the State Government
is empowered to levy tax on land and building. The provisions of the Gujarat
Stamp Act were also placed on record.

 

Further, it was also argued that
Schedule II of the GST Act, 2017 reads as – ‘any lease, tenancy, easement,
license to occupy land is a supply of service’. Lease premium is a periodical
payment. Upfront premium / salami is different and distinct from lease
rent since it is only a one-time payment. Accordingly, the question before the
Authority is whether one-time lease premium is a supply under the law and
whether the applicant is required to discharge tax under reverse charge.

 

HELD

The Authority noted that the quantum of
lease has no relation in determination of lease or sale. When a person
purchases a commercial plot / land, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of
the same and there is a sale deed between the seller and the purchaser. On
purchase of land, there is no requirement of renewal or extension of the sale
period. The owner of the commercial plot / land is not required to pay any type
of salami or annual lease premium for it. Besides, the purchaser / owner
of the land can sell the same to anybody and no permission is required from the
seller because the purchaser has an absolute right of possession on the land.

 

Therefore, the Authority noted that the
lease of the plot for 99 years by the applicant is not ‘sale of land’ but is a
lease of plot / land and therefore does not get covered under clause 5 of
Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the said one-time premium / salami
and annual lease premium paid by the applicant to the Ahmedabad Urban
Development Authority are taxable under the GST in terms of the Notification
No. 11/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. With respect to the
next question, the Authority noted that as per Notification 5/2019-Central Tax
(Rate) dated 29th March,2019, the promoter is required to pay tax
under reverse charge. Accordingly, the recipient is liable to pay GST under
reverse charge.

 

23. [2020-TIOL-274-AAR-GST] M/s Macro Media Digital Imaging Pvt. Ltd
Date of order: 4th May, 2020 [AAR-Chennai]

 

The printing of content provided by the
recipient on the PVC materials of the applicant and supply of printed trade
advertising material to the recipient is a composite supply of service of
printing

 

FACTS

The
applicant is engaged in printing of billboards, building wraps, fleet graphics,
window graphics, trade show graphics, office branding, in-store branding,
banners, free standing display units and signage graphics. The question before
the Authority is whether the transaction of printing of content provided by the
customer on polyvinylchloride banners and supply of such printed trade
advertisement material is supply of goods? The second question is the rate of
tax applicable on such transactions.

 

HELD

The Authority held
that the printing of content provided by the recipient on the PVC materials of
the applicant and supply of printed trade advertising material to the recipient
is a composite supply, and ‘supply of service of printing’ is the principal
supply. Accordingly, the classification of service is SAC 998912 and the
applicable tax rate is 9% CGST and 9% SGST as per Serial Number 27/27(iii) of
Notification 11/2017 Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 for
the period from 1st July, 2017 to 13th October, 2017; and
thereafter the applicable rate is 6% CGST and 6% SGST as per Serial No. 27(i)
of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 20I7
.  

 

Service Tax

I. TRIBUNAL

 

8.  [2020-TIOL-1626-CESTAT-Kol.] Bengal Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. CGST and CE Date of order: 9th October, 2020

 

A whole-time
director is an employee of the company. Merely because the director is
compensated by a variable pay the same does not alter the employer-employee
relationship

 

FACTS

The Department has raised a
demand of service tax under reverse charge mechanism on the entire remuneration
paid to the whole-time directors, on both the fixed part as well as the
variable pay, in terms of Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20th June,
2012. The case of the Department is that the remuneration paid to the directors
would constitute ‘service’ liable to service tax in their hands and the
assessee is required to discharge tax under reverse charge mechanism. Aggrieved
by  the decision of the lower authority, the present appeal was filed.

 

HELD

The Tribunal primarily
noted that the only dispute is on payment of remuneration in the nature and
form of commission based on percentage of profit to whole-time directors, which
is a fact on record. Section 2(94) of the Companies Act, 2013 duly defines ‘whole-time
director’ to include a director in the whole-time employment of the company. A
whole-time director refers to one who has been in the employment of the company
on a full-time basis and is also entitled to receive remuneration. The
certificate issued by the Company Secretary states that the remuneration is
given in various forms as allowed under the Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, a
whole-time director is considered and recognised as a ‘key managerial
personnel’ u/s 2(51) of the Companies Act. Further, he is an officer in default
for any violation or non-compliance of the provisions of the Companies Act.

 

Thus, the whole-time
director is essentially an employee of the company and whatever remuneration is
being paid in conformity with the provisions of the Companies Act is pursuant
to the employer-employee relationship; the mere fact that the whole-time
director is compensated by way of variable pay will not in any manner alter or
dilute the position of the employer-employee relation between the company and
the whole-time director. Thus, the appellant is not required to discharge tax
under reverse charge.

 

9. [2020-TIOL-1603-CESTAT-Del.] M/s Sir Ganga Ram Hospital vs. Commissioner
of 
Service Tax Date of order: 2nd September, 2020

 

The
facilitation fee retained from the fees payable to the consultant doctors is a
part of healthcare services and cannot be taxed separately as business support
services

 

FACTS

The appellant provides
various categories of healthcare services to its patients and for this purpose
has appointed professionals / doctors / consultants on contractual basis. The
doctors were given designated space in the hospital premises in the form of
chambers with an examination table for examining the patients coming to the
hospital. The professional fee was paid after retaining the facilitation fee.
The Department alleges that the ‘collection charges’ / ‘facilitation fee’
retained should be subjected to service tax as it was rendering infrastructural
support services to the doctors which was an activity taxable under the
category of ‘business support services’.

 

HELD

The
Tribunal placed reliance on the appellant’s own case reported in 2018-TIOL-352-CESTAT-Del.
where it has been categorically held that the view of the Revenue that in spite
of exemption available to healthcare services, a part of the consideration
received for such services from the patients shall be taxed as business support
service is not tenable. In effect, this will defeat the exemption provided to
the healthcare services by clinical establishments.

 

Admittedly, the
healthcare services are provided by the clinical establishments by engaging
consultant doctors. For such services, an amount is collected from the
patients. The same is shared by the clinical establishment with the doctors.
There is no legal justification to tax the share of the clinical establishment
on the ground that they have supported the commerce or business of doctors by
providing infrastructure. Thus, the demand is set aside and the appeal is
allowed.

 

MISCELLANEA

I. Business

 

8.
Bitcoin price prediction: Here’s why analyst thinks $22,000 is next

 

KEY POINTS

  • Bitcoin
    breached $18,000 for the first time in three years;
  •  The
    number of people holding Bitcoin for a period of one year has increased;
  •  The
    number of Bitcoin being transferred out of exchanges is rising.

 

Bitcoin just hit $18,000 and an analyst
expects the next price target to be $22,000, a figure that is higher than the
previous all-time high.

 

Bitcoin closed Tuesday (17th
November, 2020) at $17,679, a new 2020 high, breaking the earlier record of
$16,726 which was hit just the previous day (Monday, 16th November,
2020). At the time of writing this report, the benchmark crypto currency hit
$18,000, its highest price in the last three years. Bitcoin last reached
$18,000 in December, 2017, the month when it went on to touch its all-time high
price of just below $20,000.

 

With the previous all-time high on the
horizon, people are looking forward to what’s to come after that. One analyst
said Bitcoin could reach $20,000 and the first initial target is $22,000.
According to Philip Swift, an analyst and founder of Lookintobitcoin.com,
multiple indicators, including institutional buying and the one-year HODL %,
are still likely to increase soon, Cointelegraph reported.

 

The one-year HODL % refers to the number of
people whose BTC addresses hold Bitcoin for at least a year. At this point, the
one-year HODL wave chart shows these investors are growing in number. This is
significant because despite Bitcoin being up by 154% already since the start of
the year, the number of people not selling their Bitcoins is still increasing.
This implies that these investors are looking forward to a further upside in
the price of the benchmark crypto currency and that they are not selling any
time soon.

 

Additionally, the funding rate has remained
neutral. This refers to the balance between buyers and sellers particularly in
the Bitcoin futures market. According to Cointelegraph, the average funding
rate has remained at 0.01%, suggesting a balance between buyers and sellers
which also implies that the market is not yet overheated. If the market becomes
overheated, a reverse in the price trend could happen.

 

Finally, more and more Bitcoin is being
withdrawn from exchanges. In a separate article, Cointelegraph noted that a
total of 145,000 BTC were moved out of crypto currency exchanges between 15th
October and 15th November. At the price point of Bitcoin on 15th
November, the amount is worth around $2.35 billion transferred out of
exchanges.

 

Source: International Business Times; By Vincent Figueras – 18th
November, 2020)

 

II. Science

 

9. World
Science Day For Peace And Development 2020: Inspirational quotes by famous
scientists

 

Science influences most aspects of human
life including health, medicines, transportation and energy. Hence, to
highlight the role of science in daily life, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) proclaimed World Science Day for Peace and
Development in 2001. Since then, the day has been observed annually on 10th
November.

 

Apart from strengthening public awareness
about science’s role in society, the day also aims at keeping people informed
about the key developments in science and drawing their attention towards the
challenges the progress of science is facing.

 

On this day, here are a few inspirational
and powerful quotes by famous scientists, courtesy Famous Scientists and
Forbes:

An experiment is a question which science
poses to Nature, and a measurement is the recording of Nature’s answer
Max Planck

It is strange that only extraordinary men
make the discoveries which later appear so easy and simple – Georg C.
Lichtenberg

We pass through this world but once. Few
tragedies can be more extensive than the stunting of life, few injustices
deeper than the denial of an opportunity to strive or even to hope, by a limit
imposed from without, but falsely identified as lying within –
Stephen Jay Gould

Science without religion is lame, religion
without science is blind – Albert Einstein

The saddest aspect of life right now is
that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom –
Isaac Asimov

Actually, everything that can be known has a
Number; for it is impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognise it
without this – Philolaus

Progress is made by trial and failure;
the failures are generally a hundred times more numerous than the successes;
yet they are usually left unchronicled –
William
Ramsay

Did the genome of our cave-dwelling
predecessors contain a set or sets of genes which enable modern man to compose
music of infinite complexity and write novels with profound meaning? … It looks
as though the early Homo (sapiens) was already provided with the intellectual
potential which was in great excess of what was needed to cope with the
environment of his time – Susumu Ohno

 

Source: International Business Times; By Vaishnavi Vaidyanathan – 11th
October, 2020)

 

III. Health

 

10. Can’t sleep during quarantine? How to
rest while anxious | Elemental

In the age of coronavirus, sleep is more
important – and more elusive – than ever

 

May be you’ve always struggled with your
sleep. Or, perhaps because of the coronavirus outbreak you’ve started
experiencing insomnia as a result of changes to your everyday life, fears about
the health and safety of yourself and your loved ones, financial insecurities
and the barrage of coronavirus information and misinformation that’s coming
from all directions. In these uncertain times, it’s not surprising to find that
many people are facing an increase in sleep difficulties.

 

With all the challenges we’ll be facing over
the next several months as individuals and within our communities, workplaces,
schools and, indeed, globally, there are many reasons to make healthy sleep a
priority and take steps to preserve this vital bodily function.

 

What constitutes good sleep? First, getting
the right amount for your age: Most adults require seven to eight hours of
sleep for optimal health. Adolescents and emerging adults benefit from eight to
ten hours, school-aged children need between nine and 11 hours, and our littlest
ones should get even more.

 

Then, timing: Sleep does its best work for
us when we get it at the right ‘time,’ according to our internal, 24-hour body
clock, aka our circadian rhythm. Humans are diurnal, meaning all of the
workings of our body – eating, digestion, hormone secretion, and even learning
and memory – are organised around the basic framework of wakefulness during the
day and sleep at night. For individuals who work at night or follow a rotating
shift schedule, finding the right sleep timing can be complicated because their
sleep-wake schedules are often out of sync with day and night.

 

Finally, getting high-quality sleep: Sleep
disruptions – whether they are from environmental sources, like noise or light
or children, or due to things we bring to bed with us, like anxiety or an
untreated sleep disorder – diminish the benefits of sleep.

 

In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, we
can’t afford not to sleep well right now. Healthy sleep preserves our
immune function which will be critical if we are exposed to the virus.

 

Sleep also helps us focus, think clearly and
solve problems. It helps us maintain our composure when emotions are running
high. And for those with common chronic illnesses such as diabetes, obesity,
high blood pressure, heart disease or depression, healthy sleep promotes better
management of these underlying conditions.

 

Keep your body clock running on time

Just because you are stuck home does not
mean you cannot go outside. Staying inside decreases your light exposure and
makes it harder for your body clock to maintain its circadian rhythm. If you
can safely get some sunlight, especially in the morning, that will help your
brain and body keep the daytime / night-time schedule running smoothly.

 

You don’t have to keep the exact same
schedule every day. But if you are stuck at home for a while, adding structure
to your day will help. Plan some anchor activities like meals, social contact
and a concrete beginning and end of your work or school day so that everything
doesn’t run together.

 

If you have extra time at home, now might be
a good time to work on optimising your sleep environment. Install better window
blinds, put duct tape over those bright LEDs and set your phone for night mode.

 

Aim to get the amount of sleep you
need

For some people, schedule changes and more
time at home may equal more opportunities for sleep. If you’ve been ‘getting
by’ with less sleep than you need and spending your weekends ‘catching up’ on
sleep, reduced commuting time and prepping children for daycare and school may
allow you to establish new routines that allow you to get a healthier sleep
duration.

 

On the other hand, although staying home may
increase the time you have to sleep, resist the temptation to drastically
extend your time in bed. Most adults need seven to eight hours and should limit
their time in bed to the time they actually plan to sleep. Spending more time
in bed awake or sleeping on and off increases sleep fragmentation and results
in lighter, less restorative sleep.

 

Brief naps might be a good idea if you are
sleepy during the day and have the freedom to build a nap into your schedule.
Naps as short as ten minutes can improve energy levels and promote mental
performance. But too much napping across the day can backfire. A nap may make
it harder to sleep at night, leaving you sleepy the next day. Avoid this
vicious cycle whereby daytime napping worsens night-time sleep.

 

Three in the morning is a terrible time to
calm yourself down – your brain expects to be asleep at that time, not problem-solving!

 

Keep active to ‘earn’ your sleep

Move your body. Try to exercise. Do not sit
around just because you are home and your routine has changed. You will ‘earn’
better sleep with exercise and it can also keep your body clock synchronised.

 

Go easy on the booze

With the stress of a global pandemic, wine
might seem like the answer, but it is not. Although alcohol helps you fall
asleep faster, it also makes sleep more shallow and increases
middle-of-the-night insomnia. Best not to ramp up alcohol use.

 

Attempt to manage your worries

Although it is impossible to completely
avoid coronavirus-related stressors right now, you need to protect yourself
from anxiety-provoking information just as you are avoiding physical contact
with this virus. Depending on your job, you may need to check email and stay
available. Nevertheless, make an effort to limit the amount of information you
consume to what is absolutely necessary. Avoid reading news updates right
before bed.

 

For those middle-of-the-night wake-ups,
remember most of the problems can wait until tomorrow. Three in the morning is
a terrible time to calm yourself down – your brain expects to be asleep at that
time, not problem-solving! If you are worried that you’ll forget something
important, keep a notebook next to your bed and write it down. Then do your
best to go back to sleep.

 

Promote healthy sleep for your
children

For those with kids at home who are
transitioning to distance learning, remember that healthy sleep helps with
attention, memory and emotional regulation. Maintaining a structure of bedtime
and wake-time will make your job as ‘Wait, what? Now I’m a homeschool teacher?’
a little bit easier.

 

You may feel social pressure to keep your
children on their usual schedule, but remember that many schools, especially
middle schools and high schools, start earlier than is optimal for the
adolescent biological clock. A schedule is important, but there is no need to
start the day at a too-early time. Let your tweens and teens start the day at a
biologically acceptable time.

 

Take special care if you have sleep
apnoea

We should all
wash our hands, especially before bed, when we may unknowingly touch our faces
while sleeping. This is particularly important if you use continuous positive
airway pressure (CPAP) for sleep apnoea as it is common for CPAP users to
adjust their mask and headgear during the night.

 

If you are quarantined because of Covid-19
exposure or have any kind of cold or respiratory virus, it is wise, if
possible, to sleep separately from your bed partner while wearing CPAP. If you
are infected, then a CPAP machine might blow the virus into the air. By
sleeping in a different room, you will avoid exposing your bed partner to viral
exposure from your CPAP exhalation breaths.

 

The current public health situation is
stressful and might lead to some new sleep disruptions. We encourage you to use
these strategies to minimise this impact, or even make your sleep better, as we
combat the spread of coronavirus together.

 

Source: https://elemental.medium.com/pandemic-sleep-advice-straight-from-sleep-researchers-63cc2095f577

 

(Written by Katie Sharkey, MD, Ph.D. and
co-authored by Kelly Baron, Ph.D., MPH, Brendan Duffy RPSGT CCSH, Michael
Grandner, Ph.D., MTR, Jared Saletin, Ph.D., Rebecca Spencer, Ph.D., and John
Hogenesch, Ph.D. – 25th March, 2020)

COMMON CONTROL TRANSACTIONS

When a subsidiary merges
with its parent company, the profit element in the inter-company transactions
and the consequential tax effects need to be eliminated from the earliest
comparative period. This article explains why and how this is done.

 

FACTS

A parent has several
subsidiaries and is listed on Indian exchanges. One of the subsidiaries merges
with the parent. The merger order is passed by the NCLT on 30th
November, 2020 with the appointed date of 1st April, 2019. The
appointed date is relevant for tax and regulatory purposes.

 

Prior to 1st
April, 2019 the subsidiary had sold inventory to the parent for onward sale by
the parent. The cost of inventory was INR 80 and the subsidiary had sold it to
the parent at INR 100. At 1st April, 2019 the inventory was lying
with the parent company. The tax rate applicable for the parent and the
subsidiary is 20%.

 

The parent sells the
inventory to third parties at a profit in May, 2019. In June, 2019, the
subsidiary sells inventory to the parent. The cost of inventory was INR 160 and
the subsidiary had sold it to the parent at INR 200. At 30th June,
2019 the inventory remains unsold in the books of the parent company.

 

After the merger, the
subsidiary becomes a division of the parent company and the inventory transfer
between the division and the parent is made at cost.

 

In preparing the merged
financial statements, whether adjustments are made for the unrealised profits
and the consequential tax effects? If yes, how are these adjustments carried
out?

 

RESPONSE

Paragraph 2 of Appendix C
of Ind AS 103 Business Combinations of Entities Under Common Control
defines a common control transaction as

‘Common
control business combination means a business combination involving entities or
businesses in which all the combining entities or businesses are ultimately
controlled by the same party or parties both before and after the business
combination, and that control is not transitory.’

 

Paragraph 8 states as
follows

‘Business
combinations involving entities or businesses under common control shall be
accounted for using the pooling of interests method.’

 

Paragraph 9 states as
under:

‘The pooling of interest
method is considered to involve the following:

(i)  The assets and liabilities of the combining
entities are reflected at their carrying amounts.

(ii)  No adjustments are made to reflect fair values
or recognise any new assets or liabilities. The only adjustments that are made
are to harmonise accounting policies.

(iii) The financial information in the financial
statements in respect of prior periods should be restated as if the business
combination had occurred from the beginning of the preceding period
in the
financial statements, irrespective of the actual date of the combination.
However, if business combination had occurred after that date, the prior period
information shall be restated only from that date.’

 

The following conclusions
can be drawn:

1. The transaction is a common control transaction
and is accounted for using the pooling of interests method.

2. The financial statements for prior periods are
restated from the earliest comparative period, i.e., from 1st April,
2019.

3. Adjustments are made to the financial
statements to harmonise accounting policies. Therefore, in the merged accounts
unrealised profits arising from the transaction between the parent and the
merged subsidiary should be eliminated.

4. As this is a listed entity and information
relating to comparative quarters is provided in the financial results, the
adjustments for unrealised profits are made for all comparative and current
year quarters, up to the date the merger takes place.

 

In the merged accounts, the
following adjustments are made with respect to the unrealised profits:

 

At 1st April,
2019, the following adjustment will be required to the merged numbers:

Inventory
credit                                                 20

Deferred
tax asset debit (20% on 20)                  4

Retained
earnings debit                                     16

 

The adjustment is made to
reflect the fact that when the inventory is sold to external parties, the
merged entity will not be subject to tax again on INR 20.

 

As the inventory is sold in
the first quarter, the following entry will be passed with respect to tax:

P&L (deferred tax line)
debit                  4

Deferred tax asset credit                       4

 

At 30th June,
2019 the following adjustment will be required:

Inventory
credit                                    40

Current
tax asset debit (20% on 40)       8

P&L
debit                                            32

 

Since the parent will file
a revised return for the previous financial year, the tax paid on INR 40 will
be shown as recoverable from the tax authorities, rather than as a deferred tax
asset.

 

The above adjustments are carried out
for all the quarterly results from 1st April 2019 up to the date of
the NCLT order, i.e. 30th November, 2020.

 

 

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

5. Shree
Choudhary Transport Company vs. Income Tax Officer
Civil Appeal No. 7865 of 2009 Date of order: 29th July, 2020

 

Disallowance
of expenditure – Section 40(a)(ia) – The provisions relating to liability to
deduct tax at source are mandatory in nature – The expression ‘payable’ used in
this provision, that section 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the
amount is payable but also when it is paid – Sub-clause (ia), having been
inserted to clause (a) of section 40 of the Act with effect from 1st
April, 2005 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 would apply from the assessment
year 2005-06 – The date of assent of the President of India to the Finance (No.
2) Act, 2004 is not the date of applicability of any provision, for the
specific date is provided in the Finance Act – The amendment by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2014 limiting the disallowance to 30% of the sum payable is of the
substantive provision and cannot be applied retrospectively – Defaulting
assessee cannot claim prejudice or hardship

 

The
assessee-appellant, a partnership firm, had entered into a contract with M/s
Aditya Cement Limited, Shambupura, District Chittorgarh, for transporting
cement to various places in India. As the appellant did not have its own
transport vehicles, it had engaged the services of other transporters for the
purpose. The cement marketing division of M/s Aditya Cement Limited, namely,
M/s Grasim Industries Limited, effected payments towards transportation charges
to the appellant after due deduction of TDS, as shown in Form No. 16A issued by
the company.

 

On 28th
October, 2005 the assessee-appellant filed its return for the assessment year
2005-2006 showing total income at Rs. 2,89,633 in the financial year 2004-2005
arising out of the business of ‘transport contract’.

 

In the course
of assessment proceedings, the A.O. examined the dispatch register maintained
by the appellant for the period 1st April, 2004 to 31st March,
2005 containing all particulars as regards the trucks hired, date of hire,
memos (or biltis) and challan numbers, freight and commission
charges, net amount payable, the dates on which the payments were made, the
destination of each truck, etc. The contents of the register also indicated
that each truck was sent only to one destination under one challan / bilty;
and if one truck was hired again, it was sent to the same or other destination
/ trip as per a separate challan. The commission charged by the
appellant from the truck operators / owners ranged from Rs. 100 to Rs. 250 per
trip.

 

On verifying
the contents of the record placed before him, the A.O. observed that while
making payments to the truck operators / owners, the appellant had not deducted
tax at source even if the net payment exceeded Rs. 20,000. The A.O. therefore
proceeded to disallow the deduction of payments made to the truck operators /
owners exceeding Rs. 20,000 without TDS, which in total amounted to Rs.
57,11,625, and added the same back to the total income of the
assessee-appellant. The A.O. also disallowed a lump sum of Rs. 20,000 from
various expenses debited to the profit & loss account and finalised the
assessment.

 

Aggrieved by
this order, the assessee-appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner
of Income Tax (Appeals) that was considered and dismissed on 15th
January, 2008.

 

Still
aggrieved, the appellant approached the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur
Bench in further appeal. This appeal was considered and dismissed by ITAT by an
order dated 29th August, 2008.

 

The ITAT found
that the agreement in question was on a principal-to-principal basis whereby
the appellant was awarded the work of transporting cement from Shambupura but
as the appellant did not own any trucks, it had engaged the services of other
truck operators / owners for transporting the cement; such a transaction was a
separate contract between the appellant and the truck operator / owner. The
ITAT, therefore, endorsed the findings of the A.O. and the CIT(A).

 

The aggrieved
appellant now approached the High Court against the ITAT order. However, this
appeal was dismissed summarily by the High Court by its short order dated 15th
May, 2009.

 

On further
appeal, the Supreme Court was of the view that the principal questions arising
for its determination in this appeal were as follows:

 

1.   As to whether section 194C of
the Act does not apply to the present case?

2.   Whether disallowance u/s
40(a)(ia) of the Act is confined / limited to the amount ‘payable’ and not to
the amount ‘already paid’; and whether the decision of this Court in Palam
Gas Service vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2017) 394 ITR 300
requires
reconsideration?

3.   As to whether sub-clause (ia)
of section 40(a) of the Act, as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 with
effect from 1st April, 2005 is applicable only from the financial
year 2005-2006 and, hence, is not applicable to the present case relating to
the financial year 2004-2005; and, at any rate, the whole of the rigour of this
provision cannot be applied to the present case?

4.   And whether the payments in
question have rightly been disallowed from deduction while computing the total
income of the assessee?

 

Question No.
1

According to
the Supreme Court, the nature of the contract entered into by the appellant
with the consignor company made it clear that the appellant was to transport
the goods (cement) of the consignor company and in order to execute this
contract the appellant hired the transport vehicles, namely, the trucks from
different operators / owners. The appellant received freight charges from the
consignor company, who indeed deducted tax at source while making such payment
to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant paid the charges to the persons
whose vehicles were hired for the purpose of the said work of transportation of
goods. Thus, the goods in question were transported through the trucks employed
by the appellant but there was no privity of contract between the truck operators
/ owners and the said consignor company. It was the responsibility of the
appellant to transport the goods (cement) of the company; how to accomplish
this task of transportation was a matter exclusively within the domain of the
appellant. Hence, hiring the services of truck operators / owners for this
purpose could have only been under a contract between the appellant and the
said truck operators / owners. Whether such a contract was reduced into writing
or not was hardly of any relevance. In the given scenario and set-up, the said
truck operators / owners answered to the description of ‘sub-contractor’ for
carrying out the whole or part of the work undertaken by the contractor (i.e.,
the appellant) for the purpose of section 194C(2).

 

The Supreme
Court was of the view that the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner
of Income-Tax vs. Hardarshan Singh (2013) 350 ITR 427
relied upon by
the appellant had no application to the facts of the present case. The Supreme
Court observed that in that case, as regards the income of the assessee
relatable to transportation through other transporters, it was found that the
assessee had merely acted as a facilitator or as an intermediary between the
two parties (i.e., the consignor company and the transporter) and had no
privity of contract with either of such parties.

 

According to the Supreme Court, in Palam
Gas Service vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2017) 394 ITR 300
, the
facts of that case were akin to the facts of the present case and of apposite
illustration. Therein, the assessee was engaged in the business of purchase and
sale of LPG cylinders whose main contract for carriage of LPG cylinders was
with Indian Oil Corporation, Baddi (Himachal Pradesh) and for which the
assessee received freight payments from the principal. The assessee got the
transportation of LPG done through three persons to whom he made the freight
payments. The A.O. had held that the assessee had entered into a sub-contract
with the said three persons within the meaning of section 194C. These findings
of the A.O. were concurrently upheld up to the High Court and, after
interpretation of section 40(a)(ia), this Court also approved the decision of
the High Court while dismissing the appeal with costs. The Supreme Court rejected
the contention of the appellant attempting to distinguish the nature of
contract in Palam Gas Service by suggesting that, therein, the
assessee’s sub-contractors were specific and identified persons with whom the
assessee had entered into a contract, whereas the present appellant was free to
hire the services of any truck operator / owner and, in fact, the appellant
hired the trucks only on need basis.

 

The Supreme
Court therefore affirmed the concurrent findings in regard to the applicability
of section 194C to the present case. Question No. 1 was, therefore, answered in
the negative – that is, against the assessee-appellant and in favour of the
Revenue.

Question No.
2
.

According to
the Supreme Court, the decision in Palam Gas Service (Supra)
was a direct answer to all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant in
the present case. In that case, the Supreme Court approved the views of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of P.M.S. Diesels and Ors. vs.
Commissioner of Income-Tax (2015) 374 ITR 562
as regards the mandatory
nature of the provisions relating to the liability to deduct tax at source.
Having said that deducting tax at source is obligatory, the Supreme Court in
that case had proceeded to deal with the issue as to whether the word ‘payable’
in section 40(a)(ia) would cover only those cases where the amount is payable
and not where it has actually been paid. It took note of the exhaustive
interpretation of various aspects related with this issue by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of P.M.S. Diesels (Supra) as also
by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax,
Kolkata-XI vs. Crescent Export Syndicate (2013) 216 Taxman 258
, and
while approving the same it held, as regards implication and connotation of the
expression ‘payable’ used in this provision, that section 40(a)(ia) covers not
only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid.

 

According to
the Supreme Court, it was ex facie evident that the term ‘payable’ has
been used in section 40(a)(ia) only to indicate the type or nature of the
payments by the assessees to the payees referred therein. In other words, the
expression ‘payable’ is descriptive of the payments which attract the liability
for deducting tax at source and it has not been used in the provision in
question to specify any particular class of default on the basis of whether
payment has been made or not.

 

The Supreme
Court agreed with the observations in Palam Gas Service that the
enunciations in P.M.S. Diesels had been of correct interpretation
of the provisions contained in section 40(a)(ia). According to the Supreme
Court, the decision in Palam Gas Service did not require any
reconsideration. That being the position, the contention urged on behalf of the
appellant that disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) did not relate to the amount already
paid, was rejected.

 

In view of the
above, Question No. 2 was also answered in the negative – against the
assessee-appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

 

Question No.
3

Conscious of
the position that the decision of this Court in Palam Gas Service
practically covers the substance of the present matter against the assessee,
the assessee-appellant made a few alternative attempts to argue against the
disallowance in question.

 

It was
submitted that the said sub-clause (ia) having been inserted to clause (a) of
section 40 with effect from 1st April, 2005 by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2004, would apply only from the financial year 2005-2006 and, hence, could
not apply to the present case pertaining to the financial year 2004-2005.

 

The Supreme
Court held that it is well settled that in income tax matters the law to be
applied is that in force in the assessment year in question, unless stated
otherwise by express intendment or by necessary implication. The provision in
question, having come into effect from 1st April, 2005 would apply
from and for the assessment year 2005-2006 and would be applicable for the
assessment in question.

 

According to
the Supreme Court, the supplemental submission that in any case disallowance
could not be applied to the payments already made prior to 10th
September, 2004, the date on which the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 received the
assent of the President of India, was equally baseless. The said date of assent
of the President of India to Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 is not the date of
applicability of the provision in question, for the specific date had been
provided as 1st April, 2005.

 

In yet another
alternative attempt, the appellant argued that by way of Finance (No. 2) Act,
2014, disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) has been limited to 30% of the sum payable and
the said amendment deserves to be held retrospective in operation.

 

According to
the Supreme Court since this is not a curative amendment relating to the
procedural aspects concerning deposit of the deducted TDS, it cannot be applied
retrospectively. The amendment is of the substantive provision by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2014.

 

The Supreme
Court in passing observed that the assessee-appellant was either labouring
under the mistaken impression that he was not required to deduct TDS or under
the mistaken belief that the methodology of splitting a single payment into
parts below Rs. 20,000 would provide him escape from the rigour of the provisions
of the Act providing for disallowance. In either event, the appellant had not
been a bona fide assessee who had made the deduction and deposited it
subsequently. Having defaulted at every stage, the attempt on the part of the
assessee-appellant to seek some succour in the amendment of section 40(a)(ia)
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 could only be rejected as entirely baseless,
even preposterous.

 

Hence, Question
No. 3 was also answered in the negative – that is, against the
assessee-appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

 

Question No.
4

According to
the Supreme Court, the answers to Question Nos. 1 to 3 practically conclude the
matter but it had formulated Question No. 4 essentially to deal with the last
limb of submissions regarding the prejudice likely to be suffered by the
appellant.

 

The Supreme
Court was of the view that the suggestion on behalf of the appellant about the
likely prejudice because of disallowance deserved to be rejected for three
major reasons. In the first place, the said provisions are intended to enforce
due compliance of the requirement of other provisions of the Act and to ensure
proper collection of tax as also transparency in the dealings of the parties.
The necessity of disallowance comes into operation only when a default of the
nature specified in the provisions takes place. Looking to the object of these
provisions, the suggestions about prejudice or hardship carry no meaning at
all. Secondly, by way of the proviso as originally inserted and its
amendments in the years 2008 and 2010, requisite relief to a bona fide
taxpayer who had collected TDS but could not deposit it within time before
submission of the return was also provided; and as regards the amendment of
2010, the Supreme Court ruled it to be retrospective in operation. The proviso
so amended, obviously, safeguarded the interest of a bona fide assessee
who had made the deduction as required and had paid the same to the Revenue.
The appellant having failed to avail the benefit of such relaxation, too,
cannot now raise a grievance of alleged hardship. Thirdly, the appellant had
shown total payments in truck freight account at Rs. 1,37,71,206 and total
receipts from the company at Rs. 1,43,90,632. What has been disallowed was that
amount of Rs. 57,11,625 on which the appellant failed to deduct the tax at
source and not the entire amount received from the company or paid to the truck
operators / owners. Viewed from any angle, there was no case of prejudice or
legal grievance with the appellant.

 

Hence, the
answer to Question No. 4 was clearly in the affirmative – that is, against the
appellant and in favour of the Revenue and that the payments in question had
rightly been disallowed from deduction while computing the total income of the
assessee-appellant.

 

6. The Assistant Commissioner of
Income-Tax-12(3)(2) vs. Marico Ltd.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 7367/2020 Date of order: 1st June, 2020

(Arising out of order dated 21st
August, 2019 in WP No. 1917/2019 passed by the Bombay High Court)

 

Reassessment –
Change of opinion – The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment
Order would amount to the A.O. accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking
a view / forming an opinion – Once an opinion is formed during the regular
assessment proceedings, the A.O. cannot reopen the same only on account of a
different view

 

For the
assessment year 2014-15 the petitioner filed its revised return of income
declaring a total income of Rs. 418.04 crores under normal provisions of the
Act and Rs. 670.82 crores as book profits u/s 115JB. In its return, the
petitioner had inter alia claimed a deduction of Rs. 47.04 crores on
account of amortisation of brand value, while computing book profits at Rs.
670.82 crores u/s 115JB.

 

The Respondent
No.1 passed an assessment order dated 30th January, 2018 u/s 143(3)
r/w/s 144C. The above assessment order accepted the petitioner’s claim for
allowing depreciation for amortisation of brand value to determine book profits
u/s 115JB at Rs. 684.04 crores after examination.

 

Thereafter, on
27th March, 2019 the impugned notice was issued seeking to reopen
the assessment for the A.Y. 2014-15. The assessment was sought to be reopened
for the reason that the assessee company had claimed deduction of Rs.
47,04,58,042 from the book profits on the ground that after revaluation of the
assets of certain brands having the net book value of Rs. 473 crores were
written off and charged to capital redemption reserve and securities premium
during A.Y. 2007-08. The amount written off pertained to brands Manjal and
Nihar acquired in A.Y. 2006-07 and Fiancee and Haircode acquired in A.Y.
2007-08. According to the A.O., there was no provision in section 115JB for
granting deduction for the amortisation not charged in the profit & loss account
on a notional basis.

 

The petitioner
by a letter dated 14th May, 2019 objected to the reopening notice on
the ground that it was without jurisdiction inasmuch as it was based on change
of opinion. This very issue / reason for reopening the assessment was the
subject matter of consideration during the regular assessment proceedings,
leading to the assessment order dated 30th January, 2018.

 

The A.O. by an
order dated 9th June, 2019 rejected the objections by holding that
the basis of the reopening notice was not on account of change of opinion. It
was for the reason that the A.O. had not formed any opinion with regard to the
same in the order dated 30th January, 2018 passed u/s 143(3) as
there was no discussion on it in the impugned order dated 30th
January, 2018.

 

The High Court,
in a writ challenging the reopening notice, noted that the A.O. during the
course of regular assessment proceedings leading to the assessment order dated
30th January, 2018, on the basis of the profit & loss account
and balance sheet and the practice for the earlier years, i.e. A.Y. 2013-14,
had issued notice on 25th September, 2017 to the petitioner to show
cause why the amount of Rs. 47.04 crores being claimed as book depreciation on
intangibles should not be disallowed to determine book profits u/s 115JB. The
above query of the A.O. was responded to by the petitioner in great detail by
its letters dated 10th October, 2017 and 21st December,
2017. It justified its claim for deductions by placing reliance on the
decisions of the Courts. The A.O. thereafter proceeded to pass an assessment
order dated 30th January, 2018 u/s 143(3) and did not make the
proposed disallowance.

 

The High Court
observed that a query was raised on the very issue of reopening during regular
assessment proceedings. The parties had responded to it and the assessment
order dated 30th January, 2018 made no reference to the above issue
at all. However, according to the High Court, once a query has been raised by
the A.O. during the assessment proceedings and the assessee has responded to
that query, it would necessarily follow that the A.O. has accepted the
petitioner’s / assessee’s submissions so as to not deal with that issue in the
assessment order.

 

The High Court
rejected the submission of the Counsel for the Revenue that in the absence of
the A.O. adjudicating upon the issue it cannot be said that he had formed an
opinion during the regular assessment proceedings leading to the order dated 30th
January, 2018. According to the High Court, any adjudication would only be on
such issue where the assessee’s submissions are not acceptable to the Revenue,
then the occasion to decide a lis would arise, i.e. adjudication.
However, where the Revenue accepts the view propounded by the assessee in
response to the Revenue’s query, the A.O. has to form an opinion whether or not
the stand taken by the assessee is acceptable. Therefore, it must follow that
where queries have been raised during the assessment proceedings and the
assessee has responded to the same, then the non-discussion of the same or
non-rejection of the response of the assessee would necessarily mean that the
A.O. has formed an opinion accepting the view of the assessee. Thus, an opinion
is formed during the regular assessment proceedings (and it) bars the A.O. from
reopening the same only on account of a different view.

 

Therefore, the
High Court quashed and set aside the notice issued u/s 148.

 

On a Special
Leave Petition by the Revenue, the Supreme Court noted that according to the
record certain queries were raised by the A.O. on 25th September,
2017 during the assessment proceedings which were responded to by the assessee
vide letters dated 10th October, 2017 and 21st November,
2017. After considering the said responses, the assessment order was passed on
30th January, 2018. Subsequently, by a notice dated 27th March,
2019 issued u/s 148, the matter was sought to be reopened.

 

The Supreme
Court observed that while accepting the challenge to the issuance of notice,
the High Court in paragraph 12 of its judgment observed as under:

 

‘12. Thus we
find that the reasons in support of the impugned notice is the very issue in
respect of which the Assessing Officer has raised the query dated 25 September
2017 during the assessment proceedings and the Petitioner had responded to the
same by its letters dated 10 December 2017 and 21 December 2017 justifying its
stand. The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment Order would
amount to the Assessing Officer accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking
a view / forming an opinion. Therefore, in these circumstances, the reasons in
support of the impugned notice proceed on a mere change of opinion and
therefore would be completely without jurisdiction in the present facts.
Accordingly, the impugned notice dated 27 March 2019 is quashed and set aside.’

 

According to
the Supreme Court, in the given circumstances there was no reason to interfere
in the matter. The special leave petition was, accordingly, dismissed.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

My dear Members,

In continuation of my message in November, 2020 on social
responsibility activities, the BCA Foundation (BCAF) in association with
the Dharma Bharati Mission (DBM India) has re-launched a social project ‘Chalo
English Sikhayein’ digitally for the benefit of underprivileged children from
vernacular medium schools. As expected, BCAF received good response from
our BCAS family to the appeal to participate in the noble cause to make
a positive impact on the lives of students. BCAF would also contribute
to donate digital assets to schools for use by the students for the above
project. I appeal to all of you to contribute for this noble cause and for more
such initiatives to come.

 

On 26th November, Padma Bhushan Faqir Chand Kohli
(F.C. Kohli), 96, India’s Information Technology (IT) sector pioneer, passed
away. He was a true visionary and was responsible for sowing the seeds of
India’s IT industry through a Startup in 1968, viz., Tata Consultancy Services
(TCS).The current generation is the beneficiary of IT, digitalisation,
artificial intelligence and so on, all of which developed on the foundation
laid by persons like the late Mr. Kohli. How true is the statement by Mr.
Chandrasekaran, Chairman, Tata Sons:

 

‘He was a true legend, who laid the very
foundation of India’s spectacular IT revolution and set the stage for the
dynamic modern economy we enjoy today.’

 

The BCAS Diary and pocket diary – conceptualised as a
professional commitment at your fingertips, and the BCAS Calendar, 2021,
articulated with India’s rich cultural heritage, are available for
subscription. These are well-designed professional tools of daily relevance and
much-sought-after as a New Year souvenir by clients, family and friends. May I
appeal to you to book the same in advance?

 

Forensic Accounting and Investigation (FAI) is a specialised
practice area that has gained momentum in the emerging economic scenario.
Organisations increasingly seek professional help to assess fraud risk, to
discover financial frauds, to assess the quantum of loss / damage caused by
frauds and to collect evidence to quantify and corroborate the loss / damage
caused as a result of frauds. FAI Services are regularly sought by banks,
insurance companies and now even the police.

 

In keeping with its tradition of making specialised knowledge
accessible to all professionals, BCAS, through its Internal Audit
Committee, has started a long-duration course titled ‘Forensic Accounting and
Investigation Studies’. Launched in association with CDIMS as the knowledge
partner, it is offered as an E-learning course, spanning over 45 hours of
digital learning content. A well-conceptualised training programme, this course
offers an opportunity to acquire specialised skills in an emerging area of
professional practice.

 

On 9th December we have planned a lecture meeting on
‘Recent Developments in GST Law and Procedures’ by Mandar Telang. The
learned speaker would cover the critical issues related to Input Tax Credit vis
a vis
section 36(4), e-invoicing, GST audit, Department audit  and so on. It would be a very relevant and
timely programme for professionals engaged in GST compliances.

 

I am eager to meet you virtually at the 54th BCAS
Residential Refresher Course.

 

May I suggest that you visit www.bcasonline.org for the
detailed announcements and enrolments?

 

This is the end of the unprecedented year 2020. My next
communication would be in 2021. The year 2020 has taught us so much. It was a
year of extraordinary experiences on various fronts – health, work, education,
knowledge-sharing and so on. It was a case of a paradigm shift. From the
uncertain times of the pandemic and related anxieties to hope of a vaccine
coming in and which could be the year-end gift to human beings. We should enter
the New Year with hope, new directions and a positive attitude.

 

I wish all of you a Merry Christmas and a Happy and Healthy New Year
– 2021. Let’s hope that in 2021 we are back to our normal social life with
personal, face-to-face interactions.

 

Till then, we follow the dictum, ‘We isolate now, so when we meet
again no one is missing!’

 

Best regards,

 

 

 

 

Suhas Paranjpe

President

FROM PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS

KEY AUDIT MATTER INCLUDED IN AUDIT REPORT ON
‘POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE’

 

BP
plc. (31st DECEMBER, 2019)

 

From
Audit Report on Consolidated Financial

Statements

Potential impact
of climate change and the energy transition (impacting PP&E, goodwill,
intangible assets and provisions)

 

KEY
AUDIT MATTER DESCRIPTION

Climate
change impacts BP’s business in a number of ways as set out in the strategic
report on pages 2-71 of the Annual Report and Accounts. It represents a
strategic challenge with its implications becoming increasingly significant
towards 2050 and beyond. Whilst many of BP’s oil and gas properties and
refining assets are long-term in nature, none are being amortised over a period
that extends beyond this date. At current rates of depreciation, depletion and
amortisation (DD&A), the average life of the upstream PP&E is seven
years, and the downstream PP&E is 13 years. Accordingly, the related
principal risks that we have identified for our audit are as follows:

 

(1)   Forecast assumptions used in assessing the
value of assets within BP’s balance sheet for impairment testing, particularly
oil and gas price assumptions relevant to upstream oil and gas PP&E assets,
may not appropriately reflect changes in supply and demand due to climate
change and the energy transition (see ‘impairment of upstream PP&E’ below);

 

(2)   Recoverability of exploration and appraisal
(E&A) assets included within BP’s balance sheet where the investment
required in order to develop particular projects into producing oil and gas
PP&E assets might not be sanctioned by the board in future due to climate
change considerations or a potential development may not be considered to be
economic due to the impact of climate change and the energy transition on oil
and gas prices (see ‘impairment of exploration and appraisal assets’ below).
Management also assessed the following potential risks that could arise from
climate change considerations;

 

(3)   The carrying value of goodwill may no longer
be recoverable and therefore may need to be impaired;

 

(4)   The useful economic lives of the group’s
PP&E may be shortened as society moves towards ‘net zero’ emissions
targets, such that the DD&A charge is materially understated;

 

(5)   Decommissioning and asset retirement
obligations may need to be brought forward with a resulting increase in the
present value of the associated liabilities; and

 

(6)   Climate change-related litigation brought
against BP, as disclosed in Note 33 to the financial statements and described
on page 320 under legal proceedings, may lead to an outflow of funds requiring
provision in the current year.

 

The material upstream goodwill balance is recorded and tested at the
segment level. The most significant assumption in the goodwill impairment test
affected by climate change relates to future oil and gas prices (see
‘impairment of upstream PP&E’ below). Given the significant headroom in the
goodwill impairment test, management identified no other assumption that could
lead to a material misstatement of goodwill due to the energy transition and
other climate change factors. Disclosures in relation to sensitivities for
goodwill are included within Note 14 on pages 187-188. The downstream segment
has a goodwill balance at 31st December, 2019 of $3.9 billion, of
which the most significant element is $2.8 billion relating to the lubricants
business. Notwithstanding the expected global transition to electric vehicles,
management noted that demand for lubricants is forecast to continue to grow
until at least 2040, underpinning the substantial headroom in the most recent
impairment test as described in Note 14. As described on pages 70-71 and in
Note 1, the impact of potential changes in DD&A charges, or to decommissioning
dates would not have a material impact on the amounts reported in the current
period.

 

The above
considerations were a significant focus of management during the period which
led to this being a matter that we communicated to the audit committee, and
which had a significant effect on the overall audit strategy. We therefore
identified this as a key audit matter.

 

How
the scope of our audit responded to the key audit matter

Overall
response

We held
discussions with management, with Deloitte specialists and within the Group
engagement team to identify the areas where we felt climate change could have a
potential impact on the financial statements.

 

We also established a climate change steering committee comprising a
group of senior partners with specific sustainability and technical audit and
accounting expertise within Deloitte to provide an independent challenge to our
key decisions and conclusions with respect to this area.

 

Audit
procedures in respect of impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets and
exploration and appraisal assets

The audit
response related to the two principal risks identified is set out under the key
audit matters for impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets on pages
135-136 and the impairment of exploration and appraisal assets on page 137.

 

Other
audit procedures performed

We
challenged management’s assertion that the impact of potential changes in
DD&A charges, or to decommissioning dates, would not have a material impact
on the amounts reported in the current period, by making inquiries of relevant
BP personnel outside the finance function, reviewing internal and external
documents and conducting sensitivity analysis as part of our audit risk
assessment procedures. We obtained third party forecasts of future refined
petroleum product demand for those countries which are included in our group
full audit scope for downstream, under a range of scenarios including scenarios
noted as being consistent with achieving the 2015 COP 21 Paris agreement goal
to limit temperature rises to well below 2°C (‘Paris 2°C Goal’). These
indicated that global demand for such products was expected to remain
significant until at least 2040.

 

We
performed procedures to satisfy ourselves that, other than future oil and gas
price assumptions, there were no other assumptions in management’s goodwill
calculations to which reasonably possible changes could cause goodwill to be
materially misstated.

 

We
obtained an understanding of the controls identified by management as being
relevant to ensuring the completeness and accuracy of litigation and climate
change related disclosure within the Annual Report; we performed procedures to
test these controls.

 

With
regard to climate change litigation, we designed procedures specifically to
respond to the risks that provisions could be understated or that contingent
liability disclosures may be omitted or be inaccurate, including:

(i)   Holding discussions with the group general
counsel and other senior BP lawyers regarding climate change matters;

(ii)  Conducting a search for climate change
litigation and claims brought against the group; and

(iii) Making written inquiries of, and holding
discussions with, external legal counsel advising BP in relation to climate
change litigation.

 

We read
the other information included in the Annual Report and considered (a) whether
there was any material inconsistency between the other information and the
financial statements; or (b) whether there was any material inconsistency
between the other information and our understanding of the business based on
audit evidence obtained and conclusions reached in the audit.

 

 

 

 

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Corrigendum

We published an article titled Personal Data Protection by Mr. Rajendra
Ponkshe
in the November 2020 issue
of
bcaj, on
page 44. Mr. Ponkshe’s title was wrongly mentioned as ?Advocate’ instead of
?Chartered Accountant’.

 

This oversight at Spenta Multimedia, is regretted. The readers are requested
to note the correct title of the author.

__________________________________

FINANCIAL REPORTING DOSSIER

1.  Key Recent Updates

IAASB:
Auditing ECL Accounting Estimates

On 31st
August, 2020, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)
published New Illustrative Examples for ISA 540 (Revised) Implementation:
Expected Credit Losses (ECL).
The examples were developed to assist
auditors in understanding how ISA 540 (R) may be applied to IFRS 9 Expected
Credit
Losses, viz. a) credit card, b) significant
increase in credit risk, and c) macroeconomic inputs and data.

 

IAASB:
Using Automated Tools and Techniques in Audit Procedures

A month
later, on 28th September, 2020, IAASB released a non-authoritative
FAQ publication regarding the Use of Automated Tools and Techniques in
Performing Audit Procedures
to assist auditors in understanding whether
a procedure involving automated tools and techniques may be both a risk
assessment procedure and a further audit procedure. It provides specific
considerations when using automated tools and techniques in performing
substantive analytical procedures in accordance with ISA 520, Analytical
Procedures.

 

AICPA:
Considerations Regarding the Use of Specialists in the Covid-19 Environment

On 6th
October, 2020, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) and IAASB
jointly released a publication,Using Specialists in the Covid-19
Environment: Including Considerations for Involving Specialists in Audits of
Financial Statements
. The publication provides guidance to assist
preparers and auditors of financial statements to determine when there might be
a need to use the services of a specialist to assist in performing specific
tasks and other professional activities in the Covid-19 environment.

 

FRC: The
Future of Corporate Reporting

Two days
later, on 8th October, 2020, the UK Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) released a Discussion Paper: A Matter of Principles – The Future of
Corporate Reporting
outlining a blueprint for a more agile approach to
corporate reporting. The proposals in the discussion paper include: a)
unbundling the existing purpose, content and intended audiences of the current
annual report by moving to a network of interconnected reports; b) a new common
set of principles that applies to all types of corporate reporting; c)
objective-driven reports that accommodate the interests of a wider group of
stakeholders, rather than the perceived needs of a single set of users; d)
embracing the opportunities available through technology to improve the
accessibility of corporate reporting; and e) a model that enables reporting
that is flexible and responsive to changing demands and circumstances.

 

SEC:
Auditor Independence Rules

On 16th
October, 2020, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) updated the Auditor
Independence Rules.
The amendments to Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X
modernises the rules and more effectively focuses the analysis on relationships
and services that may pose threats to an auditor’s objectivity and
impartiality. The amendments reflect updates based on recurring fact patterns
that the SEC staff observed over years of consultations in which certain
relationships and services triggered technical independence rule violations
without necessarily impairing an auditor’s objectivity and impartiality.

 

FASB:
Borrower’s Accounting for Debt Modifications

On 28th
October, 2020, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a Staff
Educational Paper – Topic 470 (Debt): Borrower’s Accounting for Debt
Modifications.
According to the FASB, because of the effects of
Covid-19 there may be increased modifications or exchanges of outstanding debt
arrangements. The educational material provides an overview of the accounting
guidance for common modifications to, and exchange of, debt arrangements and
illustrative examples of common debt modifications and exchanges.

 

PCAOB:
Impact of CAM Requirements

And on 29th
October, 2020, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) released
an Interim Analysis Report – Evidence on the Initial Impact of Critical
Audit Matter (CAM) Requirements
providing insights and perspectives of
the Board on the initial impact of CAM requirements on key stakeholders in the
audit process. Key findings include: a) Audit firms made significant
investments to support initial implementation of CAM requirements, b) Investor
awareness of CAMs communicated in the Auditor’s Report is still developing, but
some investors find the information beneficial, and c) the most frequently
communicated CAMs were revenue recognition, goodwill, other intangible assets
and business combinations.

 

2. Research: Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs Setting
the context

Borrowing
costs, in general, are period costs expensed to the income statement unless an entity
incurs the same for acquiring a qualifying asset, in which case the same is
capitalised as part of the cost of that qualifying asset.

 

Under the
IFRS framework, the core principle of IAS 23, Borrowing Costs is
‘Borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset form part of the cost of that
asset. Other borrowing costs are recognised as an expense.’ [IAS 23.1]

 

In this
context, a Qualifying Asset is an asset that necessarily takes a
substantial period of time to get ready for its intended use or sale, and Borrowing
Costs
are interest and other costs incurred in connection with
borrowing of funds. Borrowing costs include interest expense, interest on lease
liabilities and exchange differences arising from foreign currency borrowings
to the extent they are regarded as an adjustment to interest costs.

 

US GAAP
has similar principles although certain terminologies and the computation
process slightly differ from IFRS.

 

In the
following sections, an attempt is made to address the following questions: How
did capitalisation of borrowing costs as an accounting topic originate? What
have been the related historical developments and the approaches adopted by
global standard-setters? What are the principles that underpin them? What is
the current position under prominent GAAPs?

 

The
Position under Prominent GAAPs

USGAAP

Capitalisation
of borrowing costs has its genesis in USGAAP. SFAS No. 34, Capitalisation of
Interest Cost
was issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
in 1979 (Extant US GAAP ASC 835).

 

Tracing
its origins, the American Institute of Accountants set up a Committee in 1917
on ‘Interest in Relation to Cost’. The Committee concluded that interest
on investments should not be included in production cost. However, the
accounting issue of capitalising interest cost was never resolved under US
accounting literature until the issuance of SFAS No. 34.

 

Capitalisation
of interest cost was practised by US Public Utilities: The rate of return on
investment was used to set regulatory prices in the industry. Accordingly, as a
practice, interest cost incurred in connection with capacity expansion was
capitalised as expensing the same would have meant that current users of
utility services would have to pay for future capacity creation. There was no
codified accounting standard on interest capitalisation and the same was also
not explicitly prohibited.

 

It was in
1974 that the US capital market regulator, the SEC, becoming concerned with the
increase in non-utility registrants adopting a policy of capitalising interest
costs, proposed a moratorium on adoption or extension of a policy of
capitalising interest costs by non-public utility registrants that had not publicly
disclosed such a policy until then. The moratorium applied till such time as
the FASB developed a related accounting standard. Accordingly, five years later
the FASB issued SFAS No.34.

 

The FASB
considered three basic methods of accounting for interest costs as part of the
standard-setting process, viz:

 

i)     Account for interest on debt as an expense
of the period in which it is incurred,

ii)    Capitalise interest on debt as part of the
cost of an asset when prescribed conditions are met, and

iii)   Capitalise interest on debt and imputed
interest on stockholder’s equity as part of the cost of an asset when
prescribed conditions are met.

 

The
standard-setter opined that the historical cost of acquiring an asset includes
the costs necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition and location
necessary for its intended use. If an asset requires a period of time in which
to carry out the activities necessary to bring it to the condition and location,
the interest cost incurred during that period as a result of expenditures for
the asset is a part of the historical cost of acquiring the asset. The
objectives of capitalising interest were: (a) to obtain a measure of
acquisition cost that more closely reflects the enterprise’s total investment
in the asset, and (b) to charge a cost that relates to the acquisition of a
resource that will benefit future periods against the revenues of the periods
benefited.

 

On the
premise that the historical cost of acquiring an asset should include all costs
necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition and location necessary for
its intended use, the FASB concluded that, in principle, the cost incurred in
financing expenditures for an asset during a required construction or
development period is itself a part of the asset’s historical acquisition cost.

 

IFRS

The
accounting topic of Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs made its
entry into International Accounting Standards (now IFRS) in 1984 with the
inclusion of IAS 23, Capitalisation of Borrowing Costs in the accounting
framework. This standard underwent a revision in 1993 as part of the
standard-setters’ ‘Comparability of Financial Statements’ project.

 

It may be
noted that the 1993 version of IAS 23 permitted two treatments for accounting
for borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset. They could be capitalised or,
alternatively, recognised immediately as an expense. The IASB concluded that during
the period when an asset is under development, the expenditure for the
resources must be financed, and financing has a cost. The cost of the asset
should, therefore, include all costs necessarily incurred to get the asset
ready for its intended use / sale, including the cost incurred in financing the
expenditures as a part of the asset’s acquisition cost. The Board reasoned that
a) immediate expensing of borrowing costs relating to qualifying assets does
not give a faithful representation of the cost of the asset, and b) the
purchase price of a completed asset purchased from a third party would include
financing costs incurred by the third party during the development phase.

 

Accordingly,
extant IAS 23 Borrowing Costs was issued in 2007 by way of revision to
the 1993 version and was made effective from 1st January, 2009.

 

Indian
Accounting Standards (Ind AS 23, Borrowing Costs) is aligned with its
IFRS counterpart IAS 23.

AS

AS 16, Borrowing Costs requires borrowing costs that are directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying
asset to be capitalised as part of the cost of that asset. Other borrowing
costs should be recognised as an expense in the period in which they are
incurred. Borrowing costs include: a) interest and commitment charges, b)
amortisation of discounts or premiums, c) amortisation of ancillary costs, d)
finance lease charges, and e) exchange differences arising from foreign
currency borrowings to the extent that they are regarded as an adjustment to
interest costs.

 

IFRS for
SMEs

Section
25, Borrowing Costs of the IFRS for SMEs Framework requires all
borrowing costs to be recognised as an expense compulsorily in the period in
which they are incurred.

 

AICPA’s
Financial Reporting Framework for Small-and Medium-Sized Entities (FRF for
SMEs)

The US FRF
(a special purpose framework for SMEs, not based on USGAAP) does not contain a
separate chapter on Borrowing Costs. However, capitalisation of interest
costs is permitted as detailed herein below.

 

14, Property, Plant
and Equipment
states that the cost of an item of PPE that is acquired,
constructed or developed over time includes carrying costs directly
attributable to the acquisition, construction or development activity, such as
interest costs when the entity’s accounting policy is to capitalise interest
costs. The Chapter on Intangible Assets contains similar provisions with
respect to Internally-Generated Intangible Assets.

 

Chapter 12, Inventories states that
the cost of inventories that require a substantial period of time to get them
ready for their intended use or sale includes interest costs, when the entity’s
accounting policy is to capitalise interest costs.

 

Accordingly,
under the FRF for SMEs framework, capitalisation of interest costs is permitted
if an entity elects to do so as an accounting policy choice. It is not a
mandatory requirement.

 

Snapshot
of position under Prominent GAAPs

A snapshot
of the position under prominent GAAPs is provided in Table A.

Table
A:

Accounting framework

Capitalisation of borrowing costs

Standard

USGAAP

If an asset requires a period of time in which to carry out the
activities necessary to bring it to the condition and location of intended
use, interest cost incurred during that period is part of the historical cost
of acquiring the asset

ASC 835-20, Capitalisation of
Interest

IFRS

Borrowing costs directly attributable to the acquisition,
construction or production of a qualifying asset are capitalised as part of
the cost of the asset

IAS 23,
Borrowing Costs

Ind AS

Same as IFRS

Ind AS 23,
Borrowing Costs

AS

Similar in principle to Ind AS except that the definition of
borrowing costs differs

AS 16,
Borrowing Costs

IFRS for SMEs

All borrowing costs are required to be expensed

Section 25,
Borrowing Costs

US FRF for SMEs

Interest costs incurred for PPE, internally generated
intangibles acquired / developed / constructed over time can be capitalised
if an entity elects to do so

No separate chapter

 

 

In
Conclusion

Capitalisation of interest costs started as an industry practice in the
US public utilities industry and non-utilities, too, started embracing this
accounting treatment. The capital market regulator had to step in to curb this
practice by way of a moratorium on fresh adoption, thereby forcing the
accounting standard-setter to issue an accounting standard for the first time
in 1979.

 

The
International Accounting Standards permitted an accounting policy choice of
capitalising interest costs on qualifying assets or expensing them. This being
at variance with USGAAP, the IASB, as part of a short-term convergence project
with USGAAP, removed this option in 2009.

 

USGAAP and
IFRS are aligned in principle in this accounting area albeit
capitalisation of exchange differences is not permissible under USGAAP.

 

The IASB,
in the process of revising IAS 23 in 2007, acknowledged that capitalising
borrowing costs does not achieve comparability between assets that are financed
with borrowings and those financed with equity. However, it does achieve
comparability among all non-equity financed assets, which it perceived as an
accounting improvement.

References:

– SFAS No.
34, as originally issued

– IAS 23
Basis for Conclusion

-http://archives.cpajournal.com/printversions/cpaj/2005/205/p18.htm

 

3. Global Annual Report Extracts: ‘Statement –
Fair, Balanced and Understandable’

Background

The UK
Corporate Governance Code (applicable to all companies with a premium listing)
published by the FRC requires a company’s board to explicitly state in the
annual report that they consider the annual report and accounts as fair,
balanced and understandable. This requirement was first made applicable in
2013. This reporting obligation cast on the Board is contained in section 4,
Principle N, Provision 27 of the 2018 Code (extracted below).

 

Section 4
– Audit, Risk and Internal Control

Principle
N – The Board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of
the company’s position and prospects.

Provision 27 – The directors should explain in the annual report their
responsibility for preparing the annual report and accounts, and state that
they consider the annual report and accounts, taken as a whole, is fair,
balanced and understandable and provides the information necessary for
shareholders to assess the company’s position, performance, business model and
strategy.

 

Extracts
from an Annual Report

Company: Ascential plc (FTSE 250 Listed
Company, 2019 Revenues – GBP 416 million)

Extracts
from Director’s Report:

We
consider the Annual Report and Accounts, taken as a whole, is fair, balanced
and understandable and provides the information necessary for shareholders to
assess the Group’s position and performance, business model and strategy.

 

Extracts
from the Report of the Audit Committee:

Section –
Fair, balanced and understandable

The Board
asked the committee to consider whether the 2019 Annual Report is fair,
balanced and provides the necessary information for shareholders to assess the
Company’s position and prospects, business model and strategy. In performing
this review, the Committee considered the following questions:

Is the
Annual Report open and honest with the whole story being presented?

Have any
sensitive material areas been omitted?

Is there consistency between different sections of the Annual Report,
including between the narrative and the financial statements, and does the
reader get the same message from reading the two sections independently?

Is there a clear explanation of key performance indicators and their
linkage to strategy?

Is there a
clear and cohesive framework for the Annual Report with key messages drawn out
and written in accessible language?

 

Following
this review, and the incorporation of the Committee’s comments, we were pleased
to advise the Board that, in our view, the Annual Report is fair, balanced and
understandable in accordance with the requirements of the UK Corporate
Governance Code.

4. COMPLIANCE: CHANGES IN LIABILITIES ARISING FROM
FINANCING ACTIVITIES

Background

Ind AS
requires entities to provide disclosures that enable users of financial
statements to evaluate changes in its ‘Liabilities from Financing Activities’.
Ind AS 7, Statement of Cash Flows mandates disclosure of movement
between the amounts in the opening and closing balance sheets for liabilities
for which cash flows were, or future cash flows will be, classified as
financing activities in the Cash Flow Statement.

 

An entity
needs to take into consideration relevant requirements of Ind AS 7 (Paragraphs
44A to 44E), IAS 7 – Basis for Conclusions, and Ind AS 1, Presentation
of Financial Statements
in complying with this requirement. The same is
summarised in Table B herein below.

5. INTEGRATED REPORTING

Key Recent
Update

On 11th
September, 2020, the five Global Sustainability, ESG and IR Framework and
standard-setting organisations (GRI, CDP, CDSB, IIRC and SASB) co-published a
shared vision of the elements necessary for more comprehensive corporate
reporting and a joint statement of intent to drive towards this goal. A report
titled Statement of Intent to Work Together Towards Comprehensive
Corporate Reporting
was released that inter alia discusses: a)
the importance of recognising various users and objectives of sustainability
disclosures and the resulting distinctive materiality concepts; b) addresses
the unique role of frameworks and standards in the sustainability information
eco-system; and c) outlines an approach to standard-setting that results in a
globally agreed set of sustainability topics and related disclosure
requirements.

 

Materiality
in Sustainability Reporting

Background

Global Reporting Initiative Standard GRI 101: Foundation applies
to organisations that want to use the GRI Standards to report about their
economic, environmental, and / or social impacts in their sustainability
reporting. In sustainability reporting, materiality is the principle that
determines which relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is
essential to report on them. A material topic is a topic that reflects a
reporting organisation’s significant economic, environmental and social
impacts; or that substantively influences the assessments and decisions of
stakeholders.

 

Extracts
from Annual Integrated Report of Netcare Limited, a leading healthcare
service provider in SA

Materiality

Matters
that have the potential to substantively affect our ability to create value for
all stakeholders in the short (one to two years), medium (three to five years)
and long term, and which are likely to influence their decisions in assessing
this ability, are considered material.

 

The
material matters, mapped to the Group’s strategic priorities, informed the
preparation of and are discussed throughout the Integrated Report.

 

Materiality
Themes

Deliver
outstanding person-centred health and care,

Adapt
proactively to developments in the local and global healthcare sectors,

Demonstrate
our commitment to transforming healthcare in SA,

Defend and
grow sustainable profitability,

Continue
to develop visionary and effective leadership.

 

6. FROM THE PAST – ‘Lack Of Transparency Directly
Feeds Into Lack Of Stability’

Extracts
from a speech by Mr. Hans Hoogervorst (then Chairman, IFRS Foundation Monitoring
Board) at a conference in Brussels organised by the European Commission in
February, 2011 related to objectives of financial reporting are reproduced
below:

 

Stability
should be a consequence of greater transparency, rather than a primary goal of
accounting standard-setters.

 

What
accounting standard-setters can also not do is to pretend that things are
stable which are not. And, quite frankly, this is where their relationship with
prudential regulators sometimes becomes testy. Accounting standard-setters are
sometimes suspicious that they are being asked to put a veneer of stability on
instruments which are inherently volatile in value.

 

The truth is that investors around the world have had little faith that
the financial industry has been facing up to its problems in the past years. In
such circumstances, markets often become suspicious and they tend to overreact.
Thus, lack of transparency directly feeds into lack of stability.

 

There is
one final reason why I think that both the accounting and prudential community
should be fully committed to transparency. That reason is that preventing a
crisis through full risk transparency is much less costly than letting things
go and cleaning up afterwards’.

 

ETHICS AND U

Shrikrishna:
Yes, my dear Arjun, how was Diwali? Any special purchases for Draupadi and
Subhadra?

 

Arjun:
Lord, due to this Covid-19 created by you, our coffers are empty. No money.
Running hand to mouth.

 

Shrikrishna:
I created Covid?

 

Arjun:
Who else? You are the Doer and Undoer of everything. Creator and Destroyer,
both.

 

Shrikrishna:
No, Arjun. I don’t create any pandemic. It is you mortals that invite
everything by your acts. It is a fruit of your karma. Anyway, how is
office going on? Still working from home?

 

Arjun:
Yes, Lord. In Mumbai, without local trains activity gets paralysed for a common
man. Staff cannot attend office. Efficiency is hampered.

 

Shrikrishna:
Why? One gets ample time at home.

 

Arjun:
Correct; but other necessary references are not readily available. But forget
that, I am disturbed due to another serious problem.

 

Shrikrishna:
What is that?

 

Arjun: See.
There is always last minute rush in our offices. Many complicated and delicate
issues arise in many cases. There is a dilemma as to what stand to take.

 

Shrikrishna:
Agreed. Even in the Mahabharat war you were faced with the dilemma – to
fight or not to fight! It’s a part of life.

 

Arjun: But
in our case it is all the more difficult. It is a daily phenomenon.

 

Shrikrishna:
Then take some expert advice. Discuss with the client.

 

Arjun:
That’s the problem, Bhagwan. There is no time. It is like fire-fighting.
So, ultimately we take a stand on our own and go ahead.

 

Shrikrishna:
So then…?

 

Arjun:
If anything goes wrong, the clients start blaming us. They speak from both the
sides. Actually, we take a decision which we honestly think is for the client’s
benefit.

 

Shrikrishna:
Agreed. But you have no control over the outcome. If it clicks, no one gives
credit, but if it misfires, you are to be hanged.

 

Arjun:
You said it! What to do?

 

Shrikrishna:
I see there are two reasons for such a situation. Firstly, you are not
proactive. Why the last minute rush every year? Secondly, you don’t communicate
with the client in time and involve him in the decision. Explain the pros and
cons.

 

Arjun:
But they say, it’s left to us.

 

Shrikrishna:
Fine. But then, they cannot blame you later. They were given an opportunity.

 

Arjun:
I remember, in the war also, you used to give opportunity to everyone before we
killed them!

 

Shrikrishna:
Moreover, please keep your role clearly in mind. You are an adviser and not the
decision-maker. Don’t step into the shoes of the client.

 

Arjun:
Just see, for example, there is the Vivad se Vishwas scheme of the tax
department. In many cases, appeals are dicey. Out of several grounds, a few are
strong, others very weak.

 

Shrikrishna:
Then you should communicate to the clients well in time about the scheme, what
are the merits, what are the stakes involved and take them into confidence.
Perhaps, they can also suggest something useful.

 

Arjun:
I agree. I must do this right away. Actually, the last date is 31st
December.

Shrikrishna:
Even in the tax audits and returns, you anticipate the issues of dilemma in
major cases. Start thinking immediately. Obtain experts’ views.

 

Arjun: I will do it on priority
basis. A few of my friends have received complaints made by clients to the
Council. They say, the CA took decisions directly without informing them!

 

Shrikrishna:
Remember, after explaining my full philosophy in the Bhagavad Geeta, I
asked you whether you have understood what I was saying; and then asked you to
take your own decision, use your own discretion. I said
(‘yathechchhasi tathaa kuru’).

 

Arjun:
Yes, Bhagwan. I will use my discretion and act.

 

Om Shanti!

 

(This
dialogue is based on understanding clearly the role of a professional, and the
importance of timely communication with the client while taking any stand.).

 
 

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

4. Economy Hotels India Services (P) Ltd. vs. Registrar of Companies
[2020] 119 taxmann.com 271 (NCLAT) Date of order: 24th August, 2020

 

There was an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in extract of
‘Minutes of Meeting’ characterising ‘special resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary
resolution’. Appellant company had tacitly admitted typographical error in
extract of minutes. Registrar of Companies had noted that appellant / company
had filed special resolution with it which satisfied requirements of section 66
of the Companies Act, 2013. The petition, filed by company u/s 66(1)(b)
rejected by NCLT on ground that there was no special resolution for reduction
of share capital as prescribed u/s 66 and as required in article 9 of the
Articles of Association of company, was set aside

 

FACTS

E Private Limited (E) is a closely-held private company, limited by
shares, incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. In fact,
Article 9 of the ‘Articles of Association’ of the appellant company specifies
that the company may, from time to time by a special resolution, reduce its
share capital in any manner permitted by law.

 

E had filed a petition u/s 66(1)(b) of the Companies Act praying for
passing of an order for confirming the reduction of share capital wherein it
had averred as under:

 

‘That annual general meeting of E was held on 19th August,
2019 and was attended by both the equity shareholders holding 100% of the issued,
subscribed and paid-up equity share capital of E. The said equity shareholders
present at the said meeting have cast their votes in favour of the aforesaid
resolution, etc.’

 

More specifically, E in the Company Petition had sought relief to
confirm the reduction of the issued, subscribed and paid-up equity share
capital of E as resolved by the members in the AGM held on 19th
August, 2019 by passing the special resolution. Further in the said petition, E
had prayed to approve the form of minutes under sub-section 5 of section 66 of
the Act.

 

E contended that it had placed on record sufficient documents to prove
that ‘special resolution’ as required u/s 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 as well
as in terms of the requirements under Article 9 of the ‘Articles of
Association’ of E was passed.

 

The National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench V while passing the
order on 27th May, 2020 had observed as under:

 

‘We have perused the minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the
company held on 19th August, 2019. On page 124 of the paper book, it
is recorded that the meeting has passed the resolution for reduction of capital
“as an ordinary resolution.” The minutes of the meeting have been
signed by the Chairman of the meeting.

 

Thus, we observe that the company has not met the specific requirement
of section 66 of the Companies Act by passing “Special Resolution” for
reduction of share capital. The company has also not complied with the
requirements of its own Articles of Association.

 

We are left with no choice but to reject the application in view of the
fact that there is no special resolution for reduction of share capital as
prescribed u/s 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 and as required in Article 9 of
the Articles of Association of the company. Section 66 of the Companies Act
also requires this Tribunal to approve the minutes of the resolution passed by
the Company which has been passed as ordinary resolution as against the
requirement of special resolution
; the Tribunal is not in a position to
approve such minutes in this case.’

 

HELD

The Appellate Tribunal observed / noted as under:

 

E had made a plea that the National Company Law Tribunal had failed to
appreciate the creeping in of an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in
the extract of the ‘Minutes of the Meeting’ characterising the ‘special
resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’. Moreover, E had fulfilled all
the statutory requirements prescribed u/s 114 of the Companies Act and as such
the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside.

 

It transpires
that the ‘Special Resolution’ passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ as filed
with the e-form MGT-14 reflects that the resolution passed by the shareholders
u/s 67 of the Companies Act, 2013 on 19th August, 2019 is a ‘Special
Resolution’ which is taken on record in the MCA21 Registry.

 

Further, the Resolution passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ of the
appellant’s company u/s 66 of the Companies Act was found to be in order by the
ROC. Even the report of the Registrar of Companies, Delhi found that E had
filed the said resolution keeping in tune with the ingredients of section 66 of
the Companies Act, 2013.

 

The Appellate
Tribunal noted that ‘Reduction of Capital’ is a ‘Domestic Affair’
of a particular company in which, ordinarily, a Tribunal will not interfere
because of the reason that it is a ‘majority decision’ which prevails. The term
‘Share Capital’ is a ‘genus’ of which ‘Equity and Preference share capital’ are
‘species’.

 

It is further
pointed out that section 114(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 enjoins that
‘Special Resolution’ means a resolution where a decision is reached by a
special majority of more than 75% of the members of a company voting in person
or proxy.

 

On a careful
consideration of the respective contentions, this Tribunal after subjectively
satisfying itself that E has tacitly admitted the creeping in of a
typographical error in the extract of the minutes and also taking into
consideration the stand of the ROC that E had filed the special resolution with
it, which satisfies the requirement of section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013,
allows the appeal by setting aside the order passed by the National Company Law
Tribunal, Bench V.

 

The Appellate
Tribunal thus confirmed the reduction of share capital of E as resolved by the
‘Members’ in their ‘Annual General Meeting’ that took place on 19th
August, 2019 and the Tribunal further approved the form of minutes required to
be filed by E with the Registrar of Companies, Delhi u/s 66(5) of the Companies
Act, 2013.
 

ALLIED LAWS

11. Ravi Dixit vs. State of U.P. and another Application u/s 482 No. 14068 of 2020
(All.)(HC) Date of order: 23rd September,
2020
Bench: Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker J.

Dishonour of cheque – Intention not to make
payment – Complainant need not wait 15 days [Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
S. 138]

 

FACTS

A cheque of Rs. 5,00,000 was issued on 1st
March, 2019 and another cheque of Rs. 5,98,000 on 2nd March,
2019. Both were dishonoured on 28th May, 2019 as the drawer (the
petitioner here) had directed the bank to stop the payments. The complainant
sent a notice to the petitioner on 11th June, 2019. A response was
received on 25th June, 2019. But the complainant did not receive any
money; therefore, on 29th June, 2019, he filed a complaint u/s 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

 

The Judge, after
referring to the dates, was satisfied that a prima facie case is made
out for issuance of notice and so on 3rd September, 2019 passed the
summoning order.

 

The petitioner
approached the High Court stating that the complainant should have waited for a
period of 15 days and should not have filed the complaint on 29th
June, 2019.

 

HELD

The provision of section 138 of the N.I. Act
cannot be interpreted to mean that even if the accused refuses to make the
payment the complainant cannot file a complaint. Proviso (c) of the said
section is to see the bona fides of the drawer of the cheque and is with
a view to grant him a chance to make the payment. The proviso does not
constitute ingredients of an offence punishable u/s 138. It simply postpones
the actual prosecution of  the offender
till such time as he fails to pay the amount, then the statutory period
prescribed begins for lodgement of complaint.

The petitioner replied to the notice which
goes to show that the intention of the drawer is clear that he did not wish to
make the payment. Once this is clarified, the complainant need not wait for the
minimum period of 15 days. The petition was dismissed with cost.

 

12. High Court on its own motion vs. the State of  Maharashtra Suo motu WP (ST) No. 93432 of 2020 (Bom.)(HC) Date of order: 29th October, 2020 Bench: Hon’ble C.J., A.A. Sayed J., S.S. Shinde
J., K.K. Tated J.

 

Covid-19 – Extension of interim orders –
Eviction, demolition and dispossession – Passed by the Courts in Maharashtra
and Goa – Until 22nd December, 2020

 

FACTS / HELD

Although the situation in the State of
Maharashtra because of the pandemic has improved over the last few days, access
to the Courts of law is not easy. To ensure that persons suffering orders of
dispossession, demolition, eviction, etc., passed by public authorities are not
inconvenienced by reason of inability to approach the Courts because of the
restrictions on movements imposed by the State Government, as well as the
requirement to maintain social distancing norms, the Court considered it just
and proper to extend the interim orders passed by it on this writ petition till
22nd December, 2020 or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

 

13. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. vs. Seirra Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. A.P. 185 of 2020 (Cal.)(HC) Date of order: 7th October, 2020 Bench: Moushumi Bhattacharya J.

 

Arbitration – Interim relief – Jurisdiction
– Where a part of the cause of action has arisen – Valid [Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 2(1)(e)(i), S. 9]

 

FACTS

The petitioner / finance company has sought
an injunction restraining the respondent / hirer from dealing with the assets
leased by it (the petitioner) to the respondent under a Master Lease Agreement
entered into between the parties on 15th March, 2018. The petitioner
has alleged outstanding rental dues as on the date of termination of the agreement
and has sought for appointment of a receiver to take possession of the assets
together with an order directing the respondent to furnish security to the
extent of Rs. 75,19,388.

 

The respondent has raised a point of
maintainability of the application on the ground that this Court does not have
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application as would be evident from
the pleadings and documents, as also the relevant provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.

 

HELD

An application u/s 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed where a part of the cause of action has
arisen or where the seat of arbitration has been chosen by the parties. It is
stated that part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this
court.

 

Further, it
must also be borne in mind that the parties have consented to the jurisdiction
in clause 18(k) as well as the seat of arbitration as provided in clause 18(l)
of the agreement. Both these clauses point to ‘Kolkata’. Section 2(1)(e)(i) of
the 1996 Act designates the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
district, including the High Court in exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil
Jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject
matter of the arbitration for the purpose of applications in matters of
domestic arbitration under Part I of the Act. Therefore, the preliminary
objection of the respondent with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court,
fails.

 

14.
Paramount Prop. Build. Pvt. Ltd. through its authorised signatory Mr. Anil
Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. and 118 others
Writ (C)
No. 12573 of 2020 (All.)(HC) Date of
order: 4th November, 2020
Bench:
Surya Prakash Kesarwani J., 
Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.

 

Promoters – Delay in handing over
possession of the flats – Contravention of obligation cast upon promoters –
Authority empowered to award interest [Real Estate (Regulation and Development)
Act, 2016, S. 18, S. 38]

 

FACTS

The petitioner is a promoter and the
respondent Nos. 3 to 119 are allottees. The petitioner could not deliver
possession of the flats to the allottees in time and there occurred a delay.
The allottees filed separate complaints before the Uttar Pradesh Real Estate
Regulatory Authority, Gautam Buddh Nagar, who passed the impugned orders
awarding interest.

 

A writ petition was filed on the ground that
the impugned orders are without jurisdiction inasmuch as the power to grant
interest does not vest with the Authority.

 

HELD

Section 18 of the RERA Act, 2016 is in
respect of return of amount and compensation in case the promoter fails to
complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building.
Sub-section (1) of section 18 provides for two different contingencies. In case
the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, the promoter shall be liable
on demand to return the amount received by him to the allottees in respect of
the apartment, plot or building as the case may be, with interest at such rate
as may be prescribed, including compensation in the manner as provided under
the Act.

 

Alternatively, where the allottee does not
intend to withdraw from the project, the promoter shall, as per the proviso
to section 18(1) of the Act, be liable to pay interest for every month of delay
till the handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be prescribed.

 

Further, section 38(1) of the Act confers
powers upon the Authority to impose penalty or interest in regard to any
contravention of obligations cast upon the promoters, the allottees and the
real estate agents, under the Act or the Rules or the Regulations made
thereunder.

 

The promoter having contravened the
aforesaid obligation with regard to giving possession of the apartment by the
specified date, and complaints in this regard having been filed by the
allottees, the Authority exercising powers u/s 38(1) of the Act is fully
empowered to impose interest in regard to contravention of the obligation cast
upon the promoter.
 

 

SOCIETY NEWS

THE
GLOBAL ENERGY & OTHER CRISES

 

The world is currently experiencing
a plethora of problems – energy crisis, supply chain disruption, chip shortage
and inflation – and these will directly impact our lives and businesses and
also the manufacturing and economic development of the country. We are staring
at shortages of coal and natural gas, along with a sudden spike in the prices
of coal (up 40% to 100% in one year), natural gas (prices have shot up six to
eight times in the last one year) and oil (prediction of oil > $100+).
Global supply-chain bottlenecks are feeding on one another, with shortages of
components and surging prices of critical raw materials squeezing manufacturers
around the world with a delay in turnaround time for containers and congested
ports in the USA and China. This is adding to inflation.

 

The USA walked out of its
20-year-old war on terror in Afghanistan, proving once again that Afghanistan
is the ‘Graveyard of Empires’, having forced the retreat of the USSR, Britain,
the Mughals and the Mongolians. Will China take the risk of entering this
graveyard? Is Pakistan celebrating its pyrrhic victory in humbling two empires
(the USA and the USSR), or will it live to regret it as the international
community is upset with it? India could see the inflow of terrorists into
Kashmir, but with the technology widely used by our security forces, terrorists
are unlikely to have a safe passage.

 

These were some of the points made
at the IESG meeting held on 25th October, 2021. All members of the
group along with
CA Harshad Shah gave their views in the course of the
deliberations.

 

‘IMPORTANT
LEGACY JUDGMENTS ON INDIRECT TAXES’

The Indirect Tax Study Circle
organised a Zoom online meeting on ‘Important Legacy Judgments on Indirect
Taxes – Discussion on Principles, Issues & Jurisprudence w.r.t. GST’ on 26th
October. Group leader
CA Vishal Poddar had drafted five case studies on
important legacy judgments on indirect taxes. The implications of the
principles, issues and jurisprudence of these cases in the GST era were
discussed.

The case studies broadly covered
the following:

 

1. Penalty u/s 74 for non-reversal
of proportionate ITC u/s 17(2) towards sale of factory building;

2. Taxability and valuation of
supply in case of supply of raw materials by customer;

3. Mismatch in ITC as per GSTR9 and
GSTR2A;

4. GST on royalty for mining,
including RCM provisions; and

5. GST on cost-sharing
arrangements.

 

The participants took active part
in the discussion on all the case studies and the issues were discussed at
length. Mentor
Adv. CA Jatin Harjai offered his exhaustive comments on
several aspects covered in all the case studies. Around 50 participants
benefited from the active discussion led by him.

 

ITF
STUDY CIRCLE MEETING

 

The ITF Study Circle’s virtual
meeting on ‘Residence of Companies under the Act and DTAA’ took place on 29th
October.

 

It was led by Group Leader CA Abbas
Moiz Jaorawala
who explained the concepts with respect to residence of companies
under the Indian Income-tax Act and DTAA.

 

Determining a company’s residence
status is one of the most important factors based on which taxability is
decided. With this in mind, he walked the audience through the Income-tax Act,
its amendments, DTAAs and various court rulings in relation to residence of
companies. With the help of several simplified illustrations, he lucidly
explained various concepts related to the topic.

 

A
few other speakers also dealt with and answered queries raised by the audience.
The meeting was quite interactive and the participants said they benefited
enormously from the discussion and insights provided. The
BCAS
ITF
Study Circle plans to organise such insightful and exciting meetings for
participants in future as well. Details of the upcoming sessions will be shared
with the Study Circle and other members soon.

REGULATORY REFERENCER

DIRECT TAX


1. Tolerance band for wholesale trading and others:
The Central Government has notified the ‘Tolerance Band’ for A.Y. 2021-22 for wholesale trading and others. The Notification provides a tolerance range of one per cent for wholesale trading and three per cent in all other cases. [Notification No. 124 dated 29th October, 2021.]


2. e-Settlement Scheme, 2021:
The CBDT has notified ‘e-Settlement Scheme, 2021′ to settle pending income-tax settlement applications transferred to a settlement commission. [Notification No. 129/2021 dated 1st November, 2021.]

 

COMPANY LAW

I. COMPANIES ACT, 2013
 
1. Relaxations in paying additional fees in case of delay in filing Form-8 by LLPs: The MCA has extended the deadline for LLPs to file Form 8 (Statement of Accounts and Solvency) for F.Y. 2020-2021 until 30th December, 2021 in response to representations about the challenges faced because of the Covid-19 pandemic. [General Circular No. 16/2021 dated 26th October, 2021.]
 

2. Relaxation on levy of additional fees in filing of e-forms: MCA has provided relaxation on levy of additional fees for Annual Financial Statement filings required for the F.Y. ended 31st March, 2021. The normal fees are payable up to 31st December, 2021 for filing the annual financial statements in the e-forms such as AOC-4, AOC-4 (CFS), AOC-4 XBRL, and AOC-4 Non-XBRL, and MGT-7 / MGT-7A. [General Circular No. 17/2021 dated 29th October, 2021.]


3. Extension of last date of filing of Cost Audit Report:
MCA has extended the due date for filing of Cost Audit Report for F.Y. 2020-21 with the Central Government. As a result, the companies can file a Cost Audit Report by 30th November, 2021 instead of 31st October, 2021. [General Circular No. 18/2021 dated 29th October, 2021.]

 
4. IEPFA claim settlement process simplified: The MCA has further simplified the claim settlement process by rationalising various requirements under IEPF Authority (Accounting, Audit, Transfer and Refund) Rules, 2016. For claimants, requirement of advance receipt has been waived off and the requirement of Succession Certificate / Probate of Will / Will has been relaxed up to Rs. 5 lakhs both for physical and demat shares. [Press Release dated 12th November, 2021.]


II. SEBI

5. SEBI directs ‘Investment Advisers’ not to deal in unregulated activities: SEBI has directed registered Investment Advisers (IAs) not to deal in unregulated activities, i.e., advisory, distribution and execution / implementation services in digital gold and other unregulated instruments. Any dealing in unregulated activities by IAs may entail action as deemed appropriate under the SEBI Act, 1992 and regulations framed thereunder. [Press Release No. 30/2021, dated 21st October, 2021.]


6. SEBI amends norms for determination of legitimate claims:
SEBI has decided to revise the section relevant to the determination of legitimate claims with the goal of aligning them with securities market norms. When a member is designated a defaulter, the claim must be presented to the Member Core Settlement Guarantee Fund Committee (MCSGFC) for penalty and approval. In addition to the foregoing, the MCSGFC’s advice regarding legitimate claims shall be sent to the Investor Protection Fund (IPF) Trust for disbursement of the amount immediately. In case the claim amount is more than the coverage limit under IPF, or the amount sanctioned and ratified by the MCSGFC is less than the claim amount, then the investor will be at liberty to opt for arbitration / any other legal forum outside the exchange mechanism for claim of the balance amount. The provisions of this Circular shall come into effect from 1st January, 2022. [Circular No. SEBI/HO/CDMRD/DoC/P/CIR /2021/651, dated 22nd October, 2021.]

7. SEBI authorises practising Cost Accountants to issue Reconciliation of Share Capital Audit Report: SEBI has amended Regulation 76 of the SEBI (Depositories and Participants) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2018 authorising practising Cost Accountants to issue Reconciliation of Share Capital Audit Report. [Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN /2021/53, dated 26th October, 2021.]

 
8. Stock brokers should maintain current accounts in multiple banks for holding of client funds:
In order to facilitate seamless settlement of funds and for the convenience of investors, the SEBI has clarified that stock brokers should maintain current accounts in appropriate number of banks (subject to the maximum limit prescribed by stock exchanges / SEBI) for holding client funds for settlement purposes and any other accounts mandated by stock exchanges. [Circular No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/DOP/P/CIR/2021/653, dated 28th october, 2021.]

 
9. Legal framework governing portfolio managers – can’t provide investing advice on unlisted offshore shares: The SEBI has issued informal guidance whereby it has been clarified that the extant legal framework governing portfolio managers does not envisage investment advice on offshore shares and securities which are neither listed nor intended to be listed in the recognised stock exchanges. [Circular No. SEBI/HO/IMD/DF1/OW/P/2021/31147/1 dated 2nd November, 2021.]


10. SEBI eases norms for processing investor service request by RTAs:
As per SEBI’s new framework effective 1st January, 2022, in addition to responding to queries, complaints, and service requests through hard copies, the RTAs shall also process the same received through the registered e-mail address of the holder. Additionally, in the case of service requests, the documents furnished shall have e-sign of the holder(s) / claimant(s). [Circular No. SEBI/HO/MIRSD/MIRSD_RTAMB/P/CIR/2021/655, dated 3rd November, 2021.]

 
11. Any person holding more than 10% or more equity shares will be deemed as related party w.e.f. 1st April, 2023: The SEBI has amended the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, 2015 whereby the scope and definition of related party has been extended. The amendment states that any person or any entity holding equity shares of 20% or more, or 10% or more in the listed entity at any time during the immediate preceding financial year, shall be deemed to be a related party. [Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2021/55, dated 9th November, 2021.]

 

FEMA

1. FPIs allowed to invest in debt instruments issued by REITs and InvITs on repatriation basis: RBI has amended the Foreign Exchange Management (Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019 to allow FPIs to invest in debt securities issued by REITs and InvITs on repatriation basis by including these securities in Schedule 1 of the said regulations. [Notification No. FEMA. 396(1)/2021-RB, dated 13th October, 2021 notified on 21st October, 2021 and A.P. (DIR Series 2021-22) Circular No. 16, dated 8th November, 2021.]

 

RBI

1. Clarifications related to Prudential Norms on IRACP Norms: To ensure uniformity in implementing Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning (IRACP norms) of advances, the RBI has issued clarifications on specific aspects of the extant regulatory guidelines, which applies to all lending institutions. The clarifications relate to: specification of due date / repayment date; classification as SMA and NPA account; definition of ‘out of order’; NPA classification in case of interest payments; upgradation of accounts classified as NPAs; and income recognition policy for loans with moratorium on payment of interest. [Notification No. RBI/2021-22/125. DOR.STR.REC.68/21.04.048/2021-22 dated 12th November, 2021.]

 

ICAI MATERIAL

Accounts and Audit

1. Report on Audit Quality Review (2020-21): The report highlights key findings observed in Audit Quality Reviews conducted by the Quality Review Board during F.Y. 2020-21. It includes a summary of observations related to Standards on Auditing, AS and Ind AS, other relevant laws and regulations and key takeaways for audit firms.

 _________________________________________________________________________

Errata

Article: Auditor’s Evaluation of Going Concern Assessment, published in November 2021
We regret to point out a typographical error on Page 28 where ‘SA 260 Using the Work of an Expert’ should be replaced with ‘SA 620 Using the Work of an Auditor’s Expert’ and to be read accordingly.

MISCELLANEA

I. World News


Why governments across the globe are taxing major tech companies: Explained

In a landmark decision, 136 countries including India signed a pact to levy a minimum corporate tax of 15%. The pact would pave the way for governments across the globe to tax multinational companies where they operate. The step is part of a growing convergence that large multinational corporations are re-routing profits via low-tax jurisdictions in order to avoid paying taxes.

For over ten years the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is mostly made up of developed economies, has led discussions on a minimum corporate tax rate. Next year, a multilateral convention will be signed. The greatest impact is likely to be felt by ‘Big Tech’ companies which have largely chosen low-tax jurisdictions to base their operations.

The new proposal aims to limit multinational companies’ ability to engage in profit-shifting by requiring them to pay at least some of their taxes where they do operate. Earlier, in April this year, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen urged the world’s 20 advanced economies to adopt a minimum global corporate income tax. At this time, the US Government benefits from a global agreement. Similar is the case with most other Western European countries, even though some low-tax European jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg, as well as some Caribbean jurisdictions rely heavily on tax rate comparative advantage to attract MNCs.

It is pertinent to note that the IMF has also expressed some interest in the proposal. While China is unlikely to object seriously to the US call, Beijing is concerned about the impact on Hong Kong, which is the world’s seventh-largest tax haven, as per a study published earlier this year by the advocacy group Tax Justice Network. Furthermore, China’s strained relationship with the United States may act as a deterrent in negotiations.

How will this affect big tech companies?

Apart from low-tax jurisdictions, the proposals are tailored to address the low effective tax rates paid by some of the world’s largest corporations, including big tech behemoths such as Apple, Alphabet and Facebook, as well as Nike and Starbucks. These giants will have to pay taxes in the country of their operation. Importantly, these firms generally depend on complex webs of subsidiaries to divert profits from big markets to low-tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, the British Virgin Islands, the Bahamas or Panama.

 
(Source: International Business Times – By Ashish Shukla, 13th October, 2021)

II. Technology

Karnataka to set up Startup Silicon Valley Bridge

On 19th November, 2021, Karnataka’s Minister for Electronics announced the setting up of a ‘Startup Silicon Valley Bridge’ to help skilled employees to work for Startups located in the US’ Silicon Valley. He said the Government has received invitations from various participating countries in the BTS-2021 to visit their countries to further strengthen investment ties.

Dr. C.N. Aswath Narayan, who is the State’s Minister for Electronics, IT, BT and S&T, Higher Education, Skill Development, Entrepreneurship and Livelihood, pointed out that Startups located in the US’ Silicon Valley are facing human resource shortage.

In his valedictory address at the 24th edition of the ‘Bengaluru Tech Summit-2021’ (BTS), he said the bridge will also serve as a connection between Startups of both the countries, enabling sharing of knowledge and other resources as part of the new initiative.

Further, a ‘Beyond Bengaluru Startup Grid’ will be set up to facilitate growth of emerging industries in other cities outside Bengaluru.

Taking a cue from the success story of India’s leading stock broking company Zerodha, a home-grown fin-tech venture, Dr. Narayan announced the constitution of a fin-tech task force to attract investments in the financial sector.

 
The Government plans to set up a Centre of Excellence (CoE) and a back office in Mangaluru for the purpose.

An entrepreneur has evinced interest in setting up an electric battery manufacturing unit at Hubballi, he said.

 
As for the BTS-2021, it has attracted investments to the tune of over Rs. 5,000 crores in the aftermath of the announcement of the Government’s new ESDM policy with industries evincing interest in setting up semi-conductor plants, motors for air conditioners, solar cell units, and electric vehicles, among others.

 
Notwithstanding the raging pandemic, Dr. Narayan said a million people had changed jobs in the last six months and another 400,000 candidates were getting ready for employment.

 
He said that for the first time, organisers conducted pre-events in the cities of Mangaluru, Hubballi and Mysuru in the run-up to BTS-2021 to promote the concept of industries going beyond Bengaluru.

‘Tech Summit’ was held in these clusters with strong participation notwithstanding the pandemic, he said.

 
The Government of Karnataka has received invitations from various participating countries in the BTS-2021 to visit their countries to further strengthen investment ties.

The Sydney Conclave and the Indo-US Conclave were successes as these saw interactions between the Prime Ministers of India and Australia and the US Consul-General in Chennai.

 
Dr. Narayan added that the 25th edition (silver jubilee) of the BTS to be held in 2022 (between 16th and 18th November) will be bigger and better and no effort will be spared to make it grand and more successful than its previous editions.

 
(Source: International Business Times – By IANS, 20th November, 2021)

 

III. Science

Space will be first home for humans, and earth will be a holiday destination: Jeff Bezos

 
Jeff Bezos is widely considered a visionary in the modern world and he is one of those billionaires on planet earth who believes in the future of space colonisation. And now, he has predicted that the future will witness human beings giving birth to children in space and over the course of time the planet earth will become a holiday destination.

Jeff Bezos made this prediction during a surprise appearance at the 2021 Ignatius Forum in Washington, DC.

‘Over centuries, many people will be born in space, it will be their first home. They will be born on these colonies, live on these colonies, then they’ll visit Earth the way you would visit, you know, Yellowstone National Park,’ he said during the event.

Future space colonies: Vision of Jeff Bezos

According to a report published in The Guardian, Jeff Bezos had once claimed that the future will have floating space colonies with weather like Maui all year long.

 
‘This is Maui on its best day, all year long. No rain. No earthquakes. People are going to want to live here.’

 
Jeff Bezos is not the only billionaire who dreams of future space colonisation. SpaceX founder Elon Musk has a strong action plan to take humans to Mars. He had several times claimed that humans are the only conscious beings in the universe, and he believes that we should use this consciousness to emerge as a multi-planetary species.

 
At one point in time, Elon Musk had revealed that the future government that will be set up on the Red Planet will be based on direct democracy. He also made it clear that people will have a direct role in the decision-making process in the future Martian government.

(Source: International Business Times – By Nirmal Narayanan, 15th November, 2021)

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

7. Karn Gupta vs. Union of India & Anr. Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 5009/2018 and CM No. 19290/2018 Date of order: 23rd May, 2018

The Director of a company who has resigned from the Directorship would not incur disqualification u/s 164 of the Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
• Mr. KG in his writ petition complained that he had been appointed as a Director in a company registered under the name of M/s EWC Pvt. Ltd. on 11th July, 2012. He resigned on 5th December, 2012.

• The company failed to submit Form 32 regarding his resignation in accordance with the provisions of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956 with the Registrar of Companies.

• On 6th September, 2017 and 12th September, 2017, MCA notified a list of Directors who had been disqualified u/s 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 as Directors with effect from 1st November, 2016.

•  Mr. KG’s name featured in this list, despite his resignation. As a result, he was prohibited from being appointed or re-appointed as a Director in any other company for a period of five years.

• It was submitted before the Delhi High Court that Mr. KG had resigned from the Directorship of the company a long time back. Therefore, he would not incur disqualification u/s 164 of the Companies Act, 2013.

• Consequently, he pleaded that the disqualification as notified in the lists dated 6th September, 2017 and 12th September, 2017 by the Registrar of Companies was incorrect and illegal.

HELD
• The Delhi High Court held that the disqualification of Mr. KG as notified in the impugned list as disqualified
Director of the company and the resultant prohibition u/s 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 by virtue of his name featuring in the lists dated 6th September, 2017 and 12th September, 2017 was incorrect, set aside and quashed.

• The Court further directed the Registrar of Companies to ensure that its records are properly rectified to delete the name of Mr. KG from the lists.

8. The Registrar of Companies West Bengal vs. Sabyasachi Bagchi National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi Company Appeal (AT) No. 12 of 2019 Date of order: 24th June, 2020

NCLT cannot ignore the provisions relating to minimum penalty for compounding of offence as per sub-section (6) of section 165 of Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
• Mr. SB was holding Directorship in 17 companies as on 1st April, 2014 when section 165(1) of the Act came into force. However, he vacated Directorship of three companies during the period from 1st April, 2014 to 31st March, 2015.

• Later, he received a show cause notice from the Registrar of Companies, West Bengal, (ROC). After receipt of the said notice, Mr. SB resigned from the Directorship of four companies on 22nd February, 2016; thus, he had contravened the provisions of section 165(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 for the period from 01st April, 2015 to 21st February, 2016 – i.e., for 326 days.

• The reply to the show cause notice of Mr. SB was found unsatisfactory; therefore, the ROC filed a complaint u/s 165 (6) against him before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata. During the pendency of the prosecution, Mr. SB filed an application u/s 441(1) of the Act before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata (NCLT) for compounding the offence.

• The ROC filed his report on the compounding application before the NCLT. After hearing the parties, NCLT allowed the application subject to payment of the compounding fees of Rs. 25,000 within 15 days from the date of the order.

• But the ROC being aggrieved with the NCLT order, preferred to file an appeal against this before the National Company Law Appellant Tribunal (NCLAT) along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. After hearing the parties and being satisfied, NCLAT, in exercise of its powers condoned the delay of 41 days in filing the appeal.

HELD
NCLAT observed and held that:
• Mr. SB had violated the provisions u/s 165(1) read with section 165(3) of the Act for the period from 1st April, 2015 to 21st February, 2016 which was punishable u/s 165(6) of the Act before amendment.

• Further, NCLAT noted that the Tribunal had failed to notice the minimum fine prescribed under sub-section 6 of section 165, which was applicable at the relevant time, i.e., before the amendment.

• Hence, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, NCLAT set aside the NCLT order and imposed a minimum fine at the rate of Rs. 5,000 for every day for the period from 1st April, 2015 to 21st February, 2016, i.e., 326 days, adding up to a total of Rs. 16,30,000. Thus, the appeal of the ROC was allowed.

9. In the Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Civil Appeal No. 1650 of 2020 Dena Bank (now Bank of Baroda) vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy & Anr.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant appeal was filed u/s 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It was filed against the judgment passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) which had held that the petition of the appellant bank u/s 7 of the IBC was barred by limitation. The verdict passed by the Supreme Court goes on to resolve issues regarding what can and what cannot be accepted as an acknowledgment of debt by the corporate debtor, the period of limitation, and whether belated filing of additional documents can be done at a later stage under the IBC.

HELD BY NCLT & NCLAT
In October, 2018, the appellant bank filed the petition before the NCLT u/s 7 of the IBC. Further, in 2019, it filed an application under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 read along with Rule 4 for permission to place on record the final judgment of the DRT and the Recovery Certificate that was issued; this application was allowed by the Adjudicating Authority. In March, 2019, a similar application was filed once again, this time to take permission to place on record additional documents, including the letter dated 3rd March, 2017 of the corporate debtor (CD) to the said bank proposing a one-time settlement; the annual report of the CD for the years 2016-2017; the financial statement of the CD for the period from 1st April, 2016 to 31st March, 2017; and also for the period from 1st April, 2017 to 31st March, 2018 – and this application, too, was allowed.

Further, in February, 2019, the CD filed its preliminary objections to the petition filed by the bank u/s 7 of the IBC, inter alia contending that the said petition was barred by limitation. This objection was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority, the petition filed by the bank was allowed and an Interim Resolution Professional was appointed in March, 2019. The CD filed an appeal against this order before the NCLAT u/s 61 of the IBC. The NCLAT allowed the appeal and set aside the earlier judgment passed by the NCLT, stating that the petition filed by the appellant bank u/s 7 of the IBC was barred by limitation.

ISSUES INVOLVED
Whether a petition u/s 7 of the IBC would be barred by limitation on the sole ground that it had been filed beyond three years from the declaration of the loan account as an NPA, even though the corporate debtor may have subsequently acknowledged the liability?

Whether a final judgment and decree of the DRT in favour of the financial creditor, or a Recovery Certificate, would give rise to a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings u/s 7 of the IBC?

Whether there is any bar in law to the amendment of pleadings to include additional documents under a section 7 petition?

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS
(1) It was contended that the corporate debtor had, in its annual reports for the financial years 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, acknowledged its liability in respect of the loan taken by it from the appellant bank.

(2) That NCLAT reversed the initial judgment of the Adjudicating Authority and held that the petition was barred by limitation on the basis of the fact that there was nothing on record that suggested that the CD had acknowledged its debt to the appellant bank, thereby ignoring the documents filed by the bank which were allowed by the Adjudicating Authority. The petition u/s 7 of the IBC was filed well within three years from the date of such acknowledgment.

(3) Further, placing reliance on Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Ors.; Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India and Ors.; and Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited vs. Bishal Jaiswal and Ors., it was argued that section 18 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings under the IBC.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS
(A) Under the scheme of the IBC, NCLAT is the final forum for determination of facts and the factual determination by the NCLAT is that the records reveal no acknowledgment of debt for the purpose of extending limitation. Since this appeal has been filed on the basis of documents that were brought on record before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) at a belated stage, it was contrary to the provisions of IBC and the law laid down by this Court.

(B) The appellant bank filed its petition u/s 7 of the IBC on 12th October, 2018, about five years after the date of default, and was thus well beyond the period of limitation of three years under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

(C) That u/s 7(3) of the IBC, a financial creditor is required to furnish ‘record of the default recorded with the information utility or record of evidence of default as may be specified’ and ‘any other information as may be specified by the Board’.

(D) Section 62 of the IBC, under which the instant appeal has been filed, is restricted to questions of law, unlike an appeal to the NCLAT from an order of the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), which is an appeal both on facts and in law. Further, it was contended that the foundation for a plea of extension of limitation by virtue of acknowledgment of debt should be in the pleadings and cannot be developed at a later stage.

(E) Lastly, that the petition u/s 7 of the IBC was not based on the Recovery Certificate issued by the DRT or the judgment and order of the DRT. Therefore, there could be no question of reckoning limitation from the date of failure to make payment in terms of the Recovery Certificate.

COURT’S OBSERVATIONS
(i) An application to the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) u/s 7 of the IBC in the prescribed form cannot be compared with the plaint in a suit.

(ii) The application does not lapse for non-compliance of the time schedule. Nor is the Adjudicating Authority obliged to dismiss the application. On the other hand, the application cannot be dismissed without compliance with the requisites of the proviso to section 7(5) of the IBC.

(iii) As per the provisions of the IBC, and in particular the provisions of section 7(2) to (5) of the IBC read
with the 2016 Adjudicating Authority Rules, there is no bar to the filing of documents at any time until a final order either admitting or dismissing the application has been passed.

(iv) There is no penalty prescribed for inability to cure the defects in an application within seven days from the date of receipt of notice, and in an appropriate case the Adjudicating Authority may accept the cured application, even after expiry of seven days for the ends of justice.

HELD BY SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has inter alia held that a final judgment, decree and / or a recovery certificate passed / issued by a court or tribunal would give rise to a fresh cause of action for a financial creditor to initiate proceedings u/s 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).

The Court, while placing reliance on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited vs. Bishal Jaiswal and Anr.; Bengal Silk Mills Co. vs. Ismail Golam Hossain Ariff; and Re Pandem Tea Co. Ltd., held that an acknowledgment of liability that is made in a balance sheet can amount to an acknowledgment of debt. Thus, entries in books of accounts and / or balance sheets of a corporate debtor would amount to an acknowledgment u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

Further, referring to the observations made in Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited vs. Rajhans Steel Limited, the Court held that the order / decree of the DRT and the Recovery Certificate gave a fresh cause of action to the appellant bank to initiate a petition u/s 7 of the IBC and the Court also held that an offer of one-time settlement of a live claim, made within the period of limitation, can be construed as an acknowledgment to attract section 18 of the Limitation Act.  

ALLIED LAWS

9 Rohit Nath vs. KEB Hana Bank Ltd. AIR 2021 Madras 241 Date of order: 28th July, 2021 Bench: Sanjib Banerjee CJ

Guarantor’s liability – Insolvency proceedings can be initiated before appropriate Debts Recovery Tribunal [Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code), S. 95, S. 79, S. 60; Companies Act, 2013, S. 408; Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, S. 3; Contract Act, 1872, S. 128]

FACTS
An individual (petitioner) had stood as a guarantor to a credit facility taken by a corporate entity. On non-payment of the credit facility the bank (respondent) proceeded against the petitioner by serving a notice as per Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019. Pursuant thereto, the bank initiated proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It is the case of the petitioner that insolvency proceedings cannot be initiated against an individual u/s 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code).

HELD
Section 95(1) of the Code read with section 79(1) thereof permits a creditor to apply to any Debts Recovery Tribunal for initiating an insolvency resolution process under such provision.

Section 95(1) of the Code, in its ordinary form, allows a creditor to initiate an insolvency resolution process. It does not specify as to who the debtor may be. Further, the enactment is a complete code in itself and the three classes of persons indicated to be governed by the Code are corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals. The Debt Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction over such firms and individuals is the adjudicating authority in matters related to insolvency.

Further, in view of section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872, the liability of a guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal-debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. Therefore, the petitioner can be held liable as a guarantor to the credit facility taken by the company. The petition was dismissed with Rs. 50,000 costs.

10 R. Selvam vs. R. Mani C.M.P. No. 8020 of 2016 (Mad)(HC) Date of order: 22nd July, 2021 Bench: G.K. Ilanthiraiyan J

Gift Deed – Unilateral cancellation by the donor – Invalid [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 123, S. 126]

FACTS
The suit is filed for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit property belonged to the first defendant as per the preliminary decree passed in O.S. No. 18 of 2010 dated 8th December, 2011 on the file of the Fast-Track Court No. 2, Salem. The first defendant filed a suit against her brothers and the suit property was allotted in her favour. Thereafter, the first defendant had executed a registered gift settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff on 8th March, 2012. From the date of the gift settlement deed, the plaintiff had taken possession of the suit property and he is in possession and enjoyment of the same.

According to the plaintiff, in the meanwhile, under the influence of defendants 2 to 4, the first defendant unilaterally executed a registered cancellation deed dated 3rd July, 2012.On the same day, the first defendant executed another gift settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4. The said cancellation deed and the subsequent gift settlement deed executed by the first defendant are void ab initio. The plaintiff’s case is that once the first defendant had lost her title to the suit property, after execution of the registered settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff, she has no title over the property. On the strength of the settlement deed executed in favour of defendants 2 to 4, they created encumbrance by execution of an agreement for sale with defendant 5 and hence, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction.

According to the second defendant, the registered gift settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff was obtained by the plaintiff by misrepresentation or undue influence and he played fraud without knowledge of the first defendant. This was not acted upon and the first defendant rightly cancelled the gift deed by cancellation.

HELD
The Court noted that the entire issue was revolving around the first defendant. Even then, the other defendants failed to examine the first defendant to support their case whether the gift settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff was obtained on compulsion, misrepresentation or by fraud or undue influence.

The Court held that there is a specific recital that the first defendant has no power to revoke the gift deed and even if she cancelled the deed, the said cancellation would not be valid. When no right has been reserved by the first defendant to cancel the settlement deed, the Court below rightly declared the title in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. It is settled law that in settlement, once the ‘settlee’ accepts the transfer, it is presumed that the said document has been acted upon irrespective of the fact whether the ‘settlee’ has obtained possession immediately or not. Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Jamil Begum vs. Shami Mohd. [(2019) 2 SCC 727], the Court held that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. The appeal suit was dismissed.

11 Davesh Nagalya (D) vs. Pradeep Kumar (D) AIR 2021 Supreme Court 2717 Date of order: 10th August, 2021 Bench: Hemant Gupta J, A.S. Bopanna J

Tenant – Partners – Business in suit premises – Death of partners – Results in dissolution of partnership – Property will be vacant [Urban Buildings Act, 1972, S. 12, S. 25, S. 41; Indian Partnership Act, 1932, S. 42]

FACTS
An application was filed by one Pradeep Kumar in July, 1982 before the Court of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in terms of the Urban Buildings Act (Act) stating that after the death of the tenant partner, he inducted the legal heir of the deceased, one Subhash Chand, and continued the business in the same premises. The application was, however, opposed by the landlord. The District Magistrate permitted Subhash Chand to be inducted as a partner on 15th November, 1982. The landlord challenged the order passed by the District Magistrate before the District Judge. The revision petition was dismissed on 12th December, 1983. A further challenge before the High Court through a writ petition also remained unsuccessful vide order dated 10th October, 2007. The appellant challenged the said order by way of a Special Leave Petition before this Court but the same was dismissed on 10th January, 2008.

The appellant filed an application for review before the High Court inter alia on the ground that pursuant to the death of the tenant, Pradeep Kumar, i.e., one of the partners of the firm, the partnership does not survive in view of section 42(c) of the Partnership Act.

The review was dismissed vide order impugned in the present appeal on the ground that the petitioners have entirely set up a new case and the grounds urged are different from those of the writ petition. As on record, both the partners, i.e., Pradeep Kumar and Subhash Chand, had died on 21st May, 2004 and 25th June, 2014, respectively. Hence, now the argument is that in terms of section 42(c) the partnership stands dissolved by law. There is no clause in the partnership deed which permits the legal heirs of the deceased partners to continue with the partnership firm. Therefore, by operation of law, the partnership has come to an end.

HELD
The order of permitting Subhash Chand as partner with Pradeep Kumar has come to an end by efflux of time and operation of law. In terms of section 42(c) of the Partnership Act, the partnership stands dissolved by death of a partner. One of the partners, i.e., Pradeep Kumar, died on 21st May, 2004. The High Court has not taken note of such fact in the review petition and failed to take into consideration the subsequent events which were germane to the controversy. Subhash Chand, the other partner, also died during the pendency of the appeal on 25th June, 2014. It was represented to the District Magistrate by Pradeep Kumar that Subhash Chand is a divorcee and has no children but such assertion was not found to be correct as he had two children, a son and a daughter, who were impleaded as his legal heirs.

Therefore, with the death of both the partners and not having any clause permitting continuation of the partnership by the legal heirs, the non-residential tenanted premises is deemed to be vacant in law as the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In view thereof, the order passed by the High Court in the Review Application dated 23rd April, 2008 is set aside. Therefore, the tenant is deemed to cease to occupy the premises in question. Consequently, the tenanted property has fallen vacant as well. The appellants may take recourse to remedy as may be available to them and may proceed in accordance with law and the provisions of the Act.

12 Hemraj Ratnakar Salian vs. HDFC Bank Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2021 Supreme Court 507 Date of order: 17th August, 2021 Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer J, Krishna Murari J

Registration – Tenancy – Claim of tenancy not supported by a registered document – Claim of tenant as ‘tenant in sufferance’ – No protection under the Rent Act [Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 2000, S. 3(2)]

FACTS
HDFC Bank had granted financial facility to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (the borrowers). They had mortgaged a property in favour of the bank with an intention to secure the said credit facility.

The accounts of the borrowers were declared as non-performing assets (NPA) on 31st October, 2013. On 25th January, 2014, the bank issued a notice u/s 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) to the borrowers. It is the case of the appellant that he is a tenant of the secured asset on a monthly rent since 12th June, 2012. And he has been paying rent regularly to his landlord since the inception of his tenancy.

The appellant filed an application before the Magistrate seeking protection of his possession of the secured asset as the Magistrate was seized with the petition u/s 14 of SARFAESI filed by the respondent No. 1 Bank. The intervention application of the appellant was dismissed by the Magistrate holding that there was no registered tenancy agreement placed on record by the appellant.

HELD
There is a serious doubt as to the bona fides of the tenant, as there is no good or sufficient evidence to establish his tenancy. According to the appellant, he is a tenant of the secured asset from 12th June, 2012. However, the documents produced in support of his claim are photocopies of the rent receipts and the first copy of the rent receipt is of 12th May, 2013 which is after the date of creation of the mortgage. The borrowers have not claimed that any tenant is staying at the secured asset. The appellant has pleaded tenancy from 12th June, 2012 to 17th December, 2018. This is not supported by any registered instrument. Further, even according to the appellant, he is a ‘tenant in sufferance’, therefore, he is not entitled to any protection of the Rent Act. Secondly, even if the tenancy has been claimed to be renewed in terms of section 13(13) of SARFAESI, the borrower would be required to seek consent of the secured creditor for transfer of the secured asset by way of sale, lease or otherwise, after issuance of the notice u/s 13(2) of SARFAESI and, admittedly, no such consent has been sought by the borrower in the present case. The appeal was dismissed.  

Service Tax

I. TRIBUNAL
    
7 Interface Communication Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of CGST [2021-TIOL-708-CESTAT-Mum] Date of order: 25th October, 2021
    
Without any allegation of fraud, suppression, wilful misstatement, collusion, suppression or contravention of facts with an intention to evade payment of tax, longer period of limitation cannot be invoked

FACTS
The assessee is in appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) wherein interest was confirmed on delayed payment of service tax through CENVAT Credit Account. Interest is proposed to be levied for the period from October, 2006 to September, 2010 and the notice was issued on 19th March, 2012, during which period the Department was only empowered to demand tax due for a period of one year unless there is allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, misstatement, suppression of fact or contravention of the provisions of the Finance Act, and is made with a proposal for penalty u/s 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

HELD
The Tribunal primarily noted that there is no allegation of wilful withholding of payment of service tax on any of the grounds of suppression, fraud or contravention of provisions of the Act. There is no requirement to give a finding that u/s 75 of the Finance Act interest is a natural corollary and consequence for any default of payment of service tax within the stipulated time. On the contrary, the tax liability or its interest component can never be enforced and recovered from the assessee beyond the period from one year without any allegation of wilful non-payment on the ground of fraud, misstatement or collusion. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

8 M/s Terex India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Commissioner of GST&CE [2021-TIOL-696-CESTAT-Mad] Date of order: 11th October, 2021

Payment of tax under reverse charge on pointing out by the audit officers cannot be considered as payment consequent to assessment / adjudication proceedings – Input tax credit / refund is allowed of the said tax payment

FACTS
On four dates, viz., 11th, 12th, 21st and 22nd December, 2012, the appellant had received services from its parent company in the USA. It appeared that the appellant is liable to pay service tax on the amount paid to the parent company under Reverse Charge Mechanism. It paid the service tax with interest and applied for a refund. The original authority rejected the refund claim holding that as per section 142(8)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017 credit is not admissible and therefore not eligible for refund
in cash.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Department has considered the said payment as consequent to assessment / adjudication proceedings and as recovery of arrears of tax not eligible for ITC / refund. However, as the said payment is made on pointing out by the audit officers, such payment does not fall under the category of arrears of tax by an assessment / adjudication proceeding. The claim is only for refund and not proceedings for assessment or adjudication. In this scenario, rejection of refund is unjustified and the impugned order is set aside.

9 Pradeep Deviah and Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Tax, Bengaluru East [2021-TIOL-653-CESTAT-Bang] Date of order: 22nd March, 2021

Once proportionate credit is reversed as per Rule 6(3A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, reversal of credit at 6% / 7% cannot be enforced
    
FACTS

The appellant is engaged in rendering both taxable and exempt services. The sale of space in print media is considered as an exempt service by the Department and therefore reversal of credit is sought. At the time of audit itself, they reversed proportionate common credit attributable to both taxable and exempt services. However, an SCN was issued for reversal of credit at 6% / 7% of the exempted turnover. Accordingly, the present appeal is filed.
    
HELD
The Tribunal primarily noted that the activity of sale of space or time for advertisement in print media is specifically covered under the negative list in terms of section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994 and therefore the same cannot be said to be an exempted service and the provisions of Rule 6(3) are not applicable to an activity which is in the negative list. It was also noted that proportionate credit is already reversed as per Rule 6(3A) of CCR, 2004, therefore, it was not incumbent on the Department to issue a show cause notice demanding reversal of 6% / 7% of the exempted turnover. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

10 Uttaranchal Cable Network vs. CCE&ST [2021] 132 taxmann.com 95 (New Delhi–CESTAT) Date of order: 13th October, 2021

The unutilised CENVAT credit as on 30th June, 2017 not carried forward into GST regime by filing TRAN-1 is permitted to be adjusted against the pre-GST demands as there is no bar in section 142 on the same

FACTS
The appellant was registered in the service tax regime for providing cable operator services; however, it did not carry forward the CENVAT credit balance as on 30th June, 2017 in the GST regime. A show cause notice was issued to the appellant for the pre-GST period u/s 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. The appellant did not contest the demand on merits but offered that the amount of CENVAT credit lying in its favour (credit) as on 30th June, 2017 may be allowed to be adjusted against the demand payable since it was not carried forward to GST in Form TRAN-01. The Adjudicating Authority disallowed such adjustment on the ground that credit account cannot be adjusted because CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 are no longer applicable and that section 140 of the CGST Act read with Rule 117 of the CGST Rules specifically provides the procedure for carry-forward of CENVAT credit. If the appellant did not follow the same, the unutilised amount cannot be permitted to be adjusted. Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed the appeal.

HELD
The Tribunal held that there is no bar or disability u/s 140(1) read with section 142 of the CGST Act, 2017 on an assessee for claiming adjustment of the tax demand from the unutilised CENVAT credit (lying to the credit as on 30th June, 2017) which has not been carried forward to the GST regime and allowed the appeal directing the Adjudicating Authority to grant adjustment of the unutilised amount against the demand payable by the assessee.

11 Atul Ltd. vs. CCE&ST [2021] 132 taxmann.com 165 (Ahm-CESTAT) Date of order: 9th November, 2021]

The assessee is entitled to refund of Education Cess and Higher Education Cess lying unutilised as on 30th June, 2017 as the said cess is ‘cenvatable’ in terms of Notification No. 12/2015 dated 30th April, 2015 and section 142 of the CGST Act provides a refund for the same

FACTS
The assessee claimed refund of Education Cess and Higher Secondary Education Cess as was in the balance as on 28th February, 2015 and carried forward till 30th June, 2017 by an application dated 5th February, 2018. The said refund was rejected on the grounds that once the amount stands lapsed, the question of its refund even under the provisions of the CGST Act does not arise.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that these cesses were leviable up to 28th April, 2015. However, with effect from 1st March, 2015, EC and SHEC paid on imports of capital goods received in the factory of the manufacturer of the final product on or after 1st March, 2015 were permitted to be utilised for payment of duty of excise leviable. Similarly, by Notification No. 12/2015 dated 30th April, 2015 the assessee was permitted to utilise the credit of EC and SHEC for payment of duty of excise for such inputs or capital goods received after 1st March, 2015. It also noted that the said refund in question would not have been allowed to be claimed in TRAN-1 for want of any column in the requisite form to carry forward the balance of such cess and the Department in its verification report also stated the same. The Tribunal also observed that the refund is claimed in time and there is no unjust enrichment. It held that EC and SHEC were ‘cenvatable’, the credit whereof was allowed even for such inputs and capital goods which were received by the manufacturer even after 1st March, 2015. The appellant had accumulated credit of EC and SHES which could not be utilised till 30th June, 2017. The unutilised amount is the assessee’s money and accordingly has to be refunded to it.

Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India, 1999 taxmann.com 1769 (SC) it was held that right to credit becomes vested and duly crystallised in favour of the assessee the moment input goods / services are received and by virtue of assessee paying the duty thereon by reimbursing the said amount to the supplier of the goods. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that he has made a wrong interpretation of Notification No. 12/2015 that such EC and SHEC could not be utilised for payment of excise duty despite the specific permission for the same in the said Notification and the subsequent amendment in CENVAT Credit Rules in 2015 permitting the utilisation of credit on cess. The Tribunal further noted that with effect from 1st July, 2017 with the introduction of GST, the utilisation of the said credit became impossible. However, in terms of section 142 of the said new Act, the amount is made refundable to the appellant in cash. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST)

I. SUPREME COURT

18 Union of India vs. Bharti Airtel Ltd. and Ors. [2021-TIOL-251-SC-GST] Date of order: 28th October, 2021

Assessee cannot be permitted to unilaterally carry out rectification of his returns submitted electronically in Form GSTR3B – Matching and correction process happens on its own as per the mechanism specified in sections 37 and 38 – Once the return is submitted, any changes thereto will have a cascading effect and therefore rectification of errors and omissions have to be done as per the scheme of the law only

FACTS
The assessee alleged that there has been excess payment of taxes by way of cash due to non-operationalisation of Forms GSTR2A, GSTR2 and GSTR3 and the system related checks which could have forewarned about the mistake. Since there were no checks in the Form GSTR3B, the excess payment of tax went unnoticed; therefore, the petitioner desired to correct its returns, but is being prevented from doing so as there is no enabling statutory procedure implemented by the Government. The Delhi High Court held that the benefit of rectification cannot be denied due to the fault of the Government in not developing the relevant infrastructure. The facility of Form GSTR2A was not available prior to 2018 and as such the scheme envisaged was not implemented during the period from July to September, 2017. The Court accordingly held that the assessee has a substantive right to rectify / adjust the input tax credit (ITC) for the period to which it relates and the correction in the subsequent return when the error is noticed is against the scheme of the Act. The Revenue is in appeal against this order.

HELD
The Court primarily noted that there is no provision in law regarding refund of surplus or excess ITC in the electronic credit ledger. An assessee who has discharged liability by paying cash cannot later on ask for swapping of the entries, so as to show the corresponding output tax liability amount in the electronic cash ledger from where he can take refund on the ground of non-availability of the relevant infrastructure. Form GSTR2A is only a facilitator for taking an informed decision while doing self-assessment. Non-performance or non-operability of Form GSTR2A, or for that matter other forms, will be of no avail because the dispensation stipulated at the relevant time obliged the registered person to submit returns on the basis of such self-assessment in Form GSTR3B manually on the electronic platform. The Court held that there is no denial of ITC and it is only postponement of availment of credit. The credit can be availed in the next return, including the return of September of the next financial year. Further rectification of a particular month’s return would not only be an illegality but in reality would simply lead to a chaotic situation and collapse of the tax administration of the Union, States and Union Territories. The appeal of the Revenue was accordingly allowed.

II. HIGH COURT

19 BMG Informatics (P) Ltd. vs. UOI [2021 130 taxmann.com 182 (Gau)] Date of order: 2nd September, 2021

Provisions of paragraph 3.2 of the Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31st March, 2020 providing that even though different tax rates may be attracted at different points of time, but the refund of the accumulated unutilised tax credit being not available is contrary to section 54(3)(ii) of the CGST Act of 2017 and should be ignored – Refund will be available once the rates are different and result in accumulation of credit

FACTS
The assessee filed a refund claim u/s 54(3)(ii) of the CGST Act under inverted duty structure which was denied by the authorities on the ground that the amount of ITC claimed for refund was accumulated out of the trading activity where the input and output were the same; although in the assessee’s case output supplies attracted different tax rates depending upon the class of buyer, it would not get covered under the provisions of section 54(3)(ii). The Department also relied upon para 3.2 of the clarificatory Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31st March, 2020. On appeal, the First Appellate Authority decided the matter in favour of the assessee on the ground that the adjudicating authority has travelled beyond the show cause notice. Hence, the Department is before the High Court. At the same time, the assessee is before the High Court challenging para 3.2 of the said Circular.

HELD
The High Court observed that the clarifications incorporated by Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31st March, 2020 were made in exercise of the powers under section 168(1) of the CGST Act of 2017. It held that issuing orders, instructions or directions to bring in uniformity in the implementation of the Act and altering the particular provision of the Act itself would be two different acts and for the latter the Central Board of Indirect Tax and Customs had not been empowered under the provisions of section 168(1) of the CGST Act of 2017. Referring to paragraph 3.2 of the Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31st March, 2020, the Court held that the paragraph provides that although the input supplies and the output supplies may attract different tax rates at different points of time, such differences in the tax rates are not covered u/s 54(3)(ii) of the CGST Act of 2017. The Court held that a conjoint reading of the said paragraph with the provisions of the Act suggests that while section 54(3)(ii) provides that refund of unutilised ITC shall be allowed in cases where the credit has accumulated on account of the rate of tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on output supplies, on the other hand, the CBIC in their impugned Circular provides that such refunds will not be available in the event that the input supplies and the output supplies are the same, even though there may be a difference in the tax rates on the input supplies and the output supplies.

Hence, such declaration / provision / clarification by CBIC in para 3.2 appears to be in conflict and provides for the contrary to the provisions of section 54(3)(ii) of the CGST Act of 2017. In the facts of the instant case, the Court noted that the buyer availed specific partial exemption given under Notification No. 45/2017-GST (Rate) dated 14th November, 2017 and is neither a case of Nil rate nor is it a case of full exemption, hence, the refund provided u/s 54(3)(ii) would be applicable as there is difference between the rate of tax of input supplies and the rate of tax on output supplies and output supplies not being fully exempted or chargeable at Nil rate. The Court accordingly remanded the matter to the refund officer to decide the refund on the factual basis as regards the different rates of taxes on inputs and outputs in the present case.

20 Jyoti Construction vs. Deputy Commissioner of CT&GST [2021 131 taxmann.com 104 (Odi)] Date of order: 7th October, 2021

The Court held that it’s not permitted to use the amounts lying in electronic credit ledger for paying 10% pre-deposit u/s 106(7) of the CGST Act

FACTS
The writ petitions were filed challenging the order passed by the first Appellate Authority u/s 107(1) of the CGST Act rejecting the appeals filed by the assessee, holding that the appeals filed are defective since the petitioner had made payment of the pre-deposit, being 10% of the disputed amount under the IGST, CGST and SGST by debiting its electronic credit ledger and did not pay it from the electronic cash ledger and furnished the proof of payment of the mandatory pre-deposit, and that this was in contravention of section 49(3) of the OGST Act read with Rule 85(4) of the OGST Rules, 2017. The Department contended before the Court that u/s 49(4) of the OGST Act, the amount available in the electronic credit ledger could be used for making ‘any payment towards output tax’ under the OGST Act or the IGST Act ‘in such manner and subject to such conditions and within such time as may be prescribed’.

Under Rule 85 (4) of the OGST Rules, the amount deducted u/s 51 or collected u/s 52, or the amount payable on a reverse charge basis, or the amount payable u/s 10, or any amount payable towards interest, penalty, fee, or ‘any other amount under the Act’ shall be paid by debiting the electronic cash ledger maintained under Rule 87 and the electronic ledger liability register shall be credited accordingly. It was submitted that the pre-deposit cannot be equated to the output tax. It was further submitted that as per section 41(2) of the OGST Act, ITC can be utilised for payment of ‘self-assessed output tax as per the return’ and in no other cases can ITC credit be utilised to discharge any liability. The petitioner argued that section 107(6) of the CGST Act is a machinery provision and that it must be interpreted purposively to sub-serve the purpose of collecting the pre-deposit amount which could be done even by debiting the credit ledger.

HELD
The Court held that ‘output tax’ as defined u/s 2(82) of the OGST Act could be equated to the pre-deposit required to be made in terms of section 107(6) of the Act. The Court concurred with the interpretation placed by the Department that the proviso to section 41(2) of the Act limits the usage to which the credit ledger could be utilised and that it cannot be debited for making payment of pre-deposit at the time of filing of the appeal in terms of section 107(6) of the Act. The Court further held that it is not possible to accept the plea that section 107(6) of the OGST Act is merely a ‘machinery provision’.

Note: The author is of the view that section 41 only deals with utilisation of the ‘provisional ITC’ and hence section 41(2) cannot be interpreted as placing an absolute embargo on the manner in which the balance in the electronic credit ledger is to be utilised. Further, section 49(7) provides that ‘all liabilities’ of a taxable person under this Act shall be recorded and maintained in an electronic liability register in such manner as may be prescribed. Rule 85(1) provides that the electronic liability register specified under sub-section (7) of section 49 shall be maintained in Form GST PMT-01 for each person liable to pay tax, interest, penalty, late fee or ‘any other amount’ on the common portal and all amounts payable by him shall be debited to the said register. Rule 85(3) permits the payment of liability by debiting an electronic credit ledger. Note 5 of Form GST PMT-01 Part II clearly indicates that the said electronic liability ledger can also be used for depositing the amount of pre-deposit and hence provides for refund thereof. Hence, with great respect, it appears that the aforesaid decision needs reconsideration.

III. AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING

21 M/s Kamdhenu Agrochem Industries LLP [2021-TIOL-248-AAR-GST] Date of order: 2nd November, 2021 [AAR-Maharashtra]

Separate registration is not required in every State where the goods are imported for further supply delivered directly from the container freight station without being cleared for home consumption

FACTS
The applicant seeks to know whether it is required to obtain registration in importing States other than Maharashtra if goods are imported, sold and delivered directly from Container Freight Station / Direct Port Delivery which is under the Customs Boundaries to customers in those States.

HELD
The Authority noted that since the applicant will be selling the goods before clearing the same for home consumption from the port of import, the ‘place of supply’ shall be the place from where the applicant makes a taxable supply of goods which, in this case is the Maharashtra office. Hence, goods can be supplied on the basis of invoices issued by the Maharashtra office and, therefore, it need not take separate registration in importing States other than Maharashtra.

22 Kanahiya Realty Pvt. Ltd. [2021-TIOL-230-AAR-GST] Date of order: 30th September, 2021 [AAR-West Bengal]

Goods given under promotional schemes will be taxed at the rates applicable to such goods – Also, ITC cannot be denied on such goods sold for nominal prices

FACTS
Whether the supply of goods such as gold coins, refrigerator, mixer-grinder, cooler, split air conditioner, etc., at nominal price to retailers against purchase of specified units of hosiery goods pursuant to a promotional scheme would qualify as individual supplies taxable at the rates applicable to each of such goods as per section 9 of the Act, or mixed supply taxable at the highest GST rate as per section 2(74) read with section 8(b) of the Act, in light of the fact that the hosiery goods and goods being sold at nominal price are sold under separate invoices with separate prices? Whether credit of the input tax paid on the items being sold at nominal prices would be available?

HELD
The supply shall not fall under the category of ‘composite supply’ since supply of hosiery goods and goods under promotional scheme cannot be considered as naturally bundled and supplied in conjunction with each other in the ordinary course of business. Supply shall be levied at the rate of each such item as notified by the Government. Provision of providing said goods under the retail scheme Circular would undoubtedly qualify as an activity undertaken in the course or furtherance of business. In the present case, a nominal value shall be assigned to the goods under the promotional scheme. Since the said goods are not supplied free of cost but at a nominal value, therefore, it cannot be termed as ‘gift’; however, the value of the said goods shall be required to be determined as per the provisions of section 15 read with Rule 27 of the Rules, as price is not the sole consideration for the supply. The Authority accordingly held that supply of goods at nominal price to retailers against purchase of specified units of hosiery goods pursuant to a promotional scheme would qualify as individual supplies taxable at the rates applicable to each supply as per section 9 of the GST Act. ITC of tax paid on the items being sold at nominal prices would be available to the applicant.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GST

I. NOTIFICATIONS

Changes in Rate of Tax

Sr. No.

Notification No.

Indicative changes

1.

13/2021-Central Tax (Rate) dated 27th October, 2021
and 13/2021-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated

27th October, 2021. Changes in rate of goods

Sr. No. 243 under Schedule II (12%) is removed. So there is no
entry levying 12% tax on software. From entry 452P under Schedule III (18%)
the words ‘in respect of Information Technology Software’ are deleted.
Therefore, sale of all software becomes taxable at 18% from 27th
October, 2021

2. Notification Nos. 14 to 17 of 2021-Central Tax (Rate) have
been issued on 18th November, 2021, effecting change in rate of
tax of certain items of goods as well as services. All such changes shall be
effective from 1st January, 2022

II. CIRCULARS

Clarification in respect of applicability of Dynamic Quick Response (QR) Code on B2C invoices and compliances of Notification 14/2020-Central Tax dated 21st March, 2020-Circular No. 165/21/2021-GST dated 17th November, 2021
The CBEC has issued Circular No. 156/20/2021 dated 21st June, 2021 clarifying various aspects relating to QR Code requirements. One of the issues clarified was about QR code on the invoices by supplier who receives payments from the recipient located outside India through RBI-approved modes of payment, but not in foreign exchange (para 4). There were further queries, too. Therefore, with the present Circular it is clarified that no Dynamic QR code is required on such invoices as such dynamic QR code cannot be used by the recipient located outside India for making payment to the supplier.

Clarification in respect of refund related issues – Circular No. 166/22/2021-GST dated 17th November, 2021
By the above Circular, clarifications regarding difficulties faced by the taxpayers in relation to getting refunds on excess balance in electronic cash ledger are given. The main issues clarified are:

(i)

Time limit for refund of excess balance in electronic cash
ledger

No time limit

(ii)

Whether certification for declaration under Rule 89(2)(l) or
89(2)(m) of CSTG Rules is required to be furnished?

No

(iii)

Whether refund for TDS / TCS deposited can be refunded as excess
balance in electronic cash ledger?

Excess balance on account of TDS / TCS can be refunded to
registered person as excess balance in electronic cash ledger in accordance
with proviso to section 54(1) read with section 49(6) of CGST Act

(iv)

In case of deemed export, whether date of return filed by the
supplier or date of return filed by the recipient will be relevant for the
purpose of determining the relevant date for such refund

Date of return filed by supplier

III. ADVANCE RULINGS

(A) Place of Supply – Immovable Property
M/s Sri Avantika Contracts (I) Ltd. (Order No. A.R. Com/18/2018 dated 5th August, 2021 and TSAAR Order No. 05 /2021)(Telangana)

In this application, an issue about place of supply in relation to construction of immovable property was involved.

The applicant secured a contract from the National Buildings Construction Corporation Limited (NBCCL), Delhi for constructing a building at Addu City, Maldives. It is the understanding of the applicant that the recipient of construction service is the Government of Maldives, as the institute building is being constructed as part of assistance from the Government of India to the Government of Maldives. It was submitted by the applicant that the supply of services is taxable only within the territory of India and since the supply of his services will be outside India, it will not constitute taxable supply.

Given the above facts, the following questions were raised before the AAR:
‘1. Whether the construction of the Institute of Security and Law Enforcement Studies at Addu City in Maldives, constructed for the Government of Maldives under a Memorandum of Understanding between India and Maldives falls within the GST net?
2. Who is the recipient of service in the instant case?
3. What is the place of supply in respect of the works contract for setting up of the Institute of Security and Law Enforcement Studies at Addu City in Maldives?’

In the personal hearing, the position was reiterated that the activity of the applicant is works contract and hence service. It was further argued that though the contract has been awarded by NBCCL, as per the MOU the Institute is being constructed on behalf of the Government of India as part of assistance to the Government of Maldives towards the social and economic development of Maldives. Therefore, it was canvassed that the recipient of service in this case is the Government of Maldives and NBCCL is the executing body which has sub-contracted the subject work to the applicant.

Therefore, the contention was that the supply is rendered by the applicant in respect of immovable property located in Maldives to the Maldives Government and not liable to tax under GST in India.

The learned AAR considered the submissions and observed that the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of Maldives entered into an MOU for construction of a Police Academy. As per this MOU, the Government of India awarded the work relating to planning, designing and execution of the project to NBCCL, New Delhi. The applicant was in turn awarded the sub-contract to construct the said building by NBCCL.

Therefore, the AAR observed that the applicant has not entered into any contract with the Government of Maldives for carrying out the said construction, nor do they have any privity with respect to the MOU between the Governments of India and of Maldives. Accordingly, it held that the applicant does not have any mutual or successive relationship with the Government of Maldives and therefore the Government of Maldives is not the recipient of any service from the applicant.

In simple terms, the applicant is a provider of services to NBCCL which is the recipient of the service.

The AAR held that since both the applicant, who is the supplier of service, and NBCCL, which is the recipient of service, are located in India, the place of supply is to be determined u/s 12 of the IGST Act. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 12 of the IGST Act clearly mentions that if the location of immovable property is intended to be outside India, the place of supply shall be the location of the recipient.

In view of above, the issues raised are answered as under:

Question Raised

Advance Ruling Issued

1. Whether the construction of Institute of Security and Law
Enforcement studies at Addu City in Maldives, constructed for the Government
of Maldives under an MOU between India and Maldives falls within the GST net?

The place of supply shall be the location of the recipient,
i.e., within India and therefore the supply by the applicant to the NBCCL is
within the ambit of GST

2. Who is the recipient of service in the instant case?

National Buildings Construction Corporation Limited is the
recipient of service from the applicant

3. What is the place of supply in respect of the works contract
for setting up of the Institute of Security and Law Enforcement Studies at
Addu City in Maldives?

As per the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 12 of
the IGST Act, the place of supply shall be the location of the recipient,
i.e., NBCCL

(B) Scope of Advance Ruling, Government Entity
M/s National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli (Order No. 22/AAR/2021 dated 18th June, 2021)(Tamil Nadu)

The applicant was started as a joint co-operative venture of the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu in 1964. Subsequently, it came to be covered by the National Institution of Technology Act, 2017.

The applicant procured services like pure labour and composite services and it framed the following questions before the AAR:

‘1. Whether National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli (NITT) is a Government Entity under GST Law?
2.    If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether
    a. The applicant is liable to deduct tax at source (TDS) u/s 51 of the CGST Act, 2017?
    b. Whether the applicant is required to discharge liability on reverse charge basis on supply of services as per section 9(3) and 9(4) of the CGST Act, 2017?
3.     Whether the entry provided under
    A. Sl. No. 3, 3A of Notification 12/2017 is applicable to them,
    B. Composite supply of works contract provided to the applicant is covered by Sl. No. 3(vi) of Notification 11/2017 dated 28th June, 2017’

The AAR referred to the scope of the Advance Ruling provisions and observed that the recipient cannot seek ruling about exemption available to the supplier. However, to the extent whether the recipient is liable to RCM, the ruling can be sought.

The AAR justified above maintaining of AR in relation to RCM on the premises that the recipient liable to RCM is deemed to be in the capacity of supplier and hence the ruling can be sought as supplier. Further, the scope will be whether RCM liability falls on applicant as per section 9(3). Therefore, questions at 3 (A&B) held non-maintainable.

Regarding the other questions, the AAR considered the position on merits. In respect of the question as to whether the applicant is a Government Entity, the AAR referred to the background of the existence of the applicant. He also referred to the AR of Uttarakhand in the case of IT Development Agency (2018-VIL-79-AAR) in which a similar issue is considered.

The AAR noted that the applicant has sought a ruling whether NITT is a Government Entity under the GST law. It had submitted that they are a Government Entity inasmuch as the NITT was started as a joint and co-operative venture of the Government of India and the Government of Tamil Nadu in 1964 with a view to cater to the needs of manpower in technology for the country; they were subsequently covered under the Schedule of the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007 and it was declared as an Institution of National Importance; that NITT is under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of Human Resources Development of India and the Board of Governors is constituted by the HRD Ministry; that the corpus fund of the Institute (akin to share capital in case of a body corporate) was initially provided by the Government of India by way of grants and it is stipulated in the Act that every institute shall maintain a fund to which shall be credited all moneys provided by the Central Government; that their accounts be audited by the Comptroller & Auditor-General of India. The applicant also submitted a copy of Gazette No. 34 dated 6th June, 2007 publishing the National Institute of Technology Act, 2007. It was also noted that the term Government Entity has been defined in Notification No. 32/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 13th October, 2017 as follows:

‘[(zfa) “Government Entity” means an authority or a board or any other body including a society, trust, corporation, (i) set up by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature; or (ii) established by any Government, with 90 per cent or more participation by way of equity or control, to carry out a function entrusted by the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory or a local authority.’

From the submissions of the applicant, it noted that the applicant institute was originally established in 1964 as a society registered with the Registrar of Societies, Tamil Nadu. Subsequently, it was covered under the NIT Act, 2007. It was also found that various authorities in NITT are from the Government, including Ministers.

It is also found that it fulfils the requirement of more than 90% financial participation from the Central or State Government. Accordingly, the applicant is held as a Government Entity by the AAR.

Regarding liability of RCM, the AAR referred to section 9(3) which reads as under:

‘9(3) The Government may, on the recommendations of the Council, by notification, specify categories of supply of goods or services or both, the tax on which shall be paid on reverse charge basis by the recipient of such goods or services or both and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such recipient as if he is the person liable for paying the tax in relation to the supply of such goods or services or both?  

Since the applicant is a registered person, the AAR held that the provision of section 9(3) applies to it. He also referred to Notification No. 13/2017 dated 28th June, 2017 by which the class of persons liable to RCM is notified.

Serial No. 14 is particularly reproduced in the AR which is as under:

Sr. No.

Category of Supply of Services

Supplier of Service

Recipient of Service

14.

Security services (services provided by way of supply of
security personnel) provided to a registered person: Provided that nothing
contained in this entry shall apply to,

(i)(a) a Department or Establishment of the Central Government
or State Government or Union Territory: or

(b) local authority; or

(c) Governmental agencies

which have taken registration under the Central Goods and
Services Tax Act, 2017 (12 of 2017) only for the purpose of deducting tax u/s
51 of the said Act and not for making a taxable supply of goods or services;
or

(ii) a registered person paying tax u/s 10 of the said Act

Any person other than a body corporate

A registered person, located in the taxable territory

On the facts, the AAR found that the security service is obtained from a body corporate, hence it held that the applicant is not liable to RCM in respect of such receipt of services.

In respect of legal services, by referring to Sl. No. 2 in the above Notification 13/2017, the AAR held that on the fees paid to the Advocate, the RCM liability accrues.

There is also online import of educational journals. Regarding RCM on such imports, the AAR held that if such import is of educational nature, no RCM would apply in view of Notification No. 2/2018-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 25th January, 2018. However, if the nature of import is non-educational, then RCM will apply, the AAR held.

(C) Classification – Electronically-Operated Vehicles
M/s Anjali Enterprises (Order No. 01/Odisha-AAR/2021-2022 dated 15th April, 2021)

The applicant is a dealer in battery-powered electric two-wheelers. It purchases vehicles from M/s Omjay Eeve Ltd., Badchana under the brand name ‘EEVE’. During transportation, the batteries are not fitted with the vehicle though they are transported together.

It also manufactures a similar battery-powered electric vehicle. When the vehicles are sold to dealers, batteries are not fitted in the vehicles but given separately. Only when the dealer sells to the ultimate customer is the battery fitted and delivered to the customer. The applicant wants to know whether its sale without the battery fitted in vehicles will still be considered as sale of electrically-operated vehicle to get the benefit of the lower rate.

Electrically-operated vehicles, including two- and three-wheeled electric vehicles falling under Chapter 87, are taxable @ 5% as per Sl. No. 242A of Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 30th June, 2017 as amended from time to time. The entry defines electrically-operated vehicles as ‘vehicles which are run solely on electrical energy derived from an external source or from one or more electrical batteries fitted to such road vehicles and shall include E-bicycles’.

It was strongly submitted that the vehicles were fulfilling all criteria and hence were duly covered by the above entry.

It was explained that though a sale of a vehicle running on fuel is done with an empty tank, it does not change the nature of the goods supplied and it remains a vehicle. If the vehicle in the case of the applicant is supplied without battery (i.e., without fuel), the nature of the goods is still ‘vehicle’. It was added that for vehicles to be classified as electrically-operated vehicles these must be such that they run solely on electrical energy derived from one or more electrical batteries, as and when put to use. The applicant argued that fitting of battery in the vehicle, at or before the time of supply, is not a precondition for the same to be classified as an electrically-operated vehicle.

The applicant relied upon the judgment of Reva Electric Car Company Pvt. Ltd. [2012 (275) ELT 488 (G.O.I.)]. The Revenue relied upon the AR in the case of Hooghly Motors (P) Ltd. (2020-VIL-235-AAR)(WB).

The AAR referred to the question posed, i.e., ‘Whether fitting of battery is mandatory in two- and three-wheeled battery-powered electric vehicles while selling the same to the dealers for getting the benefit of 5% GST rate applicable for electrically-operated vehicles?’

Though contrary judgments were cited, the AAR observed as under:

‘Before taking a final opinion, we need to go through the definition of “electrically-operated vehicle”. The Explanation to Entry No. 242A of Schedule 1 to Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate), dated 28th June, 2017 as amended from time to time defines the term “electrically-operated vehicle” to mean “vehicles which run solely on electrical energy derived from an external source or from one or more electrical batteries fitted to such road vehicles and shall include e-bicycles’. This means it is a type of electric vehicle (EV) that exclusively uses chemical energy stored in rechargeable battery packs, with no secondary source of propulsion (e.g., hydrogen fuel cell, internal combustion engine, etc.). An electric vehicle with battery pack uses electric motors and motor controllers instead of internal combustion engines (ICEs) for propulsion. It derives all power from battery packs and thus has no internal combustion engine, etc. Electrically-operated vehicles are designed to run only on electrical energy. As such, they will run on battery as and when put to use. Hence, for vehicles to be classified as electrically-operated vehicles they must be such that they would run solely on electrical energy derived from one or more electrical batteries, as and when put to use.’

Further, relying on Reva Electric Car Company Pvt. Ltd. reported in [2012 (275) ELT 488 (GOI)] 2011-VIL-01-Misc, which holds that if electrical-battery operated cars are exported, though not fitted with batteries at the time of export, the same are still classifiable as ‘battery-powered road vehicles’ and would run on battery when put to use. Accordingly, the AAR held that fitting of battery in the vehicle, at or before the time of supply, is not a precondition for the same to be classified as electrically-operated vehicle. Accordingly, the AAR decided the AR in favour of the applicant.

(D) Works Contract – ‘Original work’
M/s Bindu Projects & Co. (AR Order No. KAR ADRG 40/2021 dated 30th July, 2021)

The applicant is a registered person and engaged in executing works contract services to South Western Railways. It has sought advance ruling in respect of the following question:

‘i. Applicability of GST rates for works contract services doing original works with South Western Railways.’

The applicant is a contractor with the South Western Railway, Bangalore and has been awarded the contract of ‘KSR Bengaluru City Railway Station and Service Buildings at Bengaluru such as C&W Office, Loco Trip Shed, DRM Office, Supervisory Training Centre, ORHCM SRH, Railway Hospital, RPF Barricade, GRP Barricade, etc.’ as per Zone-S vide LOA No. Bangalore Division ENGG/12SBC190F11-4-19 ITEM 12/00841250002528 dated 25th June, 2019. The said work is a Zonal Agreement, plus…
(a) It is a lump sum contract based on Unified Schedule of Rates, 2011 of South Western Railways.
(b) It includes New Works, Repair Works, additions and alterations to existing structures.
(c) The work is carried out through Work Orders each restricted to a maximum of Rs. 5 lakhs, where each work order is an individual tax invoice.
(d) The work is executed in service buildings like stations, PWI offices, RPF Barricades, etc., and in welfare buildings like Railway Hospitals, Colonies, etc.

The applicant has submitted that as per the Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) – Serial No. 3(v), the GST rate applicable is 12% if ‘composite supply of works contract as defined in clause (119) of section 2 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is supplied by way of construction, erection, commissioning of original works pertaining to Railways (including monorail and metro).’

The applicant also brought to the notice of the AAR, Rule 2A of the Service Tax Rules 2006 wherein ‘Original Works’ has been defined as
(a) all new constructions,
(b) all types of additions and alterations to abandoned or damaged structures on land that are required to make them workable, and
(c) Erection, commissioning or installation of plant, machinery or equipment or structures whether prefabricated or otherwise.

In the light of the above, the applicant claimed that it is executing original works of Works Contract Services and hence eligible to 12% tax.

The AAR analysed the transactions and found that the applicant is executing two types of works wherein in one set the applicant is executing works contract for construction of new buildings and in the second it is executing works contracts not involving new construction. It was noticed that a majority of the works were like provision of compound wall to Railway properties, laying of tiles for buildings, plumbing with new pipelines, provision of new GLR and OHT, staff recreation like parks, new rainwater-harvesting structures, painting, renovation of old structures, etc.

The AAR reproduced Entry 3(v) of Notification No. 11/2017 dated 28th June, 2017 and the definition of ‘Original Works’ as given in clause (zs) of para 2 of Notification No. 20/2017-Central Tax Rate dated 22nd August, 2017 as under:

‘Composite supply of works contract as defined in clause (119) of section 2 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, supplied by way of construction, erection, Commissioning, or installation of original works pertaining to, –
    (a) Railways, ….
    (b)….’

    ‘Original Works’ in clause (zs) of para 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 is described as under:

‘(zs) “original works” means – all new constructions;
(i) All types of additions and alterations to abandoned or damaged structures on land that are required to make them workable;
(ii) Erection, commissioning or installation of plant, machinery or equipment or structures, whether prefabricated or otherwise;’

Although the definition is given in relation to Notification No. 12/2017, it can be adopted for the present entry also. Only ‘additions or alterations made to abandoned or damaged structures on land that are made to make them workable’ are treated as original works and not all repairs and maintenance services.

In view of the above, the AAR observed that so far as construction of new structure is concerned, it is covered by the above entry attracting tax @ 12%.

However, in the case of constructions which are made where the structures already exist, the same can be classified as under:
(a) where the additions and alterations are made to the abandoned structures on land or damaged structures on land to make them workable,
(b) repairs of already existing structures which are in working condition, and
(c) construction services on structures not on land.

It was further observed that only those works contract services covered under (a) above are to be treated as ‘original works’ and not those covered under (b) and (c). The AAR also considered the meaning of the words ‘structures on land’ by reference to the dictionary meaning.

According to the Cambridge Dictionary, ‘structure’ means ‘something that has been made or built from parts, especially a large building’ or ‘something built, such as a building or a bridge’. Considering all this, the AAR observed that the scope of the above entry will cover the structures which are directly on land. If these structures are damaged to the extent that the same cannot be used and by the activity of works contract services these unusable structures are made reusable, then such services would be covered under the above entry for reduced rate of tax.

The repair works are held to be not ‘Original Works’.

For services provided in relation to the residential accommodation of staff, the AAR examined the position separately. He referred to Entry 3(vi) which reads as under:

‘(vi) Services provided to the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory, a local authority, a Governmental Authority or a Government Entity by way of construction, erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, or alteration of,
(a) a civil structure or any other original works meant predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry, or any other business or profession;
(b) a structure meant predominantly for use as (i) an educational, (ii) a clinical, or (iii) an art or cultural establishment; or
(c) a residential complex predominantly meant for self-use or the use of their employees or other persons specified in paragraph 3 of the Schedule III of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, provided that where the services are supplied to a Government Entity, they should have been procured by the said Entity in relation to a work entrusted to it by the Central Government, State Government, Union Territory or local authority, as the case may be.’

The AAR observed that the Railway Department is a Central Government Department and therefore for services provided to it for a purpose other than for business, the same would be covered by above Entry 3(vi). The services of repairs, maintenance, renovation and alterations of residential complex meant for use of the Railway employees are therefore held as covered under Entry 3(vi) of the Notification and accordingly eligible for tax at 12% CGST.

The AAR also made observations about the application of the rate of tax. In a single contract given by the Railways, multiple works are mentioned. The issue examined is whether such multiple events are one composite supply transaction or mixed supply transaction or each one is separate. The AAR held that since there is no principal supply, it is not composite supply. Also, considering that each work is valued separately, it was held that it is also not a mixed supply. Therefore, each work in the contract is held as a separate transaction and accordingly the AAR ruled to apply the rates as discussed above.

(E) Co-operative Housing Society – Chargeability to GST
M/s Forest County Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Order No. GST-ARA-65/2019-20/B-42 dated 4th August, 2021)

The applicant society has a billing as under:

‘Total bill raised by a housing co-operative society if, for example, Rs. 6,500 per month per member, the break-up of Rs. 6,500 is as below:
1) Repair and maintenance fund: – Rs. 1,500
2) Sinking Fund: – Rs. 1,500
3) Other Maintenance charges: – Rs. 3,500
Total Maintenance Bill (1+2+3) – Rs. 6,500
Is the society liable to collect any GST in the above scenario? Or since the total maintenance bill is less than Rs. 7,500, no GST is required to be charged and collected by the housing co-operative society?’

The legality about the levy was not challenged. However, the society’s total receipts were more than Rs. 20 lakhs in a year and it has obtained registration under GST. The argument of the applicant was that though it has obtained registration, since the charges do not exceed Rs. 7,500 per member per month, it is actually not liable to pay any tax.

The applicant wanted a ruling on the above view. It cited Circular No. 109/28/2019-GST dated 22nd July, 2019.

The AAR noted that as per the provisions of the GST laws, ‘Repair and maintenance fund and sinking fund’ are covered under ‘services’ as per the provisions of the GST Act. Hence, it is observed that such services provided by the applicant to its members are liable to tax subject to crossing the threshold turnover limit and as per the provisions of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017. As per Sl. No. 77(c) of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017, charges up to Rs. 7,500 are not taxable. The AAR held that since in this case the charges are not exceeding Rs. 7,500 per member, per month, no tax is actually payable. He ruled accordingly.

(F) Valuation – DG Set and reimbursement of diesel cost
M/s Goodwill Autos (AR Order No. KAR-ADRG-44/2021 dated 30th July, 2021)

The applicant is a partnership firm registered under the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and engaged in the business of leasing of DG Sets to customers like LIC of India, Syndicate Bank and SBI in various districts of Karnataka.

It has entered into an agreement with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), Branch Office at Koppa, Udupi to install a DG on hire basis for a rent of Rs. 10,520 per month along with reimbursement of diesel cost at Rs. 305 per hour on usage of the DG Set.

The applicant is discharging tax @ 18% (CGST @ 9% and KGST @ 9%) on DG Set hiring charges and also discharging tax @ 18% (CGST @ 9% and KGST @ 9%) on reimbursement of diesel cost incurred for running the DG Set.

However, LIC was of the opinion that the taxes collected by the applicant pertaining to the reimbursement of diesel charges for running the DG Set was erroneous because diesel did not come under the purview of GST. As diesel is non-GST goods as per section 9 of the CGST / KGST Act, 2017, LIC has requested the applicant to reimburse the wrongly-collected taxes.

Given the above facts, the applicant has filed the AR to know the correct position of law. It was contended that since there is no specific provision for inclusion of diesel cost in DG Set service charges, the same should be held as not liable to GST.

The judgment under Service Tax in the case of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Private Limited vs. Union of India, 2012-VIL-106-Del-ST, was cited where the Court has taken a view that the reimbursement will not be liable to service tax in the absence of specific provision for valuation u/s 67 of the Service Tax Act. It was urged to apply the same position here.

The AAR considered the legal position by reference to section 15(1) which is reproduced as under:

‘the value of a supply of goods or services or both shall be the transaction value, which is the price actually paid or payable for the said supply of goods or services or both where the supplier and the recipient of the supply are not related and the price is the sole consideration for the supply.’

The AAR also considered the definition of ‘consideration’ in section 2(31) which reads as under:

‘(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government;
(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government:
Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;’

After considering the above definitions, the AAR observed as under:

‘The contract entered into between the applicant and the recipient is for the hiring of DG Set and is a comprehensive contract with the consideration having a fixed component and a variable component. The fixed component is the monthly fixed rent charged in the invoice for the DG Set and the variable charge is the charge for the diesel used. Both are part of the same consideration and for the contract of supplying the DG Set on hire. Though it appears that the applicant is receiving the reimbursement of diesel cost, the recipient is not paying for the diesel but for the services of DG Set, which is an integral part of the supply of DG Set rental service. There is no separate contract for supply of diesel and the invoice issued for the reimbursement of diesel cost is nothing but a supplementary invoice issued for the supply of rental service of DG Set. Hence, consideration for reimbursement of expenses as cost of the diesel for running of the DG Set is nothing but the additional consideration for the renting of the DG Set and attracts CGST @ 9% and KGST @ 9%.’

Accordingly, the AAR upheld the levy of tax on receipts towards reimbursement of diesel cost.

FINANCIAL REPORTING DOSSIER

1. Key Recent Updates

SEC: Enhanced Access to Financial Disclosure Data
On 19th August, 2021, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced open data enhancements that provide public access to financial statements and other disclosures made by publicly-traded companies on its Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) System. The SEC is releasing for the first time Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that aggregate financial statement data, making corporate disclosures quicker and easier for developers and third-party services to use. APIs will allow developers to create web or mobile apps that directly serve retail investors. The free APIs provide access to the EDGAR submission history by the filer as well as XBRL data from financial statements, including annual and quarterly reports. [https://www.sec.gov/news/ press-release/2021-159]

UK FRC: Guidance on Addressing Exceptions in the Use of Audit Data Analytics
On 27th August, 2021, the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) issued a Guidance, Addressing Exceptions in the Use of Audit Data Analytics (ADA) for auditors to address potential exceptions when using data analytics in an audit. The Guidance lays down general principles for dealing with outliers when using ADA to respond to identified audit risks and includes an illustrative example based on a real-world scenario. Also included in the Guidance are best practices and potential pitfalls to avoid when refining expectations developed for ADA. [https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/01327ab3-1d5f-4068-ab9b-ece0efc3c3af/Addressing-Exceptions-In-The-Use-of-Data-Analytics-20210824.pdf]

IAASB: Supplemental Guidance on Auditor Reporting and Mapping Documents – Audits of LCE
On 3rd September, 2021, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) published two documents, namely: (1) Proposed Supplemental Guidance on Auditor Reporting, and (2) Mapping Documents related to its open consultation on the Audits of Less Complex Entities (LCE). The supplement provides further guidance on modifications and other changes to the auditor’s report when using the proposed ISA for LCE, while the Mapping Document is aimed at assisting users in navigating between existing, equivalent ISA and the requirements in the newly-proposed ISA for LCE. [https://www.iaasb.org/news-events/2021-09/audits-less-complex-entities-consultation-supplemental-guidance-auditor-reporting-mapping-documents]

FASB: Fair Value Measurement of Equity Securities Subject to Contractual Sale Restrictions
On 15th September, 2021, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft of Proposed Accounting Standards Update – Fair Value Measurement of Equity Securities Subject to Contractual Sale Restrictions proposing amendments to Topic 820, Fair Value Measurement of USGAAP. The proposed amendments clarify that a contractual restriction on the sale of equity security is not considered part of the unit of account of the equity security and, therefore, is not considered in measuring fair value. [https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176177297732&acceptedDisclaimer=true]

FASB: Changes to Interim Disclosure Requirements
And on 1st November, 2021, the FASB issued a proposed Accounting Standards Update Disclosure Framework – Changes to Interim Disclosure Requirements (Topic 270). The Exposure Draft clarifies that interim reporting can take the following three forms: (a) Financial statements prepared with the same level of detail as the previous annual statements subject to all the presentation and disclosure requirements in GAAP; (b) Financial statements prepared with the same level of detail as the previous annual statements subject to all the presentation requirements in GAAP and limited notes subject to the disclosure requirements in Topic 270; and (c) Condensed financial statements and limited notes subject to the disclosure requirements in Topic 270. [https://www.fasb.org/cs/Satellite?c=Document_C &cid=1176178812005&pagename=FASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocumentPage]

International Financial Reporting Material

1. CPA Canada, ICAS and IFAC: Ethical Leadership in an Era of Complexity and Digital Change, Paper 1 – Complexity and the Professional Accountant: Practical Guidance for Ethical Decision Making. [19th August, 2021.]
2. UK FRC: Thematic Review – Viability and Going Concern. [22nd September, 2021.]
3. IAASB: First-time Implementation Guide for ISQM1 (Revised). [28th September, 2021.]
4. PCAOB: Staff Guidance – Insights for Auditors: Evaluating Relevance and Reliability of Audit Evidence Obtained from External Sources. [7th October, 2021.]
5. UK FRC: Structured Reporting: An Early Implementation Study – Applying Disclosure Guidance and Transparency (DTR) Rules 4.1.14 and the European Single Electronic Format (ESEF). [12th October, 2021.]
6. UK FRC: Thematic Review: IAS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. [14th October, 2021.]
7. UK FRC: Report – What Makes a Good Audit? [16th November, 2021.]

2. Enforcement Actions and Inspection Reports by Global Regulators

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)

A. Enforcement actions
Alison G. Yablonowitz, CPA and Shawn C. Rogers, CPA (Partners of Ernst and Young LLP, New Jersey)
The Case: The audit client Synchronoss sold a 70% ownership interest in the BPO segment of one of its businesses for $146 million and accounted for it as part of net income from discontinued operations in the Consolidated Income Statement. The sale was to Counterparty E. Six days after the BPO Sale, Synchronoss entered into a license agreement with Counterparty E, which allowed Counterparty E to use one of Synchronoss’s software in connection with operating the BPO business. Counterparty E paid Synchronoss a $10 million fee in connection with the license agreement. Synchronoss accounted for the license agreement separately from the BPO sale and recorded $9.2 million of the $10 million license fee as revenue in Q4 2016 ($9.2 million was the company’s fair value estimate of the license agreement). It treated the remaining $0.8 million as additional consideration paid by Counterparty E to purchase the BPO business and recorded it as an element of the gain on the sale of the discontinued operations.

PCAOB Rules / Standards Requirement: Auditors who have identified significant unusual transactions are required to comply with specific provisions in the PCAOB’s auditing standard governing the auditor’s consideration of fraud – performing adequate procedures and obtaining sufficient evidence concerning certain significant unusual transactions.

The Order: The PCAOB suspended Alison G. Yablonowitz, CPA, from being associated with a registered public accounting firm for one year, imposed a $25,000 civil money penalty and required her to complete 20 additional hours of CPE within one year. The PCAOB censured Shawn C. Rogers, CPA, imposed a $10,000 civil money penalty and required him to complete 20 additional hours of CPE within one year. [Release No. 105-2021-010 dated 22nd September, 2021.]

B. Deficiencies identified in audits

1. KPMG LLP, Canada
Audit Area: Long-Lived Assets – The audit client had multiple cash-generating units. For one CGU, the issuer concluded that there were no indicators of potential impairment. For another CGU, the issuer identified indicators of potential impairment, performed an impairment analysis and recorded an impairment charge. For testing controls, the audit firm selected the client’s evaluation of long-lived assets for possible impairment. It included the client’s reviews of potential indicators of impairment and assumptions underlying the forecasts used in the impairment analysis such as forecasted operating costs, capital expenditures and discount rates.

Audit deficiency identified: The audit firm did not evaluate specific review procedures that the control owners performed concerning potential indicators of impairment related to the first CGU and to assess the reasonableness of the forecasted operating costs, capital expenditures and discount rates used in the impairment analysis for the second CGU. [Release No. 104-2021-137 dated 6th July, 2021.]

2. Haynie & Company, Salt Lake City, Utah
Audit Area: Revenue and Related Accounts – The Audit Firm was selected for testing in the revenue process for certain IT general controls, automated controls and IT-dependent manual controls.

Audit deficiency identified: The audit firm did not test the accuracy and completeness of the information used in testing controls over access rights and removals. For testing, it selected an automated control designed to calculate and record revenue. It did not obtain an understanding of or test the configuration of the control. The firm did not identify and test: controls over the accuracy and completeness of the information used in the performance of control to verify standard terms in customer agreements; super-user access to revenue systems in which various automated IT-dependent manual controls resided; the accuracy and completeness of specific inputs used to recognise revenue; and the determination of the units of accounting and allocation of total contract consideration to each performance obligation for contracts with multiple performance obligations. [Release No. 104-2021-134 dated 6th July, 2021.]

3. Yichien Yeh, CPA, New York
Audit Area: Related Party Transaction – The audit client entered into an agreement with a related party in which it was to receive quarterly fees. Since the agreement’s inception, the client recorded the fee as receivables and deferred revenue. The client disclosed that its sole officer and director was also the beneficial owner of and controlled the related party.

Audit deficiency identified: The audit firm did not obtain an understanding of the business purpose of the transaction and failed to take the transaction into account in its identification of significant unusual transactions. It did not evaluate the financial capability of the related party concerning the outstanding receivable balance and assess whether the client’s accounting for and disclosure of the transaction was appropriate. During the audit, the audit firm was aware of information concerning possible illegal acts committed by the client and an officer. Despite this, it did not obtain an understanding of the nature of the acts, the circumstances in which they occurred and sufficient other information to evaluate the effect on the financial statements. [Release No. 104-2021-148 dated 28th July, 2021.]

4. BF Borgers, CPA, Colorado
Audit Area: Accounts Receivable – The audit firm received electronic responses to its accounts receivable confirmation requests.

Audit deficiency identified: The audit firm did not consider performing procedures to address the risks associated with electronic responses, such as verifying the source and contents of the confirmation responses. [Release No. 104-2021-155 dated 16th August, 2021.]

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
1. Kraft Heinz Company
The Case:
Kraft Heinz Company, according to the SEC order, from the last quarter of 2015 to the end of 2018, engaged in various types of accounting misconduct, including recognising unearned discounts from suppliers and maintaining false and misleading supplier contracts, which improperly reduced its cost of goods sold and allegedly achieved ‘cost savings’. Kraft, in turn, touted these purported savings to the market, which financial analysts widely covered. The accounting improprieties resulted in Kraft reporting inflated adjusted EBITDA, a key earnings performance metric for investors. In June, 2019, after the SEC investigation commenced, Kraft restated its financials, correcting a total of $208 million in improperly recognised cost savings arising out of nearly 300 transactions.

The Violations: The expense management misconduct inter alia included the following types of transactions: (a) Prebate Transactions – The company’s procurement division employees agreed to future-year commitments, like contract extensions and future-year volume purchases, in exchange for savings discounts and credits by suppliers (prebates), but mischaracterised the savings in contract documentation which stated that they were for past or same-year purchases (rebates); (b) Clawback Transactions – The procurement division employees agreed to take upfront payments subject to repayment through future price increases or volume commitments, but documented the transactions in ways which obscured the repayment obligation; and (c) Price Phasing Transactions – Suppliers agreed to reduce their prices during a specific period in exchange for an offsetting price increase in a future period, but the entire nature of the arrangement was not communicated by the procurement division employees to controller group employees.

Throughout the relevant period, the company did not design or maintain effective controls for the procurement division, including those implemented by the finance and controller groups, in connection with the accounting for supplier contracts and related arrangements.

The Penalty: Kraft consented to cease and desist from future violations without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings and paying a civil penalty of $62 million. The company’s former COO consented to cease and desist from future violations, pay disgorgement of $14,000 and a civil penalty of $300,000. [Press Release No. 2021-174 dated 3rd September, 2021.]

3. Integrated Reporting

(a) Key Recent Updates

CDSB: Application Guidance for Water-related Disclosures
On 23rd August, 2021, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) released an Application Guidance for Water-related Disclosures. The Guidance helps businesses apply the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TFCD) beyond climate to water. The Water Guidance is designed around the first six reporting requirements of the CDSB Framework: Governance; Management’s environmental policies, strategies, and targets; Risks and opportunities; Sources of environmental impact; Performance and comparative analysis; and Outlook. [https://www.cdsb.net/sites/default/files/ cdsb_waterguidance_double170819.pdf.]

IFAC: Practical Framework for Deploying Global Standards at Local Level
On 9th September, 2021, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) published a Framework for implementing global sustainability standards at the local level, focusing on the Building Blocks approach (published in May, 2021). The Framework examines how existing mechanisms already in place for adopting IFRS standards used in financial reporting may be appropriate or adapted for sustainability-related reporting. Alternatively, it states a new mechanism may be required. [https://www.ifac.org/knowledge-gateway/contributing-global-economy/publications/how-global-standards-become-local.]

CDSB: Biodiversity Application Guidance
On 15th September, 2021, the CDSB released for consultation a Biodiversity Application Guidance aimed at assisting companies in the disclosure of material biodiversity-related information in the mainstream report. The Guidance is designed around the first six reporting requirements of the CDSB Framework (Supra). For each reporting requirement, the Biodiversity Guidance provides a checklist including suggestions for effective biodiversity-related disclosures, detailed reporting suggestions and a selection of external resources to assist companies in developing their mainstream biodiversity reporting. [https://www.cdsb. net/sites/default/files/biodiversity_application_guidance_draft_for_consultation_v2_1.pdf.]

GRI: First Sector Standard for Oil and Gas
On 5th October, 2021, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) released its first sector-specific sustainability reporting standard for Oil and Gas, namely, GRI 11: Oil and Gas Sector 2021. The standard applies to any organisation involved in oil and gas exploration, development, extraction, storage, transportation or refinement. It guides reporting across 22 most likely material topics, including climate adaptation, resilience and transition, site closure and rehabilitation, biodiversity, the rights of indigenous peoples, anti-corruption, water and waste. The standard comes into effect for reporting from 1st January, 2023. [https://www.global reporting.org/about-gri/news-center/oil-and-gas-transparency-standard-for-the-low-carbon-transition/.]

GRI: Revised Universal Standards
On 5th October, 2021, the GRI launched Revised Universal Standards. The revised standards, effective for reporting from 1st January, 2023, represent the most significant update since GRI transitioned from guiding to setting standards in 2016. The revised standards reflect due diligence expectations for organisations to manage their sustainability impacts outlined in the UN and OECD intergovernmental instruments. The Universal Standards comprise three standards: (a) GRI 1: Foundation (replaces GRI 101); (b) GRI 2: General Disclosures (replaces GRI 102); and (c) GRI 3: Material Topics (replaces GRI 103). [https://www.global reporting.org/about-gri/news-center/gri-raises-the-global-bar-for-due-diligence-and-human-rights-reporting/.]

IFRS Foundation: Developments related to Disclosures on Climate and Sustainability Issues
And on 3rd November, 2021, the IFRS Foundation announced: (a) the formation of a new International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB); (b) Consolidation of Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) and the Value Reporting Foundation (VRF) by June, 2022; and (c) the publication of prototype climate and general disclosure requirements developed by its Technical Readiness Working Group (TRWG). [https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2021/11/ifrs-foundation-announces-issb-consolidation-with-cdsb-vrf-publication-of-prototypes/.]

(b) Extracts from Published Reports – Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures
Background
In 2017, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) released climate-related financial disclosure recommendations to help companies provide better information to support informed capital allocation. The disclosure recommendations are structured around four thematic areas representing core elements of how organisations operate: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.

Extracts from Annual Report of Entain PLC (listed on LSE) [2020 revenue: GBP 3.6 billion]
Reporting on climate-related risks and opportunities aligned with the TCFD
Entain supports the recommendations of the Task Force for Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The recommendations fit well with our new Sustainability Charter to help us achieve long-term success. We took our first step towards implementing the TCFD recommendations in 2020 by reporting our first CDP climate change submission in 2020. We will take a step-wise approach to implementing the recommendations, with the following page being our first TCFD Statement.

Task Force for Climate-related Financial Disclosures (‘TCFD’) Statement

Governance

• The effective understanding, acceptance and
management of risk is fundamental to the Group achieving its strategic
priorities. Climate-related risks and opportunities are included within our
risk governance framework;

• Responsibility for overseeing this framework is
with the Risk Committee, which is overseen by the Audit Committee;

Strategy

• In addition, our
board-level ESG Committee is responsible for steering our approach to environmental
issues, including climate change, and which has recently approved our updated
environmental policy;

• To double-down our
focus on the environment and climate change, we formed an Environmental
Steering Committee. Reporting to the ESG Committee, its purpose is to advise
on the environmental strategy and its implementation globally;

• We will continue to
encourage and enhance connected, strategic thinking about the risks that
climate change poses to the business, across divisions and functions;

Risk Management

• Our overall risk management framework is
overseen by the Audit Committee, with the Risk Committee responsible for
managing it;

 

 (continued)

 

• The risk management policy and framework
outline an iterative approach between the top-down view of commercial risk
and the bottom-up assessment of operational risks;

• Physical and transition climate-related risks
have been identified on our operational risk registers;

• In the coming year, we will take steps towards
systematically reviewing the risks and opportunities that climate change
poses to Entain over the medium and long term under different climate change
scenarios. We will provide further details of our progress in 2021;

Metrics
and targets

• In 2018, we set a
target to reduce our GHG emissions per colleague by 15% by 2021. We are
pleased to announce that Entain has achieved this target one year earlier,
with a reduction since 2018 levels of 15%. Whilst the Covid-19 pandemic saw a
significant reduction in business travel, office-based working, store opening
hours, our trend over time suggested we were on track to achieve our
emissions reductions despite Covid-19;

• In 2021, we will
continue to drive emissions reductions and commit to setting a science-based
target ready for our next;

• Our environmental
KPIs can be found below1.

1 The table is not reproduced for the purposes of this feature. The relevant environmental KPIs reported by Entain PLC include: total energy consumption; total GHG emissions – direct and indirect; total GHG emissions intensity per employee; water withdrawal and waste generated

(c) Integrated Reporting Material
1. IFAC Statement: Corporate Reporting – Climate Change Information and the 2021 Reporting Cycle. [7th September, 2021.]
2. UK FRC: Thematic Review – Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting. [8th September, 2021.]
3. Value Reporting Foundation: Transition to Integrated Reporting: A Guide to Getting Started. [20th September, 2021.]
4. UK FRC: Frequently Asked Questions – International Sustainability Standard Setting. [23rd September, 2021.]
5. UK FRC: Thematic Review – Alternative Performance Measures (APMs). [7th October, 2021.]
6. UK FRC: FRS 102 Factsheet 8 – Climate Related Matters. [12th November, 2021.]

GLIMPSES OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS

4 M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi [(2021) 436 ITR 582 (SC)]


Deduction – Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Issue of debentures in lieu of interest accrued under a rehabilitation plan, to extinguish the liability of interest altogether – No misuse of the provision of section 43B – Explanation 3C, which was meant to plug a loophole, cannot therefore be brought to the aid of Revenue on the facts of this case

 

On 28th November, 1996, the appellant filed a return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 1,03,18,572 for the assessment year 1996-1997. In the return, the appellant claimed a deduction of Rs. 2,84,71,384 u/s 43B based on the issue of debentures in lieu of interest accrued and payable to financial institutions. By an order dated 29th October, 1998, the A.O. rejected the appellant’s contention by holding that the issuance of debentures was not as per the original terms and conditions on which the loans were granted, and that interest was payable, holding that a subsequent change in the terms of the agreement, as they then stood, would be contrary to section 43B(d) and would render such amount ineligible for deduction.

 

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal and held that it would not be correct to say that the issue of debentures in lieu of interest merely postponed the payment of liability. A debenture is a valuable security which is freely negotiable and openly quoted in the stock market. As the financial institutions had accepted the debentures in effective discharge of the liability for the outstanding interest which was no longer payable by the appellant, it was tantamount to actual payment for the intent of section 43B. As interest had been actually paid during the year and the payment was in accordance with the terms and conditions of the borrowings, interest of Rs. 2,84,71,384 is directed to be allowed u/s 43B.

 

This order was upheld in appeal by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which held that the payment of interest by conversion of the outstanding liability into convertible debentures is a real, substantial and effective payment, meeting the requirement of the word ‘actual’ and is not a fictional or illusory payment. The parties have understood it as an effective discharge by the assessee of the interest liability. The treatment given in the accounts as well as in their income tax assessments is in accord with the factual position.

 

Revenue filed an appeal against this judgment of the ITAT before the High Court. The High Court concluded, based on Explanation 3C, as follows: ‘Now, Explanation 3C, having retrospective effect from 1st April, 1989, would be applicable to the present case as it relates to A.Y. 1996-97. Explanation 3C squarely covers the issue raised in this appeal, as it negates the assessee’s contention that interest which has been converted into loan is deemed to be “actually paid”. In light of the insertion of this explanation which, as mentioned earlier, was not present at the time the impugned order was passed, the assessee cannot claim deduction u/s 43B.’

 

On 22nd July, 2016, the High Court dismissed the review petition filed by the assessee.

 

When the case went before the Supreme Court, it observed that the object of section 43B, as originally enacted, is to allow certain deductions only on actual payment. This is made clear by the non-obstante clause contained at the beginning of the provision, coupled with the deduction being allowed irrespective of the previous years in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly employed by it. In short, a mercantile system of accounting cannot be looked at when a deduction is claimed under this section, making it clear that incurring of liability cannot allow for a deduction but only ‘actual payment’, as contrasted with incurring of a liability, can allow for a deduction. The ‘sum payable’ referred to in section 43B(d), which is applied in the present case, however, does not refer to the mode of payment (in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft), unlike proviso 2 to the said section which was omitted by the Finance Act, 2003 effective from 1st April, 2004.

 

The Supreme Court noted that both the CIT and the ITAT found, as a matter of fact, that as per a rehabilitation plan agreed to between the lender and the borrower, debentures were accepted by the financial institution in discharge of the debt on account of outstanding interest. This was also clear from the expression ‘in lieu of’ used in the judgment of the CIT. That this was also clear not only from the accounts produced by the assessee, but equally clear from the fact that in the assessment of ICICI Bank, for the assessment year in question, the accounts of the bank reflect the amount received by way of debentures as its business income. This being the fact situation in the present case, the Supreme Court held that it was clear that interest was ‘actually paid’ by means of issuance of debentures, which extinguished the liability to pay interest.

 

The Supreme Court noted that Explanation 3C, which was introduced for the ‘removal of doubts’, only made it clear that interest that remained unpaid and has been converted into a loan or borrowing shall not be deemed to have been actually paid. It observed that as per the Circular explaining Explanation 3C, at the heart of the introduction of Explanation 3C was misuse of the provisions of section 43B by not actually paying interest but converting such interest into a fresh loan. The Supreme Court noted that on the facts found in the present case, the issue of debentures by the assessee was, under a rehabilitation plan, to extinguish the liability of interest altogether. No misuse of the provision of section 43B was found by either the CIT or the ITAT. Explanation 3C, which was meant to plug a loophole, cannot, therefore, be brought to the aid of Revenue on the facts of this case.

 

The Court held that if there be any ambiguity in the retrospectively added Explanation 3C, at least three well-established canons of interpretation come to the rescue of the assessee in this case. First, since Explanation 3C was added in 2006 with the object of plugging a loophole, i.e., misusing section 43B by not actually paying interest but converting interest into a fresh loan, bona fide transactions of actual payments are not meant to be affected. Second, a retrospective provision in a tax act which is ‘for the removal of doubts’ cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. Third, any ambiguity in the language of Explanation 3C shall be resolved in favour of the assessee as per Cape Brandy Syndicate vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner (Supra) as followed by judgments of this Court – see Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613.

 

The Supreme Court held that the High Court judgment dated 18th May, 2015 was clearly in error in concluding that ‘interest’, on the facts of this case, had been converted into a loan. There was no basis for this finding; as a matter of fact, it is directly contrary to the finding on facts of the authorities below.

 

Consequently, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the judgment and order of the ITAT was restored. The appeals are allowed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid terms.

 

5 Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Kolkata vs. Batanagar Education and Research Trust [(2021) 436 ITR 501 (SC)]
           

Cancellation of registration of a Trust – Sections 12AA and 80G(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – An entity which is misusing the status conferred upon it by section 12AA is not entitled to retain and enjoy said status

 

The Trust was registered u/s 12AA vide order dated 6th August, 2010 and was also accorded approval u/s 80G(vi).

 

In a survey conducted on an entity named School of Human Genetics & Population Health (SHG&PH), Kolkata u/s 133A, it was prima facie observed that the Trust was not carrying out its activities in accordance with its objects. A show cause notice was, therefore, issued by the CIT on 4th December, 2015.

 

In answer to the questionnaire issued by the Department, Rabindranath Lahiri, the Managing Trustee, gave answers to some of its questions as under:

 

‘Q. 11: Please confirm the authenticity of the above-mentioned corpus donation.

Answer: A major part of the donations that claimed exemption u/s 11(1)(d) were not genuine. The donations received in F.Ys. 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11 were genuine corpus donations received either from the Trustees or persons who were close to the Trustees. In F.Ys. 2011-12 and 2012-13, a part of the donations were genuine like the earlier years. However, a major part of the donations received in these two F.Ys., viz., 2011-12 and 2012-13, shown as corpus donation were in the nature of accommodation entries to facilitate two things:

a) To procure loans from the bank we had to show substantial amount of capital reserve in our balance sheet.

b) We require funds for the expansion of our college. The fees received from the students along with genuine donations from the Trustees and their contacts were not sufficient to run the institution.

 

Q. 12: Why are you saying that a major part of the donations received were not genuine?

Ans: In those cases, which I admit as accommodation entries, a part of the donation received was returned back to the donors through intermediaries.

 

Q. 13: Who were the intermediaries and what were the modes of returning the money?

Ans: We were instructed to transfer funds through RTGS to the following seven (7) persons: 1. Santwana Syndicate, 2. P.C. Sales Corporation, 3. Kalyani Enterprises, 4. Riya Enterprises, 5. Laxmi Narayan Traders, 6. Hanuman Traders, and 7. Rani Sati Trade Pvt. Limited.

These payments were booked as capital expenditure under the head Building.

 

Q. 14: In response to the earlier question you have stated that you were “instructed”. Who gave you the instruction?

Ans: I can remember only one name right now, that is, Shri Gulab Pincha, Mob No. 9831015157. He was the key person for providing a large part of bogus donations received which was immediately returned back to the different parties in the guise of payments towards capital expenditure in building. We do now know any details in respect of the donors on behalf of whom Shri Gulab Pincha acted as a middle man. Shri Pincha provided us with the details of the donors, cheques of the donations, letters of corpus donations, etc. He also provided us with the names and bank account details of the seven (7) persons mentioned in Answer 13 to whom money had to be returned back through RTGS. He also collected the money receipts / 80G certifications on behalf of the donors.

 

Q. 19: The ledger copy for the period from 01.04.2014 to 04.09.2014 in respect of “General Fund” of your Trust having details of the donors is being shown to you to identify the bogus donations along with bogus donors.

Ans: After going through the list of the donors appearing in such ledger it is understood that the donors whose names are written in capital letters under the sub-head “Donation-13”, “Donation-I” and “Donations-II” having total amount of Rs. 6,03,07,550 are bogus and out of which Rs. 5,96,29,973 was returned back through RTGS to the above-mentioned seven (7) persons following the instructions of the mediators.’

 

On the basis of the material on record, the CIT came to the following conclusions:

 

‘a) Assessee trust has received a sum of Rs. 1,23,87,550 as bogus donation from M/s School of Human Genetics and Population Health and voluntarily offered as income. SHG&PH has admitted their bogus transactions by filing application before the Hon’ble Settlement Commission, Kolkata and through confirmation filed.

b) They have received bogus corpus donation not only from SGHG&PH but also from various parties in different years.

c) Society / Trust has grossly misused the provisions of sections 12AA and 80G(5)(vi).

d) They have violated the objects of the Trust as converting cheque received through corpus donation in cash beyond-the-objects. The Society was found to be involved in hawala activities.

e) Corpus donation received is not voluntary, merely an accommodation entry and fictitious.

f) Activities of the Trust are not genuine as well as not being carried out in accordance with its declared objects. The assessee’s case is covered within the 60th limb of section 12AA(3).

g) Even non-genuine and illegal activities carried on by the assessee through money laundering do not come within the conceptual framework of charity vis-à-vis activity of general public utility envisaged under the Income-tax Act as laid down in section 2(15).’

 

The CIT, therefore, invoked the provisions of section 12AA(3) and cancelled the registration granted u/s 12AA w.e.f. 1st April, 2012. Consequently, the approval granted to the Trust u/s 80G was also cancelled.

 

The matter was carried in appeal by the Trust by filing an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

After considering the entire material on record, the Tribunal concluded as under:

 

‘13. We have given a very careful consideration to the rival submissions. It is clear from the statements of the Secretary and Treasurer of SHG&PH that they were accepting cash and giving bogus donations. In the statement recorded in the survey conducted in its premises on 27th January, 2015, it was explained that SHG&PH’s source of income was the money received in the form of donations from corporate bodies as well as from individuals. In the said statement it was explained that there were about nine brokers who used to bring donations in the form of cheque / RTGS. The donations received would be returned by issue of cheque / RTGS in the name of companies or organisations specified by the nine brokers. SHG&PH would receive 7 or 8% of the donation amount. It was also stated that since the assessee was entitled to exemption under sections 80G and 35, their organisation was chosen by the brokers for giving donations to SHG&PH as well as for giving donations by SHG&PH. Till now, the assessee’s name did not figure in the statement recorded on 27th January, 2015. However, pursuant to the survey, proceedings for cancellation of the registration u/s 12A granted to them were initiated.

 

In such proceedings, Smt. Samadrita Mukherjee Sardar (in a letter dated 24th August, 2015) had given a list of donations which were given by them after getting cash of equivalent amount. It is not disputed that the name of the assessee figures in the said list and the fact that the donations paid to the assessee were against cash received from them in F.Y. 2012-13 of a sum of Rs. 1,23,87,550. Even at this stage, all admissions were by third parties and the same were not binding on the assessee.

 

However, in a survey conducted in the case of the assessee on 24th August, 2015, the Managing Trustee of the assessee admitted that it gave cash and got back donations. We have already extracted the statement given by the Managing Trustee. Even in the proceedings for cancellation of registration, the assessee has not taken any stand on all the evidence against it. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the conclusions drawn by the CIT(E) in the impugned order which we have extracted in the earlier part of the order are correct and call for no interference. It is clear from the evidence on record that the activities of the assessee were not genuine and hence their registration is liable to be cancelled u/s 12AA(3) and was rightly cancelled by the CIT(E). We, therefore, uphold his orders and dismiss both the appeals by the assessee.’

 

With this, the appeals preferred by the Trust were dismissed.

 

The Trust being aggrieved, filed an appeal before the High Court. By its order dated 4th July, 2018, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of cancellation of the registration of the Trust, with the following observations:

 

‘On the basis of the evidence and the authorities cited before the adjudicating bodies below, we say that the respondent Revenue has not been able to establish the case so as to warrant cancellation of the registration of
the appellant Trust u/s 12AA(3). The respondent also has not been able to prove any complicity of the appellant Trust in any illegal, immoral or irregular activity of the donors.’

 

The Supreme Court observed that the answers given to the questionnaire by the Managing Trustee of the Trust show the extent of misuse of the status enjoyed by the Trust by virtue of registration u/s 12AA. These answers also show that donations were received by way of cheques out of which substantial money was ploughed back or returned to the donors. The facts thus clearly show that those were bogus donations and that the registration conferred upon it under sections 12AA and 80G was completely being misused by the Trust. According to the Supreme Court, an entity which is misusing the status conferred upon it by section 12AA is not entitled to retain and enjoy the said status. The authorities were, therefore, right and justified in cancelling the registration under sections 12AA and 80G.

 

In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the High Court completely erred in entertaining the appeal u/s 260A. It did not even attempt to deal with the answers to the questions as aforesaid and whether the conclusions drawn by the CIT and the Tribunal were in any way incorrect or invalid.

 

The Supreme Court, therefore, allowed the appeal of the Revenue.

 

Note: In the CIT’s findings quoted in the above judgment, reference to the ‘60th limb’ at (f) seems to be a typing / printing error as there is nothing like that in section 12AA(3). The finding at (f) effectively means that the case is covered within the scope of section 12AA(3).

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Dear BCAS Family,
We are in the phase of bidding adieu to the year 2021. At the same time, due to the extended Covid crisis and technical glitches with the Income Tax website, we are also in the midst of meeting the deadlines for filing income tax returns and concluding tax audits. I hope there is no more extension and we are all able to welcome 2022 in a relaxed atmosphere. This hope is based on the increased filings of income tax returns on the income tax portal, which has reached 26.62 million as on 21st November, 2021. The total estimated return filers is around 60 million. Normally, the pace gathers momentum as the deadline nears and with reduced glitches the taxpayers should be able to meet the extended due dates.

Whenever we are at the end of a year, it is usual to summarise the year gone by and evaluate the lessons learnt from the action taken during the year.

The year 2021 commenced with hopes of the gradual withdrawal of Covid and with it the revival of the beleaguered economy. However, somewhere in the month of March the second wave of the pandemic struck with much greater force and India was in a state of crisis. The medical infrastructure was found to be ill-equipped to handle a crisis of such magnitude. However, human resilience and proactive measures ensured that we were back on our feet by mid-2021. The fearless approach of many, including the medical fraternity, Government agencies and charitable institutions ensured a smooth transition to normalcy. A positive approach to any problem ensures surmounting it and finding a solution. I would quote my GURU Mahatria Ra who has aptly said:

Positive thinking may not guarantee success,
but negative thinking guarantees failure.
So, might as well be positive.

With the passage of one more year the one thing that is constantly showing itself up in our lives is change. We have to recognise that there will be change and we should desist from holding on to what we know and accept that things are changing. This recognition and acceptance of change will create opportunities in future and prepare us to face challenges positively.

To take stock of the current status of our economy, we are at present facing inflationary pressure due to the strong recovery in economic activities backed by increasing demand above normal levels. This is coupled with soaring prices of a majority of the inputs with high energy costs. At the same time, GST collections up to October in this financial year have crossed Rs. 1 trillion in all the months except June. This, along with various measures taken by the Government to boost economic activity, bodes well for the calendar year 2022.

The only dampener which has to be addressed with alacrity is ensuring that the new coronavirus variant ‘Omicron’ found in South Africa does not spread rapidly worldwide. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has stated that the new variant need not be interpreted as lethal or highly transmissible.

For the profession we have a solemn task to perform on 3rd and 4th December. We have to ensure that each one of us casts our valuable vote at the triennial elections to the Central Council and Regional Councils of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. It is our duty to elect the most deserving candidates who will uphold the integrity of the profession and who have the passion and foresight to take the profession to greater heights.

On the Consultation Paper released by the National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) on Statutory Audit and Auditing Standards for Micro, Small and Medium Companies (MSMCs) which has drawn substantial attention from professionals, policy-makers and the business community, I have pleasure in informing that under the leadership of the BCAS a Joint Representation along with six other professional associations has been submitted on the same. We were also able to obtain the views of Mr. Y.H. Malegam, a doyen of the CA profession, which were also made part of the Joint Representation. We hope that our views with elaborate reasoning shall be given proper weightage by the NFRA while finalising any policy affecting the profession at large.

Regarding the hardships faced on the Direct Taxation front, there were two representations made by the BCAS. One was regarding the impact of the new Rule 11UAE faced by the taxpayers for slump sale transactions. Another was relating to the issues arising from the orders of registration granted to Charitable Institutions in response to applications preferred u/s 12A(1)(ac) and the first proviso to section 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We have circulated all the Representations to the members for their information.

As part of the joint initiatives with other professional associations, BCAS had a Half-Day Joint Seminar with DTPA Chartered Accountants’ Study Circle – EIRC at Kolkata on 20th November. This was the first hybrid event by both the associations. The hybrid mode of seminars / workshops will be the order of the day, which will enable networking and interacting with professionals physically as well as providing opportunities for those who may not be able to attend physically to imbibe knowledge through remote participation.

Another joint initiative was with the Chamber of Tax Consultants (CTC) in organising a unique Workshop on a topic which is not in focus for CA professionals. It was on Customs Duties and Foreign Trade Policy. The Workshop was addressed by four eminent faculties and was well received by the participants.

There are many more programmes planned during the ensuing month which would be of interest to all the professionals. You are all requested to be in touch with BCAS through its website and through its social media presence.

At the end, I look forward to the year 2022 with a realisation that life is a series of new beginnings. We have to be disciplined enough to look at the future as if it is beginning today. We should develop ourselves in a manner that we don’t replicate the same experiences but try to learn from past experiences and chart out a new course for the future from those experiences. A disciplined approach provides the purpose of life. This is aptly explained through a statement by my GURU Mahatria Ra:

Discipline
is your ability
to subordinate your likes and dislikes
to the purpose of your life…

I wish all of you a Merry X’mas in advance.

Best Regards,
 

Abhay Mehta
President

Society News

SEMINAR ON AUDITOR’S ROLE IN CONTROLLING INCREASING FRAUDS
The Internal Audit Committee of BCAS held its 2nd physical event of the year on 4 November, 2022 at Orchid Hotel in Mumbai. Titled, “Here a Fraud…There a Fraud…Everywhere a Fraud Fraud,” The event was themed around the increasing trends of frauds in today’s scenario and the role that Internal Auditors have in this ecosystem.

A total of 25 participants across various industries and practices attended this event. Subject matter experts and seasoned professionals also graced the event, including CA Sandeep Baldava, CA Deepa Agarwal, Mr. Sachin Dedhia, CA Chetan Dalal and CA Mahesh Bhatki who shared their decades of experience through innovative, practical, and relevant tools and case studies.

Each session was uniquely designed to cater to various relevant topics in today’s context. Some of the key topics covered include:

  • Role of Internal Auditors in Fraud prevention and detection
  • How Internal Auditors can assist Statutory auditors in discharging their duties effectively
  • Emerging Digital Financial frauds, their modus operandi, and tips for early detection of such frauds
  • Identifying early warning bells to detect and prevent frauds
  • Significance and use of data analytics in fraud detection
 
INDIRECT TAX STUDY CIRCLE MEETING ON ASSORTED INDIRECT TAX ISSUES
The Indirect Tax Study Circle organized two meetings in October 2022 on a Zoom platform to discuss various assorted issues.

The sixth meeting for the year 2022-23 was organized on 17th October 2022., wherein various issues revolving around the concept of actionable claims were addressed by group leader CA Raj Khona, Mumbai and mentored by CA Adv. Jatin Harjai.

Group leader CA Raj Khona made five exhaustive case studies. The presentation broadly covered the significant ramifications of the subtle changes on the following topics:

– Actionable Claims, their legal meaning and utility and applicability in various transactions w.r.t. the GST perspective

–  Clause (e) of Para 5 of Schedule II to CGST

–  Sundry write-backs or write-offs

–  Insurance claims received/rejected, partial claims, dissecting each word of clause (h) of sec 17(5) of CGST Act, valuation provisions

–  Implications of recent judgment concerning sports

Around 65 participants actively participated in the discussions on the three case studies. Mentor CA Adv Jatin Harjai gave his guiding comments on various aspects covered in all different case studies.

The next meeting, being the 7th meeting for the FY 2022-23 was held on 29th October 2022. The meeting was addressed by group leader CA Neha Sethi, Delhi and mentored by CA Pritam Mahure, Pune.

Group leader CA Neha Sethi made five case studies addressing the intricacies and issues of the topic revolving around the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of Northern Operating Systems. The presentation and discussion broadly covered the intricacies of the following topics:

1. Economic Employer vs Legal Employer in case of Secondment

2. Issues w.r.t. to Reverse Charge Mechanism. Payment due date. Timelines for claiming ITC if reverse charge is unpaid

3. Effect of transfer pricing adjustments considered in the books or only as reconciliations in from 3CEB without giving effect in books of accounts

4. Connected macro agreements to determine the correct facts.

5. What if the agreement prescribes the valuation model at cost plus 10 per cent?

6. Issues of a reimbursement model for a tour operator? Whether the same is legally allowed or not?

Around 75 participants from across India benefitted by actively participating in the discussions. Mentor CA Pritam Mahure clarified the issues and queries raised in the variety of aspects covered in all different case studies with the support of the observations laid down in Northern Operating Systems and other legacy case laws of Ily Lilly, etc

MEETING ON “RECENT AMENDMENTS TO FEMA PERTAINING OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS.”
The Suburban Study Circle organized a meeting on 15th October, 2022 on the topic “Recent Amendments to Overseas Investment Regime in India.” At the meeting, CA Hardik Mehta made an insightful presentation and shared his views on the following topics:

  • Enhanced clarity concerning various definitions and routes for Overseas Investment
  • Introduction of the concept of “Strategic Sector” and “Bona fide Business Activity”.
  • Insights on further development in Round tripping of Investments.
  • Understanding the issuance of corporate guarantees to or on behalf of the second or subsequent level step-down subsidiary (SDS) and deferred payment of consideration.
  • Important changes in the reporting requirement
  • Introduction of “Late Submission Fee (LSF) for reporting delays.
  • Other important amendments with relevant Posers/ Observations.
DISCUSSION ON PRACTICES UNDER OUR INDIAN CULTURE
The Human Resources Development Committee (HRD) organized a Human Resources Development Study Circle meeting on 11th October, 2022 to discuss the topic. “Aisa Kyun? (Practices under our Indian Culture).” The discussion was presented by CA Vinod Jain who spoke in Hindi on the topic “Aisa Kyun”, Why we follow certain practices under our Indian Culture, e.g. Touching feet, Putting Tilak on the forehead, using a Swastik, the significance of bells in temples, etc.

Mr. Jain began his discussion by sharing that in Haryana, there is a saying that people should not sleep, keeping their legs towards Ravana’s Srilanka. He said today, we know the law of association but not the exact reason or science behind various practices followed in our Indian Culture.

He elaborated on how various practices should be followed, such as doing Namaste and Charan Sparsh (touching feet), the reasons behind the same and the benefits of observing the same. Such as, one cannot be angry while doing Namaste. During the Covid period, the entire world appreciated greetings through “Namaste” while maintaining social distance.

He also shared in detail about the scientific reasoning and benefits of putting Tilak and its association with the third eye chakra. Various materials were used for putting Tilak by different communities and the reason behind the same. He also shared the reasoning behind females wearing Natha, the benefits and science of using the sacred symbol of Swastik, etc.

He explained the science and reasoning behind the design and Vastu of ancient Indian temples. Why is Gumbaj used, and Om is pronounced underneath it? The benefits and logic of using “Ghanta” (bells) in temples, not wearing shoes etc. He explained in detail the reasoning and benefits of various practices followed in temples and how and why they differ from churches.

You can view the recording of this event. Visit the below link or scan the QR code with your phone scanner app:

Link – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4VgcZOTxczg

FIFTH EDITION OF INTERNAL AUDIT 101 AT BCAS

The 5th Edition of the Internal Audit Committee’s flagship event – “Internal Audit 101 (IA 101) was held on 14th, 15th & 16th of September 2022 in physical mode at the BCAS Auditorium in Mumbai. IA 101 is positioned as a Foundation Course for new entrants to Internal Audit and a refresher course for seasoned IA professionals.

On day 1, CA Mihir Sheth, President- BCAS, welcomed all the participants by sharing his views on the BCAS Internal Audit Committee’s vibrant programs and expressed his best wishes to all participants for the 2 and a half days.

The various sessions over 2.5 days were coordinated and anchored by young committee members – CAs Khushi Shah, Kishore Iyer, Prajit Gandhi and Samit Saraf.

The closing remarks on Day 3 were given by CA Uday Sathe, Chairman, Internal Audit Committee, wherein he expressed his gratitude to all esteemed speakers, panellists, committee members and participants for making the IA 101 an event that participants from all age groups will look forward to.

SEMINAR ON CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The Corporate and Commercial Laws Committee organised its annual programme on Charitable Trusts on 2nd September 2022 in a hybrid mode this year.

The program had 243 participants from 45 cities in India comprising 57 in physical mode and 186 in virtual mode.

CA. Gautam Nayak
, Past President, BCAS, kick-started the first session with his astute views on the direct tax matters posed by the program mentor and director CA. Dr. Gautam Shah. The physical address by Hon. PCIT (Exemptions) Shri Anurag Sahay, Mumbai, was insightful in understanding the revenue expectations, chances of condonation of delay in filing procedural forms and compliances by the charitable trusts. PCIT Sir was candid in accepting the flaws in the ITR-7 and other Income Tax Compliances on the portal.

The next session was a classic disposition on FCRA applicable to the trusts. The compliance is taxing for the genuine trusts in an area for which the ministry of home affairs has tightened its controls. CA. Suresh Kejriwal from Kolkata joined online through zoom while CA. Anjani Sharma from New Delhi joined in physically to address the audience. The duo jointly covered the intricate issues and attended to the questions posed by the audience.

In the post-lunch session, the Treasurer of BCAS, CA. Zubin Billimoria covered in detail the CSR requirements as per the Companies Act, 2013 while Ms. Ingrid Srinath acquainted the audience with the nuances of the Social Stock Exchange – Its sunrise and its way forward. Both sessions were quite interactive.

The last session included a panel discussion on the various Litigation issues concerning GST. The new-born GST law had a young panel comprising panellists CA. Abhay Desai from Vadodara, CA. Mandar Telang, Managing Committee Member of BCAS and CA. Gaurav Save as the moderator. Both CA Desai and CA Telang dwelt upon the whole concept of the applicability of GST by answering various aspects of the law divided in different buckets by the moderator. Prosand cons of aggressive as well as conservative stands were discussed by the panel.

CA Gunja Thakrar and CA Gaurav Save with the help of convenors CA Bhavesh Gandhi and CA Sneh Bhuta and under the guidance of CA Gautam Shah and
CA Abhay Mehta ably coordinated the programme.

TWO MEETINGS ON RECENT GST AMENDMENTS
The Indirect Tax Study Circle organised two online zoom meetings in August 2022 to discuss the recent amendments made by the 47th GST Council Meeting. The topics discussed included:

I. Renting of Residential Dwelling on 6th August, 2022

Group leader CA Adyta Surte made seven exhaustive case studies on the recent changes in GST law with respect to the changes in exemption and reverse charge mechanism notification in relation to renting residential dwellings. The presentation broadly covered the major ramifications of the subtle changes on the following topics:

1.    Charging of GST on forward charge in case if specified category is provided in reverse charge and related repercussions

2.    Does a commercial electrical meter constitute a commercial property?

3.    Eligibility of ITC in case the property is partially used for residential as well as business purposes

4.    Issues regarding renting of flats by Company for the use of its directors

5.    Is registration necessary to discharge GST in another state, or can IGST be paid for the same?

6.    Differences between renting residential dwellings and accommodation services

Mentor CA Vikram Mehta gave his guiding comments on various aspects covered in all different case studies. 146 participants attended the meeting.

II. Goods Transport Agency on 18th August 2022

Second meeting was held on 18th August 2022 on the topic “Goods Transport Agency”. The group leader was CA Jignesh Kansara who was mentored by CA Vasant Bhat.

Group leader CA Jignesh Kansara made 13 case studies addressing the intricacies and issues in the Goods Transport Agency segment, especially concerning changes made by the 47th Council. The presentation and discussion broadly covered the intricacies of the following topics:

1.    Tax treatment under different methods

2.    Differentiating points for payment under the Forward charge and when the recipient is liable to pay under the reverse charge

3.    Whether a switchover is possible between rates of 5% & 12%

4.    Issue of consignment notes and intricacies thereof

5.    Case studies emanating out of the Reverse Charge Mechanism

6.    Procedural lapses regarding non-information to Jurisdictional officers

Over 120 participants benefitted from the active discussion.

LECTURE MEETING ON RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN INCOME TAX
BCAS organized a hybrid lecture meeting on “Recent Important Decisions in Income Tax” by Adv. Hiro Rai on 15th June, 2022. The key takeaways of the lecture meeting are as follows:

1)    Reason and logic behind every judgment help you to understand the issue in-depth and helps in future when one faces the same issue. The first judgment he dealt with was Union of India vs Ashish Agarwal. He shared some of the important points from the judgment. One of them was that Supreme Court lays down that new Section 147 can even be applied to earlier years too. This can affect the arguments for cases under the old provisions, as new requirements are extensive.

2)    The second judgment covered was DIT vs Mitsubishi Corporation, dealing with advance tax and interest u/s 234B for non-residents. Supreme Court held that the section deals with tax deductible at source. The main argument made was an amendment made on 1st April, 2012 in Section 209(1)(d), which says that tax deductible is not to be reduced if the payer has paid the amount without tax deduction. Since this amendment was made, the assessee’s stand before 1st April, 2012 was upheld. He also explained the importance of the said argument as it can be applied by departments too in various other cases.

3)    Another critical Supreme Court judgement dealt with was Shakti Metal Depot vs CIT dealing with section 50 of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeal of the assessee by supporting the argument that merely not using the asset for couple of years for business doesn’t impact the character of the asset in the block and any gains of sale of such asset should be treated as short term capital gains.

4)    The next judgment discussed was South Indian Bank vs CIT, dealing with Section 14A. The important point of the department, which was negated by the Hon. Supreme Court was that nowhere it is written that separate books of accounts need to be maintained by the assessee.

5)    During his talk, the faculty also touched upon many other important decisions from the Supreme Court, High Courts and the ITAT. He also answered various queries posted by the participants.

BCAS Lecture Meetings are high-quality professional development sessions which are open-to-all to attend and participate. If you have missed the Lecture Meeting, but still interested in viewing the entire meeting video then…

Visit the below link or scan the QR code with your phone scanner app:

Link – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwsgqqNj0RI

MEETING TO DISCUSS GUJARAT HIGH COURT RULING

The Indirect Taxes Law Study organised its 3rd meeting for the year 2022-23 to discuss the outcomes of Hon. Gujarat High Court judgment in the case of Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt v. UOI organised on 14th July 2022, the meeting was addressed by group leader CA. Yash Parmar & mentored by CA. Naresh Sheth

The group leader CA. Yash Parmar prepared 6 case studies based on the judgment delivered by the honourable High Court of Gujarat in the case of Munjaal Manishbhai Bhatt v. UOI covering various aspects of the real estate sector, which shall have ramifications due to reading of the valuation of land. A participative discussion covered various practical aspects of the scheme, such as:

1.    Implications when the value of land is not separable

2.    Transfer of UDS along with constructed flat

3.    Transfer of land as a conveyance to society

4.    Interpretation difference of terms Prescribed Vs. Notified

5.    Theory of accretion

6.    Issues in the refund

Around 57 participants benefitted from the informative discussion.


LECTURE MEETING ON “FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS”
On 13th July 2022, the Bombay Chartered Accountants Society organised a hybrid lecture meeting on the topic “Filing of Income Tax Returns for A.Y. 2022-23” by CA Jhankhana Thakkar and CA Utsav Shah. The opening remarks were given by the President, Mihir Sheth, followed by an introduction of the speakers. The lecture meeting was divided into two parts-

i.   CA Jhankhana Thakkar lucidly explained the amendments brought in by the Finance Act 2021 and The Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 which have an impact while determining the income for the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2022-23.

ii.   CA Utsav Shah explained the various changes made in the income tax return forms for A.Y. 2022-23 notified by the CBDT. He pointed out the practical points one needs to keep in mind while filing income tax returns.

BCAS Lecture Meetings are high-quality professional development sessions which are open-to-all to attend and participate. Missed the Lecture Meeting, but still interested in viewing the entire meeting video

Visit the below link or scan the QR code with your phone scanner app:

Link – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b37oq9oCgTQ

26TH INTERNATIONAL TAX & FINANCE CONFERENCE

The 26th International tax & Finance Conference was held at the Ananta Hotels and Resorts, Udaipur, India’s City of Lakes, from 4th – 7th August, 2022.

The conference was attended by 236 participants, including 9 non-residents and 30 online participants. It began with the traditional lighting of the lamp and blessings by Goddess Saraswati in an endeavour to learn new things.

The conference had one paper for presentation and three papers for group discussion papers. All four paper writers, namely CA Geeta Jani, CA Girish Vanvari, CA Himanshu Parekh and CA Padamchan Khinch respectively provided well-researched papers on the subjects BEPS 2.0 – Globe Rules and Pillar 2 – Case Studies, Cross Border Mergers, Demergers & Restructuring – Tax & Regulatory Aspects, Select Controversies/ Emerging trends in International Taxation and Cross-border Employment Remuneration and Benefits. The sessions were ably chaired by Dr. CA Mayur Nayak, CA Sushil Lakhani, CA Gautam Nayak & CA Kishor Karia.

This time three-panel discussions by panels consisting of distinguished panellists were conducted as follows-

1.    Panel discussions on Cross Border Swift Payment Mechanism and its Importance, Rupee Ruble Payment System, Digital Currency and its future by a panel consisting of Shri Gopalaraman Padmanabhan, Shri Mahalingam Gurumoorthy, and Shri Ananth Narayan and ably chaired by CA. Dilip Thakkar and Moderated by CA. Sunil Kothare. This Panel was in a hybrid mode, whereby the entire Panel was online whereas the participants were at the venue of the ITF Conference.

2.    Panel discussions to deal with intricate issues in the field of international taxation in the form of Case Studies in International Taxation consisting of CA Pranav Sayta (Chairman cum Moderator), Hon’ble ITAT Member Shri Amit Shukla, Sr. Adv. Shri Ajay Vohra and Shri Sanjeev Sharma, Principal Director of Income Tax (Investigation).

3.    The third eminent and well-distinguished panel on the subject “Transfer Pricing – Global Developments” consisting of CA T P Ostwal (Chairman cum Moderator), CA Karishma Phatarphekar, CA Bhavesh Dedhia and CA Vijay Iyer dealt with issues arising on account of due to Covid 2019 & Russia- Ukraine War.

A significant contribution to the success of this conference was made by Dr. CA Mayur Nayak, Immediate Past Chairman, CA Nitin Singala, Chairman, CA Chetan Shah, Co-Chairman, CA Jagat Mehta, CA Rutvik Sanghvi, CA Siddharth Banwat, CA Mahesh Nayak, CA Tarunkumar Singhal, CA Anil Doshi, Deepak Kanabar, CA Durga Shaankar Sharmaji, CA Chaitanya, CA Naman SrimalCA Kishor Pahuja helped with local coordination, arrangement for the entertainment programme and a visit to Nathdwara.

Letters to The Editor

Dear Sir,

Your Editorial on the subject ‘Financial Hara-kiri through Freebies’ in November 2022 BCAJ is indeed thought-provoking.

The Apex Court has rightly observed that these freebies are extended utilising taxpayers’ money only to increase the popularity of the various political parties and their electoral prospects. Giving away largesse to the gullible voters is nothing short of offering a bribe/ a graft. It corrupts – no two ways about it, leaving the state bleeding and over time haemorrhaging.

I came across these two very interesting quotes by Thomas Sowell, an American author, economist, political commentator and social theorist,

“Welfare states on both sides of the Atlantic have discovered that largesse to losers does not reduce their hostility to society, but only increases it. Far from producing gratitude, generosity is seen as an admission of guilt, and the reparations as inadequate compensation for injustices – leading to worsening behaviour by the recipients”.

“If you have been voting for politicians who promise to give you goodies at someone else’s expense, then you have no right to complain when they take away your money and give it to someone else, including themselves.”

Just as evil practices such as child marriages and dowry have been banned, the judiciary should ban the gifting of largesse and freebies by political parties.

CA Narayan Pasari

____________________________________________________________________________________________

Dear Sir,

The November 2022 BCAJ carried an informative article (Charitable Trusts – Recent Amendments Pertaining to Books of Accounts and Other Documents) and a thought-provoking editorial (Financial Hara-Kiri through Freebies?).

The dichotomy in these two write-ups is glaring:

On page 25, the article (Charitable Trusts) states, “The tightening of reporting requirements of charitable institutions by the tax department is aimed at higher transparency and avoiding mis-utilization”.

On page 8, the editorial states, “The other possible solutions could be, transparency in Electoral Bonds to provide level playing fields .…..”.

Both statements relate to donations. However, per the journal, one donation category (charitable donations) has been made more transparent, while another category (political donations) is stated to lack transparency. As a lay reader, my views and suggestions are as follows.

Electoral Bonds, as an instrument, require minimum or no record keeping by the donor and the donee. These are anonymous donations similar to cash transactions (primary characteristic is not to leave a trail). Given the ‘ease of giving’ and ‘ease of receiving’, the best practices embedded in Electoral Bonds issuances and receipts should be replicated to other streams. For example, to ‘charitable donations’, initially. It can later be extended to other economic transactions (both for corporates and individuals) like ‘Salary Bonds’, ‘Bank Deposits Interest Bonds’, ‘Dividend Bonds’, ‘Goods Purchase Bonds’, ‘Services Purchase Bonds’, ‘Professional Fee Bonds’ etc. Such a system, if adopted, will alleviate the compliance burden, and eliminate reporting across the transaction chain. There will be an overall acceleration in the velocity of transactions given that taxes saved thereby (because nothing will be recorded or reported), will either be spent on consumption or in savings, both of which drive economic growth.

CA Vinayak Pai

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Dear Sir,

*Revised Code of Ethics*

This refers to the Article by CA. Kemisha Soni on the 12th Edition of the Code of Conduct issued by ICAI, effective from 1st July, 2020, published in the September 2022 issue of BCAJ. It is quite lucid, informative, and useful, giving a Bird’s Eye View of very voluminous Code of Conduct. She deserves our compliments.

It was quite a revelation that Volume 1 itself has about 1,000 Sections. One really wonders how many CAs in Practice and Industry have read it or are even aware of the Revised Code of Conduct which is quite comprehensive and onerous.

In recent times, NFRA has become quite active and has imposed hefty fines and punishment by debarring CAs from Practice for extended periods for various breaches and violations of the Accounting and Auditing Standards, and Disclosure Requirements under the Companies Act.  Earlier the delinquent members could get away lightly by facing reprimands by ICAI.

It is quite likely that in the future our Members in Practice and Industry will face very stern Regulatory Action for breaches of the Code of Conduct.

It is therefore very essential that many more Articles need to be published covering various aspects of the Code to create greater awareness of the requirements of the Code, besides Organising Lecture meetings on the subject, to sensitise our members.

CA Tarunkumar G. Singhal

Regulatory Referencer

DIRECT TAX
1.    Condonation of delay in filing Form No.10A: The CBDT has condoned the delay upto 25th November 2022 in filing Form No. 1OA u/s 12A(1)(ac)(i) or first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or clause (i) of first proviso to section 80G(5) or fifth proviso to section 35(1), which was required to be filed electronically on or before 31st March, 2022. [Circular No. 22/2022 dated 1st November, 2022.]

2.    Explanatory Notes to the Provisions of the Finance Act, 2022: The CBDT has released the explanatory notes to the provisions of the Finance Act, 2022 that describes the substance of the provisions/amendments made by the Finance Act, 2022 relating to Income-taxes. [Circular No. 23/2022 dated 3rd November, 2022.]


COMPANIES ACT

1.    Provisions of the Companies Act, which would apply to Financial Products Services Institutions at IFSCs, specified: The Central Government has specified provisions of the Companies Act which shall apply with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as specified to financial products, financial services or financial institutions in an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). [Notification No. S.O. 5160E, dated 4th November, 2022.]


SEBI

1.    Face value of debt security and non-convertible redeemable preference share reduced from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 1 lakh: Earlier, SEBI had mandated that the face value of each debt security or non-convertible redeemable preference share issued on a private placement basis shall be Rs. 10 lakhs. SEBI received various representations from market participants, requesting a review of the said denominations. Accordingly, SEBI has reduced the face value of debt securities and non-convertible redeemable preference shares from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 1 lakh. The motive is to broad base the investors’ participation in the corporate bond market. [Circular No. SEBI/HO/DDHS/P/CIR/2022/00144, dated 28th October, 2022.]

2.    Unlisted INVITs can no longer carry private placement of units: SEBI vide SEBI (INVITs) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2022 has restricted private placement of units of unlisted INVITs. Earlier, INVITs were eligible to issue units via private placement mode. Now, the Board may grant exemptions to the INVITs which have issued units for the purpose of facilitating listing on a recognised stock exchange. Also, various other changes have been notified through amendments which shall come into force w.e.f. 1st January, 2023. [Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2022/101, dated 9th November, 2022.]

3.    Registration fees for FPI category I & II reduced to USD 2,500 and USD 250:
Amendments are done to the SEBI (FPIs) Regulations, 2019, whereby the registration fees have been reduced for FPI category I & II to USD 2,500 and USD 250, respectively. Earlier, it was USD 3,000 and USD 300, respectively. Similarly, application and registration fees have now been reduced from USD 2,500 & USD 10,000 to USD 2,100 and USD 8,500, respectively. [Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2022/99, dated 9th November, 2022.]

4.    SEBI (LODR) (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2022: SEBI has notified various amendments in provisions relating to independent directors, financial statements, Draft Scheme of Arrangement, Fee in respect of the draft scheme of arrangement, etc. The amendments are effective from 14th November, 2022. [Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2022/103, dated 14th November, 2022]

NFRA
1.    Auditing and Accounting Standards Circular – Non-accrual of interest on borrowings by companies in violation of Ind AS: The NFRA has advised all companies that are required to follow Ind AS not to discontinue recognition of principal/ interest merely on account of the borrowings being declared NPA by the lenders or the management’s expectation of a likely settlement with the lenders. Discontinuation of interest expense recognition on financial liabilities solely based on the borrower company’s expectation of loan/interest waiver/concession without evidence of legally enforceable contractual documents violates requirements of Ind AS 109, Financial Instruments. Auditors are required to ensure strict compliance with this Circular while performing audits. [Circular No. NF-25011/5/2022-O/o Secy-NFRA dated 20th October, 2022.]

2.    Introduction of NFRA Audit Quality Inspections: The NFRA has published its ‘Audit Quality Inspection Guidelines’ to improve the quality of the audit profession further. The objective of inspections is to evaluate compliance of the audit firm/auditor with auditing standards and other regulatory and professional requirements and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the quality control system of the audit firm/auditor. The Guidelines covers the mandate and overall objective, criteria and scope, methodology of selection of audit firms and selection of individual audit assignments and inspection reports. [Guidelines posted by NFRA on its website on 11th November, 2022.]


ICAI ANNOUNCEMENT
1.    Certificates issued by the Peer Review Board to Practice Units without an end date: For Peer Review Certificates (PRC) issued till 16th April, 2015, without mention of an end date, the end date shall be 31st December 2022. Practice Units which have been issued a certificate in which the validity of the certificate has not been mentioned, need to get the Peer Review of their firms initiated and completed on or before 31st December, 2022, to maintain the continuity of their existing PRC. [10th November, 2022.]

ICAI MATERIAL
1.    Guidance Note on Report Under Section 92E of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (Transfer Pricing), Revised 2022 Edition. [25th October, 2022.]

2.    QRBs Report on Audit Quality Review, 2021-22. [2nd November, 2022.]

3. Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS): Disclosures Checklist (Revised November, 2022). [2nd November, 2022.]

Corporate Law Corner Part B: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

7. Rajratan Babulal Agarwal vs. Solartex India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 2021

The standard i.e., the reference to which a case of a pre-existing dispute under IBC must be employed, cannot be equated with even the principle of preponderance of probability.

FACTS

The Operational Creditor (“OC”) and Corporate Debtor (“CD”) entered into an agreement for supply of 500 MT of Indonesian coal. The purchase order was dated 27th October, 2016 and the OC supplied 412 MT of coal between 28th October, 2016 to 2nd November, 2016. The CD sent a demand notice on 3rd February, 2018 to the OC for debt due of Rs. 21,57,700 against which the CD sent a reply notice holding the OC liable for an amount of Rs. 4,44,17,608 for its losses.

The OC filed a Section 9 application against the CD in the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench (“NCLT”). Before NCLT, the OC stated that the CD’s reply notice has been done to create a spurious dispute that was not in existence before receiving of the notice, and that the claim raised by the CD concerns an associate company of the OC, and not the OC itself. The CD submitted that Section 9 petition should be rejected since there existed a pre-existing dispute in response to the demand notice dated 13th April, 2018. The CD stated that civil suits are pending that seek damages for loss suffered, and that disputes between the parties existed from the very beginning. The CD also resisted the application saying that the inferior quality of the coal could be tested only upon its receipt. The NCLT, in its order, recorded that no pre-existing disputes were observed and passed an order in favour of the OC.

An ex-director of the CD appealed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) stating that emails were sent by the CD on 30th October, 2016 and 3rd November, 2016 informing the OC of the inferior quality of coal and similarly vide an email dated 4th November, 2016 which stated that moisture content in the coal is not as per specifications and thus, it suffered losses. It filed a suit on 26th March, 2018 seeking damages against the losses caused. The OC stated that a suit seeking damages Rs. 3 crores was filed after receiving the statutory notice, and hence as per Section 8(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC), the suit was not pending before the receipt of the statutory notice, and hence is not a pre-existing dispute. Reliance was further placed on the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. vs. Kirusa Software Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353 (“Mobilox judgement”) wherein it was held that dispute should not be a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. The NCLAT relied on the emails dated 30th October, 2016, 3rd November, 2016 and 4th November, 2016 along with a lab analysis report of raw material, the reply to statutory notice and civil suit for damages filed by the OC. The NCLAT held that the 30th October, 2016 email is not related to the transaction in question. After perusal of the other two emails, it was said that the CD consumed the coal after the 4th November, 2016 email, and filed a civil suit against the OC only upon receipt of statutory notice. That civil suit for damages was filed on 26th March, 2018 post receiving the notice on 8th February, 2018 and therefore should not be treated as existence of dispute. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The ex-director of the CD filed an application for appeal against the NCLAT order, and hence this appeal.

Question of law
Whether existence of the civil suit as raised by the CD be classified as ‘pre-existing dispute’ as understood by Hon’ble SC in the Mobilox judgement?

Ruling
Before the SC, the Appellant submitted that the 30th October, 2016 email contained reference of not just the purchase order of 27th October, 2016 but also with regard to supply of coal to the CD, and the 3rd November, 2016 email mentioned the inferior quality of supplied coal. He contended that as per Section 12 of the Sales of Goods Act, 1930 (“Act”), in a contract of sale of goods, a term may be a condition or a warranty, and that he treated the condition relating to quality of goods as a warranty, as per Section 59 of the Act which declares remedies open for such buyer.

A perusal of the section reveals that a stipulation in a contract of sale can be a condition or a warranty depending upon construction of the contract. Section 59 of the Act, on the other hand, contemplates a suit for damages as well as setting up the extinction of the price. It provides for the remedy for breach of warranty, and that the buyer can set up a breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price which further does not prevent him from suing for the same breach of warranty if he has suffered further damage. The context for further damage in this case can be seen from the 3rd November, 2016 email which stated that in case of any further damage, the same would be debited to the account of the OC, while the CD continued using the coal until that very day as per the OC.

The Supreme Court (“SC”) perused Section 13 of the Act that deals with when the conditions can be treated as warranty. Further emphasis was laid on Section 15 of the Act which provides for ‘sale of specific goods by description’ and that in case of sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition for the goods to correspond with the description.

The SC perused the purchase order, which mentioned that the coal must be of a certain quality in terms of its characteristics. It was stated that the transaction could be treated as a ‘sale of goods by description’ as a contract for the sale of 500 metric tonnes of Indonesian coal. The SC said that there indeed was an email dispatched to the OC on 30th October, 2016 which was wrongly brushed aside by the NCLAT.

The SC referred to the Mobilox judgement that essentially provided the non-requirement of the dispute being ‘bona fide’ to decide if a dispute exists or not, that the adjudicating authority only needs to see is if there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation, and that the ‘dispute’ is not a feeble legal argument or assertion of fact unsupported by evidence.

The SC stated that the transaction should be treated as a sale of goods as the contract gleaned from purchase order that related to goods sold by description, i.e., Indonesian coal (as also mentioned in email of 3rd November, 2016 about poor quality of ‘Indonesian coal’). The Court supported the Appellant’s argument that the specific objective criteria of quality of coal was not taken care of by the OC, thereby attracting Section 59 of the Act, hence permitting the CD to treat the breach of the condition (of specific coal quality) when there is acceptance of goods as only a breach of a warranty. It was provided that the CD has right to seek damages on the same breach.

SC considered the case of Mobilox judgement where it was held that,

“one of the objects of IBC in regard to operational debts is to ensure that the amount of such debts which is usually smaller than the financial debts does not enable the operational creditor to put the Corporate Debtor into insolvency resolution process prematurely, the same being enough to state that dispute exists between the parties. The Mobilox judgement also provided that Section 5(6) of IBC excludes the expression ‘bona fide’, and that the only requirement is existence of a plausible contention, which must be investigated.”

HELD
Holding that the standard i.e., the reference to which a case of a pre-existing dispute under IBC must be employed, cannot be equated with even the principle of preponderance of probability which guides a Civil Court at the stage of finally decreeing a suit, the SC decided that the NCLAT had erred in holding that there was no dispute within the meaning of IBC.

The SC held that, to determine a pre-existing dispute, the impact of Section 13(2) r.w.s. 59 cannot be ignored. It clarified that Section 13 of the Act permits the buyer to waive a condition, and therefore the OC persuaded the Court that the CD has waived the alleged condition as regards the coal’s quality.

The Appellant’s appeal was allowed on the basis that pre-existing dispute existed under IBC, and Section 9 application filed by the OC against the CD rejected.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

12. Economy Hotels India Services Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Registrar of Companies & Anr.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 97 of 2020
Date of order: 24th August, 2020

A ‘typographical error’ in the extract of ‘Minutes’, does not alter the fact that the resolution passed  by the shareholders is a ‘special resolution’.

FACTS

The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) observed the following:

Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 (CA 2013) states that subject to confirmation by the Tribunal on an application by the company, a company limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital may, by a special resolution, reduce the share capital in any manner.

Article 9 of the Articles of Association of EHISPL allowed it to reduce its share capital by passing a special resolution. The Board of Directors, vide their resolution dated 29th July, 2019 recommended a reduction in the capital. Article 9 further provided that the said resolution was subject to the consent of members by a special resolution.

The NCLT perused the minutes of the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the company held on 19th August, 2019. The minutes stated that Mr. BS was elected to chair the meeting. The minutes recorded that in the said AGM, members had passed the resolution for reducing capital “as an ordinary resolution”. The Minutes of the said AGM were signed by the Chairman of the meeting.

The NCLT observed that EHISPL had not met the specific requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013 by passing a ‘Special Resolution’ for reduction of share capital. EHISPL had also not complied with the requirements of its Articles of Association.

The NCLT rejected the application in view of the fact that there was no special resolution for reduction of share capital as prescribed u/s 66 of CA 2013 and as required in Article 9 of the company’s Articles of Association. Section 66 of CA 2013 also requires the Tribunal to approve the minutes of the resolution passed by the company, which had been passed as ordinary resolution as against the requirement of special resolution. NCLT was not in a position to approve such minutes and, consequently, rejected the petition by granting liberty to the Appellant/Petitioner to file a fresh application after complying with all the requirements of Section 66 of CA 2013.

EHISPL, dissatisfied with the order dated 27th May, 2020 passed by NCLT, Bench V in Company Petition No. 149/66/ND/2019, which rejected the petition filed u/s 66(1)(b) of CA 2013, thereafter filed an appeal through Mr. RR, Authorised representative of EHISPL.

Mr. RR submitted the following:

  • EHISPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore.

  • As of 30th June, 2019, the issued, subscribed and paid-up share capital of EHISPL was increased from Rs. 30 lakhs divided into 3 lakhs equity shares of Rs. 10 each to Rs. 67,47,90,000 divided into 6,74,79,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each.

  • The AGM of EHISPL was held on 19th August 2019, and was attended by both the equity shareholders holding 100 per cent of the issued, subscribed and paid-up equity share capital of EHISPL. The said equity shareholders present at the said meeting had cast their votes in favour of the aforesaid resolution etc.

Sufficient documents were present to prove that the special resolution as required u/s 66 of CA 2013 and in terms of the requirement under Article 9 of the ‘Articles of Association’ of EHISPL was passed in the AGM conducted.

Mr. RR pointed out that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the unanimous resolution was passed on 19th August, 2019, which was in fact, a ‘Special Resolution’ passed unanimously by the shareholders of EHISPL.

The resolution passed on 19th August, 2019 was in complete compliance with all the three requisites of Section 114(2) of CA 2013, and since the Tribunal treated the aforesaid ‘resolution’ as an ‘ordinary’ resolution, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in the interests of justice.

Mr. RR lent support to his contention that the resolution passed on 19th August, 2019 by EHISPL was a ‘special resolution’ that adverts to the ingredients of Section 114 of CA 2013.

The pre-mordial plea of EHISPL was that the NCLT had failed to appreciate the creeping in of an ‘inadvertent typographical error’ figuring in the extract of the ‘Minutes of the Meeting’ characterising the ‘special resolution’ as ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’. Moreover, EHISPL had fulfilled all the statutory requirements prescribed u/s 114 of CA 2013 and as such the impugned order of the Tribunal was liable to be set aside.

It transpired that the ‘Special Resolution’ passed in the ‘Annual General Meeting’ as filed with the e-form MGT-14 reflects that the resolution passed by the shareholders on 19th August, 2019 was a ‘Special Resolution’ which was taken on record in MCA21 Registry.

HELD
The NCLAT observed that ‘Reduction of Capital’ u/s 66 of CA 2013 is a ‘Domestic Affair’ of a particular Company in which, ordinarily, a Tribunal will not interfere because of the reason that it is a ‘majority decision’ which prevails.

EHISPL had admitted its typographical error in the extract of the Minutes of the Meeting characterising the ‘special resolution’ as an ‘unanimous ordinary resolution’ and also taking into consideration of the fact that EHISPL had filed the special resolution with ROC, which satisfied the requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013.

On a careful consideration of respective contentions, the NCLAT, after subjectively satisfying itself that EHISPL has tacitly admitted its creeping in of typographical error in the extract of the minutes and also taking into consideration that EHISPL had filed the special resolution with it, which satisfied the requirement of Section 66 of CA 2013, allowed the Appeal. NCLAT further confirmed the reduction of share capital of EHISPL as resolved by the ‘Members’ in their ‘Annual General Meeting’ that took place on 19th August, 2019. NCLAT further approved the form of Minutes required to be filed with Registrar of Companies, Delhi u/s 66(5) of CA 2013, by EHISPL.

Allied Laws

38. M Baburaj vs. State of Kerala
AIR 2022 Kerala 148
Date of order: 15th July, 2022
Bench: A. Badharudeen J.

Succession certificate – not mandatory – for claim of award under land acquisition cases [S.214(1)(b), Succession Act, 1925; S.31, Land Acquisition, 1894]

FACTS

In a land acquisition case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court granted enhanced compensation. The Respondent deposited the same in court after the death of the claimant. The claimant was succeeded by her son, who is the Petitioner. The Sub Court insisted that the Petitioner produce a copy of the succession certificate. The Petitioner preferred a Writ Petition against this insistence.

HELD

The law emerges is that production of succession certificate is mandatory as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act when the decree-holder dies in cases where the decree amount comes under the category ‘debts’ or ‘securities’. The compensation arising out of motor accidents or from land acquisition proceedings or cases involving grants of compensation under the Electricity Act, etc., would not come under the purview of `debts’ or `securities’. Therefore, in such cases, the production of a succession certificate is not mandatory. Therefore, the surviving decree holder can execute the decree on his own behalf and on behalf of the legal representative of the deceased decree holder and in such case, the succession certificate as per Section 214(1)(b) of the Succession Act is not necessary.
    
The petition is allowed.

39. Ram Karan vs. Gugan
AIR 2022 Punjab and Haryana 152
Date of order: 9th August, 2022
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari and
Krishna Murari JJ.

Registration of Documents – Consensual decree – Does not require registration [S. 17, Registration Act, 1908; Or 23 R. 3 Civil Procedure Code, 1908]

FACTS

An issue regarding property arose between members of a family, wherein inter alia, an issue arose in an appeal as to whether a decree obtained by the consent of both parties have to be mandatorily registered. The lower appellate court had set aside on the ground of non-registration.

On Appeal.

HELD

It was held that a decree based on the admission of a party does not require any registration, and also, a family settlement did not require compulsory registration. Therefore, the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the impugned decree is liable to be set aside on account of non-registration or account of no pre-existing right is apparently erroneous.

The appeal is allowed.
 

40. Kantaben Parsottamdas vs. Ganshyambhai Ramkrishan Purohit (Dead) by LRs
AIR 2022 Gujarat 146
Date of order: 9th June, 2022
Bench: A. P. Thaker J.

Judgements – Judges required to give citation or reference of cases being relied on in their decision [Or. 20, R 1, Civil Procedure Code, 1908]
 
FACTS

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in appeal, the original defendant has preferred the present Second Appeal.

On appeal, inter alia, it was challenged that the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court had relied upon some decision without giving any name or citation thereof and merely upon memory.

HELD

The reliance on a decision without any name or citation number and merely on the basis of memory is not proper on the part of the learned District Judge. The judgment of the court has to be based only upon the facts proved. If there is any precedent applicable in the given facts, then, the particular precedent has to be referred to by name as well as where such a decision is reported. A Judge cannot pass any order or make any observation merely on his own memory without referring names of the parties or the numbers of proceedings and where such a decision is reported. The First Appellate Court Judge has committed a serious error of facts and law in creating a new case in favour of the plaintiff of natural rights.

The appeal is allowed.


41. A. Narahari and Anr. vs. Suman Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd.
AIR 2022 Telangana 158
Date of order: 4th July, 2022        
Bench: G Anupama Chakravarthy J.

Attachment – Recovery from properties of Guarantor – Legal [Or.21 Rr 43, 54 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; S. 128, Indian Contract Act, 1872]

FACTS

The trial court passed an order directing the petitioners to deposit a sum with the court. Pursuant to the said decree, the plaintiff filed the execution petition under Order 21 Rules 43, 64 and 66 of CPC to attach and sell the petition schedule properties of judgment, for realization of the decretal amount. The revision petitioners, i.e., judgment debtors filed their detailed counters before the trial court, contending that they were not aware of the decree till they received notices in the execution petition and that the decree-holder obtained ex parte decree behind their back. Ultimately, the execution petition was allowed by the trial court ordering attachment against the revision petitioners.

HELD

The principal borrower, i.e., the prized subscriber, was also made as a party along with the guarantors. In the law of indemnity, it is a tri-party agreement, and the law permits the decree holder to proceed with the execution either against the principal borrower or against the guarantors. Further, the decree-holder can proceed against any one of the judgment-debtors, and he is not required to proceed against the principal borrower at the first instance.

The revision petition is rejected.

Service Tax

I.     HIGH COURT

18. Commissioner of CGST Delhi East vs. Anand and Anand
2022 (65) GSTL 137 (Del.)
Date of order: 1st August, 2022
 
Refund of unutilized credit admissible to exported legal consultancy services.

FACTS

The respondent, a law firm of legal practitioner, provides legal services to clients in India as well as outside India and specializes in providing services in the field of intellectual property services and exports 70 to 80 percent of its services. The short issue in the Revenue’s appeal related to whether the assessee should be allowed refund of unutilized CENVAT credit for the period from July 2012 to March 2015. The Revenue’s contention based on the sole contention was that for the legal services, the tax burden is on the recipient of service and hence such service is clearly excluded from the definition of “output service” as defined in Rule 2(p) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR). Therefore, even when the said services are exported, CENVAT credit is not available on such exported services also.

HELD

The Court examined section 68(2) of the Finance Act, 1994 along with the definition of “output service” in Rule 2(p) of CCR, the definition of “exempt service” as per Rule 2(e) of CCR as well as Rules 5 and 6(7) of Service Tax Rules, 2004 (“the Rules”). As per Rule 5 of the rules for all exported services, service providers are eligible for refund. Rule 6(7) keeps SEZ services out of the ambit while providing for the method and procedure for computing the value of exempted goods and/or exempted services used for providing taxable exempted services and/or manufacturing excisable and exempted goods. In addition to this, the Court also noted that commensurate with these observations, in Rule 2(e) of CCR also, the definition of exempted service excludes services exported in terms of Rule 6A of the Rules. Hence, the Court held that the analogy drawn by the Revenue with exempt service was flawed, or else, as per the assessee’s contention, Rule 5(1) of CCR would have been rendered redundant. Hence, agreeing with Tribunal’s conclusion, the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

II. TRIBUNAL

19 Karnataka Beverages Corporation Ltd. vs. CST Bangalore
2022 (64) GSTL 605 (Tri.-Bang.)
Date of order: 28th April, 2022

Demurrage charged on the Corporation from manufacturers of liquor not liable for service tax.
 
FACTS

The appellant–a corporation established for distribution of liquor, purchased it from distilleries and stored the same in hired godowns, and subsequently sold the same to licensed dealers. Where they did not sell within 90 days, the appellant was entitled to charge Rs. 2 per carton. According to the Revenue, the said amount collected was towards business auxiliary service (BAS) and storage and warehousing service. The appellant charged no storage charge till the period of 90 days.

HELD

Relying on several earlier decisions of various High Courts including Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corporation vs. CCE 2014 (33) STR 484 (Kerala) and Karnataka State Beverages Corporation 2017 (8) STR 411 (Tri.-Bang) [Revenue’s Appeal dismissed by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court as reported at 2011 (24) STR 405 (Kar), which was affirmed by Supreme Court as reported at 2015 (40) STR 209 (SC)], the Tribunal found that appellants discharged their statutory function as no mandate was given by the Karnataka State Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder and did not render any service as BAS and storage and warehousing service. Hence, the so named ‘commission’ or ‘warehousing charge’ are not exigible to service tax.

20. Flemingo Travel Retail Ltd. vs. CC & CE, Mumbai East
2022 (64) GSTL 564 (Tri.-Mum.)
Date of order : 10th February, 2022

Rent of duty-free shops at arrival/departure terminals of airport are beyond customs frontiers. Hence outside taxable territory of India. No service tax payable. Also, judicial discipline ought to be followed.

FACTS

The appellants challenged the rejection of refund in a bunch of claims of service tax borne by them for 7 years on rent paid to Mumbai Airport International Airport Ltd. for their duty-free shop. The issue relates to whether or not the rent charged for the immovable property is within the taxable territory when it is beyond the customs frontiers. Though there was a precedent available of the Mumbai Tribunal itself in the case of CST vs. Flemingo Duty Free Shop Pvt. Ltd. 2018 (8) GSTL 181 (Tri.-Mum), wherein the claim of refund was upheld, the refund was refused on the grounds such as unjust enrichment, and in some of the claims, the reason for rejection was that the precedent in the case of CST vs. DFS India P. Ltd. 2019 (365) (Tri.-Mum) pertained to only the departure terminal which is a “taxable territory”. However, in the decision of Flemingo Duty Free Shops Pvt. Ltd.’s case, the Tribunal had settled the issue as “there is no dispute that duty-free shops whether in arrival lounge or departure lounge of the International airports are beyond customs frontiers……. and that the rental space in arrival or departure lounge area in non-taxable territory and same therefore is not a taxable service”.

HELD

The Hon. Tribunal held that taxable territory is not necessarily the same as geographical reaches of India, nor can it be limited to the physical frontiers, it is what Finance Act, 1994 states it to be. Reiterating its reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Hotel Ashoka vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 2012 (270) ELT 433 (SC), which had laid the foundation for the ruling of Tribunal to follow inter alia in DFS India’s case (supra), the Tribunal observed that the lower authorities not only disregarded judicial discipline but also patently decided contrary to the said Supreme Court’s decision. Also, it was held that the provision relating to unjust enrichment was not available to the Revenue to deny refund of such tax collected without authority of law for non-taxable services.
 

21. PMI Organisation Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of CGST, Mumbai East
G.S.T.L. 244 (Tri. – Mum.)
Date of order: 7th February, 2022

Refund of CENVAT credit cannot be denied merely on the ground of lack of nexus between input service and output service.

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in providing Business Auxiliary Service and exported output taxable services during the relevant period. As a result, the appellant filed a refund application as per Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for the refund of CENVAT credit availed on input services used to provide output service. The Adjudicating Authority rejected the refund claim of certain input services stating that there was no nexus between input services and output services which were exported. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the stand taken by Adjudicating Authority denying refund. Being aggrieved by such an order, the appellant preferred an appeal before this Hon’ble Tribunal.

HELD

It was held that the department had only a limited angle to assess whether the refund application was filed as per prescribed formula under Rule 5 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Further, denial of CENVAT credit solely on the basis of lack of establishing nexus between input and output service without pointing any discrepancy was arbitrary and illegal. The appeal was thus allowed.

22. Bharti Realty Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-III
2022 (65) G.S.T.L. 234 (Tri. – Del.)
Date of order: 9th May, 2022

CENVAT credit on inputs used for construction of buildings which were subsequently rented out for commercial purpose was eligible.

FACTS

The appellant was engaged in construction of buildings and had rented the same for commercial purpose. It had paid service tax after utilizing the CENVAT credit on inputs used for construction. A show cause notice was issued to the appellant covering the period 1st April, 2008 to 31st March, 2011 for denial and recovery of CENVAT credit on grounds that the inputs, input services and capital goods used result into creation of immovable property which is neither good nor services as per the Circular No. 98/1/2008-S.T. dated 4th January, 2008 and CBE&C. Instruction No. 267/11/2010-CX, dated 8th July, 2010. The appellant stated that the definition of input services specifically used for construction of buildings have been excluded from the ambit of eligibility of CENVAT credit w.e.f. 1st April, 2011, prospectively. However, the respondent passed an order denying CENVAT credit on such inputs used for construction. Being aggrieved by such an order, the appellant preferred an appeal before this Hon’ble Tribunal.

HELD

It was held that the CENVAT credit of inputs used for construction of building which were then rented out, was eligible and the same cannot be denied by relying upon the decision of jurisdictional High Court in Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd 2019 (27) GSTL 481 (Del. HC). It was further held that CENVAT credit on such inputs cannot be denied merely because Revenue had gone in appeal against the above mentioned decision of the High Court before the Apex Court. Thus, the impugned order seeking to deny and recover CENVAT credit was set aside.

Goods and Services Tax

I. HIGH COURT
 
56. RSB Transmissions (India) Ltd. vs. Union of India
[2022] 145 taxmann.com 1 (Jharkhand)
Date of order: 18th October, 2022

The
liability to pay interest arises on delayed filing of GSTR-3B return
and debit of tax due from the Electronic Cash Ledger. Any deposit in the
Electronic Cash Ledger prior to the due date of filing of GSTR-3B return does not amount to discharge of tax liability on the part of the registered person.

FACTS

The
issue before the Court was whether, under the provisions of the GST
Act, the amount deposited as tax through valid challans by a registered
person in the Government Exchequer prior to the filing of the GSTR-3B
returns could be treated as the discharge of the tax liability due
against such person for the period in question in respect of which the
GSTR-3B return is being filed later and whether interest could be levied
on delayed filing of GSTR-3B in such circumstances u/s 50 of the Act.
The petitioner contended that interest cannot be levied for the delay in
filing of the return, but only on delayed payment and that a late fee is already prescribed in terms of section 47 for the delay in filing of
the return. It was further contended that as per section 39(7), payment
of tax can be made before the due date of return and that when the
amount is credited to the electronic cash ledger (ECL) is subsequently
debited to the ECL at the time of filing of the return, there is no real
movement or transfer of money from the Petitioner to the Government as
the amount is already in the Government exchequer. It was further
contended that since in terms of recent amendments, ITC is deemed to be
as good as tax paid, there is no real distinction between the Electronic
Cash and Credit Ledgers as far as the amount of tax is in the hands of
the Government is concerned.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court, after
considering the relevant provisions of the CGST Act and rules
thereunder, held that any deposit made in the modes prescribed u/s 49(1)
are mere deposit towards tax, interest, penalty, fee or any other
amount by such person which can be credited to the ECL. The Court
further held that a combined reading of section 49(1) of the CGST Act,
2017 and Rule 87 (6) and (7) of CGST Rules, 2017, go to show that such a
deposit does not mean that the amount is appropriated towards the
Government exchequer. The explanation to section 49 also makes it clear
that the date of credit to the account of the Government in the
authorized Bank shall be deemed to be the date of deposit in the ECL and
hence, the deposit in the ECL does not amount to payment of the tax
liability. Accordingly, the Court held that under the scheme of the Act,
no person can make payment of tax prior to the filing of GSTR-3B
return, though such deposits may be made or are lying in his ECL and the
tax liability gets discharged only upon the filing of GSTR-3B return.
The Court also highlighted that cash is just in the nature of a deposit
in the ECL, whereas the ITC is available in favor of the assessee on
account of tax already paid and therefore certain distinction has been
made u/s 50 of CGST Act as regards the computation of interest only on
that portion of the tax paid after due date of filing of return u/s
39(7) of the Act by debiting the ECL.

[Note: A similar decision
has been also pronounced by the Hon. Madras High Cout in the case of
Yamaha Motors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asst. Commr. 2022-TIOL-1186-HC-MAD-GST.]

57. Genpact India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. UOI
[2022] 144 taxmann.com 201 (Punjab & Haryana)
Date of order: 11th November, 2022

Since
there is not much difference between the definition of ‘intermediary’
in the pre-GST and GST regime, and the agreement between the parties is
on principal-to-principal basis involving the provision of the main
service as a sub-contractor to third-party clients of the main supplier,
they are not “intermediary services”.

FACTS

Petitioner is a
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) service provider located in India
providing services to customers located in India as well as outside
India. Services include, inter alia, (i) maintaining vendor/customer
master data, scanning and processing vendor invoices, book keeping,
preparing/finalizing books of account, generating ledger
reconciliations, managing customer receivables, etc., (ii) Developing,
licensing and maintaining software as per clients’ needs, (iii)
Technical IT support i.e. trouble-shooting services and (iv) Data
analysis and providing solutions to clients in respect of forecasting of
demand for their offerings and management of inventory, supporting
various business functions like sourcing and supply chain management,
etc. The petitioner is engaged by a foreign party for providing various
services on a principal-to-principal basis including for actual
performance of BPO services to the clients of the said party located
outside India in terms of the Master Service Agreement (MSA) entered
into between the parties.

In this writ, the order is challenged,
wherein it was held that the services provided by the petitioner are in
the nature of “Intermediary Services” and do not qualify as “export of
services” in terms of section 2(6) of the Act and hence the refund claim
of un-utilized ITC used in making zero-rated supplies of services
without payment of IGST is rejected.

HELD

The Court examined
the contents of the MSA entered into between the parties, and also the
law relating to “intermediaries services” prevailing in the pre-GST
regime as well as the GST regime. The Court held that for services to be
called as intermediary services three conditions are required to be met
namely, the relationship between the parties must be that of a
principal-agency relationship, the supplier is involved in the
arrangement or facilitation in the provision of the service provided by
the principal and plays no role in the actual performance of service
intended to be received by the receiver. Thus, the scope of the
intermediary is to mediate between the two parties i.e. the principal
service provider and the beneficiary who receives the main service and
expressly excludes any person who provides such main service on his own
account from its scope. The Court held that in the present case, since
the company provides BPO services on behalf of a foreign party, it
undoubtedly provides the main services on its own account. Further, the
agreement is on principal-to- principal basis. It also held that all
that is evident from the record is that the petitioner is providing the
services which is subcontracted to it by the foreign party. As a
sub-contractor, it is receiving fee/charges from the main contractor
i.e. foreign party for its services. The main contractor i.e. foreign
party, in turn, is receiving consideration from its clients for the main
services that are rendered by the petitioner pursuant to the
arrangement of sub-contracting. Even as per the circular dated 20th
September, 2021 issued by CBIC, at its para 3.5, it stands clarified
that sub-contracting for a service is not an ‘intermediary’ service.

The
Court held that a bare perusal of the recitals and relevant clauses of
the MSA do not in any manner indicate that the petitioner is acting as
an ‘intermediary’ and cannot also be interpreted to conclude that the
petitioner has facilitated the services. The said clauses are in
relation to the modalities of how the actual work would be carried out
and do not in any manner establish that the petitioner was required to
arrange/facilitate the third party to render the main service which has
actually been rendered by the petitioner.

The Court agreed in
principle that the definition of ‘intermediary’ in essence and there
does not seem difference in its meaning under the GST regime and the
pre-GST regime. The Court relied upon the decision of Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India [2006] 3 SCC 1,
in which the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had reiterated that where facts and law in a subsequent
assessment year are the same, no authority whether quasi-judicial or
judicial can generally be permitted to take a different view.

58. CTC (India) (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner (Appeals), CGST & Central Excise
[2022] 144 taxmann.com 10 (Jharkhand)
Date of order: 7th September, 2022

Where
the petitioner did not show zero-rated supplies in GSTR-3B and the
turnover shown in GSTR-1 was not supported by documentary evidence, even
after providing a sufficient opportunity of being heard, the officer
was right in rejecting the ITC refund claim.

FACTS

The
petitioner is a company and is a 100 per cent export-oriented unit. The
petitioner filed an application for refund of accumulated CGST, SGST and
IGST credit in the prescribed Form-GST-RFD-01A along with supporting
documents. The petitioner, while filing the GSTR-3B return of Input Tax
Credit for the relevant period, inadvertently, missed out to mention the
zero-rated supplies against the outward taxable supplies (zero-rated)
in the said return and instead mentioned the same to be ‘zero’. However,
the said amount of zero-rated supplies has been correctly shown in
GSTR-1 return of outward supplies against export invoices. The refund
was rejected, inter alia, on the grounds that the value of zero-rated
supply as per GSTR-3B appears to be zero.

HELD

The Court observed that the petitioner has not produced
any documentary evidence for his refund claim; either before the
adjudicating authority or before the appellate authority, though he was
afforded a personal hearing but he failed to prove that the declaration
(zero-rated value of GSTR-1) was legal and genuine. The Court held that
merely claiming any refund on the basis of averments would not suffice
unless and until the said claim of any assessee is corroborated by
documentary evidence.

59. Esveeaar Distilleries (Pvt.) Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner (State Tax), Tirupati-II Circle
[2022] 144 taxmann.com 153 (Andhra Pradesh)
Date of order: 20th October, 2022

“Whether
alcoholic liquor for human consumption falls within the meaning of food
or food products” to determine the rate of GST for job-work purposes?
Held – No.

FACTS

The petitioner herein is a manufacturer of
Indian made foreign liquor for the manufacture of ‘McDowell’ brand
alcoholic beverages like rum, whisky and brandy. An assessment came to
be made by the GST authorities levying GST at 18 per cent. The same is
challenged on the grounds that the job work charges relatable to the
manufacture of alcoholic liquor is chargeable at 5 per cent since liquor
also falls within the category of “Food and food products” under
Chapter 22, as it was sought to be inserted at serial No.26 after clause
‘e’ by Notification issued on 13th October, 2017 and that the
subsequent notification issued on 30th September, 2021 levying tax on
services by way of job work in relation to manufacture of alcoholic
liquor for human consumption is only prospective in nature and
applicable from 1st October, 2021.

HELD

The Court noted that
based on recommendations of GST Council in its 45th meeting held on 17th
September, 2021, it has been clarified that food and food products in
the said entry exclude alcoholic beverages for human consumption.
However, assuming that the recommendations of the GST Council are not
binding and they are only directions, plain reading of the item, which
is in dispute, would clearly show that the same cannot be treated as an
article of food. The Court held that alcohol cannot be treated as an
item of food for many reasons, more particularly, for the advertisements
carried on the item that consumption of the same would be injurious to
health, etc. Hence, job work of alcohol manufacturing cannot attract 5
per cent GST rate. The Court further held that the notification issued
on 30th September, 2021 is clarificatory in nature and would be
retrospective in operation.

60. Kinaram Vintrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal
2022 (65) GSTL 163 (Cal.)
Date of order: 30th June, 2022

Order passed for blocking of electronic credit ledger without intimating the reasons was not sustainable.

FACTS

The
respondent had blocked the petitioner’s ITC available in electronic
credit ledger. The petitioner was not informed about the reasons before
taking such an action by the respondent. Being aggrieved by such an
action, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Hon’ble High
Court.
 
HELD
It was held that the order blocking ITC without
intimating the reasons to the petitioner was arbitrary, illegal and
violative of the principle of natural justice. Accordingly, the Court
directed the respondent to provide a copy of reasons for blocking of ITC
to the petitioner and then pass a reasoned order after giving an
opportunity of being heard.

61. Hindustan Steel & Cement vs. Assistant State Tax Officer, Kozhikode
2022 (65) GSTL 133 (Ker.)
Date of order: 20th July, 2022

Right to file an appeal could not be deprived merely because no summary order in Form DRC-07 was generated.

FACTS

Goods
and conveyance of the petitioner were detained and seized u/s 129 of
the CGST/SGST Act. The petitioner paid the requisite amount for getting
its goods and conveyance released. Further, an order was issued in Form
MOV-09 but corresponding summary of order in Form DRC-07 was not issued.
As the summary order was not issued, the petitioner could not proceed
to file an appeal electronically. The respondent contested that once payment is done by the petitioner in Form DRC-03,
it demonstrates acceptance of facts by the petitioner and proceedings
are deemed to be concluded. Being aggrieved by such a stand, the
petitioner preferred this writ petition.

HELD

The Hon’ble
High Court referred to section 129(3) of CGST Act read with Rule 142 of
CGST Rules and Circular No. 41/15/2018-GST dated 13th April, 2018 and
held that irrespective of the fact whether or not a payment was made, or
security was provided as per section 129(1) of CGST Act, 2017, it was
the responsibility of respondent to pass an order and upload the summary
order in FORM DRC-07. Merely because the summary order was not
generated on culmination of proceedings, it cannot by any stretch of
imagination result into depriving of statutory right of the petitioner
to file an appeal u/s 107 of CGST Act.

The writ was thus allowed.

62. Ankush Auto Deals vs. Commissioner of DGST
2022 (65) GSTL 184 (Del.)
Date of order: 21st July, 2022

Supreme
Court order providing COVID-19 relaxation in time limit was not
applicable to interest payment on refund granted beyond 60 days.

FACTS

The
petitioner filed an application for refund on 20th July, 2021 amounting
to Rs. 25,29,944. The respondent remitted a refund to the extent of
Rs. 14,22,482 on 4th January, 2022 and the balance refund of Rs. 11,07,462 was
remitted on 22nd, March, 2022 without providing any interest. There was
no dispute with respect to the eligibility of refund. The petitioner
contended that the refund should be granted with interest since there
was a delay beyond 60 days. The Department stated that the time limit of
60 days was not applicable due to Supreme Court COVID-19 relaxation.
Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred a writ petition
before this Hon’ble High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court, after
considering the submissions, stated that the statutory rate of interest
provided u/s 56 of the CGST Act was a compensation for use of money and
the respondent could not retain money beyond the stipulated period.
Accordingly, it was held that reliance placed on Supreme Court’s order
providing relaxation in time limit by the respondent denying interest
was misconceived. Consequently, the respondents were directed to pay
interest on the delayed payment of refund.

Recent Developments in GST

I.    NOTIFICATIONS

1.    Notification No .21/2022-Central Tax dated 21st October, 2022    

By above notification, the due date of filing monthly return of September, 2022 is extended by 1 day and the same is notified as 21st October, 2022.

II.    OFFICE MEMORANDUM

1.    The Central Government has issued an Office Memorandum dated 17th October, 2022 by which the modification is effected in membership of the Law Committee and the reconstituted committee is notified.
 
2.    The Central Government has also issued one more Office Memorandum dated 19th October, 2022, in which clarification is provided about handling of investigation matters and issue of SCN where jurisdiction of the taxpayer is with the State authority and investigation is conducted by the Central Authority. It resolves the issue about consequential action, whether to be taken by State Authority or Central Authority, in case of investigation matters.


III.    ADVISORY

1. On portal, the authorities have issued an Advisory dated 21st October, 2022 about sequential filing of GSTR-1.

2. There is also information dated 20th October, 2022 about the implementation of mandatory mentioning of HSN Codes in GSTR-1.


IV.    CIRCULARS

1. Clarification on refund related issues-Circular No.181/13/2022-GST, dated 10th November, 2022    

In the above circular the CBIC has clarified various issues relating to GST refund. Two issues are clarified – One, about the effective date for amendment made in formula prescribed under rule 89(5) of CGST Rules, and second pertains to the effective date for application of restrictions inserted by notification No.09/2022-Central Tax (Rate) dated 13th July, 2022.

2. Guidelines for verification of transitional credit- Circular No.182/14/2022- GST, dated 10th November, 2022

The CBIC has issued the above circular giving guidelines to field formation about verification of transitional credit in light of the orders of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Filco Trade Centre Pvt. Ltd., SLP (C) No.32709-32710/2018, orders dated 22nd July, 2022 and 2nd September, 2022.

V.    ADVANCE RULINGS

30. Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd.
(AAR No.MP/AAAR/01/2022 dated13th April, 2022 (MP)

Developed Plot vis-à-vis Liability under GST

This appeal arose out of the AR No.16/2021 dated 22th November, 2021 passed by M.P. AAR in the case of Bhopal Smart City Development Corpn. Ltd.The issue was about liability in case of sale of developed land plots. The basic facts were that the applicant therein purchased a plot of land, developed it with various works like drainage line, water line, electricity line, land leveling and common facilities like road and street lights, etc.

The argument of the applicant therein was that, inspite of the above development, the land remains land and the applicant is not liable to GST as it will be sale of land, which is outside scope of GST (Schedule III). The ld. AAR concurred with applicant and ruled accordingly vide the above AR.
    
Against the above AR, the Respondents, i.e., Revenue Authority filed an appeal before the AAAR.

Before the AAAR, the contentions of revenue were reiterated including that there is difference between barren land and developed land. The usability also changes, argued the appellant.

The Judgment in the case of Narne Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2013 (29) STR 3 (SC)- 2012-VIL-19-SC-ST) was relied upon.

The Respondent (original applicant) reiterated its position.

The ld. AAAR examined the issue at its level and observed as under:

“The issues discussed above have been examined. In this case, the issue to be decided is whether GST is applicable on sale of developed plot of land and whether the activities undertaken for developing a barren land into a developed land with provision of amenities essential to make it inhabitable and fit for construction of a complex on the said land is a service and also whether it is a part of the service of construction of the complex and also whether this activity is covered under entry 5(b) of Schedule II of the CGST Act, 2017.”
    
The ld. AAAR thereafter analyzed the fact, that by development the use changes and involves substantial cost. The ld. AAR also referred to the Supreme Court judgment cited by the appellant and reproduced certain portion as under:

“The sale price was not for the virgin land but included the development of sites and provision of infrastructure. The opposite party has undertaken the obligations to develop the plots and obtain permissions/approvals of the lay outs. The opposite party itself pleaded in its counters that the plots were developed by spending huge amounts and subsequent to the amounts paid by the complainants also plots were developed. It pleaded that huge amounts were spent towards protection of the plots from the grabbers and developed roads, open drains, sewerage lines, streetlights etc. It is therefore, manifest that the transaction between the parties is not a sale simplicitor but coupled with obligations for development and provision of infrastructure. Inevitably, there is an element of service in the discharge of the said obligations.”
     
Based on above case and considering the scope of entry 5(b) in Schedule II, the ld. AAAR held that a developed plot has different identity and is liable to GST as per notification No.11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28th June, 2017 at 18per cent.

For valuation, the Ld. AAAR observed that the same can be arrived at as by taking 1/3rd deduction towards land.

Thus, the ld. AAAR reversed the AR.

[Note: By Circular 177/09/2022 dated 3rd August, 2022, the CBIC clarified that the sale of developed plot is also sale of land and hence not liable to GST as per entry 5 in Schedule III. The above order of AAAR is prior to the above circular.]

31. Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board
(AAR No.KAR-ADRG/17/2022
dated 1st July, 2022) (KAR)

GST – Educational Institution

The applicant is established under the Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board Act,1966 and holds GSTIN. It has raised the following questions:

“i. Whether the Applicant is an “educational institution” and ought to be treated as such for the purposes of applicability of GST?

ii. Whether the activity of printing of the following items of stationary on behalf of educational institutions constitutes a supply of service:

a. question papers,
b. admit cards,
c. answer booklets
d. SSLC Pass Certificate, the overprinting of variable data and lamination,
e. Fail Marks cards
f. Circulars, ID card and other formats used for and during examinations.
g. Envelopes for packing answer booklets

If yes, whether the service provided to educational institutions by way of printing of stationery and other services incidental to the conduct of examination by such institutions would be covered by Sr.No.66 (Heading 9992) of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended and subject to Nil rate of tax.

iii. Whether the following incidental services provided to or performed on behalf of educational institutions are also services that are covered by Sr. No.66 (Heading 9992) of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended and subject to Nil rate of tax:

a. scanning of answer booklets and converting the same into digital images;
b. hiring of light motor vehicles and heavy motor vehicles for transportation of examination materials;
c. annual maintenance of computers and equipment;
d. obtaining the services of programmers and technical staff for examination related work; and
e. Obtaining Group ‘D’ staff, Drivers, Data Entry Operators, Security Guards & House Keeping services related for SSLC Examination work.”

The applicant provided information about the administrative set up. It also informed that the functions of the Board involve the conduct of the SSLC Examination. The applicant performs all activities in relation to the conduct of examinations, declaration of results and so on, and for this purpose it engages in procurement activities for stationery and examination materials and outsources activities like maintenance of computer hardware and software.

The main activities of the applicant are printing of examination papers, answer booklets/answer scripts, marks cards, examination admit cards, circulars pertaining to the activities and functioning of the Board etc. in different formats, for which the Board maintains full ownership of all content to be printed, but the actual printing activity itself is done by third parties decided on a process of tender invitation and competitive bidding.

The applicant termed itself as an Educational Institution in view of the definition of ‘educational institution”, given in Karnataka Education Act,1983.

It further drew attention to the definition of ‘educational institution’ in clause 2(y) of the GST notification no.12/2017 Central Tax (Rate) and clause (iv) of Explanation of the said notification which are also reproduced in AAR as under:

“(y) “educational institution” means an institution providing services by way of-(i) pre-school education and education upto higher secondary school or equivalent; (ii) education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognized by any law for the time being in force; (iii) education as a part of an approved vocational education course;

Further, clause (iv) of Explanation of the said notification reads as below:

(iv) For removal of doubts, it is clarified that the Central and State Educational Boards shall be treated as Educational Institution for the limited purpose of providing services by way of conduct of examination to the students.”

It was stressed that, it being an examination Board, falls within the ambit of the term “educational institution” by virtue of judgments not only of different High Courts but also affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Referring to various other relevant materials, the applicant submitted that, they being an Examination Board established for the purposes of conducting certain examinations, it is an educational institution as held and affirmed by various case laws as well as by the legislative intent conveyed in the Karnataka Education Act and the Notifications issued under GST.

In respect of incidental services, like scanning of answer booklets and converting the same into digital images; hiring of light motor vehicles and heavy motor vehicles for transportation of examination materials; annual maintenance of computers and equipment; and obtaining the services of programmers and technical staff on outsourcing basis for examination related work, the applicant stated that they all are indisputably and unambiguously classified as services and not goods. It was further argued that such services are also exempt as they will fall under the ambit of the same Sl.No.66 (Heading 9992) of Notification 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate), which provides that services relating to admission to, or conduct of examination by, such educational institution are liable to be charged GST at Nil rate.

The ld. AAR observed that the Applicant is Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board (KSEEB), which is established for the purpose of holding and conducting public examinations. The ld. AAR noted that the application is to know whether it is an “educational institution” as per GST Notification No. 14/2018-Central Tax (Rate) dated 26th July, 2018 clause (iv) and held that Karnataka Secondary Education Examination Board is an educational institution for the limited purpose of providing services by way of conduct of examination to the students.     

In relation to various services like printing of papers and other incidents services, the ld. AAR found that the applicant is a recipient of services and not supplier.

The ld. AAR referred to section 95(a) of CGST Act which provides that AR application can be filed by supplier. In the present case, finding that the applicant is not supplier but recipient, the ld. AAR held that such questions are not maintainable. The ld. AAR passed ruling as under:

“i. The Applicant is an “Educational institution” for the limited purpose of providing services by way of conduct of examination to the students, as per clause (iv) of Notification No. 14/2018-Central Tax (Rate) dated: 26.07.2018.

ii. This question cannot be answered for the reasons mentioned supra.

iii. This question cannot be answered for the reasons mentioned supra.”

32. K. P. H. Dream Cricket P. Ltd.
(AAR No.01/AAAR/CGST/KPH/2022
dated 1st June, 2022 (Punjab)

Free Distribution of Ticket – No supply

The issue arose before the Punjab AAAR out of the AR passed by the ld. AAR in AAR/GST/PB/002/dated 20th August, 2018.
    
Before the ld. AAR, the applicant (present appellant) presented its facts that it has entered into a Franchise Agreement in the month of April, 2008 with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (‘BCCI’) for the purpose of establishing and operating a cricket team in the Indian Premier League (‘IPL’) under the title of ‘Punjab Kings’. The appellant has participated in the IPL with other franchisees where the matches are held at the home and away venues as designated by BCCI-IPL.

The appellant intended to distribute match tickets to local Governmental authorities/ officials, consultants, etc. free of cost as a goodwill gesture for promotion of business. These tickets are to be distributed without any consideration flowing from the receivers to the appellant.

Based on the above facts, the appellant sought the ruling of AAR whether there is any GST liability and whether it is entitled to ITC in respect of inward supply for above free tickets.

The ld. AAR held that providing free complimentary tickets will be a supply. The ld. AAR held that when appellant issues a complimentary ticket to any person, the appellant is displaying an act of forbearance by tolerating persons who are receiving the services provided by the appellant without paying any money, which other persons not receiving such complimentary tickets would have to pay for. Since free distribution of ticket is held as taxable supply, correspondingly it was also held that appellant will be eligible to ITC.     

Aggrieved by the above AR, an appeal was filed before the AAAR. Before the ld. AAAR, the appellant reiterated its ground that there is no consideration and hence no supply. Section 7(1)(d) is deleted by Amendment Act,2018 and section 7(1A) is inserted, providing clarification in relation to entries in Schedule II of CGST Act. The submission was that without consideration in monetary terms or otherwise, there will not be supply and transaction will be out of scope of GST.

In respect of ITC, it was submitted that the ITC will be eligible as it is not falling in rules blocking ITC, including Rule 17(5)(h).

It was argued that, if there is supply, then the question of taxable/non-taxable supply will arise and ITC can be determined accordingly.

However, when the transaction is not supply at all, the concept of taxable/non-taxable will not apply and the Rule about blocked credit will also not apply.

The ld. AAR analyzed the arguments vis-à-vis the legal position. It referred to important relevant provisions like scope of ‘supply’ as per section 7 and definition of ‘consideration’ in section 2(31).
    
The ld. AAAR concurred with appellant that the entries in Schedule II are for classifying the supply transactions into supply of goods or supply of services and by itself it is not deciding ‘supply’.

In respect of ‘consideration’, the ld. AAAR reproduced the definition as under:

““Section 2 (31) consideration in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes–

(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government;

(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government:

Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;”

It also analyzed the same as under:

“The key elements of “consideration” that emerge from the said definition are detailed hereunder:

a) Consideration includes both the payment made as well as payment to be made. This signifies that the consideration is not only limited to the payment received but shall also include the payment which has not been received;

b) Consideration can be in the form of money or otherwise. This implies that the consideration is not merely defined by the payment received in money but also includes the payment received in kind, which is other than money;

c) Consideration to flow from the supply of goods or services or both i.e. it can be in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both. The important aspect here is that the consideration has to be linked with the supply of goods or services or both and that linkage can be in varied forms. It can be in respect of the supply or in response to the supply or even be an inducement for the supply;

d) Consideration can flow from the recipient or any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government. The matrix of consideration has been widened by not limiting its flow merely from the recipient. Any consideration that is flowing from any other person but can be linked to the supply of goods or services in the manner defined in para (c) above shall bring it within the fold of consideration;

e) The ambit of consideration has been widened by including the monetary value of any act or forbearance provided the same has the linkage with the supply as detailed in in para (c) above. It needs to be understood that any act or forbearance which has a linkage with the supply in a certain manner which may be either in respect of or in response to or for the inducement of would fall within the fold of consideration;

f) Lastly, the element of deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both has been taken out of the fold of consideration. However, the same may be included in consideration when such deposit is applied as consideration for the said supply by the supplier.”

The ld. AAAR also referred to the Finance Act,1994, the Indian Contract Act and certain international rulings. The ld. AAAR came to the conclusion that, for considering a transaction as a ‘supply’, there must be consideration flowing from recipients either in money terms or in kind. It cannot be illusionary.
    
The ld. AAR summarized its findings as under:

‘20. The inference drawn from the above delineations is that even for the consideration in the form of payment in kind, it should not be vague or illusory and there should be an element of reciprocity. If the argument by the Authority for Advance Ruling is agreed to and accepted that every kind of activity or transaction whether for gift or charity or for any other purpose shall fall within the domain of supply. The CBIC vide its Circular No. 92/11/2019-GST dated 7th March, 2019 has clarified that, “goods or services or both which are supplied free of cost (without any consideration) shall not be treated as supply under GST (except in case of activities mentioned in Schedule I of the said Act). Accordingly, it is clarified that samples which are supplied free of cost, without any consideration, do not qualify as supply under GST, except where the activity falls within the ambit of Schedule I of the said Act.”

21. Thus, the argument by the appellant that on account of absence of consideration in such activity or transaction, the same should not fall within the territory of supply is well taken and therefore the activity of providing such free or complimentary tickets is not a supply as per the GST Act. However, it is important to note here that as per section 7 of the Act read with Schedule I any activity or transaction between the related person including employee shall be treated as supply even if the aspect of consideration is not there. So, where such complimentary tickets are being provided by the appellant to related person as defined in section 15 of the Act or to distinct person as defined in section 25 of the Act the same would fall within the ambit of supply even if there is no consideration.”

Therefore, providing complementary tickets are held to be not a supply.

Regarding ITC, the ld. AAAR held that the basic theory under GST is to grant ITC, if there is outward tax burden. If there is no outward tax liability, then ITC is not eligible. Accordingly, in the present case, the ld. AAAR held that ITC is not eligible.

The ld. AAAR decided the questions of the appellant as under:

“a) Activity of providing free complimentary tickets does not fall within the domain of supply as it does not have the element of consideration. However, where such complimentary tickets are being provided by the appellant to a related person or a distinct person the same shall fall within the ambit of supply on account of Schedule I of the Act and the appellant would be liable to pay tax on the same;

b) The appellant would not be eligible to avail input tax credit in relation to such activity. But, where such activity or transaction is treated as supply on account of being provided by the appellant to a related person or a distinct person the appellant would be entitled to avail input tax credit for the same.”

Financial Reporting Dossier

A. KEY RECENT UPDATES

1. IASB – AMENDMENT TO IFRS 16 (SALE AND LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS)

On 22nd September, 2022, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued Lease Liability in a Sale and Leaseback, amending IFRS 16, Leases. Extant IFRS 16 includes requirements on how to account for a sale and leaseback transaction at the date of the transaction but does not delve into specific subsequent measurement requirements. Consequently, when payments include variable lease payments in such a transaction, there is a risk that a modification or change in the leaseback term could result in the seller-lessee recognising a gain on the ROU retained even though no transaction or event would have occurred to give rise to that gain. The latest amendment explains how to account for a sale and leaseback after the transaction date. [https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2022/09/iasb-issues-narrow-scope-amendments-to-requirements-for-sale-and-leaseback-transactions/]

2. UKEB – A HYBRID MODEL FOR SUBSEQUENT MEASUREMENT OF GOODWILL

On 29th September, 2022, the UK Endorsement Board (UKEB), which endorses new/amended IFRS standards for use by UK Companies, published a research report, Subsequent Measurement of  Goodwill: A Hybrid Model, as a part of its contribution to the ongoing international debate on Day 2 goodwill measurement. The report explores the practical implications of a potential transition to a hybrid model for subsequent measurement of goodwill. Under a hybrid model, an annual amortisation charge would be combined with indicator-based impairment testing and disclosures to increase management accountability for acquisitions. [https://assets-eu-01.kc-usercontent.com/99102f2b-dbd8-0186-f681-303b06237bb2/da8976ce-bdf2-4173-839f-29d89c66a1ea/Subsequent%20Measurement%20of%20Goodwill%20-%20A%20Hybrid%20Model.pdf]

3. IESBA – UKRAINE CONFLICT: KEY ETHICS AND INDEPENDENCE CONSIDERATIONS

On 3rd October, 2022, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) released a Staff Alert, The Ukraine Conflict: Key Ethics and Independence Considerations, drawing the attention of professional accountants in business (PAIBs) and professional accountants in public practice (PAPPs), to important provisions in the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. The publication highlights the ethical implications arising from the wide-ranging economic sanctions many jurisdictions have imposed on Russia and certain Russian entities/ individuals and the related ethical responsibilities of PAIBs and PAPPs. It also highlights key ethics considerations for PAPPs on client/ engagement acceptance, audits of financial statements, key independence considerations relating to overdue fees and the Code’s prohibition against assuming management responsibility. [https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/FINAL-IESBA-Staff-Alert-Ukraine.pdf]

4. FASB – IMPROVEMENTS TO SEGMENT DISCLOSURES

On 6th October, 2022, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an Exposure Draft (ED) of Proposed Accounting Standards Update – Segment Reporting (Topic 280), Improvements to Reportable Segment Disclosures. The ED, inter alia, requires a public entity to disclose a) significant segment expenses that are regularly provided to the CODM and included within each reported measure of segment profit or loss (collectively referred to as the “significant expense principle”) and b) an amount for ‘other segment items’ by reportable segment. The ‘other segment items’ category is the difference between segment revenue less the significant expenses disclosed under the significant expense principle and each reported measure of segment profit or loss. [https://www.fasb.org/document/blob?fileName=Prop%20ASU—Segment%20Reporting%20(Topic%20280)—Improvements%20to%20Reportable%20Segment%20Disclosures.pdf]

5. IASB – PROPOSED NARROW SCOPE AMENDMENTS TO IFRS 9

On 24th October, 2022, the IASB proposed narrow-scope amendments to IFRS 9, Financial Instruments, covering: a) clarifications to assess whether a financial asset’s contractual cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest (SPPI) and new disclosure requirements for financial instruments not measured at FVTPL; b) derecognition requirements to permit an accounting policy choice to allow an entity to derecognise a financial liability before it delivers cash on the settlement date, subject to meeting specified criteria; and c) adding disclosure requirements in IFRS 7 on the aggregated fair value of equity investments for which the OCI presentation option is applied and changes in fair value recognised in OCI. [https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2022/10/iasb-adds-narrow-scope-project-to-work-plan-on-possible-amendments-to-financial-instruments-accounting-standard/]

6. IAASB – PROPOSED ISA 500 (R), AUDIT EVIDENCE

On 24th October, 2022, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued an Exposure Draft of Proposed International Standard on Auditing 500 (Revised), Audit Evidence. The proposed changes include: clarifying ISA 500’s purpose and scope; providing a principles-based approach to considering and making judgements about information intended to be used as audit evidence and evaluating whether sufficient appropriate audit evidence has been obtained; modernising the standard to be adaptable to current business and audit environment; and providing a ‘reference framework’ for auditors when making judgements about audit evidence throughout the audit. [https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/IAASB-Exposure-Draft-ISA-500-Audit-Evidence.pdf]


7. FASB – PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO ACCOUNTING FOR JV FORMATIONS

On 27th October, 2022, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft of Proposed Accounting Standards Update: Business Combinations – Joint Venture Formations (Subtopic 905-60), Recognition and Initial Measurement, to address accounting for contributions made to a joint venture (JV) upon formation in a JVs separate financial statements. Extant USGAAP does not provide related specific authoritative guidance resulting in diversity in practice – some JVs initially measure their net assets at fair value at the formation date, other JVs account for their net assets at the venturers’ carrying amounts. The ED proposes that a JV apply a new basis of accounting upon formation whereby it recognises and initially measures its assets and liabilities at fair value. [https://www.fasb.org/document/blob?fileName=Prop%20ASU—Business%20Combinations—Joint%20Venture%20Formations%20(Subtopic%20805-60)—Recognition%20and%20Initial%20Measurement.pdf]

8. IASB – AMENDMENT TO IAS 1 (LONG-TERM DEBT WITH COVENANTS)

On 31st October, 2022, the IASB amended IAS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements, to improve information about long-term debt with covenants. IAS 1 requires a company to classify debt as non-current only if the company can avoid settling the debt in the 12 months after the reporting date. However, a company’s ability to do so is often subject to complying with covenants. The amendments to IAS 1 specify that covenants to be complied with after the reporting date do not affect the classification of debt as current or non-current at the reporting date. The amendments require a company to disclose information about these covenants in the notes to the financial statements. The amendments are effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1st January, 2024. [https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2022/10/iasb-amends-accounting-standard-to-improve-information-about-long-term-debt-with-covenants/]

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING MATERIAL1

1.    UK FRC – Thematic Review: Deferred Tax Assets. [21st September, 2022.]

2.    THE TASKFORCE ON DISCLOSURES ABOUT EXPECTED CREDIT LOSSES UPDATED GUIDANCE –
Recommendations on a Comprehensive Set of IFRS 9 Expected Credit Loss Disclosures. [23rd September, 2022]

3.    UK FRC – Lab Report on Structured Digital Reporting, Improving Quality and Usability. [23rd September, 2022.]

4.    IESBA – Ethical Leadership in A Digital Era: Applying the IESBA Code to Selected Technology-Related Scenarios.
[26th September, 2022.]

5.    UK FRC – Thematic Review: Business Combinations. [29th September, 2022.]

6.    UK FRC –
Annual Review of Corporate Reporting – 2021-22 Report. [27th October, 2022.]

7.    IFAC – Quality Management Series: Small Firm Implementation – Instalment One: It is Time to Get Ready for the new Quality Management Standards. [31st October, 2022.]

8.    IFRS INTERPRETATIONS COMMITTEE – Compilation of Agenda Decisions – Volume 7. [2nd November, 2022.]


1. All publications are available online as free downloadable material at the respective organisation’s websites.

B. GLOBAL REGULATORS – ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND INSPECTION REPORTS

I. THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB)

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

1. DEFICIENCIES IN AUDIT FIRM’S QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM

The case – The matter concerns a Korean Audit Firm’s failure to take the required steps after learning that certain audit procedures may not have been performed and sufficient audit evidence may not have been obtained in connection with an audit. Specifically, after the Component Audit had been completed and the Audit Firm was preparing for a PCAOB inspection, the Firm’s senior personnel learned that the engagement team for the Component Audit may have failed to perform certain planned procedures for accounts receivable and may have failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence – that significant portions of the engagement team’s documentation related to accounts receivable for the Component Audit consisted primarily of prior-year work papers. The Audit Firm failed to take reasonable steps at the time to determine and demonstrate that sufficient procedures were performed, sufficient evidence was obtained, and appropriate conclusions were reached with respect to relevant assertions for accounts receivable. The Audit Firm thereby violated PCAOB auditing standards. The matter also concerned the Audit Firm’s failure to establish and implement appropriate policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that: a) personnel would assemble for retention (‘archive’) a complete and final set of audit documentation in connection with each issuer audit; and (b) archived audit documentation would be protected against improper alteration. In particular, the Audit Firm failed to establish appropriate policies and procedures to address the risk that hard-copy work papers might be improperly added to previously archived audit documentation.

The order – The PCAOB censured the Audit Firm, imposed a civil money penalty of $350,000 and required it to undertake and certify the completion of certain improvements to its quality control system. [Release No. 105-2022-012 dated 16th August, 2022.]

2. AUDIT OF A CRYPTO COMPANY – AUDIT FIRM UNDERTOOK ENGAGEMENT THAT IT COULD NOT REASONABLY EXPECT TO COMPLETE WITH PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE

The case – The client company (CC) reported in its post-merger financial statements that it held more than eleven different cryptocurrencies, which were significant to its assets and revenue, and that its mission was to provide investors with a diversified exposure to cryptocurrency markets. These cryptocurrencies were purchased or traded using various types of software and hardware-based wallets on various unregulated cryptocurrency trading platforms (cryptocurrency ‘exchanges’). The engagement team’s planning documentation and related communications to the audit committee for the 2017 audit concluded no specialized skills or knowledge were needed, despite being aware that CC’s investment activities in cryptocurrencies, which relied on new technology, required specialized skills. In addition, notwithstanding the engagement team’s identification of significant risks of material misstatement related to the digital nature of cryptocurrency, and its lack of experience in auditing cryptocurrencies, the engagement team unreasonably concluded no specialized IT skills were needed to address those risks. The engagement team also failed to gain a sufficient understanding of CC’s internal control over financial reporting to appropriately plan its audit, including CC’s use of service organizations for cryptocurrency investments.

Specifically, the Firm’s system of quality control did not provide reasonable assurance that: (1) the Firm undertook only those engagements that the Firm could reasonably expect to complete with professional competence, and appropriately considered the risks associated with providing professional services in the particular circumstances; (2) work was assigned to personnel having the degree of technical training and proficiency required in the circumstances; and (3) the work performed by engagement personnel met applicable professional standards, regulatory requirements, and the Firm’s quality standards.

The order – The PCAOB censured the Audit Firm; imposed civil money penalties of $30,000 and $25,000 on the audit firm and the Engagement Quality Review Partner, respectively; and required the audit firm to undertake certain remedial measures, including establishing quality control policies and procedures. [Release No. 105-2022-029 dated 3rd November, 2022.]

II. DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN AUDITS

1. A DALLAS (US) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Critical Audit Matters (CAMs)

Audit deficiency – In an audit reviewed by PCAOB, other than a matter that was communicated in the auditor’s report as a CAM, the firm did not perform procedures to determine whether other matters that were communicated to the audit committee, and that relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, were CAMs. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion. This instance of non-compliance does not necessarily mean that other CAMs should have been communicated in the auditor’s report. [Release No. 104-2022-113 dated 8th April, 2022.]

2. A FLORIDA (US) BASED AUDIT FIRM    

Audit area – Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR)

Audit deficiency – In one audit, the Audit Firm did not include in its ICFR report a disclosure regarding the exclusion of an acquired business from the scope of both management’s assessment and the firm’s audit of ICFR. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 2201, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements. [Release No. 104-2022-108 dated 8th April, 2022.]

3. A COLORADO (US) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit areas – Non-compliance with PCAOB Standards

Audit deficiency- In an audit reviewed by PCAOB, the Audit Firm did not provide a copy of the management representation letter to the audit committee. In this instance, the firm was non – compliant with AS 1301, Communications with Audit Committees, and AS 2805, Management Representations. In another audit reviewed, the Audit Firm did not place the Basis for Opinion section as the second section of its audit report resulting in non-compliance with AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion. [Release No. 104-2022-106 dated 8th April, 2022.]

4. A KOLKATA (INDIA) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit areas – Inventory & Audit Documentation

Audit deficiency – The Audit Firm selected for testing various controls that consisted of management’s review of inventory costs (including capitalized overhead), inventory valuation and related account reconciliations. It did not evaluate the review procedures that the control owners performed, including the procedures to identify items for follow up and the procedures to determine whether those items were appropriately resolved.

Also, the Audit Firm did not assemble a complete and final set of audit documentation for retention within 45 days following the report release date. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 1215, Audit Documentation. [Release No. 104-2022-129 dated 21st April, 2022.]

5. A VICTORIA ISLAND (NIGERIA) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Non-compliance with PCAOB Standards and Rules

Audit deficiencies – The individual who performed the engagement quality review was an employee of the firm who was not a partner or an individual in an equivalent position. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 1220, Engagement Quality Review

The Audit Firm did not include in the audit report the city and country from which the audit report was  issued. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion.

The Audit Firm included in its audit report an explanatory paragraph describing substantial doubt about the client’s ability to continue as a going concern but did not place it immediately following the opinion paragraph. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 2415, Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern. [Release No. 104-2022-126 dated 21st April, 2022.]

6. A TORONTO (CANADA) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Intangible Assets

Audit deficiency – During the year, the client extended the useful lives of its intangible assets from their original lives. The management used a discounted cash flow analysis over the extended lives to evaluate its intangible assets for possible impairment. The firm did not perform sufficient procedures to evaluate the reasonableness of the sales projections as it did not perform procedures, beyond inquiry, to test the reasonableness of extending the useful lives. (AS 2502.26 and .28) In addition, the firm did not sufficiently evaluate the management’s ability to achieve its forecasted sales projections considering the substantial doubt about the client’s ability to continue as a going concern because it limited its procedures to inquiry and comparing the forecasted sales projections to the current year results. [Release No. 104-2022-125 dated 21st April, 2022.]

7. A VANCOUVER (CANADA) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Related Parties

Audit deficiency –The Audit Firm did not perform sufficient procedures to evaluate whether the client had properly identified, accounted for, and disclosed its related party relationships and transactions. Specifically, the firm did not evaluate whether certain transactions (communicated by it to the audit committee as significant unusual transactions) with a company for which (i) a shareholder of the client was a director, and (ii) an immediate family member of the client’s majority shareholders was the CEO were related party transactions that the client should have identified and disclosed and whether such transactions were accounted for appropriately In addition, the Audit Firm did not perform procedures to obtain an understanding of the business purpose (or the lack thereof) of the transactions. [Release No. 104-2022-119 dated 21st April, 2022.]

8. A MEXICO BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Financial Reporting and Close

Audit deficiency-
The Audit Firm identified a risk related to the manual consolidation process. It did not identify and test any controls over the client’s financial statement consolidation process, including controls over journal entries and other adjustments. In addition, it did not perform any procedures to identify and select journal entries and other adjustments for testing. Further, the Audit Firm used the work of the issuer’s internal audit for certain testing of controls over the financial reporting and close process at certain components. It did not assess the competence and objectivity of internal audit to support the extent to which the Audit Firm used its work. [Release No. 104-2022-134 dated 13th May, 2022.]

9. A TORONTO (CANDA) BASED AUDIT FIRM

Audit area – Financial liability

Audit deficiency – The client entered into a licensing arrangement in which the licensee purchased the client’s common shares and warrants. The arrangement also included an option (‘put option’) that required the issuer to repurchase certain of the common shares under specific conditions for cash. The client did not record the put option. The Audit Firm did not identify and appropriately address a departure from IFRS related to the client not recording the put option as a financial liability at the present value of the redemption amount, in conformity with IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Presentation. [Release No. 104-2022-142 dated 26th May, 2022.]

II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

1. SEC charges a bank holding company and its former CEO with Failure to Disclose Related Party Loans

The SEC charged a Maryland based Bank holding Company, and its former CEO and Chairman of the Board with negligently making false and misleading statements about related party loans extended by the bank to his family trusts.

The SEC’s order reports that the company and its former executive stated in press releases, news articles, and meetings with investors that the trust loans were not related party loans and that the company was in compliance with all related party loan requirements. The SEC’s order finds that even though the company’s independent auditor and primary regulator concluded that the trusts were related parties under GAAP and banking regulations, respectively, it again failed to disclose the trust loans as related party loans in its 2017 annual report.

USGAAP (ASC 850) requires companies to disclose in their financial statements material related party transactions. Related parties include management, directors, and their immediate family members, and “other parties that can significantly influence the management or operating policies of the transacting parties or that have an ownership interest in one of the transacting parties and can significantly influence the other to an extent that one or more of the transacting parties might be prevented from fully pursuing its own separate interests.” Also, SEC Rule 9-03 of Regulation S-X requires bank holding companies to disclose the aggregate dollar amount of loans exceeding $60,000 made to directors, executive officers or shareholders or to any associates of such persons, as long as the aggregate amount of such loans exceeds 5% of shareholders’ equity. “Associate” includes immediate family members, entities in which such person has at least 10% ownership, and trusts “for which such person serves as trustee or in a similar capacity.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, the Company agreed to cease and desist from future violations and to pay disgorgement of $2.6 million, prejudgment interest of $750,493, and a civil penalty of $10 million. [Release No. 2022-146 dated 16th August, 2022 – https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/33-11092.pdf]

2. SEC charges a technology-based company with misleading investors by obscuring financial performance

The SEC charged a California-based technology company for misleading investors about its order backlog management practices. The Company’s backlog at the end of each reporting period consisted of unfulfilled orders for software, maintenance, and related professional services. Under USGAAP, revenue is recognised upon transfer of control. The Company recognised revenue upon delivery to customers of license keys to access on-premises or cloud-based software. During F.Y.2019 and 2020, the company controlled the timing of its revenue recognition by placing discretionary holds on selected sales orders, which delayed the delivery of license keys. The company employed discretionary holds when business objectives – including those for “bookings” and revenue – had been achieved, in order not to exceed the company’s revenue guidance. Using discretionary holds, orders were entered into the company’s system, but order booking – and the coincident, automated email delivery of license keys – was suspended until just after quarter-end, at which point the hold was released, the order booked, and revenue subsequently recognised.

The SEC’s order found the company violated antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 as well as certain reporting provisions of the federal securities laws. Without admitting or denying the findings in the SEC’s order, the Company consented to a cease-and-desist order and to pay $8 million penalty. [Release No. 2022-160 dated 12th September, 2022 – https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/33-11099.pdf]

III. THE FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), UK

1. Sanctions against a UK-based Audit Firm for failings in audit of related party disclosures

The Case – The FRC imposed sanctions against a UK based Audit Firm and one of its former partners (Respondents) in relation to their statutory audits of the financial statements of a LSE listed high street retailer for F.Ys. 2016 and 2018. The FRC, inter alia, noted serious failings by the Respondents in the conduct of the audit concerning their assessment as to whether the client’s financial statements contained the necessary disclosures to draw attention to the possibility that its financial position may have been affected by its relationship with Delivery Company A.

Key adverse findings include: the Respondents identified related parties as an area of significant risk, but failed to treat with professional scepticism the management’s assertion that Delivery Company A was not a related party of the client; the Respondents should have obtained audit evidence commensurate with the level of risk, but the evidence obtained was insufficient for the Respondents to reach a reasonable conclusion as to the appropriateness of the related parties disclosure; the Respondents failed to evaluate whether the overall presentation of the relationship between the client and Delivery Company A in the financial statements met reporting requirements and in so far as the Respondents did consider these issues, they failed to document their consideration, conclusions, and audit evidence; and even though related parties had been identified as a significant risk, the Respondents also failed adequately to communicate this to those charged with governance before the 2016 financial statements were finalised.

The Sanctions – The FRC imposed financial sanctions of £1,700,000 and £350,000 on the Audit Firm in respect of the 2016 and 2018 audits, respectively and non-financial sanctions that included a declaration that that the Statutory Audit Report for 2016 and 2018 did not satisfy the Relevant Requirements. A financial sanction of £120,000 was imposed on the former partner of the Audit Firm. [https://www.frc.org.uk/news/july-2022/sanctions-against-grant-thornton-uk-llp-and-philip | 18th July, 2022.]

C. INTEGRATED REPORTING

I. KEY RECENT UPDATES

1. IFRS FOUNDATION COMPLETES CONSOLIDATION WITH VALUE REPORTING FOUNDATION

On 1st August, 2022, the IFRS Foundation announced the completion of the consolidation of the Value Reporting Foundation (VRF) into the IFRS Foundation. This follows the commitment made at COP26 to support the International Sustainability Standards Board’s (ISSB) work to develop a comprehensive global baseline of sustainability disclosures.

The VRF’s SASB (Sustainability Accounting Standards Board) Standards serve as a key starting point for developing the IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards, while its Integrated Reporting Framework provides connectivity between financial statements and sustainability-related financial disclosures. The ISSB has articulated its encouragement to companies and investors to continue providing full support for and using the SASB Standards. The IFRS Foundation’s IASB and the ISSB now assume joint responsibility for the Integrated Reporting Framework and are working together to agree on how to build on and integrate the Integrated Reporting Framework into their standard-setting projects and requirements. The ISSB and IASB actively encourage the continued adoption of the Integrated Reporting Framework to drive high-quality corporate reporting.


2. IESBA – ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING

On 21st October, 2022, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) released a Staff Q&A publication, Ethics Considerations in Sustainability Reporting, Including Guidance to Address Concerns about Greenwashing, that highlights the relevance and applicability of the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants to ethics-related challenges in the context of sustainability reporting and assurance, especially circumstances involving misleading or false sustainability information (i.e., “greenwashing”). The publication is intended to assist professional accountants, especially those in business, but might also be of interest to other professionals involved in preparing sustainability reports or disclosures.

3. ISSB – REQUIREMENT TO USE CLIMATE-RELATED SCENARIO ANALYSIS

On 1st November, 2022, the ISSB unanimously confirmed that companies will be required to use climate-related scenario analysis to inform resilience analysis. It also agreed to provide application support to preparers including making use of materials developed by the Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) to provide guidance to preparers on how to undertake scenario analysis. This decision responds to questions from stakeholders about what is meant by the term ‘climate-related scenario analysis’.

4. CDP TO INCORPORATE ISSB CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES STANDARD INTO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE PLATFORM

On 8th November, 2022, CDP, the not-for-profit which runs the global environmental disclosure platform for corporations, and the IFRS Foundation announced that CDP will incorporate the International Sustainability Standard Board’s (ISSB) IFRS S2, Climate-related Disclosures Standard into its global environmental disclosure platform, in a major step towards delivering a comprehensive global baseline for capital markets through the adoption of ISSB standards. The Standard, currently being finalised, will be incorporated into CDP’s existing questionnaires, which are issued to companies annually on behalf of 680 financial institutions with over $130 trillion in assets.

5. IFAC – REPORT HIGHLIGHTS LACK OF COMPARABILITY IN CORPORATE CLIMATE REPORTING

On 9th November, 2022, the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) released a report Getting to Net Zero: A Global Review of Corporate Disclosures, that focuses on corporate emissions reduction reporting. The report’s findings strongly support the movement in global policy towards rapidly enhancing the usefulness of disclosures on climate-related targets and transition plans. The report analyses disclosure trends in emissions reduction targets and transition plans of the 40 largest exchange-listed companies in 15 jurisdictions, for a total of 600 companies.

  • INTEGRATED REPORTING MATERIAL


1.    The Institute of Internal Auditors –
Prioritizing ESG: Exploring Internal Audit’s Role as a Critical Collaborator.

2.    UK FRC – Lab Report: FRC Statement of Intent on Environmental, Social and Governance Challenges. [30th August, 2022.]

3.    UK FRC – Lab Report: Net Zero Disclosures. [11th October 2022.]


II. EXTRACTS FROM PUBLISHED REPORTS – MEASURING AND MONITORING IMPACT OF GHG EMISSIONS

Hereinbelow are provided extracts from the 2021 ESG Report of an FTSE 100 company relating to measuring and monitoring the impact of greenhouse gas emissions.

Company: Harbour Energy plc [Y.E. 31st December, 2021 Revenues – $ 3.48 billion]

Energy and GHG emissions – Measuring and monitoring our impact


Direct emissions

  • The primary sources of GHG emissions across our operations are associated with the combustion of fuels.
  • Total Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions from our operated facilities and drilling operations amounted to 1.6 million tonnes CO2eq. Our operations in the UK were responsible for 1 million tonnes of CO2eq, with the remaining coming from our International operations.

 

  • In terms of GHG per activity, production accounted for 92 per cent of all emissions, with drilling and decommissioning accounting for the remaining 8 per cent. Only 3 per cent of our emissions were as a result of safety, routine and non-routine flaring (accounted for within our production and drilling activities).

  • Using IPCC global warming potentials to calculate CO2 equivalency, CO2 made up 94 per cent of our total emissions in 2021. Methane (CH4) made up 4 per cent with Nitrous Oxide (N2O) making up the remaining 2 per cent of our total GHG emissions for the year.
  • 2021 Scope 1 GHG emissions were lower than our target as a result of improvements in plant efficiency and lower production, including as a result of the delayed start-up of the Tolmount project in the UK.
  • Our equity share of GHG emissions from both our operated and non-operated assets was 1.39 million tonnes of CO2eq in 2021.

Indirect emissions

  • Our indirect GHG emissions (Scope 2) account for only a small percentage of our total carbon footprint. In 2021, our indirect emissions (from consumption of purchased electricity, heat or steam) across our own operations was 3.9k tonnes CO2eq, less than 0.3 per cent of our combined Scope 1 and 2 emissions output.
  • Our Scope 3 emissions related to employee travel and commuting amounted to 448 tonnes of CO2eq in 2021.

Discharges to air

  • In 2021 total flaring amounted to 50k tonnes. This was made up of routine, non-routine flaring (comprising flaring during upset conditions), and safety flaring.

  • In 2021 Harbour publicly endorsed the World Bank’s “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” initiative.

Energy consumption

  • In 2021, our operated assets used 22.4 million GJ of energy, with 18.1 million GJ in the form of fuel gas, and 4.3 million GJ in the form of diesel.
  • Our energy intensity was 2.1 GJ per tonne of production.
  • The share of renewables in our offshore energy consumption was zero during 2021.

Fuel use

  • We used 546k tonnes of fuel in 2021. 82 per cent of this comprised fuel gas produced from our offshore facilities. The remainder was made up by diesel use on the drill rigs, vessels, helicopters and fixed wing planes that support our operations.

Emissions reduction

  • As part of our journey towards Net Zero, we continually strive to reduce our environmental footprint by improving our operations including through energy efficiency.
  • In 2021, we continued these efforts through our Environmental Hopper process. We use this tool to identify, capture and screen improvement opportunities based on feasibility, emissions and costs.
  • Throughout the year we implemented projects that are expected to result in annual emissions-reduction savings of 56k tonnes CO2eq. These were primarily as a result of reducing fuel demand on the Judy and Britannia facilities by utilising single train export compression where production rates allow.

Looking ahead, our focus areas include:

  • Successfully implementing our sanctioned emissions reduction projects
  • Building asset-specific emissions-reduction plans, with a strong focus on flaring and venting
  • Continuing baseline methane emissions surveys

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

13. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Khyati Realtors Pvt. Ltd.
(2022) 447 ITR 167 (SC)

Bad and doubtful debts – For claiming deduction of a bad debt – (i) The amount of any bad debt or part thereof has to be written-off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the Assessee for the previous year; (ii) Such bad debt or part of it written-off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the Assessee cannot include any provision for bad and doubtful debts made in the accounts of the Assessee; (iii) No deduction is allowable unless the debt or part of it ‘has been taken into account in computing the income of the Assessee of the previous year in which the amount of such debt or part thereof is written off or of an earlier previous year’, or represents money lent in the ordinary course of the business of banking or money-lending which is carried on by the Assessee; and (iv) The Assessee is obliged to prove to the AO that the case satisfies the ingredients of Sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(2) of the Act.

The Assessee carried on real estate development business, trading in transferable development rights (TDR) and finance. In respect of its return of income for the A.Y. 2009-2010, the assessment was completed by the AO u/s 143(3) on 30th December, 2011. The Assessee, in the course of the assessment proceedings, contended that an amount of Rs. 10 crores was deposited with one M/s. C. Bhansali Developers Pvt. Ltd. towards acquisition of commercial premises two years prior to the assessment year in question (i.e., in 2007). It was contended that the project did not appear to make any progress, and consequently, the Assessee sought a return of the amount from the builder. However, the latter did not respond. As a result, the Assessee’s Board of Directors resolved to write off the amount as a bad debt in 2009. It was also contended that the amount could also be construed as a loan, since the Assessee had ‘financing’ as one of its objects.

The AO disallowed the sum of Rs. 10 crores claimed as a bad debt in determining its income under ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’.

Aggrieved, the Assessee appealed before the Appellate Commissioner (hereinafter, “CIT (A)”).

The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance on account of bad debts and interest.

A further appeal was preferred to the ITAT, which allowed the Assessee’s plea.

The Revenue sought an appeal to the Bombay High Court u/s 260A of the Income-tax Act. The Bombay High Court ruled that no question of law requiring a decision arose in the appeal and consequently declined to entertain the Revenue’s plea.

The Supreme Court after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act observed that income of every Assessee has to be assessed according to the statutory framework laid out in Chapter IV, Part D of the Act. That chapter deals with heads of income. Section 28 of the Act deals with the chargeability of the income to tax under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. The other deductions that an Assessee can claim are elaborated u/s 36 of the Act, which opens with the phrase “the deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in Section 28”. For the purposes of computing income chargeable to tax, therefore, besides specific deductions, ‘other deductions’ enumerated in different clauses of Section 36 can be allowed by the AO. Each of the deductions must relate to the business carried out by the Assessee. If the Assessee carries on a business and writes off a debt relating to the business as irrecoverable, it would without doubt be entitled to a corresponding deduction under Clause (vii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36 subject to the fulfilment of the conditions set forth in Sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the IT Act.

Before the amendment in 1989, the law was that even in cases where the Assessee had made only a provision in its accounts for bad debts and interest thereon, without the amount actually being debited from the Assessee’s Profit and Loss account, the Assessee could still claim deduction u/s 36(1)(vii) of the Act. W.e.f. 1st April, 1989, with the insertion of the new Explanation to Section 36(1)(vii), any bad debt written-off as irrecoverable in the account of the Assessee would not include any ‘provision’ for bad and doubtful debt made in the accounts of the Assessee. In other words, before this date, even a provision could be treated as a write off. However, after this date, the Explanation to Section 36(1)(vii) brought about a change. As a result, a mere provision for bad debt per se was not entitled to deduction u/s 36(1)(vii).

To understand the above dichotomy, one must understand ‘how to write off’. If an Assessee debits an amount of doubtful debt to the P&L Account and credits the asset account like sundry debtor’s Account, it would constitute a write off of an actual debt. However, if an Assessee debits “provision for doubtful debt” to the P&L Account and makes a corresponding credit to the “current liabilities and provisions” on the Liabilities side of the balance sheet, then it would constitute a provision for doubtful debt. In the latter case, Assessee would not be entitled to deduction from 1st April, 1989.

This position in law was recognised by the Supreme Court in Southern Technologies Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Coimbatore (2010) 320 ITR 577 (SC).

Therefore, merely stating a bad and doubtful debt as an irrecoverable write off without the appropriate treatment in the accounts, as well as non-compliance with the conditions in Section 36(1)(vii), 36(2), and Explanation to Section 36(1)(vii) would not entitle the Assessee to claim a deduction. This position was reiterated again in Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Thrissur (2012) 343 ITR 270 (SC).

The Supreme Court noted the ruling in T.R.F. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ranchi (2010) 323 ITR 397 (SC) relied on by the Assessee. In that judgment, it had inter alia, observed that:

“4. This position in law is well-settled. After 1st April, 1989, it is not necessary for the Assessee to establish that the debt, in fact, has become irrecoverable. It is enough if the bad debt is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the Assessee. However, in the present case, the Assessing Officer has not examined whether the debt has, in fact, been written off in accounts of the Assessee. When bad debt occurs, the bad debt account is debited and the customer’s account is credited, thus, closing the account of the customer. In the case of Companies, the provision is deducted from Sundry Debtors. As stated above, the Assessing Officer has not examined whether, in fact, the bad debt or part thereof is written off in the accounts of the Assessee. This exercise has not been undertaken by the Assessing Officer. Hence, the matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration of the above-mentioned aspect only and that too only to the extent of the write off.”

According to the Supreme Court, in the above matter of T.R.F. Ltd. (supra), it had not examined the impact of Section 36(2) and the condition of write off, in the accounts of the Assessee during the previous year. However, the judgments in Southern Technologies (supra), and Catholic Syrian Bank (supra) spelt out the conditions subject to which an Assessee could write off a bad and doubtful debt. Furthermore, Catholic Syrian Bank (supra) is by a bench of three judges, whereas the other decisions are by benches of two Judges.

According to the Supreme Court, it was evident from the above rulings of this Court, that:

“(i) The amount of any bad debt or part thereof has to be written-off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the Assessee for the previous year;

(ii) Such bad debt or part of it written-off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the Assessee cannot include any provision for bad and doubtful debts made in the accounts of the Assessee;

(iii) No deduction is allowable unless the debt or part of it “has been taken into account in computing the income of the Assessee of the previous year in which the amount of such debt or part thereof is written off or of an earlier previous year”, or represents money lent in the ordinary course of the business of banking or money-lending which is carried on by the Assessee;

(iv) The Assessee is obliged to prove to the AO that the case satisfies the ingredients of Section 36(1)(vii) as well as Section 36(2) of the Act.”

The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the record showed that the accounts of the Assessee nowhere showed that the advance was made by it to M/s. C. Bhansali Developers Pvt. Ltd. in the ordinary course of business. Its primary argument was that the amount of Rs. 10 crores was given for the purpose of purchasing constructed premises. However, the amount was written-off on 28th March, 2009. As noted by the CIT(A), there was no material to substantiate this submission, in respect of payment of the amount, the time by which the constructed unit was to be given to it, the area agreed to be purchased, etc. Equally, in support of its other argument that the amount was given as a loan, the Assessee nowhere established the duration of the advance, the terms and conditions applicable to it, interest payable, etc. The Assessee conceded that it had received interest income for the relevant assessment year. However, it could not establish that any interest was paid (or shown to be payable in its accounts) for the sum of Rs. 10 crores. Furthermore, there was nothing on record to suggest that the requirement of the law that the bad debt was written-off as irrecoverable in the Assessee’s accounts for the previous year had been satisfied. Another reason why the amount could not have been written-off, was that the Assessee’s claim was that it was given to M/s. Bhansali Developers Pvt. Ltd. for acquiring immovable property – it therefore, was in the nature of a capital expenditure. It could not have been treated as a business expenditure.

The Supreme Court referred to its decision in A.V. Thomas and Co. Ltd., vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax [1963] 48 ITR 67 (SC) in which it was held as follows:

“16. Now, a question Under Section 10(2)(xi) can only arise if there is a bad or doubtful debt. Before a debt can become bad or doubtful it must first be a debt. What is meant by debt in this connection was laid down by Rowlatt J., in Curtis v. J. & G. Oldfield Ltd., (1925) 9 TC 319 as follows:

When the Rule speaks of a bad debt it means a debt which is a debt that would have come into the balance sheet as a trading debt in the trade that is in question and that it is bad. It does not really mean any bad debt which, when it was a good debt, would not have come in to swell the profits.

17. A debt in such cases is an outstanding which if recovered would have swelled the profits. It is not money handed over to someone for purchasing a thing which that person has failed to return even though no purchase was made. In the Section a debt means something more than a mere advance. It means something which is related to business or results from it. To be claimable as a bad or doubtful debt it must first be shown as a proper debt…”

In view of the above, the Supreme Court held that the Assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs. 10 crore as a bad and doubtful debt could not have been allowed. The findings of the ITAT and the High Court, to the contrary, were therefore, insubstantial and had to be set aside.

The Supreme Court also considered the second issue raised by the Assessee relating to the admissibility of expenditure as a deduction, which does not fall within the provisions of Sections 28 to 43, and is not capital in nature, but is laid out or spent exclusively for the purpose of business u/s 37 of the Act. The Supreme Court noted that a similar provision existed under the old Income Tax Act, 1922 as in the case of provision for bad debts by Section 10(2). This aspect was considered by the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. The Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd. (1962) 46 ITR 649 (SC). The Assessee there was engaged in production of sugar. It used to advance monies to cane growers in consideration of supply of sugarcane. Due to drought, the cane growers could not repay the amounts advanced.

The Assessee claimed the outstanding to be bad debts, and sought to write them off. This was not allowed; the Income-tax Officer held the expenditure to be capital in nature. The High Court however, set aside that determination. The Supreme Court confirmed the view of the High Court. However, the Court also examined the argument whether in such eventualities, the expenditure could be claimed to be exclusively laid out for the purpose of business (under the provision corresponding to Section 37(1) of the Act). The Supreme Court had held as follows:

“7. The tax under the head “Business” is payable u/s 10 of the Income-tax Act. That Section provides by Sub-section (1) that the tax shall be payable by an Assessee under the head “profits and gains of business, etc.” in respect of the profits or gains of any business, etc. carried on by him. Under Sub-section (2), these profits or gains are computed after making certain allowances. Clause (xi) allows deduction of bad and doubtful business debts. It provides that when the Assessee’s accounts in respect of any part of his business are not kept on the cash basis, such sum, in respect of bad and doubtful debts, due to the Assessee in respect of that part of the his business is deductible but not exceeding the amount actually written off as irrecoverable in the books of the Assessee. Clause (xv) allows any expenditure not included in Clauses (i) to (xiv), which is not in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the Assessee, to be deducted, if laid out or expanded wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, etc. The clauses expressly provided what can be deducted; but the general scheme of the Section is that profits or gains must be calculated after deducting outgoings reasonably attributable as business expenditure but so as not to deduct any portion of an expenditure of a capital nature. If an expenditure comes within any of the enumerated classes of allowances, the case can be considered under the appropriate class; but there may be an expenditure which, though not exactly covered by any of the enumerated classes, may have to be considered in finding out the true assessable profits or gains. This was laid down by the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chitnavis I.L.R. (1932) IndAp 290 and has been accepted by this Court. In other words, Section 10(2) does not deal exhaustively with the deductions, which must be made to arrive at the true profits and gains.

8. To find out whether an expenditure is on the capital account or on revenue, one must consider the expenditure in relation to the business. Since all payments reduce capital in the ultimate analysis, one is apt to consider a loss as amounting to a loss capital. But this is not true of all losses, because losses in the running of the business cannot be said to be of capital. The questions to consider in this connection are: for that was the money laid out? Was it to acquire an asset of an enduring nature for the benefit of the business, or was it an outgoing in the doing of the business? If money be lost in the first circumstances, it is a loss of capital, but if lost in the second circumstances, it is a revenue loss. In the first, it bears the character of an investment, but in the second, to use a commonly understood phrase, it bears the character of current expenses.”

The Supreme Court observed that it was apparent in this case, it was satisfied that the disallowance of the amount, on account of bad and doubtful debt, did not preclude a claim for deduction, on the ground that the expenditure was exclusively laid out for the purpose of business. The Court applied the test of whether the expense was incurred for business, or whether it fell into the capital stream. In the facts of the case, the tests were satisfied – the expenditure was for the purpose of business, and did not fall in the capital stream.

The Supreme Court noted that the Assessee had relied on a few High Court judgments which have ruled that even if a claim for deduction u/s 36(1) is not allowed, the possibility of its exclusion u/s 37 cannot be ruled out. According to the Supreme Court, as a proposition of law, that enunciation was unexceptional, since the heads of expenditure that can be claimed as deduction are not exhaustive – which is the precise reason for the existence of Section 37. Therefore, in a given case, if the expenditure relates to business, and the claim for its treatment under other provisions are unsuccessful, application of Section 37 is per se not excluded.

The Supreme Court was however of the opinion that in the facts of the present case, the judgment in Southern Technologies (supra) on this issue (where the claim of bad and doubtful debt was disallowed) was appropriate, and applicable.

According to the Supreme Court, in view of the foregoing, the Revenue’s appeal had to succeed. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the order of ITAT were therefore set aside. The appeal was allowed, in the above terms, without order on costs.

From The President

Dear BCAS Family,

It is said that life is such a mystery that nothing significant happens for a year and suddenly a year happens in a month. Perhaps the current times are the harbinger of this truth. There are many exciting events happening and I will be failing in my duty if I overlook their significance and implications.

Goals! Goals! Goals! The World Cup football fever is on! Players have been trained and pumped up to give their best, to excel, to have nothing else in mind but to win against all odds to bring glory to their motherland. This spirit is something which completely overwhelms even the spectator with a motivation to excel. I believe as professionals, we will need to strive in a similar spirit to give our best to the profession and aim to create a world class professional community and firms as envisaged by our Prime Minister.  
 
The recently concluded 21st World Congress of Accountants also achieved several notable goals. In its history stretching over 118 years, it was held for the first time in India and attracted a record 10,000 delegates from over 100 countries, who received priceless insights from 150+ thought leaders over 40 sessions. Delegates had the unique opportunity to explore new industry trends and business ideas, as well as network with global experts. One of the most incredible goals achieved was that this entire event was carbon neutral…in line with its theme of “Building Trust, Enabling Sustainability”. I must add that the BCAS President was received by the President of the ICAI, the host with great warmth and respect he has for the institution.
 
India scored a very tricky goal in Bali, where it got the final declaration of the G20 adopted by consensus. India will have its hands full as it assumes the presidency of the G20 from December 2022. ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam – One Earth, One Family, One Future’, India’s theme for G20 is highly relevant in today’s troubled world that has been fractured by near-sighted political and economic policies. The G20 is a powerful platform of the world’s major developed and developing economies, accounting for 85% of the global GDP, 75% of international trade and 67% of the world’s population.

November has been an eventful month. In the COP27, the UN Climate summit India informed the world that it has proactively undertaken “far-reaching new initiatives in renewable energy, e-mobility, and ethanol blended fuels and green hydrogen as an alternate energy source.” All this, despite the stark reality that India’s contribution to the world’s cumulative emissions is less than 4% and its annual per capita emissions are only one-third the global average.  It also called for the acceleration of development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, transition towards low-emission energy systems, and scaling up deployment of clean power generation. COP27 aggressively pushed for development banks to provide more climate finance without forcing developing countries deeper into debt.

I believe that these initiatives will bring a lot of professional opportunities for us to operate at a global level, and to share the knowledge gained through this experience.

And in the arena of tax collection, it is a clear case of records being broken as goals are achieved. In October, GST collections spiralled 16.6% to Rs. 1,51,718 crore – the second highest collection, since this indirect tax was implemented in 2017. Direct Tax collections up to 10th November have surged 30.69% higher over last year to settle at Rs. 10.54 crore. These are critical benchmarks that aptly reflect the remarkable bounce back and flourishing of the economy. The government is not resting on these milestone tax collections…it has unveiled a draft of a new form for filing income tax returns. It is designed to end confusion about form selection and will ease the process and cut time to file returns. With a burgeoning economy and simplified process, tax collections are poised to climb even higher.

“India has become the shining star in a world embroiled in war and stunted by inflation. India has proven its prowess “From almost negligible numbers a few years back, today we’ve over 77,000 start-ups in India, with 108 having unicorn status. India’s talent pool is like no other country’s as 50% population is below 25 years…In 2009, 17% of people in India had bank accounts; 15% used digital payments; 4% had a unique ID document. Today, around 80% have bank accounts; 80% use digital payments; 99% have unique IDs. All these in a country of 1.4 bn people…” India was a $270 billion economy 25 years ago and closed 2021 at around 3.2 trillion, which translates to 11x growth. Projections are that by 2047 India would be a $ 50 trillion economy. With such spectacular credentials and opportunities ahead, the field is vast and open for all of us, to skyrocket our growth… and exceed our goals!  Clearly, India is soaring higher and higher, and the world is noticing it.

The recent appointment of Hon. Chief Justice Dhananjaya Chandrachud to the Supreme Court of India brings back memories of his visit to the BCAS venue to deliver valedictory address at the conclusion of the first batch of the study course on Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation in 2004. With great erudition he had then emphasized the importance of the course. Considering the ever increasing volume of the pending cases in the court, his foresight could not be overemphasized. We hope that his great insight and experience helps to bring many awaited judicial reforms for speedy delivery of justice by appointment of judges to the vacant position, improvement in the administration and encouraging parallel judicial machinery by way of Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation.

BCAS was visited by the UK Director of the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) to explore ways in which the alliance forged to create awareness about emerging opportunities in the field of Risk Management can be fast tracked. He was felicitated by the President along with the members of the Internal Audit committee. Both sides had fruitful discussion to cement the ties for a long term.

Events:

BCAS organized a number of interesting events in the month of November that included a Webinar on the “Recent SC decision laying down the law on charitable trusts’ exemption, LM on Decoding Global Financial Markets and Changes in Regulations – Overseas Direct Investment, Workshop on Income Tax Issues on account of Redevelopment of Immovable Properties, Lecture Meeting on Growth Based Investing’, Seminar on Business Restructuring and Workshop on Macros Recording for GST Compliances apart from regular study circle meetings. These were all well received by the participants.
 
There are equally interesting events happening in December. To name a few, there is a Lecture Meeting on Value in the Metaverse and Why Metaverse is Inevitable,
Workshop on Penalties under Income Tax Act 1961, Enterprise Risk Management ERM 101 Play & Experience ERM with IRM’s Scenario Planning Workshop, 23rd Study Course on DTAA apart from some interesting HRD events which will be announced soon.
Booking for coveted RRC to be held in February at Coimbatore is in full swing and I request you to book your seat as soon as possible to avoid disappointment later.

Before I sign off let me send my warm greetings for the upcoming Christmas festival…Merry Christmas!

Good bye for now, till we meet again.

21st World Congress of Accountants – A Knowledge Powerhouse with Discussions on Technology, Innovation, Sustainability, Entrepreneurship, Wealth Creation, Taxation etc.

Learning from Kids

Many people cry nowadays about the degeneration of human values and the disappearance of ethics from human behaviour. I attribute this to the fact that elders have stopped learning from the innocent behaviour of small children. Due to the invasion of electronic and social media; and rat race for one-up-manship, there is no dialogue within the family. Children have so much to share with their parents, but parents have no time and mood to listen to them.

Children’s conversation is not only worth marking but worth taking a message from! Once I visited my friend’s house. His small 5-year kid came running from another room. I stared at him and said, “your nose is your mother’s, and your eyes are your dad’s”. The sweet boy retorted – “And this pant is of my bade-bhaiya (elder brother)”. This was a great lesson in sharing our belongings with brothers, sisters and friends. During the good old days, sharing textbooks with juniors was common. Presently, this system or culture is going away. One reason, perhaps, is that many parents have only one kid!

In Sanskrit, it is said Meaning – one must accept good thoughts even from children. It is important to note not only what children think and talk but also how they act. There is a well-known story that many kids participated in a running race. One of them fell. That time, others tried to lift him and helped him to reach the destination. This story was in the context of physically/ mentally challenged children. That is the reason why such children are called ‘differently-abled’. If we are contented and have no greed, the whole world, including we ourselves would be so happy!

In the field of psychology, one experiment is very famous. Forty kids in the age group of 5 to 6 years were selected. They gave one chocolate to each of them with an instruction that they would now visit a park. The boy or girl who preserves the chocolate until they come back will get one more chocolate. Many of them preserved it. Then, the lives of all of them were studied for the next 30 to 40 years. Those who preserved the chocolate were found to be more stable and happy in life. They did well in their career. The message is that of faith and patience (Shraddha and saburi). Have faith that you will get more as promised, and have patience till you get it! Small children, by their conduct, teach us a lot!

There was a housing society where there were many children. Fortunately, they were free from screen addiction. All were in the age group of 8 to 12 years. They decided to do some activities, like planting trees, for which they formed a ‘mandal’(club). They also felt that they should raise funds by contributions from all the society members.

The society consisted of many buildings. Boys and girls were allotted one building each. Accordingly, Chintu went from house to house collecting contributions. People were responding out of affection and appreciation. They encouraged the children.

One ‘uncle’ made a contribution. He was a little witty. He asked Chintu – “I have become a member of your mandal. Now, what will I get?” Chintu thought for a while, a little confused! But then he said, “Uncle, you will be able to give such a contribution next year also!”

Message – One should do good things, not with an expectation of returns but to be able to do good things again and again.

[This article has been written in the context of Children’s Day celebrated on 14th November.]

Supreme Court Holds that Profit Motive Necessary for Charge of Insider Trading – But with Several Nuances and Riders

BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has recently held that for an insider trading charge to sustain, a profit motive should be established (SEBI vs. Abhijit Rajan, Order dated 19th September, 2022, ((2022) 142 taxmann.com 373)). If it was clear that the trades by an insider, even if in possession of inside information, were clearly to result in losses, at least considering the nature of the information, then the insider trading charge cannot sustain. This makes a material change in the approach to proceedings relating to insider trading. Till now, generally in the framing of the law as well as the approach of SEBI, it was taken for granted that trading by an insider in possession of (or access to) unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) was ipso facto insider trading, which should result in adverse action such as disgorgement of profits made (or losses avoided), debarment, penalty, etc.

However, as we will see, there are several nuances and riders to this decision as well as further questions that arise in the application of this decision in diverse situations. However, before we go into that, let us consider the broad framework of the regulations relating to insider trading, namely, the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading), Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations”).

SEBI REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING
There is a unique feature of these Regulations which makes them stand out as compared to other Regulations. And, that is the endless deeming provisions whereby certain situations are deemed to be true, if certain conditions are satisfied, irrespective of the actual ground reality. In some cases, the deeming fictions merely shifts the onus to the parties, and they can rebut the fiction by presenting the actual facts with evidence. But in other cases, the deeming fictions are carved in law, with no rebuttal possible.

For example, some persons are deemed to be insiders and generally cannot rebut that they are not. However, for example, in the case of relatives of an insider who also are deemed to be insiders, there is a rebuttal possible under certain circumstances. Certain categories of information are deemed to be price sensitive, irrespective of whether they are actually or not (though the decision of the Supreme Court makes certain interesting comments on this, as we will see later herein). Trading by an insider is deemed to be insider trading (again, Supreme Court makes some qualifications to this). Reverse trades by certain insiders are effectively deemed to be insider trading, so much so that they are wholly banned with very few exceptions possible. UPSI can be said to be published only if the dispersal of this information is in the prescribed mode – the fact that, say, it was already widely reported in media will be no defense. Moreover, there is a cooling or assimilation period from the time when the information is published to the time when trading is allowed. In other words, despite modern day instant notifications, etc., the information is deemed to be unpublished till this time passes. And so on.

This puts a person charged with insider trading trapped in a fortress out of which there are few escapes. An insider has to be very careful while trading so that he does not fall into any of these deeming traps of which he cannot come out, despite his best intentions.

Such a fortress of deeming fiction is said to be necessary mainly because insider trading is said to be difficult to detect and prove. The persons who are insiders may generally be at a senior level and often sophisticated white-collar educated persons. They may use many subterfuges, ‘mules’, advanced technologies to communicate the UPSI, etc. This may make the task of SEBI tougher, more so since SEBI has often argued of the inadequate powers it has for investigation. If such mechanisms are not available, every case of insider trading would be mired in litigation since every aspect would become subjective and prone to differing interpretations.

Certain of these deeming fictions came to be questioned in this decision and the Supreme Court appears to have parted ways from giving literal effect to them and has introduced that factors such as the intent of the parties should be considered.

SUMMARISED FACTS OF THE CASE
The person charged of insider trading (“the Insider”) was the Chairman and Managing Director of a listed company, that was engaged in the business of carrying out large construction/turnkey projects. It received a contract for a total cost of Rs. 1,648 crores. Another company received a similar contract but of a lesser size. The two companies formed SPVs and had holdings in each other’s SPVs. For some reason, the companies decided to terminate the SPVs and buy each other out. While this information was not published to the stock exchanges, the Insider sold a significant quantity of shares. The Insider was charged with violation of the Regulations. SEBI held that the information of termination of the agreements and the SPVs were price sensitive information, and thus the trading by the Insider while this information was not published amounted to insider trading. SEBI calculated the loss allegedly avoided due to such a sale and sought to forfeit (disgorge) such amount. There were disputes as to whether the date in respect of which the price was calculated for the determination of such loss was correctly ascertained. The Insider appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”), which set aside the order of SEBI. SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the SAT.

IMPORTANT ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The Insider made several arguments before the Court, some of which helped in the decision going in his favour.

The Insider pointed out that he was in dire need of funds and that too for saving the company itself from insolvency. There were certain restructuring of the company’s debts going on with its lenders, one of the conditions of which was the infusion of funds by the Promoters. The Insider pointed out that he infused the sale proceeds of the sale of shares in the company to fulfil such obligations. Then he contended that the information was not price sensitive at all since the value of the contracts were miniscule with respect to the turnover of the company, particularly when taken on a net basis. He also questioned the basis of calculation of the losses avoided. SEBI contended that the closing price on the day after the information was released should be taken into account, and since it was lower, there were losses avoided. The Insider, however, stated that since the information was released well before closing on the first day, the closing price on that day should be taken into account, and since that was higher, there were no losses avoided.

Moreover, he pointed out that even if the information was deemed to be price sensitive, it was of a positive nature. Thus, it goes against the logic that he would sell shares on the basis of such information and be charged with insider trading. A person seeking to profit from such positive price sensitive information would buy shares since the price is likely to go up. SEBI contended that the intent of trades cannot matter, it is sufficient if an insider trades while in possession of UPSI.

The Supreme Court accepted that there are certain deeming provisions in the Regulations. However, it noted that while seven categories of information were deemed to be price sensitive, the particular information in question fell in the seventh category. This category specifically stated that the information should relate to “significant changes in policies, plans or operations of the company” (emphasis supplied). The Court noted that while the earlier categories of information (such as those relating to financial results, dividends, etc.) were ordinarily material, in this case, the information has to be significant enough. Hence, any changes are by themselves not necessarily price sensitive. The Supreme Court then analysed the transaction and noted that, on a net basis, the information was actually positive in nature. While other points were also analysed and discussed, the ruling turned on this point.

The Court held that it goes against human nature and logic that a person would sell shares to profit from insider trading when the information was positive in nature which would have resulted in price rise. The Court placed emphasis on the profit motive. A person cannot be charged with insider trading when the transaction was such that there was full absence of the profit motive. The Court factored into account, though clearly mentioning that this was not the deciding factor, that the Insider had carried out such trades to meet his obligations to the lenders to save the company. Thus, the Court ruled that the charge of insider trading failed and the amount disgorged by SEBI should be returned to the Insider.

NUANCES, RIDERS AND CONCERNS
There are several aspects of this case that need examination before a conclusion is drawn about the case. And these do not merely relate to the generic point that the decision should be seen on the facts of the case.

The Court held that this information related to the seventh category of information deemed to be price sensitive. Since this seventh category, as discussed earlier, specifically used the word “significant”, the information would be price sensitive only if significant. However, does it not mean that the earlier six categories of information are always deemed to be price sensitive? The Court made two observations. Firstly, it stated “nothing is required to show that the information listed in Items (i) to (vi)…is likely to materially affect the price of securities of a company”. However, it then said that “the likelihood of the price of securities getting materially affected, is inherent in Items (i) to (vi)..”. Can it be argued that, by the second set of words imply that even in respect of these first six items, the condition of their being price sensitive would have to be independently established? For example, if the financial results show no significant change or if the dividends have not changed materially from earlier periods, etc., can the information relating to such items be still held to be price sensitive?

The next question was when should the information be held to have been published? This is important because as in the present case, the amount of profits made/losses avoided are also determined on the basis of when the information can be held to be known. In the present case, the information was released at 1.05 pm and 2.40 pm respectively on the two exchanges. On that day, the price actually rose by 10 paise, while on the next day the price fell by 30 paise. The importance was obvious that in the first case, the argument was that the information was positive. The Court stated that it did not have to answer the question since it had already held that in the absence of profit motive, the charge of insider trading failed. Interestingly, at another place, the Regulations provide for a cooling period of 48 hours from the time when information was disseminated. Hence, arguably, both stands were incorrect. However, this question is sure to come in some later cases. Then, the fact that information, once released, spreads like wildfire in these days of social media, instant notifications, etc., may be considered by Courts, and perhaps such deemed cooling period of 48 hours may be questioned.

Then there is the question of determination of profits made or losses avoided. SEBI calculates, and this calculation is generally upheld, by taking into account the closing prices after disclosure of the UPSI. However, at the same time, the law provides and SEBI/Appellate Authorities contend that what matters is whether the information was price sensitive. The actual movement in price should not be relevant since the market may be subject to several influences. In view of this, is the calculation of profits with reference to the actual closing price correct? Take the present example. On the first day of disclosure, the price went up by 10 paise. This was found to be consistent with the stand of the Insider, endorsed also by the Court, that the information was positive in nature. However, on the second day, the price fell by 30 paise. This was consistent with SEBI’s stand that the information was negative in nature. In either case, this demonstrates that the use of the closing price is arbitrary and contradictory with the two stands taken. Again, in a future case, this question may be determined and the contradiction resolved.

CONCLUSION
While there are several other issues in this decision, it is fair to state that the Court has found several chinks in the fortress of deeming fiction in the Regulations. On one hand, this will help give justice, as in the present case, where the Insider was sought to be penalized despite his not attempting to profit from the UPSI. On the other hand, this will significantly reduce the relative certainty of such cases. SEBI will have more hoops to cross, and there will be more areas of litigation possible. Now it will be up to SEBI to pursue cases judiciously and not seek to enforce every deeming fiction and put the party – and SEBI itself – in much trouble and costs.

Debts and their Treatment

INTRODUCTION
The Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines a debt as a sum of money due by certain and express agreement; a specified sum of money owing to one person from another, including not only an obligation to pay but right of creditor to receive and enforce payment. The relation between a debtor and a creditor is the result of a debt. However, would the treatment of a debt in the books of account have any legal bearing? Would the treatment impact the tax position of the debtor or the creditor? Let us examine some of these facets.


MEANING UNDER IBC, 2016
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) deals with the insolvency resolution of debtors who are unable to pay their debts. The trigger point of the Code is a default by the debtor. A default is defined u/s 3 to mean non-payment of a debt when it has become payable and is not so paid by the debtor. Thus, the entire Code pivots on a debt and its default. If there is no default of a debt, then the Code does not come into play. The Supreme Court in Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy, [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) has held that under the scheme of the Code, the Insolvency Resolution Process begins, when a default takes place, in the sense that a debt becomes due and is not paid.

Section 3 of the Code defines a debt to mean a liability or obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial debt or an operational debt. A financial debt is defined to mean a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of a financial debt) u/s 7 or by an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) u/s 9 or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default) u/s 10 of the Code.

LIMITATION ACT AND IBC
Section 238A of the Code provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the proceedings or appeals before the NCLT, NCLAT, DRT, etc., under the Code. In this respect, Section 18 of the Limitation Act is relevant. It provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Section18 was explained by the Supreme Court (Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda vs. Durga Prasad, (1962) 1 SCR 140) to mean that the acknowledgement as prescribed merely renewed a debt; it did not create a new right of action. It was a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgement was based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability might not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement was made with the intention to admit such jural relationship.
In the case of Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 357, the Supreme Court held that u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the period of limitation expires.

In Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394, the Supreme Court held that Section18 of the Limitation Act gets attracted the moment acknowledgement in writing signed by the party against whom such right to initiate resolution process u/s 7 of the Code ensues. Section 18 of the Limitation Act would come into play every time when the principal borrower and/or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, acknowledge their liability to pay the debt. Such acknowledgement, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgement of the debt, from time to time, for institution of the proceedings under the Code.

One question that arises is whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which extends the period of limitation depending upon an acknowledgement of debt made in writing and signed by the corporate debtor, is also applicable u/s 238A of the Code to a debt entry appearing in the debtor’s Balance Sheet? In other words, if the debtor shows a debt as payable in its Balance Sheet would that accounting entry, give rise to a fresh period of limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act and thereby under the Code?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT IN BALANCE SHEET BY DEBTOR
The Calcutta High Court in Bengal Silk Mills Co. vs. Ismail Golam Hossain Ariff AIR 1962 Cal 115, in an exhaustive decision held that an acknowledgement of liability that is made in a balance sheet can amount to an acknowledgement of debt. It held that each of the balance sheets contained an admission that balances had been struck at the end of the previous year, and that a definite sum was found to be the balance then due to the creditor. The natural inference to be drawn from the balance sheet was that the closing balance due to the creditor at the end of the previous year would be carried forward as the opening balance due to him at the beginning of the next year. In each balance sheet there was an admission of a subsisting liability to continue the relation of debtor and creditor and a definite representation of a present intention to keep the liability alive until it was lawfully determined by payment or otherwise. This judgment held that though the filing of a balance sheet was by compulsion of law, the acknowledgement of a debt was not necessarily so. In fact, it was not uncommon to have an entry in a balance sheet with Notes annexed to or forming part of such balance sheet, or in the auditor’s report, which were to be read along with the balance sheet, indicating that the impugned entry would not amount to an acknowledgement of debt for reasons given in the said Note.

The above decision of the Calcutta High Court has been approved by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Bishal Jaiswal, [2021] 126 taxmann.com 200 (SC). It perused various decisions on this issue and various sections of the Companies Act 2013 and held that there was no doubt that the filing of a balance sheet in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act was mandatory, any transgression of the same being punishable by law. However, what was of importance was that the Notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statements were expressly recognised by Section 134(7).

Equally, the Auditor’s Report could also enter caveats with regard to acknowledgements made in the books of accounts including the balance sheet. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that the statement of law contained in the Calcutta High Court decision, that there was a compulsion in law to prepare a balance sheet but no compulsion to make any particular admission, was correct in law as it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether an entry made in a balance sheet regarding any particular creditor is unequivocal or has been entered into with caveats, which then had to be examined on a case by case basis to establish whether an acknowledgement of liability had, in fact, been made, thereby extending limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

The Supreme Court also referred to a Delhi High Court decision in CIT-III vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. [2011] 343 ITR 408, which held that the assessee had not transferred the said amount from the creditors’ account to its profit and loss account. The liability was shown in the balance sheet. The assessee, being a limited company, this amounted to acknowledging the debts in favour of the creditors and Section 18 of the Limitation Act stood attracted.

It also referred to the decision in Al-Ameen Limited vs. K.P. Sethumadhavan, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 11337, wherein the Kerala High Court held that, a balance sheet was a statement of assets and liabilities of the company as at the end of the financial year, approved by the Board of Directors and authenticated in the manner provided by law. The persons who authenticated the document did so in their capacity as agents of the company. The inclusion of a debt in a balance sheet duly prepared and authenticated would amount to admission of a liability and therefore satisfied the requirements of law for a valid acknowledgement u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, even though the directors by authenticating the balance sheet merely discharged a statutory duty and may not have intended to make an acknowledgement.

Ultimately, the Apex Court concluded that an entry made in a balance sheet of a corporate debtor would amount to an acknowledgement of liability u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

Similarly, in Dena Bank (supra), the Supreme Court held that it was incorrect to state that there was nothing on record to suggest that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ acknowledged the debt within three years and agreed to pay debt, in view of its very own Statement of Accounts/Balance Sheets/Financial Statements which showed the debt as due.

Again, in State Bank of India vs. Krishidhan Seeds (P.) Ltd., [2022] 172 SCL 515 (SC), the Court held that an acknowledgement in a balance sheet without a qualification can furnish a legitimate basis for determining as to whether the period of limitation would stand extended, so long as the acknowledgement was
within a period of three years from the original date of default.

The Supreme Court once again had an occasion to consider this aspect in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. vs. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd, [2022] 141 taxmann.com 61 (SC). It held that there was no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963, for an application under the IBC, before the NCLT. An application for which no period of limitation was provided anywhere else in the Limitation Act, was governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the said Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application was three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It further held that the period of limitation for making an application u/s 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, that is, the date of default in payment of the financial or operational debt. Accordingly, it held that an application u/s 7 of the Code would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of three years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as NPA, if there were an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of three years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of three years.

EFFECT OF WRITE-OFF OF DEBT BY CREDITOR ON RECOVERY MEASURES
Sometimes, the creditor writes-off the debt as a bad debt in its books of account. In this case, the question which arises is whether the creditor can yet pursue a legal remedy against the debtor for such a debt? Here, one must bear in mind the difference between a debt waiver and a debt write-off. A waiver is one where the creditor is forgoing the entire debt altogether, for example, under a one-time settlement, part of the loan may be waived by the bank. In this case, the debtor is no longer liable to repay the debt waived to the bank. However, in case of a write-off also known as a technical write-off, the creditor is only cleaning up its balance sheet. The loan yet remains payable, and the bank / creditor can yet pursue legal remedies for its recovery. Banks are required, by the RBI, to write-off all loans which have become NPAs. Nevertheless, they would yet continue all civil and criminal recovery methods for such an NPA. Banks and NBFCs must make provision as per the Prudential Norms of the RBI for all loans. A loan may have a 100 per cent provision, i.e., these assets represent little hope of immediate recovery. The Prudential Norms would require the lenders to remove these assets from their balance sheets. This technical writing off helps the bank present a true picture of its asset base and free up provisioning resources.

The Minister of State for Finance, in response to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha (August 2022) as to the magnitude of bank loans written-off has also explained this concept. He replied that as per the RBI guidelines and policies approved by Boards of banks, non-performing loans, including, inter-alia, those in respect of which full provisioning has been made on completion of four years, were removed from the balance-sheet of the bank by way of write-off. Banks evaluate/consider the impact of write-offs as part of their regular exercise to clean up their balance-sheet, avail of tax benefit and optimise capital, in accordance with RBI guidelines and policy approved by their Boards. As borrowers of written-off loans continue to be liable for repayment and the process of recovery of dues from the borrower in written-off loan accounts continues, write-off does not benefit the borrower. Banks continue to pursue recovery actions initiated in written-off accounts through various recovery mechanisms available, such as filing of a suit in civil courts or in the Debts Recovery Tribunals, action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, filing of cases in the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, through negotiated settlement/compromise, and through sale of non-performing assets. Having said that, in several cases, creditors have been advised by their lawyers that a write-off may impair their chances of recovery in Courts. Several times the Courts may ask the creditor for a copy of the Ledger Account of the debtor and if the debt has been written-off, it could be an issue. In addition, thought should be given as to whether the write-off would impair the position in case of a criminal complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a cheque bouncing. Hence, this is a move which requires due consideration of all facts.

CLAIM OF BAD DEBT BY CREDITOR
In this respect, the Income-tax Act provides that when a creditor writes-off a debt, he can claim a bad debt u/s 36(1)(vii). The Supreme Court recently in Pr. CIT vs. Khyati Realtors (P.) Ltd., [2022] 447 ITR 167 (SC) held, that earlier the law was that even in cases where the assessee had made only a provision in its accounts for bad debts and interest thereon, without the amount actually being debited from the assessee’s profit and loss account, the assessee could still claim deduction u/s 36(1)(vii). However, w.e.f. 1989, with the insertion of the new Explanation u/s 36(1)(vii), any bad debt written-off as irrecoverable in the account of the assessee would not include any ‘provision’ for bad and doubtful debt made in the accounts of the assessee. In other words, before this date, even a provision could be treated as a write off. However, after this date, the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii) brought about a change. As a result, the Court held that merely stating a bad and doubtful debt as an irrecoverable write off without the appropriate treatment in the accounts would not entitle the assessee to a deduction u/s 36(1)(vii).

TAXATION – WRITE BACK OF DEBTS BY DEBTOR
When a loan is waived, the debtor writes-back the quantum so waived. In this case, the issue of taxation of the loan so waived in the hands of the debtor becomes an issue. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd (2018), 404 ITR 1 (SC) had an occasion to consider a case of taxability of the write-back of a loan which was used for capital expenditure / acquiring fixed assets. This ruling has held that the waiver of such a loan by the creditor was neither taxable as a business perquisite u/s 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act nor taxable as a remission of liability u/s 41(1) of the Act. However, waiver of a trading debt by a creditor would lead to income u/s 41(1) in the hands of the debtor.

EPILOGUE
If a debtor desires to dispute a debt, then he should be very careful about its accounting treatment. Similarly, creditors should bear in mind the distinction between a loan waiver and write-off in their books of account.

Limited Review Report for Company under CIRP and Whose Resolution Plan Was Accepted by NCLT

JET AIRWAYS (INDIA) LTD. (Q.E. 30TH SEPTEMBER, 2022)

From Limited Review Report on Standalone Financial Statements

Introduction
…….

The Company was under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) under the provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) vide order dated June 20, 2019 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’). During the CIRP, the powers of the Board of Directors stand suspended as per Section 17 of the Code and such powers were exercised by the erstwhile Resolution Professional (RP) appointed by the NCLT by the said order under the provisions of the Code. Further, under process, the resolution plan submitted by Consortium of ……1 was approved (with the condition precedent therein) by the Hon’ble NCLT on June 25, 2021 via order dated June 22, 2021 (detailed order received on June 30, 2021). With the approval of the Resolution Plan by the Hon’ble NCLT, the CIRP of the Company was concluded and …….   has ceased to be the resolution professional of the Company, effective on and from June 25, 2021. As per the terms of the approved resolution plan, Monitoring Committee was constituted (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Management’), and first meeting of Monitoring Committee was duly held on June 28, 2021. During the CIRP, as per Section 20 of the Code, the management and operations of the Company were managed by the erstwhile Resolution Professional ……1 from the commencement of CIRP and up to the plan approval date (June 25, 2021) with the assistance of employees of the Asset Preservation Team (a team  formed by the erstwhile Resolution Professional based on recommendation of functional heads to safeguard and preserve the condition and value of the assets of the company). Accordingly, the Asset Preservation Team was also dissolved. Members of Monitoring Committee in the first meeting held on June 28, 2021, approved the formation of Implementation Support Team (IST) as well as employment of certain employees on the rolls of the Company. We have been informed that considering the aforesaid the Statement has been prepared on the going concern basis by the Management.


1. Not reproduced for the purpose of this Feature.

We refer to the Note no 1, 2 & 10 to the Statement with regard to the responsibility of the erstwhile RP (up to June 25, 2021) and Monitoring Committee in respect of the preparation of this Statement while exercising the powers of the Board of Directors of the Company, which were conferred by the Order of Hon’ble NCLT, Mumbai Bench. For the purpose of ensuring regulatory compliance, this Statement has been prepared in accordance with the recognition and measurement principles laid down in the Indian Accounting Standard 34 “Interim Financial Reporting” (“Ind AS 34”), prescribed under Section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with relevant rules issued there under (the ‘Act’) and other accounting principles generally accepted in India and in compliance with SEBI Regulation 2015. This Statement has been adopted by the Monitoring Committee while exercising the powers of the Board of Directors of the Company, in good faith, solely for the purpose of compliance and discharging their duties which have been conferred upon them as per the terms of the approved resolution plan. This Statement has been signed by the Authorized Representative of the Monitoring Committee duly authorized by the members of the Monitoring Committee.

Our responsibility is to express a conclusion on this Statement based on our review. In view of the matters described in our ‘Basis for Disclaimer of Conclusion’ mentioned below, we are unable to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a basis for our conclusion on this Statement. Accordingly, we do not express a conclusion on this Statement.

Scope of review
…….

Basis for disclaimer of conclusion

We draw attention to the below mentioned points pertaining to various elements of the Statement that may require necessary adjustments/disclosures in the Statement including but not limited to an impact on the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern and these adjustments when made, may have material and pervasive impact on the outcome of the Statement for the quarter and six months ended September 30, 2022. As mentioned in the Note No 9 the resolution plan has been approved by the Hon’ble NCLT that stipulates certain conditions to be fulfilled by the Company to give effect to the resolution plan as approved. In view of an approved plan, the books of account of the company have been prepared on going concern basis by the Management. We have been informed by the management that the impact of the Order can be given only on completion of implementation of the approved resolution plan. Accordingly, pending these adjustments including certain major points mentioned below and unavailability of sufficient and appropriate evidence in respect of these items, we are unable to express our conclusion on the attached Statement of the Company.

1. a) Audit for the year ended March 31, 2019 was carried out by predecessor auditor and had issued a ‘Disclaimer of opinion’. Therefore, we could not obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence for the opening balances which have a continuing impact on the financial statements. In view of this fact, we have continued with a ‘Disclaimer of Opinion’ on the financial statements audited by us for year(s) ended March 31, 2020, March 31, 2021 and March 31, 2022. These respective reports including the one from the predecessor auditor, do mention certain material points that form the basis for respective disclaimer of opinions. Any changes to the opening balances would materially impact the Statement including but not limited to the resultant accounting treatment and disclosures thereof.

b) The Shareholders of the Company have not approved the financial statements for financial year ended March 31 2019 and March 31 2020 in the 27th & 28th Annual General Meeting, respectively convened on June 15, 2021. Annual General Meeting for financial year ended March 31, 2021 and financial year ended March 31, 2022, is yet to be conducted by the Company.

2. As informed by the erstwhile RP/management, certain information including the minutes of meetings of the CoC and Monitoring Committee, and the outcome of certain procedures carried out as a part of the CIRP and post the approval of resolution plan are confidential in nature and same could not be shared with anyone other than the member of COE, Monitoring Committee and Hon’ble NCLT. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the possible financial impact, presentation/disclosures etc., if any, that may arise if access to above-mentioned documents would have been provided to us.

3. The Company continues to incur losses resulting in an erosion in its net-worth and its current liabilities exceed current assets as of September 30, 2022. Further, the operations of the Company currently stand suspended from April 18, 2019 till date. The Company has undergone and completed the CIRP, and we have been informed that the Resolution Plan submitted by the Jalan Fritsch Consortium is since approved by the Hon’b/e NCLT on June 25, 2021 vide their order dated June 22, 2021 (detailed order received on June 30, 2021). We have been informed by the management that the impact of the Order can be given only on completion of implementation of the approved resolution plan.

The Erstwhile Resolution Professional/management has prepared this Statement using going concern basis of accounting based on his assessment of a possible effects that will be given in the financial statements in view of the said implementation of the approved resolution and accordingly no adjustments have been made to the carrying value of the assets and liabilities and their presentation and classification in the Statement.

In view of approval of the Resolution Plan by Hon’b/e NCLT and subject to giving effect to the said approved plan as mentioned above, we reserve our comment on appropriateness of the going concern basis adopted for preparation of this Statement.

4.    Audit assertions i.e., existence, completeness, valuation, cut-off etc. with respect to majority of the assets, liabilities and certain income/ expenses cannot be concluded due to lack of sufficient and appropriate evidence. In addition, we could not obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence for adequacy and reasonableness of management estimates for various provisions, fair valuation/ net realizable value of various assets etc. including our inability to carry out certain other mandatory analytical procedures required for issuing a limited review report. These matters can have material and pervasive impact on the Statement of the Company. We draw attention to certain such matters and its consequential impact, if any, on the Statement including their presentation/ disclosure:

a) Tangible and intangible assets:

  • The Company has not carried out impairment testing of these assets including assets held for sale, in its entirety.


  • Basis the information and explanation provided to us; exercise of physical verification is not complete in its entirety. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the completeness including for fixed assets lying with third parties.


b) Investments: The Company has not carried out impairment testing.

c) Tax related balances: The Company is in the process of reconciling direct/indirect tax related balances as per books of account and as per tax records. Accordingly, we are unable to comment whether these balances are fairly stated in the books.

d) Loans and advances: Prior to initiation of CIRP, certain parties have utilized deposits against their pending dues from the Company and have filed claims with erstwhile RP under CIRP. We are unable to comment whether loans and advances have been fairly stated in the Statement.

e) Other non-current assets: It includes capital advances and deposits with Government authorities:

  • In case of capital advances especially given for purchase of aircrafts, balances are either not confirmed or not reconciled. No adjustment is made to these balances; [Refer Note 4{a)]


  • Majority of the deposits with Government authorities are paid under protest and matter is pending adjudication. [Refer Note l]


f) Inventories: As informed to us, exercise of physical verification is not complete in its entirety. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the completeness including inventories lying with third parties, its value in use etc.

g) Cash and bank balances: As informed to us, certain bank statements/reconciliations are not available. Certain bank accounts were frozen in earlier years. Accordingly, we are unable to comment with respect to existence or adjustments, if any, required to be carried out.

h) Other current assets: It mainly includes advances to vendors (LCs invoked by them), balances with government authorities and other recoverable. In absence of confirmations from such parties, we are unable to comment on it including its recoverable value etc.

i) Borrowings:

  •  As informed to us, certain bank statements/ reconciliations are not available.

  •  As per the information and explanations provided to us, as part of CIRP, financial creditors had filed their claims with erstwhile RP, any settlement with creditors will be carried out as per the provisions of the Code and as per the terms of approved resolution plan. The impact of the Order con be given only on the implementation of the approved resolution plan hence the actual settlement is pending. [to be read with point 5 below]

j) Provisions: It includes provision for redelivery and provisions for employee benefits

  • Redelivery provision is linked to number of aircrafts taken on operating lease and expected expenditure required to be incurred at the time of returning these aircrafts. During the pre CIRP period, lessors seized the possession of all such aircrafts due to defaults in lease rentals, no adjustment hos been done regarding redelivery provision in this Statement. During the period there is no additional provision made however opening provision has been carried forward.


  • For various reasons, we are unable to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence with respect to opening balances of these provisions. We have been informed that contracts with APT/ Implementation Support Team are of short term in nature and there are no long-term employee benefits payable, however, we have not been provided with its supporting documents.


k) Trade payable and other current /non-current liabilities: Certain parties have submitted their claims under CIRP. Post implementation of the plan, adjustments will be made in the books for the differential amount, if any, in the claims admitted. There are certain statutory payments with respect to the pre CIRP period which are not accounted. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the financial impact of the same. [to be read with point 5 below]

5. As mentioned in Note 4(j) to the Statement, pursuant to commencement of CIRP under the Code, there are various claims submitted by the financial creditors, operational creditors, Dutch Administrator, employees and other creditors to the erstwhile RP. No accounting impact in the books of account has been recognized in respect of excess or short claims or non-receipts of claims for above-mentioned creditors.

6. With respect to employee benefit expenses, certain documents could not be shared with us being confidential in nature. In addition, certain other expenses pertaining to earlier period were booked. Accordingly, we could not obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence for certain items of revenues, employee benefits expense and certain other expenses involving management estimates.

7. As stated in Note 4(h) to the Statement, various regulatory authorities and lenders have initiated investigation, which remains unconcluded at this stage. In addition, there are certain legal proceedings against the company which are not yet concluded. The Company has also defaulted on certain compliances including SEBI LODR Regulations. Accordingly, it’s impact, if any, on the Statement cannot be determined.

8. Due to Non-availability of confirmations from the related parties with respect to transactions during the period and balance outstanding as at period end, we are unable to comment whether the accounting is appropriately made in the Statement by the Company.

Disclaimer of Conclusion

In view of the significance of the matters described in aforesaid paragraphs narrating our “Basis for Disclaimer of Conclusion”, we have not been able to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence as to whether the Statement has been prepared in accordance with the recognition and measurement principles laid down in the aforesaid Indian Accounting Standard and other accounting principles generally accepted in India or state whether the Statement has disclosed the information required to be disclosed in terms of SEBI Regulation 2015, including the manner in which it is to be disclosed, or that it contains any material misstatement.

Whether Belated Deposit of Employees’ Contribution to PF/ESI is Deductible? – Section 36(1)(va)

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Legislations such as The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, The Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 [EPF Act], The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 [ESI Act], The Employees’ State Insurance (Central) Regulations, 1950, etc. require an employer to contribute certain sums to the Fund [PF or ESI] created in accordance with such legislations. The contribution to be made under these legislations consists of two parts – (i) the employer’s contribution and (ii) the employee’s contribution which is deducted from the wages payable to the employee.

1.2 With respect to the employer’s contribution, section 36(1)(iv) of the Act grants a deduction in respect of any sum paid by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution towards a recognized provident fund or an approved superannuation fund. This provision has been part of the Act from the beginning.

1.3 The Finance Act, 1983 w.e.f. 1st April, 1984 introduced section 43B to provide that certain deductions are allowed only on actual payment. In short, it provides that the items covered under this section cannot be claimed as a deduction on an accrual basis. This provision contains a non- obstante clause and accordingly overrides other provisions of the Act. This section was amended from time to time to expand the scope thereof and also for various other reasons. Presently, section 43B covers items listed in clauses (a) to (g).

1.4 Section 2(24)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides that any sum received by an assessee from his employees as a contribution to employees’ welfare funds (such as PF, ESI etc.) shall be treated as income of the assessee employer. Section 36(1)(va) of the Act allows deduction of such sums to which section 2(24)(x) applies if it is credited to the employee’s account in the relevant fund on or before the due date as defined in Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(va), which inter alia provides that the due date for this purpose is the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employees’ contribution to the employee’s account in the relevant fund under the respective legislations etc. Both these provisions were introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1st April, 1988.

1.5 In the context of this write-up, some amendments made in the past in section 43B are worth noting. The Finance Act, 1987 introduced two provisos in section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. The first proviso, at the time of introduction, provided that the provisions of section 43B would not apply to any sum payable by the way of tax, duty, cess or fee which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date for furnishing his Return of Income u/s 139(1) for that year. The second proviso to section 43B [hereinafter referred to as the said Second Proviso] provided that no deduction in respect of any sum payable by an assessee employer by way of contribution to any provident or superannuation or gratuity or any other fund for the welfare of employees shall be allowed unless such sum has actually been paid during the previous year on or before the due date defined in the Explanation to section 36(1)(va).

1.5.1. The said Second Proviso was substituted by the Finance Act, 1989 to make the condition more rigorous with which we are not concerned in this write-up. The first proviso to section 43B (as subsequently amended before 2003) granting relief for permitting payment up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income was applicable to all the items listed in section 43B, except to the contribution to welfare funds (such as PF, etc.) which was governed by the said Second Proviso and accordingly, this had no benefit of relaxation provided in the first proviso to section 43B (referred to hereinbefore) for making payments up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income. This position prevailed till the amendments were made by the Finance Act, 2003 (w.e.f. 1st April, 2004) omitting the said Second Proviso and extending the benefit of relaxation provided in the first proviso for making such payment up to the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of Income also to contribution to PF, etc. (covered in section 43B(b)). For this, consequential amendment was also made in the first proviso which was made applicable to all the items listed in Section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 2004 (hereinafter, this amended first proviso is referred to as the said First Proviso).As such, with these amendments, all the items listed in section 43B (including items listed in section 43B(b)) got covered by the relaxation provided in the said First Proviso to section 43B (hereinafter, these amendments are referred to as Amendment of 2003).

1.5.2 After the above amendments were made, but prior to the Amendment of 2003, the debate had started as to whether the relaxation granted in Section 43B by the introduction of the original first proviso to section 43B referred to in para 1.5 above (not applicable to the items covered in section 43B(b)) is clarificatory in nature and should apply to assessment years prior to A.Y. 1988-89. This issue was finally settled by the Supreme Court in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. [(1997) 224 ITR 677 –SC], and the Supreme Court, in that case, took the view that the benefit of that first proviso will apply retrospectively and will also be available for the assessment years prior to A.Y.1988-89.

1.5.3 After the deletion of the said Second Proviso to section 43B and extending the benefit of relaxation provided in the said First Proviso to section 43B to all the items listed in section 43B (including items covered in section 43B(b) such as contribution to PF, etc.) by the Amendment of 2003, the issue came-up before the various benches of Tribunal and High Courts that whether the Amendment of 2003 should be considered as clarificatory and on that ground should be applied to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 to the items covered in section 43B (b) (contribution to welfare funds such as PF, etc.) even if such contributions are belatedly deposited in the relevant Fund so long as such payments are made on or before the applicable due date of furnishing the Return of income.

1.5.4 The Apex Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (213 CTR 268) dismissed the SLP filed by the Department against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (284 ITR 619) in a case dealing with the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05, by stating that the assessee will be entitled to claim the benefit in section 43B for that period also particularly in view of the fact that he has made the contribution to P.F. before filing of the return. Thereafter, the issue referred to in para 1.5.3 finally came-up before the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. [2009] 319 ITR 306 and the Supreme Court settled the issue by taking a view that the Amendment of 2003, omitting the said Second Proviso to Section 43B is clarificatory in nature and should apply retrospectively to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05. For this, the Court also relied on its judgment of Allied Motors (P) Ltd referred to in para 1.5.2.

1.5.5 The Supreme Court judgment in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. referred to para 1.5.2 above was considered and analysed in this feature in the May 1997 issue of BCAJ. Similarly, the judgment of Alom Extrusions Ltd. referred to in para 1.5.4 above was also considered and analysed in this feature in the January 2010 issue of BCAJ.

1.6 In view of the deletion of the said Second Proviso and consequential amendment in the first proviso (referred to in para 1.5.2 above) by the Amendment of 2003, a further issue also arose as to whether an assessee is entitled to a deduction u/s 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act in respect of employees’ contributions which have been deposited in the Funds created under the respective legislations after the due dates prescribed therein. This issue had given rise to considerable litigation and was a subject matter of dispute before different authorities/High Courts. Many High Courts such as the Bombay High Courts in CIT-4, Mumbai vs. Hindustan Organics Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 366 ITR 1 and in CIT vs. Ghatge Patil Transports Ltd. [2014] 368 ITR 749, Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Dharmendra Sharma [2008] 297 ITR 320 and CIT vs. AIMIL Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 508, Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Spectrum Consultants India (P.) Ltd. [2013] 215 Taxman 597 and CIT vs. Magus Customers Dialog (P.) Ltd.[2015] 231 Taxman 379, Uttarakhand High Court in CIT vs. Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd.[2013] 356 ITR 351, Patna High Court in Bihar State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT-1 [2016] 386 ITR 410, Calcutta High Court in CIT-1 vs. Vijay Shree Ltd. [2014] 43 taxmann.com 396, Rajasthan High Court in CIT vs. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur [2014] 363 ITR 70, etc. decided the issue in favour of the assessee. In these cases, the High Courts have largely relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Alom Extrusions Ltd (supra) without appreciating the fact that this judgment dealt with the case of employers’ contribution to PF, etc. and omission of the said Second Proviso to section 43B by the Amendment of 2003 should not affect the cases of employees’ contribution which is governed by section 36(1)(va). On the other hand, some High Courts such as the Gujarat High Court in CIT-II vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation [2014] 366 ITR 170 (Gujarat) and CIT-I vs. Checkmate Services P. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 680 of 2014), Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Merchem Ltd. [2015] 378 ITR 443, etc. had decided the issue against the assessee and held that employees’ contribution in such cases will be governed only by the provisions of section 36(1)(va) which requires the payment of employees’ contribution strictly within the due date prescribed under the respective legislation and section 43B had no application to employees’ contribution.

1.7 Recently, this issue of allowability of claim for deduction of belated deposit of employees’ contribution referred to in para 1.6 above came-up before the Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. (and other cases), and the Supreme Court has now settled this dispute and therefore, it is thought fit to consider in this feature.

CIT VS. DHARMENDRA SHARMA [2008] 297 ITR 320 (DEL.)
2.1 As mentioned in para 1.6 above, the Delhi High Court took the view in favour of the assessee. In this case, the Delhi High Court was concerned with the issue as to whether deduction was allowable in respect of delayed payments of employees’ contribution to PF and ESI, which were paid within 2 to 4 days after the grace period provided, but before filing the return of income. The Delhi High Court held that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (supra) was applicable to the facts of the case and dismissed the Revenue’s appeal holding that no substantial question of law arises. This decision was followed by the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. P.M. Electronics Ltd. [2009] 313 ITR 161 (Delhi).


CIT VS. AIMIL LTD. [2010] 321 ITR 508 (DEL.)
2.1.1 In this case, the Revenue contended before the Delhi High Court that a distinction is to be made between an employer’s contribution and the employee’s contribution. The Revenue urged that the employees’ contribution which is recovered from the employees’ salaries/wages is in the nature of trust money in the hands of the assessee employer. The Act, accordingly, provides for treating it as income when the assessee employer receives the employees’ contribution and enables the assessee employer to claim deduction only on actual payment by the due date specified in the Explanation below section 36(1)(va) i.e. as per the dates specified under the respective welfare legislations. This argument of the Revenue also did not find favour with the Delhi High Court, and it held that the assessee can claim deduction if the actual payment is made before the return of income is filed in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Vinay Cement Ltd.’s case. The Court further noted that the EPF Act as well as the ESI Act permits an employer to make the deposit with some delays, subject to payment of interest on delayed payment and levy of penalties.

CIT-II VS. GUJARAT STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION [2014] 366 ITR 170 (GUJ.)
3.1 As stated in para 1.6 above, the Gujarat High Court took a contrary view in favour of the Revenue. In this case, the Gujarat High Court observed that the deletion of the said Second Proviso and the effect of the said First Proviso as amended by the Amendment of 2003 is required to be confined to section 43B alone and that deletion of the said Second Proviso cannot be made applicable with respect to section 36(1)(va). The Court further observed that there was no amendment in section 36(1)(va) and that the Explanation to section 36(1)(va) was also not deleted and is required to be complied with. The Court also noted the introduction of Section 2(24)(x), referred to in para 1.4 above, which had also remained unaffected by the Amendment of 2003. Accordingly, the assessee shall not be entitled to a deduction in respect of employees’ contribution received unless the assessee has credited the said sum to the employees’ accounts in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date mentioned in the Explanation to section 36(1)(va). The Gujarat High Court further held that the decision in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the case and stated as under (page 183):

“…….In the said case before Alom Extrusions Ltd., the controversy was whether the amendment in section 43B of the Act, vide Finance Act, 2003 would operate retrospectively w.e.f. 1/4/1988 or not. It is also required to be noted that in the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the controversy was with respect to employers’ contribution as per section 43(B)(b) of the Act and not with respect to employees’ contribution under section 36(1)(va). Before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had no occasion to consider deduction under section 36(1)(va) of the Act and with respect to employees’ contribution. As stated above, the only controversy before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with respect to amendment (deletion) of the Second Proviso to section 43(B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1963 operates w.e.f. 1/4/2004 or whether it operates retrospectively w.e.f. 1/4/1988. Under the circumstances, the learned tribunal has committed an error in relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) while passing the impugned judgment and order and deleting disallowance of the respective sums being employees’ contribution to PF Account / ESI Account, which were made by the AO while considering the proviso to section section 36(1) (va) of the Income Tax Act.”

3.2 The above decision was followed by the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT- I vs. Checkmate Services P. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 680 of 2014) while dealing with the same issues of belated deposit of employees’ contribution to PF and ESI for A.Y. 2009-10, and the disallowance made by the AO in this respect was upheld by the High Court reversing the decision of the Tribunal which had decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

CHECKMATE SERVICES (P.) LTD. VS. CIT-1 [2022] 448 ITR 518 (SC)

4.1 The issued referred to in para 1.6 above with regard to deductibility of employees’ contribution to PF and ESI in cases where the same were paid after the due date prescribed under the relevant legislations and regulations came up before the Supreme Court in various cases and it was agreed to treat the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. (referred to in para 3.2 above) as the lead case for convenience. The Court also noted that in these cases, in the years under consideration, the AO had taken a view that the appellant assessees had belatedly deposited their employees’ contribution towards the PF & ESI, considering the due dates under the relevant legislations and regulations. Consequently, the AO had disallowed such belated payment of employees’ contribution u/s 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 2(24)(x).

4.2 Before the Supreme Court, on behalf of various assesses, different counsels had appeared (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) and had raised various contentions to support the case of the assessee for securing the deductions in respect of such belated deposit of employees’ contribution. These inter alia include: the assessee placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions (supra). It was also urged that under the respective welfare legislations the employer was liable to make a composite payment comprising of the employer’s contribution as well as the contribution collected from the employees. Accordingly, the term “sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution” in section 43B(b) meant both the employer’s contribution as well as the employees’ contribution. The assessee further submitted that the explanation to section 36(1)(va) and the said Second Proviso were brought in together. Therefore, the deletion of the said Second Proviso was intended to give relief to the assesses. It was also urged that the non-obstante clause in section 43B would override other provisions including section 36(1)(va).

4.2.1 The assessee further submitted that sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va) contemplated the amount which was received from its employees as contributions and not any sum which was deducted by the employer assessee from the payments made to employees. It was also urged that ‘received’ and ‘deducted’ are two different terms and cannot be used interchangeably. It was also contended that if the employer assessee deposits the employees’ contribution after the due date prescribed under the respective legislation it is subject to fine or other adverse consequences under that legislation and that the assessee should not be subjected to disallowance under the Act so long as employees’ contribution has been deposited before the applicable due date for furnishing the Return of Income. It was also prayed that the Court should adopt an interpretation that would be pragmatic and in consonance with fairness.

4.3 On behalf of the Revenue it was pointed out that the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) was with respect to the employer’s contribution to PF account as opposed to employees’ contribution in the present case. It was also pointed out that the Act differentiated between employer’s contribution to which section 43B applied and employees’ contribution where section 36(1)(va) applied and both these provisions operated in different fields with respect to different contributions and, therefore, section 43B was inapplicable and could not override section 36(1)(va). Based on this, the Revenue contended that the said Second Proviso applied only to employer’s contribution as section 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va) were still retained. The employees’ contribution stood on a different footing as it was deducted from employees’ salary and was in the nature of deemed income of the assessee as specifically indicated in section 2(24)(x).

4.3.1 The Revenue further contended that the Explanation to section 36(1)(va) which contained the definition of ‘due date’ was clear and if the employer did not deposit the contribution to the respective funds, he would not be entitled to deduction in respect of such sums. It was also submitted that a contribution deducted from the employee’s salary and deposited by the employer could not be termed as employer’s contribution.

4.4 After considering the rival contentions, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the issue. For this purpose, the Court considered and noted the different relevant provisions/amendments made at different points of time. The Court also noted the fact that when section 36 (i)(va) was introduced, the provisions of Section 36(i)(iv) and 43B were already there on the Statute. The Court also noted that for the purpose of section 36(1)(va), the ‘due date’ is specially defined in the Explanation. The Court also noted the time limit provided for deposit of such contribution under the relevant legislations (EPF/ESI). The Court also noted the fact that the grace period of five days was allowed under the PF Scheme and discontinuance thereof by the Circular dated 8th October, 2016 under the said legislation. The Court also considered the reasons for introduction of section 36(i)(va) as mentioned in the Finance Minister’s speech at the relevant time.

4.5 The Court then stated that the employer’s contribution and the employee’s contribution stand on a different footing as evident from the intention of the Parliament. The Court also noted that the deduction in respect of employer’s contribution to recognized provident fund, etc. is the subject matter of Section 36(iv). Sections 36(1)(va) and 2(24)(x), which deal with employees’ contribution, were introduced by the Finance Act, 1987. With respect to these amendments, the Court stated as under (paras 32 and 33):

“…….This is a significant amendment, because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, – whether in the form of deductions, or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee’s income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee, but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, Section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression “due date” was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer’s contribution (i.e., Section 36(1)(iv)).

33. The significance of this is that Parliament treated contributions under Section 36(1)(va) differently from those under Section 36(1)(iv)………”

4.6 The Supreme Court further observed that the essential character of an employees’ contribution was that it is a part of the employees’ income held in trust by the employer which is underlined by the condition that it has to be deposited on or before the due date. The distinction between employer’s contribution and the employee’s contribution was explained by the Supreme Court as under (para 53):

“The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) – unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B.”

Dealing with the argument of the assessee with regard to the effect of non-obstante clause, the Court held that the non-obstante clause in section 43B would not override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained or deducted from the employee’s income on or before the due date under respective legislations. In this respect the Court stated that (para54):

“ ……… The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date……”

4.8 The Court also considered the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) on the issue under consideration as the assessee as well as various High Courts (deciding the issue in favour of the assessee) had largely relied on the same. For this, the Court referred to various findings given in that judgment and noted that the same was concerned with employer’s contribution. Finally, considering the issue on hand, the Court in this respect stated as under (para 45):

“A reading of the judgment in Alom Extrusions, would reveal that this court, did not consider Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Furthermore, the separate provisions in Section 36(1) for employers’ contribution and employees’ contribution, too went unnoticed……”

4.9 Considering the principles of interpretations, the Supreme Court observed that the general principle is that the taxing statutes are to be construed strictly, and that there is no room for equitable considerations. Further, one of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with. For this, the Court referred to its various earlier decisions. As such, the prayer of the assessee to adopt an interpretation that would be pragmatic and in consonance with fairness did not find favour with the Supreme Court.

4.10 The Supreme Court concluded that employees’ contribution would be allowed as deduction only if payments are made before the due dates prescribed under the respective legislations and accordingly, dismissed the appeals of various assessees against the judgments of High Courts which had decided the issue against the assessees. As such, the judgments of all the High Courts (such as Bombay High Court etc.) referred to in para 1.6 above, in which the issue was decided in favour of the assessee, are no longer good law.

CONCLUSION
5.1 In view of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, the issue referred to in para 1.6 above now stands settled that an assessee employer is eligible to claim a deduction of employees’ contribution only if he deposits such contribution on or before the due date specified in the respective legislations. The provisions of section 43B would have no applicability in so far as employees’ contribution is concerned and, accordingly, if the employees’ contribution is deposited beyond the due date specified in respective legislations but on or before the applicable due date of furnishing Return of Income, the same will still be subjected to disallowance.

5.2 The assessee employers should ensure that each monthly payment of employees’ contributions is deposited as per the respective due dates. The deposit of such contribution for a particular month, if delayed by say even by few days will also be subjected to disallowance under the Act. In such cases, that would be a permanent loss of the deduction.

5.3 It is worth noting that the Court in the above case was concerned with the cases of admitted delay in case of employees’ contribution to PF, etc., beyond the due date provided in the Explanation (presently, Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(va)) and was not concerned with the determination of the due date in these cases. Therefore, in each case such due date will have to be determined first under the said Explanation which defines the ‘due date’ as the date by which such contribution is required to be credited to the employee’s account under the relevant fund under “any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise”. As such, the due date for this purpose will have to be determined on this basis considering the facts of each case. In the context of the issue raised before the Supreme Court in the above cases (regarding delay in deposit of employees’ contribution towards PF and ESI), the Court has held that such due date will have to be as per the respective legislations. As such, the emerging principle is that the due date for this purpose will have to be determined only on the basis of exhaustive definition of ‘due date’ given in the Explanation to section 36(1)(va) and the provisions of section 43B have no application to the cases of employees’ contribution.

5.4 The Finance Act, 2021 introduced Explanation 2 in section 36(1)(va) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2021, clarifying that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied for the purposes of determining the “due date” u/s 36(1)(va). The Finance Act, 2021, also introduced Explanation 5 in section 43B w.e.f. 1st April, 2021, clarifying that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied to a sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of section 2(24)(x) apply. The Delhi High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. TV Today Network Ltd. [2022] 141 taxmann.com 275 (Delhi) held that these amendments made by the Finance Act, 2021 are prospective in nature and would take effect from 1st April, 2021.

5.5 The Supreme Court in the case of ACIT vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008] 305 ITR 227 (SC) has observed that it is a well-settled principle that a judicial decision acts retrospectively and that Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. Accordingly, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. with respect to the deductibility of employees’ contribution would apply even for the past assessment years, and the decision of Delhi High Court in TV Today Network (supra) with respect to the prospective application of the amendments by the Finance Act, 2021 would lose its significance. In our view, considering the nature of details required to be given in clause 20(b) of Form No 3CD for the purpose of Tax Audit u/s 44AB, the above judgment dated 12th October, 2022 should not have any direct impact on this reporting requirement.

5.5.1 As the above judgment of the Supreme Court will affect past assessment years also (pending/completed/ in litigation), the liability to pay interest (unless waived, more so in the jurisdictions of High Courts [referred to in para 1.6 above], where the issue was decided in favour of the assessee) is also likely to arise for the past years in many cases. In our view, for the past years, the question of penalty u/s 271(1)(c)/ 270A should not arise as a large number of High Courts had decided the issue in favour of the assessee, more so in the jurisdictions of such High Courts. Knowing how the Department functions in levy of such penalty, especially at the ground level, it would be just and fair for the CBDT to issue general instructions to not levy this penalty in such cases to avoid fruitless litigations on the penalty issue.

5.6 Literally construed, it would appear that the judgment in the above case is correct. The liberal approach adopted by many High Courts (referred to in para1.6 above) has not found favour with the Supreme Court in the above case and the Court applied the principle of strict construction while interpreting taxing statute and interpreted the provisions of section 36(1)(va) on that basis, more so because of the historical background of various amendments made in this respect including in section 43B revealing that even the intention of the Parliament in enacting section 36(1)(va) dealing with employees’ contribution to the PF, etc. is to treat employer’s and employee’s contribution towards PF etc. differently under the Act.

5.7 The possible debate in this respect could be whether the judgment is fair and just. While fairness and justice are not relevant for interpreting a taxing statute as held by courts from time to time in the past, they also are not enemies of taxing statute. One way of looking at the above judgment is that it is fair and just, as Revenue would like to believe, on the ground that the employers having retained the money of the employees, as a trustee, cannot delay the deposit thereof in the relevant fund beyond the prescribed/ specified period. Ideally, this could be true, but the larger question is: is it correct, or even in the national interest, to draft and interpret such laws bearing in mind the ideal situation (which, in practice, is nothing but a myth) as this ignores the ground reality of the way in which the business affairs are run, more so by small and medium business entities in this country. The business entities have to comply with numerous laws and regulations in this country and face the music from officials administering such laws and regulations, apart from running their business and dealing with business-related issues on a day-to-day basis. To comply with the requirements of such laws and regulations of the kind in question, business entities have to depend on lower staff, and some unintended mistakes do take place in real-life situations. No human being can claim that he is perfect. Apart from this, there could be many unforeseen contingencies (such as loss of power or internet connectivity, fire, etc.) leading to such delays. As such, the business entities should not be penalized with permanent disallowance even in such cases of bona fide and/or short delay (even of 1 day in this case), more so without considering reasons for the delay. We should also not forget that the Revenue Department also keeps on making many mistakes of such nature day in and day out while administering the taxing statute, and even the Courts have often pointed out this fact, of course, by and large, without any consequences. If we genuinely desire to make the tax laws fair and just to the extent possible (to achieve the proclaimed goal of achieving ‘ease of doing business’ in real terms), the Act in this regard should be amended to provide (possibly, with retrospective effect) that if such belated payments are made within a reasonable time (say, 6 months), then the deduction should be allowed in the year of actual payment so that such cases do not suffer permanent disallowance. Such an amendment would meet the ends of justice and could be a step forward in reducing the ‘trust deficit’ between the taxpaying community and the tax administration.

5.8 Of course, a larger debate still remains on whether the Government, as a policy, should use the Income-tax Act for compliance with other laws or that should be left to the provisions contained in other laws under which the consequences are already provided for this kind of default. If we genuinely desire to have workable simplified tax laws (and to achieve the goal of ‘ease of doing business’ in the real sense), this debate is absolutely necessary. Let us hope that one day the Government will start thinking of such a debate for a policy decision on issues like this for appropriate decision.

Offence and prosecution – Failure to furnish return of income – delay of 72 days in filing of return as requisite documents were not supplied to him despite being demanded – no whisper of evasion of income-tax – cognizance taken by Trial Court for offence of tax evasion u/s 276CC was ex facie erroneous.

17. Ashish Agarwal vs. Income-tax Department
[2022] 143 taxmann.com 322 (Rajasthan)
Date of order: 4th August, 2022
Sections: 276CC, r.w.s. 279 of the ITA, 1961

Offence and prosecution – Failure to furnish return of income – delay of 72 days in filing of return as requisite documents were not supplied to him despite being demanded – no whisper of evasion of income-tax – cognizance taken by Trial Court for offence of tax evasion u/s 276CC was ex facie erroneous.

The petitioner was an assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1961. A search and seizure was conducted at the petitioner’s business and residential premises on 24th February, 2016, in furtherance whereof, a notice u/s 153-A of the Act, requiring him to file return of income-tax within 30 days came to be issued.

It is the case of the petitioner that on receipt of the notice, he had sent a letter dated 28th July, 2016 and requested the Dy. Commissioner, Income-tax to provide copies of the statements recorded during the course of the search and other relevant documents so that a return as demanded u/s 153-A can be filed. Later on, the petitioner filed the return of income.

The Commissioner, Income-tax (Central), thereafter issued a show cause notice (SCN) dated 28th February, 2019 u/s 279(1) and asked him why not prosecution u/s 276-CC of the Act, for failure to file return of Income-tax in time be launched against him.

In response to the SCN, the petitioner filed a reply and explained the delay of 72 days inter alia contending that there was no intentional delay in filing the return and he was prevented by sufficient cause, as the requisite documents were not supplied to him despite being demanded. It was also stated that the demand of tax is meagre. And hence, the prosecution sanction be not granted.

The petitioner received summons issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jodhpur Metro (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’) requiring the petitioner to appear on 28th May, 2022.

On an inquiry being made, the petitioner came to know that the trial Court had taken cognizance of offence u/s 276-CC prima facie finding it to be a case made out against the petitioner.

The petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order dated 21st February, 2018, whereby cognizance has been taken against him so also the proceedings pending before the trial Court.

The Hon. High Court observed that a simple look at the complaint filed by the respondent-Income-tax Department leaves no room for ambiguity that the Department wanted the petitioner’s prosecution u/s 276-CC(ii), as is evident from the caption of the application. If the application is read, it is apparent that the Income-tax Department had desired petitioner’s prosecution for 72 days delay in filing the return. There is not even a whisper of evasion of income-tax, whereas the Id. trial Court, claiming to have perused the record, has observed that the accused (petitioner herein) has not filed his return of income for 2013-14 and has evaded income-tax.

The Court held that the order of the cognizance shows a clear misreading of the complaint and the same suffers from manifest error of law, for which it is liable to be quashed and set aside.

The Court further observed that the petitioner ought to have preferred a revision petition u/s 397 of the Code but then, considering that the petitioner and his group has filed about 80 petitions of identical nature, relegating the petitioners to file revision petition(s), that too when the order impugned suffers from palpable error of law and facts, would lead to multiplicity of litigation and passing of dockets from the High Court to the Revisional Court.

In view of the discrepancy and considering that not only the notice issued to the petitioner before granting prosecution sanction, even the complaint filed by the Department alleges delay in filing return, while eliciting prosecution u/s 276-CC (ii), thus the cognizance, which has been taken for evasion of tax is ex-facie erroneous and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

The Court observed that the order granting prosecution sanction has neither been challenged in the present petition nor can the same be permitted to be questioned before the Court in its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code. Because, the act of granting prosecution sanction is an administrative or statutory exercise of powers.

The cognizance order in each of the case was quashed and set aside.

Search and seizure — Release of seized assets — Unexplained investment — Gold jewellery seized from third party — Findings of fact recorded by Commissioner (Appeals) that purchase of gold by assessee duly substantiated by evidence and finding attaining finality — Seized gold to be released to assessee.

63. Rakeshkumar Babulal Agarwal vs. Principal CIT[2022] 448 ITR 133 (Guj.)
A.Y.: 2018-19
Date of order: 7th March, 2022
Ss. 69, 132, 143(3) and 153C of ITA,1961

Search and seizure — Release of seized assets — Unexplained investment — Gold jewellery seized from third party — Findings of fact recorded by Commissioner (Appeals) that purchase of gold by assessee duly substantiated by evidence and finding attaining finality — Seized gold to be released to assessee.

The assessee carried on business in gold jewellery. Pursuant to a search carried out in the case of one S u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and in the case of one P, the gold jewellery received through courier by the assessee as consignee was also seized by the Department. The AO passed an assessment order against the assessee u/s 143(3) r.w.s.153C for A.Y.2018-19 making an addition on account of unexplained investment u/s 69 of the value of seized gold jewelry received through courier by the assessee as consignee. The assessee stated he had purchased the gold from P.

The Commissioner (Appeals) on the facts found that the assessee had purchased the gold from P and the payment was made through banking channels, that the purchases were recorded in the assessee’s books of account, and that though P in his statement had denied any transactions with the assessee, the assessee had provided the necessary supporting documents and had duly recorded the purchases in the books of account. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that such purchases were not held to be inflated or bogus by the AO and no disallowance was warranted and deleted the protective addition made by the AO. However, the Department refused to release the seized gold jewelry.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition to release the seized gold jewelry and held as under:

“i) In view of the findings recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals) on the facts that the assessee had purchased gold from P and had made payment through the banking channels and since this finding of fact had attained finality since the Department had not challenged the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) before the Tribunal the contention of the assessee that he had purchased the gold in question from P and had also accounted for it in his books of account was accepted.

ii) Therefore, the Department could not withhold the seized gold jewelry and had to release it. The Principal Commissioner should accord approval for the release of seized gold jewellery to the assessee at the earliest.”

Reassessment — Notice — Death of assessee brought to knowledge of the assessing authorities — Reassessment proceedings and passing of assessment order against deceased assessee without issuing notice to legal heir of assessee — Notice and consequent assessment order invalid and unsustainable.

62. Shobha Mehta (through legal heir Sh. Kanhaya Lal Mehta) vs. ACIT
[2022] 448 ITR 25 (Raj.)
A.Y.: 2015-16
Date of order: 15th September, 2022
Ss. 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Death of assessee brought to knowledge of the assessing authorities — Reassessment proceedings and passing of assessment order against deceased assessee without issuing notice to legal heir of assessee — Notice and consequent assessment order invalid and unsustainable.

Notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, issued by the Assistant Commissioner and the consequent assessment order u/s 147 r.w.s.144 was challenged by the legal heir of the deceased assessee on the ground that the order was passed against the deceased assessee and was addressed to the legal heir of the assessee but no prior notice of the reopening of the assessment proceedings had been given to the legal heir.

The Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“The plea of the assessing authorities that they were not intimated regarding the death of the assessee was factually incorrect. The original assessment order for the A.Y.2015-16 u/s.143(3) indicated that the Deputy Commissioner had been intimated regarding the death of the assessee and had been passed taking into account the fact that the assessee had expired. Notice of reassessment u/s. 148 was issued to the assessee who had expired about six years back. No notice whatsoever was issued to the legal representative of the assessee before undertaking the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the reassessment and the assessment order u/s. 147 read with section 144 having been passed against the deceased assessee were invalid and unsustainable.”

Reassessment — Jurisdiction — Condition precedent — Approval of prescribed authority — Recording satisfaction with signature of prescribed authority mandatory — Prescribed authority’s digitally signed approval obtained after issue of notice without recording of satisfaction — AO had no jurisdiction at point of time of issue of notice — Notice without jurisdiction and invalid — Notice and subsequent reassessment proceedings quashed.

61. Vikas Gupta vs. UOI
[2022] 448 ITR 1 (All.)
A.Ys.: 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16
Date of order: 8th September, 2022
Ss. 147, 148, 151 and 282A of ITA,1961

Reassessment — Jurisdiction — Condition precedent — Approval of prescribed authority — Recording satisfaction with signature of prescribed authority mandatory — Prescribed authority’s digitally signed approval obtained after issue of notice without recording of satisfaction — AO had no jurisdiction at point of time of issue of notice — Notice without jurisdiction and invalid — Notice and subsequent reassessment proceedings quashed.

In a batch of writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, the admitted facts were that on the basis of an unsigned alleged digital approval u/s 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the AO issued notices to the assessees u/s 148. The point of time when the aforesaid approval u/s 151 was signed is subsequent to the issuance of notices by the AO u/s 148.

The Allahabad High Court held as under:

“i) According to the provisions of section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 an Assessing Officer gets jurisdiction to issue notice to an assessee u/s. 148 to reopen the assessment u/s. 147 after the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner is satisfied on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer that it is a fit case for issuing such notice. Section 151 specifically provides for the recording of satisfaction by the prescribed authority, on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer that it is a fit case for the issue of notice u/s. 148. Unless such satisfaction is recorded, the Assessing Officer does not get jurisdiction to issue notice u/s. 148. A satisfaction, to be a valid satisfaction u/s. 151 has to be recorded by the prescribed authority under his signature on application of mind and not mechanically.

ii) The first and foremost condition under sub-section (1) of section 282A is that notice or other document to be issued by any Income-tax authority shall be signed by that authority. The word “and” has been used in sub-section (1), in a conjunctive sense meaning thereby that such notice or other document has first to be signed by the authority and thereafter it may be issued either in paper form or may be communicated in electronic form by that authority. The expression “shall be signed” used in section 282A(1) makes the signing of the notice or other document by that authority a mandatory requirement. It is not a ministerial act or an empty formality which can be dispensed with. Therefore, a notice or other document as referred to in section 282A(1) will take legal effect only after it is signed by that authority, whether physically or digitally. The usage of the word “shall” makes it a mandatory requirement.

iii) In the facts of the case, no valid satisfaction was recorded by the prescribed authority u/s. 151 when the Assessing Officer issued the notices to the assessee u/s. 148. Subsequent to issuance of the notices by the Assessing Officer, the satisfaction u/s. 151 was digitally signed by the prescribed authority. Therefore, at the point of time when the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 148 he did not have the jurisdiction to issue the notices. Consequently, the notices issued by the Assessing Officer were without jurisdiction. The notices issued u/s. 148 and the reassessment orders u/s. 147, if any, passed by the Assessing Officer and all consequential proceedings were quashed. The concerned authority was at liberty to initiate proceedings, if still permissible, strictly in accordance with law and on due observance of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.”

Housing project — Special deduction — Whether assessee owner or developer — Approvals granted in name of assessee and taxes related to land paid by assessee — Tribunal granting special deduction on analysis of facts and applying correct principles to facts — Proper.

60. CIT vs. Abode Builders
[2022] 448 ITR 262 (Bom.)
A.Y.: 2007-08
Date of order: 16th February, 2022
S. 80-IB(10) of ITA,1961

Housing project — Special deduction — Whether assessee owner or developer — Approvals granted in name of assessee and taxes related to land paid by assessee — Tribunal granting special deduction on analysis of facts and applying correct principles to facts — Proper.

The assessee was a developer and builder. For the A.Y. 2007-08, the AO disallowed the assessee’s claim u/s 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the grounds that (a) the assessee was not the owner of the land on which the project was constructed; (b) the assessee not having invested in the construction activity or done construction, could not be considered as a developer; and (c) the project was approved and commenced before the stipulated date of 1st October, 1998.

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction, and this was affirmed by the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) The Assessing Officer had not disputed the findings of fact of the Tribunal that the assessee had through one of its partners been involved in the project from the beginning with the signing of the principal agreement and primary acquisition of the development rights for the land in question, that the intimation of disapproval issued by the Municipal Corporation and the commencement certificate were in the name of the assessee, that all taxes related to the land were paid by the assessee from the year 1998 onwards and that the assessee had even made payment for the development rights.

ii) Unless the assessee had any role in the development of the project, the joint venture partner would not agree to share 50 per cent of the profit in the project with the assessee. The assessee had submitted the original plan to the concerned authorities on November 7, 1996 for which the intimation of disapproval was granted in the year 1997, and therefore, even if a subsequent intimation of disapproval had been obtained in terms of the Explanation to section 80-IB(10) where the approval for the concerned project was given more than once, the date of final approval would be the operative date of approval.

iii) The Tribunal had found that the project, as completed, was different from the project for which initial approval had been obtained. The life of the intimation of disapproval once granted under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 was four years. The original lay-out plan had become invalid after January 7, 2001. The assessee had applied for intimation of disapproval for the second time on November 22, 2001 and was granted permission on July 21, 2002. The Tribunal had concluded on the facts which were not disputed that the second project proposal was only for three buildings as against the four for which the permission was sought earlier and intimation of disapproval for different buildings were granted on different dates and therefore the project for which permission was granted was not the same as that for which the intimation of disapproval had lapsed in the year 2001. When the facts and circumstances had been properly analysed and the correct test was applied to decide the issues no question of law arose.”

Exemption u/s 10(10AA) — Encashed earned leave by employees — Scope of section 10(10AA) — Complete exemption for employees of Central Government or State Government — Meaning of Government employee — Tamil Nadu Agricultural University — Completely funded by State Government and under its complete control — Retired employees of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University — Entitled to complete exemption in respect of encashed earned leave.

59. Dr. P. Balasubramanian and Ors. vs. CCIT(TDS)
[2022] 448 ITR 318 (Mad.)
Date of order: 10th August, 2022
Ss.10(10AA) of ITA,1961

Exemption u/s 10(10AA) — Encashed earned leave by employees — Scope of section 10(10AA) — Complete exemption for employees of Central Government or State Government — Meaning of Government employee — Tamil Nadu Agricultural University — Completely funded by State Government and under its complete control — Retired employees of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University — Entitled to complete exemption in respect of encashed earned leave.

The petitioners are employees of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University. The employees had retired from service in 2017, and at the time of retirement, had been granted a surrender of leave salary. An objection was raised by the local fund audit on the grounds that tax ought to have been deducted under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Thus, the University sought clarification from the local fund audit as well as from the Income-tax Department.

The petitioners challenged the audit objections issued by the local fund audit calling upon the petitioners to remit the Income-tax on surrender of leave salary on the grounds that tax has not been deducted at source in terms of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

“i) Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, deals with exemption on encashed earned leave by employees. Section 10(10AA) has two limbs or clauses. Clause (i) deals with the tax treatment of surrender of leave salary at the time of retirement of Central/State Government employee and states that the entire amount will stand exempt from the levy of Income-tax. Clause (ii) states that surrender of leave salary paid to any other employee, barring Central and State Government employees, is subject to a pecuniary limit as prescribed.

ii) The Tamil Nadu Agricultural University is a university that is constituted under a State Act. Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971 provides for an unfettered right of the State to inspect and conduct enquiry into the management of the university, its various activities including teaching, the work conducted by the university, conduct of examinations as well as person or persons who are connected with the administration or finances of the university, by the State. The power exercised by the State Government in the functioning and management of the university is unbridled. The Governor of Tamil Nadu is, in terms of section 9 of the Act, the Chancellor of the University. The funding of the university is entirely at the behest of the State Government. Hence the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University is a part of the State and employees of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University are Government servants, entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s. 10(10AA)(i) of the Act.

iii) Accordingly, the circular dated February 17, 2015 and consequent communications dated October 30, 2018, March 19, 2019 and November 14, 2016 issued to the petitioners, employees of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, by the University, were contrary to law and liable to be set aside.

iv) To be noted that the petitioners are direct employees of the University, and not employees of allied institutions or constituent colleges and the ratio of this decision will apply only to those employees who are under the direct employment of the University per se.”

Modification of Trade Receivables

This article deals with modification of trade receivables which involves significant sacrifice (cut in amounts to be received) by the debtor and the consequent accounting and disclosure requirements.

FACTS

The Ministry of Power, Government of India, introduced Electricity (Late Payment Surcharge and Related Matters) Rules, 2022 (“LPS Scheme”) vide notification no. G.S.R. 416 (E) dated 3rd June, 2022.

a.    The LPS Scheme provides a restructuring option to DISCOMs to liquidate their dues to Power Producers including late payment surcharge (LPS) on 3rd June, 2022 described in (b) below, through a maximum number of equated monthly instalments (EMI), ranging from 12 to 40 months determined based on outstanding dues amount. Therefore, if INR 100 were outstanding on 3rd June, 2022, INR 100 would be received by X by way of EMI’s without any loading of interest.

b.    DISCOM will have to pay Power Producer X LPS for all past periods of delay up to 3rd June, 2022, at the specified interest rate and period specified in LPS Scheme.

c.    In the past since it was not reasonably certain that the LPS would be received, X has not recorded LPS income.

d.    The sacrifice made by X is substantial and more than 25% of the amount due on 3rd June, 2022.

QUESTIONS

1.    How will X account the modification of trade receivable pursuant to the LPS Scheme? How is LPS for the past periods accounted for by X?

2.    What is the appropriate presentation for the modified receivables by X?

TECHNICAL REFERENCES

Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments

3.2.3 An entity shall derecognise a financial asset when, and only when:

a. the contractual rights to the cash flows from the financial asset expire, or

b. it transfers the financial asset as set out in paragraphs 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 and the transfer qualifies for derecognition in accordance with paragraph 3.2.6.

3.3.1 An entity shall remove a financial liability (or a part of a financial liability) from its balance sheet when, and only when, it is extinguished—i.e., when the obligation specified in the contract is discharged or cancelled or expires.

3.3.2 An exchange between an existing borrower and lender of debt instruments with substantially different terms shall be accounted for as an extinguishment of the original financial liability and the recognition of a new financial liability. Similarly, a substantial modification of the terms of an existing financial liability or a part of it (whether or not attributable to the financial difficulty of the debtor) shall be accounted for as an extinguishment of the original financial liability and the recognition of a new financial liability.

3.3.3 The difference between the carrying amount of a financial liability (or part of a financial liability) extinguished or transferred to another party and the consideration paid, including any non-cash assets transferred or liabilities assumed, shall be recognised in profit or loss.

3.2.6 When an entity transfers a financial asset (see paragraph 3.2.4), it shall evaluate the extent to which it retains the risks and rewards of ownership of the financial asset. In this case:

a.    if the entity transfers substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership of the financial asset, the entity shall derecognise the financial asset and recognise separately as assets or liabilities any rights and obligations created or retained in the transfer.

b.    if the entity retains substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership of the financial asset, the entity shall continue to recognise the financial asset.

c.    if the entity neither transfers nor retains substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership of the financial asset, the entity shall determine whether it has retained control of the financial asset. In this case:

i.    if the entity has not retained control, it shall derecognise the financial asset and recognise separately as assets or liabilities any rights and obligations created or retained in the transfer.

ii.    if the entity has retained control, it shall continue to recognise the financial asset to the extent of its continuing involvement in the financial asset (see paragraph 3.2.16).

5.4.3 When the contractual cash flows of a financial asset are renegotiated or otherwise modified and the renegotiation or modification does not result in the derecognition of that financial asset in accordance with this Standard, an entity shall recalculate the gross carrying amount of the financial asset and shall recognise a modification gain or loss in profit or loss. The gross carrying amount of the financial asset shall be recalculated as the present value of the renegotiated or modified contractual cash flows that are discounted at the financial asset’s original effective interest rate (or credit-adjusted effective interest rate for purchased or originated credit-impaired financial assets) or, when applicable, the revised effective interest rate calculated in accordance with paragraph 6.5.10. Any costs or fees incurred adjust the carrying amount of the modified financial asset and are amortised over the remaining term of the modified financial asset.

Extracts from IFRIC Committee Agenda Decision, September 2012 – IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement—Derecognition of financial instruments upon modification
The Interpretations Committee received a request for guidance on the circumstances in which the restructuring of Greek government bonds (GGB) should result in derecognition in accordance with IAS 39 of the whole asset or only part of it. In particular, the Interpretations Committee has been requested to consider whether:

  • the portion of the old GGBs that are exchanged for twenty new bonds with different maturities and interest rates should be derecognised, or conversely accounted for as a modification or transfer that would not require derecognition?


  • IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors would be applicable in analysing the submitted fact pattern?


  • either paragraphs AG8 or AG62 of IAS 39 would be applicable to the fact pattern submitted if the GGBs were not derecognised?


Exchange of financial instruments: derecognition?


The Interpretations Committee observed that the term ‘transfer’ is not defined in IAS 39. However, the potentially relevant portion of paragraph 18 of IAS 39 states that an entity transfers a financial asset if it transfers the contractual rights to receive the cash flows of the financial asset. The Interpretations Committee noted that, in the fact pattern submitted, the bonds are transferred back to the issuer rather than being transferred to a third party. Accordingly, the Interpretations Committee believed that the transaction should be assessed against paragraph 17(a) of IAS 39.

In applying paragraph 17(a), the Interpretations Committee noted that, in order to determine whether the financial asset is extinguished, it is necessary to assess the changes made as part of the bond exchange against the notion of ‘expiry’ of the rights to the cash flows. The Interpretations Committee also noted that, if an entity applies IAS 8 because of the absence in IAS 39 of an explicit discussion of when a modification of a financial asset results in derecognition, applying IAS 8 requires judgement to develop and apply an accounting policy. Paragraph 11 of IAS 8 requires that, in determining an appropriate accounting policy, consideration must first be given to the requirements in IFRSs that deal with similar and related issues. The Interpretations Committee noted that, in the fact pattern submitted, that requirement would lead to the development of an analogy to the notion of a substantial change of the terms of a financial liability in paragraph 40 of IAS 39.

Paragraph 40 sets out that such a change can be effected by the exchange of debt instruments or by modification of the terms of an existing instrument. Hence, if this analogy to financial liabilities is applied to financial assets, a substantial change of terms (whether effected by exchange or by modification) would result in derecognition of the financial asset.

The Interpretations Committee noted that, if the guidance for financial liabilities is applied by analogy to assess whether the exchange of a portion of the old GGBs for twenty new bonds is a substantial change of the terms of the financial asset, the assessment needs to be made taking into consideration all of the changes made as part of the bond exchange.

In the fact pattern submitted, the relevant facts led the Interpretations Committee to conclude that, in determining whether the transaction results in the derecognition of the financial asset, both approaches (i.e., extinguishment under paragraph 17(a) of IAS 39 or substantial change of the terms of the asset) would result in derecognition.

The Interpretations Committee considered the following aspects of the fact pattern in assessing the extent of the change that results from the transaction:

  • A holder of a single bond has received, in exchange for one portion of the old bond, twenty bonds with different maturities and cash flow profiles as well as other instruments in accordance with the terms and conditions of the exchange transaction.


  • All of the bond-holders received the same restructuring deal irrespective of the terms and conditions of their individual holdings. This indicates that the individual instruments, terms and conditions were not taken into account. The different bonds (series) were not each modified in contemplation of their respective terms and conditions but were instead replaced by a new uniform debt structure.


  • The terms and conditions of the new bonds are substantially different from those of the old bonds. The changes include many different aspects, such as the change in governing law; the introduction of contractual collective action clauses and the introduction of a co-financing agreement that affects the rights of the new bond holders; and modifications to the amount, term and coupons.


The Interpretations Committee noted that the starting point that it used for its analysis was the assumption in the submission that the part of the principal amount of the old GGBs that was exchanged for new GGBs could be separately assessed for derecognition. The Interpretations Committee emphasised that this assumption was more favourable for achieving partial derecognition than looking at the whole of the old bond. Hence, its conclusion that the old GGBs should be derecognised would apply even more so when taking into account that the exchange of the old GGBs was, as a matter of fact, the result of a single agreement that covered all aspects and types of consideration for surrendering the old GGBs. As a consequence, the Interpretations Committee noted that partial derecognition did not apply.

Consequently, the Interpretations Committee decided not to add the issue to its agenda.

Application of paragraphs AG62 or AG8 of IAS 39 to the submitted fact pattern-
The Interpretations Committee noted that the questions raised by the submitter assume that the old GGBs in the fact pattern would not be derecognised. In the submitted fact pattern, the Interpretations Committee concluded that the old GGBs are derecognised. The Interpretations Committee noted that, because of its conclusion on derecognition, these questions did not need to be answered.

Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements

Information to be presented in the profit or loss section or the statement of profit or loss

82. In addition to items required by other Ind ASs, the profit or loss section of the statement of profit and loss shall include line items that present the following amounts for the period:

a. revenue, presenting separately interest revenue calculated using the effective interest method;

(aa) gains and losses arising from the derecognition of financial assets measured at amortised cost;

b.  finance costs……

Ind AS 107 Financial Instruments: Disclosures

20A. An entity shall disclose an analysis of the gain or loss recognised in the statement of profit and loss arising from the derecognition of financial assets measured at amortised cost, showing separately gains and losses arising from derecognition of those financial assets. This disclosure shall include the reasons for derecognising those financial assets.
ANALYSIS

Response to Question 1

Paragraphs 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of Ind AS 109 relate to the derecognition of financial liabilities. The fact pattern relates to a substantial modification of a financial asset.

In accordance with Ind AS 109:3.2.3, an entity should derecognise a financial asset when, and only when:

a) the contractual rights to the cash flows from the financial asset expire; or

b) it transfers the financial asset as set out in Ind AS 109:3.2.4 and 3.2.5, and the transfer qualifies for derecognition in accordance with Ind AS 109:3.2.6.

For modifications of financial assets (e.g., a renegotiation of the asset’s contractual cash flows), derecognition can occur when then contractual cash flows expire or are transferred. In the given fact pattern, the contractual cash flows have neither expired as contemplated in 3.2.3 (a), nor are they transferred as contemplated in 3.2.3 (b). As per the fact pattern, the cash flow has been modified.

Ind AS 109:5.4.3 contains requirements on accounting for the modification of a financial asset when its contractual cash flows are renegotiated or otherwise modified, and the asset is not derecognised. In those cases, the entity should recalculate the gross carrying amount of the financial asset and recognise a modification gain or loss in profit or loss. The gross carrying amount is recalculated as the present value of the renegotiated or modified contractual cash flows, discounted at the financial asset’s original effective interest rate (or credit–adjusted effective interest rate for purchased or originated credit–impaired financial assets) or, when applicable, the revised effective interest rate calculated in accordance with Ind AS 109.6.5.10. Any costs or fees incurred adjust the carrying amount of the modified financial asset and are amortised over the remaining term of the modified financial asset.

The question that needs to be answered is whether X should apply the simpliciter modification requirement as per Ind AS 109:5.4.3 or derecognise the financial asset and recognise a new financial asset.

Clause 3.3.2 of Ind AS 109, with respect to substantial modification, applies to financial liabilities. Ind AS 109 does not contain substantive guidance on when a modification of a financial asset should result in derecognition from a lender’s perspective. IFRIC concluded that analogy, nonetheless, can be applied to financial asset from the substantial modification requirements applicable to financial liability. Though the IFRIC decision was made in the context of IAS 39, it would equally apply to IFRS 9 (Ind AS 109). In our fact pattern, there is a substantial modification, because there is a substantial sacrifice compared to the original receivable, there is an introduction of significant new features into the instrument (EMI’s), and a significant extension to the term of the instrument.

Basis the above, X does not apply the modification requirement as per Ind AS 109:5.4.3 but applies the significant modification requirement by analogy to the requirements applicable to a financial liability. Consequently, X will derecognise the receivable and recognise the new receivable which will comprise of the EMI’s discounted at a rate that reflects the current market assessment of the time value of money and the risks that are specific to the cash flows for that customer (i.e., using the prevailing market interest rate for a trade receivable determined based on the customer’s credit rating and the contracted EMI tenure). The receivable recognised at the date of restructuring will be reversed and new receivables representing discounted EMIs will be recognised, and the difference will be recognised in the profit and loss account. The LPS will not be recognised as its collection is already subsumed in the restructured EMIs to be received from the customer. If LPS is recognised it may erroneously end up grossing up of the financial income and loss on restructuring of trade receivable.

Response to Question 2

The loss on substantial modification of trade receivable computed as the difference between the carrying amount of old trade receivable and the new trade receivable is recognised as “losses arising from the derecognition of trade receivable on substantial modification” under Finance Cost in the Statement of Profit and Loss with detailed note explaining the modification. This is in line with paragraph 82 of Ind AS 1 and paragraph 20A of Ind AS 107. Though paragraph 82 requires such disclosure on the face of the P&L, keeping in mind the materiality, it may be acceptable to include the loss under finance cost and make such disclosures by way of a note. The ‘new’ trade receivable will be classified as current and non-current as per the requirement of Ind AS 1, considering the EMI period outstanding. Interest income on the new trade receivable is recognised at the EIR [i.e., discount rate used for discounting the EMI cash flow] in the Statement of Profit and Loss over the EMI period.

Location of Source of Income in Case of Exports

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 9 deems certain incomes to have accrued or arisen in India, thereby making a non-resident liable to tax in India on such income. Clauses (vi) and (vii) of section 9(1) deal with the taxability of income by way of royalty and fees for technical services respectively. As per these clauses, royalty and fees for technical services are deemed to have accrued or arisen in India under the following cases:

a) If they are payable by the Government.

b) If they are payable by a person who is a resident. However, if the properties for which the royalty is payable or the services for which fees are payable are utilized by the resident payer for the purposes of his business or profession carried on by him outside India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source outside India then this deeming fiction is not applicable.

c) If they are payable by a person who is a non-resident but only when the properties for which the royalty is payable or the services for which fees are payable are utilized by the non-resident payer for the purposes of his business or profession carried on by him in India or for the purposes of making or earning any income from any source in India.

In the case of export sales, residents need to avail various types of services from non-residents, and the corresponding consideration payable for such services may be characterized as royalty or fees for technical services, as defined in sub-sections (vi) and (vii) respectively of section 9(1). Often, the issue arises in such a case as to whether it can be said that the source of income with respect to export sales is situated outside India and, therefore, such royalty or fees for technical cannot be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India due to the exception provided in sub-clause (b) of clauses (vi) or (vii) of section 9(1). The Madras High Court has taken a view in favour of the assessee by holding that royalty payable on export sales falls under this exception. As against this, the Delhi High Court has taken a view against the assessee by holding that testing fee payable for products to be exported does not fall under this exception as the source of income of the resident payer was situated in India.


AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT KUHNLE KOPP’S CASE
The issue first came up for consideration before the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Aktiengesellschaft Kuhnle Kopp and Kausch W. Germany by BHEL [2003] 262 ITR 513 (Mad). The assessment years involved in this case were 1978-79 to 1982-83. In this case, the assessee was a German company, which had entered into a collaboration agreement with BHEL, an Indian company. By the virtue of this agreement, the assessee had received a a royalty on the export sales made by BHEL. The asseessee claimed that the amount received as royalty was not liable to tax in India. The AO did not accept the claim and completed the assessment taxing the royalty in the hands of the assessee.

The assessee challenged the assessment order before the Commissioner (Appeals), who confirmed the assessment order. Upon further appeal, the Tribunal set aside the assessment and restored the same to the AO to consider the question whether the amount of royalty received was exempt under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (“DTAA”). The AO, once again, completed the assessment bringing the royalty received by the assessee to tax and the same was upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals). In the second round of appeal, the Tribunal held that the royalty payable on export sales could not have been regarded as income deemed to have accrued in India within the meaning of section 9(1)(vi) of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the royalty on export sales is not taxable. It was this order of the Tribunal which was the subject-matter of the reference before the High Court.

With regard to the taxability of royalty, which was payable on export sales, the High Court held that it was paid out of the export sales and hence, the source of royalty was the sales outside India. Therefore, it could not be deemed to have accrued or arisen in India, though it was paid by a resident in India. Since the source for royalty was from the source situated outside India, the royalty payable on export sales was not taxable in India. On this basis, the High Court upheld the order of the tribunal.

HAVELLS INDIA LTD.’S CASE
The issue, thereafter, came up for consideration of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Havells India Ltd. [2013] 352 ITR 376 (Del).

In this case, for A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee paid testing fees of Rs. 14,71,095 to M/s. CSA International, Chicago, Illinois, USA for the purpose of obtaining witness testing of AC contractor as a part of the CB report and KEMA certification. During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the assessee had not deducted tax at source u/s 195 of the Act from the amount paid to the US Company and, accordingly, he proposed to disallow the payment by invoking section 40(a)(i). The assessee claimed that the testing was carried out by the US Company outside India, that no income arose or accrued to the US Company in India and, therefore the assessee did not deduct any tax from the amount paid. The AO did not agree with the assesse’s contentions. He held that the amount paid represented fees for technical services rendered by the US Company to the assessee within the meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, since the testing of the equipment was a highly specialised job of technical nature. The AO also referred to Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA entered into between India and USA and observed that the payment was also covered under the said article as “fees for included services” as defined therein. According to the AO, the testing report and certification represented technical services which made available technical knowledge, experience and skill to the assessee, because they were utilized in the manufacture and sale of the products in the business of the assessee.

On this basis, the AO disallowed it u/s 40(a)(i) of the Act. Upon further appeal, the CIT (A) agreed with the view of the AO and he further supported it by relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Cochin Refineries Ltd. vs. CIT, (1996) 222 ITR 354.

Before the tribunal, the assessee raised the following contentions –

  • Since the assessee was engaged in the export of goods outside India, the fees for technical services under consideration were paid for the purpose of making or earning income from a source outside India. Thus, it was excluded from the purview of taxability in India due to an exception provided in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of section 9(1).

  • The authorities have erred in holding that the technical report and certification were utilized in the manufacture and sale of the assessee’s products in the assessee’s business in India.

  • The concerned certification was not required for selling the products in India and it only enabled selling of products in the European Union. Thus, the authorities were wrong in saying that the technical services were utilised by the assessee for its business in India.

  • In any case, in order to tax the fees for included services in India under Article 12(4)(b) of the DTAA, mere rendering of technical services was not sufficient, and it was necessary that such services should have resulted in ‘making available’ the technical knowledge, experience and skill to the assessee, which was not the case.

On the basis of the aforesaid arguments, the tribunal recorded the following findings –

  • The certification obtained by the assessee from the US Company was for enabling the export of its products.

  • The authorities below had not been able to bring anything on record to support their stand that the service of testing and certification had been applied by the assessee for its manufacturing activity within India.

  • The assessee had been able to show that the testing and certification were necessary for the export of its products, and that these were actually utilised for such export, and were not utilised for the business activities of production in India. The assessee has thus discharged its burden, whereas the Revenue has not been able to show to the contrary, and they had not denied that the utilisation of the testing and certification was in respect of the exports.

In view of these findings, the Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee that the technical services were utilised for the purpose of making or earning income from a source outside India and was therefore covered by the second exception made in Section 9(1)(vii)(b).

Before the High Court, the assessee reiterated its contentions and also relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Aktiengesellschaft Kuhnle Kopp (supra). The High Court observed that this judgement of the Madras High Court certainly was supporting the contentions of the assessee. However, the High Court referred to the earlier decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Anglo French Textiles Ltd. (1993) 199 ITR 785 and observed that it appeared that this earlier decision had not been brought to the notice of the division bench which decided the later case.

In the case of Anglo French Textiles Ltd. (supra), the assessee was a company incorporated under the French laws which were applicable to possessions in Pondicherry in India. It had a textile mill in Pondicherry and its activity consisted in the manufacture of yarn and textiles as well as export of textiles from Pondicherry. The entire business operations were confined to the territory of Pondicherry. After the merger of Pondicherry with India in August, 1962, the Income-tax Act was extended to Pondicherry w. e. f. 1st April, 1963 Till then, the French law relating to income tax was in force in Pondicherry. During the period when the French tax law was in force, the assessee surrendered certain raw cotton import and machinery import entitlements and received payments from the Textile Commissioner (Bombay). The question arose as to the taxability of the income referable to the import entitlements.

While the Income-tax department took the stand that the income accrued to the assessee in India and was therefore taxable under the Act, the assessee claimed that the receipts were in Pondicherry, and since the exports were made from Pondicherry, the income accrued or arose to the assessee in the territory of Pondicherry, which was outside the purview of the Act.

The Madras High Court observed that the import entitlements arose out of the export activity which was carried on by the assessee only in Pondicherry, that no part of the manufacturing or selling activity of the assessee was carried on outside Pondicherry, that the import entitlements were relatable only to the export performance which took place in Pondicherry, and that on the fulfillment of the export activity, a right to receive the export incentive accrued in favour of the assessee in the territory of Pondicherry.

The argument of the department was that the incentive was quantified and sent from Bombay from the office of the Textile Commissioner and, therefore, the income arose within the taxable territories. This argument was rejected by the Madras High Court by holding that “the right to receive the import entitlements arose when the export commitment was fulfilled by the assessee in Pondicherry, though such amount was subsequently ascertained or quantified”.

It was also argued on behalf of the Revenue before the High Court that the import entitlement should be regarded as a source of income in the taxable territories, and u/s 9(1) of the Act, the income arising out of the encashment of the import entitlements should be deemed to accrue or arise in the taxable territories. This argument was also rejected by the High Court on the ground that source of income should be looked at from a practical viewpoint, and not merely as an abstract legal concept.

Applying this earlier judgement of the Madras High Court in the case of Anglo French Textiles Ltd. (supra), the Delhi High Court held that the export activity having taken place or having been fulfilled in India, the source of income was located in India and not outside. The mere fact that the export proceeds emanated from persons situated outside India did not constitute them as the source of income. The export contracts obviously were concluded in India and the assessee’s products were sent outside India under such contracts. The manufacturing activity was located in India. The source of income was created at the moment when the export contracts were concluded in India. Thereafter the goods were exported in pursuance of the contract, and the export proceeds were sent by the importer and were received in India.

The importer of the assessee’s products was no doubt situated outside India, but he could not be regarded as a source of income. The receipt of the sale proceeds emanated from him from outside India. He was, therefore, only the source of the monies received. The income component of the monies or the export receipts was located or situated only in India. Thus, on this basis, the High Court drew a distinction between the source of the income and the source of the receipt of the income. In order to fall within the second exception provided in Section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, the source of the income, and not the receipt, should be situated outside India.

On this basis, the Delhi High Court held that since the source of income from the export sales could not be said to be located or situated outside India, the case of the assessee could not be brought under the second exception provided in section 9(1)(vii)(b).

Further, the Delhi High Court also rejected the contention raised by assessee that the income arose not only from the manufacturing activity but also arose because of the sales of the products, and if necessary, a bifurcation of the income should be made on this basis, and that portion of the income which was attributable to the export sales should qualify for the second exception. The High Court relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai, (1950) 18 ITR 472 (SC) that the place where the source of income was located might not necessarily be the place where the income also accrues and held that this question was not material in the present case, because they were concerned only with the question as to where the source was located.

As far as the issue of taxability under the DTAA was concerned, the High Court restored it to the tribunal to decide, as it had not considered this issue on account of the view it took regarding the taxability of the fees for technical services under the Act.

The Madras High Court in a later decision in the case of Regen Powertech (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2019] 110 taxmann.com 55 (Madras) has agreed with the view of the Delhi High Court in Havells India Ltd. (supra).

OBSERVATIONS
The primary issue for consideration is the place where the source of income can be said to be located when a resident exports goods outside India. Whether the source of income in such case can be considered to have been located outside India because it arises from the export of goods outside India and it is received from a person situated outside India?

In order to address this issue, it is first imperative to understand the meaning of the term ‘source of income’. The Judicial Committee in Rhodesia Metals Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1941) 9 ITR (Suppl.) 45, observed that a “source” means not a legal concept but one which a practical man would regard as a real source of income. The observations of the Judicial Committee (supra) as to what is a source of income have been approved by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Lady Kanchanbai [1970] 77 ITR 123.

The Allahabad High Court has explained the meaning of source of income in the case of Seth Shiv Prasad vs. CIT, (1972) 84 ITR 15 (All.), in the following words –

“A source of income, therefore, may be described as the spring or fount from which a clearly defined channel of income flows. It is that which by its nature and incidents constitutes a distinct and separate origin of income, capable of consideration as such in isolation from other sources of income, and which by the manner of dealing adopted by the assessee can be treated so.”

Thus, the source of income needs to be understood from the perspective of the person who is earning that income. It is something from which the income flows to him. In view of these guidelines, what needs to be considered is whether it is the activity that generates the income which needs to be considered as the source of that income or whether it is the person from whom the income flows that needs to be considered as the source of that income. If the activity generating the income is regarded as the source of income, then the place at which that activity has been carried on would be regarded as the place where the source of that income is situated. However, if the person from whom the income has been received is regarded as the source of income, then the place where that person is located would be regarded as the place where the source of that income is situated.

Normally, it should be the activity generating the income which should be considered as the source of income. The income is earned by the person through the activitiy which he carries on and in which he employs his resources. The receipt of the income and the person from whom it is received are merely the offshoots of the activity carried on by the person. The receipt of the income is merely a final step within the activity, and that by itself should not be considered to be the source of income disregarding the whole of the activity. Similarly, in case of export sales, the customer situated in a foreigh country to whom the goods have been sold and from whom the sale consideration is received should not be regarded as the source of income, disregarding the fact that the origin of the export sales is the business which has been carried on from India.

Further, if the other person with whom the activity has been carried on and from whom the income has been received is considered to be the source of income, then the same activity will result into multiple sources of income, merely because it has been carried on with multiple persons. For example, consider a case of a person who is engaged in a business involving domestic sales as well as export sales, and that too to different countries. In such a case, it will be illogical to consider every person to whom or every geographical segment to which the sales have been made as a separate and distinct source of income.

It is true that every part of the activity contributes to the income which is being earned from that activity. So, as a result, it can be said that income accrues partly from the sales and partly from the other business functions which are involved. As a corollary, if the sales are made outside India, then the part of that income which is attributable to sales is also accruing outside India. But, here, we are concerned with the source of income and not the accrual of income.

A distinction has been drawn between the source of income and the accrual of income by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. [1950] 18 ITR 472. It has been held that the income may accrue or arise at the place of the source or may accrue or arise elsewhere. Thus, merely because the income needs to be considered as partly accruing outside India to the extent it is attributable to the export sales, the source of income per se cannot be considered to be located outside India. This aspect has also been considered by the Delhi High Court in its decision.

Consider a case where the income is earned from the exploitation of an asset, e.g., income earned from renting of an immovable property. In such a case, merely because the person to whom the property has been leased out is situated outside India and the rent is also received from him outside India, it will be illogical to conclude that the source of income is situated outside India. As the location of the asset in case of asset-based income is the material factor to decide where the source of income is located, the location of the actitiy in case of activity-based income is the material factor to decide where the source of income is located.

In the following cases, a view similar to the view of the Delhi High Court in the case of Havells India Ltd. (supra) has been taken by holding that the source does not refer to the person who makes the payment, but it refers to the activity which gives rise to the income-

  • Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT (2003) 85 ITD 478
  • International Hotel Licesnsing Co. In re (2007) 288 ITR 534 (AAR)
  • South West Mining Ltd. In re (2005) 278 ITR 233 (AAR)
  • Dorf Ketal Chemicals LLC vs. DCIT (2018) 92 taxmann.com 222 (Mumbai – Trib.)
  • Infosys Ltd. vs. DCIT (2022) 140 taxmann.com 600 (Bangalore – Trib.)
  • International Management Group (UK) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2016) 162 ITD 219 (Del)

In PrCIT vs. Motif India Infotech (P) Ltd 409 ITR 178, the Gujarat High Court held that in a case where technical services were provided by a supplier to overseas customers of a software company directly outside India, the fees for technical services was paid by the assessee for the purpose of making or earning any income from any source outside India, and clearly, the source of income, namely the assessee’s customers, were the foreign based companies. In this case, the assessee had certain contracts for rendering outsourcing services in Philippines. For rendering such services, it had availed services of a Philippines company. Therefore, the services had been rendered outside India. The Gujarat High Court distinguished the Delhi High Court decision in Havell’s case, stating that the facts were different. Perhaps, in the case before the Gujarat High Court, the fact that the services were performed outside India for the overseas customers, which services also had to be physically performed outside India, had a direct bearing on the matter.

In view of the above, the better view seems to be the one adopted by the Delhi High Court that the source of income cannot be considered to be located outside India solely on the basis that the income is derived from export of goods outside India.

Estimate of income — Accounting — Rejection of accounts — Estimate should be fair — Local knowledge and circumstances of assessee should be taken into consideration — Modification of estimate of AO by Tribunal based on material on record — Justified — No question of law arose.

58. Principal CIT vs. Smart Value Products and Services Ltd
[2022] 448 ITR 145 (HP)
A.Y.: 2009-10
Date of order: 28th March, 2022
S. 11 of ITA, 1961

Estimate of income — Accounting — Rejection of accounts — Estimate should be fair — Local knowledge and circumstances of assessee should be taken into consideration — Modification of estimate of AO by Tribunal based on material on record — Justified — No question of law arose.

In the return of income for the A.Y.2009-10, the assessee had declared gross turnover to the tune of Rs. 91,90,10,669 and net profit to the tune of Rs. 1,06,69,510. Thus, the net profit rate was 1.16 per cent. The AO rejected the accounts. The AO prepared the trading account and the gross profit of the assessee came out to be Rs. 36,39,54,887 against sales of Rs. 71,24,69,335 and, as a result, the gross profit rate came to 51.8 per cent. Consequently, an addition of Rs. 14.48 crores was made by the AO.

Since in the subsequent years, the Revenue Department accepted the net profit rate in the case of the assessee at 2.53 per cent and 2.99 per cent, therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) applied the average of the net profit of assessed income of the subsequent two years for the purpose of determining the profit of the assessee. This was upheld by the Tribunal.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 empowers the Assessing Officer to reject the books of account of the assessee if he finds them defective. The estimate of income made in consequence should be fair. The Assessing Officer should not act dishonestly or vindictively or capriciously. History, knowledge of previous returns, local knowledge, circumstances of the assessee are to be considered to arrive at a fair and proper estimation.

ii) The appellate authority as well as the Tribunal had carefully gone through the record of the case and had found that the Assessing Officer had computed the month wise and quarter wise trading account for enhancing the gross profit. The Assessing Officer had failed to consider the genuine purchases and sales made by the assessee, which had been duly entered in the books of account. The nature of business carried on by the assessee was also not considered by the Assessing Officer. The assessee was receiving goods throughout the year from different warehouses, through bills or challans. Lump-sum payments were made to the different suppliers throughout the year. All the records, i.e., books of account, sales and purchase vouchers had been fully produced by the assessee.

iii) In the subsequent assessment years, the Assessing Officer had passed the orders u/s. 143(3) of the Act in respect of the same business activities of the assessee, which gave rise to net profit of 2.53 per cent. and 2.99 per cent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal had rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.”

(A) Double taxation avoidance — Deduction of tax at source — Effect of section 90 — Provisions of DTAA applicable wherever more beneficial to assessee — Contract between Indian company and American company — Provisions of DTAA more beneficial for purposes of deduction of tax at source — Provisions of DTAA applicable — Definition in DTAA of technical services more beneficial to assessee — Tax not deductible at source as payment to American company by way of reimbursement of employees of American company seconded to it.
(B) Deduction of tax at source — Certificate for deduction at lower rate or nil deduction — Difference between sections 195 and 197 — Application u/s 195 to be made by person making payment.

57. Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT(IT)
[2022] 448 ITR 268 (Kar.)
A.Y.: 2020-21
Date of order: 24th June, 2022
Ss. 90, 195 and 197 of ITA, 1961 and
Art.12 of India-US DTAA

(A) Double taxation avoidance — Deduction of tax at source — Effect of section 90 — Provisions of DTAA applicable wherever more beneficial to assessee — Contract between Indian company and American company — Provisions of DTAA more beneficial for purposes of deduction of tax at source — Provisions of DTAA applicable — Definition in DTAA of technical services more beneficial to assessee — Tax not deductible at source as payment to American company by way of reimbursement of employees of American company seconded to it.

(B) Deduction of tax at source — Certificate for deduction at lower rate or nil deduction — Difference between sections 195 and 197 — Application u/s 195 to be made by person making payment.

The assessee was engaged in the business of providing information technology solutions and support services for the e-commerce industry. In the course of its business, the assessee made payments in the nature of ‘pure reimbursements’ to W of USA for the A.Y. 2020-21 and requested the Department for issuance of a ‘certificate of no deduction of tax at source’. The payment of salaries to the deputed expatriate employees was made by W for administrative convenience and the assessee made reimbursements to W. With respect to such payments, the assessee applied for a certificate u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. W and F of Singapore had entered into an inter-company master services agreement dated 28th May, 2019 for the secondment of employees and provision of services. In terms of the master services agreement (MSA), either of the parties or its affiliates could use the seconded employees, and the party placing the secondees would invoice the compensation and the wage cost of secondees incurred in the home country. The MSA had two distinct parts: (i) relating to the provision of services and (ii) the secondment of employees. In terms of the MSA, W seconded four employees to the assessee and entered into a ‘global assignment arrangement’ with the seconded employees, which provided that the seconded employees would work for the benefit of the assessee. In response to the invoices raised by W as regards the payments made towards salaries of the seconded employees, the assessee intended to make payments to W and in that context, made an application u/s 195(2) requesting for permission to remit the cost-to-cost reimbursements to be made without deduction of tax at source. The application was rejected.

The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order of rejection and held as under:

“i) Section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides that where the Central Government has entered into an agreement with a country outside India for the purpose of granting relief of tax or for avoidance of double taxation in relation to the assessee, the provisions of the Act would apply to the extent they are more beneficial to the assessee. The Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre Of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC) has clarified that where the provisions of the “Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement” are more beneficial than the provisions of the Act, it is the Agreement that should be treated as the law that requires to be followed and applied.

ii) Section 195 of the Act deals with deduction of tax in cases where payment is to be made to a non-resident. Section 195(2) and section 197 of the Act are in the nature of safeguards for the assessee and are to be invoked to avoid consequences of a finding eventually after assessment that the payer ought to have made deduction and in such case, it would be open to treat the assessee as “an assessee-in-default” in terms of section 201 of the Act, leading to prosecution being initiated under section 276B against the payer and disallowance of expenses u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

iii) The recourse to section 195(2) was perfectly in consonance with the object of section 195. It was maintainable.

iv) Article 12(1) of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the United States of America provides for taxation of royalties and fees for included services arising in a contracting State and paid to a resident of the other contracting State. Further, article 12(2) provides that royalties and fees for included services may also be taxed in the contracting State in which they arise. “Fees for included services” is defined in article 12(4). Section 195(2) of the Act, placed an obligation on the assessee to make deduction of tax under sub-section (1) where payment of any sum chargeable under this Act was being made to a non-resident. The words “chargeable under this Act” if read in conjunction with provisions of article 12(4) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the obligation u/s. 195(2), it becomes clear that the definition of “fees for included services” under article 12(4) was more beneficial to the assessee in so far as its obligation to deduct the tax was concerned. Accordingly, article 12(4) was to be applied to determine the liability to deduct tax.

v) In terms of article 12(4)(b) for the purpose of construing fees for included services, it is necessary that the rendering of technical or consultancy services must make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes. Further, it may also consist of development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. It is not a mere rendering of technical or consultancy services, but the requirement of make available in terms of article 12(4)(b) that has to be fulfilled. The master services agreement, if subjected to scrutiny as regards the aspect of secondment did not reveal the satisfaction of the requirement of “make available” which is a sine qua non for being fees for included services. The fact that the employees seconded has the requisite experience, skill or training capable of completing the services contemplated in secondment by itself was insufficient to treat it as fees for included services de hors the satisfaction of the “make available” clause. The “make available” requirement that is mandated under article 12(4) granted benefit to the assessee and accordingly, the question of falling back on the provisions of section 9 of the Act did not arise. On this score alone, the conclusion in the order of the payment for the service falling within the description u/s. 9 of the Act as “deemed income”, had to be rejected. The only order that could now be passed was of one granting “nil tax deduction at source”.”

The court clarified that the finding as regards to the deduction of tax at source u/s 195 of the Act is tentative and the question of liability of the recipient was to be decided subsequently. Accordingly, there was no question of prejudice to the Revenue at the stage of the section 195 order.

(A) Appeal to High Court — Powers of High Court — Has power to consider question of jurisdiction even if not raised before Tribunal.
(B) Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) — Concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof — Notice — Validity — Notice must clearly specify nature of offence — Notice which is vague is not valid.

56. Ganga Iron and Steel Trading Co. vs. CIT
[2022] 447 ITR 743 (Bom.)
Date of order: 22nd December, 2021
Ss. 260A and 271(1)(c) of ITA,1961

(A) Appeal to High Court — Powers of High Court — Has power to consider question of jurisdiction even if not raised before Tribunal.

(B) Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) — Concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof — Notice — Validity — Notice must clearly specify nature of offence — Notice which is vague is not valid.

Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, imposed by the AO, was upheld by the Tribunal. In the appeal before the High Court, the assessee raised the following question of jurisdiction for the first time:

“Whether the show-cause notice dated February 12, 2008 issued to the appellant without indicating that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of incorrect particulars of such income would vitiate the penalty proceedings or whether such notice as issued can be held to be valid?”

The Bombay High Court admitted the question, decided the case in favour of the assessee and held as under:

“i)   An appeal u/s. 260A can be entertained by the High Court on the issue of jurisdiction even if that issue was not raised before the Appellate Tribunal.

ii)    A penal provision, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the affected assessee’s favour. Assessment proceedings form the basis for the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to draw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other’s defect. A penalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. These proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that remains distinct from the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings only through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of vagueness.

iii)    In the show-cause notice dated February 12, 2008, the Assistant Commissioner was not clear as to whether there was concealment of particulars of income or whether the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Issuance of such show-cause notice without specifying whether the assessee had concealed particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of the same had resulted in vitiating the show-cause notice. The notice was not valid.”

45. Subsidy in the nature of remission of sales tax given to promote industries is capital in nature and not chargeable to tax. Further, a subsidy under a retention pricing scheme is eligible for deduction u/s 80IB of the Act.

Tata Chemicals Ltd vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 134 (Mumbai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 2439(MUM) of 2011
A.Y.: 2003-04
Date of order: 16th February, 2022
Sections: 4, 80IB

45. Subsidy in the nature of remission of sales tax given to promote industries is capital in nature and not chargeable to tax. Further, a subsidy under a retention pricing scheme is eligible for deduction u/s 80IB of the Act.

FACTS

During the captioned A.Y. the assessee company merged with a corporate entity. The assessee did not claim a deduction u/s 80IB of the Act in the revised return pursuant to the merger but reserved the right to claim it during the assessment proceedings.

During the assessment proceedings, the AO taxed the sales tax incentive considering the same as a revenue item and held that the fertilizer subsidy was not eligible for deduction u/s 80(IB).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). However, the assessee’s appeal was dismissed on the following grounds:

  • Sales tax incentive scheme does not have a direct nexus with the activities of the industrial unit.

  • Fertilizer subsidy provided by the government as price concession was not income from the industrial undertaking and therefore not eligible for deduction u/s 80(IB).

Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
While deliberating on the sales tax incentive scheme, the ITAT relied on the Apex Court decision in CIT vs. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 306 ITR 392, wherein it was held that the object behind the subsidy determines the nature of the subsidy/incentive. Further, the form of granting the subsidy was immaterial. Thus, it was held that the sales tax incentive money received was capital in nature and hence not subject to tax.

On the subsidy of fertilizers, the ITAT observed that the same was under price retention scheme i.e. the Government decides the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) and pays the difference between the cost of fertilizers and the decided MRP to the assessee in the form of a subsidy. Further, it was held that the aforesaid subsidy was allowed as a deduction u/s 80IB of the Act by the Apex Court decision in CIT vs. Meghalaya Steels Ltd.38 ITR 17 (SC).

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee.

44. Amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act cannot be applied retrospectively.

Rajib Rathindra Saha. vs. Income-tax Officer (International Taxation)
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 216 (Mumbai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 7352 (Mum.) of 2019
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 21st February, 2022
Section: 56(2)(vii)(b)

44. Amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act cannot be applied retrospectively.

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, paid earnest money for the purchase of an immovable property in 2010. The assessee executed the agreement to purchase the said property on 31st March, 2013 and paid the stamp duty on 18th March, 2013. The property was actually registered on 2nd April, 2014.

In the course of assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2014-15, the AO pointed out the fact that the stamp duty valuation on the date of registration was higher than the cost of acquisition of the property. Accordingly, the said difference was bought to tax u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, as amended vide Finance Act, 2013. The assessee requested the AO to refer the matter to the departmental valuation officer (DVO), but the same was rejected and an order was passed making an addition of the difference between the stamp duty value and the cost of acquisition.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) referred the matter to DVO and directed the AO to re-compute the income of the assessee accordingly.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee submitted that the agreement of the property was executed and stamp duty was paid on 31st March, 2013 i.e. during A.Y. 2013-14.

Prior to the amendment, where any immovable property was received without consideration and the stamp duty value of which exceeded Rs. 50,000 the stamp duty value of such property would be charged to tax. The Finance Act, 2013 introduced an amendment to section 56(2)(vii)(b), according to which the difference between the stamp duty value and the consideration paid became taxable in the hands of the purchaser.

Since the said amendment to section 56(2)(vii)(b) was applicable from A.Y. 2014-15, the said provision could not be applied to the assessee. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Ranchi Bench of Tribunal in Bajrang Lal Naredi vs. ITO [IT Appeal No. 327 (Ran.) of 2018, dated 2-1-2020].

An alternate contention was raised by the assessee, wherein it was stated that the DVO has erred in valuing the property on 31st March, 2013 as against 2010, when the earnest money was paid by the assessee.

The Departmental Representative submitted that since the property was actually registered during A.Y. 2014-15, the amended provisions were applicable in the present case.

The ITAT held that the registration of the agreement was a compliance of a legal requirement under the Registration Act, 1908 and accordingly, was not relevant while deciding the date of purchase of the property.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the addition u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) on the basis that the agreement of purchase of property was executed during A.Y. 2013-14, and thus the amended section 56(2)(vii)(b) of the Act, being applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2014, could not be made applicable to the assessee.

Further, the actual registration of property was a procedural formality as a consequence of the execution of agreement and hence not relevant to ascertain the date of purchase of the property.

43. Where the land of the assessee was situated beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation, as per Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality, the land was agricultural land and hence out of ambit of ‘capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(14).

Mohideen Sharif Inayathulla Sharif vs. Income-tax officer
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 345 (Chennai – Trib.)
ITA No.: 658 (Chny) of 2020
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date: 7th March, 2022
Sections: 2(14), 45

43. Where the land of the assessee was situated beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation, as per Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality, the land was agricultural land and hence out of ambit of ‘capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(14).

FACTS

The assessee sold certain land in his village and did not offer any capital gains on the sale on the grounds that it was an agricultural land. A copy of Google maps was submitted by the assesse to establish that land was located beyond 5 km from the nearest Municipal Corporation. Further, the certificate issued by Village Administrative Officer was furnished by the assessee in support of his claim.

Reliance was also placed by the assessee on the notification No. SO 9447 dated 6th January, 1994, wherein it was stated that the distance for Chenglepet Municipality was 5 Km.

The AO contended that the definition of agricultural land was applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2014 and prior to the amendment the distance was 8 km and not 5 km from Municipal Corporation. Accordingly, long term capital gains were computed by the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT observed that the factual considerations with respect to the location of the land and the certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer were undisputed.

Based on the submissions of the assesse, the ITAT concurred with the view of the assessee. The ITAT ruled that the Notification No. SO 9447, dated 6th January, 1994 issued for Chenglepet Municipality has also been accepted by the CIT(A) and accordingly, the relevant area will be 5 km and not 8 km. Moreover, the ITAT observed that the fact that the revenue records still show the impugned land as agricultural land was not rebutted by the AO.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the additions made.

42. Where the identity of the shareholders has been established, no addition could be made u/s 68 with respect to the increase in share capital and share premium.

Greensaphire Infratech (P.) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer
[2022] 95 ITR(T) 464 (Amritsar – Trib.)
ITA No.:213 (ASR.) of 2017
A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 23rd December, 2021
Section: 68

42. Where the identity of the shareholders has been established, no addition could be made u/s 68 with respect to the increase in share capital and share premium.

FACTS

The assessee company during the year under consideration had issued shares to five individuals and two body corporates by way of share capital and share premium.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO called for certain details about the issue of share capital. The assessee furnished certain explanations with respect to the details of shares issued. Not being satisfied with the identity and genuineness of the allottees, the AO invoked section 68 of the Act and treated the issue of share capital and premium as income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The assessee submitted that the transaction was carried out through normal banking channels and the identity of subscribers to the company had been established through various documents namely, the financial statements, PANs of the allottees, the Memorandum of Association and Form No. 23AC filed by the corporate allottees and ledger confirmations from the parties.

The assessee also submitted that once the identity of parties has been established, the onus to prove the genuineness of the transaction lies with the Revenue. Reliance was placed on the ruling of the Apex Court in Pr. CIT vs. Paradise Inland Shipping (P.) Ltd. [2018] 93 taxmann.com 84.

Reliance was also placed on the ruling of the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Gagandeep Infrastructure Ltd. [2017] 394 ITR 680 and the ruling in ITO vs. Arogya Bharti Health Park (P.) Ltd. [IT Appeal No. 2943 (Mum.) of 2014, dated 17th October, 2018, wherein it was held that the amendment to section 68 of the Act, vide Finance Act, 2012 was prospective in nature and applicable from A.Y. 2013-14 onwards. Accordingly, the same will not apply to the impugned A.Y. 2012-13. It was also observed in the aforesaid ruling, that no addition could be made in the hands of the assessee but addition, if any, could be made only in the hands of the allottees of such shares.
    
Further, it was submitted by the assessee that issue of shares being a capital transaction, cannot be considered as income in its hands. Reliance was placed on the following decisions in this regard:

  • G.S. Homes and Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT 387 ITR 126
  • Vodafone India Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India [2014] 368 ITR 1 (Bom.)
  • Pr. CIT vs. Apeak Infotech [2017] 397 ITR 148

The ITAT considered the above decisions and concurred with the view of the assessee company, stating that the assessee had furnished voluminous documents to establish the identity of the shareholders. Further, the ITAT held that the share capital and share premium, being transactions on ‘capital account’, cannot be considered as income of the assessee.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee and deleted the addition u/s 68 of the Act.

41. Interest granted u/s 244A cannot be withdrawn by the AO in an order passed u/s 154 by holding that the proceedings resulting in refund were delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

Grasim Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT
TS-813-ITAT-2022(Mum.)
A.Y.: 2007-08
Date of order :18th October, 2022
Section: 244A

41. Interest granted u/s 244A cannot be withdrawn by the AO in an order passed u/s 154 by holding that the proceedings resulting in refund were delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

FACTS

In the course of appellate proceedings before the Tribunal, in an appeal preferred by the assessee, the assessee raised an additional ground with regard to the amount suo moto disallowed by the assessee u/s 14A. The additional ground so raised was allowed by the Tribunal. The AO upon passing an order dated 16th May, 2016 to give effect to the order of the Tribunal, worked out the amount of refund due to be Rs. 54,52,12,250 which included interest of Rs. 21,25,91,553 which was granted from 1st April, 2007.

Subsequently, the AO passed an order u/s 154 withdrawing the interest granted u/s 244A to the extent attributable to the refund arising as a result of additional ground being raised by the assessee on the grounds that the delay in granting refund is due to assessee’s raising additional ground in respect of suo moto disallowance u/s 14A. He held that the case of the assessee is squarely covered by section 244A(2) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the assessee it was contended that the issue in appeal is covered in favour of the assessee by co-ordinate bench decision in the case of DBS Bank Ltd. vs. DDIT [(2016) 157 ITD 476 (Mum.)].

HELD

What is essential for declining interest to the assessee u/s 244A(2) is that the delay in refund must be on account of reasons attributable to the assessee, and where there is a dispute about the period for which interest is to be declined, the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner must take a call, in favour of the AO’s stand, on the same. The Tribunal observed that none of these conditions are satisfied on the facts of this case. Just because an assessee has raised a claim by way of an additional ground of appeal before the Tribunal, it does not necessarily mean that the delay is attributable to the assessee – this delayed claim could be on account of subsequent legislative or judicial developments, or on account of other factors beyond the control of the assessee. This exercise of ascertaining the reasons of delay is an inherently subjective exercise, and well beyond the limited scope of mistake apparent on record on which no two views are possible. In any case, there is no adjudication by the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner on the period to be excluded – something hotly contested by the assessee. The Tribunal held that unless that adjudication is done, the denial of interest u/s 244A cannot reach finality, and, for this reason also, it was held that the impugned order does not meet with the approval of the Tribunal.

The ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

40. Where the assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable, it shows that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. Since there is no revenue loss to the Department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty on the assessee.

Bagaria Trade Impex vs. ACIT
ITA No. 310/Jp./2022
A.Y.: 2017-18
Date of order: 27th September, 2022
Section: 270A

40. Where the assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable, it shows that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. Since there is no revenue loss to the Department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty on the assessee.

FACTS

The assessee firm filed its return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 95,48,815. While assessing the total income of the assessee an addition of Rs. 1,84,650 was made to the returned total income on account of interest income short declared in the return of income.

During the previous year relevant to assessment year under consideration the assessee in its return of income declared interest income of Rs. 16,61,850 (13,46,850 + 3,15,000). As per Form No. 26AS, the assessee’s interest income was Rs. 18,46,500 (14,96,500 + 3,50,000). Thus, the AO held that the assessee had declared less interest income.

In the course of assessment proceedings when this fact came to the knowledge of the assessee, the assessee vide its letter dated 31st July, 2019 stated that it is willing to pay tax on this amount and requested the AO to adjust the amount of refund due to it. It was mentioned that the assessee had, in its return of income, considered net amount of interest income instead of considering the gross amount.

The AO levied penalty u/s 270A of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the levy of penalty.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that it is undisputed fact that the amount of TDS was not claimed by the assessee and the assessee made a self-declaration of this fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a misrepresentation or suppression of facts on the part of the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not claimed credit for TDS which appears to be a bonafide mistake as the CA of the assessee was not able to detect this fact during the audit. The Tribunal observed that the assessee had short stated its interest income by Rs. 1,84,650 and had not claimed TDS credit of Rs. 1,84,650. Tax on income short stated worked out to Rs, 57,057 while tax which remained with the Revenue amounted to Rs. 1,84,650. Considering this fact the Tribunal concluded that assessee had paid indirectly higher tax than actually liable which goes to show that there was no malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the Department had no revenue loss. The Tribunal held that since there is no revenue loss to the department, therefore, there is no question of levying penalty upon the assessee. The Tribunal held that the levy of penalty was not justified and therefore it deleted the same.

39. In case the assessee’s prayer on facts is not to be accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

Surinder Kumar Malhotra vs. ITO
ITA No. 240/Chd./2020
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 9th September, 2022
Section: 54F

39. In case the assessee’s prayer on facts is not to be accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

FACTS

The present appeal was filed by the assessee, for A.Y. 2011-12, being aggrieved by the order dated 11th March, 2022 passed by NFAC, Delhi acting as First Appellate Authority. The assessee was inter alia aggrieved by the CIT(A) confirming the disallowance of claim of deduction under section 54F of the Act by ignoring the applicable judicial precedents including the jurisdictional High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

The claim of the assessee was disallowed on the grounds that the sale proceeds have been applied for acquiring two separate properties. The assessee had in statement of facts pleaded that these were adjoining properties and may be treated as a single unit in terms of various decisions available.

The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on the legal issue and in para 6 of his order stated that the assessee has not argued anything further.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noticed and drew the attention of the DR to the statement of facts recorded by the CIT(A) on page 2 of the impugned order where it is claimed that two adjoining houses were purchased hence the claim was allowable. The Tribunal referred to the grounds of appeal filed before the CIT(A) and also to the statement of facts wherein it was clearly mentioned that the assessee is a senior citizen who has purchased two adjoining residential houses through two sale deeds dated 7th December, 2010 and 21st March, 2011.

The Tribunal observed that:

(i) the CIT(A) has completely ignored the facts pleaded on record;

(ii) the assessee no doubt has purchased two separate residential houses, however, it is also a fact that consistently the assessee who is a senior citizen has pleaded in writing, which is on record that these were adjoining residential houses, hence, constituted one single unit. No finding has been given by tax authorities on this claim; and

(iii) legal position on two adjoining flats constituting a single residential unit is well settled.

The Tribunal recorded its painful dissatisfaction and disappointment in the passing of the order by the authorities and set aside the order back to the file of the AO for factual verification of facts by accepting the prayer of the DR that the matter needs verification at the end of the AO. The Tribunal also directed that in case the prayer of the assessee on facts is not accepted, a reasonable opportunity of being heard be granted putting the issue to the notice of the assessee.

The Tribunal observed that – “The obdurate attitude of ignoring the written pleadings on record is most unfortunate. Unfortunately such arbitrary orders reek of a backlog of colonial mind set. It needs to be kept in mind that the Tax Authorities are acting as servants of the Government of India. Hence are expected to be live and alert to the citizens for whom and on whose behalf, the functionaries of the State act. In the blind race of showing high disposal the careless ignoring of facts pleaded causes unaccounted harm to the reputation and fairness of the Tax Administration. It erodes the trust and faith of the citizens in the fairness of the functioning of the tax administration. It not only causes harassment to the citizens but also reflects on the arbitrary functioning of the tax administration. Such a reputation and record should not be created.”

38. MA filed on the ground that the Revenue has filed an appeal u/s 260A of the Act with the Bombay High Court in the case on which reliance was placed while deciding the appeal and also in view of subsequent SC order dismissed.

DCIT vs. Cipla Ltd.
MA No. 177/Mum./2022 in
ITA No. 1219/Mum./2018
A.Y.: 2010-11
Date of order: 19th September, 2022
Section: 254

38. MA filed on the ground that the Revenue has filed an appeal u/s 260A of the Act with the Bombay High Court in the case on which reliance was placed while deciding the appeal and also in view of subsequent SC order dismissed.

FACTS

The appeal of the assessee against the order of lower authorities disallowing claim u/s 37(1) was allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 20th September, 2021 by relying on the decision of the jurisdictional bench of the Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT.

Subsequently, the Revenue preferred this MA before the Tribunal on the grounds that the revenue has filed an appeal against the order of the Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) before the Bombay High Court, which appeal is pending and also that the Supreme Court in the case of Apex Laboratories vs. DCIT LTU [135 taxmann.com 286 (SC)] has, on identical facts, upheld the disallowance u/s 37(1) of the Act.


HELD
The Tribunal noted that the sole dispute of the Revenue is that the order of Hon’ble Tribunal in Aristro Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon while deciding the appeal of the assessee was not accepted by the Revenue and further an appeal u/s 260A of the Act has been filed before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, and is pending. Also, on similar issue, The Supreme Court has passed an order in the case of Apex Laboratories (supra) on 22nd February, 2022.

The Tribunal observed that while deciding the appeal of the assessee it had relied upon an order of the co-ordinate bench in respect of allowability of sales promotion expenses.

The Tribunal held that provisions of section 254(2) are envisaged for the rectification of the mistake apparent from the record but not to review the order. If submissions made on behalf of the revenue are accepted it would amount to review of the order which is not within the purview of section 254(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the miscellaneous application filed by the Revenue.

Ind AS 20 and Typical Government Schemes in India – Part II

[Part – I of this article published in November, 2022 BCAJ covered various aspects of Ind AS 20. In this concluding part, the author covers how certain typical Government schemes/ programs work, how they fall within the definition of “Government Assistance” and how the same should be recognized and disclosed.]

GOVERNMENT GRANTS/ ASSISTANCE
In India, due to structural issues coupled with the inefficiencies in implementing various programs on their own, the Government has recognized the need to develop multiple underdeveloped or remote locations through private participation. Additionally, to seize the opportunity in global economy/ trade, foreign investments, and earn higher foreign exchange from exports, the Government has thought it apt to promote a few activities. Consequently, governments have launched various benefits/ facilities/ schemes from time to time. These benefits/schemes have proven to be “beneficial” for the Government in terms of meeting their twin objectives, one towards fulfilling their obligation towards the public at large; and second towards achieving the long-term objective of developing remote/ under-developed regions through the creation of employment and ancillary industries with more prominent operating entities establishing their shops.  Such schemes/ benefits have also helped private sector entities get some cash/ resources from the Government or concessions to reduce the cost of their investments / working capital and cheap labour at remote locations to reduce recurring/variable costs.

In general, the schemes/ benefits/ facilities provided by the Government do not result in the actual movement of money but are like either deferral of collection of dues from entities or forgoing the dues from the entity. Deferral of dues from the entity is nothing but allowing such entities to use funds they ought to have paid for the granted deferral period and, consequently, support working capital finance by the Government. The foregoing/ deferral of dues by the Government is a transfer of resources from the Government to the entity. It is recognized as “duties/taxes foregone” while presenting budgets.

Many times, even within the commercial world, where decisions are made for the evaluation of different projects with an element of government scheme/ benefit/ facility, such entities do give cognizance to such schemes/ plans/ benefits in arriving at business decisions. This also supports the view that Government Assistance should get recognized.

Let us see how few typical Government Schemes/Programs work, how they fall within the definition of “Government Assistance” and how the same should be recognized and disclosed.


INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICE CENTRE (“IFSC”) IN GIFT CITY
The Government of India has an ambitious plan to invite global financial services companies to set up their regional centres in India and make the country one of the essential Financial Hubs globally. The activities on the same started way back in 2008, but material steps began in 2015-16 with the IFSC declaring a multi-service Special Economic Zone. Subsequently, over time and learning more about the requirements from global players in financial sectors, the law affecting the operations of IFSC kept on improving year after year. Now, we have a more structured law on the IFSC.

An operating unit/ entity in IFSC is treated differentially by treating the same (artificially) as operating/functioning “outside India” even though physically located within India. Such legislative artificial projection creates a difference between entities carrying on similar activities outside and within the IFSC. Therefore, a regulatory framework for IFSC is nothing but “an action” by the Government which, through various “exemptions”, creates a specific situation which allows units in IFSC to enjoy “certain benefits” not available to entities carrying on similar operations outside IFSC. The legislative framework is a conscious effort (intended) by the Government “to give economic benefit” to the entities investing and operating from such IFSC. Hence, IFSC squarely falls within the ambit of “Government Assistance”. However, the economic benefits are measurable and can be recognized as a benefit under the relevant Ind-AS framework, and the Standard requires careful evaluation. It will be relevant to understand that the Government has carved out “exemption” for entities operating from the IFSC against making laws not applicable as, generally, all laws are applicable across India. As the schemes have been designed as “exemptions” these further call for the considered view that the IFSC largely works as a Scheme/ Program intended to give an economic benefit. Hence, the benefit derived by the entity in terms of savings on duties or taxes, which such units ought to have paid otherwise, are clear benefits requiring recognition in financial statements. Similarly, any benefit in terms of upfront exemption vis-à-vis payment and subsequent claim of refund helps such entities in terms of working capital.

EPCG / SEZ SCHEMES

Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) or Special Economic Zone (SEZ) unit or Software Technology Park (STP) unit schemes allow certain benefits in terms of exemptions from payment of duties. All such schemes work on different principles, but the operating unit/ entity gets benefits subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions.

Both these schemes have been examined and opined by Ind AS Technical Facilitation Group (“ITFG”) of ICAI1 as qualifying Government Grants and requiring the relevant entity to recognize the same in accordance with the prescription under the Standard. The basic premise of the opinion appears to be that the legislative enactment by the Government is “action” that intends to exempt duty which such an entity (i.e. specific to the entity or group of entities qualifying requirement) ought to have paid otherwise (i.e. resulting into economic benefit to such an entity). Under EPCG, the entity which commits itself to export goods manufactured by using imported capital goods/ equipment is allowed to import such equipment without payment of customs duty. By such an exemption, the Government compensates the entity for the component of customs duty on the import of capital goods it ought to have paid but for the exemption. Even though there is requirement of certain quantum of exports to be achieved for finished goods produced from use of such assets, the exemption is granted for one of the components of the asset (i.e. import duties). In this background, in the authors view, EPCG is a grant for capital assets. It should be accounted for basis guidance provided in the Standard at Para 17 and 18 by setting up deferred revenue in the Statement of Financial Position and recognized as income in  the Statement of Profit and Loss over the asset’s life. However, a perusal of certain published results suggests that entities have opted to recognize grants to the Statement of Profit and Loss based on the satisfaction of export obligations. This is the same divergence of prescription under the Standard with Conceptual Framework for which the project has been pending since 2006. Recognition of the revenue grants on the basis of export obligation may be appropriate.


1. ITFG has provided clarification about treatment of EPCG under Ind AS 20 vide response to Issue No. 5 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 11. Further, ITFG has provided clarification on SEZ/ STP programs / Schemes as qualifying and requiring accounting as “Government Grant” under Ind AS 20 vide Issue No. 3 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 17.

However, recognizing the grant to Statement of Profit and Loss based on export obligation, even for capital grants, appears to be a deviation from the prescription under Paras 17 & 18 of the Standard, even though it might be in sync with the Conceptual Framework. However, with the amendment in the Standard2 allowing measurement of non-monetary grants relating to assets at nominal value, such an option if exercised, will excuse the entity from setting up deferred revenue and related complications if the nominal value is not material.

The SEZ scheme allows the eligible entity to procure goods (capital goods or inputs other than capex) without payment of taxes and duties. The eligible entity is expected to manufacture and export the goods to enjoy the exemption. In  case of manufactured goods sold within India, as per changed regulation3, duty/ taxes claimed exempted must be paid back to the Government without any interest. A different principle applies to the SEZ scheme, but the benefits still remain. Hence, ICAI’s ITFG4 has concluded that the SEZ scheme is a “Government Grant” requiring compliance with Ind AS 20. An important point to remember is the change with respect to allowing the entity to value (i.e., on measurement point) capital grant at nominal value instead of at fair value w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 and its prospective application. Due to this, unless relevant information is not provided as required, financial statements of otherwise comparable entities may not be comparable due to different entities accounting for grants received before and after 1st April, 2018 differently.


2. Para 23 of Ind AS 20 substituted vide Notification dated 20th September 2018, permitted an entity to adopt an alternative to recognise assets at nominal value instead of fair value in case of such grant pertained to non-monetary government grant.
3. Vide Finance Act, 2021, Provisions of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 have been amended which requires SEZ units to “surrender” duty exemption in respect of CVD/ ADD availed on inputs which have been used for finished goods sold in domestic market.

4. ITFG has provided clarification on SEZ/ STP programs / Schemes as qualifying and requiring accounting as “Government Grant” under Ind AS 20 vide Issue No. 3 to ITFG Clarification Bulletin No. 17.

Further, as per the Standard today, the recognition also depends on whether the grant relates to asset or revenue. In the author’s view, when the exemption is related to a capital asset, the intention is to compensate the cost of the capital asset, even if such a capital asset is intended to be used for manufacturing goods for exports. Therefore, if the exemption enjoyed by the entity is towards the cost (including duties/ taxes) related to capital asset, such benefits / grants should be accounted for as a grant related to capital asset in contrast to considering the same as related to revenue merely due to certain condition of certain obligation (i.e., export obligation).

MANUFACTURING AND OTHER OPERATIONS IN WAREHOUSE REGULATIONS (MOOWR)
The basic premise of the Customs Act,1962 is to levy duties on goods moving out of India or coming within India. However, with the passage of time, trade evolved and many new business models were introduced. Further, globally, the regulatory landscape has changed. Under the Customs Act, any goods entering India do not suffer duties till the same are within the Custom’s area. Generally, within Custom’s area no use of such goods is permitted. However, such regulations create a bottleneck in changing business models where entities set up facilities to manufacture and export. In such business models, imported items are not intended for consumption by a person residing in such country of import but are eventually expected to get exported after manufacture. To meet such challenges, the Government has to tweak customs law to make way for some “convenience” whereby duty liabilities are either deferred or foregone. Such an act of duty deferral/exemption has been achieved either through notifications or by legislative fiction by treating / creating an artificial projection of locations as a place not within India, even if located far away from the Customs port. MOOWRs is one such example.

Under MOOWR, the specified place is considered to be a “warehouse”, and any goods will be considered as “not entered India” for levy of Customs Duty even if the goods have actually moved in India from the port to such locations. This fiction was further extended recently by permitting even the use of such imported goods without triggering duty liability. Government creates all such fiction through the law which indicates that these are in the form of “Government Assistance”. Further, when such assistance becomes measurable, it should be considered as a “Grant” and accounted for/ recognized in the financial statements accordingly.

For example, under MOOWR, if an entity is not liable to pay customs duty upfront but it is deferred till such good is moved to a person in India out of such entity/ specified location, then the Government is actually allowing or accommodating the entity with a working capital facility for the time being and allowing the use of such goods/ equipment, as the case may be. Hence, ideally, such deferral should be accounted for as an interest-free loan granted by the Government on the duty deferral component.

However, quantification of the Government Grant or otherwise will require examination of each case and nature of exemption, whether on the capital asset or input and whether intended sales are domestic or export. In case an entity has significant exports,  the  scheme can be considered as “assistance” in place of a “grant” for duty deferral on inputs when exports are exempted. Otherwise, the entity would have anyways got a rebate for duties paid on inputs on exports. However, another view that is equally possible refers to the scheme as assistance, as the liability has been deferred through statutory notion from the date of importation till the actual export of goods out of the country. However, it appears that the earlier view seems more aligned with the requirements of the Standard.


MEIS/ SEIS / RoDTEP / PRODUCTION LINKED INCENTIVE SCHEMES
The Government of India announced the Production linked incentive (“PLI”) scheme for various sectors with multiple conditions. Such incentives are computed and earned on the basis of an “incremental production/ sale.” However, they have imposed additional conditions on the investments being made. Hence, accrual of such an incentive as Government Grant requires examination of multiple conditions including “reasonable assurance” of entitlement to such Grant and the creation of “deferred income” in case the entity receives the grant but cannot fulfill the obligations.

In contrast to the PLI scheme, Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (“MEIS”) / Services Exports from India Scheme (“SEIS”) / Remission of Duties and Taxes on Export Products (“RoDTEP”) are more straightforward. They can be easily identified as revenue grants. These revenue grants can be presented as net of expenses as per the option available under the Standard. However, the relevant expenses, which the grant intends to offset, might have been booked under different headings and groupings, and identification or bifurcation of the grant amount into differential components will be difficult. These grants should be accounted for under gross basis accounting, contrary to offset against relevant expenses.

STATE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES UNDER STATE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
Various State Governments, through their state industrial policies, announce various schemes for inviting industries to set up operating facilities in their states. Such policies generally have differentiated benefits based on the level of investments or job opportunities created, etc.

Some typical incentives are as under:

Stamp Duty waiver: The grant can be capital or revenue in nature depending on the waiver mentioned in the documents/ agreement or transaction.

Refund of State GST component on local sale within the state: The grant will be revenue grant.

Electricity duty exemption: The grant will a be revenue grant.

Reimbursement of a portion of capex cost: The grant will be capital grant.

Land at a concessional rate: The grant will be a capital grant.

Electrical/water line at no extra cost:  Grant can be a capital grant if otherwise entity needs to incur these costs.


CONCLUSION
The review of various published results indicates that the Standard on Government Grants has been considered as more of disclosure standard and might be true to many of such entities. However, generalising the same may not be correct as each scheme may require different treatment depending upon the facts. It is critical to understand the definition of a grant. For this, one must understand whether a particular scheme/ policy/ program / legislation really falls within the ambit of a “Government Grant” or not. Generally, recognition/ accounting and measurement of money actually received from the Government poses lesser challenge as compared to waivers or exemptions. Various Government benefits/ schemes, including the waiver of liability or obligation, need to be understood for transfer of resources from the Government to the entity or not. For the waiver of the obligation, firstly, one should examine whether there exists any obligation or not. Such an evaluation may require an entity to examine facts of the relevant scheme and applicable relevant statute. In some cases, it may also require an entity to perform comparative analysis of carrying on similar activity in different set-ups to come to a conclusion about existence of obligation or not. Once the obligation exists, then its waiver or deferral due to specific legislation or status may create “transfer of resource” from the   Government to the entity. ICAI’s ITFG has already provided guidance on SEZ/ STP and EPCG, which can be useful for entities and auditors. If an entity is availing any other scheme, then the scheme should be examined with regards to the parameters / guidance prescribed under the Standard. Further, the Standard having the prescribed differential treatment (recognition as well as measurement) for grants related to assets from grants related to revenue/ expenses, needs to look at the issue of recognition, measurement, accounting and disclosure more closely for each category of grants.

It will not be wrong to state that first of all, the nature of the grant should be identified followed by examination of fulfillment of secondary criteria required for recognition of the relevant grant, which are “reasonable assurance on meeting such conditions” and “assurance on realization of grant”.  

Considering that the Standard has prescribed differential recognition parameters (i.e., in case of grant related to asset, over life of the asset) as well as differential measurement parameters (i.e., all revenue grants at fair value as against non-monetary capital grant with option at nominal value), an entity should carry out careful and detailed examination and analysis of relevant parameters for eligibility of grant, to what it pertains (i.e. cost of asset or to compensate for some expenses or incentive to do some activity), conditions/ obligations required to fulfil to be entitled for such grant/ compensation, etc.

Separately, various schemes have conditions/requirements that are obligations that should be adequately disclosed to give the user of the Financial Statements adequate information on the nature of grant/assistance and its impact on the Financial Statements of the entity.

Apart from the schemes through which entities get monetary benefits, there are few schemes by the Government that give certain category of entities more “facility” or “convenience”. It may be a good practice to disclose such schemes or facilities or convenience as “Government Assistance” if management believes that they are material in nature as the benefit from such facilities may not be reasonably measurable and hence may not fit within definition of “Government Grant”.

Sustainability Reporting and Assurance

INTRODUCTION
Sustainability Reporting is an evolving discipline encompassing the disclosure and communication of an entity’s non-financial – environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and its overall impact. Over the last few years, more and more entities are preparing and disclosing their sustainability reports either under a mandate or voluntarily as per the reporting frameworks/standards provided by various standard-setting bodies/regulators. Sustainability reporting will only be useful if it is of sufficient quality, and the stakeholders understands and trust the framework.
India is one of the early adopters of sustainability reporting for listed entities amongst its various other global peers1. In 2012, requirement of Business Responsibility Report (BRR) containing ESG disclosures was introduced for adoption by listed entities. SEBI introduced the requirements for sustainability reporting in May 2021. The new report is called the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR), with nine principles covering both environmental and social aspects such as climate action. SEBI has mandated the Top 1,000 listed companies (by market capitalisation) to provide such disclosures from F.Y. 2022-23 onwards as part of their Annual Reports (voluntary basis for F.Y. 2021-22). The new reporting format, BRSR, aims to establish links between the financial results of a business with its ESG performance. BRSR is not merely presenting the data collected, but an approach to drive an organisation’s commitment to sustainability and demonstrate it to interested parties in a transparent manner. BRSR has evolved from the National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct principles issued by the MCA, which itself emanates from the UN Sustainable Development Goals. A company may adopt the practice of framing a new single BRSR Policy containing policies and implementation procedure for all the nine principles and its core elements.

1. Source: Background Material on Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting.

The BRSR is a notable departure from the existing BRR and a significant step towards bringing sustainability reporting at par with financial reporting. Further, companies will be able to better demonstrate their sustainability objectives, position and performance resulting into long-term value creation.
ESG and sustainability are both strategic considerations for businesses, executive teams, and investors. They both share the same goal of improving a company’s business practices to boost profits and win favour from investors, customers, and regulators – while safeguarding the environment and supporting communities.
The global discussion around ESG and sustainability reporting is evolving every day and organizations are increasingly reporting on their broader performance and impact. While climate-related information is certainly on top of minds for many stakeholders, other ESG factors i.e., social and governance are gaining prominence. Company-reported information about sustainability factors is becoming a key focus area through increased voluntary disclosures as well as through new jurisdiction-specific rules. Assurance is a key aspect in increasing trust in the quality and accuracy of sustainability information. Assurance from an independent professional coupled with enhanced standards and reporting rigor has the potential to further build trust in sustainability information. For sustainability reports to be credible, the reliability of the reports is important. Assurance on sustainability information helps enhance stakeholders confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the reported information and provides the intended users with useful data for decision making.
The objective of this article is to explain sustainability reporting and benefits of assurance on such reporting. It also covers the role of auditor when assessing the impact of climate change and corresponding disclosures in an audit of financial statements.


WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY AND ESG REPORTING?
There is increased investors and other stakeholders focus on seeking businesses to be responsible and sustainable towards the environment and society. Therefore, the goal of sustainability reporting is to make it easier for investors, customers, employees, and other key stakeholders to understand how well companies are managing their impact on the society and the environment. Thus, reporting of a company’s performance on sustainability related factors such as socio-cultural aspects, community participation, economic sustainability, and environmental sustainability have become as vital as reporting on financial and operational performance. However, it is yet to become a regulatory enforcement for all companies in India.

The term ESG reporting is often used for communications about ESG matters through a variety of channels, including press releases, websites, social media, investor letters or presentations and submissions to rating agencies. In many cases, ESG reporting refers to a voluntary disclosure of ESG information posted on a company’s website, commonly called ESG reports, purpose-led reports, sustainability reports or CSR reports.

In a typical ESG report, a company discusses material risks and opportunities related to ESG matters and its strategies for managing those risks and opportunities. This discussion is often accompanied by quantitative metrics. For example, a company that consumes various resources, such as electricity, jet fuel and water, or creates hazardous or non-hazardous waste from its operations and business activities may discuss its impact on the environment and its plan to reduce such impact over time, often by including reduction targets over multiyear time horizons. It may also include metrics supplementing the discussion, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, energy consumption and water usage.
 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING FRAMEWORKS
There is no standard format for sustainability reporting, however, following types of frameworks2 are often used by various companies or entities:

Framework

Organisation

Audience

Description

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

United Nations

Broad set of stakeholders

SDGs comprise 17 interlinked global goals that aim to eradicate poverty
and promote sustainable prosperity, accompanied by 169 targets. Indicators
specify the information that should be used to help measure compliance toward
each target. These goals are used by companies to shape and prioritize their
business strategies and associated reporting.

GRI standards

Global Sustainability

Standards Board

Broad set of

stakeholders

These standards are the most widely used framework to create corporate
sustainability reports targeted to a broader range of stakeholders. They
consist of Universal Standards and Topic Standards. Topic Standards are
selected based on the company’s material topics.

Recommendations of the TCFD

Financial Stability

Board

Investors,

lenders and

insurers

This framework is used to create climate-related financial disclosures
and comprises disclosure recommendations structured around the core elements
of governance, strategy, risk management metrics and targets.

Integrated Reporting

Formerly International

Integrated Reporting

Council (IIRC), now Value Reporting

Foundation which has been merged with the IFRS Foundation

Integrated reporting

focuses on how the

organization creates, preserves or erodes

value.

This principles-based framework includes seven guiding principles
applied individually and collectively for the purposes of preparing and
presenting an integrated report. The framework establishes content elements,
which are categories of information required to be included in an integrated
report.

Greenhouse Gas Protocol

World Resource Institute and World Business Council on Sustainable
Development

Corporations and their customers.

This framework is focused on accurate, complete, consistent, relevant
and transparent accounting and reporting of GHG emissions by companies and
organisations.

Stakeholder Capitalism Metrics

The world Economic Forum’s International Business Council

Broad set of stakeholders

This framework includes a universal set of metrics and recommended
dislcosures intended to lead to a more comprehensive global corporate reporting
system. It divides disclosures in four pillars

(principles of governance, planet, people and prosperity) that serve as
the foundation for an ESG reporting framework.

CDSB Framework

Climate Disclosure Standards Board

Investors

This framework sets out an approach for reporting environmental and
climate change information in mainstream reports such as annual reports or
integrated reports.

SASB Standards

SASB

Investors, lenders and insurers

The SASB provides standards for 77 industries across 11 sectors. Each
standard identifies the subset of sustainability issues reasonably likely to
impact financial performance and long-term value of a typical company in an
industry.

Other proposed frameworks and standards:

  • Setting up of new Board to issue standards on sustainability-related financial disclosures. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) has published its first two exposure drafts on IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards, namely, General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information and Climate-related Disclosures. These drafts once finalized will form a comprehensive global baseline of sustainability disclosures designed to meet the information needs of investors when assessing enterprise value. The ISSB did not propose an effective date in the drafts but plans to include one in the final standard.

  • US SEC – Proposed Rules for the Enhancement and Standardisation of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors.
  • European Union Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) proposed by EFRAG.


2. CDSB, as well as VRF, which included the SASB and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), have merged into the ISSB.
BENEFITS OF INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE
It is important to understand the benefits of independent assurance on Sustainability Reporting even if this is currently not mandatory in India and companies obtain assurance on a voluntary basis. Independent assurance can provide intended users, including boards of directors, customers, suppliers, prospective employees, and other stakeholders, with increased confidence in the reliability of ESG information, making it more likely that the data will be useful for decision-making. The management may also benefit from the feedback that comes with having an independent perspective on its sustainability reporting and associated processes. Furthermore, an assurance of such information may impact a company’s rankings and ratings on sustainability indices. It is worth noting that the assurance may benefit a company’s investors and other stakeholders, even if it is not required or stakeholders haven’t requested it. A strategic approach to sustainability issues can help organisations unlock many value creation opportunities. The other key benefits of assurance include the following:
  • Positive impact on internal practices and governance.
  • Strengthens internal awareness of sustainability risks and benefits.
  • Positive influence on branding and reputation.

  • Systems, processes, and internal controls around sustainability performance improve with each assurance engagement.

  • Credibility of information about sustainability is strengthened.
  • Improvement in positions of credit, risk, regulatory and sustainability rankings.

The IAASB has issued Non-Authoritative Guidance on Applying ISAE 3000 (Revised) to Extended External Reporting Assurance Engagements to address ten key stakeholder-identified challenges commonly encountered in applying ISAE 3000 (Revised) in sustainability assurance engagements.

The IAASB3 is currently working on a project to develop an overarching standard for assurance on sustainability reporting, that would address both limited assurance and reasonable assurance; the conduct of an assurance engagement in its entirety; and areas of sustainability assurance engagements where priority challenges have been identified, and more specificity is required.


3. Source: Assurance on Sustainability Reporting | IFAC (iaasb.org)

The two key assurance standards that are widely used for providing assurance of sustainability information are:
  • Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information – ISAE3000.
  • Accountability 1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS)

As per the IFAC study on ‘The State of Play in Sustainability Assurance’, 91 per cent of the companies reviewed report some level of sustainability information. 51 per cent of companies that report sustainability information provide some level of assurance on it. 63 per cent of these assurance engagements were conducted by Audit or Audit Affiliated Firms.

Who currently provides/obtains external assurance?
Companies do not obtain independent assurance on most of the sustainability information they disclose today. It is not mandatory, and companies obtain it on a voluntary basis. Assurance is most commonly obtained on the subject matter involving GHG emissions, safety, water usage and diversity of the workforce.
 
A company may voluntarily choose to obtain assurance over certain aspects of its ESG information for various reasons, including to respond to requests from investors and investment organizations, or meet expectations from other stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers or meet criteria of organizations that promote assurance, such as the GRI. These assurance reports are generally included in a corporate social responsibility report or posted separately on the company’s website.
Various organizations, such as engineering, consulting, and accounting firms, currently provide assurance-related services on Sustainability or ESG information.
A snapshot of assurance on ESG disclosures of 100 Indian companies with largest market capitalization as of March 2021 is as follows4:


4. IFAC publication – The State of Play in Sustainability Assurance – page 32.

Why to use a professional accountant for an assurance engagement?
The information reported by a company needs to be credible so that investors and other stakeholders can rely on it for their investment and other decisions. Many companies want to be perceived as leaders in or advocates for sustainability reporting by having their financial statement auditor provide assurance, which sends a message to the market regarding their commitment to such reporting.
Further, having the financial statement auditor perform such assurance engagements can drive efficiencies in the engagement because the auditor can use the knowledge obtained from the financial statement audit to plan the engagement. However, there is no requirement for a company to use its financial statement auditor.
The financial statement auditor is well positioned to perform the necessary work and provide this assurance. He also communicates a company’s commitment to the priorities, values and concerns that are important to the growing number of stakeholders interested in these matters.
ICAI has issued Exposure Draft on Standard on Sustainability Assurance Engagements (SSAE) 3000, Assurance Engagements on Sustainability Information, which is applicable to all assurance engagements on sustainability information. The draft defines terms such as engagement partner, firm (which is registered with the ICAI) and also provides for the characteristics of the engagement partner including he/she being a member of a firm that applies SQC 1, or other professional requirements, or requirements in law or regulation, that are at least as demanding as SQC 1. Accountants are already involved in monitoring, checking, and interpreting information relating to social, environmental, and economic impacts. The accountancy profession is quali?ed for providing external assurance, building on initiatives such as the IAASB Framework and ISAE 3000 and working with other disciplines. Other possible reasons could be as follows:
  • A professional accountant who provides assurance services has important skills that enhance the quality of those services. Professional accountants are in a position to apply sound judgement to a wide range of services, including assurance.

  • They follow well-established and widely recognised standards when conducting their work, which allows a consistent and more readily understandable approach to the work they perform. They are bound by a strict code of ethics and are subject to regular assessment by regulators. Their commitment to professional competence and due care requires them to offer high-quality services to businesses and to act in the public interest. Therefore, a sustainability report with an unmodified assurance conclusion from a professional accountant is seen as credible in the marketplace.
  • A professional accountant may be able to help in other ways to enhance business sustainability performance. If, for example, a company is just about to start measuring and managing its carbon footprint, it will need to think through the governance, control environment, process, and systems implications before starting.

STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE IN INDIA

In India, broader legislative intent in the sustainability space has been ahead of the curve. The Companies Act 2013 requires a director of a company to act in the best interests of the company, its employees, community and for the protection of the environment.
As discussed elsewhere in this article, SEBI introduced Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) and replaced it with the existing BRR. The BRSR seeks disclosures from listed entities on their performance against nine principles. These nine principles echo the Sustainable Development Goals and cover both environment and social aspects such as climate action, responsible consumption and production, gender equality, working conditions, etc.
The ICAI has issued ED on SSAE 3000, Assurance Engagements on Sustainability Information as discussed above. ICAI has also issued SAE 3410, Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements to strengthen assurance frameworks for Non-Financial Information, equivalent to ISAE 3410 “Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements” issued by the IAASB of IFAC. SAE 3410 deals with assurance engagements to report on an entity’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) statement. The objective of an engagement under SAE 3410 is to obtain either limited or reasonable assurance, as applicable, about whether the GHG statement is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error. GHG statements are assured to enhance the reliability of the emissions information reported. The standard is applicable on a voluntary basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on or after 31st March, 2024.
To strengthen sustainability reporting in the country, ICAI has also developed “Sustainability Reporting Maturity Model (SRMM) Version 1.05” with an objective to bring out a comprehensive scoring tool based on a report of the Committee on Business Responsibility Reporting constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in August 2020. BRSR scoring mechanism comprises of total 300 scores, by completing the scoring of all its three sections and nine principles. Corporates can self-evaluate their current level of maturity on the SRMM, identify areas where more focus is required and then develop a roadmap for upgrading to a higher level of maturity. SRMM would allow rating agencies and assurance providers to compare the sustainable nature of Indian companies with international companies.

5. Source: ICAI Releases Sustainability Reporting Maturity Model (SRMM) Version 1.0 | IFAC

CHALLENGES IN SUSTAINABILITY ASSURANCE
There is no doubt that an attention to sustainability issues can deliver better social, environmental, and financial outcomes for companies. Companies are very likely rewarded with lower costs of capital, and their focus on sustainability can improve margins and enhance brand value. In addition, the reporting itself has some very real problems which are given below:
  • Lack of mandates and auditing standards specific to the subject matter.
  • Lack of standardisation in reporting processes and controls.
  • Desire to establish a more consistent set of procedures for assessment.
  • Uncertainty over the reliability of information.

Some of these challenges can be overcome if the regulator prescribes a well-defined framework for such assurance engagements.
Role of the Statutory Auditor – Consideration of climate-related risks in an audit of financial statements
As per the recent article on Where climate change isn’t global: auditing6 “Climate was highlighted by auditors as a challenging issue in vetting some companies’ accounts — the type of thing that required complex, subjective judgments, or that might carry the risk of misstatements. But not consistently everywhere.”

6. Source:Where climate change isn’t global: auditing | Financial Times (ft.com)

The role of the auditor is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, to enable the auditor to report whether the financial statements are prepared and presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework. Understanding an entity and its environment is fundamental to planning and executing an effective risk-based audit. In developing the understanding of an entity, the auditor should include the consideration of climate-related risks and how these risks may be relevant to audits.
The climate-related risks could be more relevant in certain sectors or industries, e.g., banks and insurance, energy, transportation, materials and buildings, agriculture, food, and forestry products. For example, in case of transportation sector, with the introduction of new modes of transportation, traditional transportation assets may be impaired. There is a risk of this continuing to happen as environmental technologies are continuing to develop and evolve at a fast pace. Therefore, the auditor should consider climate-related risks for all sectors.
Many investors and stakeholders are seeking information from auditor’s reports about how climate-related risks were addressed in the audit. With this increased user focus on climate change, the auditor need to be aware of, and may face, increasing pressure for transparency about climate matters in their auditor’s reports. However, the auditor’s reports must follow the requirements of applicable auditing standards.
The auditor’s report is a key mechanism of communication to users about the audit that was performed. In addition to the audit opinion, it provides information about the auditor’s responsibilities and, when required, an understanding of the matters of most significance in their audit and how they were addressed (i.e., Key Audit Matters under SA 701, for example for an entity in the energy sector, the impairment analysis for long-lived assets may be an area of significant auditor judgment that also considers the potential impact of climate change and the transition to renewable energy sources).
In some circumstances, it may warrant inclusion of an Emphasis of Matter paragraph to draw attention to disclosures of fundamental importance to users’ understanding of the financial statements. The auditor should also determine whether the entity has appropriately disclosed relevant climate-related information in the financial statements in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework, e.g., Ind AS or Accounting Standards, when relevant before considering climate-related matters in the auditor’s report.
The auditor should also read the other information for consistency with information disclosed in the financial statements and information that may be publicly communicated to stakeholders outside the financial statements, such as management report narratives in the annual report, press releases, or investor updates. This is a requirement under ISA 720 and SA 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

BOTTOM LINE
The overarching importance of sustainability reporting continues to gain momentum globally with demands from various stakeholders and substantial research and developments towards a uniform set of sustainability standards. The uniformity is not achieved yet due to lack of a common language for sustainability reporting. As reporting of sustainability information becomes the trend being observed globally, the demand for independent assurance of sustainability information is anticipated to grow as entities around the globe look to enhance the integrity of their sustainability reporting. Hence, it is imperative that auditors and assurance providers understand the current landscape and continue to monitor ongoing developments. The demand for assurance on “sustainability branded” reporting continues to grow and therefore, there is an urgent need for globally accepted sustainability / ESG assurance standards that can be used by all assurance professionals. Entities may also want to begin considering how they would gather the information and whether they would need to set up new processes, systems and controls.

Secondment Conundrum: Does SC Ruling on Indirect Tax Trouble Direct Tax?

INTRODUCTION
In case of Multi-National Enterprise (MNE) Groups, it is a usual practice for a foreign parent or group entity to depute or second it’s employees to the Indian subsidiary or group company for various reasons. Such reasons, inter alia, include enabling the Indian subsidiary to provide quality services to the group entities or to enable the subsidiary to carry on its own business in a more efficient and effective manner by using the expertise of the deputationist or seconded employee. In such scenarios, the department is often found taking a stand that the salaries paid by the Indian subsidiary or group company to such deputationists or seconded employees or the reimbursement of such salary costs by it to the foreign parent or group company amounts to ‘Fees for technical Services’ payable by the Indian entity to the foreign entity. The department is also found taking a stand that the services rendered by such an employee constitutes a ‘Service PE’ in India. To counter this stand of the department, assessees adopt various defenses, which among other things, include the most common stand that the deputationist or seconded employee becomes the employee of the Indian entity during such period of deputation or secondment. In this article, the authors seek to discuss the tests laid down by Courts and Tribunals to determine the true employer in such cases.

GENERAL TESTS FOR DETERMINING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

There is a distinction between legal employment and real/economic employment. This distinction becomes even more relevant in cases of deputation/secondment. While the seconded/deputed employee may continue to remain in legal employment of the foreign entity, in so far as he would revert to the foreign entity after completion of such period of deputation/secondment, the Indian entity may be said to be the economic employer of the said employee during such period, depending on the facts and circumstances. This has been envisaged in the Commentary in Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.

The IT Act does not define the term ‘employment’. It also does not overlook the concept of economic employment, as well. Hence, the distinction between legal employment and economic employment and the principles for determination of economic employment would be relevant for the purposes of the Income-tax Act (IT Act).

We may discuss the various decisions in the context of the IT Act and other statutes which have laid down the tests to determine whether there exists an employee-employer relationship. Some of these decisions are discussed below:

  • In Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son Ltd. vs. Government of Hyderabad (1954) 25 ITR 449 (SC), it has been held that the word ‘employment’ connotes the existence of a jural relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee, that is, between the person paying and the person paid.

  • In East India Carpet Co (P) Ltd. vs. Its Employees 1970 Jab LJ 29, 31; it has been held that the term ‘employment’ involves a concept of employment under a contract of service. In DC Works Ltd vs. State of Saurashtra (1957) SCR 152 (SC), it has been held that the greater the amount of direct control exercised over the person rendering the services by the person contracting them, the stronger the grounds for holding it to be a contract for service.

  • In Silver Jubilee Tailoring House vs. Chief Inspector Of Shops And Establishments 1974 AIR 37 (SC), for drawing a distinction between a contract for service (employment) and contract of service (independent contractor), the Court has highlighted the importance of the degree of control and supervision of the employer or the person employing such services. It has been held that if an ultimate authority over the worker in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that he was subject to the latter’s direction, that would be sufficient. A reference may also be made to the decision in Shivnandan Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1427:AIR 1955 SC 404:(1955) 1 LLJ 688. The test of control and supervision has also been applied in the undernoted1  cases.

1. Ram Prashad vs. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 122 (SC); Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra 1957 SCR 152; CIT vs. Lakshmipati Singhania (1973) 92 ITR 598 (All).
One would notice a common thread flowing through the ratios laid down in the above decisions. The above decisions have unequivocally voiced the view that a contract of employment (service) can be said to exist where the following conditions are satisfied:

  • A person exercises supervisory control over another’s work; and

  • The former exercises the ultimate authority over the latter’s work in so far as the former gives directions to the latter specifying the manner in which the work is to be carried out and the latter is bound by such directions.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN MORGAN STANLEY’S CASE

In the case of DIT vs. Morgan Stanley & Co. [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the Court was hearing appeals filed by the assessee and the department against the ruling obtained by the assessee from the AAR. As per the facts of the case, an agreement was entered into by an Indian group entity Morgan Stanley Advantages Services Pvt. Ltd. (‘MSAS’) and the assessee (‘MSCO’), whereby the former would provide support services to the latter. Pursuant to the same, MSCO outsourced some of its’ activities to MSAS. MSCO filed an application for advance ruling. The basic question on which the ruling was obtained was as to whether MSCO could be said to have a PE in India under Article 5(1) of the Indo-US DTAA on account of services rendered by MSAS under the Service Agreement. The AAR ruled that MSCO cannot be regarded as having a fixed place of business in India within the meaning of Article 5(1). It also ruled that MSCO did not have an agency PE under Article 5(4) of the DTAA. However, it ruled that MSCO would be regarded as having a Service PE under Article 5(2)(l) of the DTAA if it were to send some of its’ employees to India as stewards or as deputationists in the employment of MSAS. Against the ruling, both the department and the assessee filed appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

In appeal, while examining whether a Service PE exists within the meaning of Article 5(2)(l) of the DTAA, the Court in paragraph 14 ruled that the said Article applies in cases where the MNE furnishes services within India and those services are furnished through its’ employees. Thus, where employees are deputed by MSCO in India for providing services to MSAS, the Court held that MSAS constitutes a Service PE. The Court has given due credence to the control and supervision exercised by MSCO on the employees deputed in India through whom it provides services in India to MSAS. Based on the same, the Court has concluded that MSAS constitutes a Service PE for MSCO in India.

Though the ratio is in the context of Service PE under the provisions of the DTAA, it is relevant for determination of the economic employer in the case of deputation. This is for the reason that a Service PE would be constituted in India where a foreign entity renders services in India through its’ employees in India. Thus, for a Service PE to be constituted, the deputationist must continue to remain the employee of the foreign entity even post such deputation.

The said test of control and supervision laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for determining whether the deputationist continues to remain the employee of the foreign entity is in line with the test discussed in the earlier segment.

Having ruled so, in paragraph 15, the Hon’ble Court went on to lay down the following propositions of law:

(i)    On deputation, the employee of MSCO, when deputed to MSAS, does not become an employee of MSAS.

(ii)    The deputationist has a lien on his employment with MSCO. As long as the lien remains with the MSCO, the said company retains control over the deputationist’s terms and employment.

(iii)    Where the activities of the multinational enterprise entail it being responsible for the work of deputationists and the employees continue to be on the payroll of the multinational enterprise or they continue to have their lien on their jobs with the multinational enterprise, a service PE can emerge.

(iv)    On request/requisition from MSAS, MSCO deputes its staff. The request comes from MSAS depending upon its requirement. Generally, occasions do arise when MSAS needs the expertise of the staff of MSCO. In such circumstances, generally, MSAS makes a request to MSCO. A deputationist under such circumstances is expected to be experienced in banking and finance. On completion of his tenure, he is repatriated to his parent job. He retains his lien when he comes to India. He lends his experience to MSAS in India as an employee of MSCO as he retains his lien and in that sense there is a service PE (MSAS) under Article 5(2)(1).

Thus, it may be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has provided the following parameters to treat a deputationist/expat as the employee of the foreign entity:

  • A deputationist shall have a lien on his employment with foreign entity;

  • The foreign entity retains control over the deputationist’s terms and employment at the time of deputation; and

  • A Service PE emerges where the activity of the foreign entity requires it to be responsible for the work of deputationists, and the deputationists continue to be on the payroll of foreign entity or have their lien on their jobs with the foreign entity.

Thus, it may be noted that while in paragraph 14, the Court emphasized only the control and supervision exercised by the foreign entity on the deputationist, in paragraph 15, it has brought out two aspects i.e., lien exercised by the deputationist on his employment with the foreign entity, and the foreign entity being responsible for the work of the deputationist. The second aspect i.e., being responsible for the work, may subsume into the test of control and supervision adumbrated in paragraph 14.

However, it is pertinent to note that while the Court has laid down the twin tests of control and supervision over the work [thus being responsible thereof] of deputationists and the exercise of lien by the deputationists as relevant tests, it has not discussed as to which of the two tests would have greater precedence over the other.

DELHI COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF CENTRICA INDIA
The next decision which would be relevant for discussion would be the decision in the case of Centrica India Offshore (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2014] 364 ITR 336 (Delhi). As per the facts of the said case, the Petitioner (CIOP), a wholly owned subsidiary of Centrica Plc, UK, had entered into Service Agreements with the latter and other foreign subsidiaries of Centrica Plc to provide locally based interface to those overseas entities and the Indian entity. To seek support during its’ initial year of operation, CIOP sought for some employees on secondment from the overseas entities. For this purpose, it entered into an agreement with the overseas entities whereby the latter seconded some employees for a fixed tenure. The employees so seconded would work under the direct control and supervision of CIOP who would bear all risks and enjoy all rewards associated with the work performed by such employees.

The issue that arose before the Court was whether the secondment of employees by the overseas entities would amount to Fees for Technical Services or Fees for Included Services within the relevant DTAAs in question, which would embody the concept of a Service PE.

In order to drive home the point that the seconded employees were under the employment of CIOP, it was argued on behalf of CIOP that the seconded employees would work under the direct supervision and direction of the board and management of CIOP. It was also argued that it was convenient for them to receive salaries overseas. An option available to such employees was to receive their salaries through India and later transfer their salaries overseas. However, to avoid the same, the employees continued to remain on the payroll of the overseas entities who would disburse the salaries. Thereafter, the petitioner would reimburse such salary costs to the overseas entities. Thus, the primacy of concept of economic employment as opposed to legal employment was argued to contend that for, all practical purposes, CIOP is the economic employer. The reasons attributed to defend this contention were that the entire direction and supervision over the seconded employees was under its control and the pay and emoluments were borne by it.

While negating the argument on behalf of the Petitioner, the Court ruled that the overseas entities rendered services through the seconded employees to CIOP. Thus, the Court ruled that even post the secondment, the employees continued to remain the employees of the overseas entities on the following grounds:

(i)    The service provided by the secondees is to be viewed in the context in which their secondment or deputation was necessitated. The overseas entities required the Indian subsidiary, CIOP, to ensure quality control and management of their vendors of outsourced activity. For this activity to be carried out, CIOP required personnel with the necessary technical knowledge and expertise in the field, and thus, the secondment agreement was signed since CIOP – as a newly formed company – did not have the necessary human resource.

(ii)    The secondees are not only providing services to CIOP, but rather also tiding CIOP through the initial period, and ensuring that going forward, the skill set of CIOP’s other employees is built and they continue these services without assistance. In essence, the secondees are imparting their technical expertise and know-how onto the other regular employees of CIOP. The activity of the secondees is thus to transfer their technical ability to ensure quality control vis-à-vis the Indian vendors, or in other words, ‘make available’ their know-how of the field to CIOP for future consumption.

(iii)    While the Court agreed that the seconded employees were under the control and supervision of CIOP, there was no purported employment relationship between CIOP and the secondees. None of the documents, including the attachment to the secondment agreements placed on record (between the secondees and CIOP) revealed that the latter can terminate the secondment arrangement; there is no entitlement or obligation, clearly spelt out, whereby CIOP has to bear the salary cost of these employees. The secondees cannot in fact sue CIOP for default in payment of their salary – no obligation is spelt out vis-à-vis the Petitioner.

(iv)    All direct costs of such seconded employee’s basic salary and other compensation, cost of participation in overseas entities’ retirement and social security plans and other benefits in accordance with its applicable policies and other costs were ultimately paid by the overseas entity. Whilst CIOP was given the right to terminate the secondment, (in its agreement with the overseas entities) the services of the secondee vis-à-vis the overseas entities – the original and subsisting employment relationship – could not be terminated. Rather, that employment relationship remained independent, and beyond the control of COIP.

(v)    The employment relationship between the secondee and the overseas organisation is at no point terminated, nor is CIOP given any authority to even modify that relationship. The attachment of the secondees to the overseas organization is not temporary or even fleeting, but rather, permanent, especially in comparison to CIOP, which is admittedly only their temporary home.

(vi)    The social security, emoluments, additional benefits, etc. provided by the overseas entity to the secondee, and more generally, its employees, still govern the secondee in its relationship with CIOP.

(vii)    Whilst CIOP may have operational control over these persons in terms of the daily work and may be responsible (in terms of the agreement) for their failures, these limited and sparse factors cannot displace the larger and established context of employment abroad.

(viii)    The Court placed reliance on the Commentary of Klaus Vogel, wherein it was noted that the situation would have been different if the employee works exclusively for the enterprise in the State of employment and was released for the period in question by the enterprise in his state of residence. The Hon’ble High Court considered that this factor was critical to determine the economic employer.

From the above, it may be noted that the High Court, with due respect, has erred in giving higher weightage to the latter of the twin tests laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), i.e. exercise of lien by the seconded employee on its’ employment with the overseas entities. The High Court may not be correct in stating that limited and sparse factors of operational control over the secondees by CIOP in terms of their daily work and its’ responsibility for their work would not displace the larger and established context of employment abroad.

Further, while the counsels for Petitioner argued as to the concept of economic employment and relied on the degree of operational control exercised by CIOP, it appears that satisfaction of the twin conditions as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not highlighted before the High Court. Had the Petitioner highlighted the importance of the said twin conditions, the ratio laid down by the High Court may have been different.

The petitioner’s SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dismissed in Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [SLP (C). No 22295/2014, dated 10th October, 2014. Further, a review petition filed was also dismissed in Centrica India Offshore Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [RP(C) No. 2644 of 2014 in SLP (C). No 22295/2014, dated 10th December, 2014].    

OTHER TRIBUNAL AND HIGH COURT DECISIONS
In IDS Software Solutions (India) Ltd. vs. ITO2, the ITAT held that though the service rendered by expat is technical service, the assessee was not liable to deduct tax from the amount representing reimbursement of the salary paid by IDS-USA to expat while remitting the same to IDS-USA u/s 195. The ITAT came to such conclusion based on the following grounds:

(i)    IDS-USA was the legal employer. Since the assessee-company was to reimburse the emoluments paid by IDS-USA to him, it was the assessee-company which for all practical purposes was to be looked upon as the employer of ‘S’ during the relevant period;

(ii)    The person who actually controlled the services of ‘S’ was the assessee-company. Under the secondment agreement, ‘S’ was to act in accordance with the reasonable requests, instructions and directions of the assessee-company. He would have to devote the whole of his time, attention and skills to the assessee-company. He was to report to and be responsible to the assessee-company;

(iii)    The assessee-company could remove ‘S’ before the expiration of the period of his office. The board of directors of the assessee-company regulated the powers and duties of ‘S’ by passing appropriate resolutions;

(iv)    The seconded employee is required to also act as an officer or an authorised signatory or nominee or in any other lawful personal capacity for the assessee-company, which would also be out of place in an agreement for rendering technical services; and

(v)    Therefore, it was held that seconded employee was responsible and subservient to the assessee-company, which could not be the case if the agreement was for providing technical services by IDS to the assessee-company.


2. (2009) 122 TTJ 410 (Bang); relied on in ITO vs. M/s Cerner Health Care Solutions Pvt. Ltd [I.T.(T.P.) A.No.1509/Bang/2012];  ITO vs. Ariba Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd [I.T.A. No.616(Bang.)/2011]; Caterpillar India Pvt. Ltd vs. Deputy Director of Income-tax [ITA 629/630/606/607/149/(Bang)/2010]; DCIT vs. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. [2016] 69 taxmann.com 321 (Mumbai – Trib.)

In Deputy Director of Income-tax vs. Yum! Restaurants (Asia) Pte. Ltd. [2020] 117 taxmann.com 759 (Delhi – Trib.), where, a Singapore based company, seconded its employee to an Indian concern for carrying out business operations of its’ restaurant outlets in India efficiently, the said employee worked under direct supervision and control of Indian concern, his salary cost was reimbursed to assessee on a cost-to-cost basis, the Tribunal ruled that the employee was the employee of the Indian concern during the period of secondment. The Tribunal distinguished the case on hand from the facts in the case of Centrica India (supra) on the facts of the case by observing that in the case of Centrica, the overseas entity was providing services to Indian company through seconded employees to ensure quality control and management of their vendors of outsourced activities, with the intention to provide staff with appropriate expertise and knowledge about process and practices implemented. However, a perusal of the facts before the Tribunal would reveal that during the period of secondment, the seconded employee was under the exclusive employment of the Indian entity and foreign entity did not exercise any control or lien over the employee.

In AT & T Communication Services (India) (P.) Ltd vs. DCIT [2019] 101 taxmann.com 105 (Delhi – Trib.), it was held by the Tribunal that the nature of income embedded in related payments is relevant for deciding whether or not section 195 will come into play and so long as a payment to non-resident entity is in the nature of payment consisting of income chargeable under the head ‘Salaries’, the Indian Company does not have any tax withholding applications u/s 195 of the Act. The Tribunal distinguished the case before it from Centrica India’s case (supra) and observed that seconded employees of foreign company were not taking forward the business of foreign company in India. In Centrica (Supra), the employees were seconded to Indian company to ensure that services to be rendered to the overseas entities by the Indian vendor are properly coordinated.

In DIT vs. Abbey Business Services Ltd. (2020) 122 taxmann.com 174 (Kar), the assessee was a subsidiary of ANITCO Ltd. a group company of Abbey National Plc, UK (ANP). ANP had entered into an agreement with the assessee, to outsource the provision of certain process and call centers to M/s. Msource India Pvt. Ltd. Under the agreement, Msource India Pvt. Ltd was required to provide high quality services which supports the position of ANP and its affiliates as well as to customers in UK. To facilitate outsourcing agreement between ANP and Msource India Pvt. Ltd., an agreement for secondment of staff was entered into between ANP and the assessee on 4th February, 2004. For deputation of its employees, Abbey, India had made certain payments to ANP, part of which was salary reimbursement on which tax was deducted. The question arose whether such payments amounted to fees for technical services. The Court ruled that the reimbursement of salary costs by the Appellant was not FTS as the employees in question were employees of the assessee. The Court took into consideration the aspect of control, direction and supervision exercised by the assessee. The Court also observed that the employees were required to function in accordance with the policies, rules and guidelines applicable to the employees of the assessee. The Court has distinguished the judgement in Centrica’s case (supra) on the grounds that the question of permanent establishment was not involved in the case on hand, unlike in Centrica’s case (supra). With due respect, such basis is incorrect given that even in Centrica’s case, the question for consideration was whether costs reimbursed by petitioner therein to the overseas entity was FTS/FIS within the meaning of the DTAAs in question, which was also the question before the Karnataka High Court in Abbey’s case (supra).


SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN NORTHERN OPERATING SYSTEMS (P.) LTD.’S CASE
In C.C.,C.E. & S.T. Bangalore vs. Northern Operating Systems (P.) Ltd. [2022] 61 GSTL 129 (SC), the Court was examining whether where the overseas group companies seconded their employees to the assessee in India, the same would amount to manpower recruitment and supply services liable to service tax u/s 65(68) r.w.s. 65(105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994.

From the above extracted paragraphs, it can be noted that the Honourable Supreme Court has concluded that the seconded employees were not the employees of the assessee company in India by taking into consideration the following aspects:

  • The nature of the overseas group companies’ business is providing certain specialized services (back office, IT, bank related services, inventories, etc. which can be performed by its highly trained and skilled personnel.
  • Taking advantage of the globalized economy and location savings, the Overseas group company had assigned, inter alia, certain tasks to the assessee, including back-office operations of a certain kind, in relation to its activities, or that of other group companies or entities.
  • As part of this agreement, a secondment contract is entered into, whereby the overseas company’s employee or employees, possessing the specific required skill, are deployed for the duration the task is estimated to be completed in. Thus, the employees were deployed to the assessee, on secondment in relation to the business of the overseas employer and the group.
  • Though the employee was in control of the assessee and the assessee had the power to terminate the services of the seconded employees, upon expiry of the secondment period, the employees would return to their overseas employer.
  • The Overseas employer pays them the salary. The terms of employment, even during their secondment, are in accord with the policy of the overseas company who is the employer.
  • The fact that the assessee had to ultimately bear the burden of salaries of the seconded employees was irrelevant as the seconded employees were performing the tasks in relation to the assessee’s activities and not in relation to the overseas employer.

After discussing various decisions laying down the traditional test of supervision and control, the Court has indicated that such traditional test to indicate who the employer is may not be the sole test to be applied.

The above decision, in contrast to the decisions of the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) has brought out a new perspective i.e. whose business the seconded employee is carrying on? The decision lays down the principle that where the Indian entity provides support or back-office services to the foreign entity and the seconded employees enable the company to provide such services efficiently and effectively through their expertise, the employees continue to remain in employment of the foreign entity though their functions may be under the control and supervision of the Indian entity.

The said principle appears to be in line with the facts and the ultimate ratio in Centrica’s case (supra) and also the basis on which other decisions as cited in paragraph 5 have distinguished the ratio in Centrica’s case (supra).

SUBSEQUENT DECISION IN FLIPKART’S CASE
The above decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) was considered by the Ld. Single Judge in Flipkart Internet (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2022] 139 taxmann.com 595 (Karnataka). As per the facts of the said case, the Petitioner had made pure reimbursement payments to Walmart Inc. towards payment of salaries to deputed expatriate employees. The Petitioner applied for a certificate u/s 195 for Nil deduction of tax at source which was denied by the departmental officer. In writ proceedings, the Court has observed that the seconded employees were employees of the Petitioner by making the following observations:

  • Clause 1.5 of the Master Service Agreement (MSA) defines the scope of work relating to secondment.
  • Clause 3.1 of the MSA provides that the Petitioner may terminate the services of the secondees.
  • Clause 4.2 provides that the party placing the secondees can invoice the party receiving the service, the secondment costs, expenses and incidental costs borne in the Home Country.
  • Even though Walmart Inc. has the power to decide the continuance of the services in USA of the seconded employees after the termination of their secondment in India, it would relate to a service condition post the period of secondment. What would be of significance is the relationship between the petitioner and the seconded employee.
  • The equity eligibility of the seconded employee which was a pre-existing benefit (even prior to the secondment) ought not to alter the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the employee.
  • Further, mere payment by Walmart Inc. to the seconded employees would not alter the relationship between the petitioner and the seconded employees, as the petitioner only seeks to make payment to Walmart Inc. of its payment to the seconded employees which is stated to be by way of reimbursement.
  • The Petitioner was not merely acting as a back office for providing support service to the overseas entity, whereby the overseas entity could be treated as an employer.
  • The Petitioner issues the appointment letter, the employee reports to the petitioner and the petitioner has the power to terminate the services of the employee.

The Court also rejected the revenue’s reliance on the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) by distinguishing the case on hand from the facts in the said case, on the following grounds:

  • The Apex Court has interpreted the concept of a secondment agreement taking note of the contemporary business practice and has indicated that the traditional control test to indicate who is the employer, may not be the sole test to be applied. The Apex Court while construing a contract whereby employees were seconded to the assessee by foreign group of Companies, had upheld the demand for service tax holding that in a secondment arrangement, a secondee would continue to be employed by the original employer.

  • The Apex Court in the particular facts of the case had held that the Overseas Co., had a pool of highly skilled employees and having regard to their expertise were seconded to the assessee and upon cessation of the term of secondment would return to their overseas employees. While returning such finding on facts, the assessee was held liable to pay service tax for the period as mentioned in the show cause notice.

  • The judgment rendered was in the context of service tax and the only question for determination was as to whether supply of manpower was covered under the taxable service and was to be treated as a service provided by a Foreign Company to an Indian Company. But in the case on hand, the legal requirement requires a finding to be recorded to treat a service as ‘FIS’ which is “made available” to the Indian Company.

BASIS ON WHICH THE DECISION IN NORTHERN OPERATING’S CASE (SUPRA) CAN BE DISTINGUISHED
It is needless to state that whether the seconded or deputed employee continues to remain the employee of the foreign entity or becomes the employee of the Indian entity would depend on the facts of the case.

Though the said decision is in the context of provisions of Service Tax, the decision lays down certain important principles to determine whether or not the seconded employee remains the employee of the foreign entity even after such secondment or deputation to the Indian entity. Hence, the principles laid down thereunder would equally apply even in the context of provisions of the Income- tax Act.

While the decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) was rendered by a division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) is rendered by a larger bench of 3-judges. Thus, the interesting question for consideration is whether the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) are sacrosanct or have they been diluted in terms of the ratio in Northern Operating’s case (supra).

  • While the Court has referred to its’ earlier decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) in its’ subsequent decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra), it has not doubted the twin tests laid down thereunder or dissented from the ratio laid therein.
  • As discussed earlier, the subsequent decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) has stated that the traditional test of control and supervision for determination of the economic employer cannot be the sole test. Even in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), the test of control and supervision was not the sole and determinative factor but was part of twin tests. Thus, on this count, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) appears to be line with the decision in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra).
  • A fortiori, the twin tests laid down in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra), continue to hold the field even post the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) and are still relevant given that they have been laid down in the specific context of the Income-tax Act read with the relevant DTAAs.

Northern Operating’s case (supra) was rendered in the context of sections 65(68) and (105)(k) of the Finance Act, 1994 dealing with ‘supply of manpower’ prior to amendment in 2012 (with effect from 1st July, 2012) and section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 defining the term ‘service’ post such amendment. Thus, on the interpretation of such provisions, the Court ruled that the service of supply of manpower was rendered by the overseas entities to the appellant therein. However, in the context of Income-tax Act read with the relevant DTAAs, it would be necessary for the department to establish that the services, if any, rendered by the overseas entity through its’ employees would amount to technical services or included services as per the provisions of the IT Act read with the relevant DTAA, before any liability can be imposed.

The Commentary on Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention recognizes the principles of real or economic employment in contradistinction to legal employment. It lays down the following tests or factors for determination of economic employment:

  • The hirer does not bear the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the employee’s work;
  • The authority to instruct the worker lies with the user;
  • The work is performed at a place which is under the control and responsibility of the user;
  •  The remuneration to the hirer is calculated on the basis of the time utilized, or there is in other ways a connection between this remuneration and wages received by the employee;
  • Tools and materials are essentially put at the employee’s disposal by the user;
  • The number and qualifications of the employees are not solely determined by the hirer.

In the Commentary by Professor Klaus Vogel on ‘Double Taxation Conventions,’ it has been observed that where an employee is sent abroad to work for a foreign enterprise as well, the foreign enterprise does not qualify as an employer merely because the employee performs services for it or because the enterprise was issuing to the employee instructions regarding his work or places or tools at his disposal. However, it has been highlighted that the situation would be different if the employee works exclusively for the enterprise in the State of employment and was released for the period in question by the enterprise in his State of residence.

The above commentaries lay down the tests to be applied to determine the economic employer, which would be relevant for the purposes of the Income-tax Act read with the DTAAs and may not be relevant for the purposes of the Service Tax Act. Hence, these commentaries were not considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Northern Operating’s case (supra). However, for the purposes of provisions of the Income-tax Act, the tests laid down in the said commentaries would be relevant. The Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre Of Excellence P. Ltd. vs. CIT (2021) 432 ITR 471 chose to apply principles canvassed by OECD in the absence of contrary provisions in the domestic law.

The above commentaries would indicate while the test of control and supervision may be a relevant test, it may not be sole determinative factor, more so when the employee does not work exclusively for the Indian entity to whom he has been deputed and continues to carry on the business of the foreign entity. This is the key aspect which has also been emphasized by the Delhi High Court in Centrica’s case (supra) as highlighted earlier.

This also appears to be the sentiment of the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra). Thus, the key takeaway from the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra) and on reconciling the same with various earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including the one in Morgan Stanley’s case (supra) is that supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity would by itself not be determinative. Where the Indian entity is itself under the supervision and control of the foreign entity and carries on the business of the latter, mere supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity over the seconded/deputed employees would be irrelevant. In such circumstances, the seconded employees would be enabling the Indian entity in carrying on the business of the foreign parent in a more efficient and effective manner.

Thus, an analysis would have to be made in each case whether post such secondment/deputation, the seconded/deputed employee is carrying on the business of the foreign entity or is solely serving the Indian entity to whom he has been seconded/deputed. It is only in the latter situations, coupled with the supervision and control exercised by the Indian entity, one may be able to conclude that such person is the employee of the Indian entity during such period of secondment/deputation. This proposition is in line with the Commentary on Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary by Klaus Vogel, laying down the tests for determination of economic employer, which appear to be the distinguishing factor as taken into account by the High Court in the decision in Centrica India’ case (supra).

Thus, after such deputation/secondment, where the employee is exclusively devoted to the Indian entity and does not carry on the business of the foreign entity, he can be said to be under the economic employment of the Indian entity. In such circumstances, it would be possible for the Indian entity to distinguish its’ case from the facts in Northern Operating’s case (supra).

In CIT vs. Eli Lilly & Co. (India) P. Ltd. [2009] 312 ITR 225 (SC), the assessee company, incorporated in India, was a joint venture between M/s. Eli Lilly, Netherlands B.V. and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. The foreign partner had seconded four expatriates to the joint venture in India. They were employees of the joint venture post such deputation or secondment. However, they continued to remain on the rolls of the foreign company. They received home salary outside India from the foreign partner. The Indian venture deducted tax on salary paid to such expats but failed to deduct tax on such home salary. In appeal, the Court held that the Indian joint venture was liable to deduct at source u/s 192 in respect of such home salary which accrued in India under the provisions of section 9(1)(ii) read with the Explanation thereto.

Thus, in the above decision, the Court has understood that the home salary is salary paid by the foreign entity on behalf of such Indian entity. It is for this reason, the Court directed the Indian entity to deduct tax at source from such payments u/s 192. The above judgement, in the specific context of provisions of the Income-tax Act would indicate that where the services are provided by the expatriate post the secondment to the Indian entity, the employee would be under the economic employment of the Indian entity despite the fact that such employees continue to be on the rolls of the foreign entity.

The decision in Eli Lilly’s case (supra) would support the proposition that even where salaries are paid by the foreign entity to the seconded/deputed employees, such employees can be said to be under the economic employment where the services are rendered to the Indian entity during the course of such secondment.

Further, the decision in Eli Lilly’s case (supra) appears to be in line with the principles laid down in the Commentary by Klaus Vogel, laying emphasis on sole employment during the period of secondment, which was considered the most important factor as per the decision in Centrica’s case (supra). This is for the reason that in the judgement in Eli Lilly’s case (supra), there is a finding of fact by the Hon’ble Court that post the deputation, no work was performed by the employees for the foreign company.

Dealing with this exclusivity theory, it may be noted that the concept of simultaneous dual employment is not alien to the Income-tax Act. It has in fact been recognized by section 192(2) of the IT Act, which recognizes that during the financial year, an assessee may be employed simultaneously under more than one employer. Further, in today’s times, with the emergence of concept of moonlighting, certain employers permit their employees to exercise a second employment in so far as such second employment does not affect the business activities of the employer.

In such scenarios, when the provisions of the IT Act recognize such dual employment, it may be possible for the seconded employee to exercise such dual employment, during such period of secondment. Thus, the decision in Northern Operating’s case (supra), rendered in the specific context of the facts therein and more so in the context of provisions of Service Tax, cannot be relied on to insist on exclusivity.

With respect to fee paid to visiting doctors by hospitals, the Revenue3 is often found taking a stand that such payment amounts to salary and that tax is to be deducted by the concerned hospital u/s 192 as against section 194J. This stand is adopted despite the fact that upon any negligence by the doctor, he and not the concerned hospital would be responsible as per the Code of Ethics and the Medical Council Guidelines applicable to such doctors. Thus, in such cases, the responsibility over the work of the doctors by the hospital is overlooked by the department. The department also overlooks the factor of sole employment, given that the doctors may be visiting and providing their services to more than one hospital.

However, in the context of secondment, the revenue is seen taking a completely contradictory argument of sole employment with the Indian entity, for the purposes of determination of economic employment.


3. CIT vs. Grant Medical Foundation [2015] 375 ITR 49 (Bombay); CIT vs. Manipal Health Systems (P.) Ltd. [2015] 375 ITR 509 (Karnataka); CIT vs. Teleradiology Solutions Pvt Ltd [2016-TIOL-703-HC-KAR-IT];  ITO vs. Dr. Balabhai Nanavati Hospital [2017] 167 ITD 178 (Mumbai); Hosmat Hospital (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2016] 160 ITD 513 (Bangalore – Trib.). Note that the authors have only named a few cases herein.

Will Technology Replace Skilled Auditors?

INTRODUCTION

If data is the new oil, then a digital ecosystem is its refinery. Today, entities are using next-generation technologies more than ever, and many aspects of financial reporting and underlying processes have been digitised. As referred by the World Economic Forum, we are at the cusp of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” central to which is the development and adoption of automated technologies. The audit profession is also catching up with these technological developments. Building on the changes computers brought to the assurance profession, the use of advanced technologies is driving the evolution of the audit. As digital transformations speed ahead, auditors need to follow suit – the question is no longer ‘if’ the auditor needs to change; it’s ‘how fast?’

This article provides an overview of the automated tools and techniques in vogue, their myths, challenges and considerations while embarking on innovation strategy by audit firms.

AUTOMATED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
Audit procedures are performed using several manual or automated tools or techniques (and a combination of both). The automated tools and techniques would broadly fall into any of the following categories:

Automation

Analytics

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Robotic Process Automation (RPA)

 

When an activity/ procedure is
performed by a tool with least human intervention. E.g., updating workpaper
with terms and conditions from a purchase agreement.

 

Evaluation of a large volume of data
to find trends and make objective decisions. E.g., margin analysis of a group
of products.

 

Teaching tools to complete tasks
requiring human intelligence. E.g., identification of unusual clauses in a
lease contract

 

Uses recorders and easy programming
language mimicking human execution of applications, usually for repetitive
tasks. E.g., auto bank reconciliation statements.

Some commonly used automated tools relate to the following:

  • General ledger analysers: These examine and analyse general ledgers through a suite of data capture and analytics tools, e.g. audit teams can look at sales invoicing activity throughout the year, the impact of credit/ debit notes and ultimately, how the invoices are settled and accordingly allow auditors to obtain a better understanding of both revenue and trade receivables. This tool uses an analytics-driven approach that enables auditors to provide better-quality, deeper insights and more client-relevant audits, as well as exercise a higher level of professional scepticism.

 

  • Anomaly detectors: These refer to a practice in which auditors detect accounting fraud by selecting samples and testing them to ensure accuracy basis their knowledge about the clients, their businesses and accounting policies. Machine learning and AI is capable of sensing anomalous entries in large databases and create visual maps of the flagged entries and the reason for their detection.

 

  • Data profiling: Data might be unstructured, i.e. not recorded as rows and columns of data, e.g. written reports and social media. Plugins of some of the automated tools simplify extraction and analysis of unstructured data to quickly generate in-depth interactive reports containing statistics and graphical representations so that auditors can make more informed decisions.

 

  • Working paper management: Working paper solutions allow team members to collaborate effectively on an engagement file in real-time, even when in different locations. Members of the audit team can work on a work paper at the same time without being concerned about different versions. These solutions also automatically roll forward the identified client data from year to year to ensure continuity and reduce workload.

 

  • Reporting considerations: These incorporate a deep understanding of the auditing standards and generate audit reports on the basis of the conclusion reached by the auditor, e.g. audit having a modified opinion is automatically aligned with the relevant requirements. Additional features can include health check functions such as the casting of financial statements, tie-out in financial statements, cross reference checks against financial statements and notes, as well as casting of the notes.

 

AUDITING IN A DIGITAL WORLD
The audit of the future would focus human interaction on high-risk transactions as opposed to highly repetitive and rules-based tasks. Interface tools could be used to automatically share information in real time with the auditor’s automated tool(s), which in turn could analyse, test and flag anomalies or issues that require the auditor’s attention. However, human insight and experience to ultimately understand the context underlying the output as well as the cause of the output would continue to be relevant. A high-level summary of how an auditor can benefit from the use of automated tools is summarised below:Planning phase

Audit planning involves establishing an overall audit strategy that sets the scope, timing and direction of the audit guiding the development of the audit plan. The audit planning phase includes the following:Materiality and scoping – RPA can be used to pull out relevant data from the financial statements of prior periods or interim financial statements and compute the materiality based on a range of benchmarks. The same techniques can be utilised to determine materiality in a continuous or real-time audit.

RPA and analytics can be applied to identify outliers or areas that have not followed the understood course of business to determine the scope and focus testing on accounts or transactions that appear to present a greater risk of misstatement.

Risk Assessment – During risk assessment, auditors normally perform variance analysis about how the current period amounts compare with the prior period amounts based on an understanding of the entity, its industry, and the current business environment. RPA can perform this activity quickly basis prior period financial statements and publicly available information.

AI can analyse board meeting/audit committee minutes to help the auditor identify additional risks, and request to provide for supporting information, as well as scheduling meetings with the relevant individuals to discuss audit matters.

Execution phase
The execution phase of an audit engagement is an intense period of activity. It broadly comprises analysing information, executing testing, making judgements, documenting work and the following:

Test of controls – The aim of tests of controls in auditing is to determine whether internal controls are sufficient to detect or prevent risks of material misstatements. Metadata3 can enhance the testing of controls by highlighting potentially higher-risk areas, for example, AI tools can analyse how many purchase invoices an individual typically approves and their usual frequency and duration, as well as the amount of time since their previous approval. If a reviewer approves a purchase invoice in 5 minutes, then depending on the complexity of the purchase and the comparability with others performing the same task, AI could highlight an outlier for testing.


3. A set of data that describes and gives information about other data.

Risk control matrix has several automated controls. BOT can be used to analyse the result against a defined rule. BOT can prepare draft report of exceptions in a predefined format. The exception report can be reviewed by the auditor and once accepted, BOT can send report for response to management. This can result in significant effort optimisation of auditor.Inventory counts – With the computer’s vision, an AI-based app can look at millions of pictures taken from cameras (whether statically mounted in a warehouse or mounted on moving drones) and identify articles. Articles that have indexing information (such as bar codes) are even easier to identify and be counted, giving the auditor the ability to obtain more coverage.

Estimates – Traditional audit techniques used to audit estimates typically include reperformance of management’s process, retrospective testing, or development of an independent estimate. An array of automation and AI techniques can be used to perform variations of these techniques e.g., warranty gets triggered in case of a failure in the products. Management may have established a model for determining the expected rate of failure of products. Using machine learning, the audit team could build an independent model to predict this likelihood based on historical product failures. The AI tool could also be trained to incorporate other relevant observable factors, such as customer profiles, point in time when product failure occurs and contractual terms. Inclusion of these factors could also enable determination of an independent warranty estimate for comparison with the entity’s estimate.

Reporting phase
After fieldwork is completed, the auditor needs to:

Prepare an audit report – Auditors normally have a repository of standard audit reports which are customised as per the facts and circumstances. A modified audit opinion might require an auditor to make varied changes to a standard audit report. An editable version of an audit report is prone to errors. An automated audit report generator helps the auditor to choose the required audit report format and instantly generate an audit report on the basis of the limited inputs from the auditor e.g., the auditor would input limited information such as name of the auditor, year-end, basis for modified opinion. The automated audit report generator ensures consistency in reporting requirements and brings efficiency in the audit process.

Prepare client communications – Standardised templates are already developed and available to the audit teams, but human effort is required to tailor them to speci?c clients. AI can extract information from the audit ?les and workpapers (e.g., auditor’s report, management representation letter, etc.).

 

MYTHS AND CHALLENGES

There are many misperceptions about automated tools. Contrary to popular belief, at present these tools are neither all-knowing nor inherently smart. Some of the myths and challenges are as follows:

Garbage in garbage out

Automated tools are only as effective as the underlying data. The accuracy of the information presented or produced by the automated tools and techniques depends on it. The old adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’ applies. The auditor would need to evaluate data integrity e.g., how to assess the reliability of data captured, whether any mid-year system change would affect the overall scope.Automated tools can give biased or bad predictions if they are trained using biased or bad data e.g., if an AI tool was trained to automatically classify documents as either ?nancial data or non-financial data, but if 90 per cent of the training documents were non-?nancial data, the tool would wrongly learn and predict most of the data as non-?nancial data.

The ‘black box’ problem

In a simple set of data, an auditor can trace and determine the cause-and-effect relationship of automated tools and techniques. When the data points become complex, tools may not be able to clearly link input factors and outcomes, and explain the cause-effect pattern. This lack of transparency or explainability creates a lack of trust in automated tools, and is perhaps the biggest challenge to the widespread adoption of some of the sophisticated automated tools.Data privacy and conndentiality

The effective use of automated tools often requires an access to large amounts of data, including conndential client data, in order to learn relevant patterns and apply them to predict or suggest an output. Not surprisingly, entities may be resistant to providing access to this high-value data and information. Auditors need to consider the risks associated with data and privacy, and design security protections commensurate with the sensitivity of the data.Not a substitute for auditors’ judgement

Automated tools fail to see the big picture e.g., the world of automated tools is restricted only to the (correct or incorrect) data to which it has access, what it has been taught and what it has been programmed to do. It does not know the nuances of the real world and can’t replace an auditor’s professional judgment. Fraud or bias can happen even when transactions processed by the automated tools seem perfectly legitimate. Auditors need to be alert to these qualitative aspects. Advanced technologies provide a wealth of information to an auditor that enables them to make a judgment. But the auditor will still be the one making that judgment.Technology is an enabler and is unmatched when it comes to identifying correlations among datasets or variables. However, it takes human insight and experience to ultimately understand the context underlying the output as well as the causation of the output relative to the inputs provided. An auditor confirms the information and determines whether it is an anomaly and, more importantly, determines what it implies or how to conclude on how appropriate the treatment of the information is. Accordingly, automated tools will not replace the need for professional judgment in auditing processes.

Widening expectation gap

These technologies have the potential to widen the expectation gap and raise the bar for the definition of an audit. With the ability to analyse a larger percentage of transactions and data, there will be an increased expectation as to what an audit achieves. 

CALL TO ACTION

Much of the growth in automated tools and techniques in some audit firms over the past few years can be put down to one factor: competition. The audit firm rotation rules have sent some of the audit firms into a technology arms race. As the technology trickles down, every audit firm, regardless of its size, needs to decide on its innovation strategy. No choice of the strategy is bad – it’s all a question of what suits a firm’s client base. Audit firms would need to balance the risks and benefits. While deciding the innovation strategy, audit firms are encouraged to:

  • Conduct an environmental scan: Firstly, look inwards. Research and analyse the firm’s current audit process to identify outdated systems that need improvements before exploring external products. This process may involve attending vendor events to learn about what new technology is available and considering how the firm can collaborate with external IT specialists.

 

  • Align with long-term strategy: Firms should identify which technology is best aligned with their strategy and consider the relevant business need, available budget and marketplace opportunities. The return on investment should be calculated, but the risk of not investing in a new technology should also be considered.

There are various options to manage the required investment, including exploring a subscription based or monthly-renewal model to manage the costs, and consider passing the costs on to clients. It can be difficult to determine which one is the best and a long-term solution. Sharing experiences with other similar firms can be mutually beneficial.

  • Formulate realistic implementation plan: A bite-sized plan should be developed so the firm can effectively manage the transition. Be strategic while identifying opportunities for automated tools and techniques. An ideal place to start is with high-benefit, low-effort opportunities. Assess the results using professional judgment, as well as any potential efficiency savings. Audit firms may determine the best option based on requirements, resources and schedule.

 

  • Adopt the Cloud: Cloud technology has become a key part of most industries. Firms with multiple offices can use the cloud to provide staff an easy way to work virtually on the same client simultaneously in different offices. The firm needs to know the service providers and where they are storing the data to track how it is being secured. There is also a need to be aware of any relevant laws and regulations, such as data protection legislation.

 

  • Identify innovation champions: Understanding who to approach in the audit firm places the firm in a better position to support tangible change and implementation of identified opportunities. The firm should identify and position a passionate team member to take the lead in implementing a new technology initiative. The technology champion will need support and guidance from the firm’s leadership to proceed with change because there may be challenges with its implementation. It may take time and effort, so patience and perseverance are prerequisites, but the benefits will far outweigh the costs.

 

  • Involve clients in technology decisions: Clients want to hear about technological developments that save time. Involving clients would create transparency and highlight a long-term vision for all involved. As the firm enhances its technology knowledge, it will further enhance trust and help introduce new permissible service offerings.

 

IN A NUTSHELL
Audit is changing at an unprecedented pace as technology continues to evolve and entities increasingly expect more. These two intersecting trends mean that auditors must continually acquire new skills and up their game to meet the rising bar on audit quality. It’s not enough to have the latest technology – auditors must be able to mine data for information that is important to clients, such as that affecting relevant risks, internal controls, and important processes, and be able to communicate it clearly. It is important to see automated tools as enablers. They will not replace the auditor; rather, they will transform the audit and the auditor’s role.

Immunity from Penalty for Under-Reporting and from Initiation of Proceedings for Prosecution – Section 270AA

BACKGROUND
With a view to introduce objectivity, clarity and certainty, the Finance Bill, 2016 proposed a levy of penalty for under-reporting of income in lieu of penalty for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. W.e.f. Assessment Year 2017-18, in respect of additions which are made to total income, penalty is leviable u/s 270A if there is under-reporting of income.

Under section 270A, penalty is levied at 50 per cent of tax for under-reporting of income and at 200 per cent of tax for under-reporting in consequence of misreporting. Of course, levy of penalty u/s 270A has to be in accordance with the provisions of section 270A.

Section 276C, providing for prosecution for wilful attempt to evade tax, etc., has been amended by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 to cover a situation where a person under-reports his income and tax on under-reported income exceeds Rs. 2,500,000.

Since, provisions of section 270A are enacted in a manner that in most cases, where there is an addition to the total income, penalty proceedings u/s 270A will certainly be initiated and barring situations covered by sub-section (6) of section 270A, penalty will also be levied. The Legislature, with a view to avoid litigation, has simultaneously introduced section 270AA to provide for grant of immunity from penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC.

IMMUNITY GRANTED BY SECTION 270AA

The Finance Act, 2016 has, w.e.f. 1st April, 2017, introduced section 270AA, which provides for immunity. The Delhi High Court in Schneider Electric South East Asia (HQ) Pte. Ltd. vs. ACIT [WP(C) 5111/2022; Order dated 28th March, 2022, has held that the avowed legislative intent of section 270AA is to encourage/incentivize a taxpayer to (i) fast-track settlement of issue, (ii) recover tax demand; and (iii) reduce protracted litigation.

Section 270AA achieves this objective by granting immunity from penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC, in case the assessee chooses not to prefer an appeal to CIT(A) against the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or 147, as the case may be, and also pays the amount of tax along with interest within the period mentioned in the notice of demand.

Section 270AA has six sub-sections. It has not been amended since its introduction.

In this article, for brevity sake,

i) ‘immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A and initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC’ is referred to as ‘IP&IPP’;

ii) an application by the assessee made u/s 270AA(1) for grant of IP&IPP is referred to as ‘application u/s 270AA’;

iii) the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or 147, as the case may be, in which the proceedings for imposition of penalty u/s 270A are initiated and qua which immunity is sought by an assessee is referred to as ‘the relevant assessment order’;

iv) under-reporting in consequence of misreporting or under-reporting in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A is referred to as ‘misreporting’; and

v)    Income-tax Act, 1961 has been referred to as ‘Act’.


BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SECTION 270AA
An assessee may make an application, for grant of IP&IPP, to the AO, if the assessee cumulatively satisfies the following conditions –

(a)    the tax and interest payable as per the order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or section 147, as the case may be, has been paid;

(b)    such tax and interest has been paid within the period specified in such notice of demand;

(c)    no appeal against the relevant assessment order has been filed. [Sub-section (1)]

The application for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the relevant assessment order has been received. The application is to be made in the prescribed form i.e. Form No. 68 and needs to be verified in the manner stated in Rule 129. [Sub-section (2)]

The AO shall grant immunity if all the conditions specified in sub-section (1) are satisfied and if the proceedings for penalty have not been initiated in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9). However, such an immunity shall be granted only after expiry of the time period for filing of appeal as mentioned in section 249(2)(b) [i.e. time for filing an appeal to the CIT(A) against the relevant assessment order] [sub-section (3)]

Within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the application is received by him, the AO shall pass an order accepting or rejecting such application. Order rejecting application shall be passed only after the assessee has been given an opportunity of being heard. [sub-section (4)]

The order made under sub-section (4) shall be final. [Sub-section (5)]

Where an order is passed under sub-section (4) accepting the application, neither an appeal to CIT(A) u/s 246A, nor the revision application u/s 264 shall be admissible against the relevant assessment order. [sub-section (6)]

SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
The immunity granted u/s 270AA is from imposition of penalty u/s 270AA and for initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC.

Immunity granted u/s 270AA will be only for IP&IPP and not from imposition of penalty under other sections such as 271AAB, 271AAC, etc., though penalty under such other provisions may be initiated in the relevant assessment order itself.


CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 270AA
An application u/s 270AA can be made only upon cumulative satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) – see conditions mentioned at (a) to (c) in the para captioned `Brief overview of section 270AA’.

Sub-section (1) does not debar or prohibit an assessee from making an application even when penalty has been initiated for misreporting.

The application for immunity can be made only if the proceedings for imposition of penalty u/s 270A have been initiated through an order of assessment or reassessment u/s 143(3) or section 147, as the case may be, of the Act.

In a case where an assessment is made u/s 143(3) pursuant to the directions of DRP, it would still be an assessment u/s 143(3) and therefore an assessee will be entitled to make an application u/s 270AA.

In a case where search is initiated after 31st March, 2021, assessment of total income will be vide an order passed u/s 147 of the Act and therefore, it would be possible to make an application u/s 270AA in such cases.

Orders passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 254; section 143(3) r.w.s. 260;  143(3) r.w.s. 263 and 143(3) r.w.s. 264 which result in an increase in quantum of assessed income/reduction in amount of assessed loss and consequential initiation of proceedings u/s 270A, upon assessments being set aside by revisional / appellate authority as also orders passed to give effect to the directions of appellate authorities, will also qualify for making an application for grant of immunity u/s 270AA.  The following reasons may be considered to support this proposition –

i)     Sections 143, 144 and 147 are the only sections under which an assessment can be made;

ii)    Section 270AA refers to `order of assessment’ and not ‘order of regular assessment’;

iii)     The Bombay High Court has in Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd. vs. CIT [(1975) 202 ITR 375], held that “For these reasons, the impugned order of assessment passed by the ITO pursuant to the directions of the appellate authorities with a view to giving effect to the directions contained therein was an order of assessment within the meaning of section 143 or section 144 ….”

iv)    The Madras High Court in Rayon Traders (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [(1980) 126 ITR 135] has held that “An order passed by the ITO to give effect to an appellate order would itself be an order under section 143(3).”

v)    Where the appellate authority’s order necessitates a re-computation e.g., when it holds that a particular receipt is not income from business but is a capital gain, the AO has to pass an order under this section (refers to section 143) making a proper calculation and issue a notice of demand [Law & Practice of Income-tax, 11th Edition by Arvind P. Datar; Volume II – page 2521 commentary on section 143];

vi)    The order itself mentions that it is passed u/s 143(3) though it is followed by ‘read with …..’;

vii)    Contextual interpretation requires that these orders would be regarded as ‘order of assessment u/s 143(3)’ for the purpose of section 270AA;

There can be hardly any arguments against the above stated proposition except contending that it is an order passed u/s 143(3) read with some other provision.

To avoid any litigation on this issue and to achieve the avowed object with which section 270AA is enacted, it is advisable that the matter be clarified by the Board.

An interesting issue will arise in cases where an assessment made u/s 143(3) without making any addition to returned income is sought to be revised for rectifying a mistake apparent on record after giving notice to the assessee and such rectification results in an increase in assessed income and also initiation of proceedings for levy of penalty u/s 270A. In such a case while the penalty is initiated in the course of rectification proceedings, the assessment is still u/s 143(3), and all that the order passed u/s 154 does is to change the amount of total income assessed u/s 143(3) by rectifying the mistake therein and consequently the amount of tax and interest payable will also undergo a change and a fresh notice of demand will be issued. It appears that the assessee, in such a case also, will be entitled to make an application for grant of immunity u/s 270AA if the assessee pays the amount of tax and interest as per the notice of demand issued along with order passed u/s 154 and such tax and interest is paid within the time mentioned in such notice of demand and the assessee does not prefer an appeal against the addition made via an order passed u/s 154. It is submitted that it would not be proper to deny the immunity on the ground that the proceedings for imposition of penalty have been initiated via an order which is not passed u/s 143(3) or section 147. The language of sub-section (1) is that ‘the tax and interest payable as per the order of assessment under section 143(3) has been paid within the period specified in the notice of demand’. The tax and interest payable pursuant to an order passed u/s 154 only rectifies the amount of tax and interest payable computed in the order of assessment u/s 143(3). Even going by the avowed intent of the legislature it appears that an application in such cases should be maintainable. In a case where the assessment made u/s 143(3) by making additions to returned income is sought to be rectified and against such assessment the assessee had applied for and was granted immunity, it appears that the assessee will be entitled to immunity since, as has been mentioned, order u/s 154 only amends the amount of assessed income in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3). However, if against the assessment u/s 143(3) the assessee had preferred an appeal to CIT(A) and such an assessment is rectified by passing an order u/s 154 the assessee may not qualify for making an application u/s 270AA.

The application for grant of immunity cannot be made where the proceedings for levy of penalty u/s 270A have been initiated by CIT(A) or CIT or PCIT.

Normally, the time period granted to pay the demand is thirty days. However, if the time mentioned in the notice of demand is less than thirty days, then the amount of tax and interest payable as per notice of demand will have to be paid within such shorter period as is mentioned in the notice of demand if the assessee desires to make an application for grant of IP&IPP.

If there is an apparent mistake in the calculation of the amount mentioned in the notice of demand accompanying the relevant assessment order, the assessee may choose to make an application for rectification u/s 154 of the Act. In the event that the rectification application is not disposed of before the expiry of the time period within which the application for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made, then the assessee will have to make the payment of amount demanded (though incorrect in his opinion) since pendency of rectification application cannot be taken up as a plea for making an application u/s 270AA(1) for grant of IP&IPP beyond the period mentioned in section 270AA(1).

It is not the requirement for making an application u/s 270AA that there should necessarily be some amount of tax and interest payable as per the relevant assessment order. Therefore, even in cases where the amount of demand as per the relevant assessment order is Nil (e.g. loss cases), subject to satisfaction of other conditions, an assessee can make an application u/s 270AA.

The CBDT has clarified that an immunity application by the assessee will not amount to acquiescence of the issue under consideration, for earlier years where a similar issue may have been raised and may be litigated by the assessee, and authorities will not take any adverse view in the prior year/s – Circular No. 5 of 2018, dated 16th August, 2018.


TIME WITHIN WHICH APPLICATION NEEDS TO BE MADE
The application for grant of immunity needs to be made within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the relevant assessment order is received by the assessee [Section 270A(2)].

Section 249(2)(b) provides that the time available for filing an appeal to the CIT(A), against the relevant order, if the same is appealable to CIT(A), is 30 days from the date following the date of service of notice of demand. Consequent to introduction of section 270AA, second proviso has been inserted to section 249(2)(b) to exclude the period beginning from the date on which the application u/s 270AA is made to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee. Therefore, in a case where the application u/s 270AA is rejected and the assessee upon rejection of the application chooses to file an appeal to CIT(A), then the second proviso to section 249(2)(b) will come to the rescue of the assessee to exclude the period mentioned therein. However, the benefit of the second proviso will be available to the assessee only if he has filed an application u/s 270AA before the expiry of the time period for filing an appeal. In cases where the application u/s 270AA is made after the expiry of the time period of filing the appeal to CIT(A), the appeal of the assessee will be belated and the assessee will need to make an application to the CIT(A) seeking condonation of delay which application may or may not be allowed by CIT(A). This is illustrated by the following example–

Suppose, an assessee receives an assessment order passed u/s 143(3) on 10th December, 2022, wherein penalty u/s 270A has been initiated and the assessee is eligible to make an application u/s 270AA, then the assessee can make an application u/s 270AA till 31st January, 2023. The time period for filing an appeal against this assessment order is 9th January, 2023. If the assessee files his application u/s 270AA on say 2nd January, 2023 then in the event that the application of the assessee is rejected by passing an order u/s 270AA(4) on 14th February, 2023, then for computing the time period available for filing an appeal to CIT(A), the period from 2nd January, 2023 to 9th January, 2023 will need to be excluded and assessee will still have eight days from 14th February, 2023 (being the date of service of order u/s 270AA(4)) to file an appeal to the CIT(A). However, if the above fact pattern is modified only to the extent that the assessee chooses to file an application u/s 270AA on 14th January, 2023, then upon rejection of such application the assessee does not have any time available to file an appeal to the CIT(A), as there is no period which can be excluded from the time available u/s 249(2)(b). In this case, the assessee will need to make an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and will be at the mercy of CIT(A) for condoning the delay or otherwise.

Therefore, it is advisable to file an application u/s 270AA by a date such that in case the application u/s 270AA is rejected, then the assessee still has some time available to file an appeal to CIT(A).

TO WHOM IS THE APPLICATION REQUIRED TO BE MADE, FORM OF APPLICATION – PHYSICAL OR ELECTRONIC? FORM OF APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION THEREOF
The application u/s 270AA for grant of IP&IPP needs to be made to the AO [section 270AA(1)]. The application needs to be made to the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) in all cases i.e. even in cases where the assessment was completed in a faceless manner u/s 143(3) r.w.s.144B.

The application u/s 270AA needs to be made in Form No. 68. The Form seeks basic details from the assessee. Form No. 68 has a declaration to be signed by the person verifying the said form. The declaration is to the effect that no appeal has been filed against the relevant assessment order and that no appeal shall be filed till the expiry of the time period mentioned in section 270AA(4) i.e. the period within which the AO is mandated to pass an order accepting or rejecting the application made by an assessee u/s 270AA.

Form No. 68 is to be filed electronically on the income-tax portal. On the portal, Form 68 is available at the tab e-File>Income Tax Forms>File Income Tax Forms>Persons not dependent on any Source of Income (source of income not relevant)>Penalties Imposable (Form 68)(Form of Application under section 270AA(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961). Presently, immunity is granted by the JAO. The JAO who is holding charge of the case of the assessee can be known from the income-tax portal.

ACTION EXPECTED OF AO UPON RECEIVING THE APPLICATION
The AO, upon verification that all the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) are cumulatively satisfied and also that the penalty has not been initiated for misreporting, shall grant immunity after expiry of the period for filing an appeal u/s 249(2)(b) [Section 270A(3)]. In other words, upon a cumulative satisfaction of the conditions, granting of immunity is mandatory.

The AO is not required to obtain approval of any higher authority for granting IP&IPP.

In the case of GE Capital US Holdings Inc vs. DCIT [WP No. (C) – 1646 /2022; Order dated 28th January, 2022, the Petitioner approached the Delhi High Court to issue a writ declaring Section 270AA(3) as ultra vires the Constitution of India or suitably read it down to exclude cases wherein the AO has denied immunity without ex-facie making out a case of misreporting of income. The Court observed that in the facts of the case before it – (i) the SCN did not particularize as to on what basis it is alleged against the Petitioner that he has resorted to either under-reporting or misreporting of income; and (ii) there was no finding even in the assessment order that the Petitioner had either resorted to under-reporting or misreporting. The Court has issued notice to the Department and till the next hearing has stayed the operation of the order passed u/s 270AA(4) and directed the AO not to proceed with imposition of penalty u/s 270A.

TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AO IS REQUIRED TO PASS AN ORDER ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP
While sub-section (3) casts a mandate on the AO to grant immunity upon satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph, sub-section (4) provides that the AO shall within a period of one month from the end of the month in which an application has been received for grant of IP&IPP, pass an order accepting or rejecting such application. Proviso to sub-section (4) provides that an order rejecting application for grant of IP&IPP shall be passed only after the assessee has been given an opportunity of being heard.

Except in cases where penalty u/s 270A has been initiated for misreporting, it is not clear as to whether there could be any other reason as well for which application for grant of IP&IPP can be rejected by the AO. This is on the assumption that the assessee has satisfied conditions precedent stated in sub-section (1) of section 270AA.

While the outer limit for passing an order accepting or rejecting an application has been provided for in section 270AA(4) namely, one month from the end of the month in which the application for grant of immunity has been received, the AO will have to ensure that such an order is passed only after expiry of the period mentioned in section 249(2)(b) for filing an appeal to CIT(A).

A question arises as to what is the purpose of sub-section (4) since sub-section (3) clearly provides that the AO shall grant IP&IPP. One way to harmoniously interpret the provisions of these two sub-sections would be that in cases where conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) are satisfied, it is mandatory for the AO to grant immunity whereas in cases where conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) are not satisfied, it is discretionary on the part of the AO to grant immunity. This would be one way to reconcile the provisions of the two sub-sections, and it would in certain cases appear that such an interpretation would advance the intention of the legislature to avoid litigation. For example, take a case where the under-reporting of income is Rs. 10.05 crore, of which Rs. 5 lakh is on account of misreporting, whereas the balance Rs. 10 crore is for under-reporting simplicitor and the assessee applies for grant of immunity by paying the amount of tax and interest within the time mentioned in the notice of demand and does not file an appeal against such an order. If one were to interpret the provisions of sub-section (3), it would appear that the AO is not under a mandate to grant immunity but sub-section (4) possibly grants him a discretion to pass an order accepting or rejecting the application for grant of IP&IPP. This view can also be supported by the fact that if the initiation of penalty for misreporting was a disqualification, it would have been mentioned as a condition precedent in sub-section (1) that penalty should not have been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A of the Act. As on date, this view has not been tested before the judiciary. In case the AO chooses to reject the application then, of course, he will need to grant an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

Also, it appears that in a case where the assessee has made an application for grant of IP&IPP and the AO is of the view that the penalty u/s 270A has been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A, then he may grant an opportunity to the assessee. The assessee, in response, may show cause as to how his case is not covered by the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9), in case the AO is convinced with the submissions/ contentions of the assessee, he may pass an order granting immunity. Sub-section (4) is a statutory recognition of the principle of natural justice.

The Delhi High Court in the case of Schenider Electric South East Asia (HQ) PTE Ltd. [WP No. 5111/2022 & C.M. Nos. 15165-15166/2022; Order dated 28th March, 2022] was dealing with the case of a Petitioner whose application for grant of immunity was rejected by passing an order u/s 270AA(4) on the ground that the case of the Petitioner did not fall within the scope and ambit of section 270AA. The Court observed the show cause notice initiating the penalty proceedings did not specify the limb whether “under-reporting” or “misreporting”. The Court held that in the absence of particulars as to which limb of section 270A is attracted and how the ingredients of sub-section (9) of section 270A are satisfied, the mere reference to the word “misreporting” in the assessment order to deny immunity from imposition of penalty and prosecution makes the impugned order passed u/s 270AA(4) manifestly arbitrary. The Court set aside the order passed by the AO u/s 270AA(4) and directed the AO to grant immunity to the Petitioner.

To the similar effect is the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Prem Brothers Infrastructure LLP vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre [WP No. (C) – 7092/2022; Order dated 31st May, 2022].


CONSEQUENCES OF AO NOT PASSING AN ORDER WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD MENTIONED IN SUB-SECTION (4) OF SECTION 270AA
The Delhi High Court in the case of Ultimate Infratech Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi High Court – WP (C) 6305/2022 & CM Applns. 18990-18991/2022; Order dated 20th April, 2022] was dealing with the case of an assessee who filed a Writ Petition challenging the order levying penalty u/s 270A and also sought immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A of the Act in respect of income assessed vide assessment order for A.Y. 2017-18. The assessment of total income was completed by reducing the returned loss. There was no demand raised on completion of the assessment. The assessee filed an application u/s 270AA for grant of IP&IPP. No order was passed, within the statutory time period, to dispose of the application filed by the assessee. Penalty was imposed on the assessee on the ground that no order granting immunity was passed by the JAO within the statutory time period. The Court observed that the statutory scheme for grant of immunity is based on satisfaction of three fundamental conditions, namely, (i) payment of tax demand, (ii) non-institution of appeal, and (iii) initiation of penalty on account of under-reporting of income and not on account of misreporting of income. The Court noted that all the conditions had been satisfied. The Court held that in a case where an assessee files an application for grant of immunity within the time period mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 270AA and the AO does not pass an order under sub-section (4) of section 270AA within the time period mentioned therein, the assessee cannot be prejudiced by the inaction of the AO in passing an order u/s 270AA within the statutory time limit, as it is settled law that no prejudice can be caused to any assessee on account of delay / default on the part of the Revenue

ORDER REJECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP – WHETHER APPEALABLE?
Sub-section (5) of section 270A clearly provides that the order passed u/s 270A(4) shall be final. In other words, an order rejecting the application u/s 270AA is not appealable. The only option to the assessee who wishes to challenge the order rejecting the application u/s 270AA would be to invoke a writ jurisdiction. Since there is no alternate remedy available, the revenue will not be able to oppose the writ petition of the assessee on the ground that there is an alternate remedy which ought to be exercised instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction.

The Bombay High Court in a Writ Petition filed by Haren Textiles Private Limited, [WP No. 1100 of 2021; Order dated 8th September, 2021], was dealing with the case of an assessee who filed a revision application before PCIT against the action of the AO. The PCIT rejected the revision application filed by the assessee on the ground that sub-section (6) of section 270AA specifically prohibits revisionary proceedings u/s 264 of the Act against the order passed by the AO u/s 270AA(4) of the Act. The Bombay High Court while deciding the Writ Petition challenging this order of the PCIT, agreed with the contention made on behalf of the assessee that there is no such prohibition or bar as has been held by the PCIT.

The Court held that what is provided in sub-section (6) is that when an assessee makes an application under sub-section (1) of section 270AA and such an application has been accepted under sub-section (4) of section 270AA, the assessee cannot file an appeal u/s 246A or an application for revision u/s 264 against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 147. This, according to the Court, does not provide any bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the AO, rejecting its application made under sub-section (1) of section 270AA. The Court observed that the application before PCIT was an order of rejection passed by the ACIT of an application filed by the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 270AA seeking grant of immunity from imposition of penalty and initiation of proceedings u/s 276C of section 276CC. The Court held that the PCIT was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground that there is a bar under sub-section (6) of section 270AA in filing such application. The Court set aside the order passed by PCIT u/s 264 of the Act.

It is humbly submitted that the court, in this case, has not considered the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 270AA which provide that the order passed under sub-section (4) of section 270AA shall be final. Had the provisions of sub-section (5) been considered, probably the decision may have been otherwise.    

CONSEQUENCES OF THE AO PASSING AN ORDER DISPOSING APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE FOR GRANT OF IP&IPP
In case an order is passed accepting the application, then the assessee will get immunity from imposition of penalty u/s 270A and from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C or section 276CC. Also, against the relevant assessment order, the assessee will not be able to file either an appeal to CIT(A) or a revision application to the CIT. However, in cases where an appeal against the relevant assessment order lies to the Tribunal, the assessee will be able to challenge the relevant assessment order in an appeal to the Tribunal, notwithstanding the fact that immunity has been granted, e.g. in cases where the relevant assessment order has been passed by the AO pursuant to the directions of Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).

However, if an order is passed u/s 270AA(4) rejecting the application of the assessee for grant of immunity, the assessee will be free to file an appeal to the CIT(A) or a revision application to CIT against the relevant assessment order.

Normally, an application u/s 270AA will be rejected on the ground that the penalty u/s 270A has been initiated in the circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) thereof. In order to avoid the possibility of the revenue contending at appellate stage or while imposing penalty u/s 270A, that the position that penalty has been initiated in circumstances mentioned in sub-section (9) of section 270A has become final by virtue of an order passed u/s 270AA(4) and the assessee has not challenged such an order, it is advisable that upon receipt of the order rejecting the application for grant of immunity, if the assessee chooses not to file a writ petition against such rejection, the assessee should write a letter to the AO placing on record the fact that he does not agree with the order of rejection and his not filing a writ petition does not mean his acquiescence to the reasons given for rejection of the application u/s 270AA.

The Hon’ble Delhi High Court has in the case of Ultimate Infratech Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi High Court – WP (C) 6305/2022 & CM Applns. 18990-18991/2022; Order dated 20th April, 2022, has held that “it is only in cases where proceedings for levy of penalty have been initiated on account of alleged misreporting of income that an assessee is prohibited from applying and availing the benefit of immunity from penalty and prosecution under section 270AA.”

SOME OBSERVATIONS
i)    Immunity u/s 270AA is from initiation of proceedings u/s 276C and section 276CC. However, if before an assessee makes an application u/s 270AA, if proceedings u/s 276C or 276CC have already been initiated, then it appears that the assessee will be able to avail only immunity from penalty under section 270A.

ii)    Before making an application for grant of immunity, assessee is required to pay the entire amount of tax and interest payable as per the relevant assessment order within the period mentioned in the notice of demand. In case the application is rejected, the entire demand would stand paid and the assessee would be in an appeal before CIT(A), whereas had the assessee chosen not to apply for grant of immunity, the assessee would have, as per CBDT Circular, applied for and obtained a stay in respect of 80 per cent of the demand.

iii)    Till the date of filing an application u/s 270AA, the assessee should not have filed an appeal against the relevant assessment order. However, if the assessee has, upon receipt of the relevant assessment order, filed a revision application to CIT u/s 264, he is not disqualified from making an application. However, once an order is passed accepting the application for grant of IP&PP, then such a revision application already filed will no longer be maintainable in view of section 270AA(6).

iv)    There is no provision to withdraw the immunity once granted by passing an order u/s 270AA(4).

v)    There is no bar on assessee making an application under section 154 for rectification of the relevant assessment order even after an order is passed u/s 270AA(4) accepting the application of the assessee for grant of immunity.

CONCLUSION
Section 270AA is a salutary provision and if implemented in the spirit with which it is enacted, it would go a long way to reduce litigation and collect taxes and interest. While section 270AA grants IP&IPP, it makes the relevant assessment order not appealable in its entirety. The additions made in the relevant assessment order may be such as would attract penalty / penalties leviable under provisions other than section 270A. This may work as a disincentive to an assessee who is otherwise considering to apply for immunity and accept the additions which attract penalty u/s 270A. Also, in fairness, a provision should be made that in the event that the application u/s 270AA is rejected and the assessee chooses to file an appeal, the amount of tax and interest paid by him in excess of 20 per cent of the amount demanded will be refunded within a period of 30 days from the date of order rejecting the application for grant of immunity. This is on the premise that had the assessee not opted to make an application for immunity but directly preferred an appeal against the relevant assessment order, he would have got a stay of demand in excess of 20 per cent. It is advisable that the difficulties mentioned above and may be other difficulties which the author has not noticed be ironed out by issuing a clarification.

Sustaining and Growing in “VUCA” Times!

November 2022 was an eventful month for our profession, India, and the world. ICAI organized the 21st World Congress of Accountants (WCOA) in partnership with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), with the highest number of participants (more than 10,000) from 123 countries and set many records. The WCOA is held every four years and is popularly known as the “Olympics of the Accountancy Profession”. For the first time in 118 years, WCOA was held in India at Mumbai.

Perhaps, for the first time in the history of our profession, Indian CA firms were allowed to exhibit their services. The Congress was addressed by many luminaries from the Government, Industry and Political Leaders, Investment Advisors, and Professionals. Almost all speakers were upbeat about India. The theme of the Congress was “Building Trust Enabling Sustainability”. CAs have a major role to play in building trust and ensuring sustainability. We are partners in nation-building and conscience keepers of society. The CA profession is set to scale new heights with the increased role of CAs in policymaking not only at an enterprise level, but also at the national level.

Different stakeholders have different expectations from us as auditors. It is extremely difficult to meet everyone’s expectations and therefore there is a need for collective responsibility of governance and vigilance by all stakeholders. Often our role of audit and assurance is mixed up with that of an investigator, which needs to be clearly spelled out to all stakeholders.

SEBI has mandated a “Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report” (BRSR) for the top 1,000 listed companies (by Market Cap) from the F.Y. 2022-2023. The roots of BRSR are in corporates’ responsibility and sustainability considering Environment, Social and Governance (ESG). ESG refers to an assessment of how an organisation impacts the Planet covering various Environmental aspects; the Society covering staff, customers and the community and its own Governance. As far as the environmental aspect is concerned, the impact of climate change is a major factor. Not only the organisation’s own actions, but actions of others (e.g., the Ukraine-Russia war which has disrupted the supply chain of the world economy), government policies etc. may also impact an organisation.

Although all these aspects are non-financial in nature, they can impact the very existence of an organisation. Their link to financial performance can give a clear picture of the current status and the future of an organisation in turbulent times. Therefore, the Financial Auditors are perceived to be better placed to report on BRSR. However, this additional responsibility must be accepted carefully, as there are diverse stakeholders with conflicting expectations. Moreover, at present, globally there are multiple models, guidelines for assessing the sustainability of a business. There is a compelling need for the globally acceptable Sustainability Reporting Standards. Of course, in India, one would be guided by the standards prescribed by ICAI. In short, we are living in exciting times of challenges and rising expectations of stakeholders.

We can and shall rise to the occasion and endeavour to meet the expectations. However, increased responsibilities will call for increased efforts, capacity building and may result in significant risks in execution. While we would assess the sustainability of businesses, we also need to assess the sustainability of our organisation/firm as well, in the face of growing challenges, fast-paced changes in laws/regulations, changing business landscape, automation, and increasing risks of execution etc. The sustainability of reputation would be a major task for professional firms in the wake of conflicting expectations of clients, stakeholders and regulators.

Another important development is India getting the chair of G20 Nations for one year. Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi gave the theme of the G20 as “One Nation, One Family, One Future”. How apt is the theme when we look at the concerns voiced at the recently concluded COP27 (The 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Egypt! The UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasised the need for drastic measures to reduce emissions as the world is in an emergency state right now. He remarked that the world should not cross the red line of the 1.5-degree temperature limit. He added that “We can and must win this battle for our lives”. One of the glaring examples of the serious impacts of climate change on developing nations was the recent floods in Pakistan, where almost one-third of the country was inundated. Recognising loss and damages in developing nations due to climate change, COP27 concluded with a historic decision to establish and operationalize a loss and damage fund to help and support the most vulnerable developing nations. However, unfortunately little was achieved on the front of reducing carbon emissions leading to global warming.

When we look at the current world scenario, impacted by climate changes, wars, pandemics and so on, we find that we are living in VUCA times, (i.e., Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity). Today, we are experiencing supply chain disruption, energy and food crisis, high inflation with the recession in many countries, political uncertainty and social unrest in many parts of the world.

Our profession is also passing through VUCA times. CAs belong to one of the most vulnerable classes being caught between conflicting and compelling expectations from various regulators and diverse stakeholders. We are living in uncertain times of prolonged litigations and their outcomes. We are fraught with many complex and ambiguous laws, regulations and their compliances. Thus, we need to address VUCA challenges day in and day out.

However, it is equally true that our true potential emerges during difficult times, as we challenge our limitations, beliefs and work hard to succeed. Similarly, a new world order will emerge out of this chaos, maybe new political boundaries would be drawn. A new world power will emerge at the end of all this. Clearly, India is in an advantageous position today, thanks to the pragmatic Government policies and focus on digitisation, alternative energy, innovation, and the creation of world-class infrastructure. The former Managing Director of the World Bank Group Sri Mulyani Indrawati, said that India is shining among other developing nations.

Amongst VUCA times, we CAs have a promising future ahead. Challenges would be galore as also opportunities. For this, we must reorient and reposition ourselves by developing different skill sets and mindset to cope with rapidly changing times. We need to be a VUCA of a different type, i.e., Versatile, Unwavering, Competent/Courageous, and Assiduous. Versatile in handling diverse assignments, Unwavering i.e., steadfast, or resolute in our approach, Competent in various laws providing a 360-degree assurance to stakeholders, Courageous to take a stand maintaining independence and Assiduous, i.e., diligent and hard-working in whatever we do.

Let’s contribute our might in nation-building and helping businesses to sustain and grow in VUCA times with our novel VUCA abilities!

Mahamana Vidur

In the Mahabharata, the Pandavas’ father was Pandu, who was the King. After his death, his elder brother, Dhritarashtra, became the King of Hastinapur. He was blind. Their third and youngest brother was Vidur, recognised as a very knowledgeable philosopher. He was born of a female slave

Vidur is believed to be the incarnation of ‘Yama’ – Lord of Justice, who dispenses justice after one’s death. Vidur was an ardent and favourite devotee of Shrikrishna. He was Dhritarashtra’s principal minister, but stayed like a monk outside the palace. When Krishna visited Hastinapur before the great war, he preferred to stay at Vidur’s cottage and not as Duryodhana’s guest.

The reason for remembering Vidur in today’s times is his qualities of selflessness and fearlessness and his adherence to the ‘truth’. Our profession is concerned with truth and fairness without fear or favour. In this column, I have been writing about our great freedom fighters who sacrificed everything for our country. The common quality among all of them was their courage. And today, everywhere, we find a crisis of courage.

Dhritarashtra’s sons, Kauravas, were not behaving in a just and fair manner. They were misusing their power and wrongfully denying the Pandavas their right to the throne. When finally, war became imminent, Dhritarashtra called Vidur for advice because he feared his sons would be defeated and killed in the war against the mighty Pandavas.

Vidur gave him advice in 593 shlokas (verses), known as Vidurneeti. Neeti means ethical conduct and the manner of behaviour. Three sages propounded Neeti namely, Shukra, Vidur and Chanakya. Chanakyaniti is very popular even today. In Vidurneeti, Vidur narrates principles of good behaviour for a king as well as for a lay person. It is a separate topic of study and research. We will see a few selected verses.

Vidur says – There will be many people around you who will praise you in goody-goody words. However, it is rare to have people who talk and listen to the truth, which is beneficial but not liked by you. For example, one does not like people who tell us to work hard, behave honestly or not have any addiction.

He further says there are six strategies for relationships with others – be it a person or group of persons (like political parties today), nations, and so on. Those strategies are:
(sandhi) – A pact of mutual cooperation by making available each other’s means and resources.
(Vigraha) – Conflict or war.
(Yaana) – Direct attack.    
(Aasana) – Sitting quietly on the fence.    
(Dwaidheebhava) This has two meanings. If the enemy is mightier, split his strength by creating a dispute among its people/army; or create a dilemma as to which side you are supporting; or what is your real stand.
(Sanshraya) – Take shelter with a mighty friend to protect yourself from the enemy.

He says, truth is the only stair to reach the heaven and forgiveness is the greatest virtue. Another great virtue is to help others even when you are in difficulty or you have no resources.

He advised Dhritarashtra to prevail upon his sons and give Pandavas their legitimate share. Only by doing this, he said, Dhritarashtra could save his sons. He had the courage to tell Dhritarashtra (the king and his elder brother) that he had warned him to abandon his son Duryodhana at the time of his birth itself!

Finally, Dhritrarashtra tells him something which is the reality and the plight of most of us. He says “Vidur, I accept and agree with whatever you say; but my love for Duryodhana and the temptation of kingdom do not permit me to mend my ways! I know the principles of religion but have no inclination to follow them. I also understand what is bad but have no courage to give it up!”

We CAs have many things to learn from Vidurneeti.

Namaskaars to this great thinker.

AAAR upheld the order of AAR that penal interest charged by NBFC to its borrower for default in payment of EMI would attract GST in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017

16. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 1 (AAAR-Maharashtra) Bajaj Finance Ltd. Date of order: 14th March, 2019

AAAR upheld the order of AAR that penal interest charged by NBFC to its borrower for default in payment of EMI would attract GST in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017

FACTS

The applicant NBFC charges interest to its customers / borrowers on loans granted and in case of delay in repayment of EMI, the appellant collects penal / default interest (penal interest) in terms of the agreements executed by the customers. The appellant is of the view that penal interest collected from the customer is in the nature of additional interest and, thus, not leviable to

GST. When the appellant filed an application for advance ruling, AAR ruled that penal interest charged by appellant amounts to the supply of services under serial number 5(e) of Schedule II to the CGST Act and is therefore liable to GST. Hence the appeal.

RULING

As regards appellant’s contention that penal interest is in the nature of additional interest, AAAR noted that the agreement between appellant and customer has defined separately the terms ‘Default Interest’, ‘Penal Charges’ and ‘Bounce Charges’, but they are exclusive and what the appellant recovered from his customer is only the penalty for delayed payment of EMI under the term ‘Penal Charges’. Therefore, AAAR held that the penalty recovered by the appellant does not get covered by the term ‘penal interest’ as contended by the appellant, because per se it is not interest but a penalty / penal charges. Further, AAR held that since the definition of ‘interest’ given under clause 2(zk) of Notification No. 12/2017-CTR defines interest only to mean interest in respect of any amounts of money borrowed or debt incurred but does not include any other charges in respect of the amounts of money borrowed or debt incurred, the term ‘interest’ cannot be given extended meaning to include penal charges.

AAAR observed that the substance of the transaction is that the penal charges occur on the failure of the customer to adhere to the conditions of repayment of EMI as per the agreement. Thus, it is not the nomenclature in the agreement but the nature defined in the agreement that is important, that the appellant is entitled to recover and the borrower agreed to pay it. It was noted that one of the important tests to determine whether the levy is penal in nature is to see whether it is for the non-compliance of provisions and if any criminal liability or prosecution is provided, the levy is surely penal in nature. AAR held that the said test is surely passed by the penalty / penal charges in the present case as the consequences provided in the agreement for non-compliance of it may be a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence, the penalty levied by the appellant cannot be termed as ‘additional interest’ but penal charges.

AAAR held that since there is a mutual agreement between the appellant and the borrower, it can be said that the appellant has tolerated an act or situation of default by the borrower, for which it is recovering some amount in the name of penal charges / penalty. Consequently, AAAR upheld the decision of AAR in terms of section 7(1)(a) of CGST Act, 2017 read with Entry No. 5(e) of Schedule II of CGST Act, 2017.

There is no embargo on carry forward of credit on account of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess under the GST regime

15. [2019-TIOL-2516-HC-Mad.-GST] Sutherland Global Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assis-tant Commissioner CGST and Central Excise Date of order: 5th September, 2019

There is no embargo on carry forward of credit on account of Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess under the GST regime

FACTS

Credit pertaining to Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess was rejected from being carried forward to the GST regime on the ground that the same could be set off only against specific duties and taxes provided in explanation to section 140(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 117 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules. Since the Rule does not cover any cess, the same could not be carried forward. Therefore, the present writ petition is filed.

HELD

The High Court primarily noted that there is no notification / circular / instruction expressly stating that the credit would lapse. The provisions of sub-section

(1)    read with sub-section (8) of section 140 and the Explanation thereunder state that the assessee is entitled to the amount of CENVAT credit carried forward in the return relating to the period ending with the date preceding the appointed date and this, in the present case, includes accumulated credit on account of the cesses. Thus it is more than clear that all available credit as on the date of transition would be available to an assessee for set-off. Instructions issued by the CBEC dated 7th December, 2015 reveal a policy decision not to allow utilisation of accumulated credit of Education Cess, Secondary Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess but nowhere states that the credit has lapsed. The High Court further noted the amendment in section 28 of the amended act, 2018 to exclude cesses from the ‘eligible duties and taxes’ from retrospective effect, (and) stated, however, that the same is not yet notified.

Mere reflection of transitional credit of VAT from pre-GST regime in electronic credit ledger could not be treated as availment or utilisation unless such availment or utilisation of credit reduces tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1), i.e., any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable

14. [2019] 108 taxmann.com 377 (Patna) Commercial Steel Engineering Corporation vs. State of Bihar

Date of order: 27th June, 2019

Mere reflection of transitional credit of VAT from pre-GST regime in electronic credit ledger could not be treated as availment or utilisation unless such availment or utilisation of credit reduces tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1), i.e., any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable

FACTS

The appellant, a registered dealer under VAT, filed an application in terms of section 143 of CGST Act, 2017 to take credit of surplus value-added tax and entry tax of Rs. 42.73 lakhs and to carry forward the same in its electronic ledger in the GST regime. The competent authority passed an order by invoking section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 rejecting the appellant’s application on the ground that it was not entitled to the availment of the credit reflected in the electronic credit ledger and such reflection of credit would amount to either availment or utilisation of the credit. The adjudicating authority also ordered recovery of this amount, holding it to be outstanding tax liability against the appellant. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal.

HELD

The Hon’ble High Court noted that Revenue’s contention is that reflection on the electronic credit ledger is a confirmation of a wrong availment even if the said credit was not utilised and it is liable for proceeding u/s 73. The Court held that the legislative intent present in the provisions of section 73 and rules 117 and 121 is eloquent, i.e. be it a charge of wrong availment or utilisation, each is a positive act and it is only when such act is substantiated that it makes the dealer concerned liable for recovery of such amount of tax. But in both the cases (i.e. ITC availed or utilised), the tax available at the credit of the dealer concerned must have been brought into use by him, thus reducing the credit balance. A plain reading of section 73 would confirm that it is only on such availment or utilisation of credit to reduce tax liability, which is recoverable u/s 73(1) read alongside the other provisions present thereunder. In fact, the position is made clearer by reading the said provision alongside sub-sections (5), (7), (8), (9) to (11).

Further, the High Court held that the legislative intent reflected from a purposeful reading of the provisions underlying section 140 alongside the provisions of section 73 and rules 117 and 121 of CGST Rules, 2017 is that even a wrongly reflected transitional credit in an electronic ledger on its own is not sufficient to draw penal proceedings until the same or any portion thereof is put to use so as to become recoverable. As regards reliance placed by Revenue on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs.

Ind- Swift Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 9 taxmann.com 282 (SC), the High Court distinguished the same by observing that in the said case such credit has been utilised by a dealer and it is in such circumstances that the Supreme Court, on the basis of the note on the adjudication done by the Settlement Commission, has recorded its opinion. The High Court therefore quashed the impugned order passed by the competent authority in purported exercise of the power vested in him u/s 73 being per se illegal and an abuse of the statutory jurisdiction.

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company, engaged in business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes, sold a building which was under construction at time of sale and incurred expenditure for completing its construction during financial year subsequent to sale of building, such expenditure was liable for deduction u/s 37(1)

17. CIT vs. Oberon Edifices & Estates (P) Ltd.; [2019] 110 taxmann.com 305 (Ker.) Date of order: 5th September, 2019 A.Y.: 2009-10

Business expenditure – Section 37(1) of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee company, engaged in business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes, sold a building which was under construction at time of sale and incurred expenditure for completing its construction during financial year subsequent to sale of building, such expenditure was liable for deduction u/s 37(1)

The assessee was a company engaged in the business of construction and sale of residential and commercial building complexes. During the A.Y. 2009-10 the assessee sold a portion of the mall building being constructed by it. The construction of the building was not complete at that time. The assessee incurred expenditure during the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 for completing the construction and claimed it as deduction. The AO disallowed the same.

The Commissioner (Appeals) held that in a situation where at the time of assessment the building remains incomplete, estimated future expenditure to be incurred was also considered along with the expenditure already incurred and was taken as cost relatable to the total saleable area, i.e., saleable area already built and the saleable area to be built in future, for arriving at the estimated cost of construction per square foot (sq. ft.). Therefore, the contentions of the assessee were accepted and it was held that the AO was not justified in not taking the value of building work-in-progress during the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 for working out the cost per sq. ft.

It was directed that the cost per sq. ft. would be taken as total expenditure incurred in construction, divided by the total saleable area, for the purpose of working out the profit from the sale of commercial area. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court and contended that the claim for deduction of future expenses made by the assessee could not be allowed. It contended that there was a distinction between the amount spent to pay off an actual liability and a liability that would be incurred in future which was only contingent. It was contended that the former was deductible but not the latter.

The Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘(i) The dispute raised by the Revenue is only with regard to the deduction claimed by the assessee in respect of the expenses incurred in future, that is, after the sale of the building, during the subsequent financial years, and not in respect of the expenses incurred by it during the relevant financial year. Section 37 is a residuary section for allowability of business expenditure.

(ii)    The expression “profits and gains” has to be understood in its commercial sense and there can be no computation of such profits and gains until the expenditure which is necessary for the purpose of earning the receipts is deducted therefrom –whether the expenditure is actually incurred or the liability in respect thereof has accrued even though it may have to be discharged at some future date. The profit of a trade or business is the surplus by which the receipts from the trade or business exceed the expenditure necessary for the purpose of earning those receipts. It is the meaning of the word “profits” in relation to any trade or business. Whether there be such a thing as profit or gain can only be ascertained by setting against the receipts the expenditure or obligations to which they have given rise.

(iii)    “Expenditure” is not necessarily confined to the money which has been actually paid out and it covers a liability which has accrued or which has been incurred although it may have to be discharged at a future date. However, a contingent liability which may have to be discharged in future cannot be considered as expenditure. It also covers a liability which the assessee has incurred in praesenti although it is payable in futuro.

(iv)    In order to claim deduction of business expenditure, it is not necessary that the amount has been actually paid or expended during the relevant accounting year itself and it is sufficient that the liability for payment had incurred or accrued during the relevant accounting year and the actual payment of amount or discharge of liability may occur in future and what is crucial is the accrual of liability for payment or expenditure during the relevant accounting year. But a contingent liability that may arise in future cannot be treated as expenditure. Thus, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.’

STORY OF THE GLORY

It is very nice to hear a speaker
at a conference describe ours as a ‘glorious’ profession! But what is the
reality? Here is an interesting (and frightening) true story.

 

A very big bank lent rupees one
thousand crores to a company. The bank had a ‘positive’ name. But there was a
scandal in the company. The bank had given huge advances to many such
companies. The bank went into deep trouble and the negative side of the
positive bank was exposed in the media. The bank’s high-profile CMD was
arrested. Many were put behind bars.

 

As usual, the question asked in the
public was
‘What was the auditor doing?’ As if the auditor is sitting
in the company the whole day and managing it!? It is the tradition in the
banking sector to make the auditor of the borrower a scapegoat regardless of
the person who may be at fault. The bank filed a complaint of professional
misconduct with the ICAI. Although ICAI is aware of the scandals in the banks
and the motivation behind such complaints, it has no choice but to entertain
such complaints. The reason is, it is a ‘glorious’ profession!

 

It was later revealed that the
auditor had signed the correct financial statements, made disclosures and
maintained good working papers. However, the borrower company had manipulated
the audited statements by masking certain figures and adverse observations and
qualifications. A photocopy which was not signed by the auditor was presented
to the bank for the loan. And since the bank was ‘positive’ it sanctioned the
loan of Rs. 1,000 crores. Please don’t ask stupid questions such as why did the
bank not insist on original signed statements, why it did not verify them in
the public domain, and so on. As per the banking norms, such questions are to
be asked only to small borrowers of Rs. 5 lakhs. If you want Rs. 1,000 crores,
the processing is very ‘simple’ and quick – on ‘a fast track’.

 

The poor auditor, despite doing a
fairly good job, was dragged into the investigations. Needless to say, he never
received his fees. On top of it, he has to face inquiries by CBI, SFIO, EOW,
etc., etc.

 

The poor auditor is made to visit
the investigators’ offices every day, answer the same questions, spend on his
lawyers’ fees, conveyance, humongous paperwork and what not. Everyone is
puzzled why the auditor carried out the audit properly and gave a qualified
report. Everybody feels that he could have given a clean report and shared some
Rs. 25 crores from the loan. He could have had a share in that sum!

 

And the beauty is that in the
inquiry, on some very technical grounds, the auditor may be held guilty of
professional misconduct. In other words, the auditor is the only person who
really suffers. The huge scam, the fraudulent people around, all that is irrelevant.
The reason is that ‘ours is a dignified and respectable profession’. Hence,
vulnerable.

 

Friends,
this is the common story of the ‘glory’ of our profession.

TRADING ON SELF-GENERATED RESEARCH – SEBI’S ORDERS MAKE IT ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

BACKGROUND
One would think that trading in shares based on one’s own research based on publicly available information is the commonest and the most logical thing to do and cannot imaginably be held to be illegal. Of course, many also trade on the advice of others such as professionals or even friends; equally obvious now is that trading on the basis of inside information is self-evidently illegal. And so is front-running illegal. But it would seem absurd to say that if one does meticulous research from publicly available information and then trades on it, it could be held to be illegal – and invite serious consequences! But, curiously, that is precisely one of the legal conclusions that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has drawn in at least two recent orders. To be clear, the facts as found by SEBI are peculiar. But, as a ruling in law, it does sound to be flawed. There are a couple of other similar issues in these orders which are also of concern.

The cases relate to recommendations for trading in scrips by persons (‘Hosts’) on a financial news channel and dealings by persons alleged to be closely associated with such hosts. The primary questions are three: Whether dealing by such persons (the host / persons closely associated with such host) themselves with advance knowledge of such recommendations is illegal under securities laws and hence punishable? Whether creation of momentum in the market by dealing in advance of such recommendations is illegal? The third question, which partly overlaps with the earlier two, is whether such dealings and practices are so unethical and unfair that they amount to violation of securities laws?

THE SEBI ORDERS
There are primarily two orders that SEBI has issued in this matter. The first order, an interim one, is in the case of Hemant Ghai (the host) and his relatives (order dated 13th January, 2021). This interim order and directions issued thereunder were confirmed by an order dated 2nd September, 2021.

The second order (dated 4th October, 2021), also an interim one, is in the case of Pradeep Pandya and certain members / HUFs of the Furiya family.

It may be added that these orders are / may be further contested and in any case be under further investigation / response from parties, being interim orders. Hence, the alleged findings of SEBI as discussed here are as per the SEBI orders. The focus here is to highlight the important and interesting legal issues involved and the possible ramifications of such cases.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ORDER PASSED
Television channels (and even social media / streaming services) commonly have programmes where a host discusses and often makes recommendations to buy / sell a particular security. The recommendation is usually accompanied by a detailed presentation / graphics, etc., giving the justification for such recommendations. This recommendation may be made in an exclusive show by such a host who is associated with such channel or in general news where an ‘external expert’ is interviewed and who gives his recommendation.

As stated, there were two orders. In the first case, Hemant Ghai hosted / co-hosted various shows on news channel CNBC Awaaz. Recommendations about buying or selling a particular scrip were made on one such show. It was observed that as soon as the recommendation was made, the price of the scrip moved sharply in the direction recommended. That is to say, for example, if the recommendation was to buy a particular scrip, the price of that scrip immediately rose sharply in the market, obviously, as SEBI pointed out, because of such recommendation. Even the volumes rose very significantly on that day. The rise in price was far higher than the comparative movement in the stock index and there was no specific news from the company whose shares were recommended justifying such a rise. SEBI compared the price before and after the recommendation and noted that the rise in price (and volumes, too) was highest on the day of such recommendation. Similar findings were made by SEBI in the second order in the case of Pradeep Pandya’s show.

What was, however, found was that certain persons alleged to be associated with such hosts (‘associates’) repeatedly carried out trading to profit from such recommendation. Such persons bought (in the case of a buy recommendation) on the day before (or earlier on the same day) of the recommendation. When the price of the shares rose sharply after the recommendations, the associates sold the shares and made handsome profits.

Furthermore, such trades were carried out under the Buy-Today-Sell-Tomorrow (BTST) mechanism. This ensured that there was no need to even make payment for the purchase and take delivery.

SEBI made detailed inquiries on how the hosts and the respective associates were linked by taking into account family relations, call data records, addresses, etc. Accordingly, it held that the associates were aware in advance what recommendation was going to be made and hence traded in advance of such recommendation. When the price moved in the desired direction after the recommendations were released, the trades were reversed and profits made.

In the order in the matter of Hemant Ghai, calculations were made alleging that aggregate profits of about Rs. 2.95 crores were generated. In the case of Pradeep Pandya, similar calculations were made alleging profits of Rs. 8.39 crores.

The parties concerned were directed to impound these profits and deposit them in an escrow account. The hosts were also debarred from continuing to make any such recommendations till further orders. The parties were also debarred from dealing in securities till further orders. As stated earlier, the interim order in the matter of Hemant Ghai was confirmed after giving the parties a hearing.

INTERESTING POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE ORDERS
SEBI held, under the interim order, the parties (the hosts / associates) prima facie guilty of violation of multiple provisions of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (‘the Regulations’). It was held that they traded on the basis of advance information that was not public. It was further held that trading in such manner, particularly without intimating the public that they have carried out such trades, was an unethical / unfair practice which in the light of several rulings amounted to violation of the Regulations. It was also held, in the Pradeep Pandya case, that by trading in advance, a momentum was created which contributed to price movement which, too, was in violation of the Regulations.

SEBI held, on the basis of the preponderance of probability, that the parties were guilty. For this purpose it relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases: SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. [(2018) 143 CLA 15 (SC)]; and SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera [134 SCL 481 (SC)].

SEBI also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel [(2017) 141 CLA 254 (SC)] for taking a broader and contextual view of what constitute unfair trade practices under the Regulations. Accordingly, it held that the practices alleged to have been carried out by the parties were in violation of the Regulations.

A few interesting points arise. The primary issue is whether trading on material self-generated information / analysis can be a violation of the Regulations? Can it be said that to have such advance information and trading on it amounts to such violation?

It is respectfully submitted that such ruling is absurd. Persons trading in markets, particularly informed and expert persons, often collate information of a wide nature and arrive at their own conclusion. There is no duty in law to publish such self-generated analysis and conclusions in advance to the public before carrying out trading on their own account. Investing and speculation in the market would, it is submitted, come to a standstill if this was held to be a requirement. Let us compare this aspect with two other types of dealings which are now well settled to be violations – insider dealing and front-running. In case of insider dealing, a person has access to unpublished price-sensitive information about a company and he deals on the basis of such information. It does not need elaborate explanation as to why this is illegal and indeed specific regulations make such dealings illegal. In the case of front-running, persons entrusted with price-sensitive information carry out trades on their own account first and then carry out the trades of the persons who have entrusted them with such information. They, too, thus profit and now such dealings are well settled to be violations of the Regulations.

In the case of self-generated information, there can hardly be a case of having advance information illegitimately obtained on the basis of which trades were carried out and that this is violation of the Regulations. It is submitted that this finding of SEBI has no basis in law or logic and the order needs to be reconsidered on this point.

Let us take the next issue which is a bit more contentious. The parties did not disclose to the public that they had already carried out the trades in advance of the time when they made the recommendations. To begin with, SEBI has not pointed out any specific provision in law which requires them to make such declaration. Interestingly, in most of the transactions, it was not even as if the parties made trades opposite to what they recommended. In other words, it was not as if the parties were, for example, selling while recommending to the public to buy. They did sell but after having bought first and after the price rose.

It was not even the case of SEBI that the price fell sharply after the parties sold the shares. Indeed, SEBI gave data in several cases which did not show any fall and the only point which was made was that the price did not rise as much in the days after the day of the recommendations. So it was not even a case of what is commonly known as ‘pump-and-dump’, which is a well-known fraudulent practice where unscrupulous persons by various means make the price rise to artificially high levels and then offload the shares, leaving the buyers in the lurch as the price falls soon thereafter.

Moreover, SEBI has not even claimed that the recommendation was deliberately manipulative and there was no informed basis for the recommendation. Indeed, as the SEBI orders point out, often the scrips recommended were large, well-known companies.

The allegation that in the Pradeep Pandya order the parties carried out heavy trades with an intention to thereby (even without the recommendation) result in an artificial momentum in one direction and this is thus a violation of the Regulations, of course does make sense. It would indeed be a case of pump-and-dump.

CONCLUSION
It would indeed be disturbing for the public to know that hosts of TV shows buy (or sell, as the case may be) first for themselves the scrips they recommend and sell when the price rises when there is a heavy rush to buy following the recommendation. Cynics would, of course, argue that there is no free lunch and indeed their own buying the very scrips they recommend to buy is actually having faith in their own recommendations. But holding that this is illegal and hence punishable is, it is submitted, a flawed view.

The matters are under further investigation. There could be prolonged proceedings resulting in a final order which could then be appealed against at various levels. It would be interesting to see how SEBI and appellate authorities deal with the issues. A wide range of persons, formally and informally, make recommendations about scrips. The final ruling could make such persons change the manner in which they make recommendations, what disclosures they make and perhaps debar certain types of trades.

LIABILITY OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR BOUNCED CHEQUES

INTRODUCTION
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’) is one of the few provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque. In cases where the defendant is a company, there is a tendency on the part of the plaintiff to implicate all the Directors of the company, irrespective of whether they are professional Directors / Independent / Non-Executive Directors. There have been numerous representations from chambers of commerce and professional / trade bodies to the Government that this section should be amended to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors who are not connected with the day-to-day management of the company. However, there has been no action on this front. Interestingly, the Act was amended in 2002 to provide that the provisions of section 138 would not apply to a Nominee Director appointed by the Central / State Government or by a financial corporation owned / controlled by the Central / State Government. One wonders why a similar exemption was not provided to other professional Directors.

SECTION 138 OF THE ACT
Let us pause for a moment and examine the impugned section. Section 138 provides that if any cheque is drawn by a person to another person and if the cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s bank account, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and / or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. Earlier, the maximum imprisonment was for one year; however, it was extended to two years by the Amendment Act of 2002.
    
In order to invoke the provisions of section 138, the following three steps are necessary:
(i) the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(ii) once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the cheque, he (the payee) must, within 30 days of such information, make a demand for the payment of the amount of the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque; and
(iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice. Earlier, the time given to the drawer for responding to the notice was 15 days; but this was extended to 30 days by the Amendment Act of 2002.

A fourth step is specified under section 142 which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within one month of the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice period). A rebuttable presumption is drawn by the Act that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
    
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PERSONS IN CHARGE
Section 141 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is a company then every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible for the company’s conduct of business, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished. However, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, then he would not be liable to the punishment. The section also exempts Government Nominee Directors. Although the section speaks about a company, the explanation to the section extends the same position to a firm, any other body corporate or association of individuals.
    
In almost all cases of cheque-bouncing involving companies, firms, etc., the complainant files a case and implicates all the Directors of the company, including the Independent and Non-Executive Directors. Thus, professionals such as Chartered Accountants, lawyers, etc., who are only involved in broader policy and strategic decisions of the company, or with the Audit Committee or Shareholders’ Grievance Committee and are in no way connected with the day-to-day management of the company, are also made a party to the criminal proceedings.
    
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court has passed a landmark decision in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89. This decision is by a three-Member Larger Bench in response to a reference application made to it by a two-Member Bench of the Supreme Court. Three very important issues were placed before the Court for its consideration:
(a)  Whether while making a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act must the complaint specifically state that the persons accused were in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company?
(b) Whether merely because a person is a Director of a company would he be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary?
(c) Would the signatory of the cheque and / or the Managing Directors / Joint Managing Director always be responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and hence could be proceeded against?
    
The Court held that since the provision fastens criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable. Persons who had nothing to do with the matter need not be roped in. A complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing the process. A ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the respondent. At the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint, and where the allegations in the complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that simply by being a Director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on its behalf. It may happen that a Director may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company. He may only attend Board meetings, decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. The role of a Director in a company is a question of fact depending on the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule that a Director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.

A very fitting comment made by the Court was that ‘…there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it Director, Manager or Secretary.’ What is relevant is the roles assigned to the officers in a company and not the mere use of a particular designation of an officer. Thus, merely mentioning all Directors in a compliant without anything more may not be enough. The accused should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and a person cannot be subjected to liability of criminal prosecution without it being averred in the complaint that he satisfies those requirements. It is not that all and sundry connected with a company are made liable u/s 141. A person who is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company would naturally know why the cheque in question was issued and why it was dishonoured. Specific allegations in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case that is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.

When it came to the position of a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, the Court took a different view since these are persons in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of its business. In respect of such persons, the onus is on them to prove their innocence, i.e., when the offence was committed they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

The Supreme Court laid down another important principle, that the liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company may also be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. It once again reiterates that liability depends on the role he plays in the affairs of a company and not on the designation or status. If being a Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of ‘every person’ the section would have said ‘every Director, Manager or Secretary in a Company is liable’ …etc. The Court held that the Legislature was aware that a case of criminal liability has serious consequences for the accused. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action. Thus, even a non-Director can be liable u/s 141.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court answered the queries posed to it as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of section 141 and has to be made in the complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a Director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141. A Director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.
(c) The Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Holders of such positions in a company become liable u/s 141. Merely by virtue of being a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, they get covered u/s 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the dishonour and will be covered u/s 141.

This very vital decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in cases such as S.K. Alagh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 662; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. vs. Datar Switchgear Ltd., 2010 (10) SCC 479; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust vs. India Infoline Limited, 2013 (4) SCC 505, etc.
    
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
This issue was again examined recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya vs. M/s Gharrkul Industries Pvt. Ltd., Cr. A, No. 1206/2021, order dated 27th September, 2021. In this case, the respondent filed a complaint u/s 138 with specific averments in the complaint that all the Directors (including those who were not signatories to the bounced cheque) were involved in the day-to-day management / business affairs of the company whose cheque had bounced.

Accordingly, the trial court issued summonses against all the Directors. The Directors contended that they were only Non-Executive Directors and, hence, no complaint could lie against them. Against this argument, the respondent proved that the Form filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs showed the Directors as Executive Directors. Hence, the matter was a fit case for a trial which needed to be decided by the Court and the entire process needed to be gone through without quashing the summons at source.

The Court held that the settled principle was that for Directors who were not signatories / not MDs, it was clear that it was necessary to aver in the complaint filed u/s 138 that at the relevant time when the offence was committed the Directors were in charge and were actually responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The Court further held that this averment assumed more importance because it was the basic and essential averment which persuaded the Magistrate to issue a process against the Director. If this basic averment was missing, the Magistrate was legally justified in not issuing a process. In the case on hand, the Court observed that the complainant had specifically averred that all the Directors were in charge. Further, the MCA Forms also demonstrated the same. Hence, this was an issue on which a trial is appropriate and the complaint cannot be quashed at source.

EPILOGUE
Although this is a judgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has several far-reaching consequences and its ratio descendi can be applied under various other statutes which affix a vicarious criminal liability on Directors in respect of offences committed by a company.
    
One can only hope that taking a cue from this epoch-making Supreme Court judgment, the Government would amend the Negotiable Instruments Act to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors. In fact, such an amendment is also welcome in other similar statutes prescribing a criminal liability on the Directors.

SAFE HARBOUR RULES – AN OVERVIEW (Part 1)

Over the years, Safe Harbour Rules in the context of Transfer Pricing have assumed significance. In this two-part article, we deal with Safe Harbour Rules under Transfer Pricing Regulations In Part 1 of this article, we focus on giving an overview of the Safe Harbour Rules, including background, objective and various other important aspects relating to them

1. BACKGROUND
Determination of Arm’s Length Price [ALP] is often time-consuming, burdensome and costly if an Associated Enterprise [AE] provides a range of intra-group services. It may impose a heavy administrative burden on taxpayers and tax administrations that can be intensified by both complex rules and resulting compliance requirements in respect of Transfer Pricing [TP]. Further, in recent times we have seen a substantial increase in litigation on transfer pricing issues, especially in developing countries like India. This has led to consideration of Safe Harbour(s) [SH] in the services sector like KPO services, Contract R&D services, ITES, certain low value-adding services, etc., along with the manufacture and export of core and non-core auto components (which is not a service) in the TP arena to provide certainty for the taxpayers and tax administrators. As per the amended Indian SH rules, low value-adding intra-group services have also been added in the eligible international transactions. SH rules have generally been applied to smaller taxpayers and / or less complex transactions. They are generally evaluated favourably by both tax administrations and taxpayers, which indicates that the benefits of SH outweigh the related concerns when such rules are carefully targeted and prescribed and when efforts are made to avoid the problems that could arise from poorly designed SH regimes.

A substantial number of cases in litigation on transfer pricing issues in India are in respect of selection of comparables while determining the ALP. An SH may significantly ease the compliance burden, reduce compliance costs for eligible taxpayers in determining and documenting appropriate conditions for qualifying controlled transactions and eliminating the need to undertake benchmarking exercises and selection of comparables which may be questioned by the tax authorities. It will also provide certainty to the taxpayers by ensuring that the price charged or paid on qualifying transactions will be accepted by the tax administrations with a limited audit or even without an audit, increase the level of compliance by small taxpayers and enable the tax authorities to use their resources to concentrate on TP review in which the tax revenue at stake is more significant.

2. OBJECTIVES OF SAFE HARBOUR
The importance of SH in TP has increased because of the following reasons:
a) Globalisation of markets and firms,
b) Development of powerful IT and efficient communication systems leading to increasing amounts of intercompany transactions,
c) Tax disputes on account of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
d) Complex regulatory compliances,
e) Documentation requirements, complexity in application, deadlines, stringent penalties in case of non-compliance, burden of audit and various other factors to be taken care of by the taxpayer,
f) Resource constraints of tax authorities and assessment of risk by them in order to focus their limited resources on large and significant cases.

SH has been introduced with the objective of assisting the tax authorities as well as reducing the compliance burden on the taxpayers. It has also been designed to reduce the amount of litigations in cases where there is a difference of opinion between the tax authorities and the taxpayers and also to provide certainty.

3. SAFE HARBOURS AS PER OECD TP GUIDELINES
As per the OECD, SH are expected to be most appropriate when they are directed at taxpayers and / or transactions which involve low TP risks and when they are adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as against unilateral SH which may have a negative impact on the tax revenues of the country implementing them, as well as on the tax revenues of the countries whose AEs engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing a SH. A bilateral or multilateral SH would involve multiple countries agreeing on a fixed set of SH, thereby enabling the taxpayer to select and implement the SH without undertaking a risk of transfer pricing adjustment in all such jurisdictions.

Some of the difficulties that arise in applying the ALP may be avoided by providing circumstances in which eligible taxpayers may elect to follow a simple set of prescribed TP rules in connection with clearly and carefully defined transactions, or may be exempted from the application of the general TP rules. In the former case, prices established under such rules would be automatically accepted by the tax administrations that have expressly adopted such rules. These elective provisions are often referred to as ‘safe harbours’.

4. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF SAFE HARBOUR
4.1 OECD TP Guidelines
As per OECD TP Guidelines 2017, an SH in a TP regime is a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations which are otherwise imposed by a country’s general TP rules. An SH provides simpler obligations in place of those under the general TP regime. Often, eligible taxpayers complying with the SH provisions will be relieved from burdensome compliance obligations, including some or all associated TP documentation requirements.

Such a provision could, for example, allow taxpayers to establish transfer prices in a specific way, e.g., by applying a simplified TP approach provided by the tax administration. Alternatively, an SH could exempt a defined category of taxpayers or transactions from the application of all or part of the general TP rules.

4.2 UN TP Manual
The UN TP manual defines SH as follows:
‘A provision in the tax laws, regulations or guidelines stating that transactions falling within a certain range will be accepted by the tax authorities without further investigation.’

As per the UN TP Manual, a practical alternative for a tax authority is to provide taxpayers with the option of using an SH for certain low value-adding services, provided it results in an outcome that broadly complies with the ALP. The SH may be based on acceptable mark-up rates for services. Several countries provide an SH option for certain services.

4.3 Toolkit for addressing difficulties in accessing comparables data for Transfer Pricing analyses [Toolkit]
The Toolkit prepared in 2017 in the framework of the Platform for Collaboration on Tax under the responsibility of the Secretariats and staff of the four mandated organisations, namely, International Monetary Fund, OECD, United Nations and World Bank Group, explains SH as follows:

‘An SH in a TP regime is a simplification measure through a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a country’s general TP rules. One of the merits of a well-framed SH is that it can reduce the need to find data on comparables and to perform a benchmarking study in every case.’

An SH may refer to two types of provisions:
‘Safe Harbour for TP’ – A mechanism to allow a tax administration to specify an appropriate TP method and an associated level or range of financial indicators that it considers to fulfil the requirements of the TP rules. Such an SH is applicable only in respect of a defined category of transactions.
‘TP Safe Harbour on process’ – The specification by a tax administration of a process that, when applied in respect of a defined category of transactions, is considered to produce a result that fulfils the requirements of the TP rules.

Both types of SH provide potential benefits to the tax administration and to taxpayers. In practice, SH may be appropriate in respect of a wide range of transactions, including:
* Manufacturing, especially in cases where the manufacturer does not have a right to valuable intangibles and does not assume significant risk. This is likely to include manufacturers that are in substance toll manufacturers or contract manufacturers;
* Sales and distribution entities, including sales agents, again in cases where the function does not exploit valuable intangibles or assume significant risk;
* Provision of services that do not involve the exploitation of valuable intangibles or the assumption of significant risk.

5. BENEFITS OF SAFE HARBOUR
5.1 Compliance relief
Application of the ALP may require collection and analysis of data that may be difficult or costly to obtain and / or evaluate. In certain cases, such compliance burdens may be disproportionate to the size of the taxpayer, its functions performed, and the TP risks inherent in its controlled transactions. A properly designed SH may significantly ease compliance burdens by eliminating data collection and associated documentation requirements in exchange for the taxpayer pricing qualifying transactions within the parameters set by the SH. Especially in areas where TP risks are small, and the burden of compliance and documentation is disproportionate to the TP exposure, such a trade-off may be mutually advantageous to both taxpayers and tax administrations.

5.2 Certainty
Another advantage of an SH is the certainty that the taxpayer’s transfer prices will be accepted by the tax administration, provided they have met the eligibility conditions of, and complied with, the SH provisions. The tax administration would accept, with limited or no scrutiny, transfer prices within the SH parameters. Taxpayers could be provided with relevant parameters which would provide a transfer price deemed appropriate by the tax administration for the qualifying transaction.

5.3 Administrative simplicity
An SH would result in a degree of administrative simplicity for the tax administration. Once eligibility for the SH has been established, qualifying taxpayers would require minimal examination with respect to the transfer prices of controlled transactions qualifying for the SH. This would enable tax administrations to secure tax revenues in low-risk situations with a limited commitment of administrative resources and to concentrate their efforts on the examination of more complex or higher risk transactions and taxpayers. An SH may also increase the level of compliance among small taxpayers that may otherwise believe their TP practices will escape scrutiny.

6. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
The availability of SH for a given category of taxpayers or transactions may have adverse consequences such as:
6.1 Divergence from the Arm’s Length Principle
Where an SH provides a simplified TP approach, it may not correspond in all cases with the Most Appropriate Method [MAM] applicable to the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer under the general TP provisions. SH involves a trade-off between strict compliance with the ALP and administrability. They are not customised to fit exactly the varying facts and circumstances of individual taxpayers and transactions. Any potential disadvantages to taxpayers diverging from ALP by electing SH are avoided when taxpayers have the option to either elect the SH or price transactions in accordance with the ALP. With such an approach, taxpayers that believe the SH would require them to report an amount of income that exceeds the ALP could apply the general TP rules. While such an approach can limit the divergence from ALP under an SH regime, it would also limit the administrative benefits of the SH to the tax administration.

The question of whether to opt for SH regime would actually depend on the scale of operations vis-à-vis the resultant tax impact.

Example
In the case of two assessees A & B who are engaged in the provision of Contract R&D relating to software development (where the SH Rules provide that the operating profit margin declared in relation to operating expense should not be less than 24%), the decision to opt for the SH regime may have to be considered based on the following:

Amount in crores

Sr. No.

Particulars

A

B

1.

Operating Revenue

Rs. 50

Rs. 190

2.

Operating Expense

Rs. 42

Rs. 160

3.

Operating Profit

Rs. 8

Rs. 30

4.

Operating Profit margin (3 ÷ 2)

19.05%

18.75%

5.

SH margin required

24%

24%

6.

Operating profit as per SH Rules (5 x 2)

10.08

38.40

7.

Assumed margin likely to be approved by the ITAT

22%

22%

8.

Operating profit as per assumed margin (7 x 2)

9.24

35.20

9.

Incremental cost for opting SH (6 – 8)

0.84

3.20

As we can observe from the above example, assessee A might consider opting for operating profit margin of 24% as provided in the SH Rules since the incremental cost which he might bear in India for opting for SH in exchange of having peace and certainty in a scenario where he could have got a resolution from the ITAT at, say, 22% of operating expenses, may not be quite large, being Rs. 0.84 crore approximately

However, for assessee B the situation may not warrant opting for the SH regime as the incremental costs based on the same assumptions as mentioned above could be quite significant over the years. It is, therefore, unlikely that the large captive payers would opt for such SH Rules.

Further, as the scale of operation increases and in cases where the data of comparable transactions is easily available, the determination of ALP would not be difficult, thus making the SH option less lucrative in such cases.

6.2 Risk of double taxation, double non-taxation and mutual agreement concerns
One major concern raised by an SH is that it may increase the risk of double taxation. If a tax administration sets SH parameters at levels either above or below ALP in order to increase reported profits in its country, it may induce taxpayers to modify the prices that they would otherwise have charged or paid to controlled parties in order to avoid TP scrutiny in the SH country. The concern of possible overstatement of taxable income in the country providing the SH is greater where that country imposes significant penalties for understatement of tax or failure to meet documentation requirements, with the result that there may be added incentives to ensure that the TP is accepted in that country without further review.

If the SH causes taxpayers to report income above arm’s length levels, it would work to the benefit of the tax administration providing the SH, as more taxable income would be reported by such domestic taxpayers. On the other hand, the SH may lead to less taxable income being reported in the tax jurisdiction of the foreign AE that is the other party to the transaction. The other tax administrations may then challenge prices derived from the application of an SH, with the result that the taxpayer would face the prospect of double taxation. Accordingly, any administrative benefits gained by the tax administration of the SH country would potentially be obtained at the expense of other countries, which in order to protect their own tax base would have to determine systematically whether the prices or results permitted under the SH are consistent with what would be obtained by the application of their own TP rules.

For example, let us consider Assessee A engaged in the provision of Contract R&D relating to software development to its AE in the US, where the SH provides that the operating profit margin declared in relation to operating expense should not be less than 24%. If the US considers 20% to be an appropriate ALP for payment by the US entity to Assessee A and if Assessee A opts for SH and offers a margin of 24%, such margin may not be accepted by the tax authorities in the US and may result in litigation there.

Where SH are adopted unilaterally, care should be taken in setting SH parameters to avoid double taxation, and the country adopting the SH should generally be prepared to consider modification of the SH outcome in individual cases under mutual agreement procedures to mitigate the risk of double taxation. Obviously, if an SH is not elective and if the country in question refuses to consider double tax relief, the risk of double taxation arising from the SH would be unacceptably high and inconsistent with the double tax relief provisions of treaties.

6.3 Possibility of opening avenues for tax planning
SH may also provide taxpayers with tax planning opportunities. Enterprises may have an incentive to modify their transfer prices in order to shift taxable income to other jurisdictions. This may also possibly induce tax avoidance, to the extent that artificial arrangements are entered into for the purpose of exploiting the SH provisions. For instance, if SH apply to ‘simple’ or ‘small’ transactions, taxpayers may be tempted to break transactions into parts to make them seem simple or small.

6.4 Equity and uniformity issues
SH may also raise equity and uniformity issues. By implementing an SH, one would create two distinct sets of rules in the TP area. Insufficiently precise criteria could result in similar taxpayers receiving different tax treatment: one being permitted to meet the SH rules and thus to be relieved from general TP compliance provisions, and the other being obliged to price its transactions in conformity with the general TP compliance provisions. Preferential tax treatment under SH regimes for a specific category of taxpayers could potentially entail discrimination and competitive distortions. The adoption of bilateral or multilateral SH could, in some circumstances, increase the potential of a divergence in tax treatment, not merely between different but similar taxpayers but also between similar transactions carried out by the same taxpayer with AEs in different jurisdictions.

7. EXAMPLES OF SAFE HARBOUR IN RESPECT OF INTRA-GROUP SERVICES
As per the UN TP Manual, two SH that may be used by tax authorities in respect of intra-group services are as follows:

(a) Low value services that are unconnected to an AE’s main business activity. This SH is usually available for low value-adding services. The rationale for an SH is that there may be difficulties in finding comparable transactions for low value-adding services and the administrative costs and compliance costs may be disproportionate to the tax at stake.
(b) Safe harbours for minor expenses (i.e., amounts below a defined threshold). These are for situations in which the costs of services provided or received are relatively low, so the tax authority may agree to not adjust the transfer prices provided they fall within the acceptable range. The rationale for this SH is that the cost of a tax authority making adjustments is not commensurate with the tax revenue at stake and therefore the taxpayer should not be expected to incur compliance costs to determine more precise ALP.

8. SAFE HARBOUR FOR LOW VALUE-ADDING SERVICES
Low value-adding services are services which are not part of an MNE group’s main business activities from which it derives its profits but are services that support the AE’s business operations. A determination of an AE’s low value-adding services would be based on a functional analysis of the enterprise which would provide evidence of the main business activities of an AE and the way in which it derives its profits.

Low value-adding intra-group services are services performed by one or more than one member of an MNE group on behalf of one or more other group members which:
a) Are of a supportive nature;
b) Are not part of the core business of the MNE group (i.e., not creating the profit-earning activities or contributing to economically significant activities of the MNE group);
c) Do not require the use of unique and valuable intangibles and do not lead to the creation of unique and valuable intangibles;
d) Do not involve the assumption or control of substantial or significant risk by the service provider and do not give rise to the creation of significant risk for the service provider.

Some common examples of low value-adding services for most MNE groups (i.e., provided they do not constitute the core business of the group) are human resources services, accounting services, clerical or administrative services, tax compliance services and data processing.

For an AE that is a distributor and marketer of an MNE’s products, marketing services would fail to qualify as administrative services as they are directly connected to the enterprise’s main business activity. Similarly, for an MNE whose core business is recruitment and human resources management, human resources services of a kind similar to those provided to independent customers would not qualify for the low value-adding SH despite the mention of human resources services in the section above.

9. MINOR EXPENSE SAFE HARBOUR
In the Minor Expense SH option, a tax authority agrees to refrain from making a TP adjustment if the total cost of either receiving or providing intra-group services by an AE is below a fixed threshold based on cost and a fixed profit mark-up margin is used.

The aim is to exclude from TP examinations services for which the charge is relatively minor. The rationale is that the costs of complying with the TP rules would outweigh any revenue at stake. It also considers the potential administrative savings for a tax authority by avoiding TP examinations of minor expenses. An important requirement is that the same fixed profit margin should be used for inbound and outbound intra-group services for a country. The SH provides taxpayers and tax authorities with certainty. The minor expense SH may contain the following requirements:
* A restriction on the relative value of the service expense (e.g., less than X per cent of total expenses of the AE receiving the services) or alternatively, a restriction on the absolute value of the service expense,
* A fixed profit margin,
* The requirement that the same profit margin is used in the other country,
* The documentation requirements that are expected.

An example of an SH for services is set out as follows.

For inbound intra-group services:
a) The total cost of the services provided is less than X per cent of the total deductions of the AEs in a jurisdiction for a tax year, or less than a defined absolute amount in the local currency;
b) The transfer price is a fixed profit mark-up on total costs of the services (direct and indirect expenses); and
c) Documentation is prepared to establish that the SH requirements have been satisfied.

For outbound intra-group services:
a) The cost of providing the services is not more than X per cent of the taxable income of the AE providing the services, or not more than a defined absolute amount in the local currency;
b) The transfer price charged is based on a fixed profit mark-up on the total costs of the services (direct and indirect expenses);
c) The same profit margin is used in the other country; and
d) Documentation is created to establish that these SH requirements have been satisfied.

At present there is no minor expense safe harbour rule prescribed as part of the SH regime in India.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF SAFE HARBOUR AS PER OECD TP GUIDELINES
TP compliance and administration is often complex, time-consuming and costly. Properly designed SH provisions, applied in appropriate circumstances, can help to relieve some of these burdens and provide taxpayers with greater certainty.

SH provisions may raise issues such as potentially having perverse effects on the pricing decisions of enterprises engaged in controlled transactions and a negative impact on the tax revenues of the country implementing the SH, as well as on the countries whose AEs engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing an SH. Further, unilateral SH may lead to the potential for double taxation or double non-taxation.

However, in cases involving smaller taxpayers or less complex transactions, the benefits of SH may outweigh the problems raised by such provisions. Making such SH elective to taxpayers can further limit the divergence from ALP. Where countries adopt SH, willingness to modify SH outcomes in mutual agreement proceedings to limit the potential risk of double taxation is advisable.

Where SH can be negotiated on a bilateral or multilateral basis, they may provide significant relief from compliance burdens and administrative complexity without creating problems of double taxation or double non-taxation. Therefore, the use of bilateral or multilateral SH under the right circumstances should be encouraged.

It should be clearly recognised that an SH, whether adopted on a unilateral or bilateral basis, is in no way binding on or precedential for countries which have not themselves adopted the SH.

For more complex and higher risk TP matters, it is unlikely that SH will provide a workable alternative to a rigorous, case-by-case application of the ALP under the provisions of these Guidelines.

11. RANGACHARY COMMITTEE – INDIAN SAFE HARBOUR COMMITTEE
The Prime Minister’s Office issued a press release on 30th July, 2012 announcing the constitution of a Committee to Review Taxation of Development Centres and the IT Sector under the Chairmanship of Mr. N. Rangachary, former Chairman, CBDT & IRDA (the Rangachary Committee), for seeking resolution of tax issues through an arm’s length exercise in the form of a review by the Committee including, inter alia, SH provisions announced but yet to be operationalised having the advantage of being a good risk mitigation measure and provide certainty to the taxpayer.

The Committee was mandated to engage in sector-wide consultations and finalise the SH provisions announced sector-by-sector. The Committee was also to suggest any necessary circulars that may need to be issued.

The Committee has submitted six reports including specific sector-wise / activity-wise reports for the following:
1) IT Sector,
2) ITES Sector,
3) Contract R&D in the IT and Pharmaceutical Sector,
4) Financial Transactions-Outbound Loans,
5) Financial Transactions-Corporate Guarantees,
6) Auto Ancillaries-Original Equipment Manufacturers.

12. OVERVIEW OF INDIAN SAFE HARBOUR
Businesses flourish only if there is certainty and SH provisions offer that certainty. These SH provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] specify that from the perspective of TP provisions, if the assessee fulfils certain defined conditions, the Tax Authorities shall accept the TP declared by the taxpayer.

SH Rules benefit assessees by allowing them to adopt a TP mark-up in the range prescribed, which would be acceptable to the Income Tax Department with benefits of compliance relief, administrative simplicity and certainty and hence would avoid protracted litigation.

After its enactment vide the Finance (No. 2) Act 2009, the first set of rules was notified on 18th September, 2013 – Rules 10TA to 10TG and Form 3CEFA (for international transactions), and Rules 10TH to 10THD and Form 3CEFB (for domestic transactions) for a period of three years, followed by a revision in 2017 in the SH Rules, which were made applicable till F.Y. 2018-19.

The CBDT vide Notification No. 25/2020 dated 20th May, 2020 extended the applicability of Rule 10TD(1) and (2A) (applicable for A.Y. 2017-18 to A.Y. 2019-20) for A.Y. 2020-21 also. Of the categories of the eligible international transactions, the category of software development, ITES and KPO appears to have been popularly opted for.

The CBDT has issued Notification No. 117/2021 dated 24th September, 2021 to extend the applicability of SH Rules under Rule 10TD of the Income-tax Rules to A.Y. 2021-22. The amended rule is deemed to come into force from 1st April, 2021.

Considering that the TP References in smaller cases has substantially reduced, it would have been good to revise these SH limits downward by around 2 per cent points to make it a more attractive option.

A comparison of the erstwhile and revised SH is given below:

Sr. No.

Eligible International
Transactions

Old SH Rules for

01-04-12 to 31-03-17

Revised SH Rules for

01-04-16 to 31-03-21

Threshold

Margin

Threshold

Margin

1

Provision of software development services and information
technology-enabled services

Up to Rs. 500 crores

Not less than 20% on total operating costs

Up to Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 17% on total operating costs

Above Rs. 500 crores

Not less than 22% on total operating costs

Above Rs. 100 crores up to
Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 18% on total operating costs

2

Provision of KPO services

NA

Not less than 25% on operating costs

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% and employee cost at least 60%

Not less than 21% and employee cost is 40%
or more but less than 60%

Not less than 18%, and employee cost up to 40%

3

Advancing of intra-group loans where loan is denominated in
Indian Rupees

Loan up to
Rs. 50 crores

Base rate of State Bank of India + 150 basis points

One year marginal cost of funds lending rate
of SBI as on 1st April of relevant previous year plus:

CRISIL rating between AAA to A or its equivalent

175 basis points

3

 

(continued)

 

CRISIL rating of BBB-, BBB, BBB+ or its equivalent

325 basis points

Loan above Rs. 50 crores

Base rate of State Bank of India + 300 basis points

CRISIL rating of BB to B or its equivalent

475 basis points

CRISIL rating between C & D or its equivalent

625 basis points

Credit rating is not available, and amount of loan does not exceed
Rs. 100 crores as on 31st March of relevant previous year

425 basis points

4

Advancing of intra-group loans where loan is denominated in
foreign currency

NA

NA

6 month LIBOR interest rate as on
30th September of relevant previous year plus:

CRISIL rating between AAA to A

150 basis points

CRISIL rating of BBB-, BBB, BBB+

300 basis points

CRISIL rating of BB to B

450 basis points

CRISIL rating between C & D

600 basis points

Credit rating is not available, and amount of loan does not
exceed equivalent of Rs. 100 crores as on 31st March of relevant previous
year

400 basis points

5

Providing corporate guarantee

Up to Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 2% p.a.

NA

Not less than 1% p.a. on the amount guaranteed

Above Rs. 100 crores

Not less than 1.75% p.a.

6

Provision of contract R&D services relating to software
development

NA

Not less than 30% on operating expense

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% on the operating expense

7

Provision of contract R&D services relating to generic
pharma drugs

NA

Not less than 29% on operating expense

Up to Rs. 200 crores

Not less than 24% on the operating expense

8

Manufacture and export of core auto components

NA

Not less than 12% on operating expense

NA

Not less than 12% on operating expense

9

Manufacture and export of non-core auto components

NA

Not less than 8.5% on operating expense

NA

Not less than 8.5% on operating expense

10

Receipt of low value-adding intra-group services (New)

NA

NA

Up to Rs. 10 crores including mark-up

– 5% mark-up; and

– Cost pooling method, exclusion of shareholders cost, duplicate
costs and reasonableness of allocation keys is certified by an accountant

A.Y. 2017-18 is the overlapping year for which the taxpayers had an option to exercise either of the two SH rules depending upon whichever was most beneficial to them.

The downward revision of SH margins in case of software development and ITES, Contract R&D and KPO in the revised SH Rules was long overdue and a welcome move. The revised margins are also closer to the margin range being concluded in the vast majority of APAs concluded in the IT-ITES space. As a result of the reduction in the margins, the expected savings of taxpayers due to avoidance of litigation is likely to outweigh the premium paid (if any) due to higher than arm’s length margins especially for small and medium taxpayers with lower cost bases.

This move also highlights the Indian Revenue’s intention to attract appropriate cases to the SH scheme and away from the APA scheme thereby covering the higher value and non-routine cases for the more complex cases that need a deeper understanding and negotiation by the Indian Revenue.

Another interesting feature of the revised SH rules is the gradation of the SH margin thresholds for the KPO sector based on the percentage of employee cost incurred rather than covering all the KPO activities under a single umbrella. The streamlining of margins prescribed for KPO on the basis of employee cost ratio may not be the best course of action but it does seek to align with the premise that a technically skilled workforce would lead to a higher employee cost and signify a higher value addition commanding a higher operating margin. The employee cost has been defined comprehensively.

The definitions of ITES and KPO are very broad and general and the revised SH rules did not modify / clarify them. Keeping in view the litigations that have occurred, detailed definitions would have been welcome as they would have set a clearer line of distinction between KPO and ITES. The applicability of SH for transactions of software development and ITES, contract R&D and KPO has been reduced to Rs. 200 crores. Hence, after F.Y. 2016-17, taxpayers having transaction values greater than Rs. 200 crores cannot opt for SH but can only opt for APAs to attain certainty.

13. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Complying with the ALP can be burdensome. Even good faith efforts to ensure compliance result in uncertainty because the Tax Authorities may analyse the transaction in a different way and come to a different conclusion. Though it is important for the Government to be diligent, and the enterprises to be honest, easing out more on compliance procedures would enable enterprises to focus more on their core activities and in turn generate more business and profits, thereby keeping the wheel of taxation turning and intact.

A fair and transparent SH regime goes a long way in plugging tax leakage and leads to significant tax certainty. Country tax administrations should carefully weigh the benefits of and concerns regarding safe harbours, making use of such provisions where they deem it appropriate.

In Part 2 of this Article, we will deal with the remaining aspects of Indian SH Rules and jurisprudence.

Reopening of assessment – Precondition to be satisfied – Reasons recorded cannot be substituted

Peninsula Land Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-1(3), Mumbai & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 2827 of 2021; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening of assessment – Precondition to be satisfied – Reasons recorded cannot be substituted

The petitioner challenged the notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2019 and the order dated 5th September, 2019 on the ground that the reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice do not indicate the manner in which the A.O. has come to the conclusion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in the hands of the petitioner. It has also alleged that in the reasons for reopening, there is not even a whisper as to what was the tangible material in the hands of the A.O. which made him believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and in the notice issued four years after the assessment order, what was the material fact that was not fully and truly disclosed.

The Court observed that the law on this is well settled. To confer jurisdiction u/s 147(a), two conditions were required to be satisfied, firstly, the A.O. must have reasons to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax had escaped assessment, and secondly, he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions had to be satisfied before the A.O. could assume jurisdiction for issue of notice u/s 148 read with section 147(a). But under the substituted section 147 the existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words, if the A.O. has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, it is enough to confer jurisdiction upon him to reopen the assessment.

Also, the reasons for reopening of assessment tested / examined have to be stated only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment. These reasons cannot be improved upon and / or supplemented, much less substituted by affidavit and / or oral submissions. Moreover, the reasons for reopening an assessment should be that of the A.O. alone who is issuing the notice and he cannot act merely on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. Moreover, the tangible material upon the basis of which the A.O. comes to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment can come to him from any source; however, the reasons for the reopening have to be only of the A.O. issuing the notice.

It is also settled law that the A.O. has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. If a period of four years has lapsed from the end of the relevant year, the A.O. has to mention what was the tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment and that there has been a failure to fully and truly disclose material facts. After a period of four years even if the A.O. has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee.

In the reasons for issuance of notice in this case it is recorded that the return of income for the assessment year under consideration was filed on 28th September 2012, further revised return of income was filed on 28th March, 2014 and on 9th May 2015 the return of income was processed u/s 143(1) and the assessment order u/s 143(3) read with section 153A was passed by the A.O. on 30th December, 2016. The entire basis for issuance of the notice is that information was received from the Deputy Director of Income Tax, Mumbai that a search and survey action u/s 132 was carried out in the case M/s Evergreen Enterprises and based on the statement recorded of the partner of M/s Evergreen Enterprises and documentary evidences found in the search of its premises, it unearthed an undisclosed activity of money-lending and borrowing in unaccounted cash being operated at the premises of M/s Evergreen Enterprises. It is also recorded in the reasons that based on the statements recorded of the partners of M/s Evergreen Enterprises and its employees, it came to light that one of the individuals / business concerns has lent cash of Rs. 30,00,000. It is alleged that the petitioner has lent cash loan of Rs. 30,00,000 in F.Y. 2011-12 and therefore the petitioner has been indulging in lending of cash loan and hence the amount of Rs. 30,00,000 has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147.

The Court observed that there is absolutely no mention as to how either the partners of M/s Evergreen Enterprises or its employees or one Mr. Bharat Sanghavi are connected to the petitioner. The affidavit in reply of the respondent stated that Bharat Sanghavi was an employee of the  petitioner and, therefore, the reasons have been correctly recorded and the A.O. has reason to believe that income had escaped assessment.

As noted earlier, the reasons for reopening of assessment have to be tested / examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded and those reasons cannot be improved upon and / or much less substituted by an affidavit and / or oral submission. In the reasons for the reopening, the A.O. does not state anywhere that Bharat Sanghavi was an employee of the petitioner. Further, in the reasons for reopening, the A.O. does not even disclose when the search and survey action u/s 132 was carried out in the case of M/s Evergreen Enterprises, whether it was before the assessment order dated 30th December, 2016 in the case of the petitioner was passed or afterwards. The reasons for reopening are absolutely silent as to how the search and survey action on M/s Evergreen Enterprises or the statement referred to or relied upon in the reasons have any connection with the petitioner.

In the circumstances, the Court held that the impugned notice dated 30th March, 2019 and the impugned order dated 5th September, 2019 had been issued without jurisdiction and hence were quashed and set aside.

 

Reopening notice u/s 148 – Notice issued to non-existing entity – Notice could not be corrected u/s 292B

5 Implenia Services and Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Deputy / Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax [Writ Petition (L) No. 14088 of 2021; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening notice u/s 148 – Notice issued to non-existing entity – Notice could not be corrected u/s 292B

The impugned notice dated 27th March, 2021 has been issued to a non-existing entity. In the affidavit in reply, it is admitted that the notice has been issued to a non-existing entity but the respondents state that it ought to be treated as a mistake and the name in the notice could be corrected u/s 292B.

The respondents relied upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Skylight Hospitality LLP vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-28(1), New Delhi (2018) 405 ITR 296 (Delhi) which has been subsequently affirmed on 6th April, 2018 by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court.

The Court observed that this cannot be a general proposition as the Apex Court has expressly stated in Skylight Hospitality LLP (Supra) that ‘in the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that the wrong name given in the notice was merely a clerical error which could be corrected under section 292B of the IT Act (emphasis supplied)’.

The Apex Court in its recent judgment on this subject in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (2019) 416 ITR 613 (SC) has considered the judgment of Skylight Hospitality and said that it has expressly mentioned that in the peculiar facts of that case the wrong name given in the notice was merely a clerical error. In Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (Supra) the Court has also observed that what weighed in the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition was the peculiar facts of that case. It has reiterated the settled position that the basis on which jurisdiction is invoked is u/s 148 and when such jurisdiction was invoked on the basis of something which was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved scheme of amalgamation, the notice is bad in law.

The High Court noted that the Apex Court in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. (Supra) had observed that the basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved Scheme of amalgamation. Participation in the proceedings by the appellant in the circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel against law. The stand now taken in the affidavit in reply is nothing but an afterthought by the respondent after having committed a fundamental error. Therefore, the stand of the respondent that it was an error which could be corrected u/s 292B was not acceptable to this Court.

The Court followed the decision in the case of Alok Knit Exports Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in its order dated 10th August, 2021 in WP No. 2742 of 2019.

In the circumstances, notice dated 27th March, 2021 issued u/s 148 was quashed and set aside.

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Income-tax survey – Assessment based on documents seized during survey at assessee’s premises – No incriminating material found against assessee during search of third parties – Absence of satisfactory note by A.O. that any seized document belonged to assessee – Search warrant not issued against assessee – Assessment and consequent demand notice were unsustainable

24 Sri Sai Cashews vs. CCIT [2021] 438 ITR 407 (Ori) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 23rd August, 2021 Ss. 132, 133A, 153C and 156 of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Income-tax survey – Assessment based on documents seized during survey at assessee’s premises – No incriminating material found against assessee during search of third parties – Absence of satisfactory note by A.O. that any seized document belonged to assessee – Search warrant not issued against assessee – Assessment and consequent demand notice were unsustainable

The assessee processed cashewnuts into cashew kernel. A survey operation was conducted u/s 133A against it. The A.O. invoked the jurisdiction u/s 153C for making a block assessment for the A.Ys. 2010-11 to 2016-17 as a result of searches which were conducted in the premises of two persons JR and JS u/s 132. He passed an order u/s 143(3) read with section 153C for the A.Y. 2016-17 and issued a notice of demand u/s 156.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order. The Orissa High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) In the absence of incriminating materials against the assessee having been found in the course of the search of the searched persons JR and JS, the order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153C and the consequential demand notice issued u/s 156 were unsustainable and, therefore, set aside.

ii) The documents relied upon by the A.O. were found in the course of survey of the assessee u/s 133A and not during the search of the parties against whom the search authorisation was issued u/s 132 and search was conducted. The Department had not been able to dispute any of the factual averments. No incriminating materials concerning the assessee were found in the premises of the two persons against whom search was conducted and the absence of satisfaction note of the A.O. of the persons against whom search was conducted about any such incriminating material against the assessee, were not denied. The order only related to disallowance of expenditure u/s 140A(3) that was payable to the cultivators, expenses towards hamali, i.e., labour charges, unexplained money u/s 69A, negative cash and unaccounted stock which was not on account of the discovery of any incriminating materials found in the course of the search concerning the assessee and there was no search warrant u/s 132 against the assessee.’

LOST IN CREDIT LOSS!

Indirect tax legislations across the globe introduce input credits to eliminate tax cascading in the downstream value chain of goods / services. An idealistic VAT system envisages tax as a ‘pass-through’ so that the tax itself would not be a component of product / service pricing. Yet this idealistic VAT system has been tampered with, time and again, and one is forced to ponder over the robustness of the VAT system. Inefficiencies have crept into this system through the introduction of credit blocks in respect of motor vehicles, construction activity, etc. One such inefficiency is the reversal of input tax credit (ITC) in respect of goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples [section 17(5)(h)]. None of these terms has been defined under the Act and one would have to examine the general and contextual meaning of these terms. This article seeks to articulate the plausible meanings intended by the Legislature and their impact in determining the credit eligibility. The relevant clause(s) under examination has / have been extracted below:

‘16(1). Every registered person shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and in the manner specified in section 49, be entitled to take credit of input tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both to him which are used or intended to be used in the course of furtherance of his business and the said amount shall be credited to the electronic credit ledger of such person…..
17(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 16 and sub-section (1) of section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely: -….
(h) goods lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples, and; ….’

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF IMPORTANT TERMS
The key terms under consideration in section 17(5)(h) and their respective meanings from the Law Lexicon (5th Edition) are given below:
Lost – A thing is said to be lost when it cannot be found or when ordinary vigilance will not regain it.
Stolen – ‘To steal’ means to take by theft and ‘Intent to steal’ refers to permanently deprive and defraud another of the use and benefit of property and permanently to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person other than the true owner.
Destroyed – ‘Destroyed’ occurring in section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act has a wider connotation than mere physical destruction. It would also cover loss arising on the theft of a vehicle. The term ‘destroyed’ in section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act would not cover items partly destroyed in fire and which have been retained by the assessee. In another context, the term destroyed means to ‘demolish’, i.e., to render a thing useless for the purpose for which it was intended.
Written off – ‘Write down’ means to reduce the book value of. ‘Write off’ means to carry or remove. ‘Write-off’ also means to delete an asset from the accounts because it has been depreciated (or been written-down) so far that it no longer has any book value. It can also mean to charge the whole of the value of an asset to expenses or loss (i.e., assign it zero value on the balance sheet).
Disposed of by way of gift or free sample – Dispose means to transfer to the control or ownership of another; or transfer or alienate. ‘Gift’ means to transfer by one person to another of any existing movable property voluntarily and without consideration in money or money’s worth. ‘Sample’, both in its legal and popular acceptance,  means that which is taken out of a large quantity and is a fair representation of the ‘whole’, a part shown as a specimen. The transfer ought to be by way of gift or free sample. The entire phrase can be interpreted as ‘to transfer the control or ownership over goods either by way of love / affection or by taking out a small quantity from a larger group and such transfer being without consideration’.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The phrase ‘lost’ can be understood in the sense that the taxpayer has lost possession over the goods on account of any external incident. It represents a total annihilation of the goods and does not appear to be encompassing situations where the goods are present but there is a loss (economic and / or physical loss) which is partial in nature. This expression should be understood in contradistinction to the phrase ‘loss’ which would be wider and include partial loss of goods concerned. Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Dluge vs. Robinson1, while considering an issue relating to ‘negotiable instruments destroyed, stolen or otherwise lost’, referred to the definition of the term ‘lost’ in the Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edition) which reads as follows:

‘An article is “lost” when the owner has lost the possession or custody of it, involuntarily and by any means, but more particularly by accident or his own negligence or forgetfulness, and when he is ignorant of its whereabouts or cannot recover it by an ordinarily diligent search.’

In Sialkot Industrial Corporation vs. UOI2 the phrase ‘lost or destroyed’ was examined and it means a complete deprivation of the property involved. This decision is important as it highlights the commonality in the phrases lost, destroyed, disposition as that in which there is loss of possession over the goods:

‘10. According to the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the word “Loss” means, the act or fact of losing, failure to keep possession, deprivation, theft of property. In the same dictionary, the word “lost” is defined as meaning “not made use of, ruined or destroyed physically or morally, parted with, no longer possessed, taken away or beyond reach of attainment”. According to the Law Lexicon, Vol. 2 page 44, the word “loss” has no precise hard and fast meaning. It is a generic and comprehensive term covering different situations. Loss results when a thing is destroyed. But it is also caused when the owner has been made to part with it although the thing remains intact. In this sense, loss means and implies “a deprivation”. It is synonymous with damage resulting either in consequence of destruction, deprivation or even depreciation and when a party is dispossessed of a thing, either when it can never be recovered or when it is withheld from him, he is deemed to suffer the loss.’

The said decision was distinguished in BEML vs. CC Madras3 in the context of the Customs Act which had distinct provisions for goods lost or destroyed and those that are pilfered. In that context the Court held that goods stolen cannot be included in the phrase lost or destroyed. But this distinction does not alter the interpretation in section 17(5)(h) since they are subject to similar implications under the GST law.

In CIT vs. Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. [1978] 112 ITR 776 (SC) the word ‘destroy’ came up for consideration – Destroyed is a word in common usage, with well-defined non-technical meaning. As used in law, it does not in all cases necessarily mean complete annihilation or total destruction. But in the context and under particular circumstances the word many times has been defined as meaning totally obliterated and done away with as also made completely useless for the purpose intended – vide Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 26, page 1246.

‘We are not concerned in this case with a situation where two independent machineries which are separable have to work combined for the purpose of business. We, therefore, need not answer as to what would happen in such a case. We are concerned in this case with the part of the machinery which admittedly was inseparable and had no independent existence as machinery. The context in which the words “sold”, “discarded”, “demolished” or “destroyed” are used and for the purpose for which they are used, to our mind, clearly suggest that it is to the whole machinery that they apply and not to any part of the machinery.’

OTHER LEGAL PROVISIONS
One may recollect the contextual use of the phrase lost and / or destroyed under the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The provision read as follows:

‘21. Remission of duty – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be that goods have been lost or destroyed by natural causes or by unavoidable accident or are claimed by the manufacturer as unfit for consumption or for marketing, at any time before removal, he may remit the duty payable on such goods, subject to such conditions as may be imposed by him by order in writing:’

Similar expressions were used in sections 22 and 23 of the Customs Act in the context of remission of Customs duty prior to clearance of goods for home consumption. The extract reads as follows:

‘SECTION 22. Abatement of duty on damaged or deteriorated goods. – (1) Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs –
(a) that any imported goods had been damaged or had deteriorated at any time before or during the unloading of the goods in India; or
…..
(c) that any warehoused goods had been damaged at any time before clearance for home consumption on account of any accident not due to any wilful act, negligence or default of the owner, his employee or agent,
SECTION 23. Remission of duty on lost, destroyed or abandoned goods. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 13, where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs that any imported goods have been lost (otherwise than as a result of pilferage) or destroyed, at any time before clearance for home consumption, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall remit the duty on such goods.’

The specific use of the phrases ‘damage’ / ‘deterioration’ in company with ‘destroyed’ conveys that the Legislature has in the past assigned a distinct connotation to these phrases and the degree of damage or the condition of damage plays an important role in ascertaining whether there is destruction. It appears that only complete damage rendering the goods unusable would be considered as destruction and not otherwise.

RULE OF ‘NOSCITOR A SOCII’
While understanding the above phrase individually, the Noscitor rule of construction ought to be applied. According to the rule, where two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. On application of this rule, it would be impermissible to extract a phrase and give it a meaning which is at divergence or wider in amplitude than the other phrases. They are to take colour from each other.

In the present context, the phrases ‘lost’, ‘stolen’, ‘destroyed’, ‘written off’ or ‘disposed of’ appear to have a common thread. The phrase lost and stolen is undoubtedly to be understood as a situation where the owner is deprived of the goods in its entirety. On the other end, the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ also represents transfer of goods in its entirety to another person. Accordingly, the intermittent phrases ought to also be understood in the same sense. The phrases ‘destroyed’ and ‘written off’ should also be interpreted in the same sense. Destroyed ought to imply such destruction which completely extinguishes the goods. Partial damage or spoilage of goods which continue to have a physical existence and can be recovered or used partially should not be construed as destroyed. Moreover, write-off of goods represents a permanent write-off of goods which are not having any use to the business enterprise. Partial write-off due to technological obsolescence, etc., cannot be intended to have been included in the said enumeration.

Moreover, these are instances which are unforeseen or non-recurring in nature. If the business practice recognises foreseeable losses (such as evaporation, seasonal damage, etc.), such events may not fall within the strict construction of section 17(5)(h). Losses which arise out of business necessity, conscious efforts, budgeted / identified events, factored into product costs, etc., ought not to be considered as an unforeseen loss. Though there may be involvement of incidents of destruction of the goods, such destruction (being recognised and forecast) would not contextually adhere to the intent of the entire phrase. While one may contend that the phrases ‘disposed of by gift or free sample’ is a voluntary act, the fabric of the phrase evidently necessitates that the events have an unforeseen character inherent in them.

In Symphony Services Corp. India Pvt Ltd. vs. CC Bangalore4 the Court examined a situation where the goods have become entirely useless due to seepage of water, thereby concluding that they were destroyed goods, rejecting the contention of the Department that the said goods were ‘damaged goods’ and not ‘destroyed goods’. This decision is important for the proposition that only complete damage would fall within the expression destruction of goods and the physical condition of the same should be such that it renders them utterly unusable. It is only when such an interpretation is adopted that section 17(5)(h), in its entirety, would one be able to adhere to the Noscitor rule and ensure a consistent understanding of the phrase.

‘In respect of’
Before we move further, it is also important to study the phrase ‘in respect of’ standing at the preamble of section 17(5)(h). One understanding of this phrase is that it has a wide connotation and the Legislature intends to use this phrase in an expansive sense. The popular decision cited in this context is the case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679 where the Courts examined the scope of the arbitration clause in an agreement and held as follows:

‘(2) Expressions such as “arising out of” or “in respect of” or “in connection with” or “in relation to” or “in consequence of” or “concerning” or “relating to” the contract are of the widest amplitude and content and include even questions as to the existence, validity and effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement.’

The said interpretation was followed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the context of section 8 of the IBC (Macquarie Bank Limited vs. Shilpi Cable Technologies Limited5) which stated that the phrase ‘in relation to’ is of wide import and consequently interpreted in an expansive sense. In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (1988) 2 SCC 299, the Court was examining the expression ‘in relation to’ (so also ‘pertaining to’) and held that these expressions are intended to include matters of both direct and indirect significance depending on the context. The Court also stated that the expression ‘relate’ is to be understood as bringing into association or connection with and the said expression is synonymous with ‘concerning to’ and ‘pertaining to’. These are expressions of expansion and not of contraction. Similar views were echoed in other decisions in the context of Central Excise laws6. The above conclusions convey that section 17(5) should be read in its expansive sense with complete play being given to the scope of blocked credits. Accordingly, while interpreting the provisions in respect of goods which are lost, destroyed, etc., they must be applied in an expansive sense rather than a narrow sense.

But a more proximate context was considered in State of Madras vs. Swastik Tobacco Factory7 where the Court was examining the phrase ‘in respect of’ used while granting deduction of excise duty paid in respect of goods sold. While the Revenue argued that ‘in respect of’ here is synonymous with ‘on’ and narrows down the scope of the phrase to only those goods ‘on’ which excise duty was paid, the assessee argued the phrase was wide enough to cover even cases where excise duty paid on raw materials can be attributed to the finished goods. The Court rejected the argument of the assessee and held ‘in respect of’ in the context can only mean goods on which excise duty was paid and not on raw materials which are attributable to the final product. This decision narrowed down the ambit of the phrase and limited the scope of a ‘deduction provision’ to only cases having a direct significance with the subsequent events. Accordingly, the provisions of section 17(5) [more specifically clause (h)] should mandate that the ITC is denied only in respect of those goods which are lost, stolen, destroyed, etc., and not extend itself to goods contained in the finished goods after being put to use.

IDENTITY TEST OF GOODS
The above analysis takes us to the important juncture of whether there has to be a matching of the identity of goods on which credit is taken and the goods on which credit is being denied. In other words, whether a manufactured tyre which is lost, destroyed, stolen can be subjected to reversal ‘in respect of’ the ITC availed on the rubber used as raw material for manufacture of the tyre.

We should reflect back to the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 which contained certain provisions on reversal of ITC on removal, loss, destruction, etc.

Rule

Situation

Reversal

Inference

3(5)

Inputs or capital goods removed as such

Complete

Prior to usage

3(5A)

Capital goods removed after use

Depreciated

Subsequent to usage

3(5B)

Input or capital goods wholly or partially
written off

Complete

Non-usage

3(5C)

Inputs on which excise duty remitted (lost
or destroyed)

Input contained in finished goods

Used and contained in a finished product on
which duty was not collected

The said rules captured the cases where the inputs were not put to the intended use of manufacture of goods. In rule 3(5), removal ‘as such’ was interpreted to apply only to cases where the goods were removed without putting them to any use. There have been multiple decisions on the specific point8 that ‘as such’ implies goods in their original condition without having been put to use. Courts have opined that alteration of the form, usage of goods into production process for a reasonably long period would not amount to removal of goods ‘as such’. This leads to the introduction of Rule 3(5A) which addresses the removal of capital goods after usage on a depreciated value. Such an interpretation appeared to be in harmony with the underlying basis for credit, i.e., use or intended for use. Importantly, the law refrained from introducing any reversal on removal of inputs contained in finished goods after the usage of such inputs. Rule 3(5B) was also introduced to address cases where goods, even though in non-usable condition, were retained in the premises and hence did not trigger removal of goods. The said rule therefore mandated reversal of credit where the write-off in the books of accounts was undertaken as a consequence of non-usage of goods. The proviso in the said rule entitled re-credit of this reversed amount the moment the same were again put back to use by the manufacturer.

Rule 3(5C) was introduced to address cases where goods were used and contained in the finished goods which were either lost or destroyed and the excise duty on the same was remitted under the Central Excise Rules. The crucial point worth noting is that these Rules distinctly provided for cases where goods on which credit was taken were ‘contained’ in the manufactured product. Until this Clause was inserted, courts have taken the view that CENVAT rules did not provide for reversal of goods used in the manufacturing process which were ultimately lost or destroyed and duty was remitted in terms of Rule 219. Even subsequent to the introduction of this Clause, Courts have held that the reversal of credit is not automatic and one has to establish remission of excise duty on such goods for reversal under 3(5C) to be triggered10.

The above interpretation rules out many cases of goods which are lost or destroyed or removed after use in production process. Even in cases where the identity of goods is altered / processed into finished products, the mere fact of inputs being contained in such lost / destroyed finished goods does not warrant a reversal unless there are specific provisions to perform the same. In summary, the identity test definitely played an important role in reversal of CENVAT credit.

In the context of GST law, the conclusion ought to remain constituted in view of legacy understanding of credit provisions and the literal wordings of section 17(5)(h). The preliminary conclusion derived on application of the Noscitor rule is further fortified when one reflects upon the background of legacy provisions.

Therefore, the wide interpretation of ‘in respect of’ may not be palatable to taxpayers and there may be an inclination to highlight the context in which this phrase is to be interpreted. They would claim that the expansive nature of section 16(1) should not be defeated by a wider interpretation of section 17(5). Goods lost, destroyed, etc., should be understood as an exception to the positive intent to allow tax credits in case of business use. Where business use has been met and the taxpayer is able to establish the necessity for use of the product in a particular manner (generally framed as commercial expediency), Revenue ought not to question the business acumen behind the use of such goods. And this is where Courts will have to also take cognizance of the ‘commercial expediency test’ while interpreting the said phrase.

The most profound appreciation of this test was stated in an Income-tax matter in S.A. Builders case11 which was examining a matter of allowability of interest for the purpose of business. The Court stated (in para 23-25 and 31) that expenses incurred out of business expediency do not limit themselves to earning profits or one’s own business. It would also include matters undertaken out of a business necessity or prudence even though it does not appear to render an immediate or a visible benefit to the said business. Most importantly, the A.O. cannot sit in judgement over the commercial expediency of a business decision [Hero Cycles (P) Limited vs. CIT12]. The said test was also expounded in J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer in the context of Cenvat / Modvat Credits under the erstwhile laws. The Supreme Court stated that credit ought to be extended to equipment in manufacture of goods if it aids any particular process and the said process is so integrally connected with the manufacturing that its absence would render the same commercially inexpedient.

The applicability of the above analysis under GST is visible with the decision of ARS Steel & Alloy International (P) Ltd. where the Madras High Court while addressing the Revenue’s contention that finished goods contained a substantially lower quantity of inputs in comparison with the raw material consumed, stated that loss of inputs which is inherent to the manufacturing process cannot be denied u/s 17(5)(h). The Court relied on the decision in Rupa & Co. Ltd. vs. CESTAT13 and observed that the phrase ‘Inputs of such finished product’ and ‘contained in finished products’ are distinct phrases and they cannot be viewed theoretically as mere semantics. It must be viewed in the context of the manufacturing process which necessarily entails loss of goods at various stages and such loss cannot be equated to loss of the inputs as such. Therefore, the legacy principle that the identity of the goods and the identity of the credit in respect of the goods for which reversal is being sought on the eventuality of being ‘lost’, ‘destroyed’, etc., u/s 17(5)(h) should be mapped and only on such identification would the reversal be permissible under law.

APPLICATION
The above analysis can now be applied to a set of cases where there has been a constant tug-of-war between the taxpayer and his Officer. The Table below has been divided into distinct instances based on events:

Stage

Event

Analysis for 17(5)(h)

Reasoning

Pre-receipt stage

In-transit normal loss – Foreseeable

Threshold conditions u/s 16(2) need to be satisfied and only
then 17(5) to be applied

Section 16(2) mandates receipt of goods but unavoidable
evaporation loss in transit may not disentitle credit. Receipt here is being
applied as ‘legal receipt’ and not merely physical receipt. Once legal
receipt is satisfied then 17(5)(h) test may not bar credit on normal loss

In-transit abnormal loss (pilferage)

Same as above

Section 16(2) may not place a bar on legal receipt, but
pilferage would be covered by section 17(5)(h) and hence inadmissible

Weighment

Short receipt recorded due to weighing scale calibration
differences

This is more a recognisable financial loss on account of
technical reasons and not in the sense understood by section 17(5)(h) which
are unforeseeable in nature

RM – store / shop floor

Spillages, residues, etc., due to handling

Quantitative loss but not complete loss

Generally attributable to mishandling or loss within tolerable
limits. May not be

(continued)

 

 

 

(continued)

 

‘lost or destroyed’ if an accepted business practice

Natural causes

Arising on account of floods, fire, etc.

Could fall within the scope based on degree – if goods can be
revived even partially may not fall within the phrase

Spoilage / Damage

Weather, season, handling, etc.

May not fall within the scope of destroyed or lost if goods in
usable condition partially

Pilferage

Stolen

Not eligible for credit

In-process

Normal loss – manufacturing activity

Business expediency

Eligible not covered in exigencies of 17(5)

Spillages, etc., physical handling

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

In-process damage

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible to the extent of foreseeable or budgeted losses (normal
loss)

Qualitative Testing (QC)

Part
of manufacturing process

Eligible on account of business expediency

FG/
Captive consumption

Pilferage

Stolen

In view of the phrase ‘in respect of’, the ingredients of the
finished goods may be susceptible to reversal though difference of opinion
would arise

Normal loss

Inherent
nature of product

Eligible based on it being a foreseeable loss

Physical handling damage

Lost
or destroyed

May be considered as ‘lost’ where unforeseeable and complete
loss of goods

CONCLUSION
This is a topic where the Courts may have to draw a balance between the purported widespread application of section 17(5) and the business wisdom of taxpayers to treat their purchases in a particular manner while doing business. In the context of clause (h), one should be cognizant of the fact that the Government’s stake is limited to the tax component on such goods, whereas the taxpayer himself is committed to the base value of goods involved and if the taxpayer has made a decision to treat the goods in a particular way and recover their costs from the value chain, that decision ought to be respected by the Government while granting tax credits. Moreover, in mathematical terms where the taxpayer has factored in and loaded such losses onto the product pricing and the enhanced sale price, the loss is factored therein and tax revenue attributable to such loss has been passed on as a value addition down the value chain. Ultimately, in the legal sense the maxim ‘Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio’ is apt here – the best interpretation is made from the context!

Search and seizure – Assessment in search cases – Validity – Assessment completed on date of search – No incriminating material found during search – Invocation of section 153A not valid – Assessment order and consequent demand notice set aside

23 Smt. Jami Nirmala vs. Principal CIT [2021] 437 ITR 573 (Ori) A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order:10th August, 2021 Ss. 132, 153A and 156 of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Assessment in search cases – Validity – Assessment completed on date of search – No incriminating material found during search – Invocation of section 153A not valid – Assessment order and consequent demand notice set aside

A search and seizure operation was conducted u/s 132 at the assessee’s residential premises and on a locker jointly held with another person. According to the panchanama prepared for the search and seizure, nothing was found or seized. A notice was issued to the assessee u/s 153A. The assessee requested the A.O. to treat the original return of income as the return filed in response to such notice. Thereafter, notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1) were issued. Although nothing was found during the course of the search, the order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A referred to the cash book found during the survey conducted two weeks prior to the date of search, and stated that during the course of the search operation it was found that the assessee company had made expenditure during the year which was paid in the mode of cash of beyond the prescribed limit of Rs. 20,000 or above in a single day to a single party. The A.O. also disallowed the payments made to the cultivators and hamalis and accordingly raised a demand u/s 156 along with interest.

The Orissa High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee challenging the order and held as under:

‘i) The assessment u/s 153A pursuant to a search u/s 132 has to be on the basis of incriminating material gathered or unearthed during the course of the search.

ii) The order passed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A was without jurisdiction. The order did not refer to any document unearthed during the course of the search conducted u/s 132. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction u/s 153A for assessment of the A.Y. 2015-16 was without legal basis. The panchanama of the search proceedings unambiguously showed that nothing incriminating was recovered in the course of the search. The assessment order and the consequential demand notice u/s 156 are set aside.’

Interest on excess refund – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 234D by F.A. 2012 – Section 234D applies to regular assessment – Meaning of regular assessment – Regular assessment refers to first order of assessment u/s 143, u/s 147 or u/s 153A – Order of assessment u/s 143(3) on 31st March, 2006 and order of reassessment passed on 26th December, 2008 – Section 234D not applicable – Interest could not be levied u/s 234D

22 CIT vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 301 (Mad) A.Y.: 2001-02; Date of order: 24th August, 2021 S. 234D of ITA, 1961

Interest on excess refund – Law applicable – Effect of amendment of section 234D by F.A. 2012 – Section 234D applies to regular assessment – Meaning of regular assessment – Regular assessment refers to first order of assessment u/s 143, u/s 147 or u/s 153A – Order of assessment u/s 143(3) on 31st March, 2006 and order of reassessment passed on 26th December, 2008 – Section 234D not applicable – Interest could not be levied u/s 234D

The appellant Revenue had raised the following three substantial questions of law for consideration:

‘1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in deleting the interest levied u/s 234D?

2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, no interest can be charged even for the period subsequent to the introduction of section 234D merely on the ground that the said section was introduced by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1st June, 2003?

3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that interest levied u/s 234D cannot be charged for the A.Y. 2001-02, especially when the assessment order was made after introduction of the said section?’

The Madras High Court held as under:

‘i) Section 234D deals with “interest on excess refund”. Explanation 1 to section 234D states that where, in relation to an assessment year, an assessment is made for the first time u/s 147 or section 153A, the assessment so made shall be regarded as a regular assessment for the purposes of section 234D of the Act. Explanation (2) was inserted for the removal of doubts and declared that the provisions of section 234D shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before 1st June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year are completed after that date. Explanations (1) and (2) were inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect from 1st June, 2003.

ii) “Regular assessment” has been defined u/s 2(40) to mean the assessment made under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 144. Explanation (1) would stand attracted if an assessment is made for the first time u/s 147 or section 153A and the assessment, if it is done for the first time, shall be regarded as a “regular assessment” u/s 2(40).

iii) Admittedly, the assessment order dated 26th December, 2008 u/s 143(3) read with section 147 was not the first assessment, as an assessment was made u/s 143(3) dated 31st March, 2004 which fact was not disputed. Since the assessment framed u/s 143(3) read with section 147 dated 26th December, 2008, was not the assessment made for the first time, it could not be regarded as a “regular assessment” for the purposes of section 234D and, therefore, no interest could be levied on the assessee.’

Income Declaration Scheme – Failure to pay full amount of tax according to declaration – Declaration would be rendered void and non est – Part of tax already paid under scheme cannot be forfeited by Revenue authorities – Such amount must be returned to assessee

21 Pinnacle Vastunirman Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI [2021] 438 ITR 27 (Bom) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 – Effect of S. 181 of Finance Act, 2016

Income Declaration Scheme – Failure to pay full amount of tax according to declaration – Declaration would be rendered void and non est – Part of tax already paid under scheme cannot be forfeited by Revenue authorities – Such amount must be returned to assessee

The assessee had made a declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 concerning the A.Y. 2016-17. However, it could not make full payment of tax according to the declaration. Therefore, the declaration had become void and non est. The petitioner therefore applied for refund of the taxes so paid under the declaration or to give adjustment or credit of the amount so paid. The application was rejected.

The petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of rejection. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. This would mean there must be a law, the law must authorise the tax and the tax must be levied and collected according to the law. Sub-section (3) of section 187 of the Finance Act, 2016 which deals with the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 categorically provides that if the declarant fails to pay the tax, surcharge and penalty in respect of the declaration made u/s 183 on or before the dates specified in sub-section (1), the declaration filed by him shall be deemed never to have been made under the Scheme. This would mean that the declaration will be non est. When the scheme itself contemplates that a declaration without payment of tax is void and non est and the declaration filed by the assessee would not be acted upon [because section 187(3) says the declaration filed shall be deemed never to have been made under the Scheme], the question of retention of the tax paid under such declaration will not arise. The provisions of section 191 cannot have any application to a situation where the tax is paid but the entire amount of tax is not paid. The Scheme does not provide for the Revenue to retain the tax paid in respect of a declaration which is void and non est.

ii) The assessee was entitled to an adjustment by giving credit for the amount of Rs. 82,33,874 paid under the Income Declaration Scheme.’

Capital gains – Long-term or short-term capital asset – Period of holding – No distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying as short-term capital asset

20 CIT vs. Exim Rajathi India Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 19 (Mad) A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 S. 2(42A) proviso of ITA, 1961

Capital gains – Long-term or short-term capital asset – Period of holding – No distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying as short-term capital asset

For the A.Y. 2007-08, the Commissioner invoking his power u/s 263 held that the order passed by the A.O. u/s 143(3) was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on the ground that the shares held by the assessee in a company, which was not a listed company when sold, should be treated as ‘short-term capital asset’ as defined u/s 2(42A) and not as ‘long-term capital asset’. Accordingly, the A.O. computed the short-term capital gains.

The Commissioner (Appeals) directed the A.O. to treat the shares as long-term capital asset, allow indexation and tax the resultant capital gains at the special rate of 20%. The Tribunal concluded that there was no distinction between unlisted and listed shares for classifying them as short-term capital asset under the Act and affirmed the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) In terms of the definition u/s 2(42A), short-term capital asset would mean a capital asset held by an assessee for not more than 36 months immediately preceding the transfer. The provision does not make a distinction between shares in a public company, a private company, a listed company or an unlisted company. The use of the word “or” in between each of the categories is very important and such distinction needs to be borne in mind. Although “securities” as defined u/s 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 includes shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, etc., that by itself cannot have an impact to give a different interpretation to the distinction of “short-term capital asset” as defined in section 2(42A).

ii) According to the Explanatory Notes to the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, in Circular No. 1 of 2015 dated 21st January, 2015 [(2015) 371 ITR (St.) 22] issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, all shares whether listed or unlisted enjoy the benefit of shorter period of holding, and investment in shares of private limited companies enjoy long-term capital gains on transfer after 12 months.

iii) The Tribunal was right in holding that the shares and debentures not listed could be treated as a long-term capital asset u/s 2(42A) of the Act read with its proviso.’

Assessment – Duty of A.O. to consider normal and special provisions relating to assessee – Company – Computation of book profits – A.O. must take into account provisions of section 115JB

19 CIT vs. Kerala Chemicals and Proteins Ltd. [2021] 438 ITR 333 (Ker) A.Y.: 2002-03; Date of order: 19th July, 2021 S. 115JB of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Duty of A.O. to consider normal and special provisions relating to assessee – Company – Computation of book profits – A.O. must take into account provisions of section 115JB

The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of ossein, compound glue, gelatine, etc. On 31st October, 2002, it filed the Income-tax return for the A.Y. 2002-03 declaring a total loss of Rs. 3,59,10,946. The A.O., through an assessment order dated 3rd March, 2005 made u/s 143(3), computed the total income of the assessee at Rs. 2,99,81,060.

The Commissioner (Appeals) partly allowed the appeal. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

In the appeal by the Revenue, the following questions were raised:

‘1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and also in the light of section 80AB, the Tribunal is right in holding that while computing the book profit u/s 115JB the deduction u/s 80HHC is to be computed as per minimum alternate tax provisions and not as per the normal provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law and fact,
(i) in presuming that the A.O. has considered clause (c) of Explanation to section 115JA in the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99;
(ii) in holding that merely because proper working is not available on record, it cannot be said that the A.O., has not considered the same; and are not the approach and the conclusion based on presumptions and suppositions perverse, arbitrary and illegal?

3. (a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in directing the A.O. to reduce the net profit by the sum of Rs. 3,29,27,056 in place of Rs. 1,42,02,335 as has been done by the A.O.?
(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in directing the A.O. to allow an amount of Rs. 1,87,24,721 being the provision for excise duty written back on the “presumption” that even though the provisions of minimum alternate tax were not considered as the assessments were completed applying the normal provisions of the Act; and the A.O. has considered clause (c) of Explanation to section 115JA in the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99?’

The Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Once the return is filed by the assessee, it is the responsibility of the A.O. to compute the income of the assessee under normal provisions and special provisions. The income tax is collected on the income whichever is higher in these two methods, i. e., either normal provision or special provision.

ii) In the A.Ys. 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, provision for disputed excise duty was made by the assessee. The assessment orders for the first two years were made referring to the normal provisions of the Act and the necessity to refer to the special provisions was not noticed by the A.O. The Tribunal, taking note of the fact that the assessee was subject to the slab rate of 30% for the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99, computed the tax under normal provisions.

iii) The Tribunal had rightly found that the fact that the proper working was not reflected in the respective assessment orders or the record could not lead to the conclusion that the A.O. had not considered the applicability of the special provision as well and that the omission on the part of the A.O. in referring to the special provisions ought not to deny the writing-back provision available under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 115JB. The denial of the benefit of writing back the provision to the assessee in these assessment years was illegal and the finding recorded by the Tribunal was valid and correct in the circumstances of this case.’

Assessment – International transactions – Section 144C mandatory – Assessment order passed without following procedure laid down in section 144C – Not a procedural irregularity – Section 292B not applicable – Order not valid

18 SHL (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 438 ITR 317 (Bom) A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 28th July, 2021 Ss. 144C and 292B of ITA, 1961

Assessment – International transactions – Section 144C mandatory – Assessment order passed without following procedure laid down in section 144C – Not a procedural irregularity – Section 292B not applicable – Order not valid

The petitioner is an Indian company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is a part of the SHL Group, United Kingdom, and primarily a trading entity that provides SHL products (psychometric test), assessment, consultancy and training services (‘SHL Solutions’) to clients in India in various industries. The petitioner had filed the return of income on 30th March, 2018 declaring a total income of Rs. 1,01,31,750. Its case is that during the A.Y. 2017-18 it had entered into an international transaction with its associated enterprise (the ‘AE’) whereby it was granted a licence to market, distribute and deliver the SHL Solutions to clients in India from its associated enterprise, for which the petitioner made payments towards support services charges incurred by the associated enterprise. It submitted that along with the return of income filed for the said year, in view of the various international transactions with the associated enterprise, Form 3CEB was filed along with the return of income.

The petitioner’s case was selected under the computer-aided scrutiny selection (CASS) pursuant to which, on 5th September, 2018 a notice was issued u/s 143(2). Thereafter, on 6th August, 2019, a reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) by the first respondent. A notice was issued on 16th August, 2019 by the TPO and an order dated 29th January, 2021 was passed by the TPO proposing transfer pricing adjustments of Rs. 10,74,54,337 considered as Nil by the petitioner. On 10th March, 2021, the second respondent, viz., National e-Assessment Centre, Delhi requested the petitioner to provide rebuttal to the proposed adjustments to the arm’s length price made by the TPO. On 15th March, 2021, the petitioner filed a reply and on 6th April, 2021, a final assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) read with sections 143(3A) and 143(3B), determining the total income at Rs. 11,75,86,087. A notice of demand for Rs. 1,17,60,810 was also issued. A notice initiating penalty proceedings also came to be issued u/s 274 read with section 270A.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the order and the notices. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Section 144C(1) is a non obstante provision, which requires its compliance irrespective of the other provisions that may be contained in the Act. The requirement u/s 144C(1) to first pass a draft assessment order and to provide a copy thereof to the assessee is a mandatory requirement which gives a substantive right to the assessee to object to any variation that is prejudicial to it. The procedure prescribed u/s 144C is a mandatory procedure and not directory. Failure to follow the procedure would be a jurisdictional error and not merely a procedural error or irregularity but a breach of a mandatory provision. Therefore, section 292B cannot save an order passed in breach of the provisions of section 144C(1), the same being an incurable illegality.

ii) The assessee was an eligible assessee and there was no dispute as to the applicability of section 144C. It was also not in dispute that the final assessment order had been passed without the draft assessment order as contemplated u/s 144C(1). The order was not valid.’

Assessment – Draft assessment order – Objections – Powers of DRP – DRP must consider merits of objections – Objections cannot be rejected for mere non-appearance of party at time of hearing

17 Sesa Sterlite Ltd. vs. DRP [2021] 438 ITR 42 (Mad) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 29th July, 2021 S. 144C of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Draft assessment order – Objections – Powers of DRP – DRP must consider merits of objections – Objections cannot be rejected for mere non-appearance of party at time of hearing

The issue raised in this writ petition is whether the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) is competent to reject the objections on account of non-appearance of the assessee on the hearing date. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Under section 144C, on receipt of the draft order the assessee gets a right to file his objections, if any, to such variations with the DRP and the A.O. The DRP consists of three Commissioners of the Income-tax Department. They undoubtedly have certain expertise in the tax regime. Thus, adjudication before the DRP is a valuable opportunity provided both to the assessee as well as to the A.O. Either of the parties may get guidance for the purpose of completion of the assessment proceedings. Thus, the importance attached to the DRP under the Act can in no circumstances be undermined.

ii) When the Act contemplates a right to the assessee, such right must be allowed to be exercised in the manner prescribed under it. The manner in which objections are to be considered by the DRP are well defined both under the Act as well as under the Income-tax (Dispute Resolution Panel) Rules, 2009. Sub-section (6) of section 144C unambiguously states that the DRP is bound to consider the materials denoted as the case may be and issue suitable directions as it thinks fit. Therefore, the DRP has no option but to deal with objections, if any, filed by an eligible assessee on merits and, in the event of non-consideration, it is to be construed that the right conferred to an assessee has not been complied with.

iii) The language employed is “shall” both under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 144C. Therefore, the DRP has no option but to strictly follow sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 144C which are mandatory provisions as far as the DRP is concerned; sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 144C are discretionary powers. Sub-section (11) is to be linked with sub-section (2)(b)(i) and (ii) of section 144C because an opportunity is bound to be given to the assessee as well as to the A.O. Sub-section (11) is also significant with reference to the opportunities to be granted to the parties before the DRP. The DRP is a quasi-judicial authority. This being the case, the DRP is bound to pass orders as it thinks fit only on the merits and such quasi-judicial authorities are not empowered to reject the objections merely by stating that the assessee had not appeared before the DRP. The DRP is legally bound to adjudicate the objections and pass orders on the merits, even in case of the assessee or the A.O. failing to appear for personal hearing.

iv) An order passed rejecting the objections submitted by the assessee, merely on the ground that the assessee has not appeared on the hearing date, is infirm and liable to be quashed.’

Section 3(1), Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act 2015 (‘BMA’) – Relevant point of time for taxation of an undisclosed foreign asset under BMA is point of time when such asset comes to notice of Government – It is immaterial as to whether it continued to exist at time of taxation, or at the time when provisions of BMA came into existence

2 Rashesh Manhar Bhansali vs. ACIT [(2021) 132 taxmann.com 20 (Mum-Trib)] BMA Nos. 3 and 5 (Mum) of 2021 A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 2nd November, 2021

Section 3(1), Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income & Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act 2015 (‘BMA’) – Relevant point of time for taxation of an undisclosed foreign asset under BMA is point of time when such asset comes to notice of Government – It is immaterial as to whether it continued to exist at time of taxation, or at the time when provisions of BMA came into existence

FACTS
The assessee (RMB) and his wife (ARB) were Directors and shareholders in a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (‘BVI Co’). The assessee had not disclosed this information in the Return of Income (‘ROI’) filed in India.

The Investigation Wing of the Income-tax Department received information regarding two accounts held in the UBS Bank, Singapore branch by BVI Co. On further probe, including information received through exchange of information provisions under the India-Singapore DTAA, the Department found that RMB and ARB were the beneficiaries and operators of the said accounts. Further, the said accounts showed gross credit entries of US $147 million (INR 999.74 crores @ US $1 = INR 68) over a period of time (which also included intra-bank and contra entries).

The KYC documents related to these bank accounts revealed that passport copies of RMB and ARB were submitted along with handwritten instructions for operating the bank accounts. One of the bank accounts was closed in 2008 and the other one in 2011.

The chronology of investigation by the Tax Authorities is as follows.

Year

Investigation

2013 and 2014

 

Summons for investigation were sent asking for details of
foreign asset, beneficial ownership, etc.

2016

Search conducted in premises of assessee

2017

BMA proceedings initiated by A.O.

At all the above-mentioned stages, the assessee denied having any knowledge of the said foreign bank accounts. Just three days prior to the completion of the assessment, RMB admitted that these accounts were opened in his and his wife’s name by his late father by taking their signatures on papers in the past. He submitted that the credit entries in the accounts were loans taken from UBS Bank which were repaid with interest.

The A.O. rejected various explanations offered by the assessee and held that the assessee is the beneficial owner of the undisclosed foreign bank accounts and computed total income of INR 56 crores. On appeal, CIT(A) gave partial relief of US $3.2 million (roughly, INR 21.8 crores) on account of credits in respect of redemption of investments held earlier.

Being aggrieved, both parties appealed to the ITAT.

HELD1
Applicability of BMA to undisclosed assets held, and income earned, prior to the enactment of the law (i.e., 1st July, 2015)
• The two foreign bank accounts were closed in 2008 and 2011. The assessee contended that an asset which did not exist at the time when BMA came into force cannot be assessed under the said Act.
• Section 3(1) of BMA specifically provides that an undisclosed asset located outside India shall be charged to tax in the year in which it comes to the notice of the A.O.
• It is immaterial whether the asset existed at the point of time of taxation or even at the time when the provisions of BMA came into existence. The only relevant date for levying tax is when the undisclosed asset comes to the notice of the A.O.
• The assessee further contended that BMA cannot be invoked in respect of a foreign asset which was already in the knowledge of Revenue authorities (i.e., Investigation Wing of the Income-tax Department) before the said Act came into force. The assessee relied upon the CBDT Circular2 which prohibited assessees from making a one-time voluntary declaration of foreign assets in respect of which the Government has prior information on the specified date.
• The said Circular is relevant only for voluntary declaration under BMA and it cannot be relied upon for making assessments under BMA.
• For taxation under BMA what is relevant is that either such foreign income is not disclosed in the ROI filed, or that the ROI is not filed at all by the assessee in India.

Bank account is an asset under BMA
• The assessee contended that an undisclosed foreign bank account is not an asset u/s 2(11) of BMA. The assessee argued that though Black Money Rules provide for valuation of undisclosed bank accounts, section 2(11) of the BMA does not cover a foreign bank account which does not exist.
• The assessee also contended that since section 2(11) of the BMA refers only to such assets having ‘cost of acquisition’ (i.e., source of investment), a bank account cannot be treated as an undisclosed foreign asset.
• Amount receivable from the bank in respect of a bank account is an asset of the person holding that account. If the owner of a bank account can substantiate the source of investment which is duly disclosed to Revenue authorities, to that extent, the source of investment is explained and the requirements of section 2(11) can be satisfied even in respect of a bank account.

Beneficial owner of asset
• The assessee contended that section 2(11) of the  BMA defines an undisclosed asset as one in which the assessee is a ‘beneficial owner’. Since this term is not defined under the BMA, it must derive its meaning from section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 19613.
• Merely because the expression ‘beneficial owner’ is defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961, per se, it cannot as well apply to BMA. Reliance was placed on the ITAT decision in the Jitendra Mehta case4 where it was held that beneficial owner can be interpreted with reference to the dictionary meaning and the provision in other statues keeping in mind the object and purpose of the BMA. The ITAT rejected the above arguments and held the assessee to be the beneficial owner of the foreign bank accounts under the BMA.

_____________________________________________________________________
1    For ease of reference, the issue raised by the assessee is mentioned before the observations of the ITAT
2    CBDT Circular No. 13 of 2015
3    Explanation 4 to section 139(1) provides that a ‘beneficial owner’ in respect of an asset is someone who has directly / indirectly provided for consideration for the asset
4    (BMA No. 1/Del/20; order dated 6th July, 2021)

An assessee who has voluntarily surrendered the registration granted to it u/s 12A cannot be compelled, by action of or by inaction of Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration

18 Navajbai Ratan Tata Trust vs. Pr.CIT [(2021) 88 ITR(T) 170 (Mum-Trib)] ITA No.: 7238 (Mum) of 2019 A.Y.: Nil; Date of order: 24th March, 2021

An assessee who has voluntarily surrendered the registration granted to it u/s 12A cannot be compelled, by action of or by inaction of Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration

FACTS
The assessee, a charitable trust, was granted registration u/s 12A. The trust vide letter dated 11th March, 2015 addressed to the CIT indicated that it did not desire to continue to avail the benefits of the registration made by the trustees in 1975. The trust was called for a hearing on 20th March, 2015 on which date the trust confirmed its agreement to the cancellation / withdrawal of the registration. Returns of income filed subsequent thereto were filed without claiming exemption under sections 11 and 12.

The CIT cancelled the registration of the assessee trust, as granted u/s 12A, with effect from the date of his order, i.e., 31st October, 2019.

The assessee filed an appeal with the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT tried to ascertain the objective behind the Income-tax Department’s keenness to extend registration u/s 12A for the extended period from March, 2015 to October, 2019, when the assessee did not want it.

It then considered the relevant legislative amendments to ascertain the objective. First, it considered the amendment in section 11. By insertion of sub-section (7) in section 11 with effect from 1st April, 2015, tax exemption u/s 10(34) for ‘dividends from Indian companies’, on which dividend distribution tax was already paid by the company distributing dividends which was available to every other taxpayer, was denied to charitable trusts registered u/s 12A.

It also observed that the continuance of registration u/s 12A, even when the assessee does not want exemption u/s 11, may result in higher tax liability for a trust which has earned dividends from domestic companies otherwise eligible for exemption u/s 10(34), as in the given case. However, the ITAT also took into consideration the rationale behind the said amendment which was to ensure that the assessee does not have the benefit of choice between special provisions and general provisions. The ITAT also noted the Circular No. 1/2015 dated 21st January, 2015 explaining the above amendment. As against this, the ITAT observed the way this provision was interpreted by the tax authorities. The Revenue authorities opined that once an assessee is a registered charitable institution, irrespective of admissibility or even claim for exemption u/s 11, the exemption u/s 10(34) was inadmissible. This put the assessee at a disadvantage since the scheme of sections 11 to 13 which were intended to be an optional benefit to the charitable institutions, in the present case, became a source of an additional tax burden for the trusts in question because of the interpretation given by the Revenue.

The ITAT also noted that introduction of section 115TD would also have a bearing on the tax liability of the trust which would depend on the date of cancellation of registration.

From the above-mentioned Circular the ITAT inferred that the assessee has an inherent right to withdraw from the special dispensation of the scheme of sections 11, 12 and 13, unless such a withdrawal is found to be mala fide. It also observed that the disadvantageous tax implications on the assessee [non-application of section 10(34) and section 115TD] are only as a result of a much later legislative amendment which was not in effect even when the assessee informed the CIT of his disinclination to continue with the registration; an assessee unwilling to avail the ‘benefit’ of registration ‘obtained’ u/s 12A could not be compelled, by action of or by inaction of the Revenue authorities, to continue with the said registration.

The ITAT observed that registration u/s 12A was obtained by the assessee in 1976 and registration u/s 12A simply being a foundational requirement for exemption u/s 11 and not putting the assessee under any obligations, is in the nature of a benefit to the assessee. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahendra Mills (2000) 109 taxmann 225 / 243 ITR 56, it held that ‘a privilege cannot be a disadvantage and an option cannot become an obligation’. Thus, in the instant case, registration u/s 12A cannot be thrust upon the unwilling assessee.

It also held that wherever a public authority has a power, that public authority also has a corresponding duty to exercise that power when circumstances so warrant or justify it. Accordingly, in the instant case when the assessee communicated to the CIT of inapplicability of exemptions under sections 11 to 13, the CIT was duty-bound to pass an order in writing withdrawing the registration. In the instant case, not only was the procedure of cancellation of registration kept pending but also the proceedings conducted earlier were ignored and fresh proceedings were started after a long gap, on a standalone basis de hors the pending proceedings. This is more so considering the fact that delay in cancellation of registration has tax implications to the disadvantage of the assessee.

The ITAT thus concluded by holding that the CIT was under a duty to hold that the cancellation of registration is to take effect from the date on which the violation of the statutory requirements for grant of exemption occurred, the date on which such a violation or breach was noticed, or at least the date on which hearing in this regard was concluded. That is, the cancellation of registration was required to be effective, at the most, from 20th March, 2015, i.e., the date fixed for hearing. The inordinate delay in cancellation of registration, which is wholly attributed to the Revenue authorities, cannot be placed to the disadvantage of the assessee. Finally, it was held that the cancellation was effective from 20th March, 2015 and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

Re-opening of assessee’s case merely on basis of information from Director (Investigation) pertaining to receipt of huge amount of share premium by assessee and the opinion that the amount of share premium was not justifiable considering its lesser income during the year was unjustified

17 Future Tech IT Systems (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [(2021) 89 ITR(T) 676 (Chd-Trib)] ITA Nos. 543, 548 and 549 (Chd) of 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 22nd April, 2021

Re-opening of assessee’s case merely on basis of information from Director (Investigation) pertaining to receipt of huge amount of share premium by assessee and the opinion that the amount of share premium was not justifiable considering its lesser income during the year was unjustified

FACTS
The assessee-company filed its return of income on 20th September, 2010 declaring an income of Rs. 2,55,860 which was accepted and an assessment order was passed.

Subsequently, the A.O. received information from the Director (Intelligence & Criminal Investigation) that the assessee had received share premium of a huge amount during the year. Notice u/s 148 was issued. The assessee’s objections to the same were disposed of by the A.O. and assessment order was passed after making additions of Rs. 1,17,00,000 in respect of share premium by invoking provisions of section 68. On appeal before the CIT(A), the assessee argued that the A.O. did not mount a valid base for the reasons to come to a rational belief that the income of the appellant has escaped assessment and that there was lack of material to prove that the transaction of receipt of share application money was not genuine. The A.O. acted only on the borrowed satisfaction.

The CIT(A) observed that the A.O. noticed that the book value of the share of the company was Rs. 10 and the company had nothing in its balance sheet to attract such huge share premium. He also observed that the A.O. initiated the proceedings on the basis of specific information, so it could not be said that his action was on the basis of certain surmises and conjectures only and it could also not be said that the material in his possession could just give him reason to suspect and not reason to believe that the income had escaped assessment. Another observation made by him was that the A.O. applied his mind to the information by verifying from the assessment record that the assessee had very low income as against which it received huge share premium and hence his action is valid.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The assessee argued before the ITAT that the A.O. while issuing the notice u/s 148 doubted the share premium only and accepted the share capital received by the assessee, therefore, the initiation of the proceedings u/s 147 were based on suspicion. It was also submitted that the investor company explained the source and the assessee furnished relevant documents to the A.O. The documents furnished by the assessee proved the source of credit for share application money. Thus, according to the assessee, it had proved the identity, genuineness and the credit-worthiness of the shareholders.

The ITAT observed that an identical issue was decided by the ITAT in ITA No. 1616/Chd/2018 for the A.Y. 2010-11 vide order dated 15th June, 2020 in the case of Indo Global Techno Trade Ltd. vs. ITO. Relevant findings of the said case that were considered by the ITAT in the instant case were that mere information (without recording of any details) of the assesse receiving a high premium could not be said to be a reason to form the belief that the income of the assessee had escaped assessment. There is no dispute to the well-settled proposition that reason to believe must have a material bearing on the question of escapement of income. It does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the assessing authority, such reason should be held in good faith and cannot merely be a pretence. There could be no doubt that the words ‘reason to believe’ suggest that the belief must be that of an honest and reasonable person based upon reasonable grounds and that the Income-tax Officer may act on direct or circumstantial evidence but not on mere suspicion, gossip or rumour.

The other decision relied on by the assessee and considered by the ITAT was of the Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of D.D. Agro Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA Nos. 349 & 350/Chd/2017 order dated 7th September, 2017, wherein, on identical facts and circumstances, the A.O. recorded identical reasons to form belief for re-opening of the assessment. The Tribunal held that the A.O. assumed jurisdiction relying upon the non-specific routine information blindly without caring to first independently consider the specific facts and circumstances of the case and that the assumption of jurisdiction by the A.O. under the circumstances was wrong.

Thus, the ITAT followed the decision in Indo Global Techno Trade Ltd. vs. ITO (Supra).

The ITAT also considered the following other rulings on the issue:

• Rajshikha Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs. ITO for A.Y. 2005-06 vide order dated 23rd February, 2018 (Del ITAT);
• Pr.CIT vs. G&G Pharma India Ltd. (2016) 384 ITR 147 (Del HC);
• Pr.CIT vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P) Ltd. (2017) 395 ITR 677 (Del HC);
• Pr.CIT vs. Laxman Industrial Resources Ltd. (2017) 397 ITR 106 (Del HC); and
• Signature Hotels (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (2011) 338 ITR 51 (Del HC).

The ITAT applied the rationale of the above decisions to the facts of the instant case to conclude that the re-opening initiated by the A.O. was invalid. Thus, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the assessee.

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

16 Antariksh Realtors Private Limited vs. ITO [TS-1029-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Section: 263

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

FACTS
The assessee, a company engaged in business as a builder and developer, filed its return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 14,34,236. The case was selected under ‘limited scrutiny’ for examination of two issues, viz., (i) Low income in comparison to high loan / advances / investments in shares appearing in balance sheet; and (ii) Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) liability mismatch. The A.O. upon examining these two issues completed the assessment.

Subsequently, after reviewing the assessment order, the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax in charge of the range found that the increase in loan taken by the assessee from Rs. 8.57 crores in the preceding year to Rs. 10.42 crores in the current year was not verified by the A.O. He observed that the A.O. also did not verify the assessee’s claim that all loans and advances given are for the purpose of business, by calling for details of transactions in subsequent years along with supporting documents. He also observed that the A.O. did not verify the capitalisation of interest paid. In view of these facts, the Additional Commissioner submitted a proposal to the PCIT for exercising the powers u/s 263 to revise the assessment order.

The PCIT issued a show cause notice u/s 263. The assessee submitted that the A.O. had thoroughly inquired into the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny. However, the PCIT was not convinced. He held that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue due to non-inquiry by the A.O. He set aside the assessment order with a direction to examine the relevant details as observed in the revision order and complete the assessment after conducting proper and necessary inquiry.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the two issues which require examination are whether the limited scrutiny for which the assessee’s case was selected encompassed examination of loans taken by the assessee and capitalisation of interest expenditure, and if it was not so, whether the assessment order can be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue for not examining the issues relating to loan taken and interest expenditure capitalised.

The Tribunal noted that the PCIT while exercising power u/s 263 has attempted to expand the scope of the limited scrutiny. It observed that the A.O. did examine both the issues for which the assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny and the A.O. had also conducted necessary inquiry on the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny and he completed the assessment after applying his mind to the materials on record.

The A.O. being bound by CBDT Instruction No. 20/2015 dated 29th December, 2015 and CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2016 dated 14th July, 2016, could not have gone beyond the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny for which the case was selected. He had rightly restricted himself to the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny. Unless the scope of scrutiny is expanded by converting it into a complete scrutiny with the approval of the higher authority, the A.O. could not have travelled beyond his mandate. The Tribunal held that the assessment order cannot be considered to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue for not examining the loans taken by the assessee and their utilisation as well as capitalisation of interest.

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct the A.O. to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. For this proposition the Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Su-Raj Diamond Dealers Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT, ITA No. 3098/Mum/2019; order dated 27th November, 2019.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

15 Alfa Laval Lund AB vs. CIT (IT/TP) [TS-1024-ITAT-2021 (Pune)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 2nd November, 2021 Section: 263

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

FACTS
The assessee, a foreign company, filed its return of income declaring Nil total income. The assessment of its total income was completed on 27th March, 2015, again assessing Nil total income. Subsequently, the CIT received a proposal from the A.O. for revision based on which the CIT carried out a revision by observing that the assessee had entered into an agreement on 1st October, 2011 with its related concern in India for supply of software licenses and IT support services. The amount of service fee received from the Indian entity, collected on the basis of number of users, was claimed as not chargeable to tax in India within the meaning of Article 12 of the India-Sweden Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The CIT opined that the receipt from the Indian entity was in the nature of ‘Royalty’ and not ‘Fees for Technical Services’. After issuing a show cause notice and considering the reply of the assessee, the CIT set aside the order passed by the A.O. and remitted the matter to the A.O. for treating the amount received from the Indian entity as ‘Royalty’ chargeable to tax u/s 9(1)(vi).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the order of the CIT mentioned that ‘A proposal for revision under section 263 of the IT Act, 1961 was received from DCIT(IT)-1, Pune through the Jt. CIT(IT), Pune vide letter No. Pn/Jt.CIT(IT)/263/2016-17/61 dated 23rd May,. 2016’. It observed that the edifice of the revision in the present case has been laid on the bedrock of receipt of the proposal from the A.O.

The Tribunal having noted the provisions of section 263(1) held that the process of revision u/s 263 is initiated only when the CIT calls for and examines the record of any proceeding under the Act and considers that any order passed by the A.O. is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The twin conditions are sine qua non for the exercise of power under this section. The use of the word ‘and’ between the expression ‘call for and examine the record…’ and the expression ‘if he considers that any order… is erroneous…’ abundantly demonstrates that both these conditions must be cumulatively fulfilled by the CIT and in the same order, that is, the first followed by the second. The kicking point is the CIT calling for and examining the record of the proceedings leading him to consider that the assessment order is erroneous, etc. The consideration that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue should flow from and be the consequence of his examination of the record of the proceedings. If such a consideration is not preceded by the examination of the record of the proceedings under the Act, the condition for revision does not get magnetised.

The Tribunal held that it is trite that a power which vests exclusively in one authority can’t be invoked or caused to be invoked by another, either directly or indirectly. The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law. If the A.O., after passing an assessment order finds something amiss in it to the detriment of the Revenue, he has ample power to either reassess the earlier assessment in terms of section 147 or carry out rectification u/s 154. He can’t usurp the power of the CIT and recommend a revision. No overlapping of powers of the authorities under the Act can be permitted.

As revision proceedings in this case triggered with the A.O. sending a proposal to the CIT and then the latter passing an order u/s 263 on the basis of such a proposal, the Tribunal held that it became a case of jurisdiction defect resulting in vitiating the impugned order.

The Tribunal quashed the impugned order on this legal issue itself.

REVENUE RECOGNITION FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN E-COMMERCE, GAMING AND FINTECH SECTORS

Compiler’s Note: In recent weeks, companies engaged in e-commerce, gaming and fintech have come out with IPOs or are in the process of doing so. These companies operate on very different business models without any ‘brick and mortar’ assets. Given below are the Revenue Recognition policies for a few such companies (from the annual reports where available, or offer documents filed with SEBI).

ONE97 COMMUNICATIONS LTD. (PAYTM)
Revenue Recognition
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer net of variable consideration, e.g., discounts, volume rebates, any payments made to a customer (unless the payment is for a distinct good or service received from the customer) and excludes amounts collected on behalf of third parties. The Company recognises revenue when it transfers control over a product or service to a customer. Revenue is only recognised to the extent that it is highly probable that a significant reversal will not occur.

The Company provides incentives to its users in various forms including cashbacks. Incentives which are consideration payable to the customer that are not in exchange for a distinct good or service are generally recognised as a reduction of revenue.

Where the Company acts as an agent for selling goods or services, only the commission income is included within revenue. The specific revenue recognition criteria described below must also be met before revenue is recognised. Typically, the Company has a right to payment before or at the point that services are delivered. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability. The amount of consideration does not contain a significant financing component as payment terms are less than one year.

Sale of services
Revenue from services is recognised when the control in services is transferred as per the terms of the agreement with the customer, i.e., as and when services are rendered. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Services Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled revenue under other financial assets where the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability.

Commission
The Company facilitates recharge of talk time, bill payments and availability of bus tickets and earns commission for the respective services. Commission income is recognised when the control in services is transferred to the customer when the services have been provided by the Company.

Service fees from merchants
The Company earns service fee from merchants and recognises such revenue when the control in services have been transferred by the Company, i.e., as and when services have been provided by the Company. Such service fee is generally determined as a percentage of transaction value executed by the merchants. The amounts received by the Company pending settlement are disclosed as payable to the merchants under contract liabilities.

Other operating revenue
Where the Company is contractually entitled to receive claims / compensation in case of non-discharge of obligations by customers, such claims / compensations are measured at amount receivable from such customers and are recognised as other operating revenue when there is a reasonable certainty that the Company will be able to realise the said amounts.

Interest income
For all debt instruments measured either at amortised cost or at fair value through other comprehensive income, interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (EIR). EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of a financial liability. When calculating the effective interest rate, the Company estimates the expected cash flows by considering all the contractual terms of the financial instrument but does not consider the expected credit losses. Interest income is included in finance income in the statement of profit and loss.

ZOMATO LTD.
Revenue recognition
The Group generates revenue from online food delivery transactions, advertisements, subscriptions, sale of traded goods and other platform services.

Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods or services to customers upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods or services. Consideration includes goods or services contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

Where performance obligation is satisfied over time, the Group recognises revenue over the contract period. Where performance obligation is satisfied at a point in time, the Group recognises revenue when customer obtains control of promised goods and services in the contract.

Revenue is recognised net of any taxes collected from customers, which are remitted to governmental authorities.

Revenue from platform services and transactions
The Group through its platform allows transactions between the consumers and restaurant partners enlisted with the platform. These could be for food orders placed online on the platform by the consumer or through a consumer availing offers from restaurant partners upon a visit to the restaurant. The Group earns commission income on such transactions from the restaurant partners upon completion of the transaction.

The Group is merely a technology platform provider where delivery partners are able to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners and the consumers. For the platform provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners. Up to 28th October, 2019, for orders where the Group was responsible for delivery, the delivery charges were recognised on the completion of the order’s delivery.

In cases where the Group undertakes to run the business for an independent third party, income is recognised on completion of service in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Advertisement revenue
Advertisement revenue is derived principally from the sale of online advertisements which is usually run over a contracted period of time. The revenue from advertisements is thus recognised over this contract period as the performance obligation is met over the contract period. There are some contracts where in addition to the contract period, the Group assures certain ‘clicks’ (which are generated each time viewers on our platform click through the advertiser’s advertisement on the platform) to the advertisers. In these cases, the revenue is recognised when both the conditions of time period and number of clicks assured are met.

Subscription revenue
Revenues from subscription contracts are recognised over the subscription period on systematic basis in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with the customer.

Sign-up revenue
The Group receives a sign-up amount from its restaurant partners and delivery partners. These are recognised on receipt or over a period of time in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with such relevant partner.

Delivery facilitation services
The Group is merely a technology platform provider for delivery partners to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners / consumers and not providing or taking responsibility of the said services. For the service provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners.

Sale of traded goods
Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods to merchants upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods. Consideration includes goods contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

The amount of consideration disclosed as revenue is net of variable considerations like incentives or other items offered to the customers.

Incentives
The Group provides various types of incentives to transacting consumers to promote the transactions on our platform.

Since the Group identified the transacting consumers as one of our customers for delivery services when the Group is responsible for the delivery services, the incentives offered to transacting consumers are considered as payment to customers and recorded as reduction of revenue on a transaction by transaction basis. The amount of incentive in excess of the delivery fee collected from the transacting consumers is recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

When incentives are provided to transacting consumers where the Group is not responsible for delivery, the transacting consumers are not considered customers of the Group and such incentives are recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

Interest
Interest income is recognised using the effective interest method. Interest income is included under the head ‘other income’ in the consolidated statement of profit and loss.

NAZARA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
Revenue recognition
Revenue arises mainly from income from services, other operating income, other income and dividends.

To determine whether the Company should recognise revenues, the Company follows a 5-step process:
a.    identifying the contract, or contracts, with a customer,
b.    identifying the performance obligations in each contract,
c.    determining the transaction price,
d.    allocating the transaction price to the performance obligations in each contract,
e.    recognising revenue when, or as, we satisfy performance obligations by transferring the promised goods or services.

Revenue from operations
Revenue from subscription / download of games / other contents is recognised when a promise in a customer contract (performance obligation) has been satisfied, usually over the period of subscription. The amount of revenue to be recognised (transaction price) is based on the consideration expected to be received in exchange for services, net of credit notes, discounts, etc. If a contract contains more than one performance obligation, the transaction price is allocated to each performance obligation based on their relative standalone selling price.

Revenue from advertising services, including performance-based advertising, is recognised after the underlying performance obligations have been satisfied, usually in the period in which advertisements are displayed.

Revenue is reported on a gross or net basis based on management’s assessment of whether the Company is acting as a principal or agent in the transaction. The determination of whether the Company acts as a principal or an agent in a transaction is based on an evaluation of whether the good or service are controlled prior to transfer to the customer.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, considering contractually defined terms of payment, and excluding variable considerations such as volume or cash discounts and taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured, regardless of when the payment is being made.

A contract liability is an entity’s obligation to transfer goods or services to a customer for which the entity has received consideration (or the amount is due) from the customer and presented as ‘Deferred revenue’. Advance payments received from customers for which no services have been rendered are presented as ‘Advance from customers’.

Unbilled revenues are classified as a financial asset where the right to consideration is unconditional upon passage of time.

Other operating revenue
Other operating revenue mainly consists of Technology Platform / Digital Marketing / Administrative & Business Supporting / Recharge services to subsidiaries and is recognised in the period in which services are rendered.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, taking into account contractually defined terms of payment and excluding taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Other income
Interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (‘EIR’) method. EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or over a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of the financial liability. Interest income is included under the head ‘finance income’ in the statement of profit and loss account.

Dividends
Dividend income is recognised when the Company’s right to receive dividend is established by the reporting date. The right to receive dividend is generally established when shareholders approve the dividend.

PB FINTECH LTD. (POLICYBAZAR)
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer. The Company recognises revenue as follows:

Sale of services
The Company earns revenue from services as described below:
1) Online marketing and consulting services – includes bulk e-mailers, advertisement banners on its website and credit score advisory services;
2) Marketing support services – includes road-show services;
3) Commission on online aggregation or financial products – includes commission earned for sale of financial products based on the leads generated from its designated website;
4) IT Support Services – includes services related to IT applications and solutions.

Revenue from above services (other than IT Support Services) is recognised at a point in time when the related services are rendered as per the terms of the agreement with the customer. Revenue from IT Support Services is recognised over time. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Service Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled trade receivables as the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability, if any.

Revenue from above services is recognised in the accounting period in which the services are rendered. When there is uncertainty as to measurement or ultimate collectability, revenue recognition is postponed until such uncertainty is resolved.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) fees
Income from IPR fees is recognised on an accrual basis in accordance with the substance of the relevant agreements. [Refer Note 29.]

API HOLDINGS LIMITED (PHARMEASY)
Revenue Recognition
Sale of pharmaceutical and related products:
The Group derives revenue primarily from sale of pharmaceutical and related products and rendering of pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test-related services, commission from lab services and technology platform services. Revenue is recognised upon transfer of control of promised products or services to customers in an amount that reflects the consideration the Group expects to receive in exchange for those products or services. Amounts disclosed as revenue are net of trade allowances, rebates and Goods and Services Tax (GST), amounts collected on behalf of third parties and includes reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, with corresponding expenses included in cost of revenues.

Revenue from the rendering of services and sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised when the Group satisfies its performance obligations to its customers as below:

Revenue from sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised at the point in time when control of the asset is transferred to the customer, generally on delivery of the products. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue.

Revenue from rendering services
Revenue from pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test services, technology platform services and commission from lab services are recognised as and when services are rendered as per terms of agreement, i.e., at the point in time. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts.

VERANDAH LEARNING SOLUTIONS LTD.
Revenue Recognition
Operating revenue:
Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured. The Company derives its revenue from Edutech services (online and offline) by providing comprehensive learning programmes.

A. Online revenue:
Revenue from sale of online courses is recognised based on satisfaction of performance obligations as below:
i) Supply of books is recognised when control of the goods is transferred to the customer at an amount
that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for the goods or services.
ii) Supply of online content is recognised upfront upon access being provided for the uploaded content to the learners.
iii) Supply of hosting service is recognised over the period of license of access provided to the learners at an amount that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for such services.

B. Offline revenue:
Revenue from offline courses are recognised as revenue on a pro rata based on actual classes conducted by the educators. The Company does not assume any post-performance obligation after the completion of classes. Revenue received for classes to be conducted subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.

C. Revenue from delivery partner:
License fee is recognised at a point in time upon transfer of the license to customers.

Other operating revenue
Shipping revenue is recognised at the time of delivery to end customers. Shipping revenue received towards deliveries subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.