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OVERVIEW OF AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996: ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the volume and intensity of cross-border
investment, trade and commerce have become the key indicators for defining the
developmental growth index of a sovereign state. The Government of India has
implemented a myriad legislations and policies to attract investments and make
it easier to do business in India.

 

A key impediment of doing business in India has been the
difficulty of enforcing contracts and the time taken by courts and tribunals to
give determinations. An effective and efficient dispute resolution mechanism is
critical for instilling confidence in investors and to achieve the goals of a
growing economy.

 

Against this backdrop, the Government of India (GoI) after a
period of almost 20 years, in the year 2015 made much-needed amendments to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 1996 Act) to ensure that
arbitrations are quicker and smoother. The amendments were indeed
path-breaking, since some of the amended provisions went well beyond what the
law in even arbitration-friendly countries provided for. These included
disclosures of impartiality (adopting the International Bar Association’s
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, in the Act
itself) and providing for strict timelines within which an arbitration is to be
completed.

 

However, the GoI and the stakeholders in the arbitration
process felt that various provisions required clarifications or amendments. The
GoI, which has been closely watching the situation, was eager to provide
necessary support to the legislative framework for arbitrations in India.

 

A high-level committee under the chairmanship of Justice B.N.
Srikrishna, former judge of the Supreme Court of India, was constituted by the
Central Government to submit a report on how to achieve the goal of making
India an arbitration hub, to explore the lacunae in the effective
implementation of the 1996 Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment), 2015 (2015 Amendment) and also to provide a robust scheme of
legislation aligned with the letter and spirit of the UNCITRAL Model Law and
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention).

 

Based partly on the report of the high-level committee, the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) 2019 Bill (the Bill) was framed and
placed before both the Houses of Parliament for approval. Both Houses swiftly
approved the Bill and the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment Act) 2019
(2019 Amendment) was passed. The 2019 Amendment received Presidential assent on
9th August, 2019 and by a Gazette Notification dated 30th
August, 2019 bearing No. S.O. 3154(E) (Gazette Notification), certain
provisions, namely, section 1, section 4-9 (both inclusive), sections 11-13
(both inclusive) and sections 15 of the 2019 Amendment were brought into force.
Some of the other provisions are yet to be notified. The speed at which such
amendments were passed and came to be implemented makes GoI’s intention to
support arbitrations clear. But has the GoI been successful? Some of the
amendments have given rise to mystifying questions which will be explored in
this article.

 

KEY
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE 2019 AMENDMENT

 

Definition of arbitral institution

Section 1(ca) inserted by the 2019 Amendment provides for the
definition of arbitral institution’ to mean ‘arbitral
institutions designated by the Supreme Court / High Court under the Act’.

This would mean that the established arbitral institutions such as the
International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre (SIAC), the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA), etc., would have to necessarily be designated to fall within the scope
of the definition of arbitral institution under the amended 1996 Act. This
section has been notified under the Gazette Notification. However, it is
unclear how arbitral institutions of the world will be designated and what
criteria will be required to be met to be recognised under the 1996 Act.

 

Arbitral appointments u/s 11

Sub-section 3A, inserted by the 2019 Amendment, empowers the
Supreme Court and High Court to designate arbitral institutions graded by the
Arbitration Council of India (ACI) u/s 43-I to make arbitral appointments. It
further provides that in cases where the High Court concerned does not have any
graded arbitral institutions within its jurisdiction, the Chief Justice of such
High Court is empowered to maintain a panel of arbitrators to discharge the
functions within the meaning of ‘arbitral institution’ under the amended 1996
Act. The arbitrators shall be entitled to fees as prescribed under the Fourth
Schedule of the amended 1996 Act.

 

The 2019 Amendment provides an explanation to sub-section 14
of section 11 that the rates as per the Fourth Schedule shall not be applicable
in cases of international commercial arbitration and in arbitrations (other
than international commercial arbitration) where parties have agreed for
determination of fees as per the rules of the arbitral institution. It may be
inferred from this that parties can agree to determination of fees by an
arbitral institution which is designated by the Supreme Court / High Court.
However, what happens in cases where an arbitral institution is not designated
with the Supreme Court / High Court remains unanswered.

 

The amendment also states that such panel of arbitrators as
maintained by the High Court is subject to review by the Chief Justice of the
High Court concerned. Although it may seem that the intention behind the
amendment to section 11 is to popularise institutional arbitration in India,
however, the intervention and excessive supervision may hamper party autonomy.
These provisions have not been notified as yet. There are several
representations pending with the GoI to revisit these provisions.

 

TIMELINES

The 2015 Amendment introduced a timeline of 12 months from
the date an arbitrator entered reference to complete the arbitration. This was
extendable by six months by consent of the parties. Further extensions could be
granted only by the courts.

 

The 2019 Amendment now provides that an arbitral tribunal has
to render an award within 12 months from the date of completion of pleadings
u/s 23(4) in cases of domestic arbitrations. Section 23(4) has been introduced,
providing a timeline for filing of the pleadings as six months from the date of
the arbitrator/s receiving notice of appointment. It may be noted that this
provision does not take into account the timelines for filing counterclaims and
defence thereto, rejoinders and sur-rejoinders. This provision has been
notified under the Gazette Notification. There could be challenges in some
cases, especially since there are times when parties seek additional time to
permit settlement talks, even once an arbitrator is appointed. The 12-month
timeline does not apply to international commercial arbitration. It is not
clear why international commercial arbitrations have been excluded from such
timelines and such distinction between domestic and international arbitrations
seems artificial. It is unlikely that foreign parties choosing arbitration in
India would appreciate this, since they would also desire that the arbitration
is concluded within the timeframe.

 

The Delhi High Court in its recent judgment in the matter of Shapoorji
Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Jindal India Thermal Power Limited
1
 has clarified that the new
timelines set out in the 2019 Amendment would be applicable not only to
arbitration proceedings which have commenced after the 2019 Amendment, but also
to arbitration proceedings which are pending as on the date of enactment of the
2019 Amendment. This will add to additional uncertainty, since there may be
pending arbitrations in which pleadings have not been filed within six months.

 

Amendment to section 34

The amendment to section 34 provides that the challenge to an
arbitral award could be established only on the basis of the record of the
Arbitral Tribunal.

 

The amendment was a welcome step to ensure speedy disposal of
challenges by losing parties, wherein the parties seek to produce new /
additional documents and lead evidence before the courts at the stage of
challenge to an award, thus fundamentally trying to re-open the arbitral
dispute itself. However, in September, 2019 the Supreme Court in Canara
Nidhi Limited vs. M. Shashikala
2  clarified the legal position that a challenge
u/s 34 ‘will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was
before the arbitrator and that cross-examination of persons swearing into the
affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary.
’ It will be
interesting to see how this judgment is used further as it provides for an open
field for the practitioners to adduce additional evidences, by proving that
their case falls within the exceptional circumstances contemplated under the Canara
judgment.

 

CONFIDENTIALITY

The issue of confidentiality pertaining to arbitral
proceedings has been debated extensively in international arbitrations. The
1996 Act did provide for confidentiality to be maintained in cases of
conciliation, but not in arbitration. In international arbitrations, the
parties have the option to apply the confidentiality provisions under the
International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines and Rules; however, the IBA
Rules and Guidelines can only act as a soft law. The insertion of section 42A
provides the disclosure of the arbitral award to be made only where it is
necessary for implementing or enforcing the award. It is a welcome move to
provide statutory backing to the concept of confidentiality in arbitral
proceedings and ensuring that the stand taken by the Indian legislation is akin
to the international best practices. However, the interplay between the ACI’s
power to keep a depository of arbitral awards and confidentiality provisions is
something to be seen in future.

 

Protection afforded to an arbitrator for action taken in
good faith

Under the newly-inserted section 42B of the 2019 Amendment,
immunity is now provided to the arbitrators against liabilities for acts
performed in their capacity as arbitrators, so long as they are in good faith.
This section should act as an incentive for more people to act as arbitrators.

 

Arbitration Council of India

The 2019 Amendment sought to insert an altogether new Part
‘1A’ to the 1996 Act for the establishment and incorporation of an independent
body corporate, namely, the Arbitration Council of India (ACI) for the purposes
of grading of arbitral institutions as per the qualifications and norms
contained in the Eighth Schedule (as inserted vide the 2019 Amendment) which
includes criteria relating to the infrastructure, quality and calibre of
arbitrators, performance and compliance of time limits for disposal of domestic
or international commercial arbitrations, etc., formulating policies and training
modules to adept professionals in the field of arbitration and ADR mechanisms.

 

Section 43C(1) provides that the ACI shall be composed of a
retired Supreme Court or High Court judge, appointed by the Central Government
in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, as its Chairperson; an eminent
arbitration practitioner nominated as the Central Government Member; an eminent
academician having research and teaching experience in the field of
arbitration, appointed by the Central Government in consultation with the
Chairperson, as the Chairperson-Member; Secretary to the Central Government in
the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice and Secretary to
the Central Government in the Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance,
both as ex-officio members; one representative of a recognised body of
commerce and industry, chosen on rotational basis by the Central Government, as
a part-time member; and Chief Executive Officer-Member-Secretary,
ex-officio.

 

The Ministry of Law and Justice has, in its press release
dated 12th February, 2020, enlisted the draft rules prepared to set
in motion the proposal of the ACI and has invited comments from various
stakeholders on the following:

 

(1)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Salary, Allowances and other Terms and
Conditions of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2020;

(2)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Travelling and other Allowances payable to
Part-time Member) Rules, 2020;

(3)   The
Arbitration Council of India (the Qualifications, Appointment and other Terms
and Conditions of the service of the Chief Executive Officer) Rules, 2020;

(4)  The
Arbitration Council of India (the Number of Officers and Employees of the
Secretariat of the Council and the Qualifications, Appointment and other Terms
and Conditions of the officers and employees of the Council) Rules, 2020.

 

This provision has received vastly
differing views from the arbitration fraternity. On the one hand, it is said to
enhance the use of institutional arbitration over ad hoc, as well as an
attempt to ensure that there is some quality control over institutions and
arbitrators. On the other hand, stakeholders have taken the view that being
accredited by government officials amounts to regulation and excessive control
of arbitrators. This is all the more significant, given that the government is
one of the largest litigants in India. The provisions relating to the ACI have
not been notified yet.

 

The Eighth Schedule

One of the biggest benefits for
parties opting for arbitration rather than a court process to dispute
resolution is the right to nominate an arbitrator of their choice. This gives
flexibility in the process and often parties can nominate domain experts to
determine a particular matter, rather than someone who may be a qualified
lawyer or a retired judge but who may not be as well versed in the subject
matter of the dispute. The 2019 Amendment has introduced an Eighth Schedule
setting out the eligibility requirements for the accreditation and
qualification of an individual as an arbitrator. These provisions have not been
notified as yet.

 

RESTRICTING FOREIGN LAWYERS?

While such accreditation and
qualification of individuals acting as arbitrators may, at first glance, seem
attractive as a measure for quality control, some of the eligibility criteria
are highly restrictive and will infringe on a party’s right to appoint an
arbitrator of its choice, keeping in mind the nature of the dispute.

 

Some qualifications under the Eighth
Schedule require an arbitrator to, inter alia, have knowledge of the
laws in India such as the Constitution of India and the labour laws. Such
knowledge may not have any connection with a dispute at hand, such as, say,
whilst determining a matter relating to a contractual dispute governed entirely
by foreign law.

 

The Eighth Schedule also speaks of
appointment of advocates having ten or more years’ experience and being
registered under the Advocates Act in India. This throws open the question
whether this would potentially restrict foreign lawyers from acting as
arbitrators in India. This may prove to be an issue in a contract in disputes
having smaller value. A lawyer of ten or more years’ experience may charge an
amount that is a substantial portion or even more than the amount in dispute.
Besides, the ban on foreign qualified lawyers acting as arbitrators would be
contrary to the ethos of international arbitration and could discourage foreign
parties from seating their arbitrations in India since they would be prevented
from appointing an arbitrator of their choice. This may be more significant if the arbitration itself is
governed by foreign law (although seated in India).

 

Of the changes and standards
introduced under the 2019 Amendment, the Eighth Schedule by far contains the
most restrictive provisions which might take a toll on the promotion of
arbitrations in India. In the interest of promoting India as a hub for
arbitration, it is hoped that the government will reconsider this amendment
and, inter alia, allow foreign lawyers to act as arbitrators.

Insertion of section 87

When
the 2015 Amendment came into force, there was a huge debate as to whether the
amendments would apply retrospectively or prospectively. This was ultimately
settled by the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs.
Kochi Cricket Private Limited and Ors
3. Interestingly, the
GoI had filed an affidavit in the matter stating that its intention was to have
the 2015 Amendment apply only to arbitrations invoked after the 2015 Amendment
came into force. However, in the judgment, despite the position of the GoI stated
on affidavit, on an interpretation of a plain reading of the language used in
the 2015 Amendment it was ultimately held, inter alia, that the 2015
Amendment applied to applications which were pending in various courts
challenging an award in an arbitral proceeding which commenced before the
enactment of the 2015 Amendment. The judgment also went on to analyse and hold
exactly which section of the amendment would apply to ongoing arbitrations and
proceedings arising therefrom and which amendments would apply to arbitrations
invoked after the 2015 Amendment came into force.

 

The 2019 Amendment attempted to undo
the position held in the above judgment. The 2019 Amendment provides that,
unless otherwise agreed by parties, it shall not apply to:

(a)   the
arbitral proceedings commenced prior to the 2015 Amendment;

(b) the
Court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings
irrespective of whether such court proceedings have commenced prior to or after
the commencement of the 2015 Amendment.

 

MAKING INDIA AN ARBITRATION HUB?

It was further clarified that the
2015 Amendment shall only apply to arbitral proceedings that have commenced on
or after the introduction of the 2015 Amendment and to court proceedings
arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings.

 

However, in the matter of Hindustan
Construction Company Limited & Anr vs. Union of India
4
the Supreme Court has now held that section 87 of the 2019 Amendment is
manifestly arbitrary and unconstitutional. This judgment goes on to clarify
that the 2015 Amendment, in its original form, shall be applicable as held in
the Board of Control for Cricket in India matter.

Observing the latest arbitration
trends in India, there is not an iota of doubt that the GoI is leaving no stone
unturned to try to make India an arbitration hub. However, the continuous
change in the position of the arbitration law has left many questions
unanswered. Some well-intentioned amendments also have underlying issues that
need to be revisited.

It
is also noteworthy that the Constitutional validity of the 2019 Amendments is
under challenge before the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 76 of 2020
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The main challenge is to the
provisions relating to the qualification required to be an arbitrator and the
mandatory requirement for the Arbitral Institutions to register themselves
before the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India. This petition is subjudice
before the Supreme Court. It would be interesting to follow the developments in this matter as they might
lead to defining the arbitration regime in India.

 

The 2019 Amendment, however well intentioned,
clearly has some challenges. We will have to wait and see whether these issues
are addressed by the GoI or interpreted by the Supreme Court so that there is
clarity on them.


__________________________________________

1   OMP (Misc) (Comm) 512/2019

2   2019 SCC OnLine SC 1244

3   (2018) 6 SCC 287

4   Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1074 of 2019

Business expenditure – Obsolescence allowance – Sections 36 and 145A of ITA, 1961 – Assessee following particular accounting policy from year to year consistent with provisions of section 145A – Concurrent finding of fact by appellate authorities that stock had been rendered obsolete – Loss allowable

1. CIT vs. Gigabyte
Technology (India) Ltd.

[2020] 421 ITR 21 (Bom.)

Date of order: 7th
January, 2020

 

Business expenditure –
Obsolescence allowance – Sections 36 and 145A of ITA, 1961 – Assessee following
particular accounting policy from year to year consistent with provisions of
section 145A – Concurrent finding of fact by appellate authorities that stock
had been rendered obsolete – Loss allowable

 

In its return, the assessee
claimed losses towards stock obsolescence in respect of laptops and
motherboards. The A.O. held that the laptops and the motherboards which had a
long shelf life could not be considered to have become obsolete and disallowed
the losses in his order passed u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal held that the obsolete
stock which was not disposed of or sold was allowable as expenditure and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Department.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    There were concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal that the laptops and
motherboards had been rendered obsolete. There were findings of fact in respect
of the assessee consistently following a particular accounting policy from year
to year, which was consistent with the provisions of section 145A.

 

ii)    The Tribunal was right in holding that the obsolete stock which
was not disposed of or sold was allowable as expenditure.’

REMUNERATION BY A FIRM TO PARTNERS: SECTION 194J ATTRACTED?

From the remuneration payable by a
firm to its partners in pursuance of section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(‘the Act’), the firm does not deduct any tax at source (hereinafter also
referred to as ‘TDS’) under any provision of the Act. This position has been
undisputedly settled and accepted by the Income-tax Department for over 25
years since the new scheme of taxation of firms and partners was brought on the
statute book by the Finance Act, 1992 from the assessment year 1993-94.

But in a recent case I came across an
overzealous officer of the Income-tax Department adopting the stand that a firm
is liable to effect TDS u/s 194J of the Act @ 10% from the remuneration payable
to its partners as, in their view, the services rendered by the partners to the
firm are in the nature of ‘managerial services’ which fall within the scope of
the term ‘technical services’ employed in section 194J. Apart from a huge demand
of tax u/s 201(1), a substantial amount of interest u/s 201(1A) is also being
charged. This is playing havoc with the taxpayers, especially when the partners
have already paid tax on their remuneration in their respective individual
returns and the credit for such tax paid allowable under the first proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 201 is being denied on procedural technicalities.

Therefore, before proceeding further,
it is fervently pleaded that to alleviate the hardships faced by the taxpayers
and to avoid unnecessary litigation, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (‘CBDT’)
needs to urgently issue a circular clarifying the position on this subject, to
be followed (if necessary) by an appropriate legislative amendment in section
194J expressly excluding such remuneration from the purview of section 194J.

 

CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Principally, it is submitted that the
remuneration payable by a firm to its partners cannot be subjected to TDS u/s
194J. In this regard the following propositions are submitted:

(1)  Firstly,
the legislative intent has always been clear beyond doubt that under the new
scheme of taxation of firms and partners, interest and remuneration payable by
a firm to its partners are not liable to TDS since by nature, character and
quality any such payment by a firm to its partners is nothing but a share in
the profits of the firm, though called interest or remuneration and though
deductible u/s 40(b). This legislative intent is manifestly evident from the
following:

 

ACCEPTED FOR OVER 25 YEARS

(a)  When
the new scheme of taxation of firms and partners was introduced by the Finance
Act, 1992 with effect from A.Y. 1993-94, section 194DD1 was also
proposed to be inserted in the Act which provided for TDS2 both from
interest and remuneration payable by a firm to its partners. But section 194DD
was dropped during the process of the Finance Bill, 1992 becoming an Act,
because the legislature was conscious that, conceptually, under the new scheme
of taxation of firms and partners, both interest and remuneration payable by a
firm to its partners are only a mode of transferring profits from the firm to
the partners for tax. This is fortified from the statutory provision that the
remuneration (as well as interest) received by a partner from the firm is treated
as business income in the individual hands of the partner u/s 28(v)3
of the Act4;

(b)  Explanation
2 below section 15 unambiguously provides that any salary, bonus, commission or
remuneration, by whatever name called, due to, or received by, a partner from
the firm shall not be regarded as ‘salary’. Consequently, provisions of section
192 relating to TDS from salaries are not attracted. This is statutory
recognition of the principle that there cannot be an employer-employee
relationship between a firm and its partners and as such no tax is required to
be deducted from such remuneration u/s 192;

(c)  Section
194A(3)(iv), likewise, expressly provides that no tax is to be deducted at
source from the interest payable by a firm to its partners;

(d) As
a matter of fact, any firm deducting tax at source under any provision of the
Act, including section 194J, from the remuneration payable to its partners is
unheard of in India and this position has been undisputedly, ungrudgingly and
eminently accepted by the Income-tax Department for over 25 years since the new
scheme of taxation of firms and partners came on the statute book;

(e)  Section 194J was introduced in the Act by the
Finance Act, 1995 with effect from 1st July, 1995 for TDS from fees
for professional services5  and fees for technical services6.
Later, by the Finance Act, 2012 a new category was added by inserting clause
(ba) in sub-section (1) of section 194J with effect from 1st July,
2012 which mandates TDS from ‘any remuneration or fees or commission, by
whatever name called, other than those on which tax is deductible u/s 192, to a
director of a company’. Thus, whenever the legislature intended that tax should
be deducted u/s 194J from the remuneration payable, it has expressly provided
for it in so many words as is the case with clause (ba) above applicable to
remuneration payable by a company to its directors. But no such specific clause
is inserted with regard to the remuneration payable by a firm to its partners;

while inserting clause (ba), the Memorandum explaining the provisions in the
Finance Bill, 2012 ([2012] 342 ITR [St] 234, 241) visibly
acknowledges that there is no specific provision for deduction of tax on the
remuneration paid to a director which is not in the nature of salary.
Furthermore, it is also judicially held7  that prior to insertion of the above referred
clause (ba) with effect from 1st July, 2012, no tax was deductible
u/s 194J from the commission / remuneration payable by a company to its
directors. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of any such specific
clause in section 194J postulating TDS from the remuneration payable by a firm
to its partners, the legislative intent is loud and clear – that no tax is
deductible u/s 194J by a firm from such remuneration.

 

A FIRM HAS NO LEGAL EXISTENCE

(2)  A
firm and its partners are treated as separate assessable entities for the
limited purpose of assessment under the Act, but, in law, as is settled
judicially for ages, a firm has no legal existence of its own, separate and
distinct from the partners constituting it, and the firm name is only a
compendious mode of describing the partners constituting the partnership. As
such, a person cannot render services to himself and there cannot be a contract
of service between a firm and its partners. Therefore, a firm cannot be
expected or made liable to deduct tax at source u/s 194J from such remuneration.


In CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram
Pillai [1977] 106 ITR 292 (SC)
the Apex Court observed that a firm is
not a legal person even though it has some attributes of a personality; and
that in income-tax law a firm is a unit of assessment by special provisions,
but not a full person.

The Supreme Court then unequivocally
held that since a contract of employment requires two distinct persons, viz.,
the employer and the employee, there cannot be a contract of service, in
strict law, between a firm and its partners
8.

 

SHARE OF PROFITS OF THE FIRM

(3)  A
partner works for the firm since he is duty-bound to do so under the deed of
partnership as well as in terms of the provisions of the Indian Partnership
Act, 19329  and therefore
there is no relationship of service provider or consultant and client between
the partners and the firm.

(4)  Under
the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 since there is a relationship of ‘mutual
agency’ among the partners, there cannot be a relationship between a firm and
its partners which could give rise to a liability to deduct tax at source u/s
194J.

(5)  Conceptually,
whatever may be the amount received by a partner from the firm, whether called
salary or remuneration, it is not expenditure of the firm (though allowed as
such u/s 40[b]), nor in the nature of compensation for services in the hands of
the partner, but it is in the nature of a share of profits from the firm as is
settled judicially, including by the Supreme Court. In CIT vs. R.M.
Chidambaram Pillai (Supra)
it was categorically held that payment of
salary to a partner represents a special share of the profits of the
firm and salary paid to a partner retains the same character of the
income of
the firm.

(6)  Even
under the statutory provisions embodied in section 28(v) of the Act, both
interest and remuneration received by a partner from the firm are expressly
assessed as business income in the hands of the partner and as such interest
and remuneration both are statutorily recognised as in the nature of a share of
profits from the firm10.

 

RULE OF CONSISTENCY

(7)  Since
generally the remuneration payable to the partners is a percentage of the
profits of the firm determined at the end of the year, which keeps on varying with
the amount of profits and is not reckoned with with reference to the quantity
and quality of services rendered by the partners to the firm, the same is a
mode of transferring a share of the profits of the firm to the partners and not
a compensation for the services rendered by the partners to the firm, and hence
the question of invoking section 194J does not arise.

(8)  Inasmuch
as the position that no tax is required to be deducted by a firm from the
remuneration payable to its partners is undisputedly and consistently accepted
by the Income-tax Department for over a quarter of a century now, even the rule
of consistency11 obligates
that this position should not be disturbed by the Income-tax Department at this
stage.

(9) It
can also be contended that by nature the services rendered, if any, by a
partner to the firm do not fall within the connotation of either ‘professional
services’ or ‘technical services’ as defined and understood for the purposes of
section 194J.

(10) No tax is levied under the laws
relating to Goods and Services Tax (‘GST’) on the remuneration received by a
partner from the firm. Thus, the remuneration received by a partner from the
firm is not treated as consideration for the supply of services to the firm but
as a share of profits even under the GST laws.

One arm of the Union Government (the
Income-tax Department) cannot adopt a stand conflicting with the view accepted
by another arm of the same Union Government (GST Department). In Moouat
vs. Betts Motors Ltd. 1958 (3) All E R 402 (CA)
it was held that two
departments of the government cannot, in law, adopt contrary or inconsistent
stands, or raise inconsistent contentions, or act at cross purposes. Lord
Denning in this case succinctly summed up the principle in his inimitable
style: ‘The right hand of the government cannot pretend to be unaware of what
the left hand is doing.’ To the same effect was the Supreme Court decision in M.G.
Abrol, Addl. Collector of Customs vs. M/s Shantilal Chhotelal & Co. AIR
1966 SC 197
, holding, to the effect, that the customs authorities12
cannot, in law, take a stand or adopt a view which is contrary to that taken by
the licensing authority under the Export (Control) Order, 195413.
This principle of law has been consistently applied for income-tax purposes as
well in a variety of contexts under the Act14.

In view of the foregoing discussion,
it is submitted that the remuneration payable by a firm to its partners cannot
suffer TDS u/s 194J of the Act.  

__________________________________________________________________

1   Clause 74 of the Finance Bill, 1992: [1992]
194 ITR (St) 68-69

2   At the average rate of income-tax computed on the basis of the
rates in force for the financial year concerned

3   Read with section 2(24)(ve)

4      See
also CBDT Circular No. 636 dated 31st August, 1992: [1992] 198
ITR (St) 1, 42-43

5   Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 194J

6   Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 194J

7      See, among others, Dy. CIT vs. ITC
Ltd. [2015] 154 ITD 136 (Kol.)
and Dy. CIT vs. Kirloskar Oil
Engines Ltd. [2016] 158 ITD 309 (Pune).
See also Bharat Forge
Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [2013] 144 ITD 455 (Pune)
(pre-2012 period) (sitting
fees to directors not ‘fees for professional services’ u/s 194J)

8   While reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court referred to, among others, Dulichand Laxminarayan vs. CIT [1956] 29
ITR 535 (SC); CIT vs. Ramniklal Kothari [1969] 74 ITR 57 (SC);
and
Addanki Narayanappa vs. Bhaskara Krishnappa AIR 1966 SC 1300

9      See sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 12
along with sub-section (a) of section 13 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932

10  See also CBDT Circular No. 636 dated 31st
August, 1992: [1992] 198 ITR (St) 1, 42-43

11     The rule of consistency is settled by
countless judicial precedents. See, for example, Radhasoami Satsang vs.
CIT [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC); Berger Paints India Ltd. vs. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 99
(SC); Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI [2006] 282 ITR 273 (SC); CIT vs. Neo
Poly Pack (P) Ltd. [2000] 245 ITR 492 (Del.); CIT vs. Leader Valves Ltd. [2007]
295 ITR 273 (P & H); CIT vs. Darius Pandole [2011] 330 ITR 485 (Bom.)
;
and Pr. CIT vs. Quest Investment Advisors Pvt. Ltd. [2018] 409 ITR 545
(Bom.)

12  Under the Sea Customs Act, 1878

13  Issued under the Import and Export (Control)
Act, 1947

14  See, for instance, Mobile
Communication (India) P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2010] 33 DTR (Del) (Trib) 398, 416

VIRUS AND US

There are
decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen
– Lenin

When I
called people in Italy, UK, Australia and America, they had three words to say:
‘It’s not good’. The news has been about infections, deaths and recoveries. An
invisible sub-microscopic agent stops the mighty and haughty China and America
and halts the unstoppable global industrial machine. The evolved and progressed
homo sapiens finds himself under house arrest.

The
pollution in Mumbai in the first seven days (since the lockdown) is down by 40%
(AQI PM 2.5 levels from 118 to 70). Clear skies, fresh air, zero noise. As I
write this, I can hear the Tibetan chimes playing in the breeze outside my
balcony. A Dutch client wrote that nature has put humans on notice. Earth,
which was on ventilator, seems to be breathing again, taking a break from human
disregard, entitlement and greed. On the other side there is pain and loss – of
lives and livelihoods, of wealth and income, and displacement and disarray.

The wise
must have had a thought as to why this is happening to us. The word virus
phonetically sounds like why us. What is all this telling us
individually and collectively? What is happening? Here are some immediate
reflections:

One focus: The distorted and fragmented humanity – in thought and action – was
never so cohesive in focusing on a single agenda. If one took the ‘point of
focus’ out and just became aware of the ‘focus’ itself, it is astounding.
Imagine working with such focus together on an issue like climate change that
affects every single person. (About 12.4 lakh people die in India and 16 lakhs in
China each year due to pollution). But can we? The past has shown that we are
just as likely to carry on as before. Someone wrote that perhaps the virus will
save as many or more lives of people dying from pollution and road accidents as
it takes away.

Leveller: Royalty to movie stars, all fell prey to the virus. The virus doesn’t
differentiate between rich and poor, known and unknown. Humanity as a whole
never seemed so vulnerable, overpowered and scuffling to keep its mortality
away. Each one, despite every manmade division, feels equally susceptible.

Decision,
action and speed:
Economic leverage seemed less critical,
whereas action and speed are the real levers! Those who acted faster fought
better, those who were casual are trapped. The decisions India took wisely put
life over economy, survival over everything else. The PM pleaded with gentle
persuasiveness, with folded hands, to stay indoors. The administration brought
out extensions in compliance deadlines with speed and sensibility. Food, cash
and waivers for the marginalised came out with care and clarity. The central
banker was emphatic and reassuring and put money in the hands of the banks to
lend. Governance, the health care system and social capital are at their
ultimate acid test.

Illusions: Albert Einstein said that Reality is merely an illusion, albeit
a very persistent one
. Many illusions we loved and lived with are busted.
Someone wrote: Coronavirus has proved that most corporate jobs are just
exchanges of emails, texts and calls and nothing else.
Everything – from
‘values’ and ‘ways’ – will be subjected to deep inquiry. Many narratives could
stand on their heads. The hypothetical is now the reality. Washing hands, which
was difficult to enforce even in hospitals, is more important than shaking
hands. Social distancing is more important than bridging distances.
Mathematically put, namaskar > hugs, and social capital >
capital market valuations. Eighteen million people have viewed the TED talk by
Bill Gates on a pathogen attack, in October 2019 John Hopkins Centre for Health
Security gamed a germ war, America ranked at the top in Global Health Security
Index and today it has highest infections. Context changes everything,
including ‘reality’!

The next few
months, the end game and aftermath will be long and difficult. It won’t be a
balance that we can write off with a journal entry.

I will leave
you to complete the reflective thoughts of Anand Mahindra in your own words:
‘After the pandemic, we will …….’

Meanwhile, may you remain free from affliction

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

TRUTH AND TAX PRACTICE

What is the connection between
truth and tax practice? There are two answers to this question.

Truth is a matter of philosophy.
Its right place is in temples and books. It has no place in tax practice. (1.1)

Truth is applicable to every
human being. Taxpayers, tax practitioners and tax officers are all human
beings. They should also understand and practice truth. (1.2)

Does this mean that there are
two answers to one question? Hence truth depends upon one’s belief?

No. There is only one answer.
But people have different beliefs. And it is no use entering into arguments
with people holding contrary beliefs. People who have similar beliefs and want
to understand the deeper meanings of philosophical concepts, can discuss and
learn together.

Query: Is there any
difference between ‘Truth in Substance’ and ‘Truth in Form’?

Answer: The question
itself is baseless The form must always
represent substance. If form does not represent substance, that form has to be
discarded like a dead body without an Atma.

The entire litigation about ‘Form vs. Substance’ has been possible
because certain people believe in the answer 1.1 and not in the answer 1.2 as
mentioned above. If all the taxpayers, tax consultants and tax officers
practised answer 1.2, then 95% of tax litigation would not take place. There
may be genuine differences of opinion between two honest individuals. For them,
the courts would act as arbiters to decide which opinion is correct. This may
form 5% of litigation today.

The
entire debate about ‘BEPS’, anti-avoidance provisions and digital taxation
would not be necessary. SAAR, GAAR and harsh penalty provisions would be
unnecessary. Just imagine – how many intelligent brains are being wasted today
on obviously useless issues!
(The issues are useless from the point of view of society as a whole.)

Issue: Such a belief is Utopian.
It exists only in the minds of dreamers. People will act greedily. They will
avoid and evade taxes. Only the fear of harsh punishment keeps them
disciplined. Society will always need laws and regulations with harsh
punishment provisions.

Responses: Greed is as
prevalent as gravity
. People will act greedily. Greed applies to taxpayers,
tax advisers, tax officers and law-makers – politicians, equally. Law
makers’ and regulators
’ greed, corruption and ego get boosted with harsh
laws. We have experienced that society cannot throw out the corrupt politicians
even in elections. Harsh laws and punishment have, in reality, failed. Society
becoming spiritual is the only solution. A spiritual person will not abuse law,
will not avoid / evade taxes; nor will he take bribes. Today, a majority of the
global society is not spiritual. The BEPS project is proof. As the late Shri
Nani Palkhiwala said: Society will choose the right solution only after it
experiences failure of all available wrong solutions.

A comment from Maharshi Ved Vyas
in the Mahabharata on ‘Substance vs. Form’: Bhishma Pitamaha did not protect
Draupadi from her extreme humiliation at the time of her Vastra Haran.
He even said, ‘Dharma’s secret is complex Then Draupadi told the Sabha:

                                             

Where there are no wise old
men, it is not a conference. Those who do not support Dharma are not wise old
men. That which is not based on Truth is not Dharma. That which is obtained by
twisted interpretations is not Truth.

When to tell the truth and when
to maintain silence? This shloka provides the answer:

Speak pleasant truth. Do not tell a lie. Do not
tell an unpleasant truth. Never tell untruth even if it is pleasant. This is
Sanatan / Eternal dharma. However, this restriction does not apply to
‘Activists’. They have to tell unpleasant truths to the authorities and others.
Activists are doing a different kind of Karmayog.

TRANSITION TO CASH FLOW-BASED FUNDING

HISTORY

The Indian
banking industry is centuries old. A peep into its recent past is replete with
milestone events of change. Notable among them, starting with social control
over banks, have been nationalisation of commercial banks; identification of
priority sector for lending; an annual credit plan; diversification of
institutions and setting up of the Exim Bank to focus on export financing;
regional rural banks to introduce the hybrid of commercial bank strength with
local government participation; the creation of local area banks; micro-finance
companies; and so on. Clearly, banks have been an important tool to facilitate
the development of the Indian economy for decades. Foreign direct investment
norms in the banking sector were relaxed and the cap raised to 74%. The
financial needs of the rapidly-growing economy were catered to by government
banks, private banks and foreign banks, with a major share taken by government
banks. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued guidelines for banks and ensured
compliance of BASEL-I norms in a phased manner between 1991 and 1999.

 

The growing economy needed more
finance and advanced banking. The ever-increasing need for strengthening of the
banking sector was further underlined as Lehman Brothers collapsed in the
Sub Prime Crisis
(it filed for bankruptcy in 2008 – the largest in US
history). Around that time, commercial banks in India were in the process of
implementing BASEL-II norms which were completed by March, 2009. With the
advent of Information Technology, the retail industry boom and modernisation of
communication and data transfer, there have been rapid changes in the way
people and corporates do banking. The most recent development in the banking
business was in 2016 when RBI approved ten entities to set up small finance
banks.

 

Reserve Bank of India is the
regulatory body of Indian banking. With the adoption of BASEL norms, the
functioning of Indian banks is more standardised and in line with international
practices.

 

PRESENT SCENARIO

There have been various business strategies
in corporate lending followed by bankers. Banks with large balance sheets have
shown an appetite for taking large exposures and have been also daring to play
long term. On the other hand, Non-Banking Financial Corporations (NBFCs) have
exercised quick entry and timely exit compromising on collateral covers but
snatching from banks the opportunity of making good profit margins. Whatever
the form of these loans, all of these are asset-backed financing models.

 

By and large, all public sector
banks in India are disbursing loans (long–term, short-term loans, working
capital loans / cash credits) on the basis of assets as security. For term
loans, the primary security are assets like property, plant, equipment (fixed
assets) owned by the company. For short-term loans and working capital loans,
normally stock and debtors (current assets) are the primary security. The
liquidation value of an asset is the primary focus and projected cash flows are
the secondary focus. Cash flows are part of project proposals; however, such
inflows are not linked directly to loan eligibility or repayment / servicing
frequency and mode. This involves a lot of documentation and mortgage of the
asset in the name of the banker till the loan remains outstanding.

 

Post-disbursal, borrowers submit
periodic performance reports and provisional financials to the bankers as per
agreed terms. This information is not real-time information and in many cases
there are delays in submission of these documents. Banks lack the advanced
analytical tools and bandwidth to assess these reports regularly on a real-time
basis. Non-performance of an asset, i.e., borrower account, gets noticed quite
late when risk exposure is already very high. Increase in non-performing assets
is worrisome not only for the banker but for the economy at large as public
funds are at stake.

 

One may find that the practice of
asset-based lending has not helped us in timely identification of likely
non-performing credit and immediate reconstruction to put them back on track. A
question therefore arises whether it is time to go for alternate methods of
credit appraisal and adopt international best practices in banking in general
and lending in particular.

 

PROPOSED CHANGE

Assets don’t help companies to
repay loans. Often, the disposal of assets, primarily immovable property, poses
great difficulty in selling. It’s their cash flow that makes a difference. The
need for mitigation of risk is inherent to the banking business – new
technologies, policies and strategies are adopted from time to time for this.
Under the new mechanism, banks would be able to prioritise their fund
deployment programme. The public sector major, State Bank of India (SBI), has
announced that it will shift to the cash flow-based lending model beginning April,
2020. Other PSUs will not lag behind in following suit; some banks are already
doing it for a portion of their products.

 

Banks in India have traditionally
lent to companies against their assets. Cash flow-based lending is widely
considered to be a more efficient and safe way of mitigating risk as it reduces
discretion on the part of the lender. The new framework for loan sanctions will
apply to large companies as well as small enterprises.

 

THE MECHANISM

Cash flow-based lending (CFL)
envisages a shift in the bank’s appraisal system from traditional balance
sheet-based funding to a more objective appraisal system of leveraging the cash
flows of the unit. In CFL, loan requirement is based on actual revenue
generation and capacity to repay. Further, the repayment schedule is based on
the timing of the entity’s cash inflows. Company’s cash conversion cycle is
calculated. Based on cash conversion cycle, the ability of the borrower to pay
back the loan is calculated. With better negotiated terms with vendors / creditors,
the cash conversion cycle will shrink; and with increase in credit period to
the customer, the cash conversion cycle will be longer. While 25% of the
working capital gap (the difference between assessed gross working capital
assets minus gross working capital liabilities) is met by the company, banks
fund the remainder. Most of the working capital finance is in the form of cash
credit, a system where companies freely draw (and service interest) within a
certain limit or drawing power fixed by the lender. Drawing power is arrived at
on the basis of inventory volume minus margin therein. Cash flow lending, then,
is essentially lending to repeated asset conversion cycles and payback is
dependent on the firm’s ability to generate (and retain in the business)
sufficient cash over a number of years of profitable operations to make
required interest and principal payments on the loan. The loan amount as well
as mode of repayment is adjusted with cash inflows based on the cash conversion
cycle. Documented cash flows and the credit rating of the borrower will play an
important role.

 

A system of determining monthly /
quarterly utilisation limits for credit drawings can be fixed. Actual drawings
should be confined to determine limits. Deviations are not allowed and, when
allowed, they are always with approval from higher levels. The quarterly
monitoring system should ensure no diversion of bank credit for purposes other
than the sanctioned purpose.

 

NATURE
OF CHANGE IN BASIS OF LENDING

India’s government-owned banks
are likely to change the way they lend. Since the 1970s, public sector banks
have given out most working capital loans and short-term loans required for the
day-to-day operations of a business. Public sector banks have a more than 55%
share of the loan market. These loans were disbursed on the basis of the net
current assets of corporate borrowers. This is considered as a flawed system
that is believed to have resulted in over-funding to some and under-funding to
others. A system which does not focus on entity cash inflows as the primary
basis of loan availment and mode of repayment, often results in delayed
repayments, thus adversely affecting the NPA ratio. The outdated practice may
soon change with the country’s largest lender State Bank of India proposing a
transition from an ‘asset-based lending’ model to ‘cash flow-based lending’, a
mechanism that, among other things, may reduce diversion of funds by borrowers
and enable banks to assess the ability of borrowers to service loans on time.
The shift will require borrowing entities to share their cash flow statements
more frequently with banks.

 

NATURE OF LOAN PORTFOLIOS

Except for
some seasonal industries such as sugar, public sector banks arrive at a
company’s working capital requirements by considering the difference between
the borrower’s current assets (receivables, raw material stock, finished goods)
and current liabilities (payables like loan interest, taxes, payment to vendors
and workers). While 25% of the working capital gap (the difference between
assessed gross working capital assets minus gross working capital liabilities)
is met by the company, banks fund the remainder, although in many cases they
end up funding more. Most of the working capital finance is in the form of cash
credit, a system where companies freely draw (and service interest) within a
certain limit or drawing power fixed by the lender. Such asset-based lending
ignores the manipulation of the actual value of the assets pledged.

In a country like India a major
portion of the short-term loan portfolios of PSU banks consists of Cash Credit
(CC) accounts. As mentioned above, these loans are disbursed on the basis of
current assets as primary security. These assets themselves are not cash but
there is always conversion time in which these assets will generate cash. On a
broader basis, there would be the cash conversion cycle of every company. These
types of loans are most suited for cash flow-based funding. This is further
suited for MSMEs (Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises). Cash flow-based lending
envisages a shift in the banks’ credit appraisal mechanism and monitoring
system from the traditional balance sheet-based funding to a more objective
appraisal system. In CFL, loan requirement is based on actual revenue
generation and capacity to repay. Furthermore, the repayment schedule is based
on the timing of the MSME’s cash inflows. The advantages of CFL are that the
loan amount and repayment are based on the MSME’s actual cash generation,
reduction in credit risk, reduced monitoring costs for banks, reduction in
turnaround time and ability to serve entities that don’t have adequate
collaterals.

 

CHANGE IN ASSESSMENT OF BORROWER
BUSINESS

The primary focus in assessment
of business will no longer be the asset base of the balance sheet. The primary
focus will be cash inflows and the cash conversion cycle. Assets will be only
secondary support. Proven past cash flow generation data and credit ratings
will play an important role. Various databases and information available on the
cloud platform will be considered for data analysis. TransUnion CIBIL data will
by and large be considered a reliable source. Nowadays this data is available
at one’s fingertips, thanks to linking of the data base of PAN, Udyog Aadhaar,
Credit Cards. This data is more reliable and available independently for
verification.

 

IMPACT

Banking disbursement is expected
to rise. As asset backing is no more a primary criterion, companies not having
a large fixed capital base or real estate but having past record of operations
and margins can now avail cash flow-based loans. Various Startups which are in
the category of service sector will be benefited as these cash flow-based
funding loans will be available to these units, thereby increasing the size of
the disbursement portfolios of banks and financial institutions.

 

IMPACT – On NPA and bank balance
sheet

As mentioned earlier, due to lack
of expertise and bandwidth to assess various financial data real time, the
monitoring was not very effective. Since there was no direct linking of the
timing of cash inflows, the cash conversion cycle and repayment mode and
frequency, there used to be delays and at times diversion of funds, too. With
the shift to cash flow-based funding, these drawbacks will no more result in
NPAs growing without any control as drawings can be stopped when cash flows are
affected. The framework is already available for analysis of data. Databanks
are ready with authenticated data linked to the borrower and access to such
information is available to bankers. Loan amount and repayment frequency when
tied up with cash inflow working and timing, loan disbursal will be more
scientific and will cover the cyclical nature of business. All these will
facilitate timely servicing of loans, thereby improving overall NPA ratio.

 

IMPACT – On borrowing cost

Since the primary security is
future cash flows based on past records and credit ratings, there is no
tangible security in many cases. The cost of borrowing will tend to be higher
than asset-backed lending. With favourable performance and consistency in
repayment, this cost will also tend to ease out for standard portfolios.

 

IMPACT – On sectors

Service-oriented businesses with
minimum fixed or tangible capital with proven business model Startups – which
do not have any past record but are in a tie-up with payment gateways for
capturing sales inflows which can be reliably assessed for funding.

 

Financial Technology Companies
which provide various financial solutions to traders and service providers for
capturing the data real time and for producing various complex reports needed
for assessment will be benefited and the impact will be positive.

 

INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

Cash flow-based financing may be
a recent development in India; however, all over the world this is a settled
method of financing, specially to small and medium enterprises, or to
organisations which do not have collateral but have a strong margin business
model, or organisations which do not have past track records and hence
appraisal risks are high; in such cases also, cash flow-based funding is in
vogue.

 

Key Features:

Lending to finance an entity’s
permanent (long-term) needs, seasonal needs;

Usually medium-term, with loan
terms of up to seven or eight years in most cases;

Covenants in the loan agreement
are often included as a ‘trigger’ to signal to the lender a deteriorating
situation so that corrective action may be taken.

 

While there are pronounced
advantages in CFL over asset-based lending, the emphasis is on the process of
the lending method. This presupposes a dedicated and purpose-oriented
policy-making personnel equally supported by an alert team of front-end staff.

 

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing paragraphs one
may conclude that the rapid growth of the Indian economy needs to be
continuously supported by an efficient system of banking dedicated to lend with
care and identify the potential risk much in advance; and also to mitigate the
risk by suitably hedging with a cash flow-based lending in place of asset-based
lending with all its limitations.

 

In
the short run, or even in the long run, cash is the only factor that repays a
loan; the cash conversion cycle is the only correct method to decide the mode
and frequency of repayments. Collateral is the buffer in case cash is not
generated to repay a loan. Cash flow control is the need of the times. In order
to be in line with government policies and also to reap the benefits of a
win-win situation for bankers and small and medium enterprises, cash flow-based
loans appear more appropriate as the supporting infrastructure framework is
already ready.

PANEL DISCUSSION ON UTILITY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND RELEVANCE OF AUDIT AT THE 10TH Ind AS RSC

A panel discussion on the ‘Utility
of Financial Statements and Relevance of Audit’
was the highlight of the 10th
Ind AS Residential Study Course (RSC) held at the Alila Diwa
Hyatt in Goa from 5th to 8th March, 2020.

 

The panellists represented
various stakeholder groups related to financial statements: Mr Raj Mullick,
Senior Executive Vice-President at Reliance Industries Ltd. from the preparers’
side; Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey, Past President of the ICAI representing the auditor
fraternity; Mr. Jigar Shah, CEO, Kimeng Securities India Pvt. Ltd. and
also an analyst; and Mr. Prashant Jain, Chief Investment Officer of HDFC
AMC (a fund manager). The discussion was moderated by Mr. Sandeep Shah,
CA. This report on the panel discussion is for the readers of the BCAJ
who would benefit immensely considering the present situation relating to audit
of financial statements.

 

INITIAL
REMARKS

Preparers’ Perspective:

Mr. Raj Mullick began by
indicating that the utility of the financial statements lay at two extreme
ends; whilst they provide a lot of value to certain classes of users such as
analysts, government authorities and bankers, they are often relegated to the
dustbin by certain other users, including some shareholders. However, generally
financial statements are relevant to various stakeholders like shareholders,
government authorities, bankers, analysts, suppliers and customers, each of
whom looks at specific aspects as per their requirements and serve as an
important communication tool on various matters like vision, mission and
strategy of the entity, its leadership, dividend policy and CSR activities,
amongst others.

 

He highlighted that there are
several challenges which could hamper their utility, including the sheer size
of the content, the use of several technical jargons like MAT, Deferred Tax,
OCI, ESOP, etc. Some of these challenges could be overcome by disclosure of
sufficient qualitative and quantitative information covering impact analysis of
future events and other explanatory and proactive disclosures so as to meet the
varying needs of lenders, analysts and also credit rating agencies.

 

On the role of the finance team
in making the financial statements more relevant and reliable, he highlighted
various steps which could be taken as under:

(a) Working closely with the CEO;

(b) Establishing appropriate accounting policies;

(c) Reflecting the nature of the business in the financial statements;
and

(d) Disclosing critical estimates and judgements.

 

Finally, Mr. Mullick
stated that the role of the auditors is of paramount importance since they
provide an assurance on the completeness of the financial statements and their
compliance with the generally-accepted accounting principles. He also
emphasised that by performing systematic, in-depth reviews of corporate
controls, the auditors help ensure that a company avoids coming under
regulatory scrutiny. He cautioned that going forward, for auditors to be
relevant they need to go much beyond numbers and be more tech-savvy and exhibit
a better understanding of the business.

 

Auditors’ Perspective:

Mr. Nilesh Vikamsey began by
stating that for (this) audience the relevance of the financial statements and
the utility of audit is a no-brainer in spite of some recent
‘accidents’. He indicated that financial statements are relevant to the
following sets of users:

(i) Shareholders, managements, potential investors and promoters;

(ii) Lenders, analysts, rating companies and potential lenders;

(iii) Government and tax authorities;

(iv) Regulators like SEBI, MCA
and RBI.

 

He lamented
the fact that in the past even when the auditors had qualified the financial
statements of a particular company on several counts, including on ‘going
concern’ issues, large funding was provided to it mainly on the security of its
brand, which raised a doubt as to whether the intended users took the financial
statements seriously.

According to him, the financial
statements reflect on matters involving governance, risks, estimates,
contingencies, etc. which may not always be a focus point of the various users,
and hence their relevance and utility could get diluted. Besides, the credit
and market risk disclosures need improvement from the current boiler plate /
template-ised disclosures.

 

Another area where there was
enough ammunition provided by the financial statements was the red flags (which
may not be always acted upon by the users), on issues such as:

(1)   Rising debt-equity ratio;

(2)   Capitalising revenue expenditure;

(3)   Rising fixed assets without corresponding increase in production
and / or sales;

(4)   Large ‘other expenses’ in the P&L account;

(5)   Rising accounts receivable and inventory compared with sales;

(6)   Higher or lower ‘other income’ as compared to ‘revenue from operations’.

 

Mr. Vikamsey also
touched upon disclosure initiatives at the international level to address
issues around which accounting policies need to be disclosed, defining
materiality, better organised entity-specific disclosures on performance,
working capital management, etc., improving the structure and content of
financial statements with new sub-totals (EIBDTA) and notes on management
performance measures.

 

He pointed out that in spite of
the recent aberrations due partly to the greed of some members and which needed
to be tempered, the role of auditors will always remain relevant. However, they
would need to embrace greater digitisation which would result in sampling
getting replaced with AI and routine operations like reconciliation being
automated. Going forward, the auditors would need to adopt a middle path
between scepticism and investigation.
Various reporting initiatives like
KAMS, ICFR CARO, LFAR, etc. provide useful insights to analysts, investors and
regulators. Moreover, independent directors need to see greater value in the
audit process and need to don the auditor’s hat to keep pushing the management.

 

Analysts’ Perspective:

Mr. Jigar Shah stressed
that the utility and relevance of the financial statements can be improved by
building ‘additional, relevant, non-conventional’ disclosures,
especially around predicting future events, diversity and ESG (Environment,
Social and Corporate Governance) which would be a win-win situation for all
stakeholders. Earnings may not always necessarily represent the bottom line and
may not have a correlation to the market capitalisation of the entity due to
various reasons like contingent liabilities, whistle-blower complaints, etc.

 

On the question of asset
impairment, he observed that it is generally done only in times of an extreme
business cycle, or when the business is about to be sold. He emphasised a more
regular and vigorous assessment of asset impairment due to various
technological changes like 5G, IOT and other matters like climate change and
sustainability which could have an impact on industries like automobiles
(emission norms, electric vehicles), cement (penalties for flouting pollution
norms), real estate (climate change and global warming resulting in destruction
of real estate in coastal cities due to floods), general insurance (impact of
climate change on underwriting models) and IT (impact due to water crisis in
cities like Bangalore and Chennai).

 

Another area where he felt that
more granular disclosures were needed was with regard to intangibles in certain
specific industries like pharma, banks / finance companies, consumer goods
companies and so on on matters like expenses on brands, digital initiatives,
customer acquisition, technology development (because as per the current
accounting standards, any expenses on self-generated intangibles need to be
expenses off and may not always be completely disclosed).

 

On audit quality and its
relevance, Mr. Jigar Shah felt that the same is largely maintained and
it would not be proper to paint everyone with the same brush. The role of audit
is also likely to increase in the coming days due to various additional
reporting requirements under CARO. He also felt that auditors should not resign
immediately but must report.

 

Fund Managers’ / Investors’
Perspective:

Mr. Prashant Jain started by
stating that as an investor there are two mistakes which need to be guarded
against: the first is to avoid investments in entities whose value is likely to
fall, and the other is to miss investing in entities whose value is likely to
rise. Whilst the financial statements generally provide clues to the first
situation if one reads the notes and other information in detail and identifies
any aggressive accounting policies and other red flags, the same may not be
true in the case of the latter. In his view the balance sheet and the cash
flows are more important and relevant from their long-term value perspective
than the Profit and Loss statement which is more temporary in nature. He
recalled that one of his earliest learnings from a senior fund manager was that
the bottom line is sanity, the top line is vanity but cash
is reality!

 

It would be wrong to link
failures entirely to the financial statements, except in situations like severe
ALM mismatches or aggressive accounting policies since they could arise due to
various other reasons like government policies, competitor actions, failed
acquisitions and incorrect capital allocation, amongst others.

 

Mr. Jain felt that
there could be better quality disclosures on certain matters such as:

(A) Impact on the financial statements due to non-routine matters like
significant changes in oil prices, foreign exchange volatility in case an
entity has operations in several geographies;

(B) The reasons for recording huge amounts as goodwill in tune with the
underlying performance of the group companies;

(C) The impact on the financial statements due to long-term leases where
there is a lower profitability in the initial years, and in situations where
the entity keeps on entering into new leases continuously.

 

PANEL DISCUSSION

After the above observations,
moderator Sandeep Shah put forth various questions arising out of them
and on certain other matters, resulting in a healthy discussion amongst the
panellists. A summary of the views of the panellists on various matters is
provided here:

 

(i) Whether rigorous examination by auditors
is undertaken:
The primary responsibility for the preparation of the
financial statements is that of the management and the auditors generally
conduct a rigorous examination thereof. However, the quality of disclosures
could improve and greater scepticism on their part is warranted in view of the
recent failures;


(ii) Whether audit is a commodity: There
were differing views on this. The views in support thereof arose primarily from
the growth expectations and undercutting of fees due to rotation, especially
amongst the larger firms. However, firms are now evaluating their risk
profiling of clients and increasingly resorting to resignations within the
regulatory framework. On the other hand, since in certain cases the auditors
grow with the companies, there is no commoditisation and it is up to the entity
whether it wants to do so;


(iii) Competitiveness of audit fees: On the
question whether the fees paid to the auditors are reasonable vis-a-vis
the complexity involved, it was felt that there was scope for improvement since
the lower fees are partly due to the lower rate of growth in the compensation
levels of the white-collar employees in the past 20 years compared to the
blue-collar employees, such as drivers;


(iv) Audit quality and related disclosures: The
quality of the audit firms is primarily driven by the partners and the staff
both in terms of their brand value and technical competence. However, adequate
disclosures are not made in respect of the credibility of the team members
except for the name of the signing partner. It was felt that a rating of the
audit firms is the need of the hour. The AQI proposed in the MCA consultation
paper could also be a step in that direction, though the ICAI has not made much
progress in the matter. Many small firms are quite meticulous in undertaking
their assignments. In sum, it was noted that in many cases, at the time of
acquisition the acquirer insists on firms of a certain standing to ensure quality;


(v) Role of auditors in evaluation of business and industry impact: It is not
the responsibility of the auditors to evaluate the future impact on the
entity’s business since they are not industry experts, except that they may
only highlight the risks. It was suggested that the management may, as part of
the annual report, give specific disclosures about the possible pricing and
financial implications due to the impact of technology changes on their
business in the foreseeable future;


(vi) Role of technology and digitisation on the audit function: This will
result in a revised set of skills on the part of the auditors around data
inputs / querying which would be very dynamic in nature;


(vii) Relevance and utility of the MD&A: There
were mixed reactions on its utility. Whilst, on the one hand, it serves as a
useful communication tool especially for the larger companies, on the other it
always tends to be optimistic and a report card of the present without
providing a meaningful analysis of the future plans of the business.
Accordingly, it was felt that it does not merit more than a passing interest;


(viii) Relevance of investor presentations: Since
they generally tend to be more detailed than the MD&A, they are more
relevant to the analysts due to their interactive nature which helps them in
updating their valuation models. However, the forward-looking statements made
therein are quite often not substantive and tend to be optimistic and biased;
hence they should be read in conjunction with the detailed notes in the
financial statements, because the devil lies in the details;


(ix) Transition to Ind AS – whether beneficial: Whilst
there is no doubt that Ind AS provides better quality of disclosures, it was
felt that the earlier format of the balance sheet was more reader-friendly
since it provides the sum total of the various line items at a glance as
against the ‘Current’ and ‘Non-Current’ classification of all line items under
Ind AS, which could be summarised. Further, the concept of ‘Mark to Market’ presents
challenges in analysing the financial position and results in a meaningful
manner;


(x) Earnings management: The greatest challenge therein
lies in managing the expectation mismatch. In certain situations, it could be
used as a legitimate tool by the management by cutting certain discretionary
costs like advertising or delaying capital expenditure; in other situations, it
may not be justified, especially if it is achieved through aggressive and
questionable accounting policies. It was, however, agreed that over a period of
time the same would be mitigated through a natural process of reconciliation
and tie-up with the market forces coupled with greater regulatory scrutiny;


(xi) Sufficiency of the current financial statements framework to all
industries:
Whilst it was largely felt that the current financial statements
framework is sufficient for most industries, in certain industries such as
media, real estate, airlines, multiplexes, pharma, etc., it may not always
provide meaningful and relevant information like the extent of land parcels
(real estate), products, USFDA inspections (pharma), impact of long-term leases
(airlines, multiplexes) and IPR (media);


(xii) Usefulness of joint audit: It does provide value and add to
the quality of the audit, especially in the case of larger entities; the
experience has been generally good in countries which have mandated it.
However, care needs to be exercised that whilst allocating the work no
significant areas are left out. For the smaller companies it may result in
increased cost;


(xiii) Incentives for auditors: The main incentive and
motivating factor for an auditor is being a member of the ICAI. However,
considering his role as a solution provider, one of the motivating factors
would be that his recommendations are accepted. There can be no greater feather
in the cap than when the financial statements certified by him get an award
from the ICAI for the best-presented accounts.

 

CONCLUSION

There
was unanimity that the discussion provided a 360-degree view of various matters
from the perspectives of a preparer, auditor, investor and analyst. However,
concerns remain on overregulation and the existence of a trust
deficit
which would in the coming days play a greater role in determining
the efficacy of the financial statements and the role of the auditors.

DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND

Ind AS 105 Non-current
assets held for sale and discontinued operations
requires discontinued
operations to be presented separately in the profit and loss account, so that
the users of financial statements can separate the profits or losses from
continuing and discontinued operations. Such a segregated presentation helps
users of financial statements to determine the maintainable profits or losses
that arise from continuing operations.

 

Ind AS 105 (paragraph 32) defines
a discontinued operation as a component of an entity that either has been
disposed of, or is classified as held for sale, and

(a)   represents a separate major line of business or geographical area
of operations,

(b)  is part of a single co-ordinated plan to dispose of a separate
major line of business or geographical area of operations, or

(c)   is a subsidiary acquired exclusively with a view to resale.

 

Paragraph 33 of Ind AS 105
requires an entity to disclose:

(a)   a single amount in the statement of profit and loss comprising the
total of:

(i)    the post-tax profit or loss of discontinued operations; and

(ii)   the post-tax gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair
value less costs to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s)
constituting the discontinued operation.

(b)   an analysis of the single amount in (a) into:

(i)    the revenue, expenses and pre-tax profit or loss of discontinued
operations;

(ii)   the related income tax expense;

(iii) the gain or loss recognised on the measurement to fair value less
costs to sell or on the disposal of the assets or disposal group(s)
constituting the discontinued operation; and

(iv) the related income tax expense.

A common question that is
generally raised is with respect to a parent transferring an operation to a
subsidiary and whether in the parent’s separate financial statements the
disposal of the operation will be presented as a discontinuing operation. In
the consolidated financial statements, since the business remains within the
group, there is no discontinued operation which is required to be presented separately. Consider the detailed fact pattern below:

 

FACT PATTERN

A Ltd. (‘the Company’ or ‘the
parent’) enters into an arrangement whereby it will transfer an operation that
qualifies as an operation (as defined earlier) under Ind AS 105 to a
newly-set-up company (NewCo). The transfer is a slump sale and is set out in a
Business Transfer Agreement (BTA). NewCo is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
company when it is set up.

 

The transfer is done with a
pre-requisite that an investor will concurrently invest in NewCo. to the extent
of 30%. The company has not lost control due to the said infusion, because it
still holds majority (70%) ownership. The investor will have significant
influence over NewCo.

 

There is no impairment on the
assets transferred.

 

Should the transferred operation
be classified as discontinued operations in the Separate Financial Statements
of A Ltd.?

 

ANALYSIS

There is no guidance with respect
to this specific issue either under Ind AS 105 or other Ind AS’s. In the stated
fact pattern, there are two possible views for the classification of the
transferred operation.

 

View 1: The
transferred operation is a discontinued operation in the parent’s separate
financial statements

In the fact pattern, an investor
will be investing to the extent of 30% shareholding in NewCo. There will be no
loss of control for the parent, because the parent still owns a majority stake
in NewCo. Nonetheless, running the operations by the company on its own as
against transferring it to a subsidiary, in which a potential investor has
significant influence, are two different things. Essentially, in the separate
financial statements of the parent the business is getting converted into an
investment in a subsidiary in which an independent investor will play a
significant role.

 

Earlier, the parent was running
the operations. After the transfer, the parent will have to manage the
investment in the subsidiary. The relevant decisions at the separate financial
statement level will be whether to retain the investment or dispose of the
investment, whether the investment should be further diluted, the proposal with
respect to dividends, etc. The parent and the subsidiary are two separate
entities with independent boards and subjected to a regulatory framework. This
suggests that the appropriate classification of the transferred operation
should be discontinued operation.

 

Accordingly, the transferred
operations should be classified as a discontinued operation.


View 2: The
transferred operation is not a discontinued operation in the parent’s separate
financial statements

The transfer
of operations to NewCo is simply a change in the geography of the operations,
because the operations continue to remain with the group. The transferred
operations are still controlled by A Ltd. In substance, A Ltd. continues to
control the operations though there will be significant influence exercised by
the independent investor in NewCo. There is a very thin line between managing
the investment in a subsidiary vs. running the operations represented by that
investment. Consequently, the transferred operations are not discontinued
operations in the separate financial statements of the parent.

 

The author believes that both the above views are
acceptable. However, View 1 may be preferred keeping in mind the concept
of ‘substance over form’. View 1 also represents faithfully the fact
that the profit and loss in the separate financial statements will not include
the results of the operation going forward. A segregated presentation will help
users of financial statements to determine the maintainable profits or losses
that arise from continuing operations in the separate financial statements.
 

COVID-19 AND THE RESHAPING OF THE GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL ORDER

Geopolitics has been historically
shaped by multiple events in history. Wars, conflicts and occasionally
haphazard events have changed how nations have achieved and lost power on the
international stage. The international system after the Cold War ended has been
characteristically driven by the United States-led global order. The Western
institutions, collectively known as the Bretton Woods system, have been major
institutions shaping the global financial order. In the dying stages of the
Cold War, China’s rise was seldom seen as that of the next big global power fit
enough to challenge the US presence in Asia. The post-Cold War era also saw the
formation and development of the European Union. The diffusion of power and
geopolitics from central power to multiple regional power centres led to the
formation of the multipolar regional order.

 

Frictions between countries were
commonplace in Asia; an ascendant China was not only challenged by US presence
in the region, but also by the rise of India throughout the 2000s. However,
since the mid-2000’s, the rise of China and the debate on the uneasy decline of
US power in Asia has displayed itself in multiple events and forums across the
region, often with countries such as India and groupings like ASEAN having to
pay the price for choosing sides. The recent episode involving a trade war
between the US and China over supremacy in the technological space exposed the
limits of the structure and tipping points between both the countries in the
region. Eventually, the end of this war was followed by COVID-19, a ‘Black
Swan’ event which has had a huge impact on the global economy and geopolitics.

 

‘Black Swan’ events are an extremely
negative event or occurrence that is impossibly difficult to predict. In other
words, such events are both unexpected and unpredictable. As the world deals
with the COVID-19 pandemic which has seen 15,361 deaths till 23rd
March, 2020, reports have indicated faults at multiple levels in controlling
the issue at the right time. While China’s suppression of the information has
surfaced in recent understanding, the drop in its consumption levels has
severely impacted the global economy. Businesses have been clearly hit. Major
among them have been aviation and tourism. The drop in travel and bans on
flights have impacted the two industries, leading to a complete shutdown of
some sectors within these areas. Major global airlines have cut anywhere
between 80 to 90% of their capacity on the backs of travel bans and the lack of
passengers as a result thereof. Some economies reliant on tourism have been
badly hit.

 

Nevertheless, crisis times call for
astute diplomacy and capitalisation of the issues at hand. Several issues could
be noticed on how states handled the crisis and their response, and how global
markets and the uncertainty were taken advantage of by a few countries. While
China reached the peak of the crisis, global markets had started to respond by
closing down to the outside world systemically. Crashing markets and impacted
supply chains followed by reduced demands were indicative of the coming crisis.
One of the key impacts of the slowing economy was felt in the oil markets. The
reduced demand from China and the rest of the world has led to tumbling prices.
The OPEC, which coordinates and sets global oil prices, fell out with Russia.
This fallout between Russia and Saudi Arabia has sent oil prices crashing,
leading to historical lows, possibly benefiting bigger global consumers.

 

Japan, which had been continually
struggling to keep its economy afloat, reported one of the slowest growth rates
in many years due to domestic policies. Just staying above the line going into
recession, due to the slowdown caused by the virus, Japan may very well be
heading into an economic crisis. Recent discussions also highlight that Japan
would most likely be postponing the Summer Olympics which could have provided a
great boost to its economy.

 

Similarly, some other countries have
not failed to showcase their power through diplomacy. India, which has till now
done some of the most extensive relief operations in all affected regions by
bringing back stranded citizens, has also extended its hand to the South Asian
region which has fallen apart after the failure of the South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation (SAARC); the joint effort call was heeded by all
(except Pakistan). Similarly, India also lifted the ban on the export of all
kinds of personal protection equipment, including masks, and cleared some
consignments of medical gear placed by China, a move seen as a goodwill
gesture; such diplomatic signalling is seen positively as an extending reach in
times of crisis. India’s ability to get back its citizens from Wuhan is also a
demonstration of this extended positive reach.

 

In the global sense, as the crisis’s
epicentre moves to Europe where the death toll has now overtaken that of China,
and the United States’ healthcare system has showcased its total unpreparedness
to tackle this epidemic, China’s reviving supply lines will surely find a
future market to sell its goods. India, with its developed pharmaceutical
sector, should capitalise on this situation. However, the US lobbies which are
averse to generic substitutes have always scuttled any ideas for the lucrative
markets. China’s companies, including its retail giant Alibaba, have already
started to send across protective medical supplies to all South Asian countries
(excluding India) as well as some countries in Africa. The inability to rely on
existing Western donor systems which have been increasingly challenged by China
since the last decade, may turn out to be a silver lining for China.

 

The
future of the global order remains uncertain; the COVID-19 crisis has struck at
a time when leaderships have been challenged domestically all over the world.
While the United States is in election season, China’s vulnerability to a
crisis has put a question mark on the strengthening of the power base of
President Xi Jinping within China and that of its ruling Communist Party.
However, India’s handling of the situation has helped quell some negativity for
now about the ongoing domestic issues in the country. Nevertheless, once the
dust settles, the gravest impact would be felt in Europe. As the region was
already battling a refugee crisis, deaths relating to Coronavirus would add a
burden on the regional economies. The inability to rebuild from the economic
impact would invariably shift the burden on the emerging powers within the
grouping, forcing an already delicate line in the grouping; the region’s
economic engine Germany has already recorded no growth in the coming year. The
negative growth rate and the developing internal political crisis within the
country do not hold a positive outlook.

 

In the second half of 2020, the geopolitical
shifts will be visible through geo-economics outlays. China, which was first in
and is now first out, will continue to rebuild from the economic shocks. It is
bound to benefit most from the post-crisis scenario as the virus spread will
keep it from exhausting its options in supplying the growing needs during the
crisis and its aftermath. India’s chances to plug into this geopolitical
reordering will be crucial. The uncertain political and economic reach of the West
could well make it use a resilient India to assert itself to balance China in
Asia; nevertheless, India will have to once again resort to its delicate
balancing game between the US and China, at the same time being careful not to
tip the scales too much to still be able to plug itself into a reviving Asian
economy.

HOUSEKEEPING FOR BHUDEVI

Nandurbar is one of Maharashtra’s
smaller districts by area (5,955 sq. km.) and its forest cover, according to
the India State of Forest Report, 2019, is just over 20% of its area; which
means that about 1,196 sq. km. of Nandurbar is forest. Far away from Nandurbar
is the district of Kokrajhar in Assam, which has about 1,166 sq. km. of forest
covering a smaller total area (3,296 sq. km.).

 

For all those who prefer seeing the
wood for the trees, the more forest a district has, the happier it must be.
There are a host of reasons why this is so and many of these reasons have to do
with the idea of ‘environment’, both as the presence of and manifestation of
what in English is called ‘nature’, and also as the provision of many of the
basic materials that are central to our lives.

 

Our Indic conception transcends
‘environment’ entirely, for our tradition regards the earth as Bhudevi,
whose consort Vishnu incarnates from age to age to rid her of the
accumulation of demonic forces. He does this out of love for the earth and its
inhabitants.

 

As guardians and practitioners of
this tradition, those who live close to and within the forest tracts of
Nandurbar and Kokrajhar would be the ideal persons to inform us about the worth
and value of the forest to their lives. To even the partially observant
traveller, India’s tribal and rural societies – wondrously variegated though
their individual cultures may be – take much of their identity from the forest
and from nature.

 

The forest supplies them with
firewood and timber for construction, it is home to the animal and bird prey
they seek for their cooking pots; the forest contains the medicinal plants and
herbs that indigenous and local medicinal traditions depend upon; fruits are
plentiful, cattle are watchfully allowed into the forest to seek the remedies
they are preternaturally aware of; and the forest is home to the wild relatives
of the grasses we call cereals and to the great majority of our vegetables.

 

If we compare this list of what the
forest supplies its residents with with another list, that of what contemporary
industrial society supplies its residents with, then there is no contest about
which list is the longer one. However, the most elementary materials on both
lists are none too different from each other. What is different is that the
non-forest list supplies each and every one of its items for a fee.

 

That fee embodies several important
concepts. There is extraction or collection of the primary material (wood, for
example, in the form of whole, uncut logs), movement of the primary material to
a place where some initial transformation to it can take place (such as a saw
mill), movement of the transformed material to a consumption centre (such as a
town or city), further transformation (sections for door and window frames, for
furniture, shaping into ordinary household goods, shaping into crafts items and
curios), final purchase and use in a wholesale or retail transaction.

 

These concepts communicate with us
in today’s world not as the transformation of a material, not as a reminder of
the origin of a material, but through a number we call the cost that is
connected to either the extraction of a material, the transformation of a
material, or the marketing of a transformed material to its final consumers.

 

These costs, whether considered once
depending upon where, in this chain of transformation, you stand, or whether
considered two or three times by those tasked with analysing an industry based
on a primary material, satisfy the current frameworks we employ to describe how
value is understood, multiplied and given economic substance. But they are
utterly unable to convey other kinds of valuing, especially the kind that the
tribal societies of Nandurbar and Kokrajhar use when they regard primary
material from their forests.

 

What are these other kinds of value?
From the point of view of the holders of knowledge about the primary material
in all its aspects, values associated with the forest in their living vicinity
are cultural, social, spiritual and pertain to health and well-being. Their
knowledge relates not to the market worth of a cubic metre of wood and how much
price value can be added to that block of wood by transforming it into a
contemporarily styled cabinet, or an objet d’art. Their knowledge
relates to the numerous physical conditions that need to be maintained and
balanced so that trees in the forest, just as much as the forest’s flora and
non-human residents, continue to be nourished.

 

The manner in which our system of
national accounts is framed, there is no scope whatsoever for knowledge of this
kind to be recognised, let alone to be valued even if imperfectly. Yet it is
becoming clearer with every passing year that such a valuation is needed. The
clarity comes because several biophysical and geophysical changes are becoming
more intense.

 

There is the diminishing of
biodiversity, which means fewer species than before. There is the expansion of
the human settlement footprint, which encroaches on nature’s territory, and in
doing so alters natural rhythms (such as when a wetland is filled in to become
a city suburb). There are the effects of climate change and variation, which
affect crop cycles as much as coastal towns or snowfields.

 

The science that monitors these
changes has led to some sophisticated models being created which, in turn, lead
to estimates of risk (and the corollary, prescriptions for the mitigation of
risk) and therefore estimates of the costs of not acting to reduce risk. This
is where cost sets that can apply to the bewildering complexity of our natural
world make their appearance. A domain dedicated to this nascent art has been
named, too: it’s environmental-economic accounting.

 

India’s official statisticians have considered
how to ‘cost’ (or ‘price’) nature since the mid-1990s, when experimental
accounts which included ‘nature’s value’ were drawn up for a few states. The
activity has languished at that level since. Had they looked at our wisdom,
they may well have found inspiration, for the Shiva Purana explained to
us that during Kaliyuga, our present age, one of the many signs of
growing chaos is that the merchant class ‘have abandoned holy rites such as
digging wells and tanks, and planting trees and parks’ (II.1.24).

 

Now, however, India’s obligations to
the large number of multilateral treaties and agreements which have to do with
environment and biodiversity broadly, as well as the effects of climate change,
and moreover to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, are running
into the inherent limitations of the system of national accounts that, so far,
excludes nature and knowledge systems associated with nature.

 

The accounting fraternity in our
country possesses experience and wisdom aplenty, for they know the daily pulse
of a huge and astonishingly variegated economic web. As our companies and
industries learn to lighten the environmental footprint of all their
activities, their need to adopt methods to measure, cost, assess and plan for
the environmental consequences of those activities will only increase.

 

Yet
it is not for us to adopt, in the name of standardisation, an ‘international’
method that values nature. Rather, what is called for is an Indic
conceptualisation of nature which suits our civilisational economic trajectory
and which is rooted in our scriptures. ‘Heaven is my father; my mother is this
vast earth, my close kin,’ says the Rig Veda (1.164.33).

 

By taking up such a challenge –
conceiving and imparting a new accounting literacy that sensitively interprets
the wisdom of our rishis and sants to temper the demands of our
era – the accounting fraternity will contribute considerably to renewing our
homage to Bhudeví.

 

(The author, Rahul Goswami, lives in Goa and is
the Unesco-Asia expert on intangible cultural heritage)
 

Sections 144C(1), 143(3) – For the period prior to 1st April, 2020 in case of an eligible assessee, draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) is not required to be passed in cases in which no variation in returned income or loss is proposed Mere issuance of draft assessment order, when it was legally not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time limit for completing the assessment u/s 143(3)

2.       [2020]
115 taxmann.com 78 (Mum.)

IPF India Property Cyprus (No. 1) Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA No. 6077/Mum/2018

A.Y.: 2014-15

Date of order: 25th February, 2020

 

Sections 144C(1), 143(3) – For the period prior to 1st April,
2020 in case of an eligible assessee, draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s.
144C(1) is not required to be passed in cases in which no variation in returned
income or loss is proposed

 

Mere issuance of draft assessment order, when it was legally
not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time limit for
completing the assessment u/s 143(3)

 

FACTS

The A.O., for A.Y. 2014-15, passed a draft assessment order
u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) even when no variation was proposed therein to the
income or loss returned by the assessee.

 

The assessee challenged the correctness of the DRP’s order
dated 26th July, 2018 in the matter of assessment u/s 144(C)(1)
r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act. It contended that the A.O. had erred in passing a
draft assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(1) of the Act, even when no
variation has been proposed therein to the income or loss returned by the
assessee and in passing the final assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act, after
the due date provided u/s 153 of the Act, thus making the final assessment
order illegal, bad in law and non-est.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the short question for
adjudication is whether or not the A.O. was justified in passing a draft
assessment order on the facts of the case, and whether the fact that the A.O.
chose to issue the draft assessment order even though he was not required to do
so, would result in affecting the normal time limit within which the normal
assessment order u/s 143(3) is to be issued. It also observed that there are no
variations in the returned income and the assessee income.

 

The controversy is thus confined to the question as to what
will be the rate on which income returned by the assessee is to be taxed. While
the assessee has claimed taxation @ 10% under article 11(2) of the India-Cyprus
DTAA, the A.O. has declined the said treaty protection on the ground that the
assessee was not beneficial owner of the said interest and, accordingly,
brought the income to tax @ 40% thereof. The Tribunal observed that there is,
quite clearly, no variation in the quantum of income.

 

The Tribunal observed that the assessee before it is a
non-resident company incorporated, and fiscally domiciled, in Cyprus.
Accordingly, in terms of section 144C(15)(b)(ii), the assessee is an eligible
assessee but then there is no change in the figure of income returned by the
assessee vis-a-vis the income assessed by the A.O. It held that there
is, therefore, no question of a draft assessment order being issued in this
case. It noted that the Finance Bill, 2020 proposes to make the issuance of
draft assessment orders in the case of eligible assessees mandatory even when
there is no variation in the income or loss returned by the assessee, but then
this amendment seeks to amend the law with effect from 1st April,
2020. Since the amendment is being introduced with effect from that date, the
Tribunal held that it is beyond any doubt that so far as the period prior to 1st
April, 2020 is concerned, in the cases in which no variations in the returned
income or loss were proposed, the draft assessment orders were not required to
be issued. The Tribunal upheld the plea of the assessee on this point.

 

The Tribunal noted that if no draft assessment order was to
be issued in this case, the assessment would have been time-barred on 31st
December, 2017 but the present assessment order was passed on 17th
August, 2018. It held that since no draft assessment order could have been
issued in this case, as the provisions of section 144C(1) could not have been
invoked, the time limit for completion of assessment was available only up to
31st December, 2017. The mere issuance of a draft assessment order,
when it was legally not required to be issued, cannot end up enhancing the time
limit for completing the assessment u/s 143(3). The Tribunal held the
assessment order to be time-barred.

 

The Tribunal allowed these grounds of appeal filed by the
assessee.

Sections 23, 24(b) – Where assessee is receiving rent from his own son and daughter who are financially independent, property is both a self-occupied and a let-out property – Consequently, interest claim cannot be allowed in full and shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the interest claim relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs

1.       [2020]
115 taxmann.com 179 (Mum.)

Md. Hussain Habib Pathan vs. ACIT

ITA No. 4058/Mum/2013

A.Y.: 2009-10

Date of order: 5th March, 2020

 

Sections 23, 24(b) – Where assessee is receiving rent from
his own son and daughter who are financially independent, property is both a
self-occupied and a let-out property – Consequently, interest claim cannot be
allowed in full and shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the
interest claim relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs

 

The children of the assessee were financially independent;
so instead of just transferring some money to their father, they wanted it to
be regarded (by mutual agreement) as rent – They believed that thus he would
receive funds in the shape of rent and that would also help meet their father’s
(the assessee’s) interest burden and help him with some tax savings – It was to
be regarded as a genuine arrangement in order to minimise assessee’s tax
liability

 

FACTS

The assessee claimed a loss of Rs. 15,32,120 qua his
residential house property in Mumbai. He claimed that he had incurred interest
on borrowed capital of Rs. 21,62,120 which was adjusted against rental income
of Rs. 9,00,000; this (rent), on a field inquiry, was found by the A.O. to be
from the assessee’s major son and major daughter residing in the said property
along with other family members of the assessee.

 

The A.O. was of the view that nobody would charge rent (for
residence) from his own son and daughter, particularly considering that both
are unmarried and living together with their family at its self-owned abode.
The arrangement was therefore regarded as merely a tax-reducing device adopted
by the assessee and liable to be ignored. Treating the house property as a
self-occupied property, the A.O. restricted the claim of interest u/s 24(b) to
Rs. 1,50,000.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who
confirmed the action.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal
where he contended that there is nothing to show that the arrangement, which is
duly supported by written agreements furnished in the assessment proceedings,
is fake or make-believe. Rental income cannot be overlooked or disregarded
merely because it arises from close family members. However, on a query from
the Bench, the counsel for the assessee was not able to state the status, i.e.,
self-occupied or rented, of the said premises for the earlier or subsequent
years, though he submitted that this is the first year of the claim of loss. He
was also unable to tell the Bench about the area let out, i.e., out of the
total area available, inasmuch as other family members, including the assessee,
were also residing in the same premises.

 

The Revenue’s case, on the other hand, was of no cognisance
being accorded to an arrangement which is against human probabilities and
clearly a device to avoid tax.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the arrangement is highly unusual,
particularly considering that the rent is in respect of a self-owned property
(i.e., for which no rent is being paid), which constituted the family’s
residence, and with the assessee’s son and daughter both being unmarried.
However, the Bench felt that that may not be conclusive in the matter. Being a
private arrangement not involving any third party, not informing the
co-operative housing society was also found to be of not much consequence. It also
observed that the Revenue has rested on merely doubting the genuineness of the
arrangement without probing the facts further. What was the total area, as well
as its composition / profile? How many family members, besides the assessee
(the owner) and the two ‘tenants’, were resided thereat? Has the area let out
been specified, allowing private space (a separate bedroom each) to the son and
the daughter who would in any case be also provided access to or use of the
common area – specified or not so in the agreement/s, viz. kitchen, balcony,
living area, bathrooms, etc.? How had the rent been received, in cash or
through a bank and, further, how had it been sourced, whether from the assessee
(or any other family member), or from the capital / income of the ‘tenants’?
Why was there no attempt even to inquire whether the arrangement was a
subsisting / continuing one, or confined to a year or two, strongly suggestive
in the latter case of a solely tax-motivated exercise?

 

The Tribunal held that it could, however, well be that the
assessee’s major son and daughter are financially independent (or substantially
so), with independent incomes, sharing the interest burden of their common
residence with their father. As such, instead of transferring funds to him have
decided by mutual agreement to give the amounts as rent as that would, apart
from meeting the interest burden to that extent, also allow tax saving to the
assessee-father. A genuine arrangement cannot be disregarded just because it
results in or operates to minimise the assessee’s tax liability. The Tribunal
found itself in agreement with the assessee’s claim inasmuch as there was
nothing on record to further the Revenue’s case of the arrangement not being a
genuine one, but just that it was an unusual one.

 

However, on quantum the Tribunal found the stand of the
assessee infirm. It held that the house property, that is, the family residence
of the Pathan family, was both a self-occupied and a let-out property in view
of the rent agreements. It observed that the interest claimed (Rs. 21.62 lakhs)
is qua the entire property, which therefore cannot be allowed in full
against the rental income, which is qua only a part of the house
property. The assessee’s interest claim therefore cannot be allowed in full and
shall have to be suitably proportioned, restricting the interest claim
relatable to the self-occupied part thereof to Rs. 1.50 lakhs as allowed. The
assessee shall provide a reasonable basis for such allocation as well as the
working of the area let out. It observed that it may well be that in view of
the joint residence, no area (portion) is specified in the rent agreements. The
number of family members living jointly; their living requirements – which may
not be uniform; fair rental value of the property; etc. are some of the
parameters which could be considered for the purpose. The Tribunal directed the
A.O. to adjudicate thereon per a speaking order, giving definite reasons for
being in disagreement, whether in whole or in part, with the assessee’s claim
within a reasonable time.

 

The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the
assessee.

VVF Ltd. vs. DCIT-39; [ITA. No. 9030/Mum/2010; Date of order: 31st August, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08; Bench: F; Mum. ITAT] Section 37 – Business expenditure – Salary paid to director – The expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity – So long as it is incurred for the purposes of business, the same is allowable as deduction

The Pr. CIT-3 vs. VVF Ltd.
[Income tax Appeal No. 1671 of 2017]

Date of order: 4th
March, 2020

(Bombay High Court)

 

VVF Ltd. vs. DCIT-39; [ITA. No.
9030/Mum/2010; Date of order: 31st August, 2016; A.Y.: 2007-08;
Bench: F; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 37 – Business expenditure
– Salary paid to director – The expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and
without any necessity – So long as it is incurred for the purposes of business,
the same is allowable as deduction

 

A search and seizure action u/s
132(1) of the Act was carried out by the Department in the case of the assessee
and its group associates, including its directors, on 3rd January,
2008. In A.Y. 2002-03, the A.O. made an addition of Rs. 13,00,000 which
represented the salary paid to Shri Faraz G. Joshi, its Director.

 

The A.O. disallowed the salary
paid to Shri Joshi primarily relying on a statement recorded during the course
of the search u/s 132(4) of the Act. The A.O. noted that in the course of the
search it was gathered that Shri Joshi was not attending office on a day-to-day
basis and no specific duties were assigned to him except some consultation.

 

The assessee had pointed out
before the A.O. that Shri Joshi was a whole-time Director and was performing
his duties as Director of the assessee-company and was being paid remuneration
in accordance with the limits prescribed under the Companies Act, 1956.

 

The A.O. disagreed with the
assessee and concluded that the payment made to Shri Joshi in the form of
salary was an expenditure not expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes
of business and, therefore, disallowed the same u/s 37(1) of the Act.

 

The CIT(A) also sustained the
action of the A.O. by noting that Shri Joshi had specifically admitted in the
statement recorded at the time of the search that he was not attending office
for the last six years and no specific duties were assigned to him.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assessee has appropriately explained the statement rendered by Shri Joshi. His
answer has to be understood in the context of the question raised. In this
context, attention has been drawn to the relevant portion of the statement,
which reads as under:

 

‘Q.9: What is the nature of
business conducted by the company, i.e., M/s VVF Ltd.?

A.9:  The company deals in Oleo-Chemicals. We also
work on contract basis for Jhonson & Jhonson
(sic)
& Racket – Colman
(sic). (Johnson & Johnson; Reckitt-Coleman.)

Q.10: Who looks after the day to
day activity of that company and what are the duties assigned to you?

A.10: I am not aware about the
person who looks after the day to day business activity. Since last 6 years I
am not attending the office nor any duty is assigned to me except
consultation.’

 

It has been explained that the
answer by Shri Joshi was in response to the question put to him which was as to
whether he was involved in the day-to-day management of the company. It was in
this context that the answer was given. However, it is sought to be pointed out
that the said Director was rendering consultation and advisory services which,
in fact, is the role of a Director. Therefore, it has to be understood that
services were indeed being rendered by the said Director to the assessee
company. The Tribunal observed that the overemphasis by the Revenue on the
wordings of the reply of Shri Joshi has led to a wrong conclusion.

 

Further, Shri
Joshi was one of the two main Directors of the assessee company and that
historically such salary payments had been allowed as a deduction. In fact,
there is no negation to the plea of the assessee that for A.Ys. 2009-10 to
2012-13, such salary payments stood allowed and such assessments have been
completed even after the search carried out on 3rd January, 2008. It
is judicially well settled that it is for the assessee to decide whether any
expenditure should be incurred in the course of carrying on of its business. It
is also a well-settled proposition that expenditure may be incurred voluntarily
and without any necessity and so long as it is incurred for the purposes of
business, the same is allowable as deduction even though the assessee may not
be in a position to show compelling necessity of incurring such expenditure. In
support of the aforesaid proposition, reliance can be placed on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sasoon J. David & Co. P.
Ltd., 118 ITR 261 (SC).

 

Being aggrieved, the Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in response to the
specific query the answer given by Shri Joshi was quite reasonable and no
adverse inference could be drawn therefrom. Besides, the Tribunal also found that
in all the assessments made up to the date of the search, the salary payment to
Shri Joshi was allowed. Even post-search, from A.Y. 2009-10 onwards where
assessments have been made u/s 143(3) of the Act, salary paid to Shri Joshi was
not disallowed.

 

The Supreme Court in the case of Sassoon
J. David & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (Supra)
, examined the expression
‘wholly and exclusively’ appearing in section 10(2)(xv) of the Income tax Act,
1922 which corresponds to section 37 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of section 37
says that any expenditure not being expenditure of the nature described in
sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or
personal expenses of the assessee, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively
for the purposes of the business or profession, shall be allowed in computing
the income chargeable under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’.

 

It was observed that the expression ‘wholly
and exclusively’ appearing in the said section does not mean ‘necessarily’.
Ordinarily, it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure should be
incurred in the course of his business. Such expenditure may be incurred
voluntarily and without any necessity. If it is incurred for promoting the
business and to earn profits, the assessee can claim deduction u/s 10(2)(xv)
even though there was no compelling need for incurring such expenditure. The
fact that somebody other than the assessee is also benefited by the expenditure
should not come in the way of an expenditure being allowed by way of deduction
u/s 10(2)(xv) of the Act. In the light of the above, the Revenue appeal was
dismissed.

 


M/s Sunshine Import and Export Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT; [ITA No. 4347/Mum/2015; Date of order: 9th September, 2016; Bench: B; A.Y.: 2008-09 to 2010-11; Mum. ITAT] Section 133A – Survey – Statement of directors of company recorded u/s 133A – No incriminating evidence and material – No evidentiary value – Any admission made in course of such statement cannot be made basis of addition

The Pr. CIT-4 vs. M/s Sunshine Import and Export Pvt. Ltd. [Income
tax Appeal Nos. 937, 1121 & 1135 of 2017]

Date of order: 4th March, 2020

(Bombay High Court)

 

M/s Sunshine Import and Export
Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT; [ITA No. 4347/Mum/2015; Date of order: 9th September,
2016; Bench: B; A.Y.: 2008-09 to 2010-11; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 133A – Survey – Statement
of directors of company recorded u/s 133A – No incriminating evidence and
material – No evidentiary value – Any admission made in course of such
statement cannot be made basis of addition

 

The assessee is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and trading in precious and semi-precious stones and
jewellery. It has two Directors, Shri Paras Jain and Shri Saurabh Garg. A
survey u/s 133A of the Act was carried out in respect of the assessee. During
the post-survey proceedings, the statement of one of the Directors, Shri
Saurabh Garg, was recorded. He was reported to have stated that the assessee
company provided only bill entries and there was no actual transaction of
purchase and sale. Subsequently, the statement of the other Director, Shri
Paras Jain, was also recorded. From the latter statement, the A.O. came to the
conclusion that he was a person of no means and drew the inference that the
assessee was engaged in the activity of issuing accommodation bills for the
sale and purchase of diamonds, apart from acting as a dummy for importers.
Holding the transactions as not reliable, the A.O. rejected the books of
accounts of the assessee company. He assessed 2% as the rate of commission of
the assessee on account of import purchases, i.e., for acting as a dummy. That
apart, commission @ 0.75% on sales bills was also assessed.

 

The CIT(A) confirmed the action
of the A.O., whereupon the assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal held that the
assessee is mainly engaged in the import of diamonds and their sale in local
markets to exporters. The import of diamonds is done through customs
authorities and banking channels in India. The import of diamonds undergoes the
appraisal process by appraisers appointed by the custom authorities. The officers
appointed by the Government of India verify physically each and every parcel of
diamonds in order to ascertain the quality, quantity, rate, value and place of
origin against the declaration made by the importers. Further, all the
transactions of purchase, sales, import are made through account payee cheques
and not a single payment is made to any party by way of cash. All the purchase
and sales transactions are carried out with reputed parties in the diamond
trade and all the payments received from debtors are through account payee
cheques; similarly, all payments to creditors are through account payee
cheques.

 

As such, the A.O. cannot
allegedly consider the import of goods as providing accommodation bills in the
market when physical delivery of goods was confirmed by the other arm of
government, i.e., the custom authorities. From the record it is noted that the
sales were made to reputed exporters who are assessed to tax and their
identities are known to the Income Tax Department. The customers are registered
under state VAT laws. The company has received payments against sales proceeds
by account payee cheques. The company has also purchased from local parties to
whom payment was made by account payee cheques. To discharge the onus of
proving the transactions as genuine and to substantiate that all purchases and
sales made are genuine, the assessee has submitted various documents and
submissions; copies of bank statement for the relevant year; ledger copies of
various purchases from parties for A.Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10; photo copies of
purchase invoices of parties for A.Y. 2008-09 and 2009-10; the relevant copies
of the daily stock register; confirmation from various sale parties; details of
interest received from various parties; details of unsecured loans along with
confirmation; and so on. These documents prove that the assessee is not engaged
in issuing accommodation bills and acting as a dummy for importing diamonds.
Thus, the contention of the A.O. that the bills issued by the assessee are all
accommodation bills is wrong. Just on the basis of one recorded statement he
cannot reach the conclusion that the assessee has issued accommodation bills
and reject the books of accounts of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved by the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in
arriving at such a finding, the Tribunal had noted that the survey party did
not find any incriminating evidence and material that could establish the stand
taken by the A.O. There was no disputing the fact that no incriminating
evidence was found on the day of the survey. It was also noted that merely on
the basis of the statement of one of the directors, Shri Saurabh Garg, and
that, too, recorded after 20 to 25 days of the survey, could not be sufficient
for bringing into assessment and making any addition to the income without
further supporting or corroborative evidence. The statement recorded u/s 133A
of the Act not being recorded on oath, cannot have any evidentiary value and no
addition can be made on the basis of such a statement.

 

In CIT
vs. S. Khader Khan Son 300 ITR 157
, the Madras High Court had concluded
that a statement recorded u/s 133A of the Act has no evidentiary value and that
materials or information found in the course of survey proceedings could not be
a basis for making any addition; besides, materials collected and statements
obtained u/s 133A would not automatically bind the assessee. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court by dismissing the civil appeal of the Revenue in CIT
vs. S. Khader Khan Son (Supra).
In view of the above, the Revenue
appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

Settlement of cases – Section 245D of ITA, 1961 – Proceedings for settlement are not adjudicatory proceedings – Assessee disputing liability but offering to pay additional tax – No non-disclosure of full and true facts – Order of Settlement Commission accepting offer of assessee is valid

8. Principal CIT vs.
Shreyansh Corporation

[2020] 421 ITR 153 (Guj.)

Date of order: 7th
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2004-05

 

Settlement of cases – Section
245D of ITA, 1961 – Proceedings for settlement are not adjudicatory proceedings
– Assessee disputing liability but offering to pay additional tax – No
non-disclosure of full and true facts – Order of Settlement Commission accepting
offer of assessee is valid

On an application for settlement
after considering the issues put forth by the Principal Commissioner in the
report u/r 9 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and the rejoinders of the assessees
and the documents submitted along with the statement of facts and the
submissions of the respective parties, the Settlement Commission noted that
insofar as the addition to partner’s capital was concerned, the assessees had
submitted affidavits made by M and the two assessees and it was further stated
that if at any stage these affidavits were found to be false, it may be treated
as a misrepresentation of facts u/s 245D(6) of the Act and the consequences as
u/s 245D(7) of the Act may follow in the case of the two assessees. The
Settlement Commission further noted that the assessees had offered additional
income for bringing quietus to certain issues in the spirit of a
settlement.

 

Taking into account all the facts
and discussions on record, the Settlement Commission was of the view that the additional
income offered during the section 245D(4) proceedings by the applicant’s letter
dated 8th June, 2018 over the additional income disclosed in the
settlement applications could be accepted with reference to the income
disclosed in the settlement applications. It further noted that the
Commissioner and the A.O. also did not make any further submissions. The
Settlement Commission accordingly settled the cases of the assessees on the
terms and conditions set out in the order.

 

The Principal Commissioner filed
writ petitions and challenged the order of the Settlement Commission. The
Gujarat High Court dismissed the petitions and held as under:

 

‘i)    The proceedings before the Settlement Commission are in the
nature of settlement between the parties and are not strictly speaking
adjudicatory proceedings. On a perusal of the order passed by the Settlement
Commission it was abundantly clear that the assessees had not accepted the
liability of 5% of trading expenses but in the spirit of settlement offered to
pay the amount computed by the A.O. with a view to bring quietus to the
matter and buy peace of mind. The offer to pay such amounts in addition to the
amounts disclosed in the applications u/s 245C of the Act could not be said to
be disclosure of any further amounts under that section as they had been
offered only to bring about a settlement.

 

ii)    The fact that the assessees had offered to pay such amounts, the
liability whereto they had not accepted, could not be termed as non-disclosure
of full and true facts in the applications u/s 245C of the Act.


iii)  Under the circumstances, considering
the amounts so offered by way of settlement, which were quite meagre
considering the overall disclosure made, there was no infirmity in the order
passed by the Settlement Commission warranting interference in exercise of
powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India’.

Revision – Section 264 of ITA, 1961 – Application for revision – Powers of Commissioner – Powers u/s 264 are very wide – Mistake in computation of income and revised return barred by limitation – Commissioner finding that mistake was inadvertent and claim for deduction bona fide – Order rejecting application for revision is not valid Income-tax – General principles – Effect of Article 265 of the Constitution of India – No tax collection except by authority of law

7. Sharp Tools vs. Principal
CIT

[2020] 421 ITR 90 (Mad.)

Date of order: 23rd
October, 2019

A.Y.: 2013-14

 

Revision – Section 264 of ITA,
1961 – Application for revision – Powers of Commissioner – Powers u/s 264 are
very wide – Mistake in computation of income and revised return barred by
limitation – Commissioner finding that mistake was inadvertent and claim for
deduction bona fide – Order rejecting application for revision is not
valid

 

Income-tax – General principles –
Effect of Article 265 of the Constitution of India – No tax collection except
by authority of law

 

The assessee
filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2013-14. It then received an intimation
u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 accepting the returned income.
Thereafter, the assessee realised that a mistake had inadvertently crept in
while filling up the quantum in column 14(i) of the return. Therefore, on 9th
January, 2016, the assessee filed a revised return rectifying the mistake. The
return was not processed by the Central Processing Centre, since it was
considered as a revised return filed beyond the specified time u/s 139(5) of
the Act. The assessee made an application to the A.O. for rectification u/s
154. The A.O. rejected the plea,  stating
that the claim was belated. Thereafter, the assessee filed a revision petition
u/s 264. Though the Principal Commissioner found that the mistake was inadvertent
and that the claim was bona fide, he rejected the revision petition.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition against the order. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and
held
as under:

‘i)    A careful perusal of section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
would show that it empowers the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner to
exercise the revisional jurisdiction over “any order” other than the
order to which section 263 applies. Such power is wider and confers on such
authority the responsibility to set things right wherever he finds that an
injustice has been done to the assessee. Before passing any order u/s 264 of
the Act, it is open to the authority to make such inquiry or cause such inquiry
to be made. However, such order should not be prejudicial to the assessee.

 

ii)    Article 265 of the Constitution of India specifically states that
no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Therefore, both
the levy and collection must be with the authority of law, and if any levy or
collection is later found to be wrong or without authority of law, certainly
such levy or collection cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Constitutional
provision and would be in violation of article 265 of the Constitution of
India.

 

iii)   A mere typographical error committed by the
assessee could not cost it payment of excess tax as collected by the Revenue.
The denial of repayment of such excess collection would amount to great
injustice to the assessee. Even though the statute prescribes a time limit for
getting the relief before the A.O. by way of filing a revised return, there was
no embargo on the Commissioner to exercise his power and grant the relief u/s
264. The order rejecting the application for revision was not valid.

 

iv)    Accordingly, this writ petition is
allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the matter is
remitted back to the respondent for considering the claim of the petitioner and
to pass appropriate orders in the light of the observations and findings
rendered supra. The respondent shall, accordingly, pass such fresh order
within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.’

Recovery of tax – Company in liquidation – Recovery from director – Section 179 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O. issued a notice u/s 179 against assessee director of a company seeking to recover tax dues of the company, since such notice was totally silent regarding fact that tax dues could not be recovered from company and, further, there was no whisper of any steps being taken against company for recovery of outstanding amount, impugned notice u/s 179 against director was to be set aside

6. Ashita Nilesh Patel vs.
ACIT

[2020] 115 taxmann.com 37
(Guj.)

Date of order: 20th
January, 2020

A.Ys.: 2011-12 to 2014-15

 

Recovery of tax – Company in
liquidation – Recovery from director – Section 179 of ITA, 1961 – Where A.O.
issued a notice u/s 179 against assessee director of a company seeking to
recover tax dues of the company, since such notice was totally silent regarding
fact that tax dues could not be recovered from company and, further, there was
no whisper of any steps being taken against company for recovery of outstanding
amount, impugned notice u/s 179 against director was to be set aside

 

The assessee was a director in
the company TPPL which failed to make payment of outstanding tax demand of
certain amount. The A.O. observed that it was noticed from the records of the
company that there were no recoverable assets in the name of the assessee
company. In such circumstances, proceedings u/s 179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
were initiated by way of issuing of notice to the assessee treating her as
jointly and severally liable for payment of such tax.

 

The assessee filed a writ
petition challenging the notice. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 179(1) provides for the joint and several liability of
the directors of a private company, wherein the tax dues from such company in
respect of any income of any previous year cannot be recovered. The first
requirement, therefore, to attract such liability of the director of a private
limited company is that the tax cannot be recovered from the company itself.
Such requirement is held to be a pre-requisite and necessary condition to be
fulfilled before action u/s 179 can be taken. In the context of section 179
before recovery in respect of the dues from a private company can be initiated
against the directors, to make them jointly and severally liable for such dues,
it is necessary for the Revenue to establish that such recovery cannot be made
against the company and then alone can it reach to the directors who were
responsible for the conduct of the business during the previous year in
relation to which liability exists.

 

ii)    There is no escape from the fact that the perusal of the notice
u/s 179 reveals that the same is totally silent as regards the satisfaction of
the condition precedent for taking action u/s 179, viz., that the tax dues
cannot be recovered from the company. In the show cause notice, there is no
whisper of any steps having been taken against the company for recovery of the
outstanding amount. Even in the impugned order, no such details or information
has been stated.

 

iii)   In the circumstances referred to above, the question is whether
such an order could be said to be sustainable in law. The answer has to be in
the negative. At the same time, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case and, more particularly, when it has been indicated by way of an additional
affidavit-in-reply as regards the steps taken against the company for the
recovery of the dues, one chance is to be given to the Department to undertake
a fresh exercise so far as section 179 is concerned. If the show cause notice
is silent including the impugned order, the void left behind in the two
documents cannot be filled by way of an affidavit-in-reply. Ultimately, it is
the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned that is important and it
should be reflected from the order itself based on some cogent materials.

 

iv)   The impugned notice as well as the
order is hereby quashed and set aside. It shall be open for the respondent to
issue fresh show cause notice for the purpose of proceeding against the writ
applicant u/s 179.’

Income – Business income – Section 41 of ITA, 1961 – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Condition precedent for application of section 41 – Assessee must have obtained benefit in respect of liability – Mere change of name in books of accounts not sufficient – Interest liability of State Government undertaking on government loans converted by order of State Government into equity share capital – No cessation of liability – Section 41 not applicable

5. CIT vs. Metropolitan
Transport Corporation (Chennai) Ltd.

[2020] 421 ITR 307 (Mad.)

Date of order: 9th
July, 2019

A.Y.: 2001-02

 

Income – Business income –
Section 41 of ITA, 1961 – Remission or cessation of trading liability –
Condition precedent for application of section 41 – Assessee must have obtained
benefit in respect of liability – Mere change of name in books of accounts not
sufficient – Interest liability of State Government undertaking on government
loans converted by order of State Government into equity share capital – No
cessation of liability – Section 41 not applicable

 

The assessee was a wholly-owned
Tamil Nadu Government undertaking, operating transport services. The assessee
had taken over the assets and liabilities of the transport services, which were
previously run by the Tamil Nadu State Government. The State Government treated
a part of the net worth of the undertaking as its share capital and the balance
as loan, on which the assessee claimed and was allowed interest payable year
after year as deduction u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Government of
Tamil Nadu took a decision and issued G.O. (Ms). No. 18, dated 7th
March, 2001 converting the interest outstanding of Rs. 8,264.17 lakhs payable
by the assessee company on 31st October, 2000 into equity shares.
The A.O. held that the sum of Rs. 8,264.17 lakhs was assessable u/s 41(1) of
the Act.

 

The Tribunal held that the amount
was not assessable u/s 41.

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    It is a prerequisite condition before having recourse to section
41 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that the assessee must have either obtained the
amount in respect of the loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred
earlier by it, or it should have received any benefit in respect of such
trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof. The objective is to
tax the amount or benefit received by the assessee, thereby making him pay back
the benefit availed of earlier by him by way of claiming loss, expenditure or
liability in respect of that amount. Remission is a positive conduct on the
part of the creditor. Mere change of nomenclature in the books of accounts
without anything more brings no benefit to the assessee and its liability to
pay to the creditor does not get extinguished. The treatment given in
accounting entries does not give rise to a taxable event. To invoke section 41
of the Act, the initial burden is on the Revenue to establish cessation or
remission of liability.

 

ii)    When there was no writing off of liabilities and only the
sub-head under which the liability was shown in the account books of the
assessee was changed, there could be no cessation of liability. When the
assessee company was liable to pay and it continued to remain liable even after
change of entries in the books of accounts, no benefit would accrue to the
assessee company merely on account of change of nomenclature, and consequently
the question of treating it as profit and gain would not arise.

 

iii)   For all the above reasons, the appeal
filed by the Revenue is dismissed and the substantial question of law is
answered against the Revenue.’

Income – Accounting – Section 145 of ITA, 1961 – Rejection of accounts and estimate of income – Discretion of A.O. must be exercised in a judicious manner

4. Rameshchandra Rangildas
Mehta vs. ITO

[2020] 421 ITR 109 (Guj.)

Date of order: 15th July,
2019

A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Income – Accounting – Section 145
of ITA, 1961 – Rejection of accounts and estimate of income – Discretion of
A.O. must be exercised in a judicious manner

 

For the A. Y. 2011-12 the
appellant had filed his return of income on 15th September, 2011
declaring total income at Rs. 5,34,342. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice
u/s 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued dated 31st July,
2012. The appellant filed his revised return of income on 30th
March, 2012, declaring a total income of Rs. 7,44,070 and claimed refund of Rs.
23,26,700. According to the appellant, he derived income from civil contracts
(labour job works). The appellant showed gross business receipts of Rs.
12,00,02,100 and a net profit of Rs. 5,37,942. The refund of Rs. 23,26,700 out
of the prepaid taxes contained tax deducted by M/s PACL Limited against the
payment for labour. The appellant showed labour receipts for income account of
Rs. 12,00,02,100.

 

The A.O., relying on the
statement of the appellant recorded u/s 131 of the Act and the information
received subsequent to the search in the case of M/s PACL India Limited, came
to the conclusion that the dealings of the appellant with M/s PACL India
Limited were accommodation entries. The A.O. issued show cause notice dated 14th
March, 2014 calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why the labour
receipt income of Rs. 12,00,02,100 should not be treated as income from other
sources u/s 56 of the Act. The appellant, vide his reply dated 21st
March, 2014, explained that he had only received commission of Rs. 0.30 on Rs.
100, i.e., Rs. 3,60,000 on Rs. 12,00,02,100 which had already been included in
the net profit and reflected in the profit and loss account. The A.O. rejected
the books of accounts u/s 145(3) of the Act and estimated the income at 10% of
the gross receipts; he made an addition of Rs. 1,20,00,210 as income from other
sources u/s 56 of the Act.

 

The appellant submitted before
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the estimation of net profit at
10% was on the higher side and he had received commission at 0.45% only. He
also pointed out that the returned income included the profit of Rs. 4,13,742
from the labour contract receipts and set-off should have been granted against
the addition of commission income by the A.O. The Commissioner (Appeals)
estimated the commission at Rs. 24,00,042, i.e., 2% on the basis that the same
is 6.7% of the tax benefit derived by PACL India Limited, i.e., 30%, and the
same was a reasonable estimate. The Commissioner (Appeals) took the view that
the set-off of only the net income from the fictitious contract receipts could
be granted. Further, he reduced the interest income and retail sales from the
net profit to grant the set-off. The set-off granted by the Commissioner
(Appeals) came to only Rs. 1,46,942 [Rs. 5,37,942 (net profit) – Rs. 1,20,000
(interest income) – Rs. 2,71,000 (retail sales)]. Thus, the Commissioner
(Appeals) partly confirmed the addition to the extent of Rs. 22,53,100.

 

Being dissatisfied with the order
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), the Department preferred an appeal before
the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The appellant preferred cross-objection. The
Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

Dissatisfied with the order
passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the appellant filed an appeal before the High
Court and proposed the following substantial question of law:

 

‘Whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law
in confirming addition of Rs. 22,53,100 on account of alleged commission income
at 2% without there being any evidence or material on record for making such
estimate?’

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed
the appeal and held as under:

 

‘i)    Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 gives power to the A.O.
to reject the assessee’s accounts. Although sub-section (3) of section 145
gives him the discretion to make an assessment in the manner provided in
section 144, yet this discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The question
to determine in every such case is whether there is any material for the basis
adopted by the A.O. or the Tribunal, as the case may be, for computing the
income of the assessee. The material which is irrelevant or which amounts to
mere guesswork or conjecture is no material.

 

ii)    The A.O. thought it fit to estimate 10% commission for providing
accommodation entries to the tune of Rs. 12,00,02,100. The Commissioner
(Appeals) took the view that the estimation of commission at 10% by the A.O. is
one-third of the benefit, which could be termed as excessive and not a
reasonable estimate. The Commissioner (Appeals), without there being anything on
record, thought it fit to take the view that the estimate by the assessee at 3%
translated to 1% of the benefit derived, which could be termed too low, and in
such circumstances, estimated it at 2%, which would translate to about 6.7% of
the benefit alleged to have been derived by P. This was nothing but pure
guesswork without there being any material or basis for arriving at the same.
The Tribunal was not right in law in confirming the addition.

 

iii)   Ordinarily, we would not have entertained the appeal of the
present nature having regard to the fact that the income has been assessed
based on estimation. However, the way the authorities have proceeded with the
guesswork, it cannot be approved.

 

iv)   In view of the above, this tax appeal
succeeds and is hereby allowed. The question of law is answered in favour of
the assessee and against the Revenue. The impugned order passed by the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside.’

Charitable purpose (objects of general public utility) – Section 2(15) r.w.s. 12A of ITA, 1961 – Where assessee association was engaged in primary aim and objective to organise and arrange all licensed third party administrators (TPAs) to be members of trust for mutual betterment of TPA business, merely because certain benefits accrued to TPA members and certain objects of trust were for advancement of business of TPA, it would not ipso facto render trust to be non-charitable

3. CIT (Exemption) vs.
Association of Third Party Administrators

[2020] 114 taxmann.com 534
(Delhi)

Date of order: 20th
January, 2020

 

Charitable purpose (objects of
general public utility) – Section 2(15) r.w.s. 12A of ITA, 1961 – Where
assessee association was engaged in primary aim and objective to organise and
arrange all licensed third party administrators (TPAs) to be members of trust
for mutual betterment of TPA business, merely because certain benefits accrued
to TPA members and certain objects of trust were for advancement of business of
TPA, it would not ipso facto render trust to be non-charitable

 

On 12th December, 2005
the assessee association of third party administrators (ATPA) filed an
application seeking registration u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said
application was rejected by the Director (Exemption) holding that certain
objects of the trust were not charitable and trustees had discretion in
applying the trust’s income to any of the objects. The Director (Exemption)
held that the assessee ATPA was aiming at industry status for third party
administrator (TPA) business and was working for mutual benefit of its members.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal
in favour of the assessee and directed the Commissioner (Exemption) to provide
registration to the assessee u/s 12AA of the Act.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)    At the initial stage of registration, it is
to be examined whether the proposed activities of the assessee can be
considered charitable within the meaning of section 2(15). On an application
for registration of a trust or institution made under section 12AA, the
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner shall call for such documents or
information from the trust or institution as he thinks necessary in order to
satisfy himself about the genuineness of the activities of the trust or
institution; and the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the
time being in force by the trust or institution, as are material for the
purpose of achieving its objects, and he may also make such inquiries as he may
deem necessary in this behalf. Once he is satisfied about the objects of the
trust or institution and the genuineness of its activities, he shall pass an
order under the said provision. On this aspect the tax authorities have looked
into the aims and objects of the trust.

 

ii)    The primary or dominant object of the trust satisfies the
conditions laid down u/s 2(15). Even if some ancillary or incidental objects
are not charitable in nature, the institution would still be considered as a
charitable organisation. Merely because some facilities were beyond its main
object, that by itself would not deprive the institution of the benefits of a
charitable organisation. If the primary purpose of advancement of objects is
for general public utility, the institution would remain charitable, even if
there are incidental non-charitable objects for achieving the said purpose.

 

iii)   Merely because the objects of the trust are for the advancement of
the business of TPA, it would not ipso facto render the trust to be
non-charitable. The objects of the trust are not exclusively for the promotion
of the interests of the TPA members. The objects were to provide benefit to the
general public in the field of insurance and health facilities. In the course
of carrying out the main activities of the trust, the benefits accruing to the
TPA members cannot, by itself, deny the institution the benefit of being a
charitable organisation.

 

iv)     For
the foregoing reasons, there is no substantial question of law arising.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.’

Business expenditure – Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempted income – Section 14A of ITA, 1961 – Disallowance cannot exceed exempt income earned – Tribunal restricting disallowance to extent offered by assessee – Proper

2. Principal CIT vs. HSBC Invest Direct (India) Ltd.

[2020] 421 ITR 125 (Bom.)

Date of order: 4th
February, 2019

A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Business
expenditure – Disallowance of expenditure relating to exempted income – Section
14A of ITA, 1961 – Disallowance cannot exceed exempt income earned – Tribunal
restricting disallowance to extent offered by assessee – Proper

 

The assessee
is a limited company. In the return of income filed for the A.Y. 2009-10, the
question of making disallowance to the expenditure claimed by the assessee in
terms of section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 came up for consideration. During the assessment in the
appellate proceedings, the assessee offered restricted disallowance of Rs. 1.30
crores. The Department contended firstly that the statutory auditors in the
report had made a disallowance of Rs. 2.53 crores u/s 14A of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, and secondly that in view of the assessee’s income which was exempt,
the disallowance had to be made under Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s voluntary offer of disallowance of
expenditure.

 

The Revenue filed an appeal
against the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, raising the
following question for consideration:

 

‘(i) Whether the order of the
Tribunal is perverse in law as it ignored the disallowance computed by the
auditors of the assessee which was in accordance with section 14A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962?’

 

The Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The disallowance of expenditure incurred to earn the exempt
income could not exceed the exempt income earned. The ratio of the decisions in
the cases of Cheminvest Ltd. vs. CIT [2015] 378 ITR 33 (Delhi) and
CIT vs. Holcim India (P) Ltd. (I.T.A. No. 486 of 2014 decided on 5th
September, 2014)
would include a facet where the assessee’s exempt
income was not nil, but had earned exempt income which was more than the
expenditure incurred by the assessee in order to earn such income.

 

ii) The order of the Tribunal which
restricted the disallowance of the expenditure to the extent voluntarily
offered by the assessee was not erroneous.’

RETURNS UNDER GST – A NEW LOOK !!

INTRODUCTION


1.  When GST was introduced in July,
2017, a lot of noise was created around the proposed elaborate return filing
systems which provided for online uploading of invoices issued by the supplier
systems, monthly reconciliation of transaction between registered persons,
amendment of transaction in case of mis-matches and subsequently filing of the
final return on a monthly basis to be followed by an annual return at the end
of the financial year and audit for suppliers where the aggregate turnover
exceeded the prescribed limit of Rs. 2 crore.

2.  However, the system remained in
papers only as implementation was hit with multiple issues, ranging from
non-functional government portal, lack of preparedness amongst all the
stakeholders, confusion relating to the law, and so on. Therefore, dropping the
above proposed structure, the elaborate return filing mechanism was kept on
hold and compliance was restricted to filing of GSTR 1, i.e., details of
outward supplies on either monthly or quarterly basis depending upon prescribed
turnover and GSTR 3B, a summary statement of outward supplies made during the
period and input tax credit availed on inward supplies on a monthly basis.

3.  However, the makeshift
arrangement did not serve the purpose of Government to allow credits based on
transaction level matching, identifying defaulting taxpayers at an earlier
stage, etc. Therefore, a new return filing mechanism has been proposed to
re-introduce the concept of uploading of all details relating to outward and
inward supplies and matching of transactions. In this article, we shall deal
with the proposed return forms and various intricate issues revolving around
the same. The entire discussion is based on the proposed return formats made
available on the public platform. The proposed return filing mechanism is
expected to be made applicable w.e.f July, 2019. The enabling provisions w.r.t
the same are contained in section 43A of the CGST Act, 2017.

 

BROAD FRAMEWORK

4.  The proposed framework
bifurcates tax payers into two categories, based on their aggregate turnover
as:

Tax payers having annualised aggregate turnover during FY 2017-18
not exceeding Rs. 5 crore
. Such tax payers have been given an option to
file returns quarterly or monthly. Further, there are three different options
of returns which can be filed by such tax payers, which are Sahaj, Sugam and
Normal returns. However, if opting for quarterly returns, the tax payers would
be required to make payment of taxes on monthly basis only, which would be
considered while filing of quarterly returns. Further, in case of fresh
registration, the turnover of the previous financial year shall be considered
as zero and therefore such taxpayers shall have an option of filing the returns
either monthly or quarterly.

Tax payers having annualised aggregate turnover during FY 2017-18
exceeding Rs. 5 crore.
Such tax payers have to compulsorily file returns on
monthly basis.

5.  The following chart explains
the proposed scheme:

 

6.  The option of whether return
has to be filed monthly or quarterly has to be selected at the start of the
financial year. It is important to note that once a periodicity is selected,
the same can be changed only during the start of next financial year. It is
also important to note that in case there is a change in status during the next
Financial Year, it will be the responsibility of the tax payer to opt for the
change. In case no option is selected, the option selected in the previous year
shall continue to be applied for the next Financial Year as well.

7.  Once a tax payer opts to file
quarterly returns, the next step that he needs to take is decide the type of
return that he has to file. For such tax payers there are three different
options of return filing available based on the type of transactions carried
out. For instance, Sahaj scheme is feasible for such tax payers who exclusively
provide service to unregistered persons while Sugam is suitable for those class
of tax payers who are providing service to both, registered as well as
unregistered persons but do not make other supplies, such as exempt, non-GST,
zero rated, etc. For the balance tax payers, i.e., who have all kinds of
transactions, the normal option has to be chosen.

8.  In case Sahaj option has been
selected, the tax payer can switch to Sugam but not vice-versa. Similarly, in
case a tax payer selects the normal scheme, he can switch to Sahaj / Sugam
scheme. However, the switch can be done only once, at the start of the
financial year. Further, option for switching from Sugam to Sahaj is not
available, except at the start of the financial year.

 

FLOW OF EVENTS


9.  The flow of events preceding
the filing of the above returns, be it Sahaj / Sugam / Normal return is

-Filing of ANX – 1 – this contains details of outward supplies made
during the tax period and details of inward supplies liable to RCM.

-Filing of ANX – 2 – based on details auto-populated from the suppliers
ANX – 1, the recipient shall file details of inward supplies are following the
steps discussed in the subsequent paras.

-Filing of RET – 1/2/3 – basis the details furnished in ANX – 1 and ANX
– 2, the tax payer will be required to file his applicable return and discharge
the applicable taxes, interest, fees, etc.,

-Interestingly, the formats are silent w.r.t the due dates for filing
the Annexures. Only in the context of ANX – 2, it has been stated that the same
shall be deemed to be filed after the return for the relevant period (month /
quarter) has been filed.

10. While the return in case of
Sahaj and Sugam has to be filed quarterly, the tax payer will have to make
payment on monthly basis in PMT-08 on provisional basis, after disclosing the
liability as well as the ITC availed provisionally, which will be available for
offset while filing the quarterly return. However, in all other cases,
compliances will have to be done on a monthly basis.

11. In this article, we shall
discuss in detail the various intricate aspects revolving around the filing of
ANX – 1 , ANX – 2 and RET – 1 along with the amendments through ANX – 1A and
RET – 1A.

 

ANX – 1 – details of outward supplies and inward
supplies liable to RCM

12. The new mechanism provides the
tax payer an option to upload ANX – 1 during the course of tax period itself
and not after the end of tax period. Further, the details will also be updated
on real time basis and would be made available to the recipient in his ANX – 2
by way of auto-population.

13. It is imperative to note that
the information to be provided in ANX – 1 is segregated into two parts, one
relating to outward supplies and second relating to inward supplies liable to
RCM. However, on going through the proposed formats, one can note that the
details relating to inward supplies required to be reported not only covers
transactions where tax is payable on RCM, but also all other cases where tax is
applicable but not charged by vendors. For instance, import of goods from
outside India / SEZ / SEZ developer and documents on which credit has been
claimed but not disclosed by the supplier in his RET – 1 for more than two tax
periods, if the tax payer files return monthly and one tax period if the tax
payer files return quarterly.

14. The following table lists down
the key information relating to a transaction that would be required to be
reported in ANX – 1:

 

GSTIN / UIN

      The requirement to file this information
is available in the current scheme as well.

Place of Supply
(Name of State/ UT)

Document Details

      Type

      No.

      Date

      Value

 

      Under the
current scheme of things, each document type had to be reported separately.
For instance, under the current regime, invoices and credit notes were
reported in separate tables. This is sought to be changed with all document
types, have to be reported under the same head.

HSN Code

      While the
current formats prescribed the  need to
disclose the HSN code of goods / SAC of service being supplied to be
disclosed in the GSTR 1, the said functionality was never enabled on the
portal. The same is sought to be reintroduced.

      Under the
proposed scheme, the reporting is mandated as under:

 

 

      Interestingly, the need to report HSN
wise summary, containing quantitative details has been done away with.

 

Tax rate (%)

This is standard
information which is required to be disclosed even under the existing scheme.

Taxable value

Tax amount
(I/C/S/Cess)

      Under the proposed scheme, the tax
amount will be auto calculated and not editable, except by way of issue of
debit notes / credit notes. Cess will have to be inputted manually.

Shipping Bill/ Bill
of Export details (No. & Date)

      If at the time of filing ANX – 1, these
details are not available, an option to update the same at a later date will
also be provided.

 

15. Once the above set of details
w.r.t each transaction has been collated, the tax payers will need to
segregate, depending on its’ nature, each transaction into:

 

Segregation into
the basket of

Comments

3A. Supplies made to consumers and unregistered persons
(Net of debit notes/ credit notes)

3A is common across all the three return schemes while
3B is common for Sugam and the normal scheme.

      HSN wise
details need not be reported for 3A, though required for 3B.

      It is
however important to note that disclosure relating to outward supplies liable
for tax under reverse charge need not be reported here.

3B. Supplies made to registered persons (Other than
those attracting reverse charge mechanism) – including edit / amendment

3C. Exports with payment of tax

      The
information sought in this section is similar to what is being required to be
provided in the current scheme as well.

      However, it
is provided that in case of export of goods, details of shipping bill / bill
of export may be provided at a later date also. 

3D. Exports w/o
payment of tax

3E. Supplies to SEZ units/ developers with payment of
tax – including edit / amendment

      The
information sought in this section is similar to what is being required to be
provided in the current scheme as well.

      However,
one important aspect that needs to be noted in the context of 3E is that the
supplier will have an option to select whether he / the SEZ Unit / Developer
would claim refund on such supplies or not? The SEZ Developer / unit will be
entitled to avail such credits and claim consequential claim refund of such
tax only if the supplier is not claiming refunds.

      Similarly,
even in the context of 3G, it has been provided that supplier shall declare
who will claim the refund, the supplier or recipient. If supplier is claiming
refund, the recipient shall not be entitled to avail the corresponding
credits.

3F. Supplies to SEZ units/ developers without payment
of tax – including edit / amendment

3G. Deemed exports
– including edit / amendment

3H. Inward supplies attracting reverse charge

      The notes
to the return provides that the details of inward supplies attracting RCM
need to be provided GSTIN wise and not invoice wise. In case of unregistered
suppliers, it has been provided that the PAN wise details may be disclosed.

      Furthermore,
it has been also clarified that the details of advances / debit notes /
credit notes relating to such inward supplies have also to be included in the
summary referred. Interestingly, the notes further provide that in case of
advance payment, the tax credit needs to be reversed in the Return form and
the same has to be claimed only after the said service has been received.

3I. Import of Services (Net of DN/ CN and advances
paid, if any)

3J. Import of goods

      The note
provides that the details of tax paid on import of goods from outside India /
SEZ Units / developers shall be reported here.

      It further
clarifies that this information shall be required to be provided till the
data starts flowing from the ICEGATE (Customs) portal.

 

3K. Import of goods from SEZ units/developers on a Bill
of Entry

3L. Missing documents on which credit has been claimed
in T-2 / T-1 (for quarter) tax period and supplier has not reported the same
till the filing of the return for current tax period

      This refers
to cases where credit was claimed though not appearing in ANX – 2 but even
after the expiry of two months/1 quarter from the availment of credit, the
same has not been uploaded by the supplier, thus triggering a reversal u/s.
42 (5) of CGST Act, 2017.

 

16. The above classification at
various junctures mentions “including edit / amendment”. The background to the
same is that the proposed scheme is also expected to work on a concept of
matching of transactions. It has been provided that once a transaction has been
uploaded on the portal, the facility to edit/amend the same shall depend on the
status of the transaction, i.e., whether it has been accepted or not? If not
accepted, the same can be amended upto 10th of the following month.
However, if accepted, the same can be amended upto 10th of the
following month, provided the same has been reset/unlocked by the recipient.
However, this restriction of editing/amending a transaction will not apply to
cases where the same pertains to a transaction of supply to a person not filing
returns in RET – 1/2/3, for example supplies made to composition dealers, ISD
or UIN holders and so on). Further, a facility of shifting the documents is
also proposed to be provided for transactions rejected by recipients on account
of wrong tagging. For instance, transaction wrongly tagged as SEZ supply on
payment of tax while the same relates to SEZ supply without payment of tax.

17. In addition to the above, all
tax payers who make supplies through e-commerce operators shall also be
required to disclose the details of turnover made through E-commerce operator
in table 4. However, it is important to note that the details to be disclosed
in table 4 should already be disclosed in table 3 and this is merely for
statistical purpose and would not have any impact on the output liability of
the tax payer.

 

TRANSITION FROM EXISTING SYSTEM


18. One important question that
arises is how to deal with cases where invoices were issued prior to the
introduction of the proposed scheme. For such cases, there can be three
probable scenarios, as tabulated below:

 

Scenario

Probable actions

Not reported, either in R1/ 3B

Upload the document in ANX – 1 and discharge tax along
with interest in RET – 1

Reported in 3B, but not reported in R1

Document should be uploaded, but in case of invoice,
since the tax liability would already have been discharged, the same would
have to be disclosed at 3C (5) of RET – 1 as reduction in liability.

However, while dealing with CNs, since the reduction
has already been claimed in the earlier scheme, reporting of CN would require
increase in liability to be reported at 3A (8) of RET – 1.

Reported in R1, but not reported in 3B

This would refer to cases where the tax effect of an
invoice/CN has not be considered while filing 3B. For such cases, w.r.t
invoices, the tax amount should be disclosed at 3A (8) in RET – 1 to increase
the liability and in case of credit notes, the tax amount should be disclosed
at 3C (5) to reduce the liability.

 

ANX – 2 ANNEXURE OF INWARD SUPPLIES AND MATCHING CONCEPT


19. This annexure primarily deals
with the concept of matching of transactions wherein the transactions reported
by suppliers would be auto-populated on real time basis in this annexure and
the recipient is required to mark each such transaction as either accepted,
rejected or pending.

20. The act of accepting a document
would mean that the recipient has accepted the transaction in all aspects. Acceptance
of a transaction would make it not eligible for edit / amendment by supplier,
unless unlocked.

21. Upon acceptance, if the
supplier has disclosed the transaction in ANX – 1 by 10th of the
next month, credit of the same can be claimed by the recipient in the month to
which the transaction pertains. However, for transactions disclosed after 10th
of the next month, credit would get deferred. Let us understand this with an
example. A supplier has issued an invoice on 15th July, 2019 and
disclosed the same in ANX – 1 on 5th August, 2019, the recipient can
claim credit of this invoice while filing the return for the month of July,
2019 itself. However, in case the supplier reports this transaction only on 15th
August, 2019, then the credit will have to be claimed in the next month.

22. The need to reject a
transaction shall arise, as per the instructions to filing ANX – 2, when
recipient does not agree with details disclosed such as the HSN Code, tax rate,
value etc., which cannot be corrected through a credit/debit note or the GSTIN
of the recipient itself is erroneous and therefore the transaction appears to a
person who is not concerned with the same. The notice of rejection of a
transaction would be sent to the supplier only after filing of return by the
recipient and the same would enable the supplier to edit / amend the
transactions in ANX – 1.

23. The third action, i.e., mark
the transaction as pending means that the recipient is either unsure of the
transaction appearing in ANX – 2 or he is yet to receive the invoice for such
transaction or the corresponding supplies would not have been received by them.
Such transactions which are marked as pending would be rolled over to the ANX –
2 for the next period. However, the same would not be available to the
supplier for editing / amendment unless the recipient rejects them.

24. However, if any transaction is
not marked as accepted/ rejected / pending and the return in RET – 1 / 2 / 3 is
filed, the same shall be deemed to be accepted and corresponding ITC shall be
made available for such recipient. Therefore, it would be very important for
the recipient to ensure that all transactions are marked as either accepted,
rejected or pending as failure to do so might result in claim of credit in case
of transactions which were ultimately meant to be rejected or dealt with
ineligible credits.

25. In addition to the above, there
can be instances wherein a recipient has received invoice from a supplier and
accounted the same in his books of accounts. However, such invoice is not
reported by the supplier in his ANX – 1 or has been reported wrongly (say
classified as B2C or tagged to wrong GSTIN and so on). For such transactions,
the recipient of supply shall be required to self-claim credit for such
transactions in the return form. However, such recipient shall be required to
disclose transactions of self – claim of credit in ANX – 1 if the supplier has
failed to report the transaction in his ANX – 1, in the following manner:

-If the supplier failed to report supplies after lapse of two tax
periods in case of monthly return and one tax period in case of quarterly
return being filed by the recipient.

-The details of such transactions
wherein the suppliers have still not filed their returns, but credit has been
claimed by therecipient shall be made available to the recipient through ANX –
2.



RET – 1 – MONTHLY OR QUARTERLY RETURNS UNDER THE NORMAL SCHEME


26. This is the return which each
tax payer is required to file w.r.t his outward and inward supplies. As of now,
the formats suggest that substantial information would be auto-populated from
disclosures made in ANX – 1 and actions taken on various transactions appearing
in ANX – 2 of the tax payer.

27. However, there would be certain
information which would be required to be filled by the tax payer. The same in
the context of outward supplies would be:

 

3.A.8. Liabilities relating to period prior to the
introduction of current return filing system and any other liability to be
paid

Refer discussion at para 19

3.C.3. Advances received (net of refund vouchers and
including adjustments on account of wrong reporting of advances earlier)

In the current scheme, this information needs to be
furnished in GSTR 1 along with POS wise, rate wise summary.

3.C.4. Advances adjusted

3.C.5. Reduction in output tax liability on account of
transition from composition levy to normal levy, if any or any other
reduction in liability

Refer discussion at para 19

3.D. (1-5) Details of supplies having no liability
[Exempt and nil rated supplies, non-GST supplies (including no
supply/Schedule III supplies), outward supplies attracting reverse charge and
supply of goods by a SEZ unit/ developer to DTA on a bill of entry]

This clause proposes to cover transactions of outward
supplies on which no GST is applicable, such as exempt supplies, non-GST
supplies and so on.

 

28. Similarly in the context of
inward supplies and input tax credit, the tax payer would require to input
following details which would increase the claim of input tax credit:

 

4.A.4. Eligible credit (after 1st July,
2017) not availed prior to the introduction of this return but admissible as
per Law (transition to new return system)

This clause will cover disclosure of  credit claim relating to invoices issued
under the GST Regime but prior to the introduction of the new scheme of
returns filing.

4.A.10. Provisional input tax credit on documents not
uploaded by the supplier (net of ineligible credit)

This clause will cover self – claimed credits where
transactions are not appearing in ANX – 2 but claimed by the tax payer on the
strength of the documents available on record.

4.A.11. Upward adjustments to input tax credits due to
receipt of credit notes and all other adjustments and reclaims

In case of credit notes reported by a supplier in ANX –
1 and accepted by the recipient in his ANX – 2, there will be automatic
reversal of input tax credit. However, there can be cases where the recipient
would not have claimed credit in the original invoice itself, thus resulting
in double reversal of credit for the recipient. For such cases, the amount of
tax associated with each credit notes will have to be added back to the ITC
claim of the recipient.



Any other adjustments shall also be reported here.

 

29. Further following details which
would decrease the claim of input tax credit will also have to be manually
added to the return by the tax payer:

 

4.B.2. Supplies not eligible for credit (including ISD
credit)

[out of net credit available in table 4A above]

This would cover cases relating to claim of input tax
credit which are covered by section 17 (5) or other cases wherein the claim
of credit is not eligible.

4.B.3. Reversal of credit in respect of supplies on
which provisional credit has already been claimed in the previous tax periods
but documents have been uploaded by the supplier in the current tax period

This clause covers credits which were self-claimed in
the earlier period, and the corresponding transaction has been uploaded by
the supplier and accepted by the tax payer during the current tax period and
therefore in order to avoid double claim, to the extent credit was claimed
provisionally to be reversed.

4.B.4. Reversal of input tax credit as per law (Rule
37, 39, 42 and 43)

This would include adjustments on account of the
specific provisions in the Act

4.B.5. Other reversals, including downward adjustments
to input tax credits on account of transition from composition to normal
levy, if any

This would include all other reversals to input tax
credit on account of reasons, other than the above.

30.In addition to the above, as statistical
information, the tax payer would need to identify the amount of credit which
pertains to capital goods and input services out of ITC available net of
reversals determined in the return. The logic behind this segregation is to
determine the amount of ITC in case the tax payer claims refund of accumulated
ITC on account of zero rated supplies/inverted rate structure. However, this
would pose a substantial challenge since various adjustments to the ITC
reported in the return, such as relating to Rule 43 are at aggregate level and
cannot be identified easily at transaction level and therefore the submission
of information to this extent might pose difficulty.

31. The next field that is relevant relates to
calculation of interest and late fee details at table 6. The liability on
account of interest and late fee due to late filing of returns would be
auto-computed by the system. Interestingly, this would also cover following:

liability on
account of late reporting of tax invoices, for instance, invoice of July
reported in August.

liability on
account of rejection of accepted documents.

32. In addition to the above, the tax payer will be
also required to self-calculate interest liability on account of following:

reversal of input
tax credit on account of various reasons, such as Rule 37, 42, 43, etc., as
well as interest

interest liability on account of delayed reporting of transactions
attracting reverse charge. The time of supply in case of reverse charge
transactions is attracted within 60 days from the date of invoice or date of
payment to the vendor, whichever is earlier. However, in case of supply of
services by Associated Enterprises located outside India, the time of supply is
triggered on the date when the entry is made in the books of accounts or the
date of payment, whichever is earlier. In all such cases where the time of
supply is determined late, the same would result in a liability to pay interest
which would have to be reported here.

    Any other interest liability

33. Once the above action is taken, the tax payer
will have to discharge the liability, either by utilising the balance lying in
electronic cash ledger or electronic credit ledger as per the applicable
provisions and file the return.

 

ANX – 1A AMENDMENTS TO ANX – 1

34. Under the proposed scheme, it is provided that
a tax payer can amend the details furnished in ANX – 1 and RET – 1 by amending
the return filed for the tax period in which the transaction was reported.
However, such amendment can be done only for transactions wherein GSTIN level
details were not submitted. In other words, B2B, SEZ and Deemed export
transactions cannot be amended. The same will have to be processed through the
“edit/amendment” route only as discussed above.

35. For other cases wherein amendment is required,
the amendment will have to be given effect for the period to which the
transaction pertains. For instance, a sales invoice was reported in July, 2019
as local sale. In September, 2019, it came to the tax payers’ attention that
the transaction was wrongly reported as local sale though it was an interstate
sale as per invoice. Accordingly, for such transaction, the tax payer will be
required to file ANX – 1A of July, 2019 and then proceed to file RET – 1A to
amend the RET – 1 of that period.

36. The above concept will be applicable in case of
amendment of transaction reported late in ANX – 1 also. For instance, an
invoice dated July, 2019 has been reported in ANX – 1 of September, 2019 and
liability discharged while filing the return for September, 2019. However, if
for such transaction any amendment is required to be done, the same will have
to be done in the month of July, 2019 as the transaction pertains to that
month, though disclosed in September, 2019.

37. An amendment can be done in ANX – 1A only w.r.t
transactions which have been reported in ANX – 1. For instance in the above
example, if an invoice dated July, 2019 was not reported in ANX – 1 of July,
2019, the same cannot be then reported in July, 2019 through ANX – 1A. Such
transactions can be reported only through ANX – 1.

38. The ANX – 1A shall be deemed to be filed only
after the RET – 1A has been filed.

 

RET – 1A – AMENDMENT TO RET – 1

39. Based on the details amended in ANX – 1A,
amendment to details already disclosed in RET – 1 on account of the ANX – 1A
will have to be done. For instance, in ANX – 1A, the liability under reverse
charge has been increased. The impact of this amendment will be auto-populated
in RET – 1A and the tax payer will have to make disclosures w.r.t the said
amendment as to whether any supplies are not eligible for credits and so on.
Only the impact of amendments will be considered in RET – 1A and not all the
transactions reported in the original return.

40. Basis the amendments disclosed in the RET – 1A,
the net tax payable/refundable will be determined. In case a liability is
determined, the same will have to be paid before the filing of RET – 1A.
However, in case the amendment results in excess payment, or negative liability
as referred in the instructions, the same will be made available to the
taxpayer in the next RET – 1 to be filed after filing of RET – 1A. 

 

CONCLUSION:

41. The proposed scheme of returns, undoubtedly
appear more in the nature of old wine in new bottle, with the scope of details
to be disclosed remaining more or less the same. However, there are certain
substantial changes, such as option to amend the returns itself.

42.  In
addition to the above, it will also be important for tax payers to shore up
their IT systems to facilitate the above process through automation rather than
manual intervention to avoid possibility of errors.

IMPORTANCE OF VOLUNTEERING IN STUDENT LIFE

“The way to find
yourself is to lose yourself in the service of others” – Mahatma Gandhi.

 

It is rightly
concluded by the great national leader and human being, Mahatma Gandhi in the
above quote that you need to serve others in order to know your true purpose in
life and what better stage than student life.

 

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY VOLUNTEERING?

Volunteering simply
means undertaking a task or providing service to an organisation or a cause
without being paid for the same. It is an act of altruistic behaviour i.e., not
having a selfish motive behind doing anything. Thus, it is rightly said that
volunteers are paid in six figures i.e. S-M-I-L-E-S.

 

WHY SHOULD STUDENTS VOLUNTEER?

The early you start
a habit the better it is. A human being while he is studying can quickly adapt
changes and make such change a part of his life. Student life enables a person
to explore among the choices which he can make along with its academic curriculum.

 

Following are the
benefits of volunteering in a student’s life which make the act of volunteering
important:

 

1. Effective
utilisation of time and time management skills

Nowadays, it is a
common scenario to find students of all ages especially the teenagers glue
their eyes to electronic devices like mobiles, tablets and laptops. Though
technology is an integral part of the human beings alive today but more often
it is found to be misutilised or excessively utilised by the younger
generation.

 

Volunteering for a
particular cause or an event will help a student to effectively utilise the
available time.

 

Also, it is
observed that those students’ who volunteer develop better time management
skills because they learn to balance all tasks in the given time.

 

2. Inculcating civic behaviour

Students who
volunteer for social causes tend to develop a sense of civic behaviour. A
recent example is that of Swachh Bharat Mission which saw many students
actively participating in cleanliness drive which has created awareness among
all.

 

Causes like
protecting the environment, saving wildlife, segregation of waste, saving
water, among others have immensely helped in creating a sense of responsibility
towards the society and mankind.

 

3. Develops a habit
of team work

“Alone we can do
little but together we can do so much” – Hellen Keller.


Volunteering is
done in groups or teams and students are assigned tasks they are supposed to
perform in a team. A student learns how to be a team player. He learns to adapt
with people of different culture and background and thus be effective in
adjusting with anyone in the future while working in a team.

 

4. Improve leadership skills

Students who volunteer often find themselves capable of taking any task
on their own. The confidence gained during volunteering helps them to possess
good leadership skills which will be beneficial in every aspect of life in the
future.

 

5. Promotes healthy well-being

Students remain
active when they take up any other activity voluntarily and it is normally seen
that such students are very active, energetic and have a positive outlook
towards life. They are enthusiastic as they always look forward to do something
more than normal. It is observed that students who volunteer gain peace of mind
through the activities they perform for others.

 

6. Students become more responsible –
socially

Be the change
you wish to see in the world. – Mahatma Gandhi

 

In todays’ era,
change is inevitable and it is the only thing which is constant. Students wish
to make a difference in the society and volunteering or standing up for
something gives them a platform to put forward their point of views and help in
bringing about the change by first, starting themselves and then creating
awareness among their peers social responsibility is that of the society and
what better way than learning in a students’ life.

 

7. Helps in improving CV

After completing
your academic career, a student builds his professional career based on his
knowledge. But it is those extra-curricular activities which give him an extra
edge among his peers. Employers generally find it impressive when they find
that a person has volunteered in his student life because it helps to make them
conclude that he/she is a person with a vision, a purpose and he can do so much
more than what is generally expected out of employees.

 

8. Provides an opportunity to learn a new
skill

Based on my personal experience, I had the opportunity to be part of
the club which promoted Gujarati and Marathi language wherein several
activities were conducted weekly. As a student volunteer, I not only gained
knowledge on these languages but also a sense of belonging to the people
belonging to the respective caste.



Many organisations, University Clubs and Associations take up
activities which are either not for profit or are for a particular event which
involves lot of work from organising, co-ordinating, working with technology,
innovation and so much more. These activities help students to learn a new
skill for example, calligraphy or may be learning a new language or painting,
sketching, public speaking among others.



9. Makes way for future goals

If a student has
volunteered for something then it is quite possible that he can take the
learnings further by making a career in the same. Many students who volunteer
for a single task or may be try hands at different things often are able to
judge their capabilities and interests which helps them to make a career
choice.

 

10. Gives a sense of satisfaction and its
fun

The miracle is
not knowing how the work is done but by being happy in doing it. – Mother
Teresa

 

It is always a
joyous feeling to do something for others and it is quite evident when you see
smiles on the faces of other people or you are able to do something for a
cause. It is always happy feeling to do something for others.

 

First give and only
then you can get.
 

 

Note – Kanika has been an active and regular
participant in Tarang 2K15, Tarang 2K16, Tarang 2K17 and Tarang 2K18 events and
has consistently won prizes in Essay and debate competitions. In Tarang 2K18,
she bagged the 1st prize in Essay Competition for this Essay. In a
fitting tribute to her contribution, this award winning Essay is printed in
this BCAJ issue.

 

 

FDI IN E-COMMERCE

Background

 

Retail sector in
India is considered to be a sensitive sector especially due to factors, such as
(i) the employment it generates; (ii) unorganised clusters of traders iii)
inability to compete with large players iv) concentration of vote bank.
Accordingly, Government over the years has traded consciously and opened up FDI
in retail sector in truncated manner.

 

The Department of
Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India has issued Press Note No 2 (2018 Series) on 26th
December, 2018 (PN 2 of 2018). PN 2 of 2018 amends paragraph 5.2.15.2
(e-commerce activities) of the current ‘Consolidated FDI Policy’ of the DIPP
effective from 28th August, 2017 (FDI Policy), effective from 1st
February, 2019. Paragraph 5.2.15.2 (e-commerce activities) incorporates the
provisions of Press Note No 3 (2016 Series) dated 29th March, 2016
(PN 3 of 2016), pursuant to which foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 100%
was allowed under the automatic route in entities engaged in the marketplace
model of e-commerce, subject to compliance with certain conditions. However,
FDI in entities engaged in the inventory-based model of e-commerce was
expressly prohibited, and this continues to be the case as on date. A
marketplace-based model of e-commerce is a model of providing an information
technology platform by an e-commerce entity on a digital and electronic network
to act as a facilitator between buyer and seller. An inventory-based model of
e-commerce, on the other hand, is a model where inventory of goods and services
is owned by an e-commerce entity and is sold to the consumers directly.

 

It has been a bone
of contention of trade association that FDI component is creating an uneven
playing field to the disadvantage of millions of small business enterprises. It
is alleged that the e-retailers are engaged in predatory pricing policy and
subsidizing the prices with a view to oust brick and mortar shops from retail
trade.

 

While the
conditions contained in PN 3 of 2016 were introduced to bring some comfort to
brick and mortar retailers (small traders) and to ostensibly create a level
playing field for such retailers with their e-commerce counterparts, it was
felt in some quarters that the wording of PN 3 of 2016 was not stringent enough
and that the intended goal of such PN 3 of 2016 was not being achieved.
Complains were made to regulator that certain marketplace platforms were
violating policy by influencing the price of products and indirectly engaging
in inventory-based model. In order to ensure that rules are not circumvented
DIPP came up with PN 2 of 2018[1].

 

Some of the
important changes made by PN 2 of 2018 are highlighted in this article.

 

Scope and
applicability

PN 2 of 2018
proposes to amend para 5.2.15.2 dealing with e-commerce activities.
Accordingly, PN 2 of 2018 has no impact on following:

 

  •     Wholesale cash and carry
    trading;
  •     Single brand retail trading
    operating through brick and mortar stores;
  •     Multi brand retail trading;
  •     Indian entity with no FDI
    engaged in online e-commerce business;
  •     Indian entity with FDI
    engaged in manufacturing selling products in India through e-commerce.

 

Restrictions of PN
2 of 2018 are applicable to Indian e-commerce company having FDI. It does not
apply to home grown retail majors like Vijay Sales, Big Bazaar, Reliance Retail
etc. Thus, PN 2 of 2018 may assure level playing field against foreign capital but
does little to prevent small traders from predatory pricing and market
penetration policy adopted by Indian conglomerates.

 

PN 2 of 2018 is
applicable from 1st February, 2019. There is no express
grandfathering of existing structures. Moreover, since amendments seek to
clarify legislative intent, it is advisable that e-commerce companies comply
with new regulations. Some of the stringent conditions will require e-commerce
companies to rejig their business model.

 

 

Ownership and control over inventory

 

Policy

E-commerce entity
providing a marketplace will not exercise ownership or control over the
inventory i.e. goods purported to be sold. Such an ownership or control over
the inventory will render the business into inventory based model. Inventory of
a vendor will be deemed to be controlled by e-commerce marketplace entity if
more than 25% of purchases of such vendor are from the marketplace entity or
its group companies.

 

Comments

  •     Existing regulation i.e. PN
    3 of 2016 provides that e-commerce entity providing a market place will not
    exercise ownership over the inventory i.e. goods purported to be sold. Such an
    ownership over inventory will render the business into inventory-based model.
  •     PN 2 of 2018 imposes an
    additional condition and deems inventory of vendor to be controlled by
    e-commerce marketplace entity if more than 25% of purchases of such vendor are
    from market place entity or its group companies.
  •     Said condition seems to
    plug in loophole in existing regulatory framework. Under existing regulatory
    framework e-commerce entity can undertake B2B trading. Marketplace Entities
    used one or more of their group entities to sell goods to sellers on a B2B
    basis with such sellers in turn listing the goods on the Marketplace Entity’s
    platforms for sale to retail customers.
  •     Going forward, e-commerce
    entity will have to develop mechanism to track purchases of vendor listed on
    its portal. If 25% limit is breached by vendor it will tantamount to violation
    of FDI conditions for e-commerce entity. This is likely to be cumbersome
    compliance as vendors may be reluctant to share their financial details.
  •     Regulation is not clear on
    period for computing ‘25%’ threshold limit. Arguably, 25% of purchases should
    be calculated for each financial year and reference to 25% should be in value
    terms based on financial statement of vendor. Further, 25% of overall threshold
    can be computed only after closure of financial year. This poses challenge on
    e-commerce companies to test compliance before closure of financial year. Further,
    regulation is not clear in case of computation of 25% threshold in case of
    vendor engaged in trading of multiple goods. It is not clear whether 25%
    threshold should be computed for that segment of goods traded on e-commerce
    website or purchase on overall basis needs to be seen.
  •     Regulation stresses on
    purchase aspect of vendor from e-commerce companies or its group companies and
    has nothing to do with the aspect of vendor selling goods on market platform of
    e-commerce companies. Accordingly, on plain reading – say Vendor A purchasing
    goods in bulk[2]
    from group companies of Flipkart and selling on Amazon and offline in large
    quantities and on Flipkart in small quantities, will render Flipkart to
    violation of FDI norms.
  •     Restriction may put
    limitation on Indian vendors who are not 
    recipient of FDI to look out for alternatives sources to procure goods.
    Thus, PN 2 of 2018 indirectly regulates procurement pattern of non FDI
    companies trading on e-commerce platform.
  •     Sellers may require to
    broad base their procurement function and approach directly distributors or
    manufacturer of products. This is likely to impact margins and supply chain
    efficiency.
  •     Interestingly, PN 2 of 2018
    permits e-commerce companies to provide support services in respect of
    warehousing, logistics, order fulfilment, call centre, payment collection and
    other services. Accordingly, it may be open for e-commerce company or group
    company to provide indenting services to sellers and facilitate them to
    purchase goods from distributor or manufacturers. Said services can be validly
    provided as long as it is provided in fair and non-discriminatory manner.
  •     Regulation 2 of FEMA 20(R)
    defines group company as follows:

“Group Company
means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in a position
to

(a)  Exercise 26 percent, or more of voting rights
in other enterprise;  or

(b) Appoint more than 50 percent, of members of
board of directors in the other enterprise.”

  •     Definition of Group Company
    is based on 26% shareholder threshold and power to appoint more than 50%
    members of Board. This definition is in contradiction to definition of control
    under Ind AS 110[3].
    Ind AS definition of control is expansive and requires Company to give
    consideration to shareholders agreement and right flowing to investor to
    determine control. As against that, definition of group company in FEMA 20(R)
    is more legalistic. Further, analyst believes that stringent condition is
    likely to pave way to franchisee models[4].

 

Restriction on group company sellers to
participate on e-commerce platform

 

Policy

An entity having
equity participation by e-commerce marketplace entity or its group companies,
or having control on its inventory by e-commerce marketplace entity or its
group companies, will not be permitted to sell its products on the platform run
by such marketplace entity.

 

Comments

  •     Existing regulation i.e. PN
    3 of 2016 provides that e-commerce entity will not permit more than 25% of the
    sales value on financial year basis affected through its marketplace from one
    vendor or group company.
  •     PN 2 of 2018 prohibits i)
    entity having equity participation by e-commerce marketplace entity or its
    group companies or ii) vendor on which e-commerce marketplace entity or its
    group companies has control over inventory.
  •     On comparison of existing
    and new regulation following are notable changes:

    Ban on entity in which e-commerce
marketplace entity or its group companies has equity participation to sell on
e-commerce platform.

    Ban on entity on which e-commerce
marketplace entity or its group companies has control over inventory to sell on
e-commerce platform.

    Other vendors (other than mentioned above)
can sell on e-commerce platform even if its sales amount to more than 25% of
sales value.

  •     PN 2 of 2018 has used
    ambiguous term ‘equity participation’. Extant FDI Policy defines ‘capital
    instrument’ as referring to equity shares, CCPS, CCDs and warrants. It is
    therefore unclear whether the term “equity participation” refers solely to
    equity investments or whether it includes investments using other instruments
    (such as CCPS, CCDs or warrants) as well and its impact on conversion. Further
    no threshold for equity participation is prescribed. Accordingly, holding of 1%
    by specified entities will debar investee entity from trading in e-commerce platform.
  •     At times investing in
    companies providing support services are driven by business and commercial
    consideration. Since services are so interlinked, it may be a commercial
    necessity to hold stake in service company to ensure quality of service and safeguard
    reputation of e-commerce companies. Revised policy seems to give a total go-by
    to business consideration and looks involvement of service company (with equity
    participation of e-commerce company) as a sole driver.

    Many e-commerce entities operating in India
have made (or entities controlled by them have made) investments in entities
(First Level JV Entity) that are owned and controlled by an Indian resident.
The First Level JV Entities establish further subsidiaries (Second Level JV
Entity). In light of the current guidelines on downstream investments, these
Second Level JV Entities or group entities are not subjected to similar
obligations as applicable to foreign direct investment in First Level JV
Entity. Use of term ‘equity participation’ raises issue whether restriction
will apply to First Level JV entity or even Second Level JV Entity. In contrast
to other clauses in PN 2 of 2018, this clause does not use the words equity
participation ‘directly or indirectly’.

    Policy is likely to put a break on Amazon
from selling products from subsidiaries like Cloudtail and Appario, Flipkart
from selling products through its investee company WS Retail unless e-commerce
major restructures their business model. 

 

No exclusivity

 

Policy

E-commerce
marketplace entity will not mandate any seller to sell any product exclusively
on its platform only.

 

Comments

  •     Condition seems to be one
    way in terms of requiring e-commerce entity to sell product exclusively on its
    platform. Condition does not restrict seller to approach e-commerce company to
    sell its product exclusively on its platform.
  •     This condition will put
    check on practices of selling mobile phones and white goods on exclusive basis.
    Accordingly, it will no longer be open for Flipkart to have exclusive partnership
    of selling smartphones like Xiaomi and Oppo. Exclusive sale was perceived to be
    concentration of power in hands of few and detrimental to the interest of small
    traders.
  •     Said condition puts
    practice of selling private label products say Amazon kindle, Amazon Echo, MarQ
    range of electronic goods in doubt. Private label products are in-house brands
    of e-commerce company. Reason for promoting private label products is to earn
    high margin and seek repetitive customers as private label products are exclusively
    sold by e-commerce companies.  E-commerce
    entities seek to sell private label products at discounted price vis-à-vis
    compete and try to lure customers.
  •     On plain reading, there is
    no bar on sellers to sell products exclusively on e-commerce platform. DIPP in
    its press release has clarified that present policy does not impose any
    restriction on the nature of products which can be sold on the marketplace.

 

Level playing field

 

Policy

E-commerce entities
providing marketplace will not directly or indirectly influence the sale price
of goods or services and shall maintain level playing field. Services should be
provided by e-commerce marketplace entity or other entities in which e-commerce
marketplace entity has direct or indirect equity participation or common
control, to vendors on the platform at arm’s length and in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner. Such services will include but are not limited to
fulfilment, logistics, warehousing, advertisement/marketing, payments,
financing etc. Cash back provided by group companies of marketplace entity to
buyers shall be fair and non-discriminatory. For the purposes of this clause,
provision of services to any vendor on such terms which are not made available
to other vendors in similar circumstances will be deemed unfair and
discriminatory.

 

Comments

  •     PN 3 of 2016 merely
    stipulates that e-commerce entities providing marketplace will not directly or
    indirectly influence the sale price of goods or services and shall maintain
    level playing field. PN 2 of 2018 imposes additional conditions on e-commerce
    companies and its investee company to provide services to vendors on platform
    at arm’s length on fair and non-discriminatory manner. Policy deems that
    provision of services to any vendor on such terms which are not made available
    to other vendors in similar circumstances will be deemed unfair and
    discriminatory.
  •     Policy seems to plug
    practices of predatory pricing policy and subsidising the prices. Going forward
    it will be difficult to provide cash back, fast delivery, etc., to select set
    of sellers. All the service providers will have to open up such services for
    all the sellers on its platform.
  •     Use of terms ‘arm’s
    length’, ‘fair and non-discriminatory’ and ‘similar circumstance’ are
    subjective and is likely to give rise to further frictions. It is equally true
    in a market place; all sellers can’t be treated similarly. It is natural for
    business to give preferential treatment to set of customers who are top
    customers. Person selling miniscule quantity cannot be compared with customer
    selling substantial quantity. Use of the word ‘similar circumstances’ should be
    construed in right perspective.
  •     Policy requires cash back
    to be provided to buyers and services to be provided to sellers to be fair and
    non-discriminatory. Policy does not seem to restrict buyer/seller to be
    provided better services if they are paying a premium/price to avail
    preferential service. Accordingly, services like prime membership are unlikely
    to be affected by new regulation.

 

Report to RBI

 

Policy

E-commerce
marketplace entity will be required to furnish a certificate along with a
report of statutory auditor to Reserve Bank of India, confirming compliance of
above guidelines, by 30th of September of every year for the
preceding financial year.

 

Comments

  •     Regulation places
    additional obligation on statutory auditor to certify compliance with new
    guidelines. This will be an onerous task given subjectivity involved in
    guidelines.

 

Concluding Remarks

Revised regulation
seeks to provide level playing field to small traders and protect them from
foreign capital. Changes come at a time when 
investments in e-commerce are at record high. Acquisition of controlling
stake by Walmart in Flipkart at whopping USD 16 billion raised bar of
e-commerce industry in India. Research firm Crisil has estimated that nearly
35-40% of e-retail industry sales, amounting to Rs 35,000-40,000 crore, could
be impacted due to the tightened policy. It is further estimated that Brick and
Mortar business will gain 150-200 bps topline boost. Media5 has
reported that new regulations are draconian and a bigger retrograde move than
even Vodafone tax issues. It will not only impact e-commerce sector but also
FDI inflow in other sectors because regulations can change overnight. One
believes that DIPP will come out with clarification and allay all fears.

STAMP DUTY ON CHAIN OF DOCUMENTS

Introduction


Go to register a document
for a flat/office and chances are that the Sub-registrar of Assurances would
point out that the antecedent title documents have not been stamped properly
and hence, the current instrument cannot be registered. The Authority would first
ask that stamp duty with penalty be paid on all the earlier chain of documents
and only then would the current instrument get stamped and registered. This
creates several hurdles for property buyers and they are unnecessarily
penalised for past lapses in the property documents. One wonders till what
extent can the current buyer be asked to go to pay stamp duty on the past
documents?

 

In this respect, the Bombay
High Court has given a path breaking decision which would ease the property
buying process.

 

The Case


The decision was rendered
in  the case of Lajawanti G.
Godhwani vs. Shyam R. Godhwani and Vijay Jindal, Suit No. 3394/2008
,
decision rendered on 13th December, 2018.This case
pertained to a flat purchased in an auction conducted by the Court Receiver.
The last time the flat was sold was in 1979 and that document was stamped only
with a duty of Rs. 10. The old agreement was not even registered. When the
purchaser went to register the instrument of transfer, the Sub-registrar of
Assurances demanded stamp duty on the entire chain of title documents since the
same was not paid. The duty alone on the old agreement at the Stamp Duty
Reckoner Rates amounted to Rs. 2 crore. As the purchaser had bought the flat
through a Court Receiver’s auction, he approached the High Court to get
directives that the seller should bear the previous stamp duty and penalty.
While one of the original owners agreed, the other former co-owners refused.
Accordingly, the High Court was hearing their dispute.

 

Basics of Stamp Law


Before understanding what
the Court held, it would be useful to appreciate certain basics of stamp duty.
Stamp duty is both a subject of the Central and the State Government. Under the
Constitution of India, the power to levy stamp duty is divided between the
Union and the State. The Parliament has the power to levy stamp duty on the
instruments specified in Article 246 read with Schedule VII, List I, Entry 91
and the State Legislature has the power to levy stamp duty on instruments
falling under Article 246 read with Schedule VII, List II, Entry 63. Often a
question arises, which Act applies – the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 or the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. For most of the instruments, the State Act would
apply. However, for the nine instruments provided in the Union List of the
Constitution of India, the rates are mentioned in the Schedule to the Indian
Stamp Act, 1899.

 

In Hindustan Steel
Ltd. vs. Dalip Construction Company, 1969 SCR (3) 796,
the Supreme
Court held that the Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for
the State on certain classes of instruments. 

 

Stamp Duty is leviable on
an instrument (and not a transaction) mentioned in Schedule I to the Maharashtra
Stamp Act, 1958 at rates mentioned in that Schedule – LIC vs. Dinannath
Mahade Tembhekar AIR 1976 Bom 395.
An Instrument is defined under the
Maharashtra Stamp Act to include every document by which any right or liability
is created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded.  However, it does not include a bill of
exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of
insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. This is because
these nine instruments are within the purview of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
All instruments chargeable with duty and executed in Maharashtra should be
stamped before or at the time of execution or immediately thereafter or on the
next working day following the date of execution. 

 

One of the biggest myths
surrounding stamp duty is that it is levied on a transaction. It is only levied
on an instrument and that too provided the Schedule mentions rates for it. If
there is no instrument then there is no duty is the golden rule one must always
keep in mind. An English decision in the case of  The Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs.
G. Anous & Co. (1891) Vol. XXIII Queen’s Bench Division 579
has
held that held that the thing, which is made liable to stamp duty is the
“instrument”. It is the “instrument” whereby
any property upon the sale thereof is legally or equitably transferred and the
taxation is confined only to the instrument whereby the property is
transferred. If a contract of purchase or sale or a conveyance by way of purchase
and sale, can be, or is, carried out without an instrument, the case would not
fall within the section and no tax can be imposed. Taxation is confined to the
instrument by which the property is transferred legally and equitably
transferred. This decision was cited by the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan
Lever Ltd vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 438.

 

On 9th December,
1985, the Maharashtra Stamp Act was amended which mandated that stamp duty had
to be paid at the rates prescribed in the Ready Reckoner published every year.
Following this, the Stamp Office started demanding stamp duty even on resale
agreements of old properties for which a nominal duty had been paid on the
agreements when they were originally executed. Consequently, the issue arose as
to whether the amendments made in 1985 were applicable even to documents which
were registered earlier than 1985. Two Single Judge decisions of the Bombay
High Court, Padma Nair vs. The Deputy Collector, Valuation, AIR 1994 Bom
160 / ITC Limited and Anr. vs The State and a Division Bench decision in the
case of Nirmala Manherlal Shah vs State, 2005 (5) BomCR 206
are
relevant in this respect. The Courts in these cases were considering whether
stamp duty was payable on the agreement to sell entered into before 9th
December, 1985. The Courts took a view that only in respect of those Agreements
to Sell entered into with effect from 9th December, 1985 and not
earlier were to be stamped in terms of the definition ‘conveyance’ read with
Explanation under article of Schedule I. Inspite of these verdicts the Stamp
Office demands stamp duty on old agreements that had been executed prior to
1985.

 

Bombay High Court’s verdict


The verdict in the instant
case was delivered by J. Gautam Patel. The Court held that as regards the
question of stamp duty on antecedent documents there was no clear or well
considered response from the Stamp Office. Neither the Officer from the Stamp
Office nor the Assistant Government Pleader was able to show the Court as to
under what provision of the Stamp Act, old documents prior to the amendments to
the Stamp Act could be legitimately or lawfully said to be “unstamped” or even
insufficiently stamped if, according to the law as it stood at that historical point
in time, the document itself was not liable to stamp in the first place. The
Counsel for the Government agreed that any such assessment would have to be on
the basis of the Stamp Act as it stood at that time of the older transactions
and not at the current rates.

 

The High Court held that
the entire approach of seeking duty on past agreements seemed prima facie
entirely incorrect. The Court considered a very simple example to substantiate
its stand—a flat in a cooperative housing society was held by A, who was the
original allottee of the flat. In 1970, he sold the flat to B. It is not shown
that the 1970 sale attracted stamp duty. B held the flat until 2018, when he
sold it to C. Now when C submitted his transfer instrument of 2018  (from B to C) for adjudication, was it even
open to the Stamp Authorities to contend that the parent 1970 transfer from A
to B was bad or invalid or inoperative for want of stamp since, had it been
done today, it would have attracted stamp, notwithstanding that it did not attract
duty at the date of that transfer in 1970? The Court did not think so and held
that the Authority should remember that what was submitted to it was the
current instrument of 2018, not the instrument of 1970; the latter was only an
accompaniment to trace a history of the title of the property, not to
effectuate a transfer. Stamp duty was attracted by the instrument, not the
underlying transaction, and not by any historical narrative in the instrument.
If the Authority’s view of levying duty on past instruments was to be accepted,
then it had no answer to the inevitable consequences, for its view necessarily
meant that no title ever passed to B, and A would have to be held to continue
to be the owner of the flat, which was clearly absurd and was nobody’s case. It
was also unclear just how far back the Authority could travel by applying the
current taxing regime on old concluded transactions. Moreover, when such
transactions were in every sense complete and not being effectuated currently.

 

Accordingly, the Court concluded that there
was no question of either the auction purchaser or anyone else being liable to
pay stamp duty on the older documents, copies of which were tendered along with
the auction purchaser’s instrument of transfer. The Bombay High Court also laid
down very vital principle—since the auction purchaser’s instrument of transfer
had been stamped, no question could arise of reopening an issue of sufficiency
of stamps on the antecedent documents. That claim was deemed to have been given
up by the Authority by its act of accepting the stamp duty paid on the auction
purchaser’s transfer instrument.

 

CONCLUSION

Registration offices should no longer demand
payment of stamp duty on antecedent documents of title at current rates before
accepting registration of the current instrument of transfer. This decision
have very rightly held that a purchaser only seeks to register and pay duty on
the current instrument of transfer and he cannot be held responsible for
non-payment of past owners. One hopes that the offices of the Registrar would
take this decision in the right spirit and act accordingly. A circular from the
Stamp Office toeing the line of this decision would really help smoothen the
property buying process and may ultimately even act as an impetus to the house
buying process.  

PENALTY PROVISIONS UNDER SECURITIES LAWS – SUPREME COURT DECIDES

Securities Laws empower
SEBI to levy penalty in fairly large amounts, often even for technical
violations. The maximum amount can extend in some cases to upto Rs. 25 crores
or even more. It is fairly common to see penalties in lakhs or tens of lakhs
and more even for violations such as late filing of returns and making of
certain disclosures, etc.

 

The legal provisions have
seen frequent changes and even suffer from poor drafting. Even court decisions
have seen twists and turns by changes in interpretation by SEBI. SEBI
interpreted an earlier decision of Supreme Court in Shri Ram Mutual Fund
((2006) 5 SCC 361 (SC))
that the court held that penalty was mandatory in
case of violations and no mens rea had to be proved. It was arguable
that the Court did not make penalty mandatory. However, SEBI took a view that
it had no choice but to levy penalty. This had also to be seen in context of
the fact that there were provisions which provided for fairly large minimum
penalties.

 

Finally,
there were two fundamental interpretation issues of certain provisions. One
related to section 15J in the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992
provided that three factors to be taken into account by the Adjudicating
Officer (“the AO”) while levying penalty. The second question was whether these
three factors were merely illustrative, in which case other factors
could also be taken into account? Or whether they were exhaustive, meaning
that no other factors could be taken into account.

 

A related issue was whether
the AO has any discretion not to levy penalty or levy a lower penalty
than the one prescribed. These questions arose out of seemingly anomalous or
contradictory provision because some sections provided for a minimum and
mandatory penalty while another provision required the AO to consider certain
factors while deciding levy of penalty.

 

Fortunately, all of these
issues have been considered by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Adjudicating
Officer, SEBI vs. Bhavesh Pabari ((2019) 103 taxmann.com 8 (SC)).

 

Background


The decision with several
separate cases in appeal though all of them had a common theme of penalty. The
Court thus first discussed in detail the legal background in the form of
earlier cases of the Supreme Court and also the provisions of the Act including
the various changes therein over the period.

 

The Court then arrived to
certain conclusions as to how the law should be interpreted and applied with
regard to certain matters and questions. These interpretation were then applied
to the facts of individual cases while deciding the violation.

 

It will be thus necessary
to summarise what the Court decided for each issue before it.

 

Whether
penalty is to be mandatorily levied or is there any discretion/exception
possible?

This has been a fundamental
question and the general stand taken by SEBI was that its hands were tied by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Shriram. Thus, SEBI held that once there
was a violation levy of penalty was mandatory and mens rea has no
relevance. Author submits that the Court in Shriram’s case did not held that
levy of penalty was mandatory. However, the Court in the present case has
reviewed the provisions dealing with penalty and some other issues.

 

It was seen that there were
several provisions dealing with levy of penalty – for example section 15A(a) to
15-HA) each section provided for penalty for the specific violation dealt with
in the section. Curiously, from 2002 to 2014, provisions relating to penalty
made a strange reading. Some provisions provided for a minimum penalty of Rs. 1
crore u/s. 15-A. The questions were : whether minimum penalty was to be
mandatorily levied? Did the Adjudicating Officer have the power to levy a lower
penalty or even waive the penalty? For instance section 15J provided for three
specific factors to be considered whilst levying penalty. The issue was : if
levy of a minimum penalty was mandatory, then would section 15J not become
redundant?

 

The Court pointed this
anomalous consequence and held that such a view usually cannot be taken. It
observed, “…if the penalty provisions are to be understood as not admitting of
any exception or discretion and the penalty as prescribed in Section 15-A to
Section 15-HA of the SEBI Act is to be mandatorily imposed in case of default/failure,
Section 15-J of the SEBI Act would stand obliterated and eclipsed… Sections
15-A(a) to 15-HA have to be read along with Section 15-J in a manner to avoid
any inconsistency or repugnancy. We must avoid conflict and head-on-clash and
construe the said provisions harmoniously. Provision of one section cannot be
used to nullify and obtrude another unless it is impossible to reconcile the
two provisions.”.

 

The court then pointed out
that the law had been amended in 2014 and it was clarified that discretion was
available to the Adjudicating Officer to consider the specified factors before
levying a penalty. The Court held that this clarification put beyond doubt that
discretion was always available with the Adjudicating Officer to consider
various factors and was not bound by the provisions providing for minimum and
mandatory penalty.

 

The Court observed, “The
explanation to Section 15- J of the SEBI Act added by Act No.7 of 2017, quoted
above, has clarified and vested in the Adjudicating Officer a discretion
under Section 15-J on the quantum of penalty to be imposed while adjudicating
defaults under Sections 15-A to 15-HA.
Explanation to Section 15-J was
introduced/added in 2017 for the removal of doubts created as a result of
pronouncement in M/s. Roofit Industries Ltd. case ([2016] 12 SCC 125).”
(emphasis supplied). Hence the court reaffirmed that the earlier decision in
Roofit’s case was erroneous.

 

How should
a provision specifying a minimum penalty be interpreted?

There were several
provisions in the Act that provide, even today, for a minimum penalty of Rs. 1
lakh. The Court pointed out that some of these can be even for technical
defaults involving small amounts. The Court highlighted its earlier decision in
Siddharth Chaturvedi & Ors.( [2016] 12 SCC 119), which had held,
“…that Section 15-A(a) could apply even to technical defaults of small amounts
and, therefore, prescription of minimum mandatory penalty of Rs.1 lakh per day
subject to maximum of Rs.1 crore, would make the Section completely
disproportionate and arbitrary so as to invade and violate fundamental rights.”

 

The Court also pointed out
that the law was later amended to provide for a lower minimum penalty. In
short, the court concluded that discretion was available with the AO even with
regard to levy of a minimum penalty taking into account relevant facts of the
case.

 

Whether
the factors specified in section 15J were illustrative or exhaustive?

Section
15J is the general provision that applies to the various specific penalty provisions.
It states that while levying penalty, the AO shall consider three factors. One
was the amount of disproportionate gain or unfair advantage made. The second
was whether loss was caused to investors. The third was whether the default was
repetitive.

 

The
issue was: whether the above three were the only factors to be
considered by an AO or whether the other relevant factors AO could consider. It
was pointed out that section 15-I did provide that the AO shall levy “such
penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of any of those
sections.”.

 

The
Court pointed out that there were several penalty provisions where none of the
three factors specified in section 15J would be relevant. Hence, taking a view
that these three factors are the only relevant factors would lead to an
anomalous result.

 

The
Court thus concluded the AO ought to consider not just the three factors
specified in section 15J but such other factors that are relevant. It observed,
“Therefore, to understand the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of Section 15-J to be exhaustive and admitting of no exception or vesting any
discretion in the Adjudicating Officer would be virtually to admit/concede that
in adjudications involving penalties under Sections 15-A, 15-B and 15-C,
Section 15-J will have no application. Such a result could not have been
intended by the legislature.
We, therefore, hold and take the view that
conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J are not
exhaustive and in the given facts of a case, there can be circumstances
beyond those enumerated by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 15-J which
can be taken note of by the Adjudicating Officer while determining the quantum
of penalty.

 

Application
in individual cases

The Court then applied the
aforesaid conclusions in the various individual cases before it in appeal to
decide whether the penalty levied was in accordance with law and the
conclusions reached by the Court.

 

Can
penalty be levied separately for transactions in a party’s own name and also in
the name of a firm in which he is sole proprietor?

While dealing with individual cases, the
Court was presented with an interesting question. In a particular case, it was
observed that a party carried out transactions in violation of law in two names
– one (Bhavesh Pabari) was in his own name and the other through a firm name
(Shree Radhe) where he was sole proprietor. SEBI levied penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs
each for both the names. The appellant argued only one penalty should have been
levied since the party was the same. The Court rejected this argument on the
facts of the case. It observed, “This contention superficially seems
attractive, but on an in-depth reflection should be rejected as Bhavesh Pabari
had indulged in trading in its personal name and also in the name of his firm
M/s. Shree Radhe.”.



Can the
Supreme Court consider the reasonableness of penalty levied?

This was yet another issue
worth discussing. Can a party pray to the Supreme Court for reconsidering the
amount of penalty levied and argue that it was excessive or disproportionate?
This is particularly relevant since appeals against such orders can be to the
Securities Appellate Tribunal and thereafter straight to the Supreme Court. The
Court rejected this contention, and made the following pertinent observation,
“This court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 15-Z of the SEBI
Act, cannot go into the proportionality and quantum of the penalty imposed,
unless the same is distinctly disproportionate to the nature of the violation
which makes it offensive, tyrannous or intolerable. Penalty by it’s very
nature of the is penal. We can interfere only where the quantum is wholly
arbitrary and harsh which no reasonable man would award.”

Hence, except in exceptional
case the court, would generally not go into the reasonableness of the penalty.

 

Conclusion

The
decision of the Supreme
Court is very relevant and will need to be considered by SEBI and even
SAT
while considering cases of penalty. Parties would be free to present all
relevant facts of the case and emphasise all relevant factors with
respect to
the alleged violations in penalty proceedings. The AO will have to
judicially consider the facts and is no longer bound to levy ?minimum
penalty’.
 

 

 

 

DUPLICATE PART OF C FORM, WHETHER VALID

Introduction


Under CST
Act, the vendor can sell the goods against C form to the buyer. The vendor is
depending upon buyer for getting the C form. As per Rules, there are three
identical parts in C form. The buyer retains counterpart with him. The two
parts marked as original and duplicate are given to vendor. The vendor is
required to produce the above two parts before his assessing authority for getting
the claim of sale against C form allowed.

 

India Agencies case


There the
controversy is about which part to be produced before the assessing authority.
The party, India Agencies, produced duplicate parts of C forms in its
assessment and they were disallowed on the ground that original parts are
required to be produced. The matter went to the Hon. Supreme Court which is
reported in case of India Agencies (139 STC 329)(SC). In this case,
Kerala (CST) Rules provided for production of original parts and on
non-production the claim was disallowed which was contested before the Hon.
Supreme Court. In above judgment the Hon. Supreme Court has rejected the claim
observing, amongst others, as under:- 

 

“25. The
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no suggestion
anywhere that there is anything wrong with the genuineness of the transaction
or any doubts as to the possession by the purchasing dealer on a certificate
enabling the sellers to obtain the concessional rate of tax under section 8 of
the Act.

 

Under such
circumstances, the authorities should not have taken the strict view in
rejecting the claim of the concessional rate of tax. At first sight, the
argument of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be genuine and
acceptable but considering the mandatory nature of the provisions of the Act
and Rules, this Court is called upon to decide the questions involved in this
case. The provisions being mandatory they should have been complied with. The
appellant made no attempt to comply with rule 12(3) till after his claim was
rejected by the assessing authority. Having made no attempt to comply with the
mandatory provisions, he disentitled himself from getting the concessional
rate. Even otherwise, in our view, it is a pure question of law as to the
proper interpretation of the provisions of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax
Act and the provisions of rule 12 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and
Turnover) Rules, 1957 and rule 6(b)(ii) of the Central Sales Tax (Karnataka) Rules,
1957. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute
Manufacturing Co.* [1965] 3 SCR 626 and of the decision in Delhi Automobiles
(P) Ltd.† (1997) 10 SCC 486, it is clear that these provisions have to be
strictly construed and that unless there is strict compliance with the
provisions of the statute, the assessee was not entitled to the concessional
rate of tax.”

 

Based on
above judgment there are a number of Tribunal judgments in Maharashtra where
the claims are disallowed for non-production of original parts.

 

Recent judgment of the Hon. Madras High
Court in case The State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL India Rosin Industries [Tax Case
(Revision) No.66 of 2017 dt.13.12.2017]

The Hon.
Madras High Court had an occasion to deal with similar issue. The facts in this
case are that the original parts were misplaced and in appeal, the claim was
allowed based on duplicate parts. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the first
appellate authority. Therefore, the State Government has filed revision before
the Hon. Madras High Court. Following questions were referred for the opinion
of the High Court.

 

“9. Being
aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal in S.T.A.No.86 of 2011, dated 25/10/2013,
on the file of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench),
Chennai, instant Tax Case Revision Petition is filed, on the following
substantial questions of law:-

 

1. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
law in holding that duplicate Form F is sufficient for availing concessional
rate of tax?

2. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
law in holding that though the decision reported in 83 STC 116 is related to C
Form, F Form also comes under CST Act?

3. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
not considering the Rule 10 (2) of the CST Rule which prescribed, under which
circumstances duplicate forms can be accepted?

4. Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in
not considering Rule 12 (2) and 12 (3) of the CST Rule which deals with the
procedure to be followed for obtaining duplicate forms in lieu of the original
declaration forms lost?

5. Whether
the Tribunal was right in ignoring the fact that the dealer while replying to
the pre-revision notice issued by the Assessing Officer, promised to file the
original form and requested extension of time for filing the same?” 

The Hon.
Madras High Court referred to the arguments of the State Government i.e.
revisionist and also referred to various provisions applicable on above subject
under CST Act and Local Act.

In
particular arguments on behalf of State Government are noted as under:-

“17.
Though Ms. Narmadha Sampath, learned Special Government Pleader contended that
one of the conditions required to be satisfied by the purchasing dealer is that
the Forms should have been lost and that the purchasing dealer, ought to have
submitted an indemnity bond, in Form G to the notified authority, from whom the
said Form was obtained, for such sum and only in the event of satisfying the
above said requirement, the Assessing Authority can decide, as to whether such
duplicate/certificate, can be accepted or not, and further submitted that in
the case on hand, when purchasing dealer had failed to discharge the statutory
obligation, refusal to accept the duplicate forms, cannot be said to be
erroneous, we are not inclined to accept the said contention, for the simple
reason that the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Harbour 2, Assessment Circle, has
not passed orders, with the above said reasons.”

 

The Hon.
Madras High Court further observed as under while rejecting the revision filed
by the State Government.

“20.
Having regard to the Forms (Original, duplicate or counter foil) and placing
reliance on the decision rendered in Manganese Ore (India) Ltd Vs. Commissioner
of Sales, Tax, Madhya Pradesh, reported in {1991 (83) STC 116}, the Appellate
Deputy Commissioner (CT)-I, has passed the orders, stating that, there is
nothing wrong in filing duplicate forms, for availing concessional rate. The
Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Chennai, has
referred to the Rules and accordingly, concurred with the views of the
appellate Authority.

21. Though
before the appellate Authority, contention has been made that submission of
original portion of Form, is mandatory for claiming concessional rate and that
there is every possibility of misuse of original Form, in some other
transaction, the said contention has been rejected. Form C (Rule 12 (1), is
issued by the State authority of the State. It also contains and name of the
person signing the declaration. Genuineness of the duplicate forms issued by
the authority of the other state to the purchaser-dealer is not disputed.
Revenue has not disputed that there was a inter-state sale and that a
certificate has been issued by the competent authority. Both the appellate
Deputy Commissioner (CT), Chennai, as well as the Tribunal had the opportunity
of perusing the duplicate forms. Assessee has relied on Manganese Ore Ltd’s
case and revenue has not placed any contra decision. On the facts and
circumstances of the instant case, the said judgment has persuasive value and
rightly applied.”

 

Thus, the
Hon. Madras High Court has taken a view, which will certainly give relief to
the litigants. It is nightmare to get the original of duplicate C forms from
the buyers. Under such circumstances, in genuine cases, the claim should remain
allowable against duplicate part of C form.

Although,
in this case the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in case of India Agencies
is not referred. But still the above judgment of the Hon. Madras High Court
based on provisions of CST Act will be helpful to the litigants. 

 

Conclusion

The above judgment is really very useful and it is a judgment
contemplating good relief in case of loss of original parts of C forms. Since
it is judgment under CST Act, it should remain applicable in all States unless
there is contrary judgment of any jurisdictional High Court. It should also
remain applicable in Maharashtra. A line of clarification and confirmation
about acceptance of above judgment by the concerned authority of Maharashtra
State will be much useful to avoid unnecessary litigations.
 

 

Article 12 and Article 14 of DTAA – Consultants providing technical consultancy services in the capacity of an advisor and who also bears the risk in relation to such services, would be treated as an independent person – services rendered by them would qualify as Independent Personal Services.

1.      
TS-43-ITAT-2019 (AHD) DCIT vs.
Hydrosult Inc.
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of Order: 31st
January, 2019

 

Article 12 and Article 14 of DTAA –
Consultants providing technical consultancy services in the capacity of an
advisor and who also bears the risk in relation to such services, would be
treated as an independent person – services rendered by them would qualify as
Independent Personal Services.

 

FACTS

Taxpayer, a foreign Company incorporated in
Canada, was engaged in the business of providing technical consultancy services
for development of irrigation and water resources in India. During the year
under consideration, Taxpayer was awarded a contract for providing consultancy
services in relation to irrigation development project. In relation to the said
project, Taxpayer made payments to certain non-resident individuals as fees for
consultancy services. Taxpayer did not withhold tax from the payments on the
ground that such payments were not chargeable to tax in India for the following
reasons:

 

a. Payments made to professionals were in the
nature of independent personal services (IPS).

b. Aggregate period of presence of such
professionals in India did not exceed the threshold provided in the treaty.

c. Professionals did not have a fixed base in
India.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO), however
contended that the professionals were not independent per se as their
scope of work and activities were regulated by contractual obligations or other
forms of employment. Hence, payments made to them would not qualify as IPS
under the treaty. AO held that the services were rendered by the professionals
specialising in their respective domains. Accordingly, such services were in
the nature of technical/consultancy services covered under the Fees for
Technical Services (FTS) article of the treaty and therefore, subject to
withholding of tax in India.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) [CIT(A)]. CIT(A) examined the terms of
agreement between Taxpayer and the non resident consultants and held that such
services qualified as IPS and, in absence of a fixed base as also stay in India
being within the prescribed threshold of 90 / 183 days of the respective DTAA,
such income was not taxable in India.

 

Aggrieved, the AO appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  • Perusal of the specimen
    agreement entered into between the Taxpayer and one of the non-resident
    consultants indicated the following:

    The non-resident consultant was engaged in
the capacity of an ‘advisor’.

    The responsibility or the risk for the
results to a greater degree belonged to the professional.

    The obligations arising from the contract
could not have been assigned to some other persons unlike in the case of an
employer.  Thus, the contract did not
lack independence of work/services to be rendered.

 

  •   Above factors indicate that
    the services rendered by the consultants was of independent in nature, which
    qualified it as IPS under the treaty. Payment for such services was not taxable
    in India in absence of fixed base in India and the physical presence of
    professionals in India not exceeding the threshold of 90 / 183 days that was
    specified in the respective DTAA. 

 

(PS: However, it is not clear from the
ruling if the recipient would have been taxable in India, if he had rendered
services in the capacity of an employee.)

 

Section 271(1)(c), 271AAA – In a case where penalty is leviable u/s. 271AAA, penalty initiated and levied u/s. 271(1)(c) is unsustainable in law.

3.  ACIT
vs. Nitin M. Shah  (Mumbai)
Members: G. S. Pannu, VP and Sandeep Gosain,
JM ITA No.: 2863/Mum./2017
A.Y.: 2012-13 Dated: 1st November, 2018 Counsel for revenue / assessee: B. S. Bist /
Dr. P. Daniel

 

Section 271(1)(c), 271AAA   In
a case where penalty is leviable u/s. 271AAA, penalty initiated and levied u/s.
271(1)(c) is unsustainable in law.

 

FACTS

The assessee was a director and key person
of one company N. A search and seizure operation was carried out on the
assessee and his group concerns. During the course of assessment proceedings,
the Assessing Officer (AO) made addition of Rs. 5,81,07,680 and assessed his
income at Rs. 12,06,72,926. Subsequently, the AO initiated penalty proceedings
u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act in respect of the additions made during the course of
assessment. Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed
the addition of Rs. 2,67,68,882. As regards, the balance additions for which
relief was allowed by the CIT(A), the department filed appeal before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and thereafter, the AO
initiated the action for levy of penalty.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal on the ground that explanation furnished by the assessee was not bonafide
and incriminating material was found and seized in search and that the assessee
had defrauded the revenue by not offering true and correct income in the return
of income filed by the assessee. The assessee was therefore liable for penalty
as per Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Act.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) held
that assessee’s case for levy of penalty fell u/s. 271AAA of the Act and not
u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. Further, sub-clause (3) to sub-section (1) of
section 271 of the Act clearly prohibited imposition of penalty in respect of
undisclosed income referred to in sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act.
Since the AO had initiated penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, the same was
unsustainable in law and therefore was directed to be deleted. The Tribunal
concurred with the view of the CIT(A) and held that penalty initiated and
levied by the AO u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act was unsustainable in the eyes of law
and was thus rightly held to be deleted by the CIT(A).

 

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by
the revenue.
    

Section 54F – Claim u/s. 54 is admissible in respect of flats allotted by the builder to the assessee under the terms of the Development Agreement as the same constitute consideration retained by the Developer and utilised for construction of flats on behalf of the assessee.

2.  Shilpa
Ajay Varde vs. Pr. CIT (Mumbai)
Members: Joginder Singh, VP and Ramit Kochar, AM  ITA No.: 2627/Mum./2018 A.Y.: 2013-14. Dated: 14th November, 2018 Counsel for assessee / revenue: M.
Subramanian / L. K. S. Dehiya

 

Section 54F Claim u/s. 54 is admissible in respect of flats allotted by the
builder to the assessee under the terms of the Development Agreement as the
same constitute consideration retained by the Developer and utilised for
construction of flats on behalf of the assessee.

 

FACTS

The assesse, an individual, in his return of
income declared Capital Gains at Rs. 15,982 after claiming deduction u/s. 54F
and 54EC of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment
accepting the returned income. Subsequently, the Pr. CIT issued notice u/s. 263
of the Act and held that the order passed by the AO u/s. 143(3) of the Act was
erroneous as the same was prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Pr.
CIT observed that during the year under consideration, the assessee along with her
relatives entered into development agreement for the development of property
owned by the assessee with her relatives. As per the terms of agreement with
the developer, consideration for the said transfer of development rights was a
sum of Rs. 40 lakhs and four residential flats and six car parking spaces. The
assessee computed the gains by adopting Rs. 1,32,62,500 to be full value of
consideration. This sum of Rs.1,32,62,500 comprised of Rs. 40,00,000 being the
monetary consideration and Rs. 92,62,500 being the value of residential flats
which the assessee was entitled to receive from the developer. From the full
value of consideration the assessee reduced indexed cost of acquisition and the
value of two new residential houses which were to be received by the assessee
u/s. 54F of the Act.

 

The Pr. CIT, however, held that the assessee
could not be allowed to claim exemption u/s. 54F of the Act in respect of the
said two residential flats as the said flats were yet to be constructed by the
developer and were future properties and hence the assessee was not entitled to
claim exemption u/s. 54F of the Act. 
Further, he also observed that the assessee claimed deduction of Rs.
71,50,000 u/s. 54EC of the Act which was restricted to Rs. 50,00,000 as per the
amended provisions of the Act and therefore directed the AO to revise the order
passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

Against the said order passed by the Pr.CIT,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the Pr. CIT’s
action of directing the AO to revise the order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act.

 

On appeal, the Tribunal held as follows:

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the assessee,
during the course of assessment, disclosed complete details of transaction with
the developer and furnished all the details of computation of long term capital
gains and exemption claimed u/s. 54F and 54EC of the Act.  The Tribunal also observed that the AO had,
after due application of mind and considering all the details and documents on
record allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54F and 54EC of the Act
and it would not be correct to say that the AO did not make any inquiry or did
not make proper inquiry before allowing the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal
thus held the action of Pr. CIT of initiating section 263 of the Act to be
bad-in-law.

 

On merits, the Tribunal observed that flats
were specifically allotted by the developer in favour of the assessee under the
development agreement and effectively it could be said that the share of
consideration in lieu of property for development given by the assessee to the
developer to the extent of four residential flats will be retained by the
builder and invested by the developer by utilising its own funds for
constructing the flats on behalf of the assessee. Effectively, therefore
consideration under development agreement which the assessee was otherwise
entitled to receive was withheld by the developer for constructing the flats on
behalf of the assessee which satisfied the requirement of making investment in
construction of new residential flat as provided u/s. 54F of the Act. The
Tribunal also observed that CBDT in circulars had held that allotment of flat under
self-financing scheme is held to be construction for the purposes of capital
gains. Thus the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54F of
the Act. As regards assessee’s claim for exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act of Rs.
71,50,000, following the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT vs.
Jaichander [2015] 370 ITR 579 (Madras)
and co-ordinate bench of the
Tribunal in Tulika Devi Dayal vs. JCIT [2018] 89 taxmann.com 442 (Mum.)
held that the exemption claimed u/s. 54EC of the Act was in accordance with the
provisions of the Act.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

Section 54 – Purchase of residential property is said to have been substantially effected on the date of possession. Accordingly, where assessee had received possession of a residential house one year before the date of transfer of residential house, though the agreement to purchase was entered into much prior thereto, the assessee was held to be eligible to claim deduction u/s. 54.

1. Ranjana R. Deshmukh vs. ITO (Mumbai) Members : Shamim Yahya,  AM and Ravish Sood, JM ITA No.: 697/Mum./2017 A.Y.: 2013-14 Dated: 9th November, 2018. Counsel for assessee / revenue: Moti B.
Totlani / Chaitanya Anjaria

 

Section 54
  Purchase of residential property is
said to have been substantially effected on the date of possession.  Accordingly, where assessee had received
possession of a residential house one year before the date of transfer of
residential house, though the agreement to purchase was entered into much prior
thereto, the assessee was held to be eligible to claim deduction u/s. 54.

 

FACTS

The assessee,
an individual, sold immovable property on 28th March, 2013 and
claimed exemption u/s. 54 on the resultant gains. During the course of
assessment, the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the property in respect of
which exemption was claimed by the assessee was purchased on 29th
January, 2009 by entering into an agreement to purchase. The AO therefore
concluded that since the residential property purchased by the assessee was
beyond the stipulated period of one year before the transfer of property under consideration
and hence the assessee was not entitled to claim exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that possession of the
residential property purchased by the asssessee was handed over to the assessee
18th May, 2012 which was within the prescribed period of one year
prior to the date of transfer of property under consideration and therefore the
assessee was entitled to claim exemption u/s. 54 of the Act. The Tribunal held
that purchase of residential property is said to have been substantially
effected on the date of possession and for this view it relied on the decision
of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Beena K. Jain [1994] 75
Taxman 145 (Bom.)
wherein it was held that purchase was completed by
payment of full consideration and handing over of possession of the flat.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the
assessee.

Section 154 – What is permissible is merely rectification of an obvious and patent mistake apparent from record and not wholesale review of an earlier order.

4. 
[2019] 103 taxmann.com 154
(Mum.)
Maccaferri
Environmental Solutions (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No.:
7105/Mum./2014
A.Y.: 2010-11 Dated: 12th
December, 2018

 

Section 154 – What is permissible is merely
rectification of an obvious and patent mistake apparent from record and not
wholesale review of an earlier order.

 

FACTS


The assessee, a private limited company,
filed its return of income declaring total income at NIL after setting off
brought forward losses under the normal provisions of the Act. Further, since
the book profit determined by the assessee was a negative figure, there was no
liability to pay MAT on book profits u/s. 115JB of the Act and the same was
accordingly declared and disclosed in the return of income filed by the
assessee. The case was selected for scrutiny and assessment was completed u/s.
143(3) of the Act determining the total income at NIL. Subsequently, the
Assessing Officer (AO) issued notice u/s. 154 of the Act so as to rectify the
mistake of accepting the book profits as such and thereby determined the book
profits at Rs. 6,95,57,438.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal,

 

HELD


The Tribunal made a reference to the well
settled position that the power u/s. 154 to rectify a mistake apparent from
record did not involve a wholesale review of the earlier order and rather, what
was permissible was only to rectify an obvious and patent mistake. The Tribunal
further noted that even debatable points of law would not fall in the meaning
of the expression “mistake apparent” for the purposes of section 154
of the Act. The Tribunal observed that the adjustments made by the AO disagreeing
with the determination of book profits by the assessee u/s. 115JB of the Act
involved a debatable issue which was outside the purview of section 154 of the
Act. The Tribunal held that action of the AO in invoking section 154 was unjust
in law as well as on facts. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 54F – Deposit of the amount of capital gains in a separate savings bank account and utilisation thereof for the purposes specified u/s. 54F is said to be substantial compliance with the requirements of section 54F.

3.      
[2019] 102 taxmann.com 50
(Jaipur)
Goverdhan Singh
Shekhawat vs. ITO
ITA No.:
517/JP/2013
A.Y.: 2009-10  Dated: 11th
January, 2019

 

Section 54F – Deposit of the amount of
capital gains in a separate savings bank account and utilisation thereof for
the purposes specified u/s. 54F is said to be substantial compliance with the
requirements of section 54F.

 

FACTS


The assessee, an individual, received
certain compensation on compulsory acquisition of land. The assessee offered
the said receipts as long-term capital gains and claimed exemption u/s. 54F of
the Act by depositing the amount of capital gains in a separate savings bank
account. The assessee contended that the amount of gains was deposited under
Capital Gains Accounts Scheme 1988. The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that
the account in which amount was deposited by the assessee was not a Capital
Gains Scheme Account and therefore denied exemption u/s. 54F of
the Act.

 

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the undisputed facts
viz. that despite having an existing account in another bank, the assessee
opened a new bank account and deposited not only the amount of consideration
but also the TDS refund received by it in this respect. Subsequently, the
assessee utilised the said amount for the construction of house. Thus, the
Tribunal noted that since the assessee had not utilised the amount for the
purposes stated u/s. 54F, he had duly deposited the entire compensation in the
bank account at the time of filing of return of income and claimed exemption
u/s. 54F of the Act. The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to claim
exemption as the assessee had substantially complied with the provisions of
sub-section (4) of section 54F.

 

The Tribunal held that the idea of opening
capital gains account under the scheme is to delineate the funds from other
funds regularly maintained by the assessee and to ensure that benefit availed
by an assessee by depositing the amount in the said account is ultimately
utilised for the purposes for which the exemption has been claimed i.e, for
purchase or construction of a residential house.

 

The Tribunal further observed that though
savings bank account was not technically a capital gains account, however the
essence and spirit of opening and maintaining a separate capital gains account
was achieved and demonstrated by the assessee. The Tribunal thus held that
merely because the saving bank account is technically not a capital gains
account, it cannot be said that there is violation of the provisions of s/s.
(4) of the Act in terms of not opening a capital gains account scheme.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the
assessee.

Section 22, 24(4) and 56 – Income earned by assessee from letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile tower/antenna was taxable as ‘income from house property’ and, therefore, deduction u/s. 24(a) was available in respect of it.

2.      
(2019) 197 TTJ (Mumbai) 966 Kohinoor
Industrial Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No.:
670/Mum/2018
A. Y.: 2013-14 Dated: 5th
October, 2018

           

Section 22, 24(4) and 56 – Income earned by
assessee from letting out space on terrace for installation of mobile
tower/antenna was taxable as ‘income from house property’ and, therefore,
deduction u/s. 24(a) was available in respect of it.

 

FACTS

 The assessee, a co-operative society, had
derived income from letting out some space on terrace for installation of
mobile towers/antenna which was offered “as income from house
property”. Further, against such income the assessee had claimed deduction
u/s. 24(a). The Assessing Officer observed that, the terrace could not be
termed as house property as it was the common amenity for members. Further, the
Assessing Officer observed that the assessee could not be considered to be
owner of the premises since as per the tax audit report, conveyance was still
not executed in favour of the society. He also observed that the annual letting
value of the terrace was not ascertainable. Accordingly, he concluded that the
income received by the assessee from the mobile companies towards installation
of mobile towers/antenna was to be treated as “income from other
sources”.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the order of
the Assessing officer on grounds that the income received by the assessee was
in the nature of compensation received for providing facilities and services to
cellular operators on the terrace of the building.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
held that the terrace of the building could not be considered as distinct and
separate but certainly was a part of the house property. Therefore, letting-out
space on the terrace of the house property for installation and operation of
mobile tower/antenna certainly amounted to letting-out a part of the house
property itself. That being the case, the observation of the Assessing Officer
that the terrace could not be considered as house property was unacceptable. As
regards the observation of the CIT(A) that the rental income received by the
assessee was in the nature of compensation for providing services and facility
to cellular operators, it was relevant to observe, the department had failed to
bring on record any material to demonstrate that in addition to letting-out
space on the terrace for installation and operation of antenna, the assessee
had provided any other service or facilities to the cellular operators. Thus,
from the material on record, it was evident that the income received by the
assessee from the cellular operators/mobile companies was on account of letting
out space on the terrace for installation and operation of antennas and nothing
else. Therefore, the rental income received by the assessee from such
letting-out had to be treated as income from house property.

 

 

Section 68 – Bank account of an assessee cannot be held to be ‘books’ of the assessee maintained for any previous year, and therefore, no addition u/s. 68 can be made in respect of a deposit in the bank account.

1.      
[2019] 198 TTJ (Asr) 114 Satish Kumar vs. ITO ITA No.: 105/Asr/2017 A.Y.: 2008-09 Dated: 15th January, 2019

                                               

Section 68 – Bank account of an assessee
cannot be held to be ‘books’ of the assessee maintained for any previous year,
and therefore, no addition u/s. 68 can be made in respect of a deposit in the
bank account.

 

FACTS


The assessee had filed his return of income
for A.Y. 2008-09. In the course of the assessment proceedings the Assessing
Officer observed that the assessee had during the previous year made a cash
deposits of Rs.11,47,660 in his saving bank account. In the absence of any
explanation on the part of the assessee as regards the ‘nature’ and ‘source’ of
the aforesaid cash deposit in the aforesaid bank account, the Assessing Officer
made an addition of the peak amount of cash deposit of Rs.11,47,660 u/s. 68 of
the Act.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the addition made
by the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal held that an addition u/s. 68
could only be made where any sum was found credited in the books of an assessee
maintained for any previous year, and the assessee either offered no
explanation about the nature and source as regards the same, or the explanation
offered by him in the opinion of the assessing officer was not found to be
satisfactory. A credit in the ‘bank account’ of an assessee could not be
construed as a credit in the ‘books of the assessee’, for the very reason that
the bank account could not be held to be the ‘books’ of the assessee. Though it
remained as a matter of fact that the ‘bank account’ of an assessee was the
account of the assessee with the bank, or in other words the account of the
assessee in the books of the bank, but the same in no way could be held to be
the ‘books’ of the assessee. Therefore, an addition made in respect of a cash
deposit in the ‘bank account’ of an assessee, in the absence of the same found
credited in the ‘books of the assessee’ maintained for the previous year, could
not be brought to tax by invoking the provisions of section 68.

TOP BOOKS ON PROFESSIONAL SERVICES MANAGEMENT: THE QUINTESSENTIAL McKINSEY WAY

INTRODUCTION


In the December, 2018 issue of the Journal, Nitin Shingala wrote an
article that highlighted the need to read a number of books on management of
professional services firms and also curated a list of must-read books on the
subject. He summarised key lessons from The Trusted Advisor by David
H. Maister, Charles H. Green and Robert M. Galford.

 

This article seeks
to summarise and highlight key learnings from another classic — The McKinsey
Way
by Ethan M Rasiel.

 

THE McKINSEY WAY


The McKinsey Way is
one of the most recommended, read and referred books on consulting as it
delivers crisp insights into the working of one of the most successful
consulting firms in the world. The book is teeming with amusing anecdotes which
make it quite different from the usual dry management literature on similar
subjects. The book provides an honest account of how one can be a successful
consultant and how can consulting firms grow themselves in the footsteps of
McKinsey & Co.

 

Ethan M. Rasiel was
a consultant in McKinsey & Co.’s New York office. His clients included
major companies in the finance, telecommunications, computing and consumer
goods sectors. Prior to joining McKinsey, Rasiel, who earned an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania,
was an equity fund manager at Mercury Asset Management in London, as well as an
investment banker.

 

THEME


McKinsey & Co,
(“the firm”) is arguably the most celebrated consulting firm in the world.
Since its founding in 1923, it has now grown to 65+ offices in 130+ countries
and employs 4,500+ top minds. The book provides the reader a keyhole view of
how the firm thinks about business problems and the process through which it
solves them. The book also provides insight into how the firm markets its
services without “selling”. The final section of the book helps the reader
reflect on how to survive at McKinsey and how is life after working with the
firm.

 

The most important
learnings from each of these parts in the book are highlighted in this article.

 

PART ONE: THE McKINSEY WAY OF THINKING ABOUT BUSINESS PROBLEMS

When team members
meet for the first time to discuss their client’s problem, they know that their
solution will be:

  •    Fact-based
  •    Rigidly structured
  •    Hypothesis-driven

 

Fact-based

The firm loves facts for two key reasons. First, facts compensate for
lack of knowledge since most McKinsey-ites are generalists rather than industry
specialists. They bridge this industry knowledge gap through extensive
research. Second, facts bridge the credibility gap. The CEO of a Fortune 50
company will not give much credence to what some newly-minted, 27-year-old MBA
has to say.

 

Rigidly structured

Further, the
section explains a sine qua non for problem-solving at McKinsey –
“MECE”.

 

MECE stands for
mutually exclusive collectively exhaustive. Every list that the firm comes up
with in the process – problems with client, possible solutions or probable
outcomes – needs to be MECE. This ensures that while all possible items are
covered, none of them overlaps any other to add just redundant pointers to a
list.

 

Hypotheses-driven

The initial
hypotheses (IH) is an important pillar to McKinsey problem-solving which
involves 3 steps:

  •    Defining the IH
  •    Generating the IH
  •    Testing the IH

 

Defining the IH

The essence of the
IH is “Figure out the solution to the problem before you start”. While it may
sound counter-intuitive, IH is not the answer – it is just a theory which needs
to be proved or disproved. If IH is proved to be correct, it will become the
first slide of the presentation to be delivered a few months later. If proved
wrong, however, the process will give enough information to move on towards the
right answer.

 

Generating the
IH

The hypothesis is
then broken down into key drivers. Next, making an actionable recommendation
regarding each driver. For the next step, each top line recommendation is
broken down to the level of issues. If a given recommendation is correct, what
issue does it raise?

 

Testing the IH

Finally, the
hypothesis is tested to check whether anything is being missed out or any
issues are being ignored or all drivers of the problem have been considered?

 

Don’t reinvent the wheel and don’t boil the
ocean


McKinsey, like many
other firms, has developed a number of problem-solving methods. These
techniques are immensely powerful and allow the consultants to quickly fit in
raw data into frameworks and quickly begin to work towards the solution.
Further, the firm has a database of cases they have solved in what they call PD.net.
Here, the consultants can often tap into solutions to similar problems and
sometimes save days of effort. Further, sometimes it’s good to take a break
from the problem and resume later rather than sitting at a place and trying to
“boil the ocean”.

 

80/20 and other rules


80/20 is a rule
that has wide applicability and is one of the greatest truths of management.
80% of sales come from 20% of customers, 80% of the wealth is owned by 20%
people and 20% of a secretary’s job will take 80% of her time. The 80/20 rule
can provide the much-needed jumpstart in solving a problem as one can focus on
the few items that create maximum impact on the business and work on them
rather than going through a sea of data which has little impact.

 

The elevator test


Know your solution
(or your product or business) so thoroughly that you can explain it clearly and
precisely to your client (or customer or investor) in 30 seconds. If you can do
that, then you understand what you’re doing well enough to sell your solution.
You never know how long you might have with the CEO or a top investor to tell
him about your idea and keep them interested enough that they will come back to
know more.

 

Pluck the low hanging fruit


Clients can get
impatient during longer assignments. In such cases, rather than waiting to
present all findings and solutions in that final presentation, it is better to
present easy initial victories to the client. They boost team and client morale
and give the firm added credibility by showing anybody who may be watching that
you are on the ball and mean business. This rule is really about satisfying the
client in a long-term relationship.

 

Just say “I don’t know”


As professionals,
we think we are expected to solve challenges and answer queries at the drop of
a hat. I observe many professionals falling prey to this delusion and often
offering shallow or incorrect advice just to save face. A much better approach
is to just accept that you do not know something and that you will get back on
it. This helps build trust in the long term as people see you as somebody who
will not comment without adequate facts and credence.

 

PART TWO: THE McKINSEY WAY OF WORKING TO SOLVE BUSINESS PROBLEMS

How to sell without selling?

McKinsey is one
firm that does not advertise itself or have a sales team to constantly call and
reach out to prospects to grow their practice. However, it has still been one
of the most successful consulting firms in history. So how does the firm sell
without selling? The secret is that McKinsey constantly produces high quality
reports and newsletters which make their way onto the desks of CXOs. So, when
they have a business problem, who do they think of? You guessed it right! This
is how McKinsey markets itself but without selling.

 

Conducting interviews

Interviewing the
employees and management of the client is one of the most important tasks of
the firm’s engagements. They ensure that they use the best of their client’s
knowledge to assimilate processes and provide the most apt solutions. The
author advises that interviews should begin on a broad note and graduate to
specific questions as it progresses. This helps the interviewee to be more
relaxed in the process. Further, the interview should be a two-way process for
sharing information so that it makes the most of the time of all parties to the
interview. The author has also given advise on how to conduct difficult
interviews where the interviewee refuses to participate and has recommended
escalation of the issue to managers as a final resort.

 

Brainstorming

The firm is known
to think and provide solutions as a team. The whole team may sometimes spend a
whole day together in a room brainstorming on the solution. They also ensure
that the discussion points are being noted by someone in the room or by use of
digital whiteboards. The firm’s strength lies in its teams and how its best
brains work together.

 

“My experience at
the firm (and that of the many McKinsey alumni I interviewed for this book)
taught me that IHs produced by teams is much stronger than that produced by
individuals. Why? Most of us are poor critics of our own thinking.”

 

PART THREE : THE McKINSEY WAY OF SELLING SOLUTIONS

Making presentations

Client
presentations are where the firm presents its solution. They also print their
study and solution in ‘blue books’ which are handed over to each person in the
board room as they take them through the presentation. The author recommends
the client should be kept abreast of developments and findings in the study so
that the final presentation does not come as a surprise but rather, the client
has already begun to buy into the solution by the time the final presentation
takes place.

 

Rigorous implementation

A strategy is only
as good as how it is implemented. The author has suggested that the person in
charge of implementing the strategy at the client level should be thorough,
precise and with the propensity to get things done by people. This will ensure
that the strategy gets implemented in a timely and effective manner. Rigorous
implementation ensures that the strategy is able to see the light of day.

 

PART FOUR: SURVIVING AT McKINSEY

Finding a mentor

The author has
suggested that every person in the firm should have a mentor who can provide
necessary guidance and feedback to help them grow in their career. The mentor
could be the manager in the team or some other person who has considerable
experience at the firm. The mentor helps them see a different perspective, find
their place in the firm and grow in the required direction.

 

Recruiting at McKinsey

McKinsey invests
considerable time, attention and resources to hire nothing but the best brains
across top schools around the globe. They also recruit people from varied
backgrounds and disciplines to add diversity to their teams. The author has
also given various examples of how the firm goes to different lengths (like
taking them to the best fine dines in town) so that who they recruit are
nothing short of the best.

 

PART FIVE : LIFE AFTER McKINSEY

“As one former
McKinsey-ite told me, leaving McKinsey is never a question of whether — it’s a
question of when. We used to say that the half-life of a class of new
associates is about two years — by the end of that time, half will have left
the firm. That was true in my time there and still is today. There is life
after McKinsey, however. In fact, there may be more life, since you are
unlikely to work the same hours at the same intensity in any other job. There
is no doubt, however, that the vast majority of former McKinsey-ites land on
their feet.

 

A quick scan
through the McKinsey Alumni Directory, which now contains some 5,000 names,
reveals any number of CEOs, CFOs, senior managers, professors, and
politicians.”

 

The drill that
consultants go through at the firm and their interactions with the best minds
of the world in absolutely unforgiving scenarios helps McKinsey-ites flourish
long after they have moved on from the firm.

 

CONCLUSION


The book is a rare,
honest and striking account of what consultants and firms can learn from “The
McKinsey Way” to grow their careers and practice. The anecdotes dotted across the
book keep the readers’ attention alive and also quickly endorse the opinions
presented by the author. The book runs across multiple vertical facets like
practice-building, presentations, marketing, client management, psychology and
productivity while still not coming across as generic. These directly
applicable tools and advices hit the nail on the head rather than beating
around the bush.
 

 

TWO SETS OF STARS LIGHT UP THE 50TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS OF BCAJ

There were two sets of stars at the launch of the Golden Jubilee issue of the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal (BCAJ) – on the one hand were five young music students at the Symphony Orchestra of India, NCPA, and on the other hand were stalwarts who had consistently contributed to the Journal for decades.

The glittering event was held on Wednesday, 6th March, 2019 in the C.K. Nayudu Hall of the Cricket Club of India and attracted a full house of office-bearers, eminent chartered accountants, committed contributors and unabashed admirers of the BCAJ. When the special commemorative issue was formally released, there was prolonged applause, bursting of balloons and a shower of confetti.

BCAJ Editor Raman Jokhakar, who was the master of ceremonies, started by welcoming the guests and introducing the young musicians at the ‘Birthday Celebrations of the BCA Journal’. First off, Gauri Khanna played Air Pergolesi and Dance Jenkenson on the cello. She was followed by Pranaya Jain on the flute rendering Rondo Mozart. Leah Divecha on the violin and Tivona Murphy D’Souza (D-Bass) rendered the popular Bollywood number “Senorita”. And Sangeeta Jokhakar ended the performance with a Bollywood medley and a cavatina by J. Raff on the violin. The budding, young musicians (some of whom will become the stars of tomorrow) and their teachers were felicitated with bouquets and mementoes.
Next, Raman invited the chief guest, Sunil Nair, Mumbai Resident Editor of the Times of India and BCAS President Sunil Gabhawalla to the dais. He stressed that the purpose of the celebration was to honour and acknowledge those who had contributed to the BCAJ for long and enabled it to reach the fabulous figure of fifty. He also quoted Steve Jobs who had said, “One way to remember who you are is to remember who your heroes are.”

Thereafter, the President spoke about the service provided by the Journal and acknowledged the scores of dedicated people who had nurtured it for years. He then introduced the chief guest.

Sunil Nair, who spoke on the “Future of the Print Media”, gave a brief and informative talk. He spoke about similarities in the roles of auditors and the press. He stressed the need for independence of media and also spoke about the future trends in media by embellishing his points with statistics.

He was astounded by the fact that the BCAJ had been published without a break for fifty long years and depended totally on subscriptions. Another unique achievement was that it was being brought out by chartered accountants who stole time from their professions to publish it on a voluntary basis. Warming up, he was candid enough to admit that although The Times of India was the biggest English language newspaper in the world, of late it had slid to the third position overall in terms of copies sold in India. The first two positions were now held by Hindi news dailies and the Times was no longer the highest-selling daily in the land. The silver lining, according to him, was that overall the circulation of newspapers in India was on the upswing – whereas in the rest of the world it was seeing a pronounced fall.

In other words, he stressed, the printed word still carried weight, and although television, the internet and other electronic forms of dissemination of news were becoming popular all over the world, they had still to make any huge impact in India. This was probably because of the late “blooming” of the Indian economy. Nair’s talk was well received and he was presented with a memento by Vice-President Manish Sampat.
Raman then spoke about the early days when editing DID NOT involve backspace, select, delete, cut, copy, paste. He stated that instead of a big bang special issue, the Editorial Board had decided to carry Golden Pages throughout the year which contained Interviews, Views and Counterviews and Special Articles (32 in number) amongst other regular features.

Just before the release of the last issue of Volume 50, past Editors Ashok Dhere, Gautam Nayak, Sanjeev Pandit and Anil J. Sathe along with Editorial Board members Kishor Karia and Anup Shah were invited to be part of the team to release the special issue. The twelfth issue of Volume 50 was then released by them.

The next segment consisted of honouring the Editors and the authors, writers and columnists of existing features. Raman started off with the words of Khalil Gibran: “You give little when you give of your possessions. It is when you give of yourself that you truly give.” What Gibran meant was giving of one’s time, because one’s time was one’s life. He also spoke about the past eight Editors and acknowledged the presence of the family members of the Late B.V. Dalal, the Late Ajay Thakkar and the Late Narayan Varma who served as Publisher for a long time. He also regretted the absence of K.C. Narang who was indisposed on that day.

Four past Editors, Ashok Dhere, Gautam Nayak, Sanjeev Pandit and Anil Sathe, were felicitated by the chief guest with a special memento designed for the event for their diligent, meticulous, persistent and focused contribution to the BCAJ. The words on the mementoes read: “In appreciation of your long and outstanding contribution to the BCA Journal…”

There was special applause when President Sunil took the mike in between and requested the chief guest (himself a resident Editor) to present a trophy to the BCAJ Editor, Raman.

In a touching gesture, Raman did not overlook those of his predecessors who were no longer with us. Thus, bouquets were presented to Mrs. Dalal, Mrs. Thakkar and Mrs. Varma, spouses of late Editors and Publisher.

Moving on, Raman spoke about a set of Japanese people called TAKUMI, which stood for artisans. This word could be written in many different ways in Kanji characters and each one of them gave different meanings – adroit, eminent, clear and so on. It is said that the intensity of the Takumis’ work borders on obsession – they are precise, absorbed and meticulous. These people are real experts. One of their characteristics is – Ganbaru – or to persevere, to stay firm by doing one’s best, with obsessive attention to detail. All of this is considered to be a unique talent in Japan.

The twenty five feature writers of the BCAJ, he stated, are perhaps best described by these two words: They are “Takumis” or artisans whose hands dance and flow in concert, designing and creating a new form each month.

Each of the features was introduced with a brief history, how it was curated and who were the people who wrote them. Each of the feature writers was then presented with a trophy as a mark of appreciation and regard for their consistency, quality and length of voluntary service to the Journal. It was notable that some feature writers had been contributing for more than 30 years on a monthly basis.

In an interesting twist, the trophies were not presented by the chief guest or by the Editor. Rather, the past Editors and President were called upon to make the presentations. Editor Raman, who compered the event, included not only facts and anecdotes during the presentations, but also sprinkled a fair dose of humour on the proceedings. He requested Gautam Nayak to present the trophy to the other Nayak — Mayur. Similarly, one Anil (Sathe) was asked to present a trophy to another Anil (Doshi). A round of applause greeted Anup Shah when Raman pointed out that when he had started off as a contributor, he was called CA. Anup Shah, but after nearly two hundred columns he had now become Dr. Anup Shah.

The presentation included a specially-designed trophy to all the regular contributors who had been writing for more than five years for the features concerned. Each trophy contained a sketch of the feature writer himself, along with a citation mentioning the feature. More than 40 trophies were ready for distribution.

Raman also recognised those involved in bringing out the Journal : V.K. Sharma, the Knowledge Manager, and Ms. Navina Vishwanathan, the Assistant Knowledge Manager, Anmol Purohit and the BCAS team. The printers, M/s Spenta Multimedia, were also present and each of the team members was acknowledged with a round of applause.

And then it was time to cut the ceremonial cake. It was a huge cake, to put it mildly, and it required the efforts of Raman, Sunil and some of the past Editors to cut it. The icing on top of the cake was designed to look like the cover of the issue that was released on the occasion.

Apart from the Editors, office-bearers and authors, the C.K. Nayudu Hall also saw the presence of some of the chartered accountants whose absorbing life stories featured in the article “Kaleidoscopic View” in the Golden Jubilee issue. Among them were Motichand Gupta, now Senior Manager for Taxation with Ion-Exchange (India) Ltd.; Ms. Nandini Shankar, CA, violinist and music teacher; Kisan Daule, who established his own practice after serving Transworld Shipping for 20 years (he retired as Senior GM); and Brij Mohan Chaturvedi, who is the third generation in a family having five generations in the CA world (he was accompanied by his granddaughter Tina, who is the fifth-generation CA in the Chaturvedi family).

A sumptuous repast was laid out for the guests who partook of it with great delight. As the eventful night came to an end, the hosts and the guests headed home carrying pleasant memories of an evening well spent.

KEY AUDIT MATTERS IN THE AUDITOR’S REPORT

It is always dissatisfaction with the status quo that drives
change, and the quantum of change is often proportionate to the magnitude of
dissatisfaction. So it was with the auditor’s report that auditors the world
over had been issuing with consistency. When the powerful investor-lender
lobby, who are the prime stakeholders in corporate enterprises, and therefore
the most crucial users of auditor’s reports, said that “the auditor’s opinion
on the financial statements is valued, but that the report could be more
informative”, they were making a polite understatement. In reality, they were
pretty upset about the fact that auditors were not telling them very much about
the most important matters they dealt with during the audit, how they responded
to them, and how they had concluded on them in forming their opinion. They were
unhappy that the entire process of audit was rather opaque and mysterious and
sought greater transparency. Their dissatisfaction got exacerbated each time
one more large corporation went under and they lost money. 

 

Standard setters across the world were under acute pressure from this
powerful lobby, supported by regulators, to change the situation. That was the
genesis of the effort to revise reporting standards by the two leading standard
setters in the world: the IAASB1 and the PCAOB. In the meanwhile, an
initiative for change was taken independently by the UK as early as in 2012-13
followed closely by the Netherlands, both countries bringing out revised
reporting standards by 2014. When the IAASB announced 2016 as the effective date
for its revised ISAs, there were several countries that early-adopted them,
including Germany, Switzerland, Hong Kong, South Africa, New Zealand and
Poland. In fact, Zimbabwe conducted a “dry run” of the revised reporting
standards a full year ahead of the IAASB effective date. The PCAOB in the US
started its effort even earlier, in 2008. The new proposed standard was exposed
for outreach of various stakeholders several times, comments were invited and
examined, roundtables were held and finally, in 2016, a reproposed standard was
announced with staggered effective dates2. India framed its revised
reporting standards, based almost wholly on ISAs, with 2017 as the effective
date. But that date was later revised to accounting periods beginning 1st
April, 2018.

___________________________________________________

 

1   IAASB or
International Auditing & Assurance Standards Board is a constituent of the
International Federation of Accountants. The PCAOB or Public Companies
Accounting Oversight Board is the audit oversight body created under the
Securities & Exchange Commission of the United States.

 

 

The auditor’s report of a large enterprise is the “finished product”
signed and delivered after months of sustained efforts put in by a large number
of audit professionals and partners in planning and performing an audit. It
addresses the final outcome of that process for users of financial statements.
Yet, over the years, the auditor’s report largely became so standardised (or
“boilerplate”) that there was no significant difference to be seen between the
auditor’s report of one enterprise as compared to that of another, particularly
where the opinion was “clean”, even though the two entities’ businesses and
economic situations would be completely different. Users of audited financial
statements wanted to see more distinctiveness in the auditor’s report so that
each such report told its own story and had its own character. To achieve this,
the standard setters introduced the concept of disclosing Key Audit Matters
(KAMs) in the auditor’s report.

 

INTENDED
BENEFITS

Communicating KAMs3  in
the auditor’s report does not change the auditor’s responsibilities in any way.
Nor does it change the responsibilities of either the management or those
charged with governance (TCWG). Rather, it is intended to highlight matters of
the most significance in the audit that was performed “through the eyes of the
auditor”. KAMs may also be perceived by users to enhance audit quality, and
improve the confidence that they have in the audit and the related financial
statements. The communication of KAMs could help to alleviate the information
asymmetry that exists between company managements and investors, which could
result in more efficient capital allocation and could even lower the average
cost of capital.

 

Throughout the standard-setting
process, both by IAASB and by PCAOB, the multitude of stakeholders who
responded, ranging from investors, lenders, regulators, oversight authorities,
national standard setters, preparers of financial statements and accounting
firms have expressed their support to the introduction of KAMs in auditors’
reports of listed entities and felt that it would protect the interests of
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative,
accurate and independent auditors’ reports. 

 

2   For large
accelerated filers FYs ending on or after 30/6/2019; Others – 15/12/2020

3         Under
the related PCAOB Standard, KAMs are called Critical Audit Matters (CAMs). An
effort has been made to give key comparative positions under the
related PCAOB standard in the footnotes, for the general appreciation of the
reader.

 

It is believed that having KAMs in the auditor’s report will:

  •    Increase transparency
  •     Focus users of the financial statements on
    areas of financial statements that are subject to significant risks,
    consequence and judgement
  •    Provide users with a basis to further engage
    with managements and TCWG
  •     Enhance communications between the auditor
    and TCWG on the most significant matters in the audit
  •     Increase the attention given by both,
    managements and auditors, to disclosures in the financial statements,
    particularly for the most significant matters
  •     Renew the auditor’s focus on matters to be
    communicated, indirectly resulting in an increase in professional scepticism
    and improvement in audit quality. 

 

CHANGES MADE IN
STANDARDS


Apart from the introduction of the concept of communicating KAMs
contained in a new Standard, SA 701 Communicating Key Audit Matters in the
Independent Auditor’s Report
, some other changes have also been made,
mainly in SA 260(R) Communication with Those Charged With Governance; SA
570(R) Going Concern; SA 700(R) Forming an Opinion and Reporting on
Financial Statements
; SA 705(R) Modifications to the Opinion in the
Independent Auditor’s Report
; SA 706(R) Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs
and Other Matter Paragraphs in the Independent Auditor’s Report
; and SA
720(R) The Auditor’s Responsibilities Related to Other Information.
Besides this, consequential amendments have also been made to SAs 210, 220,
230, 510, 540, 600 and 710.

 

WHAT IS A KEY
AUDIT MATTER?


KAM is defined in the Standard as: Those matters that, in the
auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit of the
financial statements of the current period. Key audit matters are selected from
matters communicated with those charged with governance
.4

_______________________________________

4   A
CAM under the PCAOB Standard, on the other hand, is any matter arising from the
audit of the FS that was communicated or required to be communicated to the
audit committee and that (1) relates to accounts or disclosures that are
material to the FS, and (2) involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex
auditor judgement. CAMs are not a substitute for the auditor’s departure from
an unqualified opinion.

 

Perhaps the most challenging part of disclosing KAMs is how to determine
the matters that constitute KAMs. The Standard has struck a delicate balance
between prescription and auditor judgement over here. The definition itself
clearly states that the matters to be disclosed should be those that “in the
auditor’s professional judgement” were of the most significance. It then
requires that such matters should be selected by the auditor “from matters
communicated with TCWG”. Apart from this, it also underlines three areas that
are the most likely sources of matters that would be discussed with TCWG, among
others.

 

Several auditing standards specify matters that the auditor should take
up with TCWG, in addition to SA 260(R) Communication with Those Charged with
Governance, and 265 Communicating Deficiencies in Internal Control to Those
Charged with Governance.
From these, the auditor first picks out matters
“that required significant auditor attention.” Then he applies his professional
judgement to further filter down matters and selects those that were “of the
most significance” in the audit of the current period as KAMs.

 

The auditor would
therefore be well advised to be armed with a ready-referencer checklist of
matters that the various standards prescribe for communication with TCWG to
first ensure that he complies with that requirement. It may be noted that there
is a subtle difference between SA 260 and SA 265 that is to be found in their
respective titles. Whereas SA 260 requires the auditor to communicate “with”
TCWG, SA 265 requires him to communicate “to” TCWG. To put it colloquially, SA
260 is two-way traffic (a discussion) but SA 265 is largely one-way traffic.
The definition of KAM talks about matters that were communicated “with” TCWG.
Significant deficiencies in internal control that are communicated to TCWG may
not always fall within the concept of KAM, although the auditor might have had
to modify his audit approach due to them, increasing his audit effort.

 

MATTERS TO BE
CONSIDERED BY THE AUDITOR IN DETERMINING KAMS5

The auditor is required to explicitly consider:

  •     Areas of higher assessed risks of material
    misstatement, or significant risks.
  •     Significant auditor judgements relating to
    areas of significant management judgement, including accounting estimates
    having high estimation uncertainty.
  •     The effect of significant events or
    transactions that occurred during the year. 

______________________________________________

5   For
determining CAMs under the PCAOB Standard, the following points are provided:
(a) the auditor’s assessment of the risks of misstatement, including
significant risks; (b) the degree of auditor judgement related to areas in the
FS that involve the application of significant judgement or estimation by
management, including estimates with significant measurement uncertainty; (c)
the nature and timing of significant unusual transactions and the extent of audit
effort and judgement related to these transactions; (d) the degree of auditor
subjectivity in applying audit procedures to address the matter or in
evaluating the results of those procedures; (e) the nature and extent of audit
effort required to address the matter, including the extent of specialised
skill or knowledge needed or the nature of consultations outside the engagement
team regarding the matter; and (f) the nature of audit evidence obtained
regarding the matter.

 

 

This requirement articulates the thought process the auditor should go
through to consider these drivers of “areas of significant auditor attention”
while noting that KAMs are always selected from matters communicated to TCWG.
It should not, however, be assumed that KAMs could only result from a
consideration of these three specific indicators, nor that all the three
indicators must exist to determine KAMs. Furthermore, the standard requires the
auditor to filter down to “matters of most significance” from out of the “areas of significant auditor
attention”. 

 

If one examines the three indicators mentioned above, one would see that
these are matters of most concern to the users of the audited financial
statements because any of them could turn out to be the cause of material
infirmity in the balance sheet of an entity or a source of management fraud.
Identification of matters drawn from them as KAM would enlighten users about
their nature, magnitude and how the auditor dealt with them. It would also
enable users, such as investors or analysts, to directly question the
management and TCWG about those matters. 

 

The importance given in the Standard to matters discussed with TCWG has
a double purpose: (a) investors and lenders want to have insights into matters
taken up in interactions between the auditor and TCWG, including those that
were keeping the auditor up at nights, consistent with the audit committee’s
role representing the interest of shareholders; and (b) to stimulate discussion
between the auditor and TCWG that, it was perceived, was not happening as much
as it should. Obviously, matters that comprise communications with TCWG would
be matters that are material to the audit of the financial statements, and
selecting the ones that are of the most significance out of these would limit
KAMs to only crucial issues that were hitherto not getting disclosed in the
auditor’s report, and which investors and lenders wanted to focus on in
understanding the financial statements of companies they had put their money
into.

 

Significant
risks


To determine a risk as significant the auditor considers:

(a)    Whether it is a fraud risk;

(b)    Whether the risk relates to
major changes in developments that impact the entity or its business;

(c)    Whether the risk arises from
complexity of transactions;

(d)    Whether there are
significant related party transactions;

(e)    Whether measurements of
amounts included in the financial statements involve a high level of
subjectivity or measurement uncertainty; and

(f)     Whether the risk involves
significant events or transactions that are outside the normal course of
business of the entity, or appear to be unusual in nature.

 

Significant
judgements


The second point of consideration is significant auditor judgements
relating to areas of significant management judgement, including accounting
estimates having high estimation uncertainty. Accounting estimates involving
the outcome of litigation, fair value estimates for derivative financial
instruments that are not publicly traded, and fair value accounting estimates
for which a highly specialised entity-developed model is used, or for which
there are assumptions or inputs that cannot be observed in the marketplace,
generally involve a high level of estimation uncertainty. However, estimation
uncertainty may exist even where the valuation method and data are well
defined. Estimates involving judgements are generally made in the following
areas and often involve making assumptions about matters that are uncertain at
the time of estimation:

(a)    Allowance for doubtful
accounts;

(b)    Inventory obsolescence;

(c)    Warranty obligations;

(d)    Depreciation method used or
useful life of assets;

(e)    Provision against carrying
amounts of investments;

(f)     Outcome of long-term
contracts;

(g)    Financial obligations or
costs arising from litigation;

(h)    Complex financial
instruments that are not traded in an open market;

(i)     Share-based payments;

(j)     Property or equipment held
for disposal;

(k)    Goodwill, intangible assets
or liabilities acquired in a business combination;

(l)     Transactions involving non-monetary
exchange.

 

Estimates involving
judgements are likely to be susceptible to intentional or unintentional
management bias. This susceptibility increases with subjectivity and is often
difficult to detect at the individual account balance level. Intentional
management bias often foreshadows fraud.

 

Significant
events and transactions

The auditor would
need to exercise professional judgement to determine if a significant event or
transaction that he encounters in an audit poses a risk of material misstatement
or not, since such events or transactions could be of many assorted types. Some
such events are listed below:

(a)    Operations in economically unstable regions,
volatile markets, or those subject to complex regulation;

(b)    Cash flow crunch, non-availability of funds,
liquidity and going concern issues, or loss of customers;

(c)    Changes in the industry where the entity
operates, or in the supply chain;

(d)    Forays into new products, services, lines of
business, or new locations;

(e)    Failed products, service
lines, ventures, business segments or entities;

(f)     Complex alliances, joint
ventures, or significant transactions with related parties;

(g)    Use of off-balance sheet
finance, special purpose entities, and other complex financial arrangements;

(h)    Distress related to
personnel like non-availability of required skills, high attrition, frequent
changes in key executives;

(i)     Unremediated internal
control weaknesses;

(j)     Inconsistencies between
entity’s IT and business strategies, changes in IT environment, installation of
new IT systems and controls having a bearing on revenue recognition or
financial reporting;  

(k)    Inquiries into the entity’s
business by regulators or government bodies;

(l)     Past misstatements, history
of errors, or significant period-end journal entries;

(m)   Significant non-routine or
non-systematic transactions, including inter-company transactions, and large
revenue transactions at or near period-end;

(n)    Transactions recorded based
on management intent, e.g. debt financing, intended sale of assets,
classification of marketable securities;

(o)    Application of new
accounting pronouncements;

(p)    Pending litigation and
contingent liabilities.

 

Matters to be
communicated with TCWG

SA 260, Communication with Those Charged With Governance,
includes many matters that should be communicated by the auditor. For the
purposes of KAMs reporting, however, all of those (e.g. the auditor’s
responsibility in relation to the audit; auditor independence) may not be
relevant. What would be relevant are communications of the significant risks
identified by the auditor and his significant findings.

 

Significant
risks


Communication with TCWG of significant risks (including fraud risks)
identified by the auditor helps them understand those matters, why they require
special audit consideration, and helps them in fulfilling their oversight
responsibility better. However, care should be taken when discussing the
planned scope and timing of the audit procedures so as to not compromise the
effectiveness of the audit, especially when some or all of TCWG are also part
of management. Such communication may include:

(a)   How the auditor plans to
address the risks;

(b)   The auditor’s approach to
internal control;

(c)   The application of the
concept of materiality;

(d)   The nature and extent of
specialised skills or knowledge needed to perform the audit, including the use
of auditor’s experts;

(e)   The auditor’s preliminary
views about matters that are likely to be KAMs;

(f)    Interaction and working
together with the entity’s internal audit function.

 

On his part, the auditor also benefits from a discussion with TCWG by
understanding:

(a)   The appropriate persons
within TCWG with whom to communicate;

(b)   The allocation of
responsibility between management and TCWG;

(c)   The entity’s objectives,
strategies and the related business risks;

(d)   Matters that TCWG consider
warrant particular auditor attention and areas where they request him to
perform increased audit procedures;

(e)   Significant communication
with regulators;

(f)    Other matters that TCWG
consider may influence the audit;

(g)   The attitudes, awareness and
actions of TCWG concerning (i) the importance of internal control and how they
oversee the effectiveness of internal control, and (ii) the detection and
possibility of fraud;

(h)   The actions of TCWG in
response to changes taking place in the accounting, IT, legal, economic and
regulatory environment;

(i)    Responses of TCWG to
previous communication with the auditor.

 

Significant
findings


These include:

(a)    The auditor’s views about
qualitative aspects of the entity’s accounting practices such as the
appropriateness of accounting policies, determination of accounting estimates,
and adequacy of financial statement disclosures;

(b)    Significant difficulties
encountered by the auditor during the audit;

(c)    Significant matters arising
during the audit that were or are being discussed with management;

(d)    Written representations that
the auditor desires;

(e)    The form and content of the
auditor’s report (now also including matters that the auditor expects to
include as KAMs);

(f)     Other significant matters
arising during the audit that the auditor feels are relevant to TCWG.

 

Other matters:

Beyond SA 260, there are several other standards that specifically
require the auditor’s communication with TCWG that have a bearing on KAMs
reporting:

(a)    SA 240, pertaining to the
auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud;

(b)    SA 250, pertaining to
consideration of laws and regulations;

(c)    SA 265, pertaining to
communicating internal control deficiencies;

(d)    SA 450, pertaining to
evaluation of misstatements;

(e)    SA 505, pertaining to
external confirmations;

(f)     SA 510, pertaining to
initial audit engagements;

(g)    SA 550, pertaining to
related parties;

(h)    SA 560, pertaining to subsequent
events; and

(i)     SA 570, pertaining to going
concern.

 

ORIGINAL
INFORMATION AND SENSITIVE MATTERS


During the
formation of the Standard, concerns were voiced that the auditor might provide
“original information” when reporting KAMs. Original information is any
information about the entity that has not otherwise been made publicly
available by the entity. The Standard has addressed this in paragraphs A35-A38
by emphasising that the auditor should take care not to provide any original
information in KAMs, but if it becomes necessary to do so, he should encourage
management to include new or additional disclosures in the financial statements
or elsewhere in the annual report so that it no longer remains original
information.

 

Similar apprehension was voiced with regard to the auditor disclosing
“sensitive matters” when reporting KAMs. Sensitive matters could be possible
illegal acts or possible fraud, significant deficiencies in internal control,
breaches of independence, complex tax strategies or disputes, problems with
management or TCWG, quality of risk management structures, regulatory
investigations, a contingent liability that did not meet the requirements for
disclosure, other litigation or commercial disputes, evaluation of identified
or uncorrected misstatements, etc. The Standard has addressed this in paragraph
14(b), with more detailed application guidance in paragraphs A53-A56, by
stating that in extremely rare circumstances, where the entity has not publicly
disclosed information about it, the auditor may determine that a matter should
not be communicated in the auditor’s report because the adverse consequences of
doing so would reasonably be expected to outweigh the public interest benefits
of such communication.

 

COMMUNICATING
KAMS


To introduce KAMs to the user, and to dispel the danger that
communication of KAMs might be misunderstood by some users to be a separate
opinion by the auditor on those specific matters, the Standard makes the
following introductory statements6:

 

  •     Key audit matters are those matters that,
    in the auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit
    of the financial statements of the current period; and
  •      These matters were addressed in the context
    of the audit of the financial statements as a whole, and in forming the
    auditor’s opinion thereon, and the auditor does not provide a separate opinion
    on these matters.

 

Each KAM should then describe (i) why the matter was considered to be
one of most significance in the audit, and was therefore determined to be a
KAM, and (ii) how the matter was addressed in the audit. It would be advisable
for the auditor to include in the description of a KAM a reference to a Note to
the Financial Statements where management has described the matter in detail
from its point of view7. And, if there is no such disclosure, he
should encourage management to include it. Doing so will also take care of the
danger of the auditor unwittingly providing any original information.  

_________________________________________

6   The introductory statement
in case of CAMs under the PCAOB Standard is: The critical audit matters
communicated below are matters arising from the current period audit of the FS
that were communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee
and that: (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the
financial statements and (2) involved our especially challenging, subjective,
or complex judgements. The communication of critical audit matters does not
alter in any way our opinion on the financial statements, taken as a whole, and
we are not, by communicating the critical audit matters below, providing
separate opinions on the critical audit matters or on the accounts or
disclosures to which they relate.

7   The
following needs to be done to communicate CAMs under the PCAOB Standard: (a)
identify the CAM; (b) describe the principal considerations that led the
auditor to determine that the matter is a CAM; (c) describe how the CAM was
addressed in the audit [in doing so, describe: (i) the auditor’s response or
approach that was most relevant to the matter; (ii)  a brief overview of the audit procedures
performed; (iii) an indication of the outcome of the audit procedures; and (iv)
key observations with respect to the matter, or some combination of these
elements]; (d) refer to the relevant financial statement accounts or
disclosures that relate to the CAM.

 

To dispel any misunderstanding that may arise in the minds of users as
to the import of disclosing KAMs by the auditor, and to clearly make users
understand the significance of a KAM in the context of the audit, and the
relationship between KAMs and other elements of the report, it is necessary for
the auditor to use language that:

  •       Does not imply that the matter was not appropriately
    resolved by the auditor in forming his opinion;

  •       Relates the matter directly to the
    specific circumstances of the entity, while avoiding generic or standardised
    language;
  •       Takes into account how the matter is
    addressed in the related disclosures in the financial statements, if any; and
  •       Does not contain or imply discrete
    opinions on separate elements of the financial statements.

 

The Standard intends that description of a KAM should be relatively
clear, concise, understandable, entity-specific and should not be viewed as
competing with the management’s disclosures or providing original information
about the entity. Also, that there should be a balance between the requirement
to explain why the auditor considered each matter to be of the most significance
in the audit and the flexibility allowed in describing its effect on the audit.
The Standard has left the nature and extent of the auditor’s response and
conclusion on the matter to his judgement by using the words “how the matter
was addressed in the audit”. Nevertheless, the Standard provides guidance that
the auditor may describe:

  •       Aspects of the auditor’s response or
    approach that were most relevant to the matter or specific to the assessed risk
    of material misstatement;
  •       A brief overview of procedures performed;
  •       An indication of the outcome of the
    auditor’s procedures; or
  •       Key observations with respect to the
    matter;

– or some combination of these elements.

 

While matters that give rise to a modified opinion that are reported
under SA 705(R) or going concern matters that are reported under SA 570(R) are,
by definition, KAMs, as they are already prominently mentioned elsewhere in the
auditor’s report, they are not required to be again described in detail under
the KAMs section. Only a reference may be made in the KAMs section to the
related Basis for Qualified/ Adverse Opinion, or the Material Uncertainty
Related to Going Concern sections of the auditor’s report.

 

Where the auditor determines, based on facts and circumstances of the entity
and the audit, that there is no KAM to be disclosed, he shall nevertheless
include a statement under the KAMs section that there is no KAM to communicate.
It is an expectation in the Standard that in every audit of a listed entity
there would be at least one matter that qualifies as KAM, and therefore the
auditor should be very circumspect in asserting that there is no KAM to report.
However, there could be situations where the auditor determines that a KAM,
though there, is not to be communicated (i) because law or regulation prohibits
such communication, (ii) that the matter belongs to the category of extremely
rare circumstances where the consequences of communication outweigh the public
interest benefits of communication, or (iii) that the only matters to be
communicated as KAMs are disclosed elsewhere in the report in the basis for
modified opinion or going concern sections.

 

SA 705.29, Considerations When the Auditor Disclaims an Opinion on
the Financial Statements
states that when the auditor disclaims an opinion
on the financial statements, the auditor’s report shall not include a KAMs
section.

 

The auditor is required to communicate with TCWG (i) the matters that he
has determined to be KAMs, or (ii) that he has determined that there are no KAMs.

 

APPLICABILITY


The Standard is mandatorily applicable to listed entities8.
Yet, the Standard allows for voluntary application by the auditor to audits of
financial statements of other entities also. SA 700(R).A35-A38 deals with two
situations where KAMs may be communicated: (i) where law or regulations
requires such communication, and (ii) where the auditor decides to communicate
KAMs for unlisted entities, particularly in case of unlisted public interest
entities (PIEs). PIEs are large entities that have a large number and a wide
range of stakeholders, for example, banks, insurance companies, employee
benefit funds, charitable institutions, etc.

 

Even where law or regulation is silent, voluntary communication of KAMs
in the auditor’s report by auditors of PIEs is to be encouraged, given the fact
that most of them are very large in size, have many stakeholders, and deal with
huge amounts of public money and may often also have large government
shareholding.

 

The ICAI Implementation Guide to SA 701
pointedly mentions that: “The auditor’s report is a deliverable by the auditors
and hence the decision to communicate key audit matters is to be taken by
auditors only.” In cases of unlisted entities where the auditor would like to
keep his option open for communicating KAMs, ISA 210.A249 (2018
Handbook) Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements, states that the
engagement letter may make reference to “the requirement for the auditor to
communicate key audit matters in the auditor’s report in accordance with ISA
701.” This is also reiterated in SA 700.A37.  

 

 

8   PCAOB Standards apply only to listed
entities and hence there is no ambiguity w.r.t. CAMs communication.

 

 

DOCUMENTATION


While the overarching requirements of SA 230, Documentation, of
documenting significant professional judgements made in reaching conclusions on
significant matters arising during the audit appropriately address the
documentation of significant judgements made in determining KAMs, SA 701
nevertheless includes specific documentation requirements in respect of the
following:

  •       Matters that required significant auditor
    attention and the rationale for the auditor’s determination as to whether or
    not each of these matters is a KAM;
  •       Where applicable, the rationale for the
    auditor’s determination that there are no key audit matters to communicate in
    the auditor’s report or that the only key audit matters to communicate are
    those matters addressed by paragraph 1510 ;
  •       Where applicable, the rationale for the
    auditor’s determination not to communicate in the auditor’s report a matter
    determined to be a key audit matter.

 

This is so that a more specific documentation requirement 11 would
address the concerns of regulators and audit oversight authorities (like NFRA)
for their ability to appropriately inspect or enforce compliance with the
Standard.  

 

ILLUSTRATIVE KAMs

A)      Introductory paragraph

  •       Key Audit Matters

Key audit matters are those matters
that, in our professional judgement, were of most significance in our audit of
the financial statements of the current period. These matters were addressed in
the context of our audit of the financial statements as a whole, and in forming
our opinion thereon, and we do not provide a separate opinion on these matters.

 

 

9   The related Indian Standard
on Auditing, SA 210, has not been correspondingly revised by ICAI as of the
date of this article.

10  Matters given in the basis
for modified opinion or the going concern sections of the auditor’s report

11       The
corresponding documentation requirement for CAMs under the PCAOB Standard is:
For each matter arising from the audit of the financial statements that: (a)
was communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee, and (b)
relates to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial
statements; the auditor must document whether or not the matter was determined
to be a critical audit matter (i.e., involved especially challenging,
subjective, or complex auditor judgement) and the basis for such determination.
[Note: Consistent with the requirements of AS 1215, Audit Documentation, the
audit documentation should be in sufficient detail to enable an experienced
auditor, having no previous connection with the engagement, to understand the
determinations made to comply with the provisions of this Standard.]

 

B)      Why the matter was considered to be one of
most significance in the audit and therefore determined to be a KAM?

 

  •       Goodwill

Under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS), the Group is required to
annually test the amount of goodwill for impairment. This annual impairment
test was significant to our audit because the balance of XX as of March 31,
20X1 is material to the financial statements. In addition, management’s
assessment process is complex and highly judgemental and is based on
assumptions, specifically [describe certain assumptions], which are
affected by expected future market or economic conditions, particularly those
in [name of country or geographic area].

 

  •       Valuation of Financial Instruments

The Company’s investments in structured financial instruments represent
[x %] of the total amount of its financial instruments. Due to their
unique structure and terms, the valuations of these instruments are based on
entity-developed internal models and not on quoted prices in active markets.
Therefore, there is significant measurement uncertainty involved in this
valuation. As a result, the valuation of these instruments was significant to
our audit.

 

  •       Effects of New Accounting Standards

As of April 1, 20XX, Ind ASs 110 (Consolidated Financial Statements),
111 (Joint Arrangements) and 112 (Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities)
became effective. Ind AS 110 requires the Group to assess for all entities
whether it has: power over the investee, exposure or rights to variable returns
from its involvement with the investee, and the ability to use its power over
the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s returns. The complex
structure, servicing and ownership of each vessel requires the Group to assess
and interpret the substance of a significant number of contractual agreements.

 

  •       Valuation of Defined Benefit Pension
    Assets and Liabilities

The Group has recognised a pension surplus of [monetary value] as
of March 31, 20X1. The assumptions that underpin the valuation of the defined
benefit pension assets and liabilities are important, and also subjective
judgements as the surplus/deficit balance is volatile and affects the Group’s
distributable reserves. Management has obtained advice from actuarial
specialists in order to calculate this surplus, and uncertainty arises as a
result of estimates made based on the Group’s expectations about long-term
trends and market conditions. As a result, the actual surplus or deficit
realised by the Group may be significantly different to that recognised on the
balance sheet since small changes to the assumptions used in the calculation
materially affect the valuation.

 

  •       Revenue Recognition

The amount of revenue and profit recognised in the year on the sale of [name
of product
] and aftermarket services is dependent on the appropriate
assessment of whether or not each long-term aftermarket contract for services
is linked to or separate from the contract for sale of [name of product].
As the commercial arrangements can be complex, significant judgement is applied
in selecting the accounting basis in each case. In our view, revenue
recognition is significant to our audit as the Group might inappropriately
account for sales of [name of product] and long-term service agreements
as a single arrangement for accounting purposes and this would usually lead to
revenue and profit being recognised too early because the margin in the
long-term service agreement is usually higher than the margin in the [name
of product
] sale agreement.

 

  •       Going Concern Assessment

As disclosed in Note 2, the Group is subject to a number of regulatory
capital requirements, which are a key determinant of the Group’s ability to
continue as a going concern. We identified that the most significant assumption
in assessing the Group’s and [significant component’s] ability to
continue as a going concern was the expected future profitability of the [significant
component
], as the key determinant of the forecasted capital position. The
calculations supporting the assessment require management to make highly
subjective judgements. The calculations are based on estimates of future
performance, and are fundamental to assessing the suitability of the basis
adopted for the preparation of the financial statements. We have therefore
spent significant audit effort, including the time of senior members of our
audit team, in assessing the appropriateness of this assumption.

 

C)      How the matter was addressed in the audit?

  •       Goodwill

Our audit procedures included, among others, using a valuation expert to
assist us in evaluating the assumptions and methodologies used by the Group, in
particular those relating to the forecasted revenue growth and profit margins
for [name of business line]. We also focused on the adequacy of the
Group’s disclosures about those assumptions to which the outcome of the
impairment test is most sensitive, that is, those that have the most
significant effect on the determination of the recoverable amount of goodwill.

 

  •       Revenue Recognition

Our audit procedures to address the risk of material misstatement
relating to revenue recognition, which was considered to be a significant risk,
included:

    Testing of controls, assisted
by our own IT specialists, including, among others, those over input of
individual advertising campaigns’ terms and pricing; comparison of those terms
and pricing data against the related overarching contracts with advertising
agencies; and linkage to viewer data; and

    Detailed analysis of revenue
and the timing of its recognition based on expectations derived from our
industry knowledge and external market data, following up variances from our
expectations.

 

  •       Disposal of a Component

We have involved our valuation, financial instruments and tax
specialists in addressing this matter and focused our work on:

       Assessing the
appropriateness of the fair values assigned to each element of the
consideration received by referring to third-party data as applicable;

       Evaluating management’s
assessment of embedded derivatives within the sale and purchase agreement; and

       Critically assessing the
fair value of [name of component] and the related allocation of the
purchase price to the assets and liabilities acquired by evaluating the key
assumptions used.

 

We also evaluated the presentation and disclosure of the transactions
within the consolidated financial statements.

 

  •       Restructuring Provision and
    Organisational Changes

In our audit we addressed the appropriateness and timely recognition of
costs and provisions in accordance with Ind AS 37 – Provisions, Contingent
Liabilities and Contingent Assets. These recognition criteria are detailed and
depend upon local communication and country-specific labour circumstances.
Recognition criteria can be an agreement with the unions, a personal
notification or a settlement agreement. The component audit teams have
performed detailed audit procedures on the recognition and measurement of the
restructuring provisions related to their respective components. The Group
audit team has identified the completeness and accuracy of the restructuring
provisions as a significant risk in the audit, has reviewed the procedures
performed by the component audit teams and discussed with the component teams
the recognition criteria. The restructuring provisions at the head office were
audited by the Group audit team. We found the criteria and assumptions used by
management in the determination of the restructuring provisions recognised in
the financial statements to be appropriate.

 

Decision framework to guide the auditor in
exercising his professional judgement





  •       Restructuring Provision and Disposition
    of a Mine

Our audit procedures included, among others: examining the
correspondence between the Group and the [name of government] and
discussing with management the status of negotiations; examining announcements
made by management to assess whether these currently commit the Group to
redundancy costs; analysing internal and third-party studies on the social
impact of closure and the related costs; recalculating the provision for
closure and rehabilitation costs for the mine in the context of the accelerated
closure plans; and reassessing long-term supply agreements for the existence of
any onerous contracts in the context of the Group’s revised requirements of the
accelerated closure plans. We assessed the potential risk of management bias
and the adequacy of the Group’s disclosures.

 

We found the assumptions and resulting estimates to be balanced and that
the Group’s disclosures appropriately describe the significant degree of
inherent imprecision in the estimates and the potential impact on future
periods of revisions to these estimates. We found no errors in calculations.

 

D)      How the auditor may refer to the related
disclosures in the description of a KAM?

 

  •       Valuation of Financial Instruments

The Company’s disclosures about its structured financial instruments are
included in Note 5.

 

  •       Goodwill

The Company’s disclosures about goodwill are included in Note 3, which
specifically explains that small changes in the key assumptions used could give
rise to an impairment of the goodwill balance in the future.
 

 

BAN ON UNREGULATED DEPOSIT SCHEMES

1.  BACKGROUND


The Lok Sabha
passed the “Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Bill, 2019” on 13th
February, 2019. As the said Bill could not be passed by Rajya Sabha before the
Parliament was dissolved, the Hon’ble President has issued an Ordinance called
“The Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Ordinance, 2019”, on 21st
February, 2019. This has come into force on 21st February, 2019. The
main objective of the Ordinance is to provide for a comprehensive mechanism to
ban unregulated deposit schemes and to protect the interest of depositors. The
Ordinance contains a substantive banning clause which bans deposit takers from
promoting, operating, issuing advertisements or accepting deposits in any
unregulated deposit scheme. It creates three different types of offences, viz.,
Running Unregulated Deposit Schemes, Fraudulent default in Regulated Deposit Schemes
and Wrongful inducement in relation to Unregulated Deposit Schemes. There are
adequate provisions for disgorgement or repayment of deposits in cases where
such schemes have managed to raise deposits illegally. The Ordinance provides
for attachment of properties/assets of the deposit taker by the Competent
Authority and subsequent realisation of assets for repayment to the depositors.
However, there are some controversial provisions in the Ordinance which have
created some practical issues. In this article an attempt is made to discuss
some of the important provisions of this Ordinance.

 

2. UNREGULATED
DEPOSIT SCHEMES

(i)     Section 2(17) of the
Ordinance states that an
“Unregulated
Deposit Scheme” shall mean a Scheme or an arrangement under which deposits are
accepted or solicited by any deposit taker by way of business. However, this
term does not include a deposit taken under the Regulated Deposit Scheme as
stated in the First Schedule to the Ordinance.


(ii)    Section 3 of the Ordinance
bans any Unregulated Deposit Schemes effective from 21st February,
2019. In other words, no deposit taker can directly or indirectly promote or
issue any advertisement soliciting participation or enrolment in such a scheme.
Further, the deposit taker cannot accept any deposits in pursuance of an
Unregulated Deposit Scheme.


(iii)    Section 5 of the Ordinance
provides that no person shall knowingly make any statement, promise or forecast
which is false, deceptive or misleading in material facts or deliberately
conceal any material facts to induce another person to invest in, or become a
member or participant of, any Unregulated Deposit Scheme.


(iv)   Further, section 6 of the
Ordinance states that a Prize Chit or Money Circulation Scheme which is banned
under the provisions of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning)
Act, 1978, shall be deemed to be an Unregulated Deposit Scheme under this
Ordinance.

 

3. REGULATED DEPOSIT SCHEMES


(i)     The Ordinance does not apply to Regulated
Deposit Schemes as mentioned in the First Schedule to the Ordinance as under:  


S.No

Schemes Prescribed by

Regulated Deposit Schemes

(a)

Securities and  Exchange
Board of India

Collective Investment Scheme

Alternative Investment Funds

Funds managed by Portfolio Managers

Share-Based Employee Benefits

Any other scheme registered under SEBI

Amounts received by Mutual Funds

(b)

Reserve Bank of India

Deposits accepted by NBFC

Any other scheme registered / regulated with RBI.

Amounts received by 
Business Correspondents and Facilitators

Amounts received by Authorised Payment System.

(c)

Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority

Contract of Insurance

(d)

State Government or Union Territory Government

Scheme by Co-operative Society

Chit Business under Chit Funds Act, 1982.

Scheme regulated by enactment relating to money lending

Any scheme of prize chit or money circulation scheme

(e)

National Housing Bank

Scheme for accepting deposits under NHB Act, 1987

(f)

Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority

Scheme under PFRDA

(g)

Employees P. F. Organisation

Scheme under EPFMP Act, 1952

(h)

Central Registrar, Multi-State Corporative Society

Scheme for accepting deposits from voting members

(i)

Ministry of Corporate Affairs

Deposits under Chapter V of Companies Act, 2013

Nidhi or Mutual Benefit Society u/s. 406 of Companies Act, 2013.

(j)

Any Regulatory Body

Deposits accepted under any scheme registered with a regulatory
body

(k)

Central Government

Any other scheme as notified by the Government under this
Ordinance

 

(ii)    Section 4 of the Ordinance
provides that while accepting deposits pursuant to a “Regulated Deposit Scheme”
no deposit taker shall commit any fraudulent default in the repayment or return
of the deposit on maturity or in rendering any specified services promised
against such deposit.


(iii)    From the above provisions
for Unregulated Deposit Schemes it is evident that the terms (a) Deposit and
(b) Deposit Taker are important. It may be noted that merely because a person
is covered by the term “Deposit Taker”, or loan or advance is covered by the
term “Deposit”, it does not mean that such deposit taken by a deposit taker is
prohibited by the Ordinance. These two terms defined in the Ordinance are
explained in the following paragraphs.

 

4.     DEFINITION OF “DEPOSIT”


The term “Deposit” is defined in section 2(4) of the Ordinance as under:

 

(i)     Deposit

Deposit means an amount of money received by way of an advance or loan
or in any other form by any Deposit Taker with a promise to return the money
after a specified period or otherwise, either in cash or kind or in the form of
a specified service. This may be with or without any benefit in the form of
interest, bonus, and profit, or in any other form.

(ii)    Exclusions

However, the following transactions are excluded from the definition of deposit.

(a)    Loan from a Scheduled Bank,
Co-operative Bank or any other banking company as defined in the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949.

(b)    Loan or financial assistance
received from a notified Public Financial Institution, Regional Financial
Institution or insurance companies.

(c)    Amount received from a State
or Central Government or from any other source if it is guaranteed by the
government or from a Statutory Authority.

(d)    Amounts received from any
foreign government, foreign bank, multilateral financial institution, foreign
government-owned development financial institutions, foreign export
collaborators, foreign corporate bodies, foreign citizens, foreign authorities
or persons resident outside India (subject to provisions of FEMA, 1999), etc.

(e)    Amounts received as credit
by a buyer from a seller on the sale of any movable or immovable property.

(f) Amounts received by a recognised asset reconstruction company.

(g)    Any deposit made u/s. 34 or
an amount accepted by a political party u/s. 29B of the Representation of
People Act, 1951.

(h)    Any periodic payment made by
the members of the self-help groups recognised by the State Government.

(i)     Any amount collected for
such purpose as is authorised by the State Government.

(j)     An amount received in the
course of or for the purpose of business and bearing a genuine connection to
such business. This includes the following receipts:

(i)     Payment or advance for
supply or hire of goods or services.

(ii)    Advance received in
connection with consideration of an immovable property.

(iii)    Security or dealership
deposit for contract for supply of goods or services.

(iv)   Advance received under
long-term projects for supply of capital goods.

 

The above receipts are subject to the following conditions:

  •    If the above amounts become refundable,
    such amount shall be deemed to be deposits on the expiry of 15 days, if not
    refunded within 15 days.
  •     If the above amount becomes refundable due
    to the Deposit Taker not obtaining necessary permission or approval under the
    law to deal in goods or properties or services for which the money is taken, it
    will be treated as a ‘Deposit’

(k)    Amount received as
contribution towards the capital by partner of any partnership firm or LLP.        

(l)     Amounts received by an
Individual by way of loan from relatives or amounts received by a firm by way
of loan from relatives of any of its partners.

 

For the above purpose the term “relative” is defined to mean any one who
is related to another if they are members of an HUF, or is husband, wife,
father, mother, son, son’s wife, daughter, daughter’s husband, brother, or
sister of the individual.

 

It may be noted that this is a very restricted definition as brother’s
wife, sister’s husband, nephew, niece, mother-in-law, father-in-law or near
relatives of spouse are not considered as relatives.  Therefore, any loan or advance received from
such persons will be treated as a deposit.

 

5.     DEPOSIT TAKER

Section 2(5) of the Ordinance states that a “Deposit Taker” means (i) An
Individual or a Group of Individuals, (ii) A proprietorship Concern, (iii) A
Partnership Firm, (iv) An LLP, (v) A company, (vi) AOP, (vii) A Trust – Private
Trust or Public Trust, (viii) Co-operative Society or a Multi – State
Co-operative Society, (ix) Any other arrangement of whatsoever nature. However,
this term does not include (a) A Corporation incorporated under an Act of Parliament
or a State Legislature or (b) a Banking Company, SBI, a subsidiary bank, a
regional rural bank, a co-operative bank, or a multi- state co-operative bank.

 

6.     IMPACT OF THE ORDINANCE ON CERTAIN DEPOSITS

Some practical issues arise from the above provisions of the
Ordinance.  As stated above, if any loan,
advance or deposit is taken by a person who falls in the list of Regulated
Deposit Schemes the provisions of the Ordinance will not apply.  Further, merely because a loan, advance or
deposit falls within the definition of ‘Deposit’ given in the Ordinance it does
not mean that it is to be considered as a deposit under the Unregulated Deposit
Scheme.  What is prohibited under the
Ordinance is a loan, advance or deposit taken under the “Unregulated Deposit Scheme”
as defined in section 2(17) of the Ordinance. 
In other words, if the deposit taker is not operating any scheme under
which deposits are accepted by way of business, such deposit will not be
considered as a deposit under Unregulated Deposit Scheme.  Accepting deposit by way of business would
mean that the business of the deposit taker is to accept deposits and give the
money as loans to others (i.e. Money-Lending or Finance business). 

 

In the light of the above, some of the practical issues are discussed
below:

 

(i)     If an Individual takes a
loan of Rs. 50 lakh from his friends for construction of his house, such loan
is not prohibited by the Ordinance although such loan is considered as a
deposit u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance.  This
is because under the definition of the term “Unregulated Deposit Scheme” only
such deposit which the deposit taker takes by way of business is
prohibited.  In other words, if the
deposit taker is taking loans, advances or deposits for his money-lending or
finance business and such business is not covered by the definition of
Regulated Deposit Schemes, it will be considered as a deposit under the
Unregulated Deposit Scheme.

(ii)    If an Individual, Firm or
LLP takes any loan, advance or deposit of Rs. 1 crore from any person (including
a partner of the firm or LLP or a non-relative of such partner) as working
capital for the manufacturing or trading business, it is not prohibited by the
Ordinance.  The reasoning is the same as
stated in (i) above as the person taking such loan, advance or deposit is not
taking the same for the business of taking deposits.  Further, the deposit taker cannot be
considered as having advertised or solicited for taking loans, advances or
deposits.  Such receipt is in the course
of, or for the purpose of, business and bearing a genuine connection to such
business and therefore will not be considered as a ‘Deposit’ u/s. 2(4) of the
Ordinance.

(iii)    If an LLP engaged in
construction of residential flats takes an advance from the prospective
customers against promise to allot residential flats after construction, the
said advance cannot be considered as a deposit taken under the Unregulated
Deposit Scheme. This is because the advance is not taken for the purpose of
business of taking deposits as stated in (i) above.

(iv)   If an individual carrying on
business of money-lending has taken loans, advances or deposits from relatives
he will not be considered as  having
contravened the provisions of the Ordinance since such  loans, advances or deposits do not come within
the definition of ‘Deposit’ u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance. The same will be the
position if such loans, advances or deposits are taken from relatives of a
partner of a partnership firm.  However,
if such loans, advances or deposits are taken from relatives of any partner of
an LLP carrying on money-lending business, which is not falling within the
definition of Regulated Deposit Scheme, the LLP will be considered as violating
the provisions of the Ordinance.  This is
because deposits from a relative of a partner of an LLP is not excluded from
the definition of a deposit under the Ordinance.

(v)    Amounts received by way of
contributions towards the capital by partners of any partnership firm or an LLP
are not considered as ‘Deposit’ u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance.  A partnership deed of any partnership firm or
LLP specifies the initial contribution to be made by partners towards
capital.  Further, the deed also provides
that further contribution of money shall be made by the partners in such manner
as may be mutually agreed upon by the partners. 
Therefore, it is possible to take the view that any further funds
brought in by the partners in the partnership firm or LLP will be considered as
contribution towards capital by partners. 
Further, even if the amount received from a partner is considered as a
‘Deposit’ u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance, it will not be considered as a deposit
under Unregulated Deposit Scheme if the partnership firm or LLP is not carrying
on money-lending or finance business.

(vi)   If a company is accepting
deposits from public and is complying with Chapter V  (Acceptance of Deposits by Companies) of the
Companies Act, 2013, such deposits will not be considered as deposits under
Unregulated Deposit Scheme.

(vii)   If an LLP engaged in manufacturing business takes
a loan of Rs. 2 crore from a partnership firm carrying on Money-Lending
Business, the provisions of the Ordinance will not apply.  This is for the  reason that the  term ‘Deposit’ in section 2(4) of the
Ordinance does not include any amount received in the course of or  for the purpose of business of LLP and having
a genuine connection to the business.

(viii)  If a subsidiary company
takes a loan from its holding company it will not be contravening the
provisions of the Ordinance. This is because u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance
‘Deposit’ taken by a company is given the same meaning as assigned to it in the
Companies Act, 2013. Section 2(31) of the Companies Act read with Rule 2(1) (c)
(vi) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014 provides that “Any
amount received by a company from any other company is  not to be considered as a deposit.

(ix)   If a buyer of goods receives
credit of 45 days from the seller, the same will not be considered as an
Unregulated Deposit and the Ordinance will not apply to such credit.  This is because such credit is not considered
as a Deposit u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance.

(x)    Section 3 of the Ordinance
bans the Unregulated Deposit Schemes w.e.f
21st
February, 2019. It also prohibits, w.e.f. 21st
February, 2019, any deposit taker from,
directly or indirectly, promoting, operating, issuing any advertisement or
accepting deposits in pursuance of an Unregulated Deposit Scheme.  This will mean that a Deposit Taker cannot
take any fresh deposit under such scheme on or after
21st
February, 2019.  However, it is not clear from this section as
to what is the position of the deposits already taken before
21st
February, 2019 under any Unregulated Deposit
Scheme.  This issue — whether the Deposit
Taker has to refund such outstanding deposits to the depositor and, if so,
within what period? — requires clarification from the government.

 

7.     COMPETENT AUTHORITY


(i)     The provisions of the
Ordinance are to be administered by the State Governments and the Union
Territories (Appropriate Governments). Section 7 of the Ordinance authorises
the Appropriate Governments to appoint one or more officers (not below the rank
of Secretary to that government) as a Competent Authority.


(ii)    Where a Competent Authority
has reason to believe, on the basis of the information and particulars as
prescribed by the Rules, that any Deposit Taker is soliciting deposits in
contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance, he may provisionally attach
the deposits held by the Deposit Taker. 
He may also attach the money or other property acquired by the Deposit
Taker or any other person on his behalf. 
The procedure for such attachment will be as prescribed by the Rules.  


(iii)    For the above purpose the
Competent Authority is vested with the powers of the Civil Court under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. While conducting the investigation or inquiry he can
exercise this power for (a)  discovery
and inspection, (b) enforcing attendance of any person, (c) compelling the production
of records, (d) receiving evidence on affidavits, (e) issuing commission for
examination of witnesses and documents, 
and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed  by the Rules.


(iv)   Except for the offences u/s.
4 (fraudulent default under Regulated Deposit Schemes) and intimation to be
given about accepting deposits u/s. 10, all other offences under the Ordinance
shall be cognisable and not-bailable. In other words, for these offences any
police officer can book a case on receipt of an FIR without waiting for a
magistrate’s order. The police officer has, then, to inform the Competent
Authority. On receipt of such information, the Competent Authority shall refer
the matter to CBI if the offence relates to a deposit scheme involving
depositors or properties located in more than one State or Union Territory or
outside India and the amount involved is of such magnitude as to significantly
affect public interest.  


(v)    The proceedings before the
Competent Authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings u/s. 193 and 288
of the Indian Penal Code.  In other
words, the Competent Authority will have to conduct the proceedings as per the
Rules to be prescribed and on the basis of principles of natural justice.


(vi)   U/s. 9(1) the Central
Government is required to designate the Authority to maintain and operate an
online database for information on Deposit Takers operating in India.  This Authority may require any Regulator
(SEBI, RBI, IRDA, State Government, Union Territory, etc.,) or the Competent Authority
to share such information about Deposit Takers as may be prescribed.  Similarly, section 11 of the Ordinance
provides that all other authorities such as Income tax  authorities, banks, regulators or any investigating
agency has to share information about any offence by a Deposit Taker with the
Competent Authority, CBI, police, etc.


(vii)   Section 10 of the Ordinance
provides that every Deposit Taker who commences or carries on its business as
such on or after
21st February, 2019 shall intimate the Authority appointed by the
Central Government u/s. 9(1) of the Ordinance about its business in the
prescribed form.  It may be noted that
this form is required to be filed by any Deposit Taker who accepts or solicits
deposits as defined u/s. 2(4) of the Ordinance. Further, this form is to be
filed by a company which accepts deposits under Chapter V of the Companies Act,
2013. In other words, the form is required to be filed even if the deposits
taken by the Deposit Taker are under unregulated Deposit Scheme or not.


(viii)  It may be noted that the requirement of
furnishing information u/s. 10 of the Ordinance is going to be onerous as it
applies to almost all persons who are carrying on any business of manufacturing
goods, trading in goods, money lending, financing, rendering of services, etc.
The definition of ‘Deposit’ in 2(4) of the Ordinance includes any loan or
advance. Therefore, any person engaged in business or profession receiving
loan, advance or deposit, as stated in Para 3 and 4 above, will have to furnish
the information in the prescribed form to the Authority appointed u/s. 9(1) of
the Ordinance. Even a company accepting fixed deposits as specified under
Chapter V of the Companies Act, 2013 has to comply with this requirement. It is
not clear as to whether this information is to be given only once or every year
on an ongoing basis. We will have to await the relevant rule to be prescribed
or any clarification from the government.

       

8.     DESIGNATED COURTS

(i)     Section 8 of the Ordinance
provides that the appropriate government shall constitute one or more courts
which will be called “Designated Courts” to deal with the cases relating to
contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance.  No other court shall have jurisdiction in respect
of matters relating to the provisions of the Ordinance.


(ii)    The Competent Authority,
within a period of 30 days (which may be extended to 60 days for the reasons to
be recorded in writing) from the date of provisional attachment of the
property, as stated in Para 7(ii) above, has to file an application to the
Designated Court for confirmation of the attachment and for permission to sell
the property so attached by public auction or by private sale.


(iii)    On receipt of such
application the Designated Court has to issue notice to the Deposit Taker, the
person whose property has been attached and other concerned persons to show
cause within 30 days as to why the attachment should not be confirmed and  these properties should not be sold.


(iv)   The Designated Court, after
adopting the established procedure, has to pass an order confirming the
attachment or such other order as it deems fit. 
The Designated Court can also pass an order that either entire or part
of the attached property may be sold by the Competent Authority by public
auction or by private sale.


(v)    The Designated Court can
pass an order or issue directions, as may be necessary, for equitable
distribution amongst the depositors of money attached or realised from the sale
of attached properties.


(vi)   When the default relates to
one or more Unregulated Deposit Schemes which are investigated by CBI, the
Supreme Court can direct that the case be transferred from one designated court
to another designated court.


(vii)   Section 15 of the Ordinance
provides that the Designated Court shall endeavour to complete the above
proceedings within a period of 180 days from the date of receipt of the
application from the Competent Authority.


(viii)  Any aggrieved person who is
not satisfied with the order of the Designated Court can file an appeal before
the High Court against the said order within 60 days of such order. The High
Court may entertain any appeal  filed after the above period if sufficient cause for the delay is explained.

 

9.     PUNISHMENT
FOR OFFENCES


Sections 21 to 27 of the Ordinance
provide for punishment for contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance as
under:

SNo.

Nature of Offence

Fine

Imprisonment

Minimum

Maximum

Minimum

Maximum

 

 

(Rs. in lakh)

(No. of Years)

(No. of Years)

(i)

Soliciting
for Unregulated Deposits Scheme (Section 3) (This will include advertisement)

2

10

1

5

(ii)

Accepting
deposit under Unregulated Deposits Scheme (Section 3)

3

10

2

7

(iii)

Deposit
Taker fraudently defaults in repayment of such deposit or in rendering any
specified service (Section 3)

5

200% of deposit collected

3

10

(iv)

Failure
to furnish information u/s. 10

0

5

—–

(v)

Contravention
of section 4

5

25 crore or 300%, of profits made whichever is
higher

0

7

(vi)

Contravention
of section 5

0

10

1

5

(vii)

Second
or subsequent offence

10

50 (crore)

5

10

(viii)

In
case of offences by persons other than individual,  every individual in charge of the affairs
of the Deposit Taker shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and  punished as above

—–

—–

—–

—–

 

 

10.   TO SUM UP

(i)       The
present Ordinance banning Unregulated Deposits Scheme has been issued after
detailed consideration at various levels. The Standing Committee on Finance
(SCF) presented its report on the subject of “Efficacy of Regulation of
Collective Investment Schemes, Chit Funds, etc.” in the Lok Sabha.  The SCF had issued this report after
consultations with various ministry officials and other stakeholders.


(ii)    The Central Government had
appointed an Inter-Ministerial Group to identify gaps in the existing regulatory
framework for deposit-taking activities and suggest administrative / legal
measures and also to draft a new legislation to cover all aspects of deposit
taking.


(iii)    The report of this
Inter-Ministerial Group was made public for public comments.  After detailed consideration a Bill to ban
Unregulated Deposits Schemes was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 18.7.2018. The
Bill was referred to the SCF on 10.8.2018. It was only after consideration of
the SCF report that the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 13.02.2019.


(iv)   From the above it is evident
that a lot of thought has gone into the drafting of this legislation. It is
only because the Rajya Sabha could not pass this Bill, before the Parliament
was dissolved, that the Hon’ble President has issued this Ordinance on 21st
February, 2019. Let us hope this Ordinance is approved by both Houses of
Parliament after the elections.


(v)    Reading the provisions of the
Ordinance it appears to be very harsh. But considering the fact that many
ill-informed persons get lured by attractive schemes for deposits floated by
unscrupulous persons, the government has considered it necessary to enact this
legislation in order to protect the interests of small depositors. 


(vi)   An issue which requires
clarification is about the position of such Unregulated Deposits Schemes
started before 21.2.2019. There is no specific mention about the same. There is
also no provision for refund of money to depositors of such existing schemes
within a particular period. Let us hope that the government will issue
clarification in this matter. 


(vii)        Section 10 of
the Ordinance requiring every person carrying on business or profession of
receiving loans, advances or deposits to report to the Authority to be
appointed by the government in the prescribed form, is going to be an onerous
exercise. Whether the form is to be filed only once or every year on an ongoing
basis is not clear. This requirement and certain other procedural requirements
under the Ordinance are dependent on the rules to be prescribed by the
government. We have to wait for these rules which are likely to be issued
shortly.

Section 5(2), read with section 9, of the Act – Agency commission received by non resident outside India, for services rendered outside India, is not taxable in India.

2.      
TS-84-ITAT-2019 (Mum) Fox International
Channel Asia Pacific Ltd. vs. DCIT 
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 15th
February, 2019

 

Section 5(2), read with section 9, of the
Act – Agency commission received by non resident outside India, for services
rendered outside India, is not taxable in India.


FACTS

Taxpayer, a company resident in Hong Kong,
was a part of a group of companies, and was engaged in distribution of
satellite television channels and sale of advertisement air time for the
channel companies at global level.

 

During the year under consideration, Taxpayer
received income in the nature of agency commission for distribution of
television channels and sale of advertisement air time as an agent of the
channel companies. Having noted that the Taxpayer has entered into an
international transaction with its associated enterprises (AEs), AO made a
reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for the determination of the
arm’s length price (ALP).

 

The TPO while computing ALP noted that out
of the global commission received by the Taxpayer from the overseas channel
companies, commission fee received towards the services rendered outside India
was not offered to tax in India and only the commission fees for services
rendered within India was offered to tax in India. The TPO held that the entire
income including for services rendered outside India was taxable in India and
hence made transfer pricing adjustment to the total income of the Taxpayer. In
pursuance to the ALP determined by the TPO, the AO passed a draft assessment
order adding the transfer pricing adjustment to the income of the Taxpayer.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) and contended that agency commission received in
respect of services rendered outside India, and received outside India, is not
taxable in India u/s. 5 and 9 of the Act.

 

However, DRP rejected the Taxpayer’s
contention and held that by virtue of Explanation to section 9(2), entire
income is deemed to accrue or arise in India whether or not the non-resident
has a residence or place of business or business connection in India or the
non-resident has carried on business operations in India. Accordingly, DRP
upheld the adjustment made to the ALP by the TPO.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •   The conclusion of the DRP
    that section 9 being a deeming provision can bring to tax any income which
    accrues or arises outside India, is incorrect.
  •   As per Explanation 1 to
    section 9(1)(i), a non-resident whose business operations are not exclusively
    carried out in India, only such part of the income as is reasonably
    attributable to the operations carried out in India, is deemed to accrue or
    arise in India. Thus, on a complete reading of the provisions of section 9 of
    the Act, only such income which has a territorial nexus is deemed to accrue or
    arise in India.
  •  Moreover, provisions of Explanation to section 9(2)1  of the Act, is not applicable to the agency
    commission earned by the Taxpayer.
  •   It is a well settled position
    of law that agency commission paid to non-resident agents outside India, for
    services rendered outside India, is not taxable in India. Thus, agency
    commission paid to Taxpayer outside India, for services rendered outside India,
    is not taxable in India.

 

C.A

Electoral Bonds: Bonding Money and Power?

Politics is the gentle art of getting
votes from the poor and campaign funds from the rich, by promising to protect
each from the other
– Oscar Ameringer

 

Election buzz is getting louder. A notable
change in this election from a financial perspective is that of funding of
elections via electoral bonds. The Finance Act, 2017 brought a far-reaching and
even questionable change that restricts citizens’ fundamental right to know
where the money comes from. The Finance Minister called it “substantial
improvement in transparency”. One can say this is a substantial example of
false equivalence.

 

Elections like everything else require
money. It is well known that power chases money and money seeks out power. One
of the greatest threats to democracy is money manipulating power. Electoral
Bonds (EB) compound these perennial problems manifold and even legitimise what
is fundamentally against the interest of citizens. Here is how the scheme
works:

 

a.  EB are as much or more opaque than earlier
systems:


i.   They are bearer instruments and a political
party does not have to disclose the name of the donors to anyone ever (as they
don’t even know it);


ii.   Companies are not required to disclose the
names of political parties to whom they give bonds; 


b.  The cap on corporate political funding of 7.5%
of last three years’ net profits was removed at the same time;


c.  F.Y. 2017-18 data shows1


i.   53% of all income (donations) of six
political parties came from Income from Unknown Sources2
 amounting to Rs. 689.44 crore
including 31% from EB (Rs. 215 crore) and Rs. 354.38 crore from voluntary
contributions below Rs. 20,000 where donor details are unknown (F.Y. 2017-18);


ii.   Six national political parties received 90%
of all donations from companies and 10% from 2,772 individual donors ;


iii.  The ruling party got 80% of its total income
from unknown sources.

As a wise citizen, you can connect the dots.
C K Prahalad3  gave an
interesting perspective a decade ago: “I cannot but assume that private funding
of elections of this magnitude is predicted on making an appropriate return.
Given the risky nature of the investment in elections, politicians as venture
capitalists, we can assume, will not settle for a less than ten-fold return.”

 

In the Indian context, it is hard to
understand why companies should fund important institutions and events of
democracy to this extent with anonymity? Why should corporates not disclose how
much and where the EB were given if they are only participating in the
democratic process? Why should political parties not disclose cash and non-cash
funding? Why should political parties not be audited by a panel approved by ECI
and CAG as proposed by an ADR report? Till this happens, I am not sure if
political parties really represent people and their interest!

 

Opaque funding through EB could easily be
legitimising corruption for favours granted by those in power in a way that can
never be known. While politicians are never known for matching words and
actions, one didn’t expect it from this government. Clean money without source
is akin to unclean money and is a slap on the face of ‘transparency’.

 

__________________________________________________

1   From Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR)
website/reports.

2     Unknown sources means – income declared in
tax returns but without giving sources of donations below Rs. 20,000 and
includes donation via electoral bonds, sale of coupons, etc.

 3   Seventh Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture,
January, 2010

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

Love – Hate

?Discover
the redemption power of love’

               Martin Luther King Jr.

 

Love and hate : both are very strong
emotions. They are actually two sides of the same coin. The irony is that at
times, with change in environment – the person we love is the person we hate.
Graham Greene says `I hate him for the very quality that once made me love him’.
The issue is: what is the difference between love and hate. Hate has been
defined as having strong feeling of hostility and / or antipathy. In my view –
love is giving without expectation and is based on the concept of `let go’
whereas `hate’ results from failure of expectations and is based on the concept
of `hold on’. Osho says : `love is happy when it gives something’ – whereas
hate is based on an unfulfilled demand / need expectation. Love expands and
grants space whereas hate contracts. Love accepts individuality – hate arises
because of failure of desire to control and change the other person. Love is a
mood reader. Hate is blind to the mood of the other person. Paul Coelho says :
`one is loved because one is loved. No reason is needed in loving’. Love is
always unconditional whereas `hate’ has a reason.

 

Love is the breath of life. Secret of basis
of lifelong love is understanding. Love is the essence of life – without love,
life is like an empty vessel. Love could be for a person, pet or place. It has
no boundary. Love need not be person-oriented. It could be love for nature, for
any of the performing arts, for a place. Love for books, and knowledge and
above all our unconditional love for God – our Creator.

 

The antidote to hate is forgiveness coupled
with other side of the coin ?love’.

 

?Forgiveness’ relieves and benefits both the
forgiver and the one who is forgiven. Gandhi says that forgiveness can only be
practised by the strong. The author has already expressed his view on a
previous writing on ?forgiveness’. I also believe that if one can forgive and
forget, it would make forgiveness divine. However, it is easy to forgive but
difficult to forget. One can only forget by the grace of God. Hence to really
get out of hate seek – nay crave His grace to forget. It would relieve you of
negativity and lead to love. Jesus said ?love thy enemy’. Even on the cross,
Jesus prayed for forgiveness of his tormentors when he prayed `Father, forgive
them’.

 

It is rightly said that ?a person who
truly loves one cannot but love all
’. I believe that a person who loves God
cannot ever feel hate. In essence, he falls in love with himself and there
is no duality in love.

 

Thus ultimate of love is loving yourself.
This can happen only when you forgive yourself – stop repenting your mistakes
and ensure that you don’t repeat them. This happens when we are
mindfully-conscious of our actions and behaviour. Love for oneself is
the basis of loving others. Azim Jamal advises : ?If you yearn for love – be
loved, treat everyone you meet with love’
.

 

I
would conclude by quoting Peter Usitnov :

?Love
is an endless act of forgiveness’.

THE FUGITIVE ECONOMIC OFFENDERS ACT, 2018 – AN OVERVIEW – PART 1

In the recent
past, there have been quite a few instances of big time offenders including
economic offenders (For example, Vijay Mallya, Lalit Modi, Nirav Modi, Mehul
Choksi, Deepak Talwar, Sanjay Bhandari, Jatin Mehta, Prateek Jindal etc.),
fleeing the country to escape the clutches of law. The Parliament has therefore
enacted a new law, to deal with such offenders by confiscating the assets of
such persons located in India until they submit to the jurisdiction of the
appropriate legal forum.

 

In this Part 1
of the article, we have attempted to give an overview of some of important
aspects of The Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 [the FEO Act or the Act].

 

1.  INTRODUCTION


The FEO Bill, 2018
was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 12th March, 2018 but the same
could not be passed both the houses of parliament were prorogued on 6th
April, 2018.  Hence, the FEO Ordinance,
2018 was promulgated on 21st April, 2018 which came into force
immediately. The FEO Bill, 2018 was passed by Parliament on 25th
July, 2018 and received the assent of the President on 31st July,
2018. Section 1(3) of the FEO Act provides that it is deemed to have come in to
force w.e.f. 21st April, 2018 and section 26(1) repeals the FEO
Ordinance, 2018.

 

2. 
NEED AND RATIONALE FOR FEO ACT


2.1  After approval of the proposal of the Ministry
of Finance to introduce the Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill, 2018 in
Parliament, the Press Release dated 1st March, 2018, issued by the
Ministry of Finance, Government of India, explained the background of the FEO
Bill, 2018, as follows:

 

“Background

There have been
several instances of economic offenders fleeing the jurisdiction of Indian
courts, anticipating the commencement, or during the pendency, of criminal
proceedings. The absence of such offenders from Indian courts has several
deleterious consequences – first, it hampers investigation in criminal cases;
second, it wastes precious time of courts of law, third, it undermines the rule
of law in India. Further, most such cases of economic offences involve
non-repayment of bank loans thereby worsening the financial health of the
banking sector in India. The existing civil and criminal provisions in law are
not entirely adequate to deal with the severity of the problem. It is,
therefore, felt necessary to provide an effective, expeditious and
constitutionally permissible deterrent to ensure that such actions are curbed.
It may be mentioned that the non-conviction-based asset confiscation for
corruption-related cases is enabled under provisions of United Nations
Convention against Corruption (ratified by India in 2011). The Bill adopts this
principle.
In view of the above context, a Budget announcement was made by
the Government in the Budget 2017-18 that the Government was considering to introduce
legislative changes or even a new law to confiscate the assets of such
absconders till they submit to the jurisdiction of the appropriate legal
forum.”

 

2.2  The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
FEO Bill, provides as follows:

 

“Statement of objects and reasons


There have been several instances of economic
offenders fleeing the jurisdiction of Indian courts anticipating the
commencement of criminal proceedings or sometimes during the pendency of such
proceedings. The absence of such offenders from Indian courts has several
deleterious consequences, such as, it obstructs investigation in criminal
cases, it wastes precious time of courts and it undermines the rule of law in
India. Further, most of such cases of economic offences involve non-repayment
of bank loans thereby worsening the financial health of the banking sector in
India. The existing civil and criminal provisions in law are inadequate to deal
with the severity of the problem
.


2.    In order to address the said problem and
lay down measures to deter economic offenders from evading the process of
Indian law by remaining outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts, it is
proposed to enact a legislation, namely, the Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill,
2018 to ensure that fugitive economic offenders return to India to face the
action in accordance with law.


3.    The said Bill, inter alia, provides for:
(i) the definition of the fugitive economic offender as an individual who has
committed a scheduled offence or offences involving an amount of one hundred
crore rupees or more and has absconded from India or refused to come back to
India to avoid or face criminal prosecution in India; (ii) attachment of the
property of a fugitive economic offender and proceeds of crime; (iii) the
powers of Director relating to survey, search and seizure and search of
persons; (iv) confiscation of the property of a fugitive economic offender and
proceeds of crime; (v) disentitlement of the fugitive economic offender from
putting forward or defending any civil claim; (vi) appointment of an
Administrator for the purposes of the proposed legislation; (vii) appeal to the
High Court against the orders issued by the Special Court; and (viii) placing
the burden of proof for establishing that an individual is a fugitive economic
offender on the Director or the person authorised by the Director.


4.    The Bill seeks to achieve the above
objectives.”

 

2.3  Shri Piyush Goyal, then holding charge as
Finance Minister explained the rationale for the FEOA in the Rajya Sabha debate
on 25th July, 2018
, as under:

 

“Sir, there have been many instances of economic
offenders in last several decades, fleeing from the jurisdiction of the Indian
Courts, sometimes in anticipation of commencement of proceedings or sometimes
during the pendency of proceedings. Sir, you are not able to impound of those
leaving the country, except through due process of law. The current laws as
they stand today, have its own limitations in stopping people who flee the
country in anticipation or during the pendency of the proceedings. The absence
of such offenders from the Indian courts has very deleterious consequences. The
existing civil and criminal laws do not allow us to adequately deal with the
severity of the problem, since they are not available or present.

 

Criminal law
does not allow us to push in for punishment, impound their properties and deal
with their properties. Therefore, it was felt necessary to provide an
effective, expeditious and constitutionally permissible deterrent to ensure
that such people do not runaway or, if they runaway, confiscate their
properties.
In this context, in the Budget for
2017-18, the hon’ble Finance Minister had announced the intention of the
Government to introduce legislative changes or even a new law to confiscate
assets of such absconders till they submit themselves before the jurisdiction
of the appropriate legal forum. We are not only confiscating their assets but
we are also providing how the confiscated property will be managed and disposed
of, so that dues of Government of India, State Governments and banks, etc., can
be recovered from them.”

 

2.4  The Preamble to the FEO Act
provides as follows:

 

“An Act to
provide for measures to deter fugitive economic offenders from evading the
process of law in India by staying outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts,
to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law in India and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.”

 

2.5  On 30th November, 2018 in the
meeting at Buenos Aires, India suggested following Nine Point Agenda to G-20
for action against Fugitive Economic Offences and Asset Recovery:

 

1.    “Strong and active cooperation across
G-20 countries to deal comprehensively and efficiently with the menace fugitive
economic offenders.

2.    Cooperation in the legal processes such
as effective freezing of the proceeds of crime; early return of the offenders
and efficient repatriation of the proceeds of crime should be enhanced and
streamlined.

3.    Joint effort by G-20 countries to form a
mechanism that denies entry and safe havens to all fugitive economic offenders.

4.    Principles of United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNOTC), especially related to “International Cooperation”
should be fully and effectively implemented.

5.    FATF should be called upon to assign
priority and focus to establishing international co-operation that leads to
timely and comprehensive exchange of information between the competent
authorities and FIUs.

6.    FATF should be tasked to formulate a
standard definition of fugitive economic offenders.

7.    FATF should also develop a
set of commonly agreed and standardized procedures related to identification,
extradition and judicial proceedings for dealing with fugitive economic
offenders to provide guidance and assistance to G-20 countries, subject to
their domestic law.

8.    Common platform should be set up for
sharing experiences and best practices including successful cases of
extradition, gaps in existing systems of extradition and legal assistance, etc.

9.    G-20 Forum should consider initiating
work on locating properties of economic offenders who have a tax debt in the
country of their residence for its recovery.”

 

2.6  From the above, it is apparent that the
government is making all possible efforts to compel the FEOs to submit
themselves before the jurisdiction of the appropriate legal forum.

 

3.  OVERVIEW OF THE ACT AND THE RULES


3.1  The FEO Act is divided in three Chapters
containing 26 sections and one Schedule listing the sections and description of
various offences.

 

3.2  Various rules have been made by the Central
Government for various matters for carrying out the provisions of the FEO Act.
The present list of rules is as follows:

 

Sr. No.

Particulars of the Rules

Effective Date

1.

Fugitive Economic Offenders (Manner of Attachment of Property) Rules,
2018

(Issued in suppression of the Fugitive
Economic Offenders (Issuance of Attachment Order) Rules, 2018 dated 24th
April, 2018 and Fugitive Economic Offenders (Issuance of Provisional
Attachment Order) Rules, 2018 dated 24th April, 2018.)

24th August, 2018

2.

Declaration of Fugitive Economic Offenders (Forms and Manner of Filing
Application) Rules, 2018

(Issued in suppression of the Fugitive
Economic Offenders (Application for Declaration of Fugitive Economic
Offenders) Rules, 2018 dated 24th April, 2018.)

24th August, 2018

3.

Fugitive Economic Offenders (Procedure for sending Letter of Request
to Contracting State) Rules, 2018.

(Issued in suppression of the Fugitive
Economic Offenders (Procedure for sending Letter of Request to Contracting
State for Service of Notice and Execution of Order of the Special Court)
Rules, 2018 dated 24th April, 2018.)

24th August, 2018

4.

Fugitive Economic Offenders (Procedure for Conducting Search and
Seizure) Rules, 2018

(Issued in suppression of the Fugitive
Economic Offenders (Forms, Search and Seizure and the Manner of Forwarding
the Reasons and Material to the Special Court) Rules, 2018 dated 24th
April, 2018.)

24th August, 2018

5.

Fugitive Economic Offenders (Manner and Conditions for Receipt and
Management of Confiscated Properties) Rules, 2018.

(Issued in suppression of the Fugitive
Economic Offenders (Receipt and Management of Confiscated Properties) Rules,
2018 dated 24th April, 2018.)

24th August, 2018

 

 

3.3  Some
Salient Features of the FEO Act

a.  
The FEO Act is deemed to have come into force on 21st April
2018 i.e. the date of issuance of the FEO Ordinance, 2018.

b.  
The FEO Act extends to whole of India including Jammu and Kashmir.

c.  
The Act provides for measures to deter fugitive economic offenders from
evading the process of law in India by staying outside the jurisdiction of
Indian courts, to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law in India and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

d.   
Section 3 of the FEO Act provides that the provisions of the Act apply
to any individual who is, or becomes a Fugitive Economic Offender [FEO] on or
after the date of coming into force of the Act i.e. 21st April,
2018.

e.  
Section 4(3) provides that the authorities appointed for the purposes of
the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 shall be the Authorities for the
purposes of the Act.

f.  
Section 18 provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to
entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Special
Court is empowered by or under the Act to determine and no injunction shall be
granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be
taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act.

 

4.    FUGITIVE ECONOMIC OFFENDER [FEO]


4.1  The term ‘Fugitive Economic Offender’ or FEO
is the main stay of the FEO Act, as the Act provides for action against FEOs
and the significance of the definition of FEO cannot be undermined. Section
2(1)(f) of the Act defines the term FEO, as follows:

“(f) “fugitive
economic offender” means any individual against whom a warrant for arrest in
relation to a Scheduled Offence has been issued by any Court in India, who –

(i)    has left India so as to avoid criminal prosecution;
or

(ii)   being abroad, refuses to return to India to
face criminal prosecution;”

 

Thus, a person is
considered to be a FEO, if he satisfies the following conditions:

a)    He is an individual;

b)    a warrant for arrest in relation to a
Scheduled Offence has been issued by any Court in India against him;

c)    he is a fugitive i.e. he (i) has left India
so as to avoid criminal prosecution; or (ii) being abroad, refuses to return to
India to face criminal prosecution.

 

4.2  Only
an Individual to be declared as FEO

From the definition
in section 2(1)(f) and provisions of section 3 (Application of Act), section
4(1) (Application for declaration of FEO and procedure therefore), section
10(1) (Notice), section 11 (Procedure for hearing application) and section 12(1)
(Declaration of FEO), makes it abundantly clear that only an individual can be
declared as a FEO.

 

Thus, prima
facie
, the provisions of the FEO Act should not have application to a
company or Limited Liability Partnership [LLP] or partnership firm or other
association of persons.

 

However, as an
exception, section 14 dealing with ‘Power to disallow civil claims’ provides
that on declaration of an individual as a FEO, any Court or Tribunal in India
in any civil proceeding before it may, disallow any company or LLP (as defined
in section 2(1)(n) of the LLP Act, 2008) from putting forward or defending any
civil claim, if such an individual is (a) filing the claim on behalf of the
company or the LLP, or (b) promoter or key managerial personnel (as defined in
section 2(51) of the Companies Act, 2013) or majority shareholder of the
company or (c) having a controlling interest in the LLP.

 

Section 12(2) of
the FEO Act provides that on declaration of an individual as a FEO, the Special
court may order that any of the following properties stand confiscated to the
Central Government (a) the proceeds of crime in India or abroad, whether or not
such property is owned by the fugitive economic offender; and (b) any other
property or benami property in India or abroad, owned by the fugitive economic
offender. The assets owned by LLPs in which the FEO having controlling interest
or Companies in which the FEO is promoter or key managerial personnel or
majority shareholder, can be confiscated only if it is established that such
LLP or Company is benamidar of the FEO or the property held by the company or
LLP represents proceeds of crime. Further, it appears that the courts can lift
the corporate veil in appropriate cases and rule that the property standing in
the name of the company or LLP is actually the property of the Individual FEO
and the same is liable for confiscation.

 

4.3  Warrant
of Arrest

For an individual
to be declared as a FEO, it is necessary that (a) a warrant of arrest has been
issued against him by a Court in India; (b) such warrant is in relation to a
Scheduled Offence, whether committed before or after the date of coming in to
force of the FEO Act i.e. 21-04-18; (c) it is immaterial whether the warrant
was issued before, on or after 21-04-18 as long as the same is pending on the
date of declaration as FEO; and (d) if the warrant of arrest stands withdrawn
or quashed as of the date of declaration as FEO, then the individual cannot be
declared a FEO.

 

4.4 
Fugitive

The term ‘fugitive’
has not been defined in the FEO Act. Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a
‘fugitive’ as
a person who has escaped from the captivity or is in hiding. To be considered a
FEO the individual should
have (a) has left India so as to avoid criminal prosecution; or (b) being
abroad, refuses to return to India to face criminal prosecution.

 

Section 11(1) of
the Act provides that where any individual to whom notice has been issued under
sub-section (1) of section 10 appears in person at the place and time specified
in the notice, the Special Court may terminate the proceedings under the Act.
Thus, if the alleged FEO returns to India at any time during the course of
proceedings relating to the declaration as a FEO (prior to declaration) and
submits to the appropriate jurisdictional court, the proceedings under the FEO
Act cease by law.

 

4.5  Procedure
to declare an individual as FEO

The FEO Act, inter
alia
, provides for the procedure to declare an individual as FEO, which is
as follows:

 

(i)    Application of mind by the Director or other
authorised office to the material in his possession as to whether he has reason
to believe that an individual is a FEO.

(ii)   Documentation of reason for belief in
writing.

(iii)   Provisional attachment (without Special
Court’s permission) by a written order of an individual’s property (a) for
which there is reason to believe that the property is proceeds of crime, or is
a property or benami property owned by an individual who is a FEO; and (b)
which is being or is likely to be dealt within a manner which may result in the
property being unavailable for confiscation. In cases of provisional
attachment, the Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any
property under this section 5(2) is required to file an application u/s. 4
before the Special Court, within a period of thirty days from the date of such
attachment.

(iv)  Making an application before the special court
for declaration that an individual is a FEO (Section 4);

(v)   Attachment of the property of a FEO and
proceeds of crime (Section 5);

(vi)  Issue of a notice by the special court to the
individual alleged to be a FEO (Section 10);

(vii)  Where any individual to whom notice has been
issued appears in person at the place and time specified in the notice, the
special court may terminate the proceedings under the FEO Act. (Section 11(1))

(viii) Hearing of the application for declaration as
FEO by the Special Court (Section 11);

(ix)  Declaration as FEO by Special Court by a
speaking order (Section 12);

(x)   Confiscation of the property of an individual
declared as a FEO or even the proceeds of crime (Section 12);

(xi)  Supplementary application in the Special Court
seeking confiscation of any other property discovered or identified which
constitutes proceeds of crime or is property or benami property owned by
the individual in India or abroad who is a FEO, liable to be confiscated under
the FEO Act (Section 13)

(xii)  Disentitlement of a FEO from defending any
civil claim (Section 14); and

(xiii) Appointment of an Administrator to manage and
dispose of the confiscated property under the Act
(Section 15).

 

4.6  Manner
of Service of notice

Section 10 dealing
with Notice, provides for two alternative prescribed mode of service of notice
on the alleged FEO: (a) through the contracting state (s/s. (4) and (5); and
(b) e-service.

 

Notice through Contract State

Section 2(1)(c) of
the Act defines Contracting State as follows:

“Contracting
State” means any country or place outside India in respect of which
arrangements have been made by the Central Government with the Government of
such country through a treaty or otherwise;”

 

Section 10(4)
provides that a notice under s/s. (1) shall be forwarded to such authority, as
the Central Government may notify, for effecting service in a contracting
State.

 

Section 10(5)
provides that such authority shall make efforts to serve the notice within a
period of two weeks in such manner as may be prescribed.

 

Service of notice
through the contracting state is possible only when alleged FEO is suspected or
known to be in a contracting state with which India has necessary arrangements
through a treaty or otherwise.

 

E-service of Notice

Section 10(6)
provides that a notice under s/s. (1) may also be served to the
individual alleged to be a FEO by electronic means to:

 

(a)   his electronic mail address submitted in
connection with an application for allotment of Permanent Account Number u/s.
139A of the Income-tax Act, 1961;

(b)   his electronic mail address submitted in
connection with an application for enrolment u/s. 3 of the Aadhaar (Targeted
Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016; or

(c)   any other electronic account as may be
prescribed, belonging to the individual which is accessed by him over the
internet, subject to the satisfaction of the Special Court that such account
has been recently accessed by the individual and constitutes a reasonable
method for communication of the notice to the individual.

 

4.7  India’s
First Declared FEO

As per the news
report appearing in the New Indian Express dated 19th January, 2019,
Mr. Vijay Mallya is the first businessman to be declared an FEO under the FEO
Act. In absence of the copy of the court’s order being available in public
domain as yet, the key points of the special court’s order, as appearing in the
text of the new report, is given for reference.

 

“Businessman
Vijay Mallya’s claim that the Indian government’s efforts to extradite him were
a result of “political vendetta” was “mere fiction of his
imagination”, a special PMLA court observed in its order.

Mallya, accused
of defaulting on loans of over Rs 9,000 crore, was on January 5 declared a
fugitive economic offender (FEO) by special Judge M S Azmi of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act (PMLA) court.

 

The judge, in
his order that was made available to media Saturday, said, “Mere statement
that the government of India had pursued a political vendetta against him and
initiated criminal investigations and proceeding against him cannot be ground
for his stay in UK.”

 

Besides these
bare statements, there is nothing to support as to how the government of India
initiated investigation and proceedings to pursue political vendetta, the judge
said in his order.

 

“Hence the
arguments in these regards are mere fiction of his imagination to pose himself
as law-abiding citizen,” he added.

 

The court said
the date of Mallya leaving India was March 2, 2016, and on that day admittedly
there was offence registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and
the Enforcement Directorate (ED).

 

Mallya laid much stress on the fact that he went
to attend a motorsports council meeting in Geneva on March 4, 2016.

 

“Had it
been the case that he went to attend a pre-schedule meeting and is a
law-abiding citizen, he would have immediately informed the authorities about
his schedule to return to India after attending his meeting and
commitment,” Azmi observed.

 

Therefore, in
spite of repeated summons and issuance of warrant of arrest, he had not given
any fix date of return, therefore it would be unsafe to accept his argument
that he departed India only to attend a pre-schedule meeting, he said.

 

The judge stated
that the ED application cannot be read in “piece meal” and must be
read as whole.

 

The satisfaction
or the reasons to believe by ED that Mallya was required to be declared as an
FEO appears to be based upon the foundation that despite repeated efforts, he
failed to join investigation and criminal prosecution.

 

Even the efforts
taken by way of declaring him as a proclaimed offender have not served the
desired purpose, he added.

 

Azmi said the
intention of the FEO Act is to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law and the
expression “reason to believe” has to be read in that context.

 

The reasons
supplied by the ED were the amount involved – Rs 9,990 crore, which is more
than Rs 100 crore which is the requirement of the Act.

 

As pointed out,
the summons issued were deliberately avoided, the passport was revoked,
non-bailable warrants were issued and he was also declared a proclaimed
offender, the judge said.

 

These appear to
be sufficient reasons to declare him an FEO, the judge observed.

 

Mallya is the first businessman to be declared an
FEO under the FEO Act which came into existence in August 2018.

 

The ED, which
had moved the special court for this purpose, requested the court that Mallya,
currently in the United Kingdom, be declared a fugitive and his properties be
confiscated and brought under the control of the Union government as provided
under the act.”

 

The various factors
considered by the court, as mentioned in the news report above, are important
for consideration. The special court has rejected the arguments of (a) that the
Indian government’s efforts to extradite him were a result of “political
vendetta”; (b) that he departed India only to attend a pre-schedule
meeting; (c) satisfaction or the reasons to believe by ED that Mallya was
required to be declared as an FEO appears to be based upon the foundation that
despite repeated efforts, he failed to join investigation and criminal
prosecution; and (d) since the proceedings of his extradition had begun in UK
and with those underway, Mallya cannot be declared a Fugitive.

 

In this connection,
it would be pertinent to mention that the Westminster’s Magistrates’ Court,
London, UK in the case of The Govt of India vs. Vijay Mallya, dated 10th
December, 2018
after detailed examination of various issues raised in
respect of Govt of India’s Extradition Request in its 74 page Judgement
available in public domain, found a prima facie case in relation to three
possible charges and has sent Dr. Vijay Mallya’s case to the Home Secretary of
State for a decision to be taken on whether to order his extradition.

 

4.8  Applications
in Other Cases

In a recent new
report in Hindustan Times, it is mentioned 
that the Enforcement Directorate [ED] has also submitted applications to
have Jewellers Nirav Modi and Mehul Choksi declared fugitives under the FEO Act
after they left India, where they are accused in a Rs. 14,000 scam at Punjab
National bank. These applications are likely to be heard by the same special
court.

 

4.9  Appeals

Section 17 of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie from any
judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the
High Court both on facts and on law.

Every appeal u/s.
17 shall be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date of the judgment
or order appealed from. The High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry
of the said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of 30 days. However, no
appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of 90 days. The Bombay
High Court in the case Vijay Vittal Mallya vs. State of Maharashtra
(Criminal Appeal No. 1407 of 2018)
vide order dated 22nd
November, 2018, while dismissing the Mallya’s appeal for stay of the
proceedings u/s. 4 of the FEO Act, held that for an appeal to lie against an
order of the special court, the said order would have to determine some right
or issue.

 

5.     CONCLUDING REMARKS


The FEO Act is a
huge step towards creating a deterrent effect for economic offenders and would
certainly help the government bring alleged fraudsters such as Vijay Mallya,
Nirav Modi, Mehul Choksi and such other offenders  to justice.

 

In Part 2 of the
Article we will deal with remaining other important aspects of the FEO Act and
the Rules.

DETERMINING THE LEASE TERM FOR CANCELLABLE LEASES

FACT PATTERN


A lease contract of a
retail outlet in a shopping mall allows for the lease to continue until either
party gives notice to terminate the contract. The contract will continue
indefinitely until the lessee or the lessor elects to terminate it and includes
stated consideration required during any renewed periods (referred to as
“cancellable leases” in the rest of the document). Neither the lessor nor the
lessee will incur any contractual cash payment or penalty upon exercising the
termination right. The lessee constructs leasehold improvements, which cannot
be moved to another premise. Upon termination of the lease, these leasehold
improvements will need to be abandoned, or dismantled if the lessor so
requests.

 

QUESTION


Can the lease term go
beyond the date at which both parties can terminate the lease (inclusive of any notice period)?

 

TECHNICAL DISCUSSION


View 1:
No. The lease term cannot go beyond the date where the lessee can enforce a
right to use the underlying asset, i.e. the end of the notice period. The
existence of economic penalties (eg; cost of shifting) does not create
enforceable rights and obligations.

The definition of “lease
term
” in Ind AS 116 refers to lessee’s rights and reads as follows:

 

The
non-cancellable period for which a lessee has the right to use an underlying
asset, together with both:

 

a)  Periods covered by an option to extend the
lease if the lessee is reasonably certain to exercise that option; and

b)  Periods covered by an option to
terminate the lease if the lessee is reasonably certain not to exercise that
option.

 

B34 of Ind AS 116 contains
further guidance and states:

 

In
determining the lease term and assessing the length of the non-cancellable
period of a lease, an entity shall apply the definition of a contract and
determine the period for which the contract is enforceable. A lease is no
longer enforceable when the lessee and the lessor each has the right to
terminate the lease without permission from the other party with no more than
an insignificant penalty.

 

Appendix A of Ind AS 116
clarifies that the word “contract” is defined in other standards and
used in Ind AS 116 with the same meaning, i.e. “an agreement between two or
more parties that creates enforceable rights and obligations”.

 

For example, paragraphs 10
and 11 of Ind AS 115 include the following more detailed guidance about “contracts”:

 

10. A contract is an
agreement between two or more parties that creates enforceable rights and
obligations. Enforceability of the rights and obligations in a contract is a
matter of law.
Contracts can be written, oral or implied by an entity’s
customary business practices. The practices and processes for establishing
contracts with customers vary across legal jurisdictions, industries and
entities. In addition, they may vary within an entity (for example, they may
depend on the class of customer or the nature of the promised goods or
services). An entity shall consider those practices and processes in
determining whether and when an agreement with a customer creates enforceable
rights and obligations.

 

11. Some
contracts with customers may have no fixed duration and can be terminated or
modified by either party at any time. Other contracts may automatically renew
on a periodic basis that is specified in the contract. An entity shall apply
this Standard to the duration of the contract (ie the contractual period) in
which the parties to the contract have present enforceable rights and
obligations.

 

Both B34 and the definition
of a contract in Appendix A of Ind AS 116 is cross-referenced to BC127 in the
Basis of Conclusions of IFRS 16, specifically deals with “cancellable leases
as follows:

 

Cancellable
leases

For the
purposes of defining the scope of IFRS 16, the IASB decided that a contract
would be considered to exist only when it creates rights and obligations that
are enforceable.
Any non-cancellable period or
notice period in a lease would meet the definition of a contract and, thus,
would be included as part of the lease term. To be part of a contract, any
options to extend or terminate the lease that are included in the lease term
must also be enforceable; for example the lessee must be able to enforce its
right to extend the lease beyond the non-cancellable period. If optional
periods are not enforceable, for example, if the lessee cannot enforce the
extension of the lease without the agreement of the lessor, the lessee does not
have the right to use the asset beyond the non-cancellable period.

Consequently, by definition, there is no contract beyond the non-cancellable
period (plus any notice period) if there are no enforceable rights and
obligations existing between the lessee and lessor beyond that term. In
assessing the enforceability of a contract, an entity should consider whether
the lessor can refuse to agree to a request from the lessee to extend the
lease.

 

This conclusion is entirely
consistent with a “right-of-use model” based on recognising and measuring the
rights that the lessee controls and has had transferred to it by the lessor.
Including a renewal which the lessee cannot enforce without the agreement of
the lessor would unduly recognise in the right of use optional periods that do
not meet the definition of an asset. Even if the lessee has a significant economic
incentive to continue the lease, this does not turn a period subject to the
lessor’s approval into an asset because the lessee does not control the
lessor’s decision, unless the lessor’s termination right lacks substance. This
is a very high hurdle, which would be expected to be extremely rare and require
objective evidence.

 

View 2:
Yes, the lease term go beyond the date at which both parties can terminate the
lease.

 

Supporters of view 2
believe that an entity should evaluate the relevant guidance in the standard.
In considering the guidance in the standard, View 1 believes Ind AS 116 is
clear the lease term cannot be longer than the period in which the contract is
enforceable. However, Ind AS 116 is equally clear that a contract is
enforceable until both parties could terminate the contract with no more than
an insignificant penalty – which may be a period beyond the termination notice
period.

 

In the fact pattern above,
while the lease can be terminated early by either party after serving the
notice period, the enforceable rights in the contract (including the pricing
and terms and conditions) contemplate the contract can continue beyond the
stated termination date, inclusive of the notice period. In the fact pattern
above, there is an agreement which meets the definition of a contract (i.e., an
agreement between two or more parties that create enforceable rights and
obligations). However, the mere existence of mutual termination options does
not mean that the contract is automatically unenforceable at a point in time
when a potential termination could take effect.

 

Ind AS 116.B34 provides
explicit guidance on when a contract is no longer enforceable:

 

“A lease
is no longer enforceable when the lessee and the lessor each has the right to
terminate the lease without permission from the other party with no more than
an insignificant penalty.”

 

Therefore, when either
party has the right to terminate the contract with no more than insignificant
penalty there is no longer an enforceable contract. However, when one or both
parties would incur a more than insignificant penalty by exercising its right
to terminate – the contract continues to be enforceable. The penalties should
be interpreted broadly to include more than simply cash payments in the
contract. The wider interpretation considers economic disincentives.

 

While the IFRS16.BC127 does
not discuss the notion of “no more than insignificant penalty”, supporters of
View 2 believe that Ind AS116.B34 should be evaluated based on the wording in
the standard (i.e., taking into account the economic disincentives for the
parties). To the extent that the lessee has a more than insignificant economic
disincentives (e.g., significant leasehold investments) to early terminate the
lease, the 2nd sentence in B34 will not be applicable. However, on
the other hand, if one or both parties have only insignificant economic
disincentives to terminate, say, after five years, the lease is not considered
enforceable after five years and hence the lease term cannot exceed five years.
Ind AS116.B34 does not directly provide guidance as to how long the lease term
should be. Rather, it provides guidance as to when a contract is no longer
enforceable and thus no longer exists.

 

While Ind AS 116.B34 and
B35 provide guidance on evaluating the period in which a contract continues to
be enforceable and how to evaluate lessee and lessor termination options, they
do not address how to evaluate the lease term once the enforceable period of
the contract has been determined (i.e., at least until both parties no longer
have a more than insignificant penalty if they were to terminate the contract).
To determine the lease term, the parties would apply Ind AS 116.18-19 and
B37-40 (i.e., the reasonably certain threshold). “Reasonably certain” is a high
threshold and the assessment requires judgement. It also acknowledges the
guidance in Ind AS 116.B35 which indicates lessor termination options are
generally disregarded (“If only a lessor has the right to terminate a lease,
the non-cancellable period of the lease includes the period covered by the
option to terminate the lease.”)

Thus, in this fact pattern
above, it is possible that the lease term may exceed the notice period. The
lease term is the non-cancellable (notice) period together with the period
covered by the termination option that it is reasonably certain the lessee will
not exercise such termination option.

 

However, the lease term
cannot be no longer than the period the contract is enforceable (i.e., the
point in time in which either party may terminate the lease without permission
from the other with no more than an insignificant economic disincentive,
inclusive of any notice period). 

 

If the facts were different
and the contract had an end date but contemplates the lease might be extended
if both the lessee and lessor agree to new terms and conditions (including new
pricing) there may be no enforceable contract but rather an invitation to enter
into new negotiations.

 

In light of the compelling
arguments in both views, the author recommends that the Ind AS Transition
Facilitation Group (ITFG) should address this issue in consultation with the
IASB staff or IFRIC.

 

 

 

REOPENING CASES OF INTIMATION u/s. 143(1)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION


Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
provides for reassessment of income which has escaped assessment for any
assessment year. The section reads as under:

 

“Income Escaping Assessment

If the Assessing Officer has reason to
believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any
assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153,
assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax
which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the
course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the
depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the
assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153
referred to as the relevant assessment year) :

 

Provided that where an assessment under
sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant
assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry
of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless any income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of
the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or
in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section
148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment, for that assessment year:”

 

The issue of applicability of the above
referred  proviso to section 147 has come
up before the courts in cases where no assessment has been made u/s. 143(3),
but merely an intimation has been issued u/s. 143(1). In other words, in cases
where more than 4 years have expired from the end of the relevant assessment
year, is the A.O. required to satisfy and establish that there was a failure on
the part of the assessee  to disclose
fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for a valid
reopening of the case? While the Madras High Court has taken the view that
the  proviso applies even in cases of
intimation u/s. 143(1) and the A.O  is
required to establish that there was a failure to disclose material facts
before reopening a case, the Gujarat High Court has taken a contrary view that
the  proviso applies only in the case of
assessments u/s. 143(3). 

 

EL FORGE’S CASE


The issue came up before the Madras High
Court in the case of EL Forge Ltd vs. Dy CIT 45 taxmann.com 402.

 

In this case, an intimation was issued u/s.
143(1) on 31st December, 1991 for assessment year 1989-90. The
assessing officer thereafter noticed that the assessee had claimed deduction
u/s. 80HH and 80-I on the total income before set off of unabsorbed losses of
earlier years. Therefore, as the assessing officer was of the view that the
assessee was not entitled to deduction under chapter VI-A, reassessment proceedings
were initiated u/s. 147 and a notice was issued u/s. 148 on 15th
December, 1997.

 

The assessee objected to the reopening of
the assessment, contending that as the reopening was made after a lapse of 4
years from the end of the assessment year, and as there was no failure on the
part of the assessee to disclose all material facts necessary for making the
assessment, the reopening was not valid.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the
assessee’s claim and dismissed the appeal, holding that the reopening of the
assessment by the assessing officer was perfectly in order. The Tribunal held
that the assessee did not disclose fully and truly all material facts, and
therefore agreed with the finding of the assessing officer as well as the
Commissioner (Appeals). It held that the reopening of the assessment was
justified, as it was well within the period provided for under the proviso to
section 147.

 

Before the Madras High Court, besides  pointing 
out on behalf of the assessee that the notice u/s. 147 did not give any
independent reasons for reopening of assessment u/s. 147,  it was argued that the details of the income
computation were very much before the assessing officer. The assessee therefore
claimed that the assessing officer had not shown that there was a failure to
disclose material facts necessary for assessment.

 

The Madras High Court observed that the
facts of the case showed that there was no denial of the fact that the assessee
had disclosed details of carry forward of the losses as well as the computation
of income, and that these details were very much before the assessing officer.
It observed that there was no denial of the fact that there was no failure on
the part of the assessee in disclosing the facts necessary for assessment, and
there was no allegation that the escapement of income was on account of failure
of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts for assessment.

 

Applying the decision of the Supreme Court
in Kelvinator’s case, the Madras High Court accepted the argument of the
assessee that the assumption of jurisdiction beyond four years was hit by the
limitation provided under the proviso to section 147. The Madras High Court
therefore allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

LAXMIRAJ DISTRIBUTORS’ CASE


The issue again came up before the Gujarat
High Court in the case of Pr CIT vs. Laxmiraj Distributors (P) Ltd 250
Taxman 455.

 

In this case, the assessee, a company, had
filed its return of income for assessment year 2009-10 on 13th
September, 2009. The return was accepted and an intimation was issued u/s.
143(1). Subsequently, a survey was carried out on the premises of the company.
During the course of such survey, several documents were seized and a statement
of a director of the company was recorded on 30th August, 2012.

 

The assessee also wrote a letter on 4th
September, 2012 to the assessing officer, in which it stated that the company
had verified its records for various years, that it might  not be possible to substantiate certain
issues and transactions recorded in the regular books of account as required by
law, as it would take a lot of time and effort, and that it would like to avoid
protracted litigation. To avoid litigation and penalty and to buy peace, the
company stated that it would voluntarily disclose an amount of Rs. 9 crore as
it’s undisclosed income, comprising of Rs. 7.52 crore for assessment year
2009-10 towards share capital reserves and Rs. 1.48 crore for assessment year
2013-14 towards estimated profit for the year of survey. In such letter,
details of the companies to which 7.52 lakh shares were allotted with premium
of Rs. 6.77 crore were given.

 

In spite of such letter, the company did not
offer such income to tax. The assessing officer therefore issued notice on 13th
February, 2013 u/s. 148, to reopen the assessment for assessment year 2009-10.
The reason recorded for such reassessment was that the income disclosed as a
result of survey at Rs. 7.52 crore was over and above the income of Rs. 78.47
lakh returned in the original return of income.

 

In reassessment proceedings, an addition of
Rs. 7.52 crore as bogus share capital was made. The Commissioner (Appeals)
rejected the assessee’s appeal.

 

The ground of
validity of the notice of reopening was raised before the Tribunal for the
first time. The Tribunal permitted raising of such ground, since it touched
upon the very jurisdiction of the assessing officer to reassess the income.

 

The Tribunal held that reopening of
assessment was bad in law, and therefore it did not enter into the question of
correctness of the additions. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court
decisions in the case of ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das 103 ITR 437, and Asst
CIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd 291 ITR 500
, and the decision
of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Inductotherm (India) (P) Ltd vs. M
Gopalan, Dy CIT 356 ITR 481
, and proceeded to annul the reassessment on the
ground that the formation of belief by the assessing officer that income
chargeable to tax had escaped assessment was erroneous  on account of the fact that there was no
corroborative evidence casting doubts on the assessee’s share capital received
up to the date of issue of the notice of reopening. According to the Tribunal, the
basic tenet of cause effect relationship between the reasons for reopening and
the taxable income having escaped assessment was not made out by the assessing
officer.

 

The Gujarat High Court observed that, in the
case of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd (supra), the Supreme Court
highlighted a clear distinction between assessment under section 143(1) and
assessment made by the assessing officer after scrutiny u/s. 143(3). Such  distinction was noticed in the background of the
notice of reassessment where the return of the assessee was accepted u/s.
143(1). The Supreme Court had observed that, in the scheme of things, the
intimation u/s. 143 (1) could not be treated to be an order of assessment, and
that being the position, the question of change of opinion did not arise. The
Gujarat High Court further observed that the ratio of the decision was
reiterated in a later judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Dy CIT
vs. Zuari Estate Development & Investment Co Ltd 373 ITR 661.

 

The Gujarat High Court also referred to its
decision in the case of Inductotherm (supra), where the court observed
that even in case of reopening of an assessment where the return was accepted
without scrutiny, the requirement that the assessing officer had reason to
believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, would apply.

 

The Gujarat High Court further referred to
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Lakhmani Mewal Das (supra),
where it had been held that the reasons for the formation of the belief contemplated
by section 147 for the reopening of an assessment must have a rational
connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. Rational
connection postulated that there must be a direct nexus or live link between
the material coming to the notice of the assessing officer and the formation of
his belief that there had been escapement of the income of the assessee from
assessment.

 

Culling out the ratio of those decisions,
the Gujarat High Court stated that what broadly emerged was that there was a
vital distinction between the reopening of an assessment where the return of an
assessee had been accepted u/s. 143 (1) without scrutiny, and where the
scrutiny assessment had been  framed.
According to the Gujarat High Court, in the former case, the assessing officer
could not be stated to have formed any opinion, and therefore, unlike in the
latter case, the concept of change of opinion would have no applicability. The
common thread that would run through both sets of exercises of reopening of assessment
was that the assessing officer must have reason to believe that income
chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.

 

Looking at the facts of the case and the
observations of the Tribunal, the Gujarat High Court observed that the Tribunal
had evaluated the evidence on record in minutest detail, as if each limb of the
assessing officer’s reasons recorded for issuing notice of reassessment was in
the nature of an addition made in assessment order, which had either to be
upheld or reversed, which, according to the High Court, was simply
impermissible.

 

The Gujarat High Court referred to the
decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Indu Lata Rangwala vs. Dy
CIT 384 ITR 337
, where the Delhi High Court had taken the view that where
the return initially filed was processed u/s. 143(1), there was no occasion for
the assessing officer to form an opinion after examining the documents enclosed
with the return. In other words, the requirement in the first proviso to
section 147 of there having to be a failure on the part of the assessee “to
disclose fully and truly all material facts” did not at all apply whether the
initial return had been processed u/s. 143(1). In that case, the Delhi High
Court had taken the view that it was not necessary in such a case for the
assessing officer to come across some fresh tangible material to form reasons
to believe that income had escaped assessment.

 

The Gujarat
High Court thereafter considered the decision of the Madras High Court in the
case of EL Forge (supra) and expressed its inability to concur with the
view of the Madras High Court in the said case where it held that the condition
that there was a failure to disclose the material facts for the purposes of
assessment was required to be satisfied even in cases of intimation issued u/s.
143(1). According to the Gujarat High Court, the proviso to section 147 would
apply only in a case where  an assessment
had been framed after scrutiny. In a case where the return was accepted u/s.
143(1), the additional requirement that income chargeable to tax had escaped
assessment on account of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose
truly and fully all material facts, would simply not apply. According to the
Gujarat High Court, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kelvinator’s
case did  not apply, to the facts of the
case before the court, as that was a case in which the original assessment was
framed after scrutiny.

 

The Gujarat High Court therefore allowed the
appeal of the revenue, quashing the conclusion of the Tribunal that the notice
of reopening of assessment was invalid.

 

OBSERVATIONS


Reading the proviso  in the manner, as is read by the  Gujarat High Court, would mean that in all
cases of the intimation u/s. 143(1) where other things are equal, the time
limit for reopening gets automatically extended to six years from the end of
the assessment year and that the requirement to satisfy the disclosure test has
to be met with only in cases of assessment u/s. 143(3) and is otherwise  dispensed with in  cases of intimation u/s. 143(1). On a reading
of the Proviso this does not appear to be the case and even on the touchstone
of common sense  there appears to be a
case that the requirement to satisfy the disclosure test should not be
restricted to section 143(3) cases only. A failure by the AO to initiate the
proceedings u/s. 143(2) and again under the main provisions of section 147,
within the time prescribed under the respective provisions can not be remedied
by resorting to the reading of the proviso in a convenient manner that
gives  a license to the AO to reopen a
case even after a lapse of a  long time
and deny the finality to the proceedings in cases where there otherwise is not
a failure to disclose the material on the part of the assessee. Such an
understanding is strongly supported by the overall scheme of the Income tax
Act.     

 

In cases where the assesssee has disclosed
the material facts and the AO has failed to have a prima facie look into
the facts, in time, and fails to pursue the matter appropriately, within the
prescribed time, it is reasonable to hold that his power to reopen a case comes
to an end irrespective of the fact that the assessment was not made u/s.
143(3).

 

Even otherwise, it is not unreasonable to
hold that in cases where the assessee has made an adequate disclosure of facts,
then the same are deemed to have been considered by the AO and therefore his
inaction, within the prescribed time, should be construed to be a case of a
change of opinion.  

 

It is difficult to appreciate that the
standards that are applicable to the cases covered by section 143(3) are not
applied to cases covered by section 143(1) for no fault of the assessee  more so when the assessee has no control over
the action or inaction of the AO. It is not the assessee who prevented the AO
from scrutinising the return of income. In fact, permitting the AO to have a
longer time than it is prescribed is giving him a premium for his inefficiency
of not having acted within the time when he should have.

 

The decision of the Gujarat High Court in Laxmiraj’s
case, is the one delivered on very peculiar facts involving an admission by the
assessee firm at the time of survey and not following it us with the offer for
tax in spite of admitted facts that were not denied by the assessee later on at
the time of even reassessment. The SLP file by the assessee against the
decision has been rejected by the Supreme Court 95 taxxmann.com
109(SC). 

 

The Madras High Court  in case of TANMAC India vs. Dy.CIT  78 taxmann.com 155 (Mad.)  held 
that if after issuing intimation u/s. 143(1) of the Act, the Assessing
Officer did not issue notice of scrutiny assessment u/s. 143(2) of the Act, it
would not be open for the Assessing Officer thereafter to resort to reopening
of the assessment. The High Court in deciding the case placed heavy reliance on
the decision of Delhi High Court in case of CIT vs. Orient Craft Ltd. 354
ITR 536
in which the distinction between scrutiny assessment and a
situation where return has been accepted u/s. 143(1) was narrowed down. The
Court had applied the concept of true and full disclosure even in case of
reopening assessment where return was accepted u/s. 143(1) of the Act.

 

It seems that the excessive reliance on the
ratio of the Supreme Court cases in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers’ case
(supra)
and Zuari Estate & Investment Co.‘s  case (supra) requires a fresh
consideration and perhaps was uncalled for. The issue in those  cases has been about whether there could be a
change of opinion in a case where an intimation u/s. 143(1) was issued and
whether there was a  need to have the
reason to believe that income has escaped income in such cases of intimation
and whether an intimation was different form an order.  The issue under consideration, namely, the
application of the first proviso to section 147 was not an issue before
the  court in both the cases. It is
respectfully submitted that in the below quoted part of the decision, the
Supreme Court inter alia held that the condition of the First Proviso to
section 147 were required to be satisfied for a valid reopening of a case
involving even an intimation issued u/s. 143(1) of the Act.   

 

“The scope and effect of section
147 as substituted with effect from 1-4-1989, as also sections 148 to 152 are
substantially different from the provisions as they stood prior to such
substitution. Under the old provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a) and
(b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the
past assessment years could be assessed or reassessed. To confer jurisdiction
under section 147(a) two conditions were required to be satisfied firstly the
Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that income profits or gains
chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment, and secondly he must also
have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of
either  omission or failure on the part
of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment of that year. Both these conditions were conditions precedent to be
satisfied before the Assessing Officer could have jurisdiction to issue notice
under section 148 read with section 147(a). But under the substituted section
147 existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words if the
Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has
escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is
however to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case
falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147.
 
The disclosure of
the material facts is a factor that can not be ignored even in the case of
intimation simply because the first proviso expressly refers only to the order
of assessment u/s. 143(3). It appears that the last word on the subject has yet
to be said and sooner the same is said by the Supreme Court, is better. 

 

Rectification of mistake – Debatable issue –Adjusting the business loss against capital gain in terms of provisions of section 71(1) of the Act –View once allowed by the AO could not be rectified by him if the issues is debatable. [Section 154]

1.     3.  
Pr.CIT-6 vs. Creative
Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal no 1570 of 2016 Dated: 13th February, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]


[Creative Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd vs.
ACIT-6(2); dated
28th October, 2015; ITA. No 7480/Mum/2013, AY : 2005-06,
Bench:C  Mum. ITAT]

 

Rectification
of mistake – Debatable issue –Adjusting the business loss against capital gain
in terms of provisions of section 71(1) of the Act –View once allowed by the AO
could not be rectified by him if the issues is debatable. [Section 154]

 

The
assessee is engaged in the business of Processing, Manufactures and Export of
Readymade Garments & Fabric, filed its return of income on 30.10.2005
declaring total loss of Rs. 4,37,23,576/-. The assessment order was passed on
31.12.2007 declaring total loss of Rs. 2,29,98,454/-. However, the AO made a
rectification of the assessment order u/s. 154 of the I.T. Act in its order on
the pretext that computation of loss has not been adjusted against the capital
gain and that excess loss has been allowed to the assessee and thus a sum of
Rs. 1,82,65,501/- was added on account of LTCG, against which an appeal was filed
before the CIT(A) on the ground, the order u/s. 154 was bad in law, void, ab
initio
and was impermissible under the law.However, the ld. CIT(A) upheld
the order of AO.

 

Being aggrieved with the CIT(A) order, the assessee filed an appeal to
the ITAT. The Tribunal held that the assessee relied upon the judgment in case
of T.S.Balaram, ITO vs. Vokart Brothers & Others 82 ITR 50 (SC)
wherein it was held “that mistake apparent from the record must be an obvious
and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn
process and of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two
opinions. A decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from
the record. The Ld AR further relied upon the cases of CIT vs. Victoria
Mills Ltd. [153 ITR 733]
, CIT vs. British Insulated Calender’s Ltd. [202
ITR 354]
, Addl. Second ITO vs. C.J. Shah [10 ITD 151 (TM)] and DCIT
vs. Shri Harshavardan Himatsingka [ITA No. 1333 to 1335/Kol/2012] (Bom. High
Court)
. In DCIT (Kol.) vs. Harshavardan Himatsingka, it was held
that the order passed by the AO u/s. 154 of the Act adjusting the business loss
against capital gain in terms of provisions of section 71(1) of the Act,
wherein assessee is entitled to carry forward the business loss without
adjusting the same from capital gain or the same is mandatory required to be
adjusted. It was further held by co-ordinate bench that this aspect of
provision of section 71(1) of the Act is also a subject matter of dispute and
there are case law both in favour and against the said proposition as
canvassed. Hence issue is debatable cannot be said that there was a mistake
apparent on record which could be rectified u/s. 154 of the Act, hence the
order passed by AO u/s. 154 of the Act is not sustainable. It was  further seen that in the regular assessment,
certain disallowance/additions were made by the AO which was deleted by ld.
CIT(A) in further appeal and the appeal filed by the department against the
order of CIT(A) has also been dismissed by the Tribunal and the case had
already travelled up to the ITAT till then no such interference was drawn at
the time of regular assessment or during the appellate stage. In view of the
above, ITAT held that  the order passed
by the AO u/s. 154 which was subsequently upheld by CIT(A) is void, ab
initio
and the same is liable tobe set-aside and is not permissible under
the law.

 

Being aggrieved with the
ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that
sub-section (1) of section 71 of the Act provides that where in respect of any
assessment year the net result of the computation under any head of income
other than “capital gains’ is a loss and the assessee has no income under the
head ‘capital gains’ he shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be
entitled to have the amount of such loss set off against his income, if any,
assessable for that assessment year under any other head. This provision came
up for consideration before this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income
Tax vs. British Insulated Calendar’s Ltd. [202 ITR 354]
in which it was
held that under sub-section (1) of section 71 of the Act the assessee has no
option in setting off the business loss against the heads of other income as
long as there was no capital gain during the year under consideration. The case
of the assessee does not fall under sub-section (1) of section 71 of the Act
since the assessee had declared capital gain. Such a situation would be covered
by subsection (2) of section 71 of the Act which reads as under;

“(2) Where in respect
of any assessment year, the net result of the computation under any head of
income, other than “Capital gains”, is a loss and the assessee has income
assessable under the head “Capital gains”, such loss may, subject to the
provisions of this Chapter, be set off against his income, if any, assessable
for that assessment year under any head of income including the head “Capital
gains” (whether relating to short-term capital assets or any other capital
assets)”.

 

In case of British
Insulated Calender’s (supra) this Court had in respect to sub-section 2 of
section 71 observed that “

in case of the assessee
declaring capital gain, he had an option to set off the business loss, whereas
no such option is given for sub-section (1)”. Before the High Court, of course,
the provision of sub-section 2 of section 71 of the Act was somewhat different
and the expression “ or, if the assessee so desires, shall be set off only
against his income, if any, assessable under any head of income other than
‘capital gains’” has since been deleted. Nevertheless, the question that would
arise is, whether even in the unamended form sub-section (2) of section 71 of
the Act mandates the assessee to set off its business loss against the capital
gains of the same year when this provision used an expression “may” as compared
to the expression “shall” used in s/s. (1).

 

In the present case, the Hon’ble Court was  not called upon to judge the correctness of
interpretation of either the revenue or the assessee. However the court
observed that issue  was far from being
clear. It was clearly debatable. In this position, the A.O, as per the settled
law, could not have exercised the rectification powers. The Income Tax Appeal
was dismissed.
  

 

 

Section 45 – Capital gains – Non-compete clause – Transfer of business – Amount is liable to be bifurcated and apportioned – Attributed to the non- compete clause is revenue receipts and remaining was to be treated as the capital receipt taxable as capital gains.

1.    2.   
Pr CIT-17 vs. Lemuir Air
Express [ ITA no 1388 of 2016 Dated: 6th February, 2019 (Bombay High
Court)]

 

[ACIT-12(3)
vs. Lemuir Air Express; dated 9th October, 2015 ; ITA. No
3245/Mum/2008, AY : 2004-05 Bench: G 
Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section
45 – Capital gains – Non-compete clause – Transfer  of 
business – Amount is liable to be bifurcated and apportioned –
Attributed to the non- compete clause is revenue receipts and remaining was to
be treated as the  capital receipt
taxable as capital gains.

 

The
assessee is a partnership firm. The assessee was engaged in the business as
custom house agent, as also an air cargo agent. The activities of the assessee
would involve assisting the clients in air freight, forwarding for export etc.
During the year, the assessee transferred its business of international cargo
to one DHL Danzar Lemuir Pvt Ltd (“DHL” for short) as a going concern
for consideration of Rs. 54.73 crore. The assessee offered such receipt to tax
as capital gain. The A O did not accept this stand of the assessee. He noticed
that in the deed of transfer of business, there was a clause that the assessee
would not involve into carrying on the same business. According to the A.O,
therefore, in view of such non-compete clause in the agreement, the receipt could
be the assessee’s income in terms of section 28(va) of the Act and
consequentially taxable under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business and
Profession’.

 

The
assessee carried the matter in appeal. The CIT(A) was of the opinion that the
entire sum of Rs. 54.73 crore was not paid for non-compete agreement. He
apportioned the total consideration into two parts namely a sum of Rs. 4.5
crore was attributed to the non-compete clause, the rest i.e Rs. 50.23 crore
(after deducting costs) was treated as the assessee’s capital receipt taxable
as capital gains. On this apportionment, the CIT(A) arrived at after taking
into consideration the profit of the firm for last two years from said
business.

 

Revenue
carried the matter in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by the impugned
judgment, upheld the view of the CIT(A) inter alia observing that the
assessee had under the agreement in question transferred the entire business
and the non-compete clause was merely consequent to the transfer of business.

 

Being aggrieved with the
ITAT order, the revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Court observed
that the entire sale consideration of Rs. 54.73 crore could never have been
attributed to the non-compete clause contained in such agreement. The CIT(A)
applied logical formula to arrive at the apportionment between the value for
the sale of business and of non-compete clause in the agreement. No perversity
is pointed out in this approach of the CIT(A). The assessee which was engaged
in highly specialised business, transferred the entire business for valuable
consideration. Non-compete clause in such agreement was merely a part of the
understanding between the parties. What purchaser received under such agreement
was entire business of the assessee along with non-compete assurance. We notice
that Clause (va) of section 28 pertains to any sum whether received or
receivable, in cash or kind, under an agreement, inter alia for not carrying
out any activity in relation to any business or profession. A non-compete agreement
would therefore fall in this clause. Proviso to said Clause (va), however,
provides that the said clause would not apply, to any sum whether received or
receivable, in cash or kind, on account of transfer of right to manufacture,
produce or process any article or thing or right to carry on any business or
profession which is chargeable under the head Capital Gains. The assessee’s
receipt attributable to the transfer of business was correctly taxed by the
CIT(A) as confirmed by the Tribunal as giving rise to capital gain. It was only
residual element of receipt relatable to the non-compete agreement which was
brought within fold of Clause (va) of section 28 of the Act. In the result, the
appeal was dismissed.

 

Section 68 – Cash credits – Share application money – Identity, genuineness of transaction and creditworthiness of persons from whom assessee received funds – Allegation by AO about evasion of tax without any supporting evidence, is not justified.

1.  1.    
The Pr. CIT-1 vs. Pushti
Consultants Pvt Ltd [Income tax Appeal no 1332 of 2016 Dated: 6th February, 2019 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Pushti
Consultants Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT-1(2); dated 23rd March, 2015 ; ITA. No
4963/Mum/2012, AY 2008-09, Bench : C , Mum. 
ITAT ]

 

Section
68 – Cash credits – Share application money – Identity, genuineness of
transaction and creditworthiness of persons from whom assessee received funds –
Allegation by AO about evasion of  tax
without any supporting evidence, is not justified.

During
the course of the scrutiny proceedings, the A.O noticed that the assessee had
received share application money of Rs. 2.20 crore during the year under
assessment. The assessee substantiated its claim of share application money of
Rs. 2.20 crore received from Speed Trade Securities Pvt Ltd (“STSPL”
for short) by filing Board resolution and a letter from STSPL. The assessee
also filed details consequent to the summons issued u/s. 131 of the Act to the
director of STSPL. However, the A.O was not convinced with the same on the
ground that the board resolution of STSPL mentions that it will pay 50% of the
share application money i.e Rs. 2.20 crore and if the balance 50% of share
application money is not paid before 30.9.2008, the amount paid as share application
money will stand forfeited by the assessee. The A.O noted that STSPL has
sufficient funds to the extent of Rs. 14.33 crore available with it on
31.3.2009 (the extended period within which the balance amount of the share
application money has to be paid). In spite of having such huge funds at its
disposal, STSPL has allowed its investment to go in waste and claim loss in its
profit and loss account.

 

The A.O held that the
entire act of obtaining share application money and having it forfeited was an attempt
to evade tax. Thus, AO came to the conclusion that the share application money
was in fact the assessee’s own funds which were introduced under the garb of
share application money. Therefore,made an addition of Rs. 2.20 crore to
assessee’s income.

 

Being
aggrieved by the order of the A.O, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A).
The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal upholding the view of the A.O and inter alia
placing reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of McDowell
& Co Ltd vs. Commercial Tax Officer1 (1985) 154 ITR 148 (SC)
as being
applicable to the  facts of this case,
thus, dismissing the assessee’s appeal.

 

On
further appeal of the assessee, the Tribunal held that the evidence on record
established the identity, capacity and genuineness of the share application
money received from STSPL. This is on the basis of the fact that the amounts
were received through proper banking channels, the ledger accounts, bank
statement and audited annual accounts of STSPL were also submitted which
supported the case of the assessee. Further the valuation report/certificate of
a Chartered Accountant to the effect that the valuation of shares would be Rs.
20.83 per share and therefore, the receipt of share application money at the aggregate
price of Rs. 20 i.e Rs. 10 as face value and Rs. 10 as premium was perfectly in
order. It also recorded the fact that the application money had been paid by
STSPL by selling its own investments/shares in the stock exchange through its
broker Satco Securities and Financial Ltd (Satco) and had received the money
from Satco for sale of its investments/shares. The statement of Bank of Baroda,
the banker of Satco reflected the payments to STSPL for sale of its own
investments/shares of stock exchange was also produced. In the aforesaid view,
the impugned order held that the investment of Rs. 2.20 crore by STSPL on the
basis of evidence on record was established, as the identity, capacity and
genuineness stood proved. In the above view, the impugned order allowed the
assessee’s appeal.

 

Being
aggrieved with the ITAT order, the Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court.
The Court held that the assessee has gone beyond the requirement of the law as
existing in the subject assessment year 2008-09 by having explained the source
in terms of section 68 of the Act. Besides, the reliance by the CIT (A) on the
decision of McDowell (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the
present case. The Apex Court in decisions in the cases of Union of India
& Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan & 
Anr2
and Vodafone International Holdings 2 (2003) 263 ITR 706
(SC) B.V. vs. Union of India & Anr.3
also held that principles laid
down in the case of McDowell (supra) is not applicable across the board
to discard an act which is valid in law upon some hypothetical assessment of
the real motive of the assessee. Thus, imputing a plan on the part of the
assessee and STSPL to evade tax without any supporting evidence in the face of
the detailed facts recorded by the impugned order of the Tribunal, is not
justified. We find that the impugned order of the Tribunal being essentially a
finding of fact which is not shown to be perverse does not give rise to any
substantial of law. Hence, not entertained. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed.

 

Section 40A(2)(b) and 92BA – Specified domestic transactions – Determination of arm’s length price – Meaning of “specified domestic transactions” – Section 92BA applies to transactions between assessee and a person referred to in section 40A(2)(b) – Assessee having substantial interest in company with whom it has transactions – Beneficial ownership of shares does not include indirect shareholding – Amount paid to acquire asset – Not an expenditure covered by section 40A(2)(b)

6.      
HDFC Bank Ltd. vs. ACIT; 410
ITR 247 (Bom):
Date of order: 20th December, 2018 A. Y.: 2014-15

 

Section
40A(2)(b) and 92BA – Specified domestic transactions – Determination of arm’s
length price – Meaning of “specified domestic transactions” – Section 92BA
applies to transactions between assessee and a person referred to in section
40A(2)(b) – Assessee having substantial interest in company with whom it has
transactions – Beneficial ownership of shares does not include indirect
shareholding – Amount paid to acquire asset – Not an expenditure covered by
section 40A(2)(b)

 

By an
order dated 29/12/2016, the Assessing Officer held that three transactions were
specific domestic transactions and referred the case to the Transfer Pricing
Officer for determining arms length price. The three transactions were, loans
of Rs. 5,164 crore purchased by the assessee from the promoters (HDFC) and
loans of Rs. 27.72 crore purchased from the subsidiaries, payment of Rs. 492.50
crore by the assessee to HBL for rendering services and payment of interest of
Rs. 4.41 crore by the assessee to HDB trust. The assessee filed a writ petition
and challenged the order.

 

The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   The assessee purchased the
loans of HDFC of more than Rs. 5,000 crore. HDFC admittedly held 16.39% of the
shareholdings in the assessee. If one were to go merely by  this figure of 16.39% then, on a plain
reading of section 40A(2)(b)(iv) read with Explanation (a) thereto, HDFC would
not be a person who would have a substantial interest in the assessee. However,
the Revenue contended that the requirement of Explanation (a) of having more
than 20% of voting power is clearly established in the case because HDFC held
100% of the shareholding  in another
company which in turn held 6.25% of shareholding in the assesee. When one
clubbed the shareholding of HDFC of 16.39% with the shareholding of the other
company of 6.25%( and which was a wholly owned subsidiary of HDFC) the
threshold of 20% as required under Explanation (a) to section 40A(2)(b) was
clearly crossed.

ii)   HDFC on its own was not the
beneficial owner of shares carrying at least 20% of the voting power as
required under Explanation (a) to section 40A(2)(b). The Revenue was incorrect
in trying to club the shareholding of the subsidiary with the shareholding of
HDFC, in the assessee, to cross the threshold of 20% as required in Explanation
(a) to section 40A(2)(b). HDFC did not have a substantial interest in the
assesee, and therefore, was not a person contemplated u/s. 40A(2)(b)(iv) for
the present transaction to fall within the meaning of a specified domestic
transaction as set out in section 92BA(i).

iii)   Moreover the assessee had
purchased the loans of HDFC. This was  a
purchase of an asset.  This transaction
of purchase of loans by the assessee from HDFC would not fall within the
meaning of a specified domestic transaction.

iv)  As far as the second
transaction was concerned, the assessee held 29% of the shares in ADFC. In
turn, ADFC held 94% of the shares in HBL. The assessee held no shares in HBL.
The assessee could not be regarded as having a substantial interest in HBL.

v)   It was not the case of the
Revenue that the assessee was entitled to at least 20% of the profits of the
trust. The trust had been set up exclusively for the welfare of its employees
and there was no question of the assessee being entitled to 20% of the profits
of such trust. This being the case, this transaction clearly would not fall
within 40A(2)(b) read with Explanation (b) thereto to be a specific domestic
transaction as understood and covered by section 92BA(i).

vi)  None of the three
transactions that formed the subject matter of this petition fell within the
meaning of a specified domestic transaction as required u/s. 92BA(i) of the
Income-tax Act. This being the case, the Assessing Officer was clearly in error
in concluding that these transactions were specified domestic transactions and
therefore required to be disclosed by the assessee by filing form 3CEB. He
therefore could not have referred these transactions to the Transfer Pricing
Officer for determining the arms length price.”

 

 

 

Sections 69 and 147 – Reassessment – Where Assessing Officer issued a reopening notice on ground that assessee had made transactions of huge amount in national/multi commodity exchange but he had not filed his return of income and assessee filed an objection that he had earned no income out of trading in commodity exchange and he had actually suffered loss and, therefore, he had not filed return of income. Since, Assessing Officer had not looked into objections raised by assessee and proceeded ahead, impugned reassessment notice was unjustified

5.      
Mohanlal Champalal Jain vs.
ITO; [2019] 102 taxmann.com 293 (Bom):
Date of order: 31st January, 2019 A.  Y.: 2011-12

 

Sections
69 and 147 – Reassessment – Where Assessing Officer issued a reopening notice
on ground that assessee had made transactions of huge amount in national/multi
commodity exchange but he had not filed his return of income and assessee filed
an objection that he had earned no income out of trading in commodity exchange
and he had actually suffered loss and, therefore, he had not filed return of
income. Since, Assessing Officer had not looked into objections raised by
assessee and proceeded ahead, impugned reassessment notice was unjustified

 

The
assessee, an individual was engaged in trading in commodity exchange. On the
premise that he had no taxable income, the assessee had not filed return of
income for the relevant assessment year. An information was received by the
Assessing Officer that as per NMS data and its details the assessee had made
transactions of Rs. 18.82 crore in national /multi commodity exchange. Further,
it was seen that the assessee had not filed his return of income. The Assessing
Officer concluded that profit/gain on commodity exchange remained unexplained
and also the source of investment in these transactions remains unexplained.
Therefore, the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the
meaning of provisions of section 147 as no return of income has been filed by
the assessee.

 

The
assessee raised an objection that he had earned no income out of trading in
commodity exchange. He pointed out that the assessee’s sales turnover was Rs.
16.82 crore (rounded off) and he actually suffered a loss of Rs. 1.61 crore.
The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the objections. With respect to the
assessee’s contention of no taxable income, he stated that the same would be
subject to verification and further inquiry.

 

The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)   The Assessing Officer has
proceeded on wrong premise that even when called upon to state why the
petitioner had not filed return of income, he had not responded to the said
query. The petitioner did communicate to the department that he had no taxable
income and therefore, there was no requirement to file the return. The
Assessing Officer did not carry out any further inquiry before issuing the
impugned notice. In the reasons, one more error pointed out by the petitioner
is that the Assessing Officer referred to the sum of Rs. 18.82 crore as total
transaction in the commodities. In the petition as well as in the objections
raised before the Assessing Officer, the petitioner pointed out that his sales
were to the tune of Rs.16.82 crore against purchases of Rs. 16.84 crore and
thereby, he had actually suffered a loss.

ii)   The Assessing Officer has not
discarded these assertions. Importantly, if the Assessing Officer had access to
the petitioner’s sales in commodities, he could as well have gathered the
information of his purchases. Either on his own or by calling upon the
petitioner to provide such details, the Assessing Officer could and ought to
have verified at least prima facie that the income in the hands of the
petitioner chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. In the present case, what
the Assessing Officer aiming to do so is to carry out fishing inquiry. In fact,
even when the assessee brought such facts and figures to his notice, the
Assessing Officer refused to look into it.

iii)   In the result, the impugned
notice is quashed and set aside.”

Sections 12AA, 147 and 148 – Charitable Trust – Cancellation of registration – Section 12AA amended in 2004 enabling cancellation of registration is not retrospective – Cancellation cannot be made with retrospective effect Reassessment – Notice u/s. 148 consequent to cancellation of registration – No allegation of fraud – Notice not valid

4.      
Auro Lab vs. ITO; 411 ITR
308 (Mad):
Date of order: 23rd January, 2019 A. Ys.: 2004-05 to 2007-08

 

Sections 12AA, 147 and 148 – Charitable Trust –
Cancellation of registration –  Section
12AA amended in 2004 enabling cancellation of registration is not retrospective
– Cancellation cannot be made with retrospective effect

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s. 148 consequent to cancellation
of registration – No allegation of fraud – Notice not valid

 

The
assessee, a charitable trust, was granted registration by the Commissioner u/s.
12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as it stood prior to the year 1996 with
medical relief as the main object of the trust. The returns of income were
assessed periodically by the Department and assessment orders passed year after
year until the  amendment to section 12AA
was introduced to specifically to empower the proper officer to cancel the
registration granted under the erstwhile section 12A of the Act. Subsequent to
the amendment, by an order dated 30/12/2010, the registration granted to the
assessee was cancelled on the allegation that the assessee failed to fulfil the
conditions required for enjoying the exemption available to the assessee
registered u/s. 12A. The Tribunal upheld the cancellation. Assessee preferred
appeal to the High Court which was pending. In the meanwhile, the Assessing
officer issued notices u/s. 148 of the Act and reopened the assessments for the
A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08. The assessee’s objections were rejected. The
assessee filed writ petitions and challenged the validity of reopening.

 

The Madras
High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   Until 2004, when section 12AA of the
Income-tax act 1961 was amended, there was no power under the Act to the
Commissioner or any other authority to revoke or cancel the registration once
granted to charitable trusts. Later, on June 1, 2010, by the Finance Act, 2010,
section 12AA(3) was further amended to include specifically registration
granted under the erstwhile section 12A of the Act also within the ambit of
revocation or cancellation as contemplated u/s. 2004 amendment.

ii)   The powers of the Commissioner u/s. 12AA are
neither legislative nor executive but are essentially quasi-judicial in nature
and, therefore, section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to
orders passed by the Commissioner u/s. 12AA. Section 12AA(3) is prospective and
not retrospective in character. The cancellation of registration will take
effect only from the date of the order or notice of cancellation of
registration.

iii)   The cancellation of the registration would
operate only from the date of the cancellation order, that is December 30,
2010. In other words, the exemption u/s. 11 could not be denied to the assessee
for and upto the A. Y. 2010-11 on the sole ground of cancellation of the
certificate of the registration.

iv)  Unless the assessee had obtained registration
by fraud, collusion or concealment of any material fact, the registration
granted could never be alleged to be a nullity. It was evident that fact of the
cancellation of the registration triggered the reassessment proceedings and
evidently formed the preamble of each of the orders. And clearly, there was no
allegation of fraud or misdeclaration on the part of the assessee and the
Department was candid in confessing that the certificate was granted
erroneously. Therefore, reopening the assessment for the past years on account
of  the cancellation order dated December
30, 2010, in the case of the assessee by the Assessing Officer  was not permissible under the law and the
proceedings relating to the A. Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08 were liable to be
quashed. Also, the assessment order relating to the A. Y. 2010-11 disallowing
exemption on the basis of cancellation order dated December 30, 2010, was
liable to be quashed.”

 

Section 68 – Cash credits – Capital gain or business income – Profits from sale of shares – Genuineness of purchase accepted by Department – Profits from sale cannot be treated as unexplained cash credits – Profit from sale of shares to be taxed as short/long term capital gains

3.      
Principal CIT vs. Ramniwas
Ramjivan Kasat; 410 ITR 540 (Guj):
Date of order: 5th June, 2017 A. Y.: 2006-07

 

Section
68 – Cash credits – Capital gain or business income – Profits from sale of
shares – Genuineness of purchase accepted by Department – Profits from sale
cannot be treated as unexplained cash credits – Profit from sale of shares to
be taxed as short/long term capital gains

 

For the A.
Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer made additions to the income of the assessee
u/s. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee had sold
certain shares and the purchasers were found to be bogus. The second issue
was  in respect of the treatment of the
income earned by the assesse on the sale of shares. The assesse contended that
the shares were in the nature of his investment and the income earned to be
treated as long term capital gains. The Department contended that looking to
the pattern of holding the shares, the frequency of transactions and other
relevant considerations, the assessee was trading in shares and the income was
to be taxed as business income.

 

The
Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal
found that the purchase of the shares was made during the month of April, 2004
and they were sold in the months of May, June and July, 2005, that the
purchases thus made during the Financial Year 2004-05 had been accepted in the
relevant A. Y. 2005-06 and that in the assessment made u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 147
the purchases of the shares were accepted as genuine. The Tribunal therefore
held that no additions could have been made u/s. 68 when the shares were in the
later years sold and deleted the addition. On the second issue, the Tribunal
took the relevant facts into consideration and referred to the circular dated
29/02/2016, of the CBDT and held that the income was to be taxed as capital
gains, be it long term or short term, as the case might be, and not as business
income.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“i)   Circular dated 29/02/2016, issued by the CBDT
provides that in respect of listed shares and securities held for a period of
more than 12 months immediately preceeding the date of their transfer, if the assessee
desires to treat the income arising from the transfer thereof as capital gains
that shall not be disputed by the Assessing Officer and the Department shall
not pursue the issue if the necessary ingredients are satisfied, the only rider
being that the stand taken by the assessee in a particular year would be
followed in the subsequent years also and the assessee would not be allowed to
adopt a contrary stand in such subsequent years.

ii)   The circular dated 29/02/2016 applied to the
assessee. The Tribunal was right in deleting the addition made u/s. 68 upon
sale of shares when the Department had accepted the purchases of the shares in
question as genuine and in holding that the share transaction as investment and
directing the Assessing Officer to treat the sum as short/long term capital
gains and not business income.”

 

Bank – Valuation of closing stock – Securities held to maturity – Constitute stock-in-trade – Valuation at lower of cost or market value – Proper – Classification in accordance with Reserve Bank of India guidelines – Not relevant for purposes of income chargeable to tax

2.      
Principal CIT vs. Bank of
Maharashtra; 410 ITR 413 (Bom):
Date of order: 27th February, 2018 A. Y.: 2005-06

 

Bank – Valuation
of closing stock – Securities held to maturity – Constitute stock-in-trade –
Valuation at lower of cost or market value – Proper – Classification in
accordance with Reserve Bank of India guidelines – Not relevant for purposes of
income chargeable to tax

 

The
assessee claimed that the held-to-maturity securities constituted
stock-in-trade and were to be valued at cost or market value whichever was
less. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the
assessee had shown the value at cost for earlier assessment years and therefore
it could not change the valuation. The Commissioner upheld the decision of the
Assessing Officer. The Tribunal held that irrespective of the basis adopted for
valuation in earlier years, the assessee had the option to change the method of
valuation of its closing stock to the lower of cost or market value provided
the change was bonafide and followed regularly thereafter, that the
held-to-maturity securities were held by the assessee as stock-in-trade and that
the receipts therefrom were business income.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

“The order
of the Tribunal to the effect that the securities held to maturity were
stock-in-trade and the income on sales had been offered to tax as business
income, was correct. Merely because the Reserve Bank of India guidelines
directed a particular treatment to be given to a particular asset that would
not necessarily hold good for the purposes of income chargeable to tax.”

Section 260A – Appeal to High Court – Power of High Court to condone delay in filing appeal – Delay in filing appeal by Revenue – General principles – No reasonable explanation for delay – Delay cannot be condoned

1.   CIT vs. Lata Mangeshkar
Medical Foundation; 410 ITR 347 (Bom):
Date of order: 1st
March, 2018 A. Ys.: 2008-09 and 2009-10

                                         

Section
260A – Appeal to High Court – Power of High Court to condone delay in filing
appeal – Delay in filing appeal by Revenue – General principles – No reasonable
explanation for delay – Delay cannot be condoned

 

Revenue
filed notice of motion for condonation of delay of 318 days in filing appeal.
The Bombay High Court dismissed the notice of motion and held as under:

 

“i)   Section 260A(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
allows the Court to admit an appeal beyond the period of limitation, if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. It
cannot be accepted that in appeal by the Revenue, the delay has to be condoned,
if large amounts are involved, on payment of costs. Each case for condonation
of delay would have to be decided on the basis of the explanation offered for
the delay, i.e., is it bona fide or not, concocted or not or does it evidence
negligence or not. The object of the law of limitation is to bring certainty
and finality to litigation. This is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium”, i.e., for the general benefit of the community at large,
because the object is every legal remedy must be alive for a legislatively
fixed period of time. Therefore, merely because the respondent does not appear,
it cannot follow that the applicant is bestowed with a right to the delay being
condoned. The officers of the Revenue should be well aware of the statutory
provisions and the period of limitation and should pursue its remedies
diligently.

ii)   There was no proper explanation for the delay
on the part of the applicant. In fact, the affidavit dated 16/09/2017 stated
that, the applicant handed over the papers to his subordinate, i.e., the Deputy
Commissioner. This was also put in as one of the reasons for the delay. This
even though they appeared to be a part of the same office. In any case, the
date on which it was handed over to the Deputy Commissioner was not indicated.
Further, the affidavit dated 16/09/2017 also did not explain the period of time
during which the proposal was pending before the Chief Commissioner of
Income-tax, Delhi for approval. The Chief Commissioner of Income-tax was also
an officer of the Department and there was no explanation offered by the Chief
Commissioner at Delhi or on his behalf, as to why such a long time was taken in
approving the proposal. In fact, there was no attempt to explain it. The
applicant being a senior officer of the Revenue would undoubtedly be conscious
of the fact that the time to file  the
appeal was running against the Revenue and there must be an averment in the application
of the steps he was taking to expedite the approval process. Further, there was
no proper explanation for the delay after having received the approval from the
Chief Commissioner at Delhi on May 29, 2017. No explanation was offered in the
affidavits dated 16/09/2017 and for having filed the appeal on July 20, 2017,
i.e., almost after two months. The delay could not be condoned.”

 

Article 7 of India-Singapore DTAA – No further profit attribution to an Indian agency PE where the commission is paid at arm’s length.

4.      
TS-74-ITAT-2019(Mum) Hempel Singapore
Pte Ltd. vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of Order: 8th
February, 2019

 

Article 7 of India-Singapore DTAA – No
further profit attribution to an Indian agency PE where the commission is paid
at arm’s length.

 

FACTS


Taxpayer, a foreign company incorporated in
Singapore, was engaged in the business of selling protective coating/paints for
marine industry. Taxpayer had appointed its wholly owned subsidiary in India (I
Co) as a sales agent for rendering sales support services in India. For such
services I Co was remunerated at cost plus mark-up as commission on sales
effected in India. There was no dispute on the ground that I Co constituted
dependent agency PE (DAPE) for the Taxpayer in India under Article 5(4) of
India-Singapore DTAA.

 

Taxpayer contended that the cost plus mark
up to I Co was at arm’s length. Further, since the income attributable to the
DAPE in India was equal to the commission paid to I Co, the resultant income in
India was NIL.

 

AO, however computed an ad hoc amount
of 25 percent of sales in India as the income attributable to the DAPE in
India. Thus, the difference between such income and commission paid to ICo was
held as taxable in India.

 

The DRP affirmed the order of the AO.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •    A foreign company is liable
    to be taxed in India on so much of its business profits as is attributable to
    its PE in India.
  •    The commission paid by the
    Taxpayer to I Co was accepted to be at arm’s length in the transfer pricing
    analysis of I Co for the relevant year.
  •    Further, once the commission
    is accepted to be at arm’s length in the hands of the agent, a different view
    cannot be taken in the case of non-resident principal who pays the commission
    to the agent. This principle has been enunciated by Delhi High Court in the
    case of DIT vs. BBC Worldwide Ltd.3
  •    If basis the transfer
    pricing analysis undertaken, the remuneration paid to the Indian agent is held
    to be at an arm’s length, there is no need to attribute further profits to the
    agency PE. The above principle has been confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
    in the case of Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc4  and the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case
    of SET Satellite Singapore Pte Ltd5. For this purpose, it is
    of no relevance if the transfer pricing analysis of the commission paid is done
    in the hands of the agent and not the principal.
      

 

 

 

 

3.    ITA Nos. 1341 of
2010 & ors. dated 30.09.2011

4.  292 ITR 416

5.  (2008) 307 ITR 205

 

 

Article 13(4)(c), Article 7 of India-UK DTAA – the development and supply of a technical plan or a technical design does not amount to ‘making available’ technical knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow or process to the service recipient; amount paid for such services does not qualify as FTS.

3.      
TS-76-ITAT-2019 (Mum) Buro Happold
Limited vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of Order: 15th
February, 2019

 

Article
13(4)(c), Article 7 of India-UK DTAA – the development and supply of a
technical plan or a technical design does not amount to ‘making available’
technical knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow or process to the service
recipient; amount paid for such services does not qualify as FTS.

 

FACTS


Taxpayer, a company incorporated in the UK
was involved in the business of providing engineering design and consultancy
services. Taxpayer also rendered these services to its Indian affiliate, I Co.
During the year under consideration, I Co made payments to the Taxpayer towards
provision of consulting services as well as towards a cost recharge of common
expenses incurred by the Taxpayer on behalf of the group.

 

Taxpayer contended that the consultancy
services did not qualify as “Fee for included services (FIS)” under the treaty
in the absence of satisfaction of the ‘make available’ condition. Further, in
absence of a PE in India, such income is not taxable in India. Taxpayer also
contended that the amount received towards cost recharge is not taxable in India,
since such amount was a part of cost allocation made by the Taxpayer on a
cost-to-cost basis without any profit element. 

 

 

 

1.  Explanation to section 9(2) of the Act
provides that interest, royalty and FTS paid to a non-resident shall be deemed
to accrue or arise in India whether or not non-resident has a place of business
or business connection in India, and whether or not non-resident renders
services in India. The Tribunal appears to have not applied explanation to
section 9(2) on agency commission on the basis that it is business income and
not in the nature of interest, royalty or FTS.

 

 

AO observed that the services rendered by
the Taxpayer included supply of design/drawing. AO held that  as per Article 13(4)of the India–UK DTAA,
payment received for development and transfer of a technical plan or technical
design qualifies as FIS, irrespective of whether it also makes available
technical knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow, etc.  Further, the cost recharge expense which are
related to and are ancillary to the provision of consulting engineering
services held as FIS will bear same character as that of FIS and, hence,
taxable in India.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the
CIT(A) who upheld AO’s order. The CIT(A) concluded that provision of a specific
design and drawing requires application of mind by various technicians having
knowledge in the field of architectural, civil, electrical and electronic
engineering, and overseeing its implementation and execution at site in India
by the Taxpayer’s technical personnel, amounts to making available technical
services and hence the amount received would be in the nature of FIS.

 

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD

  •    A careful reading of Article
    13 of the India-UK DTAA suggests that the words “development and transfer
    of a technical plan or technical design” is to be read in conjunction with
    “make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow or
    processes”. As per the rule of ejusdem generis, the words “or
    consists of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical
    design” will take color from “make available technical knowledge,
    experience, skill, knowhow or processes”.

 

  •    The technical
    designs/drawings/plans supplied by the Taxpayer are project-specific and cannot
    be used by ICo in any other project in the future. Thus, the Taxpayer has not
    made available any technical knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow or processes
    while developing and supplying the technical drawings/designs/plans to I Co.

 

  •    Reliance was placed on the
    Pune Tribunal decision in the case of Gera Developments Pvt. Ltd.2,
    in the context of the FTS Article under the India-US DTAA. In Gera’s case it
    was held that mere passing of project-specific architectural drawings and
    designs with measurements does not amount to making available technical
    knowledge, experience, skill, knowhow or processes. The Tribunal also held that
    unless there is transfer of technical expertise skill or knowledge along with
    drawings and designs and unless the recipient can independently use the
    drawings and designs in any manner whatsoever for commercial purpose, the
    payment received cannot be treated as FTS.

 

2.   
[(2016) 160 ITD 439 (Pune)]

ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS MODEL FOR NON-BANKING FINANCIAL COMPANIES (NBFCs)

INTRODUCTION


India Incorporated continues its journey
with the next phase of adoption of Ind As by Non-Banking Finance Companies
in two phases commencing from the accounting period beginning 1 April, 2018.
Whilst there are several implementation and transition challenges, assessment
of the business model is an important area which is likely to impact most
NBFCs.

 

The initial plan of the MCA was to implement
Ind AS for the entire gamut of financial service entities covering NBFCs, banks
and insurance entities, which has been deferred by a year for banks and by two
years for insurance companies. Accordingly, the discussion in this article is
restricted only to NBFCs.

 

It may be pertinent to note that the RBI
had constituted a Working Group to deal with the various issues relating
to Ind AS Implementation by Banks which had submitted a detailed
report in
September, 2015 which may be equally important and
relevant to NBFCs since there is a fair degree of similarity in their business
models and the same would be also taken into account in the course of our
subsequent discussions.

 

BUSINESS MODEL ASSESSMENT FOR FINANCIAL
ASSETS (INCLUDING THE MEASUREMENT AND CLASSIFICATION)


Assessing the business model for holding
financial assets is the anchor on which the entire accounting for financial
assets rests. Before going into the assessment of the business model for
financial assets it is necessary to understand as to what constitutes a
financial asset, since for NBFCs it represents the single most important
component in the Balance Sheet and how its initial measurement is determined.

 

Meaning and Nature of Financial Assets Ind AS-32 defines a financial asset as any asset that is:

a)  Cash

b)  An equity instrument of another entity

c)  A contractual obligation to receive cash or
another financial asset from another entity or to exchange financial assets or
financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially
favourable to the entity.

 

As can be seen
above, an equity instrument needs to be evaluated from the perspective of an
issuer
and the same is defined in Ind AS-32 as any contract that
evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all
its liabilities.
Accordingly, from the point of view of the holder an
equity instrument is an asset / instrument in which the entity does not have a
right to receive a fixed contractual amount of principal or interest.

 

Accordingly, by
default any instrument which does not meet the definition of an equity
instrument from an issuer’s perspective would be regarded as a debt instrument
in which there is generally a contractual cash flow involved.

 

Initial Measurement of Financial Assets


As per Ind AS-109
an entity shall initially measure its financial assets at their
fair value plus or minus any transaction costs that are directly attributable
to the acquisition of the financial assets in case of those falling under the
FVTPL category (discussed later).

 

The best evidence of the fair value on initial
recognition is normally the transaction price.
However, if the NBFC determines that the fair
value based on quoted prices in an active market for identical items, or
based on observable and unobservable inputs like interest rates, yields, credit
spreads etc., is different, the same shall be recognised as a day one gain or
loss. The common areas where such adjustments are required are staff and
related party loans and refundable premises deposits which carry preferential
interest rates or no interest rates.

 

Classification of Financial Assets


Under Ind AS-109,
understanding the business model under which financial assets are held is the
key criterion for determining their classification and subsequent measurement
and accounting. Ind AS-109 requires that all financial assets are required to
be classified under the following three categories for subsequent measurement
purposes:


a)  Amortised Cost

b)  Fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL)

c)  Fair value through other comprehensive income
(FVTOCI)

 

The classification
depends upon the following two criteria and options elected by the entity:

a)  The entity’s business model for
managing the financial assets, and

b)  The contractual cash flow characteristics
of the financial assets.

 

Further, there are separate
classification requirements
for:

a)  Equity Instruments

b)  Debt Instruments

 

Equity
Instruments


Since equity instruments
do not involve the right to contractually receive fixed and determinable cash
flows whether through principal or interest, their classification is more dependent
upon the intention of whether it is “held for trading”
(discussed
later). However, in situations in which the instruments are not held for
trading, the entity needs to exercise an irrevocable choice
as to whether
it wants to elect the FVTOCI option. A tabulation of the choices
available is depicted hereunder:

 

 

 

Accordingly, all
equity instruments which are “held for trading” are required to be mandatorily
classified as FVTPL, whereas for all other instruments, the entity can make an
irrevocable option to classify the same as FVTOCI or elect the FVTPL option
(discussed later). The following are some of the key points which are
relevant regarding the FVTOCI classification of equity instruments:


a)  Classification as FVTOCI is not mandatory
though it cannot be used for equity instruments “held for trading”.


b)  The classification needs to be made on initial
recognition and is irrevocable.


c)  The election can be made on an instrument by
instrument basis and is not an accounting policy choice.


d)  If the entity elects this option then all fair
value changes on the particular instrument, excluding dividends, are recognised
through OCI and no recycling is permitted to Profit and Loss even on disposal,
though the cumulative gain or loss at the time of disposal may be transferred
within equity to retained earnings.


e)  There are no separate impairment requirements.


f)   Ind AS-101 gives the entity a choice to
designate the equity instruments on the basis of facts and circumstances that
exist on the date of transition to Ind AS.

 

Debt Instruments


The classification of debt instruments is dependent upon the business
model which refers to how an entity manages its financial assets so as to
generate cash flows i.e. whether the entity will collect the cash flows
by holding the financial asset till maturity or sell those assets or both.

A tabulation of the choices available is depicted hereunder:

 

 

The following are some of the key points which are relevant regarding
the FVTOCI classification of debt instruments:


a)  For debt instruments meeting
the above prescribed criteria, FVTOCI classification is mandatory, unless
FVTPL option is exercised as discussed below
.


b)  For such debt instruments, interest income,
impairment and foreign exchange changes are recognised in profit and loss
whereas all other changes are recognised directly in OCI.

c)  On derecognition, cumulative
gains and losses previously recognised in OCI are reclassified from equity to
profit and loss.


d)  Ind
AS-101 gives the entity a choice to designate the debt instruments on the basis
of facts and circumstances that exist on the date of transition to Ind AS.

 

Option to Designate Financial Assets at FVTPL


Irrespective of the satisfaction of any of the above conditions for
amortised cost or FVTOCL designation, Ind AS-109 provides an option to
irrevocably designate a financial asset as measured at FVTPL if doing so eliminates
or significantly reduces a measurement mismatch, which is also referred to as
an ‘accounting mismatch’,
which would otherwise arise if a different basis
is followed.
Though this is an accounting policy choice, it is not required to be applied
consistently for all similar transactions. Ind AS-109 provides the following
guiding principles to designate financial assets as measured at FVTPL:

 

a)  When the financial asset is
part of a hedging relationship.


b)  When the financial assets,
financial liabilities or both share a common risk such as interest rate risk
that gives rise to offsetting changes as part of the entity’s ALM policy.


c)  When a group of financial
assets is managed and performance is evaluated on a fair value basis such as
investment management, venture capital companies or stock broking companies.

 

Held for
Trading


Apart from the option to designate financial assets at FVTPL as
discussed above, another important consideration for FVTPL designation is
whether the financial assets are “held for trading” for which Ind AS-109 has
provided certain guiding principles which are briefly discussed hereunder:

 

a)  The financial assets are
acquired ‘principally’ for the purpose of selling in the near term e.g. stock
in trade held by a stock broker.


b)  The financial asset is part of a portfolio of
financial instruments that are managed together and for which there is evidence
of a recent actual pattern of short-term profit taking.


c)  ‘Trading’ generally reflects active and
frequent buying/selling with the objective of generating a profit from
short-term fluctuations in the price. However, churning of portfolio for risk
management purposes is not necessarily ‘trading’ activity.  

 

Business Model Assessment


Guiding
Principles


The following are some of the guiding principles laid down in Ind AS-109
which need to be considered whilst assessing and determining the business model
for managing financial assets, in the context of debt instruments, some of
which have also been reiterated in the RBI Working Group Report, referred to
earlier
in the context of Banks which may also be pertinent to NBFCs:

 

a)  Assessing the entity’s business model for
managing financial assets is a matter of fact and not merely an assertion. It
has to be based on relevant and objective evidence including but not limited to
how the performance of the business model and the financial assets held within
the same are evaluated by the entity’s key management personnel, their risks and
how the personnel are compensated.


b)  The assessment is based on how groups of
financial assets are managed to achieve a particular business objective and is not
an instrument by instrument analysis, though at another level it is also not an
entity level assessment.


c)  A few exceptions against the stated portfolio
objectives may not necessitate a change in the business model e.g. a few sales
out of a portfolio which is on the “hold to collect” business model. In such
situations what needs to be considered are factors like the frequency, timing
and reasons for the sales and expectations of the future sales activity.


d)  Business model assessment is done based on
scenarios reasonably expected to occur and not on exceptional or extreme
situations such as ‘worst case scenario’ or ‘stress case scenario’.

 

Amortised Cost –
Business Model Test


Some of the key
features for assessing the business model test of holding on to a financial
asset for amortised cost determination areas are as under:


a)  To evaluate the entity’s business model to
hold financial assets to collect contractual cash flows, the frequency,
value and timing of sales in prior periods and the reasons for such sales have
to be analysed.
Also, future expectations about such sales is required
to be analysed. It is important to bear in mind that higher or lower sales than
the previous expectations is not a prior period error.


b)  In real time business it is not always
practical to hold all the financial assets until their maturity, regardless of
the business model. Hence, some amount of selling/buying or so called ‘churning
of portfolio’ is expected and permitted. However, if more than infrequent
number of sales are made out of a portfolio or those sales are more than
insignificant in value
, then there will be a need to assess and
validate how such sales are consistent with the business model whose objective
is to collect contractual cash flows.  

 

It would be useful
at this stage to analyse certain common situations where the business model
test of holding would not fail or fail from a practical perspective, before
getting into the assessment of the subsequent criteria of the contractual cash
flow test:

 

Circumstances when the business model test would not
necessarily fail

Circumstances when the business model test may generally fail

Infrequent  sales to meet unforeseen funding needs.

Holding
financial assets to meet everyday liquidity needs.

Purchases
of loan portfolio instead of originating loan portfolio, which may include
credit impaired loans.

Loans
originated with an intention to sell in the near future.

Sales
due to increase in credit risk of the financial assets which can be
demonstrated either with entity’s credit risk management policy or in some
other way. This could also include sales to manage credit concentration risk
regardless of the increase in credit risk.

Portfolio
of financial assets that meet the definition of ‘held for trading’ as
discussed above even if they are held for a long period.

Sales
effected closer to maturity where the proceeds approximately equal the
remaining contractual cash flows.

 

    

Amortised Cost –
Cash Flow Characteristics Test


Another equally
important test or criterion to be met for classification of financial assets as
subsequently measured at amortised cost is the characteristics of the cash
flows arising from the financial asset. Ind AS-109 provides that for this
purpose, the contractual terms of the financial asset should give rise on
specified dates to cash flows that are solely payment of principal and the
interest on the principal outstanding (SPPI).

 

Ind AS-109 defines
interest
, for the purpose of the above assessment, as consideration for the
following:

 

a)  the time value of money.

b)  credit risk associated with the principal
amount outstanding during a particular period of time.

c)  other basic lending risks (such
as liquidity risk) and costs (such as administration for holding
the financial asset).

d)  profit margin.

 

Ind AS-109 defines
principal
, for the purpose of the above assessment, as fair value of
the financial asset at the date of initial recognition. This initial amount may
change subsequently if there are repayments of the principal amount.   

 

For the purposes of
the above assessment, principal and interest payments should be in the currency
in which the financial asset is denominated. The following are some of the practical
considerations which are relevant for assessing the SPPI test:

 

a)  Modified (or imperfect) Time Value of Money
Element:
This kind of situation arises when the financial asset’s interest
rate is reset periodically and the tenor of rate (benchmark rate) does not
match the tenor of interest period e.g. interest rate for a term loan is reset
monthly but rate is reset to one year rate. In such cases, entity will have to
assess whether the cash flows represent SPPI. This has to be demonstrated as
follows:


  • Compute (undiscounted) cash
    flows as if benchmark rate tenor matches interest period and compare it with
    cash flows (undiscounted) as per contractual terms (i.e. tenors do not match).

  • Above computation has to be
    done for entire period of the financial asset and hence consideration of facts
    that affect future interest rates and estimation would be required.
  • If the cash flows under
    above two scenarios are significantly different then the modified time value of
    money element does not represent SPPI.


b)  Rates set by Regulators: These shall be
considered as proxy for time value of money element, provided it is set by
broadly considering the passage of time element and does not introduce exposure
to risks and volatility inconsistent with basic lending arrangement.


c)  Pre-payment or extension options pass
the SPPI test, provided that the repayment amount substantially represents
unpaid principal and interest accrued as well as reasonable compensation for
early payment or extension of payment period.


d)  Floating or Variable Rates: Provisions
that change the timing or amount of payments of principal and interest fail the
SPPI test unless it is a variable interest rate that is a consideration for the
time value of money and credit risk and other basic lending risk associated
with the principal outstanding and the profit margin.

 

Key
Implementation and Transition Challenges


The current requirements for classification and accounting for
investments by NBFCs were quite simple and hence shifting over to an Ind AS
regime is expected to present a fair share of challenges both in initial
transition and on-going implementation. Further, though all Ind AS requirements
are required to be applied retrospectively on the date of transition, Ind
AS-101 provides certain exceptions thereto, one of them being that the entity
should assess the business model criteria on the basis
of facts and circumstances on the date of transition. Finally, the measurement
basis for all financial assets on initial recognition would henceforth be at
the fair value for which also Ind AS-101 provides for prospective application
on or after the date of transition to Ind AS. In spite of the aforesaid
exemptions from retrospective application, NBFCs are likely to face certain
transition and on-going implementation challenges, which are briefly discussed
hereunder:

 

a)  Treatment of existing
investments classified as current:
As per the existing AS-13, all
investments that by their nature are readily realisable and are intended to be
held for not more than one year from the date on which they were made, are
regarded as current investments. Under Ind AS, all such investments may not
automatically meet the held for trading criteria especially in respect of
equity instruments, and especially if these are continuing for periods in
excess of one year on the date of transition. Accordingly, a fresh evaluation
of the purpose, nature and intention of such investments would need to be
undertaken to categorise them under the appropriate bucket. Also,
investments in mutual funds would generally fall under the
FVTPL
category based on the “look through” test since there are no defined
contractual cash flows even in case of fixed maturity plans.


b)  Documentation and business
model assessment:
– The classification requirements based on the criteria
discussed above may not be straitjacketed in all cases and would need to be
documented in a fair degree of detail based on the activity level and type of
business of the NBFC. The existing risk management and ALM policies especially
in case of smaller and unlisted entities would need to be recalibrated to
capture the various scenarios under Ind AS.


c)  Fair value determination:
The initial measurement of all financial assets at fair value would be a game
changer for many NBFCs. Whilst initially the transaction price would be the
fair value in many cases, this would need to be carefully evaluated in the case
of transactions with related parties, transactions not on an arm’s length basis
or transactions under duress, since in such cases the fair value at which other
market participants enter into the transactions would need to be considered which
would represent a day one gain or loss. Finally, the on-going assessment of the
fair value especially in case of financial assets which are not readily
tradeable or quoted on an active market would present challenges especially in
cases where there are not many observable inputs to determine the fair value,
since it could be based on significant judgements which more often than not
could be biased. This would make it inherently difficult for a comparison
between entities and also involve significant costs and efforts which may not
be always commensurate with the benefits.


d)  Link with liquidity crisis:
The current liquidity crisis which has engulfed many NBFCs may necessitate
selling of portfolios of financial assets the impact of which on the continued
assessment of the business portfolio would need a closer assessment requiring a
reclassification of debt instruments and loans from amortised cost to FVTOCI
for subsequent measurement.


e)  Judgements: Finally, the
assessment of the business model involves significant judgements and
assumptions which need to be constantly evaluated by the key management
personnel on several matters like determining the frequency and volume of sales
so as to rebut the business model of held to sale, whether interest rates reset
is on time value and the other criteria discussed earlier, the manner of
determining the pricing for financial assets and the inputs involved therein
since all of this would ultimately impact the business model assessment and the
consequential classification and measurement of financial assets. It may be
noted that the RBI working group has recommended the fixing of certain
thresholds to determine as to when the volume of sales could be considered frequent
so as to rebut the business model of “held to sale” criteria.

 

CONCLUSION


The above
evaluation is just the tip of the iceberg on a subject for which there may not
always be straitjacketed answers. However, the business model assessment is
here to stay and it would impact the way the financial statements are evaluated
and also impact the auditors and prove to be a bonanza for specialists to
develop fair values, who could laugh all the way to the bank!

 

 

Right to Information

PART A I DIRECTIONS OF SUPREME COURT

 

Fee For RTI Application Should Not
Exceed Rs.50/, Rs. 5/- Per Page, Motive Need Not Be Disclosed

 

The Supreme
Court on March 20, 2018 capped the fee charged by high courts for responding to
queries filed under the RTI Act at Rs. 50 per application, bringing cheers to
activists seeking information under the transparency law.

 

The bench
comprising Justices A. K. Goel, R. F. Nariman and U. U. Lalit also asked the
high courts not to force applicants to disclose the reason for seeking
information under the Right to Information law.

 

On the fee: “We
are of the view that, as a normal Rule, the charge for the application should
not be more than Rs.50/- and for per page information should not be more than
Rs.5/-. However, exceptional situations may be dealt with differently. This
will not debar revision in future, if the situation so demands.”

 

On disclosure
of motive: With regard to the requirement of disclosure of motive for seeking
information, the Court ruled, “No motive needs to be disclosed in view of the
scheme of the Act.

 

On CJ’s
permission for disclosure of information: The Court noted that the requirement
of seeking permission of the Chief Justice or the concerned Judge for
disclosure of information “will be only in respect of information which is
exempted under the Scheme of Act.”

 

On transfer of
application to another public authority: The Court opined that while normally
the public authority should transfer the application to another public
authority if the information is not available, the mandate may not apply “where
the public authority dealing with the application is not aware as to which
other authority will be the appropriate authority”.

 

On disclosure
of information on matters pending adjudication: With regard to the Rules
debarring disclosure of information on matters pending adjudication, the Court
clarified that “the same may be read consistent with Section 8 of the Act, more
particularly sub-section (1) in Clause (J) thereof, bench passed the order on a
batch of petitions challenging the RTI rules of various high courts, and other
authorities like the Chhattisgarh Legislative Assembly, which imposed
exorbitant fees for application and photocopying.

 

Advocate
Prashant Bhushan, the counsel for NGO Common Cause, which was one of the
petitioners, said exorbitant fee was charged to disincentivise the general
public from seeking information. He also said the fee should not act as a
deterrent for information seekers.

 

The petition
filed by the NGO claimed that the Central Information Commission had repeatedly
asked the Allahabad High Court to modify its RTI rules, but its pleas were
ignored.

 

The Allahabad
High Court was charging Rs. 500 for a reply under the RTI Act, the petition
claimed.

 

A similar plea
was filed against the Chhattisgarh High Court which had dismissed a petition of
an applicant Dinesh Kumar Soni, and imposed a cost of Rs 10,000 on him for
seeking information.

 

In his
petition, Soni had challenged the Rule 5 and Rule 6(1) of the Chhattisgarh
Vidhan Sabha Secretariat Right to Information (Regulation of fees and costs)
Rules 2011, which require that a person making an application u/s. 6(1) of the
RTI Act was required to pay Rs. 300.

(Source: http://www.livelaw.in/fee-rti-application-not-exceed-rs-50-rs-5-per-pages-motive-need-not-disclosed-read-sc-directions-read-order/)

 

PART
B RTI ACT, 2005

 

 

India’s
Right to Information in a mess

 

Over the years, the pendency of cases under
Right to Information (RTI) Act has shown an upward trend with close to two lakh
pending second appeal and complaint cases been reported under the Act across
the country.

 

According to the latest report “State of
Information Commissions and the Use of RTI Laws in India (Rapid Review 4.0)” by
Access to Information Programme, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), a
New Delhi-based NGO, there were 1.93 lakh pending second appeal and complaint
cases in 19 Information Commissions at the beginning of this year as compared
to 1.10 lakh cases pending across 14 Information Commissions in 2015. The
report based on annual reports and websites of Information Commissions was
released at the Open Consultation on the Future of RTI: Challenges and
Opportunities held in New Delhi in the second week of March.

 

Maharashtra (41,537 cases), Uttar Pradesh
(40,248), Karnataka (29,291), Central Information Commission (23,989) and
Kerala (14,253) were the top five Information Commissions that accounted for 77
percent of the overall pendency. Pendency in Bihar, Jharkhand and Tamil Nadu
among others was not publicly known while Mizoram State Information Commission
(SIC) received and decided only one appeal case in 2016-17, said the report,
adding that SICs of Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya had no pendency at all. The
Central Information Commission and nine SICs (Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu &
Kashmir, Kerala, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Odisha, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh)
displayed updated case pendency data on their websites.

 

Referring to RTI applications, the report
said that around 24.33 lakh RTI applications were filed across the Central and
14 state governments between 2015-17. The report mentioned that it was not
possible to get accurate figures in the absence of annual reports from several
Information Commissions. By a process of extrapolation it may be conservatively
estimated that up to 50 lakh RTI applications would have been submitted by
citizens during the same period, the report added.

 

About 24.77 lakh RTI applications were
reported in 2015 and it was based on data available for the years 2012-14
(where data was taken for the latest year for which an annual report was
available). The figure for 2015-17 appeared to be a little less but that might
be due to the absence of figures from several jurisdictions where RTI was used
more prolifically, added the report. Furthermore, around 2.14 crore RTI applications
were filed across the country since October, 2005, as per the data published in
the annual reports of Information Commissions accessible on their websites, the
report said, adding that if data was published by all Information Commissions
the figure might have touched 3 to 3.5 crores. Less than 0.5 percent of the
population seemed to have used RTI since its operationalisation, it further
added.

 

Despite the absence of their latest annual
reports, the Central Government (57.43 lakhs) and the state governments of
Maharashtra (54.95 lakhs) and Karnataka (20.73 lakhs million) continue to top
the list of jurisdictions receiving the most number of information requests.
Gujarat (9.86 lakhs) recorded more RTI applications than neighbouring Rajasthan
(8.55 lakhs) where the demand for an RTI law emerged from the grassroots.
Despite having much lower levels of literacy, Chhattisgarh (6.02 lakh) logged
more RTI applications than 100 percent literate Kerala (5.73 lakhs). Despite
being small states, Himachal Pradesh (4.24 lakhs), Punjab (3.60 lakhs) and
Haryana (3.32 lakhs) registered more RTI applications each than the
geographically bigger state of Odisha (2.85 lakhs). Manipur recorded the lowest
figures for RTI use at 1,425 information requests between 2005-2017. The SIC
did not publish any annual report between 2005 and 2011 and is yet to release
the report for 2016-17.

 

While the Central government, Andhra Pradesh
(undivided), Assam, Goa, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala and Uttarakhand have
recorded an uninterrupted trend of increase in the number of RTI applications
received, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Sikkim, Nagaland and Tripura have reported
a decline in the number of RTI applications received in recent years and the
reasons for the drop in numbers, according to the report, requires urgent
probing. Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Meghalaya, Gujarat, Mizoram,
Odisha and West Bengal have recorded a mixed trend where the RTI application
figures have fluctuated over the years. After seesawing in the initial years, Arunachal
Pradesh has reported a more than 82 percent decline in the number of RTI
applications received in 2015 against the peak reached in 2014. Mizoram also
showed a declining trend of 23 percent in 2016-17 after the peak scaled during
the previous year. West Bengal’s figures rose and dipped to less than 62
percent of the peak reached in 2010 but a rising trend was reported in 2015.

 

Referring to headless and non-existent SICs,
the report highlighted that there was no State Chief Information Commissioner
(SCIC) in Gujarat since mid-January 2018. While Maharashtra SIC was headed by
an acting SCIC since June 2017, there was no Information Commission in Andhra
Pradesh (after Telangana was carved out in June 2014). The State government had
assured the Hyderabad High Court that it would soon set up an SIC. More than 25
percent (109) of 146 posts in the Information Commissions were lying vacant.
Against 142 posts created in 2015, 111 Information Commissioners (including
Chief Information Commissioners) were working across the country. 47 percent of
the serving Chief Information Commissioners and ICs were situated in seven
states: Haryana (11), Karnataka, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh (9 each), Central
Information Commission, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (7 each). Six of these
Commissions were saddled with 72 percent of the pending appeals and complaints across the country.

 

The report further referred that 90 percent
of the Information Commissions were headed by retired civil servants and more
than 43 percent of the Information Commissioners were from civil services
background. This is the trend despite the Supreme Court’s directive in 2013 to
identify candidates in other fields of specialisation mentioned in the RTI Act
for appointment, argued the report. The report further mentioned that only 8.25
percent of the serving SCICs and ICs were women. Only 10 percent (8 out of 79)
of the Information Commissioners serving across the country were women. Three
of these women ICs were retired IAS officers while two were advocates and two
had a background in social service and education. One woman IC in Punjab had a
background in medicine.There were nine women ICs in 2015. The report said that
the websites of SICs of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar could not be detected on any
internet browser and the SICs of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had not
published any annual report so far. Jharkhand and Kerala SICs each had six
pending annual reports and Punjab had five while Andhra Pradesh had four
pending reports.

 

(Source: http://www.milligazette.com/news/16188-india-s-right-to-information-in-a-mess)

 

 

 

PART C INFORMATION
ON & AROUND

 

Focus On
“Act Rightly” As Much As Right To Information Act, Says PM Modi

 

Twelve years after it was set up under the
Right To Information (RTI) Act, the Central Information Commission has a new
address — a five-storey environment friendly building in south Delhi, fitted
with information technology and video conference facilities. Earlier, the
highest appellate authority for RTI complaints used to function from two rented
accommodations.

 

“The greatest asset of a democracy is
an empowered citizen. Over the last 3.5 years we have created the right
environment that nurtures informed and empowered individuals,” said Prime
Minister Narendra Modi who inaugurated the new premises.

At a time when activists have accused the
government of holding back information, PM Modi said like the RTI Act, serious
attention should be paid to “Act Rightly”.

 

“Many times it has been seen that some
people misuse the rights given to the public for personal gains. The burden of
such wrong attempts is borne by the system”.

 

Activists say the government is yet to walk
the talk on transparency, and anti-corruption laws await proper implementation.

 

A Lokpal is yet to be appointed, four years
after the law was put in place. The chief information commissioner was
appointed by the present government after activists went to court. Of the 11
posts of information commissioner, four are vacant and four more retire this
year.

 

(Source:https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/focus-on-act-rightly-as-much-as-right-to-information-act-says-pm-modi-1821017)

 

u Ex-corporators
seek right to pursue RTI

Eight former corporators of the Thane
Municipal Corporation (TMC) have filed a criminal writ petition in the Bombay
high court seeking quashing of complaints registered against them by the Thane
police commissioner at the behest of the corporation and its commissioner. The
corporators have alleged that the complaint lodged against them was aimed at
discouraging them from seeking information under Right To Information (RTI) Act
about unauthorised and illegal construction being carried on in the municipal
limits of the corporation. 

 

According to the petition filed by Sanjay
Ghadigaonkar and seven others, all of whom were former corporators in TMC, a
complaint was lodged against them by the Thane police as they had been seeking
information under RTI. The petition has alleged that they had been discouraged
by the corporation from seeking the information, but when it did not deter
them, the police complaints were lodged. The complaint has alleged that the
corporators were misusing the RTI Act for vested interests.

 

The petition also points to the fact that in
the recent session of the Vidhan Sabha, the chief minister Devendra Fadnavis
had clarified that there was no restriction on anyone from seeking information
under RTI and they cannot be prosecuted for seeking the information, but the
corporation had not heeded the same but had lodged complaints with the police
against them.

 

The petition while seeking an early hearing
has also prayed for restraining orders against the police from taking any
action against them as well as quashing of the complaints. The petition is
expected to come up for hearing in due course.

RTI shows Left leader’s murderer received
parole every month for 3 yrs.

 

A Right To Information (RTI) reply has
revealed that CPI(M) leader and murder convict P.K. Kunhanandan was given 15
days parole every month since 2015.

 

Kunhanandan, one of the convicts in the
murder case of slain leader T.P. Chandrasekharan, is serving a life-term for
the same.

 

The reply, sought by slain leader’s wife K.
K. Rema, also stated that barring two months (October and November 2017), the
convict had got parole repeatedly from 2015 to 2018.

 

Chandrasekharan, a local leader of CPI (M)
at Onchiyam in Kozhikode district, left the party in 2009 to form a new one,
Revolutionary Marxist Party (RMP); however, his political journey was cut
short, as he was brutally murdered on May 4, 2012, after his party won
considerable number of seats in a local body elections.

 

Fifteen CPI (M) workers were found guilty in
the case.

Rema is now reportedly considering legal
action against the state government.

 

(Source:http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/kerala-rti-shows-left-leader-s-murderer-received-parole-every-month-for-3-yrs-118031900030_1.html)

 

RTI being
strangled due to Maha’s neglect: Former CIC Gandhi

 

Former Central Information Commissioner
Shailesh Gandhi today said that the Right to Information Act was being
“strangled” due to the neglect of the state government.

 

Gandhi has written a letter to Chief
Minister Devendra Fadnavis asking him to fill the vacancies in the Information
Commission in the state.

 

“RTI is slowly being strangled in
Maharashtra by not appointing information commissioners. In Maharashtra, there
is vacancy of one Chief Information Commissioner and three commissioners. These
are not being filled despite repeated reminders,” Gandhi stated in his
letter to Fadnavis.

 

Gandhi said that the pendency at all the
commissions was now alarming and it was in turn killing the objective of the
Act which was transparency.

 

Sharing the figures of 31,474 pending cases
in four regions, Gandhi said, “Nashik region has 9,931 pending cases, Pune
has 8,647 cases, Amravati 8,026 cases and Mumbai(HQ) has 4,870 cases pending.
These cases are languishing for the want of information commissioners.”

His letter stated that it was a serious
matter and needed immediate attention and claimed that failure to do so would
allow the state to “succeed” in making the RTI Act
“redundant”.

 

“It will continue as a haven for
rewarding retired bureaucrats and other favourites. It will be an expense
account with no benefit to its citizens,” Gandhi wrote.

 

He said that Maharashtra was one of the
first states to enact the law when it came into effect in October, 2005 but the
state was now “reeling from the worst levels of pendency in years”.

 

(Source:http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/rti-being-strangled-due-to-maha-s-neglect-former-cic-gandhi-118031900500_1.html)

 

 

Agents of
RTI justice, information commissions are its biggest bottleneck

 

A crippling staff shortage and vacancies in
crucial positions at the central and state information commissions is severely
undermining the Right to Information (RTI) Act, a study by NGOs Satark Nagrik
Sangathan (SNS) and Centre for Equity Studies (CES) has found.

 

According to the study, ‘Report Card on the
Performance of Information Commissions in India’, which looked at 29
information commissions, including the central information commission (CIC),
and is based on data gathered via 169 RTI pleas, the failure of the central and
state governments to proactively put out information in the public domain is
the second biggest bottleneck in the effective implementation of the Act.

 

The CIC and state information commissions
(SICs) are almost all functioning much below their sanctioned strength. The
CIC, for example, is four short of its sanctioned strength of 10 information
commissioners. Of these, four are set to retire this year.

 

Also, the Maharashtra, Nagaland and Gujarat
SICs are headless in the absence of a chief information commissioner. Kerala’s,
meanwhile, has only one information commissioner, out of a sanctioned strength
of five.

The information commissions serve the role
of watchdogs in the implementation of the RTI Act, approached by petitioners
when their pleas are either not accepted by a government agency, refused, or
elicit inadequate information.

 

According to the report, in 2016, the number
of appeals and complaints pending with 23 SICs stood at the “alarming figure of
1,81,852”, growing 9.5 per cent to 1,99,186 at the end of October 2017. The
Mizoram and Sikkim SICs had zero pendency as of October 2017, while information
wasn’t available for other states.

 

“The assessment found that several ICs were
non-functional or functioning at reduced capacity, as the posts of
commissioners, including that of the chief information commissioner, were
vacant during the period under review,” said the study, which covered the
period from January 2016 to October 2017.

 

According to the report, Telangana, Andhra
Pradesh and Sikkim had spells where the SICs didn’t function at all, while the
West Bengal SIC did not hear any complaints or appeals for nearly 12 months.
Not surprisingly, the date of resolution for a complaint/appeal filed with West
Bengal SIC in November 2017 was estimated at 43 years later by the NGOs (see
graphic).

 

Estimated time required for disposal of an
appeal/complaint filed on November 1, 2017.

 

In a situation of this kind, people have “no
recourse to the independent appellate mechanism prescribed under the RTI Act”,
the report pointed out.

 

“The transparency in public authorities
completely diminishes. They have no fear or accountability when this happens,”
said RTI activist Subhash Agrawal.

 

“The poorest of the poor use RTI for
information regarding basic entitlements such as ration cards. If it takes 5
years to get a response then what is the point? Justice delayed is justice
denied,” said Anjali Bhardwaj, co-convenor of the National Campaign for
People’s Right to Information and a founding member of the Satark Nagrik
Sangathan. There are outliers, of course. The SICs for Mizoram and Sikkim
disposed of appeals/complaints in less than a month.

 

The political side of it

State chief information commissioners, as is
the case with the central chief information commissioner, are appointed by the
government in consultation with the opposition. Agrawal said while not
appointing chiefs was often a government bid to dilute institutions, delayed
appointments resulted several times from a lack of coordination between the
chief minister and the leader of the opposition. “Mayawati and Mulayam Singh
didn’t see eye to eye, so it took a long time for the UP state commission to be
set up,” he added.

 

“Not having a chief (information
commissioner) is legally unsound. It is the commissioner who runs everything,
while everyone else is supposed to support him,” said Habibullah.

 

When the last resort crumbles:

The multitude of vacancies is a factor, of
course, but experts pointed out that it was the lack of transparency on the
part of the central and state governments that forced people to file RTI pleas
even for the most basic information.

 

“The government is not doing its job of suo
motu
disclosure u/s. 4(1)(B) of the RTI Act, under which it has to update
information every 120 days,” said Wajahat Habibullah, the first chief
information commissioner.

 

Agrawal said
“more proactive disclosures by the government can cut the number of RTI pleas
filed by 70%”.

 

The ‘inexplicable’ overnight drop

The report pointed out how the CIC stated in
an RTI reply that the total number of appeals and complaints pending with it
stood at 28,502 as on 31 December 2016. However, according to its website, only
364 cases were pending with it on 1 January 2017, it added, terming the fall
“inexplicable”.

 

The returned complaints

Apart from the pendency, concerns have also
been raised about the high number of appeals and complaints returned to
petitioners, several for unspecified reasons, with many people wondering
whether this was a ploy to project lower pendency rates.

 

“This is extremely problematic as people,
especially the marginalised, reach the commissions after a great deal of
hardship and a long wait,” said the report.

 

“The number is so high that I suspect cases
were not rejected on solid grounds,” Habibullah added.

 

Bhardwaj said they had found instances where
cases were wrongfully returned.

 

She added that when the commissions returned
complaints, it “fails to perform its legal duty as a friend of the petitioner”.
“Many people are unlettered but they do have the right to information,” she
said.

 

The penalties, or the lack thereof

According to the RTI Act, the information
commissions can impose penalties of up to Rs 25,000 against public information
officers (PIOs) for violations of the RTI Act. However, according to the
report, penalties were rare.

 

The report added: “Penalties were imposed
in… only 4.1% of the cases where penalties were imposable!”

 

(Source:https://theprint.in/governance/agents-of-rti-justice-information-commissions-are-its-biggest-bottleneck/41229/)

 

Govt
Orders Voluntary Info Disclosure Under RTI

With most of the departments and authorities
in the state yet to disclose voluntary information under Right to Information
(RTI) Act, the government on Friday directed all the concerned officials to
ensure the disclosures as per the transparency law within a week. 

 

“With a view to maintaining conformity with
the provisions of Section 4 of J&K Right to Information Act, 2009, from
time to time, instructions have been issued, impressing upon all the
Administrative Secretaries, Heads of the Departments and Public Authorities of
the State to ensure effective implementation of the provisions of Section 4 of
the J&K RTI Act in letter and spirit by hosting all requisite information
on the official websites and updating them periodically,” reads a circular
issued by the government.

 

“However, it is being constantly observed
that some of departments are not implementing the provisions of Section 4 of
the Jammu & Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2009 and some of them have
yet not created their departmental websites.”

 

The J&K State Information Commission has
been persistently requesting for ensuring implementation of the provisions of
the J&K Right to Information Act, it said.

 

“Therefore all such departments as have not
so far created their own departmental websites are impressed upon to do so
within a fortnight and host the requisite material on the websites under the
provisions of Jammu & Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2009, on regular
basis. Further, all the Administrative Secretaries are enjoined upon to furnish
the status on this account to the General Administration Department as well as
State Information Commission within a week’s time positively.”

 

The CIC had shared details with the GAD about
the status of different departments regarding creation of websites, disclosure
u/s. 4 of the RTI Act, appointment of Public Information Officer and First
Appellate Authority.

 

The CIC has informed the GAD that many
departments were not disclosing the information as per the Act.

 

The CIC has also highlighted that the domain
name of GMC Jammu has expired on August 30 last year.

 

(Source:https://kashmirobserver.net/2018/local-news/govt-orders-voluntary-info-disclosure-under-rti-29164)

 

Meghalaya
RTI Activist, Who Went After Cement Firms, Found Murdered

 

A right-to-information activist who was
working to expose alleged misuse of public funds in Meghalaya was found dead in
the northeast state, police said on Tuesday.

 

Poipynhun Majaw had been filing applications
under the Right to Information (RTI) Act to check alleged corruption in public
projects in Meghalaya’s Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council.

 

His body was found near a bridge in
Khliehriat, the district headquarters of East Jaintia Hills, 120 kilometres
from state capital Shillong. He was also the president of Jaintia Youth
Federation.

 

Police said he was last seen riding a
motorcycle near the East Jaintia Hills deputy commissioner’s office on Monday
night.

 

“A wrench was found next to the body.
Preliminary inquest suggests the victim was hit on the head leading to his
death,” senior police officer AR Mawthoh said.

 

Recently, using replies he got from the
authorities under using the RTI route, he had alleged that cement firms have
been mining in the area without permission from the council.

 

(Source:https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/meghalaya-rti-activist-who-went-after-cement-firms-found-murdered-1826488)

 

RBI: SMA details exempted from disclosure under
RTI

Contradicting its reply to an earlier right
to information (RTI) query, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has recently said
bank-wise information on special mention account (SMA) 1 and 2 is exempt from
disclosure u/s. 8 (1) (a) & (d) of the RTI Act. While SMA 1 refers to loans
where repayments are overdue between 31-60 days, SMA 2 loans are ones where
principal or interest is overdue between 61-90 days. Although these are
technically not non-performing assets (NPAs), but nonetheless indicate
‘incipient stress’. In April 2016, RBI had said in an RTI response that SMA 1
and 2 loans of all banks stood at Rs 6,24,119 crore at the end of December
2015, 9% higher than Rs 5,73,381 crore at the end of June 2015. It had further
said while SBI’s SMA-2 accounts stood at Rs 60,228 crore, or 5.17% of its total
advances, at PNB this exposure was approximately 6.31% of its total loan book
or Rs 24,824 crore. RBI’s executive director and appellate authority Uma
Shankar said on March 7, 2018, that there is no overriding public interest in
the disclosure of credit information. She added that section 45E of the RBI
Act, 1934, contains a specific bar against disclosure of credit information
collected by the central bank. “Though section 22 of the RTI Act, 2005, starts
with a non-obstante clause, the interpretation given to that section by CIC is
that it is not intended to override special enactments,” she said. She said SMA
data is collected by RBI solely for disseminating the information to other
banks having exposure to the accounts reported in SMA by banks.

 

(Source:http://www.financialexpress.com/industry/rbi-sma-details-exempted-from-disclosure-under-rti/1096387/)

 

RTI Clinic in April 2018: 2nd, 3rd,
4th Saturday, i.e. 8th, 15th and 22nd
11.00 to 13.00 at BCAS premises.

Tax Planning/Evasion Transactions On Capital Markets And Securities Laws – Supreme Court Decides

Background

Carrying out
transactions on stock market to avoid tax is practiced. Using capital market
for tax evasion has recently been in news, for example, cases involving
long-term capital gains. A person may, for example, sell shares and book exempt
gains and soon thereafter buy such shares again from the market. At times, such
shares are sold within the family/group and therefore after some time,
transferred to the seller. In particular, what has also been alleged is that
transactions are carried not only with the sole purpose of generating capital
gain but also for manipulating volume and price on stock exchanges. The
question whether such transactions will get concessional tax treatment in tax
assessments is of course an important question. However, in this article, the
question is : how are such transactions treated under the Securities Laws?

 

Take a common
modus operandi to have been typically employed in the so-called long-term
capital gain transactions. A small listed company with low or non-existent
operations is used. A large quantity of shares is issued by way of preferential
allotment. The quantity of shares may be further increased through bonus issue.
During the period of one year for which such shares have to remain locked-in
(which is also the period of holding for availing of long term capital gains
benefits), the price of the shares is artificially inflated by a small group of
persons who trade within themselves at progressively higher prices. At the end
of this period, by which time the price of the shares is many times (often
50-100 times) more than the original price, the preferential allottees sell the
shares at such higher price. The initial buyer is alleged to have organised all
this. The preferential allottee thus obtains tax free long-term capital gains
(Finance Bill 2018 though seeks to charge 10% capital gains tax). However, in
the process, the capital market system is abused. Fake turnover at artificial
prices is recorded. If unchecked, this not only harms the credibility of the
capital markets but can also result in loss to investors. Several provisions of
Securities Laws specifically prohibit such artificial trading and manipulation.

 

There were
decisions of the Securities Appellate Tribunal that held, in effect, that the
mere fact that transactions were undertaken for purposes of obtaining tax
benefits, penal action will not necessarily follow. However, while such
decisions could be arguably held to be limited to their facts, it still leaves
an uneasy feeling.

 

Now, the
Supreme Court has given a detailed ruling. While we will consider the facts
before the Court and also what the Court said, it is important to note that the
Court did not specifically rule on the intent tax planning or even evasion in
such transactions. It did not consider the question whether the capital markets
can or cannot be used for such purposes. It, however, dealt with violation of
Securities Laws that often takes place in such cases and whether and when they
can be said to fall foul of Securities Laws. Hence, the decision has direct
relevance.

 

Facts of the
case

There were
several parties in the case before the Court but they fell in two broad
categories – the parties who carried out the transactions and the stock brokers
through whom such transactions were carried out.

 

The parties
entered into transactions that resulted in some persons making profits and
others making losses. This was said to have been done by entering into
transactions in the following manner. In the futures and options markets, one
party (or group) bought futures (or similar derivatives) from the other party
through the stock market mechanism at a particular price. These same parties
then entered into reverse transactions at a higher price, thus resulting in one
side earning profits while the other side was making losses. Take an example. A
transaction in futures of scrip X could be carried out by Mr. A purchasing 1000
futures at a price Rs. 100 each from Mr. B. This transaction would later be
reversed by selling such 1000 futures at a price or Rs. 140. Mr. A would earn a
profit of Rs. 40000 while Mr. B would make a loss of about the same amount.

 

These
transactions would be synchronised well and rarely, if at all, any other party
would – or even could – transact. Effectively, these persons would be almost
the only persons trading in such scrip.

 

SEBI found out
what was happening and penalised the parties and the brokers. The parties were
penalised for carrying out artificial trading and price manipulation. The stock
brokers, who are expected to act as gate keepers to the capital market and
exercise due diligence, were penalised for allowing such transactions to happen
through them.

 

The question
before the Supreme Court was whether such transactions violated the Securities
Laws and whether the parties and their stock brokers could be so punished ?

 

Ruling of
Court

The Supreme
Court had to deal with several aspects. The Court had to focus on how the
capital markets get affected by such transactions. Even if the purpose was
legitimate, the issue was whether the transactions contravened the Securities
Laws, if so, penal action would follow.

 

In particular,
it elaborately discussed the issue of synchronised trading. This is trading
where buyers and sellers match their transactions very closely in terms of
timing, volume and price. Thus, the net result is generally that, though the
market is open to all, the transactions get executed between connected parties.
The Court, discussed in detail certain decisions of SAT and ruled that
synchronised trading is not ipso facto illegal or violative of
Securities Laws.

 

However, it
noted that on the facts before it, the transactions were manipulative. The
price at which purchases and sales of futures and other derivatives was carried
out was not market driven but was pre-determined and therefore artificial. The
buying and selling price of such derivatives are usually related to the
underlying price of the shares/index with which they are linked. While of
course parties can buy at prices far away from such underlying price of the
scrip/index, if their judgement of the future tells them so, the Court found
that this was not so on the facts before it. The purchases and sales were
carried out at widely different prices on the same day and between the same
parties in a synchronised manner in terms of timing and volume. The conclusion
was only that the transactions for all practical purposes were bogus.

 

Interestingly,
a curious argument was advanced. Whether trading on the derivatives markets
could affect – and hence manipulate – the trading and price in the cash market?
For example, by manipulating say, the price of futures in Scrip X, can the
price of trading of Scrip X in the spot/cash market be affected? The SAT had
held that this was generally not possible in the type of transactions involved
in the present case. This was one of the reasons why SAT overturned the order
of Securities and Exchange Board of India. However, it is submitted the Supreme
Court, rightly pointed out that this was not the issue at all. It was not
SEBI’s case that the transactions in the derivatives markets were carried out
to manipulate the price in the spot/cash markets. SEBI’s case was that the
trading in the derivatives markets itself was artificial, bogus and
manipulative and this by itself was a violation of Securities Laws.

 

The Court also
rejected the argument that in case of futures, no delivery took place and hence
the transactions did not violate the provisions which prohibit dealing without
change of beneficial interest.

 

The Court
further described the meaning of unfair trade practices in securities particularly
in the context of the case. It stated, “Contextually
and in simple words, it means a practice which does not conform to the fair and
transparent principles of trades in the stock market. In the instant case, one
party booked gains and the other party booked a loss. Nobody intentionally
trades for loss. An intentional trading for loss per se, is not a
genuine dealing in securities. The platform of the stock exchange has been used
for a non- genuine trade. Trading is always with the aim to make profits. But
if one party consistently makes loss and that too in preplanned and rapid
reverse trades, it is not genuine; it is an unfair trade practice.”.
The
Court pointedly noted that, “The non-genuineness of these transactions is
evident from the fact that there was no commercial basis to suddenly, within a
matter of minutes, reverse a transaction when the underlying value had not
undergone any significant change”. Once it held this, it was not difficult to
take the argument to the logical conclusion to hold that the trades were
violative of Securities Laws and uphold the penal action by SEBI.

 

The Court also
rejected the ruling of SAT that “only if there is market impact on account of
sham transactions, could there be violation of the PFUTP Regulations”. The
court held that fraudulent and unfair trade practices have no place whatsoever
in the capital market.

 

As far as the
stock brokers were concerned, the Court held that they could not be held liable
unless their own involvement could be demonstrated or it could be shown that
they acted negligently or in connivance with such traders.

Thus, the Court
upheld the penal actions against the traders but not against the stock brokers.

 

Tax
planning/avoidance/evasion through capital markets

The Court
steered clear of giving a specific and direct ruling on whether tax planning
through transactions in capital markets was by itself violative of Securities
Laws. However, it is submitted that it has given enough guidance on what the
approach should be. As discussed above, transactions that are manipulative or
fraudulent or apparently fake will by themselves be violative of Securities
Laws.

 

Conclusion

The decision
makes it clear that SEBI can examine transactions in light of how they are
carried out and whether they are violative of Securities Laws, irrespective of
whether or not the objective was tax planning, etc. Some tests are given on
whether such transactions would be held to be violative. The penal action under
Securities Laws will be in addition to any findings and consequences under tax
law.
 

Hindu Succession Amendment Act– Poor Drafting Defeating Gender Equalisation?

Introduction

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“2005
Amendment Act”
) which was made operative from 9th September, 2005, was
a path-breaking Act which placed Hindu daughters on an equal footing with Hindu
sons in their father’s Hindu Undivided Family by amending the age-old Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act”).  
However, while it ushered in great reforms it also left several
unanswered questions and ambiguities. Key amongst them was to which class of
daughters did this 2005 Amendment Act apply? The Supreme Court has answered
some of these questions which would help resolve a great deal of confusion. 

 

The 2005 Amendment Act

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
amended the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is one
of the few codified statutes under Hindu Law. It applies to all cases of
intestate succession by Hindus. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs,
Buddhists and to any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. Any
person who becomes a Hindu by conversion is also covered by the Act. The Act
overrides all Hindu customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs
entitled to such property and the order or preference among them. The Act also
deals with some important aspects pertaining to an HUF.

 

By the 2005 Amendment Act, the Parliament
amended section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the amended section was
made operative from 9th September 2005. Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 was totally revamped. The relevant portion of the amended
section 6 is as follows:

 

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary
property.?(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment)
Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law,
the daughter of a coparcener shall,?

 

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her
own right in the same manner as the son;

(b) have the same rights in the
coparcenery property as she would have had if she had been a son;

(c) be subject to the same liabilities in
respect of the said coparcenery property as that of a son, and any reference to
a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a
daughter of a coparcener:

 

Provided that nothing contained in this
sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including
any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place
before the 20th day of December, 2004.”

 

Thus, the amended section provides that a
daughter of a coparcener shall:

 

a)   become, by birth a coparcener in her own
right in the same manner as the son;

b)   have, the same rights in the coparcenary
property as she would have had if she had been a son; and

c)   be subject to the same liabilities in respect
of the coparcenary property as that of a son.

 

Thus, the amendment equated all daughters
with sons and they would now become a coparcener in their father’s HUF by
virtue of being born in that family. She has all rights and obligations in
respect of the coparcenary property, including testamentary disposition. Not
only would she become a coparcener in her father’s HUF but she could also make
a will for the same. The Delhi High Court in Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs. Shri
Manu Gupta, CS (OS) 2011/2006
has held that a daughter who is the eldest
coparcener can become the karta of her father’s HUF.

 

Key Question

One issue which remained unresolved was
whether the application of the amended section 6 was prospective or
retrospective?

 

Section 1(2) of the Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005, stated that it came into force from the date it was
notified by the Government in the Gazette, i.e., 9th September,
2005. Thus, the amended section 6 was operative from this date. However, does
this mean that the amended section applied to:

 

(a)  daughters born after this date;

(b)  daughters married after this date; or

(c)  all daughters, married or unmarried, but
living as on this date. 

 

There was no clarity under the Act on this
point. The Maharashtra Amendment Act (similar to the Central Amendment) which
was enacted in June 1994 very clearly stated that it did not apply to female
Hindus who married before 22nd June, 1994. In the case of the
Central Amendment, there was no such express provision.

 

Prospective Application upheld

The Supreme Court, albeit in the context of
a different context, clarified that the 2005 Amendment Act did not seek to
reopen vesting of a right where succession has already taken place. According
to the Supreme Court, “the operation of the Statute is no doubt prospective in
nature…. Although the 2005 Act is not retrospective its application is
prospective” – G. Sekar vs. Geetha (2009) 6 SCC 99.

 

The Supreme
Court has held in Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand, (2007) 1 MLJ 797 (SC),
that if the succession was opened prior to the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,
2005, the provisions of the 2005 Amendment Act would have no application. Thus,
a daughter can be considered as a coparcener only if her father was a
coparcener at the time of the 2005 Amendment Act coming into force –  Smt. Bhagirathi vs. S Manivanan AIR
2008 Mad 250.
In that case, the Madras High Court observed that the
father of the daughter had expired in 1975. It held that the 2005 Amendment Act
was prospective in the sense that a daughter was being treated as a coparcener
on and from 9th September 2005. It was clear that if a Hindu male
died after the commencement of the 2005 Amendment Act, his interest in the
property devolved not by survivorship but by intestate succession as
contemplated in the Act. The death of the father having taken place in 1975,
succession itself opened in the year 1975 in accordance with the earlier
provisions of the Act. Retrospective effect cannot be given to the provisions
of the 2005 Amendment Act.

 

The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Badrinarayan
Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, AIR 2014 Bom 151
has
held that the legislative intent in enacting clause (a) of section 6 was
prospective i.e. daughter born on or after 9th September 2005 will
become a coparcener by birth, but the legislative intent in enacting clauses
(b) and (c) of section 6 was retroactive, because rights in the coparcenary
property were conferred by clause (b) on the daughter who was already born
before the amendment, and who was alive on the date of Amendment coming into
force. Hence, if a daughter of a coparcener died before 9th September
2005, since she would not have acquired any rights in the coparcenary property,
her heirs would have no right in the coparcenary property. Since section 6(1)
expressly conferred a right on daughter only on and with effect from the date
of coming into force of the 2005 Amendment Act, it was not possible to take a
view that heirs of such a deceased daughter could also claim benefits of the
amendment. The Court held that it was imperative that the daughter who sought
to exercise a right must herself be alive at the time when the 2005 Amendment
Act was brought into force. It would not matter whether the daughter concerned
was born before 1956 or after 1956. This was for the simple reason that the
Hindu Succession Act 1956 when it came into force applied to all Hindus in the
country irrespective of their date of birth. The date of birth was not a
criterion for application of the Principal Act. The only requirement was that
when the Act was being sought to be applied, the person concerned must be in
existence/ living. The Parliament had specifically used the word “on and
from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005” so as to
ensure that rights which were already settled were not disturbed by virtue of a
person claiming as an heir to a daughter who had passed away before the
Amendment Act came into force.

 

Finally, the matter was settled by the Apex
Court in its decision rendered in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati,
(2016) 2 SCC 36.
The Supreme Court examined the issue in detail and
held that the rights under the Hindu Succession Act Amendment are applicable to
living daughters of living coparceners (fathers) as on 9th
September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters were born. It further held
that any disposition or alienation including a partition of the HUF which may
have taken place before 20th December, 2004 (the cut-off date
provided under the 2005 Amendment Act) as per law applicable prior to the said
date would remain unaffected.

Thus, as per the above Supreme Court
decision, in order to claim benefit, what is required is that the daughter
should be alive and her father should also be alive on the date of the
amendment, i.e., 9th September, 2005. Once this condition was met,
it was immaterial whether the daughter was married or unmarried. The Court had
also clarified that it was immaterial when the daughter was born.

 

Further Controversy

Just when one thought that the controversy
had been settled by the Supreme Court, the fire was reignited. A new question
cropped up – would the 2005 Amendment Act apply to those daughters who were
born before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? Thus, could it be
said that since the daughter was born before the 1956 Act she could not be considered
as a coparcener? Hence, she would not be entitled to any share in the joint
family property? The Karnataka High Court in Pushpalata NV vs. V. Padma,
ILR 2010 KAR 1484
held that prior to the commencement of the 2005
Amendment, the legislature had no intention of conferring rights on a daughter
of a coparcener including a daughter. In the Act before the amendment the
daughter of a coparcener was not conferred the status of a coparcener. Such a
status was conferred only by the 2005 Amendment Act. After conferring such
status, right to coparcenary property was given from the date of her birth.
Therefore, it necessarily followed such a date of birth should be after the
Hindu Succession Act came into force, i.e., 17.06.1956. There was no intention
either under the unamended Hindu Succession Act or the Act after the amendment
to confer any such right on a daughter (of a coparcener) who was born prior to
17.06.1956. The status of a coparcener was conferred on a daughter of a
coparcener on and from the commencement of the 2005 Amendment Act. The right to
property was conferred from the date of birth. Both these rights were conferred
under the original Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, it necessarily followed
that the daughter who was born after the Act came into force alone would be
entitled to a right in the coparcenary property and not a daughter who was born
prior to 17.06.1956. The same view was taken again by the Karnataka High Court
in Smt Danamma and Others vs. Amar and Others, RFA NO. 322/2008 (Kar).

 

This 2nd decision of the
Karnataka High Court was appealed in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
gave its verdict in the case of Danamma @ Suman Surpur and Others vs.
Amar and Others, CA Nos. 188-189 / 2018
.
The Apex Court observed that
section 6, as amended, stipulated that on and from the commencement of the 2005
Amendment Act, the daughter of a coparcener would by birth become a coparcener
in her own right in the same manner as a son. It was apparent that the status
conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat
them as coparceners since birth.

 

The amended provision now statutorily
recognised the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth. The
section used the words ‘in the same manner as the son’. It was therefore
apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener had been
conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth. It was the very factum
of birth in a coparcenary that created the coparcenary, therefore the sons
and daughters of a coparcener became coparceners by virtue of birth.

 

Devolution of coparcenary property was the
later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The firststage of a
coparcenary was obviously its creation. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the
provisions of the 2005 Amendment Act granting rights even to those daughters
who were born before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, i.e.,
before 17.06.1956. Thus, the net effect of the decisions on the 2005 Amendment
Act is as follows:

 

(a)   The amendment applies to living daughters of
living coparceners as on 09.09.2005.

(b)  It does not matter whether the daughters are
married or unmarried.

(c)   It does not matter when the daughters are
born. They may be born even prior to the enactment of the 1956 Act, i.e., even
prior to 17.06.1956.

(d)  However, if the father / coparcener died prior
to 09.09.2005, then his daughter would have no rights under the 2005 Amendment
Act.

 

Conclusion

An extremely sorry state
that such an important gender equalisation move has been marred by a case of
poor drafting! One wonders why these issues cannot be expressly clarified
rather than leave them for the Courts. It has been 12 years since the 2005
Amendment Act but the issues refuse to die down. One can think of several more
questions, which are waiting in the wings, such as, would the daughter’s
children have a right in their maternal grandfather’s HUF? Clearly, this
coparceners amendment loves controversy.
 

 

 

Ind AS 115 – Revenue From Contracts With Customers

The impact
of revenue is all pervasive and encompasses all entities. The standard brings
about a fundamental change in how entities will envision, recognise and measure
revenue. In this article the author briefly discusses the date of applicability
of Ind AS 115, the fundamental changes from current practice, key impacts for
certain industries and disclosure and other business implications. Given the
pervasive and fundamental impact of the standard, entities that have not
already started, should waste no time in preparing for Ind AS 115.

 

When does Ind AS 115
apply?

The Exposure Draft (ED)
issued by the ICAI states that the standard would apply from accounting periods
commencing on or after 1st April 2018.

 

However, it is not yet
notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). In the past we have
observed instances where standards have been notified on the last day of the
financial year. Whilst there is no 100% guarantee that the standard would apply
from 1st April, 2018, companies should anticipate that it would be
notified by MCA before the end of the financial year, given the past
experience.

 

Whilst this is an unhappy
outcome, it may be noted that the ICAI had clarified the applicability date in
April 2017 and the ED was issued much earlier; providing enough opportunity to
prepare for implementation of the new standard. By the time this article is
published, it will be clear whether the standard has become applicable. It may
be noted that listed companies will have to churn out numbers under Ind AS 115
in the first quarter of 2018-19, and hence this is a highly onerous obligation,
than what may initially appear.

 

What are the fundamental
changes compared to the existing I
nd AS 18 Revenue?

Ind AS 115 requires
perceiving revenue from the customer’s point of view; which is whether the
customer has received a stand-alone benefit from the goods or services it has
received. This is likely to impact accounting of connection, activation,
installation, admission, and similar revenue. This can be observed across
several industries, such as, telecom, power, cable television, education,
hospitality, etc. Consider for example, an electricity distribution
company installs an electric meter at the customer’s site. The meter certainly
benefits the customer, but it does not provide to the customer any independent
stand-alone benefit, because the meter is useless without the subsequent
transfer of power to the customer. Neither the customer can use the meter to
procure power from other distributors. Therefore, the customer has not received
any benefit from the meter on its own and consequently such connection income
is recognised overtime by the distribution company.

 

The other fundamental
change is that under Ind AS 115, an entity recognises revenue when control of
the underlying goods or services are transferred to the customer. This is
different from the current “risk and reward” model under Ind AS 18, where
revenue is recognised on transfer of risk and rewards to the customer. Consider
an entity transfers legal title and control of goods to a customer on free on
board (FOB) delivery terms. However, the entity reimburses the customer for any
damages or transit losses in accordance with its past practice. Under the Ind
AS 18, risk and reward model, some entities may have delayed recognition of
revenue till the time the customer has received and accepted the goods. This is
on the basis that the risk and rewards are transferred when the customer
receives and accepts the goods. Under the control model in Ind AS 115, revenue
will be recognised on shipment because control is transferred to customers at
shipment. As soon as the goods are boarded, the customer has legal title to the
goods, the customer can direct the goods wherever it wants and the customer can
decide how it wants to use those goods. In this situation, the entity will have
two performance obligations (1) sale of goods, and (2) reimbursing transit
losses. The total transaction price will be allocated between the goods and the
transit losses, and recognised when those respective performance obligations
are satisfied. However, in most situations, the performance obligation relating
to reimbursement of the transit losses may be insignificant, in which case it
may be ignored.

 

There are numerous other
changes that may not be fundamental, but still be very important. Take for
example, the discounting of retention monies. Currently under Ind AS 18 there
is debate on whether retention monies need to be discounted. This is because of
contradictory requirements in the standard. One view is that since revenue is
recognised at fair value, the retention monies need to be discounted to
determine the fair value of revenue. Ind AS 18 also states that “when the
arrangement effectively constitutes a financing transaction, the fair
value of the consideration is determined by discounting all future receipts
using an imputed rate of interest…………….The difference between the fair value
and the nominal amount of the consideration is recognised as interest revenue
in accordance with Ind AS 109.” This means that discounting is only required
when the arrangement contains a financing arrangement. Ind AS 18 was therefore
debatable.

 

On the other hand, Ind AS
115, is absolutely clear. Paragraph 62 states that “notwithstanding the
assessment in paragraph 61, a contract with a customer would not have a
significant financing component if any of the following factors exist: ………….(c)
the difference between the promised consideration and the cash selling price of
the good or service (as described in paragraph 61) arises for reasons other
than the provision of finance
to either the customer or the entity, and the
difference between those amounts is proportional to the reason for the
difference. For example, the payment terms might provide the entity or the
customer with protection from the other party failing to adequately complete
some or all of its obligations under the contract.

 

Since retention monies are
held by customers as a measure of security to enforce contractual rights and
safeguard its interest, retention monies are not discounted under Ind AS 115.

 

Explain the five step model
in

Ind AS 115 and briefly
outline the impact on industry
.

The model in the standard
is based on five steps, which are given below.

 

Step 1:
Identify the contract: A contract has to be enforceable and the transaction
price should be collectable on the day the contract is entered into. The
contract can be written or oral, but has to be enforceable. If the contract is
not enforceable revenue cannot be recognised.

 

Step 2:
Identify performance obligations: Within a contract there could be several
performance obligations. Performance obligations are basically distinct goods
and services within a contract from which the customer can benefit on its own.

 

Step 3: This
step requires determining the transaction price in the contract. Whilst in most
cases this would be fairly straight-forward, in certain contracts, it could be
complicated because of:

 

Variable consideration (including application of the constraint)

Significant financing component

Consideration paid to a customer (for example, free mobile
offered to a customer that buys a telecom wireless package)

Non-cash consideration

 

The standard deals in
detail on how to recognise, measure and disclose the above components.

 

Step 4: Allocate
the transaction price to the various performance obligations in the contract.

 

Step 5:
Recognise revenue when (or as) performance obligations are satisfied. This can
be at a point in time or over time.

 

The construct of the model
is very simple but when applied, can throw huge challenges and is very
different from current Ind AS 18. It may be noted, that there would be numerous
areas of differences and challenges for each industry. Below is a broad outline
of the impact of the standard and the interplay of the five steps on various
industries. It is a very brief summary of a few of the many issues, used only
for illustration purposes.

 

Real estate

Real estate entities offer
a 10:90 or similar schemes to customers. As per the scheme, the customer pays
10% of the contract value on signing the offer letter, followed by a 90%
payment when the unit is delivered to the customer. If real estate prices fall
significantly, the customer may simply decide not to take delivery, and allow
the 10% to be forfeited. In many jurisdictions, such contracts may not be
legally enforceable against the customer and when enforceable the legal system
could be a huge deterrent to recover the monies from the customer. If this is
the situation, there is no enforceable contract under Ind AS 115, and
consequently no revenue is recognised till such time the contract is enforceable
or the remaining 90% is received by the real estate entity.

 

Another hot topic for real
estate entities would be the method for recognition of revenue, i.e. whether
percentage of completion method (POCM) or completed contract method (CCM) would
apply when a building is constructed which has several units sold to different
customers. In this case, since the customer does not control the underlying
asset itself, as it is getting constructed, revenue is recognised only on
delivery of the real estate unit to the customer. This issue was discussed in
detail by IFRIC at a global level. IFRIC observed the following: although the
customer can resell or pledge its contractual right to the real estate unit
under construction, it is unable to sell the real estate unit itself without
holding legal title to the completed unit. Consequently, the real estate entity
is not eligible for overtime recognition of revenue. However, the standard
allows overtime recognition of revenue, in situations where the real estate entity
has the right to collect payments from the customer for work completed to date.
Such amounts should include cost and an appropriate margin. If the real estate
entity does not have such a right, in statute and contract, POCM recognition of
revenue is not allowed. In other words, revenue is recognised when the
completed unit is delivered to the customer. Real estate entities in India that
want to apply POCM should verify if the statute entitles them with such a
right. If such a right is provided in the statute, they should ensure that the
contract with the customer also provides such a right.

 

Pharmaceutical

Some Indian pharmaceutical
companies have sales in US, through a few large US distributors on a principal
to principal basis. However, the amount of revenue to be received from the US
distributors may be variable, as the contract may have a price capping
mechanism or provide an unlimited right of return to the US distributors. The
price capping mechanism ensures that if the entity sells the same products at a
lower price to other customers, the distributor would be entitled to a
proportionate refund.

 

The US distributors will
send a sales report containing quantity and value to the pharma company on a
quarterly basis. Under current standards, some pharmaceutical companies may not
recognise revenue on dispatch to the US distributor, but recognise revenue
based on reported sales at the end of each quarter; effectively treating the US
distributor as an agent. This is because the risks and rewards may not have
transferred to the US distributor who has an unlimited right of return and is
also entitled to the benefit from the price capping mechanism. Under Ind AS
115, the control of goods is transferred to the distributor on dispatch since
the US distributor has legal title and ownership of the goods.

 

The pharma company does not
have any rights to recover the products, except as a protective right in rare
situations. Consequently, the pharma company recognises revenue upfront when
the control of the goods is transferred to the distributor. Since revenue is
variable because of the price capping mechanism and the unlimited right of
return, the transaction price will need to be estimated in accordance with the
methodology prescribed in the standard.

 

Software Company

Many Indian software
companies applied the US GAAP accounting for Indian GAAP as well. Under US
GAAP, a software company needs to separately account for elements in a software
licensing arrangement only if Vendor Specific Objective Evidence (VSOE) of fair
value exists for the undelivered elements. An entity that does not have VSOE
for the undelivered elements generally must combine multiple elements in a
single unit of account and recognise revenue as the delivery of the last
element takes place. VSOE is not required under Ind AS 115. The standard
prescribes a methodology for determining and allocating the transaction price
to various elements, which uses VSOE but in its absence prescribes other
methods of determining the allocation of the transaction price to the various
elements.

 

Telecom

Telecom companies may offer
a free handset to customers along with a wireless telecom package (voice and
data). Currently, some telecom companies recognise the telecom package overtime
and the cost of the free handset is recognised as a sales promotion cost. Under
Ind AS 115, the total consideration will be split between the telecom package
and the handset, and recognised as those performance obligations are satisfied.
This would give a completely different revenue, cost and margin pattern
compared to current practice.

 

Engineering and
Construction

The standard contains a
detail set of requirements on how to account for contract modifications. For
example, an unpriced change order is common in construction contracts; wherein
the scope of work is changed by the customer but the price for the change is
not agreed. The standard would require that the revenue and cost estimates on
the contract are immediately updated, consequently percentage of completion
margins would change. The problem is that revenue from the change in scope is
variable and the standard requires caution in estimating the variable revenue,
whereas costs are fully estimated. Consequently, the initially estimated POCM
margins may decline.

 

Consumer products and other

industries

An entity may have sold
goods, but on request from the customer, would have held those goods in its
storage facility. This is often referred to as bill and hold sales and is
common across all industries. For example, some pharmaceutical companies may
have a stock pile program for vaccinations based on government directives or a
consumer goods company may hold goods sold at its storage location on request,
as the distributor may be short of storage space. Contrary to current practice,
under Ind AS 115, in many cases bill and hold sales may not qualify for revenue
recognition because the underlying goods are fungible. For example, the stock
pile program may not qualify for revenue recognition, if they are subject to rotation,
i.e., the entity can sell some from the pile to another customer and replace it
with fresh supplies. These arrangements do not meet the criterion for
recognition of revenue on bill and hold sales, though they may have fulfilled
the criterion under Ind AS 18.

 

Another common topic
relevant for a consumer goods and other companies is warranties. If the
warranties are sold separately, or warranty entails a service in addition to
assurance (such as an extended warranty period), they are accounted for as a
separate performance obligation, rather than as a cost accrual.

 

Currently, the entire
revenue is recognized upfront and estimated cost for warranty is provided.
Under Ind AS 115, revenue will be allocated between the goods and the warranty.
Revenue and cost of goods is recognised as soon as the goods are sold. Revenue
and cost on warranties is recognised overtime as the warranty service is
provided.

 

This will result in a
different revenue, cost and margin profile compared to current practice under
Ind AS 18. It may be noted, that if the warranties are assurance type
warranties, and not sold separately or contain extended terms, the accounting
under Ind AS 18 and Ind AS 115 is the same.

 

Which are the disclosure
requirements that are onerous?

There are numerous
disclosure requirements. Entities should not underestimate the disclosure
requirements. Here we discuss two key disclosure requirements.

 

1. Entities will be
required to provide disaggregated revenue information in the financial
statements. The standard requires such disclosure on the basis of major product
lines, geography, type of market or customer (government, non-government, etc.),
contract duration, sales channel, etc., whichever is the most
appropriate and relevant for the entity. The standard provides guidance on how
this disclosure is made, and suggests that existing information provided to the
CEO, board, analysts, etc. may be used, and one need not reinvent the wheel.

 

2. For contracts or orders
that require more than one year to execute, the standard requires disclosure of
(a) transaction price allocated to the unsatisfied or partially satisfied
performance obligations, and (b) time bands by which the obligations will be
fulfilled and revenue recognised. For the said purpose, quantitative or
qualitative measures can be used.

 

What are the business

implications of Ind AS 115?

Certainly when top line and
margins change compared to current accounting, it will have numerous
implications, such as on income-tax, bonuses that are dependent on
revenue/margins, revenue sharing arrangements, contract terms and conditions,
internal control over financial reporting, etc. For example, companies
may change the sales arrangement with their distributors, to provide them
control at the point of shipment, so that revenue can be recognised at
shipment, rather than when the customer accepts the goods.

 

Certain business implications may
not be immediately obvious. Some companies may accept onerous contracts, to
recover some portion of the fixed costs/capacity. The IFRIC is currently
discussing whether when providing for onerous contract full cost provision or
only incremental cost needs to be provided for. Now if full cost absorption is required,
more onerous losses get recognised earlier. This may be a deterrent for
companies to accept a contract that is onerous.

Perspectives On Fair Value Under Ind As (Part 2)

INTRODUCTION

Under Part 1 which was published in February 2018, we had discussed the broad principles underlying fair value measurement as enshrined in Ind AS 113- Fair Value Measurements. In this part,  we would be broadly understanding the requirements for measurement and disclosure of fair value for various types of assets, liabilities and equity under various Ind ASs as indicated in Part 1, coupled with the benefits and perils of fair value accounting followed by certain practical considerations for first time adoption by Phase II entities based on the learnings gathered from the Phase I entities.

BROAD PRESCRIPTION ON FAIR VALUE UNDER CERTAIN Ind ASs:
As indicated earlier, the following are the main Standards which prescribe the use of fair value either for measurement, disclosure or assessment purposes.

Ind AS 36- Impairment of Assets:

The broad objectives of this Standard are as under:

a) To observe if there are any indicators of impairment of various assets.
b) To measure the recoverable amount and compare the same with the carrying value of the asset.
c) To impair the assets if the carrying value is greater than the recoverable amount.

The key consideration for assessing impairment is the determination of the recoverable amount which is defined as the higher of the “Value in Use” or “Fair value less Costs of Disposal”.

“Value in Use” for the purpose of the above assessment is determined by estimating the future cash flows that can be derived from the continuous use of the asset including its realisable value on ultimate disposal and discounting the same at an appropriate rate after considering the risk, premium or discount as applicable.The principles underlying the present value technique as per Ind AS 113 as discussed in Part 1 need to be kept in mind whilst estimating the future cash flows and the discount rate to be applied for arriving at the value in use.

The “Fair Value less Cost of Disposal” for the purpose of the above assessment refers to the amount arising from the sale of an asset or CGU in an arm’s length transaction less the cost of disposal. The costs of disposal includes legal costs, stamp duty and other similar levies, as applicable, cost of removing the asset and direct incremental costs to bring the asset into a selling condition. However, finance costs and income tax expenses need to be excluded whilst determining the cost of disposal. For determining the fair values,  the principles as enunciated under Ind AS 113 as discussed in part 1 need to be kept in mind. However, there is no bar on the type of valuation technique to be used.

Apart from the other disclosures, Ind AS 36 requires the following specific disclosures dealing with fair value:

a) The basis used for determining the recoverable amount keeping in mind the fair value hierarchy as per Ind AS 113 discussed earlier.
b) The key assumptions and the discount rate considered for determining the value in use as defined above.

Ind AS 103- Business Combinations:

This Standard deals with the initial recognition of assets and liabilities in respect of business combinations which could be in the nature of acquisitions or amalgamation under common control transactions. In respect of business combinations accounted for under the “acquisition method”, the initial recognition of assets and liabilities is as under:

– Recognising and measuring all the identifiable assets, whether tangible or intangible, including those that are not previously recognised by the acquiree, and liabilities (including contingent liabilities) at fair value as determined as per Ind AS 113.

– Any contingent consideration which forms a part of the transaction also needs to be accounted at fair value in accordance with Ind AS 109 or 113, as applicable.

– Any goodwill resulting from the transaction needs to be tested annually for impairment in accordance with Ind AS 36 as discussed above.

This is one of the key Standards wherein extensive use of fair valuation is mandated. The broad principles governing fair valuation under Ind AS 113 would need to be kept in mind depending upon the nature of the assets and liabilities being acquired.

Further, apart from the other matters, the main challenge lies in identifying the intangible assets acquired as a part of the business combination which have not been recognised by the acquiree, but which meet the recognition and identifiability criteria and to allocate a fair value to them as a part of the overall consideration. This would require significant judgements based on the business rationale and other commercial considerations of the transaction. The broad principles governing the determination of fair value as discussed later, under Ind AS 38 – Intangible Assets would need to be kept in mind. The following are some of the broad categories related to intangible assets arising from acquisitions under business combination:
– Marketing
– Customer
– Artistic
– Contractual
– Technology

Ind AS 109- Financial Instruments:

This is another Standard which almost entirely rests on the premise of fair valuation. The underlying theme of the Standard is that all financial assets and liabilities should be initially measured at fair value as determined under Ind AS 113, which would normally be the transaction price, unless proved otherwise as discussed below.

Para B 5.1.2A of Ind AS 109
provides that the transaction price may need to be adjusted on initial recognition if there is a fair value as evidenced by a quoted price in an active market for an identical asset or liability (level 1) or based on a valuation technique that uses data only from observable markets (level 2).

The way the financial instruments are classified under Ind AS 109 drives their subsequent measurement.

Whilst the valuation of quoted financial instruments is quite straight forward, it is the valuation of unquoted and complex financial instruments, including derivatives, which poses various challenges given their hybrid nature and the difficulty in quantifying the associated risks. Whilst a detailed discussion of the valuation methods is beyond the scope of this study, the broad underlying principles are briefly touched upon hereunder.

For ease of understanding, financial instruments are classified into the following broad categories for valuation purposes:
a) Bonds and its variants
b) Forwards and futures
c) Call and put options
d) Equity Instruments

In respect of the instruments indicated in (a) to (c) above, determination of fair value needs to  consider the various specific features like conversion options, put and call options, caps and floors and various other subjective assessments and judgements which are captured through various mathematical models. However, if such instruments are traded and quoted on a recognised stock exchange, the challenges in determining fair value are much less.

Equity Instruments:

The valuation of equity instruments is dependent on the underlying valuation of the company which has issued these instruments. For this purpose, the appropriate valuation methodology from amongst the various methods as discussed earlier would need to be considered dependent upon the nature of the business / industry and the purpose of the valuation whether on a going concern or liquidation basis etc.
 
A question which often arises in case of unquoted equity shares is the basis and frequency with which the fair value needs to be measured due to lack of credible recent information being available and consequently whether the cost can be considered as the fair value. In this context, para B 5.2.3 of Ind AS 109 provides that in limited circumstances, cost may be an appropriate estimate of fair value, especially in case if insufficient more recent information is available to measure fair value, or if there is a wide range of possible fair value measurements and cost represents the best estimate of fair value within that range. Further, para B5.2.4 of Ind AS 109 provides for a list of some of the following indicators, amongst others, where cost might not be representative of the fair value:

a) Significant change in the performance of the investee compared with budgets, plans or milestones.
b) Changes in expectation that the investee’s technical product milestones will be achieved.
c) Significant change in the market for the investee’s equity or its products or potential products.
d) Significant change in the global economy or the economic environment in which the investee operates.
e) Significant change in the performance of comparable entities, or in the valuations implied by the overall market.

Ind AS 28- Investments in Associates and Joint

Ventures:

The Standard provides that an investment in an associate or joint venture should be accounted by using the equity method under which the investment is initially recognised at acquisition cost. Subsequent to the acquisition, the difference between the cost of the investment and the investee’s share of the net fair value of the identifiable assets and liabilities, determined in accordance with Ind AS 113, is accounted as under:

Goodwill – if the cost of the investment is greater than the investee’s share of the net fair value of the assets and liabilities. This goodwill is to be adjusted with the carrying value of the investment and is neither eligible for amortisation nor is it to be tested for impairment.

Capital Reserve– if the investee’s share of the net fair value of the assets and liabilities is greater than the cost of the investment.

Further, such investments are to be tested for impairment in accordance with Ind AS 36 as a single asset.

Ind AS 38- Intangible Assets:

Any intangible asset which satisfies the recognition criteria as per the Standard shall be measured at cost. However, in the following situations, the intangible assets are required to be measured at fair value:

– Business Combinations – As discussed above, in such cases the cost shall be the fair value as on the acquisition date.

– Government Grants – In such cases, the entity shall recognise both the intangible asset and the grant initially at the fair value as per Ind AS 20 – Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance.

Acquisition for non-monetary consideration– If any intangible asset is acquired in exchange of non-monetary considerations, the cost shall be the fair value of the asset given up or the fair value of the asset received which is more evident.

An entity has an option of choosing the revaluation model for subsequent measurement of intangible assets. However, for this purpose, the revaluations shall be done with sufficient regularity to ensure that the carrying value does not differ materiality from the fair value determined in accordance with Ind AS 113. Further, the entire class of intangible assets shall be subjected to revaluation. The frequency of revaluation depends upon the changes in the fair value of the intangible assets being revalued.

Whilst a detailed discussion of the valuation methods to be adopted for intangible assets is beyond the scope of this study, the broad underlying principles are briefly touched upon hereunder.

Income Approach– As discussed earlier, this approach converts future cash flows to a single present value and discounting the same based on a rate or return that considers the relative risk of the cash flows. This approach is most commonly used to value technology and customer related intangibles, brands, trademarks and non-compete arrangements. The following variations to the income approach are also used to measure certain types of intangible assets:

a) Multi period excess earnings method as discussed earlier.

b) Relief from Royalty method– which is generally used for assets subject to licencing. The fair value of the asset under this method is the present value of the licence fee avoided by owning the asset (i.e. the savings in royalty).

c) With and without method – the value of the intangible asset in question is calculated by taking the difference between the business value estimated under two sets of cash flow projections for the whole business and without the intangible asset in question.

Market Approach – This method is used for certain type of assets which trade as separate portfolios such as FMCG or pharmaceutical brands or licences.

Cost Approach – This method is adopted for certain types of intangibles that are readily replicated or replaced such as software, assembled workforce etc.

Further, all intangible assets with a finite useful life need to be amortised and tested for impairment in accordance with Ind AS 36. Finally, all intangible assets with an indefinite useful life need to be tested annually for impairment.

Ind AS 102- Share Based Payments:

Ind AS 102 deals with the following types of share based payments:

– Equity settled share based payments
– Cash settled share based payments
– Share based payment transactions with alternatives

All transactions involving share based payments are recognised as expenses or assets over the underlying vesting period. Transactions with employees are measured on the date of grant and those with non-employees are measured when the goods or services are received.

In case of measurement of equity settled share based payment transactions, the goods or services received by an entity are directly measured at the fair value of such goods or services received. However, in case such fair value cannot be estimated reliably, the fair value is measured with reference to the fair value of the equity instruments granted.

In case of measurement of cash settled share based payment transactions, the goods or services received by an entity and the liability incurred will be measured at the fair value of the liability. This liability has to be re-measured at each reporting date, up to the date of settlement and changes in the fair value are to be recognised in the profit or loss for the period.

In case of transactions with employees, the fair value of the equity instrument must be used and if it is not possible, the intrinsic value may be used.

The term fair value is defined in the Standard as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, a liability settled, or an equity instrument granted could be exchanged between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.  This definition is different in some respects from the definition in Ind AS 113.

Ind AS 16– Property, Plant and Equipment:

Any item of property, plant or equipment which satisfies the recognition criteria as per the Standard shall be measured at acquisition cost.

An entity has an option of choosing the revaluation model for subsequent measurement of property, plant or equipment. However, for this purpose, the revaluations shall be done with sufficient regularity to ensure that the carrying value does not differ materiality from the fair value determined in accordance with Ind AS 113. Further, the entire class of property, plant or equipment shall be subjected to revaluation. The frequency of revaluation depends upon the changes in the fair value of the property, plant or equipment being revalued.

Whilst a detailed discussion of the valuation methods to be adopted for property, plant and equipment is beyond the scope of this study, the broad underlying principles are briefly touched upon hereunder.

Market Value:– In case of real estate properties, the market approach is best suited by considering relevant information generated by market transactions for similar assets.

Replacement Value:- In case of equipment, the replacement value is the most suitable method since that represents the price that an acquirer would pay after adjusting for obsolescence, physical wear and tear and other technological considerations.

Ind AS 40- Investment Property:
Any item of investment property which satisfies the recognition criteria as per the Standard shall be measured at acquisition cost.

Unlike in the case of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets, the subsequent measurement of investment property should be on the basis of the cost model. However, there is a mandatory requirement to disclose the fair value of investment property on the basis of a valuation by an independent valuer who holds a recognised and relevant professional qualification.
Whilst the fair value would need to be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Ind AS 113, Ind AS 40 also lays down certain broad parameters, as under, for determining the fair value, which  valuers would need to keep in mind.

– When measuring the fair value of investment property in accordance with Ind AS 113, an entity shall ensure that the fair value reflects, among other things, rental income from current leases and other assumptions that market participants would use when pricing investment property under current market conditions.

– There is a rebuttable presumption that an entity can reliably measure the fair value of an investment property on a continuing basis. However, in exceptional cases when the fair value of the investment property is not reliably measurable on a continuing basis (e.g. there are few recent transactions, price quotations are not current or observed transaction prices indicate that the seller was forced to sell) and alternative reliable measurements of fair value (for example, based on discounted cash flow projections) are not available, or if an entity determines that the fair value of an investment property under construction is not reliably measurable but expects the fair value of the property to be reliably measurable when construction is complete, it shall measure the fair value of that investment property either when its fair value becomes reliably measurable or construction is completed (whichever is earlier). In such cases, specific disclosures need to be given.

– If an entity has previously measured the fair value of an investment property, it shall continue to measure the fair value of that property until disposal (or until the property becomes owner-occupied property or the entity begins to develop the property for subsequent sale in the ordinary course of business) even if comparable market transactions become less frequent or market prices become less readily available.

Ind AS 41 – Agriculture:

This Standard applies to biological assets, agricultural produce at the point of harvest and government grants related to biological assets.

The fair value of biological assets and agricultural produce at the point of harvest shall be measured in accordance with Ind AS 113.

A biological asset needs to be measured on initial recognition as well as at the end of each reporting period at its fair value less cost to sell, unless the same cannot be determined in which case it needs to be measured at cost less accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses.

Any agricultural produce harvested from an entity’s biological assets should also be measured at its fair value less the cost to sell at the point of harvest.

BENEFITS AND PERILS OF FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING:
As is the case with any journey, the journey of fair value accounting under Ind AS also has a smooth ride and at the same time there are several roadblocks. Let us now briefly review its benefits as well as understand its perils and challenges.

Benefits of Fair Value Accounting:

Some of the major benefits of fair value accounting are discussed below:

Realistic Financial Statements – Companies reporting under this method have financial statements that are more accurate than those not using this method. When assets and liabilities are reported for their actual value, it results in more realistic financial statements. When using this method, companies are required to disclose information regarding changes made on their financial statements. These disclosures are done in the form of footnotes. Companies have an opportunity for examining their financial statements with actual fair values, allowing them to make wise choices regarding future business operations.

Benefit to Investors – Fair value accounting offers benefits for investors as well, since fair value accounting lists assets and liabilities for their actual value. Accordingly, financial statements reflect a clearer picture of the company’s health. This allows investors to make wiser decisions regarding their investment options with the company. The required footnote disclosures allow investors a way of examining the effects of the changes in statements due to fair values of the assets and liabilities.

Timely Information – Since fair value accounting utilises information specific for the time and current market conditions, it attempts to provide the most relevant estimates possible. It has a great informative value for a firm itself and encourages prompt corrective actions.

More data than historical cost – Fair value accounting enhances the informative power of the financial statements vis–a-vis the historical cost. Fair value accounting requires an entity to disclose extensive information about the methodology used, the assumptions made, risk exposure, related sensitivities and other issues that result in a more thorough financial statement.

Mirrors Economic Reality – Proponents of fair-value accounting argue that using fair-value measurements is necessary for financial records to represent the economic reality of the business. Since conventional accounting only allows for asset values to be written down, book values tend to underestimate the value of assets. Fair-value accounting allows the value of investments as well as other assets (subject to choices being exercised) to be written up and down as market values change. Perils and Challenges of Fair Value Accounting:

Though there are several benefits in adopting fair value accounting, it is not without its fair share of perils and challenges, some of which are discussed hereunder:

Frequent Changes – In times of volatility, values can change quite frequently which would lead to major swings in a company’s value and earnings. Publicly held companies find this difficult as investors may find it difficult to value the company when such swings take place. Additionally, the potential for inaccurate valuations can lead to audit problems, which are discussed separately.

Less Reliable – Traditional accountants may find fair value accounting less reliable than historical costs. When an item has different values across different regions and entities, accountants must make a judgement call on valuing items on their books. If a company with similar assets or investments values items differently than another, issues may arise because of the differences in valuation methods.

Inability to value certain Assets – Businesses with specialised assets may find it difficult to value these items on the open market. When no market information is available, accountants must make a professional judgement on the item’s value. Accountants must also make sure that all valuation methods used are viable and take into account all technical aspects of the item.

Subjectivity – For assets that are not actively traded on a public exchange, fair-value measurements are subjectively determined. While the Accounting Standards provide a hierarchy of inputs for fair-value measurements, only level 1 inputs are unadjusted quoted market prices in active markets for identical items. If these are not available, the company either has to look to similar items in active markets, inactive markets for identical items, or unobservable company-provided estimates. These level 2 and level 3 estimates can also be a bone of contention between auditors and management.

Challenges for Auditors:

Whilst there are several challenges in adopting fair value accounting, by far the greatest challenge in implementing fair value accounting is faced by the auditors since they cannot abdicate their responsibilities on the ground that the fair values are determined by specialists and experts. In this context, SA-540 on Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value Estimates, makes it clear that the auditors should identify and assess the risk of material misstatements and perform appropriate procedures to mitigate the same. However, several challenges are likely to be encountered by auditors in the course of their audit of the fair value estimates whether determined by the Management or the experts / specialists, due to the following factors:

– Fair value accounting estimates are expressed in terms of the value of a current transaction or financial statement item based on conditions prevalent at the measurement date;

-The need to incorporate judgements concerning significant assumptions that may be made by others such as experts employed or engaged by the entity or the auditor;

– The availability (or lack thereof) of information or evidence and its reliability;

– The choice and sophistication of acceptable valuation techniques and models;

– The need for appropriate disclosure in the financial statements about measurement methods and uncertainty, especially when relevant markets are illiquid; and

– The possibility of Management Bias in making estimates, selection of the method of valuation and finally the valuer itself (if there is a conflict of interest)!

SA-540 deals with the overarching requirement for the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that fair value measurements and disclosures are in accordance with the entity’s applicable financial reporting framework. Within the SA, additional requirements tailor the requirements in other SAs to the audit of fair value; in particular, those dealing with the following matters:

– SA-315 – Understanding the entity and its environment and assessing the risks of material misstatement,
–  SA-330 – Responding to assessed risks;
–  SA-240 – Responsibilities relating to fraud;
–  SA-570 – Going Concern;
–  SA-620 – Using the work of an expert;
–  SA-580 – Obtaining management representations; and
– SA-260 – Communicating with those charged with governance.

Thus it is imperative for the auditor to ensure that the requirements of the SAs are complied with by taking due care and exercising professional scepticism whilst auditing the fair value estimates and documenting the reasonableness of the management estimates and judgements regarding fair value, keeping in mind the principles laid down in Ind AS-113.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES AND DECISIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY PHASE II ENTITIES:

Key Learnings from Phase I Entities due to Adoption of Fair Value Accounting:

Some of the key learnings in the context of fair value accounting during the transition to Ind AS by phase I companies are of a net increase in the net worth of the top 100 listed entities due to adoption of fair value accounting in respect of investments (including in group companies) and property plant and equipment based on the options available on transition (which are discussed below) with a corresponding reduction in the Profit after Tax due to increased depreciation on property, plant and equipment as a result of fair value thereof.

Implementation Issues by Phase II Entities due to Adoption of Fair Value Accounting:

The transition to Ind AS by Phase II entities is already underway for the remaining listed entities and other entities having a net worth of more than Rs. 250 crores during the current financial year ending 31st March, 2018 and they would need to take certain decisions on the accounting choice from a fair value perspective keeping in mind the following matters, whilst transitioning to Ind AS.

Mandatory Fair Value Accounting:

In respect of the following areas fair value accounting would be mandatory, except that in certain cases an option has been given to adopt it either retrospectively or prospectively, as indicated there against, as provided for in Ind AS 101- First Time Adoption of Ind AS.

Area

Transition Applicability

Ind
AS 109 – Financial Instruments

Retrospectively
(optional)

Ind
AS 102  – Share Based Payments

Retrospectively
(optional)

Ind
AS 103 – Business Combinations

Retrospectively
(optional)

In respect of the first two items before taking any decision to adopt fair value retrospectively, the entity would need to take into account whether all the data and information is available to enable the computation of the fair value since origination, including but not limited to details of the cash flows and other data and assumptions required for valuation purposes. If the necessary data is not available or it is impractical and costly to reconstruct the same, the entity could adopt fair value prospectively from the date of transition. These decisions would accordingly have an impact on the net worth on the date of transition.

In respect of Ind AS 103, the entity has three options as under, to account for business combinations as per the acquisition method on a fair value basis, as provided in Ind AS 101:

a) To restate past business combinations retrospectively; or
b)  To restate past business combinations from any other earlier date,  in which case, all business combinations after that date would have to be restated; or
c) To apply Ind AS 103 prospectively.
This choice, like in the earlier two cases, would depend upon whether the necessary data and information is available as also the business rationale of the earlier acquisitions to enable fair values to be attributed to any intangibles especially against any goodwill which is accounted, whose amortisation would need to be reversed and it would need to be tested for impairment annually. Any such decisions could have a significant impact on the consolidated net worth.

Voluntary Fair Value Accounting:

The most significant decision for entities with regard to fair value on transition to Ind AS is whether to elect to measure an item of property, plant and equipment at the date of transition at its fair value and use that fair value as its deemed cost in accordance with para D5 of Ind AS 101.

Further, as per para D6 of Ind AS 101, a first-time adopter may elect to use a previous GAAP revaluation of an item of property, plant and equipment at, or before, the date of transition to Ind ASs as deemed cost at the date of the revaluation, if the revaluation was, at the date of the revaluation, broadly comparable to:
 
a) fair value; or
b) cost or depreciated cost in accordance with Ind ASs, adjusted to reflect, for example, changes in a general or specific price index.

The requirements discussed above also apply to intangible assets which meet the recognition and revaluation criteria as per Ind AS 38.

It needs to be noted that the above requirement is different from adopting the fair value model as laid down under Ind AS 16 and is a one-time decision to use the fair value as the new deemed cost which may have an immediate positive impact on the net worth but would impact the profitability on an ongoing basis if depreciation needs to be provided, unless the asset in question is land.

Finally, the above decisions on transition would have tax implications including under MAT, which have not been separately discussed but which would also need to be factored in before a final decision is taken.

CONCLUSION:
The above evaluation is just the tip of the ice-berg on a subject that is quite vast and complex. However, fair value accounting is here to stay and it would impact the way the financial statements are evaluated and also impact the auditors but prove to be a bonanza for valuation specialists who can laugh all the way to the bank!

5 Section 10A, proviso to Section 92C(4) – Section 92C(4) does not apply to income offered as part of voluntary transfer pricing (TP) adjustment. Voluntary TP adjustment being a notional income will not form part of turnover for computation of deduction u/s. 10A.

1.       TS-116-ITAT-2018(PUN)

Approva Systems Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT

ITA No.1051/PUN/2015

A.Y.: 2011-12

Date of Order: 12th March,
2018

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company
was a 100% export oriented unit engaged in the business of providing software
development service to its US affiliate (FCo), as a captive service provider.
Taxpayer was also eligible to claim deduction u/s. 10A 1.

 

For the relevant year under
consideration, Taxpayer voluntarily offered additional income to tax in respect
of its services to FCo, basis its transfer pricing (TP) documentation and claimed
a deduction u/s 10A on such additional income.

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

1   There was litigation on the
issue of whether the Taxpayer was eligible to claim
deduction u/s 10A or 10B. The Tribunal in this decision held that the Taxpayer
was eligible to claim deduction u/s 10B.

 

AO contended that proviso
to section 92C(4) will apply to such income and no deduction can be allowed
u/s.10A. Without prejudice, since the Taxpayer failed to bring into India the
export proceeds in relation to the voluntary adjustment, it was not eligible to
claim deduction u/s. 10A in respect of such income.

Taxpayer contended that
such additional income represented the TP adjustment made to the profits of the
business and not the turnover and hence there was no requirement to realise the
same in convertible foreign exchange in India. Further Taxpayer contended that
the additional income was not determined by AO, but by itself on a voluntary
basis and hence proviso to section 92C(4) is not applicable in respect of such
income.

 

On appeal, the CIT(A) upheld
the order of AO. Aggrieved the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

The income which is
computed u/s. 92(1) in respect of an international transaction is a notional
income in the hands of Taxpayer.

   Section 92C(4) of the Act
requires the AO to compute the income of the Taxpayer as per the arm’s length
price (ALP) determined u/s. 92C(3). The proviso, to section 92C(4) further
provides that no deduction will be allowed to a Taxpayer u/s. 10A in respect of
such amount of income which is enhanced by AO having regard to the ALP u/s.
92C(3).

 –  In the present case, the
additional income was determined by the Taxpayer and not the AO. The Taxpayer
voluntarily offered an additional income to tax. Hence proviso to section 92C
(4) does not apply to such income. Reliance in this regard was placed on Austin
Medical Solutions Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (I.T. (TP) A. No.542/Bang/2012)
and
IGate Global Solutions Ltd. vs. ACIT (2008) 24 SOT 3.

  As per section 10A
deduction is allowed on the profits derived from export of articles or things
or computer software upto an amount which bears to the profits of the Taxpayer,
the same proportion as the export turnover bears to the total turnover of the
Taxpayer. Once the additional notional income has been so offered to tax, it
forms part of profits of business.

 

Thus, the additional income notionally
computed u/s. 92(1) would form part of the profits of the Taxpayer for the
purpose of section 10A, however, such notional income does not qualify as
export turnover or total turnover. Hence there is no requirement to realis e
such income in the form of convertible foreign exchange in India. Hence
Taxpayer is eligible to claim deduction on such additional income.

 

4 S. 2(14), S. (47), S. 45, S. 92B of the Act; Exercise of right to nominate a person to exercise call option results in transfer of a capital asset. Since such exercise was as a result of an understanding or action in concert of various related parties, the transaction qualifies as a deemed international transaction.

TS-37-ITAT-2018 (Ahd-TP)
Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITA No. 565/Ahd/17
A.Y: 2012-13;
Date of Order: 23rd January, 2018

FACTS
The Taxpayer, an Indian company, was an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) of a Netherlands entity (BV Co) and was a part of a global group of companies (V Group). V Group carried on its telecommunication business in India through an operating company, I Co. All the shares of I Co were indirectly controlled by BV Co through a number of subsidiaries, AEs, call options and other financial arrangements. One such entity through which BV Co indirectly held interest in I Co was an Indian company, Omega Telecom Holding (Omega). Omega held around 5% shares in ICo.

Prior to the Taxpayer becoming a part of V Group, it was held by Hutchinson Group (H Group). H Group purchased the stake in I Co through various unrelated third parties owing to the regulatory restrictions on investment in the telecom sector.

 

SMMS investment Private Limited (SMMS) was one such Indian company through which H Group acquired interest in I Co. SMMS held around 62% shares in Omega (another Indian Company) which translated to an indirect interest of 3% stake in I Co. The acquisition of Omega by SMMS was funded through certain loans and capital (equity and preference share) contributed by third party investors (Investors). Investors, thus, became 100% shareholders of SMMS. The loans taken by SMMS were guaranteed by the ultimate parent entity of H Group.

It was as a result of transfer of certain intermediary companies by H Group to BV Co that Taxpayer became an indirect subsidiary of BV Co.

Taxpayer entered into a Framework agreement in June 2007 (FA 2007) with the investor. In terms of FA 2007, the Taxpayer had a call option to acquire entire equity capital of SMMS at nominal consideration of 4 Cr. (even when the value of SMMS could have been much higher than 1,500 Cr.). The taxpayer also had right to nominate some other person to exercise the available option right.

In November 2011, Termination Agreement and Shareholders Agreement were signed. In terms of TA, Taxpayer terminated the call option and paid a termination fee of INR 21 Crores to the investors. Post the termination of the call and put options, SMMS issued shares to another Indian company, India Hold Co, as agreed under SHA. Issue of shares resulted in India Hold Co holding 75% shares in SMMS. Further, as per the SHA, investors effectively exited from SMMS India on buyback of shares by SMMS and consequently India Hold Co. became 100% shareholder of SMMS.

Taxpayer contended that options that it held vis-à-vis investors in respect of shares of SMMS India were a contractual right and not a property right. Therefore it did not qualify as capital asset. Without prejudice, termination of option does not result in transfer. Further, since the transaction was between two residents, it did not qualify as an international transaction.

AO held that the Taxpayer had two rights by virtue of the call option viz., the right to exercise the option of purchasing the shares of SMMS and the right to assign the call option. On termination of the call option, such rights were extinguished and resulted in transfer of a capital asset by the Taxpayer. Further, AO held that, various agreements entered into by the parties indicate that the terms of the transaction were, in essence, decided by BV Co. Thus, such a transaction would qualify as a deemed international transaction.

Aggrieved, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

HELD

Whether call option is a capital asset and whether there was a transfer of no cost asset

–  The two rights viz. the right to purchase shares of SMMS from the Investors and the right to sell shares of SMMS to the Taxpayer granted under FA 2007 are independent rights, in the sense that if one of the rights is exercised, the other right would become infructuous.

–   In essence, the Taxpayer had a right to nominate who could acquire shares of SMMS at the agreed price.

– In the present case, the Taxpayer did not acquire the shares of SMMS, but exercised the right to nominate the person who could acquire the share of SMMS. Such right clearly falls within the expanded definition of capital asset under the ITL.

– Undisputedly, the facts before the SC in the Taxpayer’s case for earlier years did not involve nomination or assignment and, hence, the question of whether a right to nominate can be treated as a capital asset was never considered by the SC. Without prejudice, post the amendment to the ITL expanding the definition of capital asset u/s. 2(14), the SC’s decision stating that pending exercise, an option does not qualify as a capital asset, is no longer applicable.

–   The Taxpayer had exercised the right of nomination under the call option. Once the right is exercised, its existence comes to an end. Hence, exercise of right to nominate results in transfer of a capital asset under the ITL.

–    All the agreements entered into by the parties are to be read together to understand the actual transaction. The rights were acquired by paying consideration and hence it is not correct to suggest that options were no cost asset.

Whether there is an international transaction and whether the TP provisions apply in the absence of a consideration?

–    The Scheme of Arrangement implemented effectively ensured that SMMS shares which could have been acquired and held by taxpayer in India came to be held by AE of the Taxpayer (India Hold Co). Hence the transaction qualifies as an international transaction.

–  The Taxpayer had a valuable right to purchase shares of I Co at a nominal consideration of ~INR4crores. Such a right was given up by the Taxpayer for “zero” consideration.

–    The TP provisions enable determination of the ALP for an international transaction and, hence, they have a role to play in computation of income. As long as a transaction is capable of producing an income, the TP provisions will apply to compute the income in accordance with ALP.

–   The termination if implemented at ALP could have resulted in an income in the form of capital gains and such income has to be computed having regard to the ALP of the transaction. Even in case where there is zero income but application of the ALP results in a consideration being assigned, then the income i.e., capital gains in this case, is to be computed basis such ALP.

–   The TP provisions cease to apply only when a transaction is inherently incapable of producing an income and is applicable in cases where income is not reported or if an income is not taken into account in computation of taxable income. Reliance in this regard was placed on a Special Bench decision in the case of Instrumentarium Corporation Ltd. (171 taxmann.com 193).

–  The Bombay HC decision in the Taxpayer’s own case for earlier years was concerned with determination of the ALP of shares issued by the Taxpayer, which was admittedly a transaction on capital account. It is a settled proposition that capital receipts cannot be brought to tax in the absence of a specific enabling provision. In other words, the ALP adjustment was proposed in respect of an item of income which could never be brought to tax. Thus, the ratio of that decision is not applicable in the present facts of the case.

3 Article 5 and 7 of India-UAE DTAA – AAR’s decision indicating that a group concern has a PE in India, cannot be a basis for concluding that the Taxpayer has a PE in India. In absence of FTS article in the DTAA, income from provision of technical personnel is taxable as business income, provided that Taxpayer has a PE in India as per the relevant DTAA.

TS- 27-ITAT-2018 (Mum)
Booz & Company (ME) FZ-LLC vs.  DDIT
I.T.A. No. 4063/Mum/2015
A.Y: 2011-12;
Date of Order: 19th January, 2018

Facts

Taxpayer, a company incorporated in UAE, was engaged in the business of
providing management and technical consultancy services. During the year, the
Taxpayer provided technical/professional personnel to its Indian associated
enterprise (ICo). The personnel were physically present in India for a period
of 156 days.

 

The Taxpayer contended that since DTAA does not have any specific
article on fees for technical services (FTS), the consideration received from
ICo is taxable as business income. However, in the absence of a PE in India,
the income received from ICo was not offered to tax by the Taxpayer.

 

AO observed that in respect of certain group companies including the
parent of the Taxpayer, AAR had given a common ruling that the said companies
had a PE in India. By placing reliance on AAR’s ruling, AO held that ICo
created a PE for the Taxpayer in India.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before the CIT(A) who
upheld the order of AO. Subsequently, Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held

   The
ruling of the AAR in the case of group entities of the Taxpayer cannot be the
basis for determining the existence or otherwise of PE of the Taxpayer in
India, especially when AAR gave a common ruling without making any specific
reference to the provisions of the respective DTAA.

 

  ICo
did not earmark any specific or dedicated place for the personnel of the
Taxpayer, hence it cannot be said that the premises of ICo was under the
control or disposal of the Taxpayer. Thus ICo premises did not create a fixed
place PE for the Taxpayer in India.

 

   FCo
provided services to ICo and it is not a case where FCo was receiving any
services from ICo. Thus the question of dependent agent PE in India does not
arise.

 

  Since
the employees worked in India for an aggregate period of 156 solar days on all
projects taken together, the threshold for triggering Service PE clause is not
met.

 

  Thus
the income of the Taxpayer from provision of personnel is not taxable in India

INTERVIEW | ZIA MODY

QUALITY IS THE ONLY THING,
IN QUALITY IS EVERYTHING!

In celebration of its 50th
Volume – the BCAJ brings a series of interviews with peopl
e of eminence, the
distinct ones we can look up to, as professionals. Those people who have
reached to the top of their chosen sphere, people who have established a
benchmark for others to emulate. 

This first interview is with
Mrs. Zia Mody. Zia is an advocate and solicitor, founder and managing partner
of AZB and Partners. She is considered an authority on corporate merger and
acquisition law in particular. Zia studied at Cambridge and Harvard both,
worked in the US for five years with Baker McKenzie and then in India. She
started her own firm which today is considered one of the best in India. A
wife, mother, winner of many awards, an active practitioner of the Bahai faith.

In this interview, Zia talks to
BCAJ Editor Raman Jokhakar and BCAJ Past Editors Ashok Dhere & Gautam Nayak
about her formative years, what she learnt from her mentors, the factors she
attributes to her success, the sacrifices that she had to make, her thoughts on
the laws in India, and more…..

(Raman Jokhakar): From being in employment
at a US law firm, to being a counsel, to leading your own law firm – yours has
been a multi-faceted career. Which part of it was the most enjoyable?

Well, the truth is that, in hindsight, the
most enjoyable part if you say of my career would be my time as a counsel in
the High Court. And although, I enjoy my work as M&A lawyer, for sure, I
think that the thrill of winning a matter which I got when I was younger is
probably the biggest thrill in my span as a lawyer.

(Gautam Nayak): In spite of being a first
generation law firm, I think you have overtaken most of the firms which are
much older and established firms in that sense. From being a first generation
firm to being a top rank firm is
an amazing achievement. What do you attribute your success to?

A
combination of being there at the right time. When I came back from America, I
was in court for 10 years and the opportunity to start a firm was not there.
Then after Manmohan Singh’s policy in 1991 to about 1995, in those 4 years, a
lot of foreign friends who wanted their clients to set up shop, clients wanted
to set up shop, India opened up. So I was there at the right time. Because I
had foreign education and foreign training, my acceptability was much easier
for my foreign friends and clients. Again, in comparison we were
technologically savvy. We had star programme, which the older firms who were
giants then could not have. We had a computer for each lawyer; God forbid, the
other firms didn’t have. We spent more money, invested more money in getting
technologically better and also I think, frankly, I spoke the language better
to an American General Counsel, I knew what they were looking for.

(Gautam
Nayak): Maybe the initial impetus yes, came from these factors, but as
your firm grew in size, what factors made it work later? 

 There
again, a combination of being lucky to get such good talent and though not
always successful, trying my best to retain the talent. Sometimes you can and
sometimes you can’t. Then always emphasizing to everybody who walked in and
carried our card, that quality is the only thing, and in quality is everything
– hard work, loyalty to the letterhead, loyalty to the client – all comes out
of quality. So like in any service profession – what do you want to be – you
want to be the best and how do you get to be the best – when you hire the best
and how do you make them the best – by showing them the way.

(Raman Jokhakar): Role of your Mentors: you
worked here in India and in the US all these years. Would you like to share a
trait that has stayed relevant even today or over all these years?


As
a young professional, your prayers get answered if you get a good mentor. It’s not
choosing your job, it’s choosing your boss right? And, I think for me, both my
mentors, in America and in India, were really patient human beings because they
invested time in me and had affection for me. Both of which are key. You know
if you have a good mentor but he does not love you, it does not work as much as
if he loves you. So I think, a personal connect which I had, helped me a great
deal. Therefore, the person was willing to do more than he needed to.
Therefore, my duty as a mentee was to never let that mentor waste his time; to
learn all the time; to let him know that I am learning.



(Raman
Jokhakar): And something that still rings true, even today – something that you
learnt during those times.

Honesty
to the matter. Every matter has to be dealt with honesty. You can nuance your
advice. You can have gradations of what you want to say. But stick to the
skeleton of what is an honest assessment of the matter. That is key.


(Gautam Nayak): Both you
and you
r husband have been and are very successful in your respective careers.
What is the role that you played in each other’s success?

So
I always again thank God, although my husband is a typical Gujju, he has
enormous respect for his wife. And, I think that is really why I have been able
to be successful. My profession has taken a toll in terms of time on my
marriage, not having conventional rule as a wife, not able to spend time with
my children as I would have liked to. My mother in law compensated a lot of my
absenteeism. But I think the luck that I had was that my husband was not
insecure. He is very proud of me. His father was a lawyer. So I never grew up
having to be worried about what my husband would feel. Because he was so
successful in his own mind and later on in life, that there was no feeling- How
she is so important, why is she on this TV show or something? It was– Great
that you are on this TV show! There was no competitiveness at home. This is
important.

(Raman
Jokhakar): Any special sacrifice that you felt you had to particularly make?

Time.
Time with my family.

(Raman
Jokhakar): If you look back at your career, in hindsight, is there anything
you feel you would have done differently?

No.
Except, maybe being less paranoid! (laughter)

(Gautam
Nayak): One of the significant issues which you may have faced when you
started your career, was that you were in a legal profession dominated by males
(Zia: Still is). Being a woman, how has it played out for you as a woman? For
other women professionals, what is your advice?

It
was hard. It is much better now. But it was hard. In early 1980s, as a young
woman going to court, which client is going to give you his matter to argue –
right? They would say (go away – gesture) It is much better now. I don’t
think it is much better still in Court, I think it is the same. But, in the
table space of our profession, it is much better. It is well paid – women get
more attracted to the profession. Frankly, their parents have changed. Today
our generation puts more value on a girl child than they did on our
sisters.  Our fathers are much more
vested in educating us than the previous generations. That is what is making a
change.

(Gautam
Nayak): What is your advice to women professionals that they should follow
in order to succeed?

The same story – Quality, Focus and
Sacrifice. We can keep talking about what we want to, but as women, we have to
make that sacrifice. And sometimes it’s not worth it – it’s just not worth it.
It is different for every woman. I think I overdid it. I don’t think I will
recommend my life to many people. But each one has to strike their own balance.
Because, if all this is going to make you miserable personally, why would you
do it?

(Gautam
Nayak): You are legendary for your long working hours. Even today after
having so much success, you put in long hours. What is it that drives you even
today?

I
just can’t stand not being prepared. If I have a calendar tomorrow, I will
prepare. I want to know if I can add a little more value by having a pre-discussion,
by reading, by pre-reading material: I also want to know what laws have
happened, I look at what my knowledge management team pushes out, changes in
FEMA, changes in Companies Act, I will read the headlines. I think it is the
fear of not being up to date. Then of course, long hours are also because
clients want to meet, after clients finish, partners want to meet for views.

(Ashok Dhere): What are your hobbies?

 I
had hobbies. (laughter) I used to write, I used to play the piano and I
used to do cooking classes with Tarla Dalal. But now, my only hobby today is
travelling with my family for short breaks.

(Raman Jokhakar): A Daily habit that you
have?

Prayers

(Ashok
Dhere): We have complex Laws. What do you suggest about repealing laws and
reducing complexity?

 It
is a big problem. It’s a good one. There is not one law you could repeal in
totality. Look at your Companies Act, there are lot of provisions that don’t
make sense to me but you can’t repeal that law. You have to amend them in bits
and pieces. I don’t think there is one statute that I would say – DHUM!
– kill it! There are so many statutes that need updating, fine-tuning. You take
the latest Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, it is doing a great job as a
statute, but it still needs refining. So, it is an ongoing process.

(Gautam
Nayak)
: What is your view on
Companies Act 1956 versus the current Companies Act?

 But
the 1956 Act had also outgrown its useful life. It is just that our new Act is
unfortunately a knee jerk reaction to Satyam- that is the problem. Satyam
happened 10 years ago. (Raman: We call it Roy and Raju Act). Perfect.

 (Gautam
Nayak): Some of the old laws we have such as Indian Contract Act from 1872.
As compared to that, some of the recent legislations have a lot more
litigations, a lot more ambiguity in drafting. What is your view on that?

 I
think, the old statutes are better drafted. Our current drafting is the biggest
problem.

(Raman
Jokhakar)
: The way they use English.
Imagine in a country like ours where most people can’t speak English, can’t
read English, and you have these laws which even professionals can’t
understand?

 What
to do. It’s good for Lawyers!           

(Gautam Nayak): Technology is changing,
laws are changing, and the society is changing. In that sense, going forward,
what do you see as the key attributes a professional needs to have? As in your
times, technology was the key factor, what would be the key factors now?

 A
senior professional as he climbs up the value chain, has to morph into a
Trusted Advisor. That is the biggest value you can give to the clients. You are
not a lawyer. You are a trusted advisor. Your client comes to you, to make the
company calls, real crisis calls. At that time you are not reading sections.
You are simply reading, assimilating everything.  And then taking a judgement call, which is
different for each client. One guy is risky, one risk averse, one guy is a
foreigner, one Indian, one guy is a listed company, and one guy is an unlisted
company. So you have to put everything into the mix. That’s the issue.

(Ashok
Dhere): Madam, I am a fan of your book translated (shows the book ….) into
Marathi. I read that book.

Even
Marathi one also. I know Penguin said can we get the book translated into
Marathi and I said yes – as long as it is an honest translation.

(Ashok Dhere): I was fascinated by that
judgement of Aruna Shanbag. (Zia: Right to live). At that time, Supreme Court
was shy of pronouncing it because they passed it on to the Dean. Let the Dean
decide. They were shy. Now they are bold.

They
are bold. Life has changed.

(Ashok Dhere): In Golaknath and
Keshavanand Bharati, there is a constant tussle between judiciary, executive and
parliament. Will it continue forever?

Probably,
because there is misalignment spiritually. The executive feels they need more
control over judiciary, who can otherwise keep hauling them up for contempt and
striking down their laws. Judiciary feels that they are the custodians of the
Constitution which they are spiritually duty bound to protect. There is a
misalignment. But, I am for the judiciary.

(Ashok
Dhere): What about judicial activism which is also being criticised (Zia: I
understand sometimes it is overboard but…) they are giving direction to Reserve
Bank of India…

I Understand. But if you are asking me which
balance I prefer, I prefer this one even if it has these side effects, because
without that, you can’t have a country that can be kept in check. As much as I
love Reserve Bank of India, sometimes even they may go wrong. It’s ok. I don’t
think they were right in the directions they gave. I think even Reserve Bank or
the Government or any Regulator today is concerned about what the Supreme Court
thinks of them.

 (Ashok
Dhere): What about corruption in the Judicial System in the light of recent
Supreme Court (four Judges) matter?

 I
think there is more corruption at junior level simply because pay scales are so
pathetic and there is less corruption at the higher level. I am not a believer
that there is systemic judicial corruption. I don’t think so at all.

 (Gautam Nayak): Professional Firms:
Today, do you feel there is a scope for small professional firms or are large
firms alone the future?

Boutique
firms. Specialised Boutique (firms).Otherwise big firms. Unless you have
domain and you are a boutique. Larger companies would veer towards branded
firms.

(Ashok
Dhere)
:Madam, so far as frauds and
scams happen or other activities that are in the newspapers, Chartered
Accountants are always at the receiving end (Zia: Poor guys) and everything is
always done with drafting with lawyers or law firms etc. (Zia: We protect
ourselves) Tell us a few tips for Chartered Accountants, how to protect themselves?

You
don’t have to sign balance sheets. (Laughter) and if you are smart, stay
away from being Directors.

(Gautam Nayak): Large firms that
we talked about. Do you think that now professions are becoming a business,
some of the large firms you see?

See,
it has always been a business. You can keep calling yourself a noble
profession, which of course it is. That does not mean that you are doing
charity. You are doing work for doing business. Just that you have to do it
ethically. That’s what makes it noble.

 (Ashok
Dhere)
: What do you have to say
about prohibitive cost of litigation? Sometimes, litigation in an income tax
matter is valid, but the client just does not have the capacity to pay.

Answer:
That’s life. What can you do!

(Gautam Nayak): There was a talk of legal fees, capping
that etc. that the Government is considering.

Why should they? It is a free market. How do
we hire the best, pay the best and then not charge the best? That is socialism?

 (Ashok
Dhere)
: Do you make a distinction,
M’am, between banking fraud and political corruption, say in PNB Case?

 Depends.
Depends on reason. Talk about PNB, there is no fraud proved yet at a senior
level. How are you asking to compare senior level fraud before it’s even
proved? That is pre-judging.

(Ashok
Dhere)
: What about political
overtones as in Karti Chidambaram Case? That is also fraud matter.

It
is. But let the investigation happen.

(Raman
Jokhakar)
: For the Chartered
Accountant profession, what is your advice to Chartered Accountants as you look
at them and you interact with them? Is there something that you want to tell
them?

 Be
stricter with your clients. (Raman: And in which way?)  Get proper back up, don’t stop asking
questions, be comfortable with the balance sheet you are signing and the
qualifications, and don’t be scared about losing the account. That’s all.

 The minute you can say “Go Away”,
you are capable. That’s what we do. If we are not comfortable – “We are not
going to give you that opinion.” No problem. That has been our approach right
from the day we started with twelve lawyers.  


 

AS IT WAS, IS AND MAY BE
(MUSINGS FROM THE PAST, ABOUT THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE AS FORESEEN)

As one’s professional career inches to what would be the age
of a senior citizen one tends to look more to the past than the future. One
suddenly finds that he/she can remember what happened in 1990 more clearly than
what happened in 2016!

When the Editor of the 50th anniversary
publication of the BCAJ approached me to write an article and suggested that I
recollect real life experiences, I expressed serious reservations as to whether
anybody would really be interested in the same. I do hope the Editor does not
have cause to regret his mistaken choice (of person and subject). In any case,
my vanity ultimately prevailed and I agreed to pick up my pen and let it run
wild.

In 1952, I joined the Sydenham College of Commerce and
Economics named after Lord Sydenham, a former Governor of Bombay. At that time,
it was situated in premises belonging to the J. J. School of Arts (with two
divisions of the first year class being located in the Sukhadwala Building near
Excelsior Cinema). My father was in the first batch of students (of 1913) to
enroll in the College! My brother as well as my wife graduated from Sydenham.
It was, perhaps the only College with a tennis court! In 1955, the College
shifted to its present location on B. Road near Churchgate.

In 1956, I joined the Government Law College for the then
two-year LL.B. degree course for those who had already graduated. Surprising as
it may sound to today’s college student fraternity, at that time at least 90%
of the students attended classes regularly (the Canteen residency was limited).
For the lectures by Prof. Sanat P. Mehta on the Indian Constitution, the class
was always full even though the lectures were scheduled at a most unearthly
hour early in the morning. I understand that today the percentage is reversed
and perhaps more than 90% do not attend lectures but join private coaching
classes. In our days a student who took private tuitions was looked down upon
as being backward! What I find even more surprising, and rather intolerable, is
that I am told that today professors themselves do not attend regularly. The
other leading Counsel in the field of Tax Law at that time were Mr. R. J. Kolah
and Mr. N. A. Palkhivala. Mr. R. J. Kolah was also the foremost lawyer in the
field of labour law – if this branch did not rub off on me it was, I suppose,
because I did not labour enough. Two Solicitors: Mr. N. R. Mulla and Mr.
Tricumdas Dwarkadas also had a large practice in the Tribunal. Mr. Tricumdas
(partner in the firm of M/s. Kanga & Co.) was and has been the only person
allowed to appear before a Bench of the Tribunal, otherwise than in the
regulation coat and tie! I may in passing, mention my eternal admiration of Sir
Dinshaw Mulla (the founder of the firm of M/s. Mulla and Mulla) for the number
of classical treatises he has written on varied legal subjects. I do not think
anyone, the world over, has rivaled his achievement. 

With the confidence (arrogance) of youth I decided to take
the plunge in individual law practice as, according to me, it afforded
independence. The next question was whose Chamber I should join. At the request
of Mr. R. K. Dalal, the founding partner of the Chartered Accounting firm of
Messrs. Dalal & Shah, Mr. N. A. Palkhivala agreed to see me but not to
accept me as a Junior! Thereafter, through the good offices of Mr. Maneck P.
Mistry (popularly known as “Botty” Mistry, though I do not quite know why) I
joined the Chambers of Mr. R. J. Kolah.

The Law Chambers were at that time just newly located on the
first floor of the Annexe building which was connected by a passage to the High
Court Building. Chamber No.1 was of Sir Jamshedji B. Kanga in which Seniors of
great eminence like Mr. K. H. Bhabha, Mr. Murzban Mistree etc., who were
earlier his juniors, functioned. Chamber No. 2 was of Mr. R. J. Kohla and
chamber No.3 of Mr. N. A. Palkhivala. Prior thereto Chambers of Counsel were on
the Ground Floor of the High Court Building to the left as one entered the High
Court building from the gate near the University (and not the one near the Hong
Kong Bank building). Later in 1987, Counsel functioning from the Annexe
building received notices to quit as the High Court wanted the premises for
itself.

The atmosphere on the 1st floor was unique. There
was great fellowship between the 50 odd Counsel who occupied the 12 Chambers
situated there including the Chambers of Mr. Motilal Setalvad (the first
Attorney-General for India), Mr. M.P. Amin (Advocate-General for the State of
Bombay) and Mr. Karl Khandalawalla, a lawyer of eminence at the Criminal Bar, and
many more. Mr. Khandalawalla was a distinguished art critic. He was as devoted
to art as Mr. Kolah was to horse-racing and to dog-racing (which latter sport
he wanted to initiate at the Brabourne Stadium). Very often when Mr. Kolah was
in the Supreme Court on a Friday but his matter had not concluded, he would fly
back to Bombay on Friday night and after attending the races at Mahalaxmi on
Sunday evening proceed by the early morning flight on Monday back to Delhi. He
travelled extensively for professional work and invariably went to the then
Santa Cruz airport by the airport bus run by Indian Airlines. I still remember
a delightful photograph which was displayed in Chamber No. 2 of Mr. R. J. Kolah
in a top hat and tail coat with his devoted and charming wife Lorna, which
photograph was taken when they had attended the Epsom Derby race in
England.  

My practice as a lawyer had a slow (more accurately, a very
slow and halting) start. In the first year of my practice at the Bar I earned a
total of Rs.30 and that too not on account of any merit of mine! A brief for
applying for an adjournment at 2.45 p.m. (which was when the High Court used to
resume work at that time after the lunch break), was marked by Messrs. Little
& Co. (the instructing solicitors) for Mr. K. K. Koticha, Advocate. A fee
of 2 Gold Mohurs (GMs) which is the denomination in which advocates practicing
on the original side of the High Court traditionally marked (and some still
mark) their fees. Interestingly a Gold Mohur, a currency prevailing in ancient
times, was reckoned at Rs.15 in Bombay, Rs.16 in Delhi and Rs.17 in Calcutta!
The bearer of the brief could not locate Mr. 
Koticha in the High Court library as, (most fortunately!) he had gone
out for lunch. He noticed that (having nothing better to do) I was sitting in
the Library and offered the brief to me. This incident increased my belief in a
kind, benevolent and benign God who looked after briefless lawyers!

I may mention that Mr. Palkhivala had once offered me
employment in the legal department of Tatas at what I considered to be a
princely salary. My brother, Jal, a Chartered Accountant of great learning, was
vehemently against my accepting the offer and when I talked about it to Mr.
Kolah he was forthright, as usual, in his view. He remarked “gadhero thai
gayoch ke.”

When I commenced my practice in 1959, the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) had 2 Benches each in Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta
and one at Allahabad, Madras, Patna and Hyderabad. If I remember correctly,
there were just 2 or 3 Commissioners of Income-tax in Bombay jurisdiction. I
have lost track of the number of Principal Commissioners of Income-tax and
Commissioners of Income-tax who now hold office. The Tribunal which was formed
in 1941 was initially located in the Industrial Assurance Building near Eros
Cinema. By 1959 it had shifted to its present location. I have not been able to
discover exactly when such shift was effected. Even the Encyclopaedic Dr. K.
Shivaram, has not been able to enlighten me!

The ITAT has evolved into the leading and most satisfactorily
of all functioning Tribunals. I may refer to what I consider to be two
unfortunate administrative aberrations on its part. The Headquarters of the
Tribunal has   always been at Bombay.
Three Presidents shifted the office of the President to Delhi. Thus, during
their tenure, though the Headquarters of the Tribunal was at Bombay, the office
of the Head of the Tribunal was in Delhi! A junior lawyer appropriately
remarked, “the importance of the Headquarters of the Tribunal has now been
reduced to a quarter thereof!” Mr. Rajagopala Rao a very sincere, patient and
fair member had during his tenure as President very correctly restored the
President’s office to Bombay.

The other unfortunate administrative decision is that the
Tribunal now organizes a farewell meeting for a retiring member. The hallowed
tradition followed by the Income-tax Tribunal Bar Association, at Bombay, (in
the same manner as by the High Court Bar Association) was that it was the prerogative
of the Bar to organize a Reference to a retiring member (if the Bar felt he
merited one). The occasional decision of not granting a Reference on the
retirement of a member (considered by the Bar as not being fit to be so honoured)
was not acceptable to the authorities.

There cannot be a truer saying than “Justice delayed is
justice denied.” As major reason for the abysmal mounting arrears both in the
Tribunal and the Courts is on account of the fact that the judicial authorities
have to function much below their sanctioned strength. It is proudly claimed
that the present Government is one which works. However, there does not appear
to be any evidence in support thereof, at least in the law and judicial field.
When a vacancy will occur is known well in advance – the only exception being
the unexpected event of resignation or unfortunate premature demise. Instead of
spending time on making tax life more complicated, cannot the Ministries of Law
and Finance find time to attend to this long-standing yet unresolved problem?

The malaises of mounting arrears of tax appeals and writ
petitions in the High Courts would be alleviated if more judicial members of
the Tribunal, and perhaps even Accountant Members with appropriate judicial
qualifications, were promoted to the High Courts and special benches dealing
the year round with tax matters were set up in the High Courts. It may also be
appropriate if the Supreme Court collegium, which finally recommends persons
for promotion to the High Courts, was a little more circumspect in rejecting
proposals for such promotion made by a High Court. It is for serious
consideration whether, in the event of there being a doubt about the fitness of
a member for promotion to the High Court, it is possible to devise a system
whereunder the Collegium obtains (on the condition of maintenance of complete
secrecy) the views of Advocates of pre-eminent reputation, who have practiced
before the concerned person.

Legal practice can be broadly of 2 types: a) table practice
comprising of advisory work in conference, furnishing of written opinions and
drafting pleadings and b) arguing matters before different fora. Variety is the
spice of life and, as in life generally, it is always good to have a
combination of all possibilities. However, if I had to choose only one of the
two forms of legal practice I would certainly plump for the second alternative
as appearing before a Tribunal or Court requires one to attune one’s arguments
to what is likely to appeal to the particular judge, bearing in mind his
approach to life, his bent of mind and also brings into focus one’s ability to
respond immediately to queries (relevant and irrelevant) His Lordship or Honour
may pose. A ready repartee, a light hearted remark sometimes achieves more than
learned legal submissions based on case laws. One has also to cultivate the
ability to deal on the spot with arguments urged by the opposing Counsel. The
ability to do all this is what distinguishes an Advocate from a lawyer. Law can
be learnt from text books, – advocacy requires an inherent talent and
experience.  

The practice of tax laws is not confined just to the
provisions of the relevant Direct Tax Acts. One has to consider the provisions
of a whole range of what may be termed as “general laws” like the Transfer of
Property Act, personal laws which determine succession to a deceased’s
property, company and partnership law (including the Limited Liability
Partnership Act), stamp duty and registration provisions, and laws relating to
limitation and new financial instruments etc. Even the provisions of the
Evidence Act and of criminal law may have to be applied. A judge once addressed
Counsel arguing a tax appeal before him by saying. “You tax lawyers …” Counsel
replied, “I am not aware of any such animal!”

About 3 or 4 years after I joined the legal profession, Mr.
N. A. Palkhivala gradually shifted the field of his operation from Chamber No.3
to his office in Bombay House and became a Director of several Tata companies.
It was somewhat of a unique decision because Counsel generally prefer to
operate from their own independent chambers without being associated with a
particular business house. In retrospect I felt that it was all to the good
that he had not approved of me as a prospective junior. Unfortunately, in life
when one is faced with a disappointment it is only in retrospect that one
thinks of the disappointment as being all for the good.

Lord Macnaghten in London County Council v. Attorney-General
44 TC 265, 293, observed “Income Tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a
tax on income. It is not meant to be a tax on anything else.” Our Finance
Ministers should take heed of these words of wisdom. Today, section 2(24) of
the Income-tax Act includes twenty-eight items as “income,” quite a few of
which cannot at all be regarded as “income.” The zeal of our Finance Ministers
has resulted in our presently having Volume 402 of the Income-tax Reports. The
publication of the Income-tax Report started in 1933. The proliferation of
litigation is shown by the fact that whereas till 1950 we had only one volume
of the Income-tax Reports per year, now (in 2017) we have 10 Volumes per year
and I do not know how many volumes 2018 will generate! Prior to the publication
of the Income-tax Reports we had “Income-tax Cases” which covered 10 Volumes
relating to the period from 1886 to 1937. The Tax Cases in England published
from 1876 presently are in the 80th volume. Of course, in so far as
the legal profession is concerned, the Indian overdose is all to the good! I
may note in passing something which is rather intriguing. In India we refer to
“Income-tax” but in the United Kingdom it is “Income Tax.”

There is today a strong lobby which doubts the wisdom of
several provisions in the annual Finance Bills (sometimes 2 per year) which
amend the Income-tax Act. The thought process which goes into the enactment of
the proposed amendments is best illustrated by the fact that recently the
Finance Bill, 2018, was apparently passed by the Lok Sabha without debate.

Some people today complain about the rates of tax and
surcharge making unwarranted inroads into one’s income earnings. They overlook
that during our flirtation with socialism some assessees were liable in 1972 to
1973 to pay more than 100% of their income as direct taxes (income-tax plus
wealth tax). The imposition of such draconian rates of taxes led to the
development of a tax planning industry. Some of the schemes were really
fantastic. An assessee is certainly not bound to pay the maximum amount of tax
possible. At the same time excessive and daring tax-planning is not advisable
as, in my view, a good untroubled night’s sleep is more important than the
possible increase in one’s wealth by embarking on such a scheme. I hasten to
add that tax planning is undoubtedly legal and permissible. The Duke of
Westminster’s case (19 TC 490) is a classic example of tax planning, perhaps
even stretching the permitted limits. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Union
of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan 263 ITR 706
observed at page 758 that the
principle in the Honourable Duke’s case “was very much alive and kicking.” Even
ignoring the exceptional 2 years in the 1970s one has ruefully to accept that
in several other years in the past the individual income-earning assessee
(Mr.A.) was a junior partner in profit sharing in the firm of the Central
Government and Mr.A!

There is no reason why we should complain about the present
rates of income-tax even though one may not be able to muster the enthusiasm of
Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court who observed “Taxes are what we pay
for civilized society. I like to pay taxes, with them I buy civilization.” Mr.
C. K. Daphtary, the first Solicitor-General of India, who was known for his
ready wit and felicity of language, in a speech when he was felicitated by the
Bombay Bar, referred to the observation of Justice Holmes and wryly commented
“If by payment of taxes one buys present-day civilization then I do not want
any part of it!” The key issue was rightly summarized by Justice Sabyasachi
Mukharji in CWT v. Arvind Narottam 173 ITR 479: “Does he with taxes buy
civilization or does he facilitate the waste and ostentation of the few. Unless
waste and ostentation in Government spending are avoided or eschewed no amount
of moral sermons would change people’s attitude to tax avoidance.” Mr. N. A.
Palkivala has pithily observed “a widespread taste for tax promises to be a
thing of slow growth.”

The prodigious and unwieldy growth of tax legislation and
amendments after the present Act came into being is evidenced by the fact that,
to cite but one example, between section 115 and section 116, more than 120
sections have been inserted at one time or the other. The total inadequacy of
the English language to provide for this overdose is shown by the fact that we
have such monstrosities as section 80JJAA and section 115BBDA!

The change in the nature of the litigation then and now is
striking. In 1959 a large part of the appeals before the Tribunal centered
around cash credits, unexplained investments, capital and revenue expenditure
etc. The litigation is now more sophisticated and with an international flavour
like the circumstances in which income earned by a non-resident from an asset
situated outside India is to be deemed to accrue or arise in India (section 9),
transfer pricing and Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements. One of the most
often cited cases today is the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of
India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan 263 ITR 706
where the Supreme Court laid down
the path-breaking interpretation to be placed on the words “may be taxed”
appearing in DTAAs. I daresay in the future, a substantial part of the
litigation will centre around Chapter XA of the Income-tax Act (concerning
General Anti-Avoidance Rule) bearing in mind the very wide, if not wild,
provisions which have been enacted.

People often condemn Treaty Shopping overlooking that
Treaties are negotiated with several political, economic and other
considerations in mind and if in achieving/implementing the same tax concessions
are available so be it. If the Government negotiates a treaty which opens a
shop it cannot complain if people resort thereto!

A matter of great importance to the well-functioning of the
Tribunal is who is appointed as its President. Previously, the Central
Government was empowered to appoint the Senior Vice-President or one of the
Vice-Presidents to be the President. Now sub-section (3) of section 252 of the
Act enables the Central Government to appoint in addition a person who is a
sitting or retired judge of a High Court and who has completed not less than
seven years of service as a judge in a High Court.

Pursuant to the newly acquired power vested in it in 2013 the
Central Government appointed a retired judge of a High Court to be the
President of the Tribunal with effect from 14th March, 2015. In my
view the conferment on the Central Government of the option to appoint a
retired High Court judge as the President is misconceived. The President has to
perform various administrative tasks relating to the functioning of the
Tribunal such as constitution of the Benches, the posting of members etc. which
requires him to be a person who has worked as a member for a long period of
time before he assumes charge as President. The President is also a part of the
Committee to select persons to function as members of the Tribunal. An existing
Vice-President, and more so the Senior Vice-President, would be fully
experienced to discharge these functions. A retired High Court Judge is not
likely to be aware of the plethora of judgements, reports, magazines etc.
dealing with the tax matters. Speaking for myself I do not think the experiment
of appointing a retired High Court judge as the President of the Tribunal was
at all successful.  

For almost two decades moves have now been afoot to redraft
our income-tax law. It was way back in 1997 that “A Working Draft of the
Income-tax Bill, 1997” saw the light of day. This was followed in August 2009
by the Direct Taxes Code. Later, the Direct Taxes Code Bill 2010 was published.
It is undoubtedly necessary to redraft the entire Act and not merely to move
piecemeal amendments. However, one has to bear in mind that several critical
sections have already been interpreted by the High Courts and the Supreme
Court. If in the process of redrafting them, different language is used, even
though the same may appear to be more elegant, it may start the ball of fresh
litigation rolling once again. This would be not only time but money consuming
and cause harassment to the assessee, though of course it may fill the pockets
of tax lawyers and practitioners. The net gain may be that the Government would
be able to collect more taxes from them!

A professional in the field of law is often asked which is
the moment in his legal practice or which is the case or matter which he has
argued or handled which has left him with a sense of enduring satisfaction. For
myself I would say that what is most satisfying is to note with admiration how
those who have passed through my Chambers have overcome that handicap and
achieved enviable eminence in their own legal careers.

Another question a lawyer is often asked is what is most
essential for success in the legal profession. My answer is simple: the ability
to find an all understanding spouse who will (a) put up with ill-temper (which
the lawyer can’t afford to exhibit in the Court room or in his Chamber and,
consequently, reserves it for the residence) (b) tolerate and overlook his
forgetting specific occasions and (c) be immune to his lack of punctuality in
attending to and looking after personal and social commitments.

One gathers from newspaper reports, instructions issued by
the CBDT and comments regarding the provisions in the Finance Bill, 2018, that
it is proposed to vest more and more powers in the Centralised Processing
Centre (CPC) in Bengaluru. Whilst such a move may be theoretically supportable
I feel that the Government should first put in place a satisfactory and
reliable mechanism to resolve grievances and objections raised by assessees.
Let me refer to only one example. Nowadays, if a refund is due to an assessee
it is adjusted against what is shown as arrears due from him in the records of
the all powerful, all knowing, but “in purdah” CPC. Protests lodged with
incontrovertible proof in support, against the proposed adjustments are dealt
with by a standard response: “Your objections ‘if any’ have been considered and
no interference is called for.” Representations and appeals for justice to the
higher authorities have invariably proved futile. The use of the words “if any”
shows a complete lack of application of mind (if any exists). Today an assessee
can contact his Assessing Officer and personally explain to him that the
alleged arrears are not outstanding by producing documents in support of such
assertion and by responding to any doubts entertained by the Officer. This
avenue is no longer open.

High sounding words and phrases are used to declare what the
Government proposes to do. For example, it is stated 1) there would now be
team-based assessments with dynamic jurisdiction 2) there would be
jurisdiction-free assessment i.e., a tax payer in Delhi could be assessed by a
tax officer situated elsewhere in India 3) the role of the tax officials will
be split into functions of assessments, verification, tax demands, recovery
etc.” What these phrases mean is not at all clear to me and perhaps not even to
the tax officers!

The new system is allegedly designed for minimizing the scope
for corruption. However, the cure seems to be worse than the disease at least
from the point of view of the honest tax payer who will now be denied the
opportunity of a direct and fair hearing.

If minimal interaction between the assessee and the tax
officials is the goal for allegedly avoiding corruption it would, perhaps, be
more meaningful to formulate rules limiting interaction between the citizen and
ministers and the citizen and powerful Government Officers as it is these
interactions which are probably most corruption prone.

I had better now conclude these ramblings before my pen runs
completely dry and before the reader, (if any), of this article wants to turn
over the pages to venture to the next article, assuming he has not already
entered slumberland. 

It is said that what distinguishes a good lawyer from the
run-of-the-mill ones is that he can articulate his views precisely and briefly.
I have hopelessly failed so to qualify as I have over-stepped the limit
suggested by the Editor for the length of this article!

I must record that the Editor had very thoughtfully and
helpfully suggested as one of the titles for my proposed article “Happy Hours
at the Bar.” I can only say that whilst young there are undoubtedly happy hours
at the Law Bar, but as one grows older, one appreciates the happier hours one
can spend at a conventional Bar which creates a feeling of solidity,induced by
consuming liquidity!  


THE EDITORIAL TRIO AND ANGEL IN HEAVEN

It is undoubtedly a historical event that BCAJ is completing
50 years of its knowledge dissemination “YADNYA” and it would be
pleasantly nostalgic to remember past Editorial Trio in heaven Sarvashree
Shamrao Argade, Bhupendra Dalal and Ajay Thakkar and our personal friend and a
permanent member of the Journal Committee Shri Jal Dastur.

It was a typical and a loving combination of knowledge, wit,
fun, hobby and a common desire to be of help to the fellow professionals
through the medium of BCA journal.

Each one had a different style, nature, professional
expertise and yet an ability to share was a common factor.

Shri Shamrao Argade was the founder Editor. He used to
write editorials in Marathi English, with an abundant sprinkling of Sanskrit
shlokas, Shri Bhupendra Dalal would write in Gujarati English with enjoyable
spread of a Gujarati poetry whereas Ajay Thakkar would write in his queen’s
English with a wide ranging background of philosophy.

Shamrao was a “DADA” to his friends and juniors. Argade would
be incomplete without a suffix of “DADA”. He had lots of interest, except a
keen interest in professional practice. He would spend a lot of time with his
political colleagues in the erstwhile Bhartiya Jan Sangh, a sizable time for
the activities of our Institute as a four time central council member and
shuttling between Mumbai and Delhi. He always had plenty of time for
establishment and taking care of BCA journal which was his baby child till the
journal reached its adolescent age, and of course time for his numerous friends
like Ambalal Kaka (Thakkar), one of the crazy seven who established BCAS on 6th
July 1949. These seven persons as founders of BCAS wanted to test limits to
their knowledge which in itself is limitless and it was reason enough for them
to establish the BCAS just 5 days after the birth of our Institute.

Besides this, Argade Dada was fond of his Lonavala farmhouse,
where there were plenty of trees, flower beds and what not and he would
genuinely love to show his garden to all his visitors.

Naturally, he had no time for his clients and office. His
clients would believe that their CA is extremely busy. In spite of all this he
called himself a practising C.A !

Shri Bhupendra Dalal was a poet president and poetic
editor. He was extremely passionate about everything that he did. However,
audit was his love bird and income tax law and more than that income tax
practice
was on his hate list. History must have been his pet subject and
even in audit,   he was fond of
historical practices. Travel, trekking and trying to catch Himalayan heights
(in literal sense) was his favourite past time. He would be more than an
enthusiastic child to make a presentation of his slide shows and narrating his
historical travels.

He was a “Laxman” for his elder cousin Shri Arvindbai
Dalal. As a result of Arvindbai’s absence from office on account of numerous
central council meetings and lecture meetings and other related work,
Bhupendrabhai would be fighting like a warrior on office front and at the same
time he had also taken the responsibility of BCAJ editorial work with equal
enthusiasm.

Shri Ajay Thakkar was a different lovable fish. He
never wanted to become a Chartered Accountant or even a commerce graduate. He
was passionate about many unknown things, but was an obedient son as well. He
wanted to keep serpents as pet. Our country lost another Baba Amte staying in a
jungle. He would find mathematical Fibonacci numbers in abundance in nature,
plant, jungle. He wanted to do his Masters in Arts and further do his PhD in
Philosophy. He was, with lot of difficulties, persuaded to be a commerce
graduate and must have created a record of all sorts by using only one 400
pages note book throughout his four years period in the college and managed to
keep that note book without a touch of pen or pencil except for the name
written on the first page.

College lecture bunking was his second nature. Once he saw
his father walking through cross maidan to go to I.T Office and Ajay could not
go back to avoid his father. He immediately sat down near a beggar hiding
himself behind a torn umbrella used by the beggar. In spite of all this, he
became a commerce graduate and then even a Chartered Accountant. His father
once told him that one is required to study to pass the CA examination. He then
hid himself in a room for about 2 months before the examination and passed.

Once a Chartered Accountant, he paid attention to whatever
work was allotted to him by his father Ambalal Kaka. He had a special passion
for income tax law and frequent appearance before Tribunal or CIT(A) became a
routine for him. With memory tips from none other than Nani Palkhiwala, he
would anytime impress the ITAT members with facts and figures on the tip of his
tongue.

As a son of a founder member Ambalal Kaka, he instantly
became a chela of Argade dada and his journey with journal was continuous till
his death. He was a philosophical editor with queen’s English and fluent
writing skills. His prose would also sound like poetry when writing editorials,
when he became editor of the journal and later as a member of editorial board.

The Editorial Trio of these persons now enjoying heavenly
hospitality would be incomplete without mentioning another heavenly personality
Shri Jal Dastur. Although Jalbhai, as he was popularly known and
affectionately called, never became an editor of BCA journal, he was a
permanent member of the Journal Committee. He would be an excellent aid to any
Editor and I can say this with personal experience during my 5 years stint as
an editor. He would always communicate with the editor through his printed
“letters to the editor” and would be a permanent guide to the editor on company
law matters.

It was a treat to see Jalbhai in his second floor office in
Dol-Bin-Shir. It was a fairly large office, but there would be a cluster of books
and files near and in his cabin. Whenever you visit his office for journal work
or even a personal query, he would immediately take out a book, Institutes’
Guidance note and file notes to give you a studied reply. To keep eye contact
with him during the course of his own study for your query, you have to see him
by bending a little and look at him through the valley created between the
books and files. You only face him straight when you are sipping hot boiling
tea offered with love and affection in a large cup. He would otherwise be
seriously immersed in books and notes to solve your problem. Other roughly 2/3rd
portion of his office would be fairly empty and lonely.

These apparently serious looking our loving friends would now
be chitchatting in heaven together. However, even during life time, behind
their serious looking face would be a naughty child with Jalbhai narrating
funny Parsi anecdotes, Bhupendrabhai narrating his gujju tales, Ajay being
master of ceremony, making you laugh with his own straight face and Dada would
pretend to be not listening while displaying a gentle smile of acknowledgement
on his face.

In the 50th year of BCA journal’s journey, I am
sure; many of us truly miss them. I am sure their good wishes would make the
journey smoother, enjoyable and lovable.   

(Shri Ashok Dhere served as the fourth Editor of
the BCA Journal from the year 2000 to 2005)

Summary Of Supreme Court’s (Sc) Judgement On Operations Of Multinational Accounting Firms (MAF) In India

Date: 23rd February, 2018

Writ Petitions:

Civil Appeal No. 2422 of 2018: Arising out
of SLP (Civil) No. 1808 of 2016 and Write Petition  (Civil) No. 991 of 2013

Issue/s Involved:

“Whether the MAFs are operating in India in
violation of law in force in a clandestine manner; and no effective steps are
being taken to enforce the said law. If so, what orders are required to be
passed to enforce the said law.”

 

Averments:

a.  MAF are operating illegally in India and
providing Accounting, Auditing, Book Keeping and Taxation Services.

b.  They are operating with the help of ICAFs
illegally.

c.  Operations of such entities are, inter alia,
in violation of Section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956, sections 25 and 29 of
the CA Act, the Code of Conduct laid down by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (‘ICAI’ or ‘Institute’).

 

(Reference: Report dated 15th
September, 2003 of Study Group of the ICAI)

 

Study Group Report dated 15th September
2003:

The Study Group was constituted by the
Council of the ICAI in July, 1994 to examine attempts of MAFs to operate in
India without formal registration with the ICAI and without being subject to
any discipline and control. This was in the wake of liberalisation policy and
signing of GATT by India.

 

It was noted by the study group that the
bodies corporate formed for management consultancy services were being used as
a vehicle for procuring professional work for sister firms of Chartered
Accountants. Members of ICAI were associating with such board of directors,
managers etc. to provide escape route to MAFs. CA function must be discharged
by animate persons and not in anim bodies.

 

The concerns of various segments of CAs
noted by the Study Group are as under:

 

a)  Sharing fees with non-members;

b)  Networking and consolidation of Indian firms;

c)  Need to review the advertisement aspect;

d)  Multi-disciplinary firms with other
professionals;

e)  Commercial presence of multi-national
accounting firms;

f)   Impact of similarity of names between
accountancy firms and MAFs/Corporates engaged in MSC-Scope for reform and
regulation;

g)  Strengthening knowledge base and skills;

h)  Facilitating growth of Indian CA firms &
Indian CAs internationally;

i)   Perspective of the Government, corporate
world and regulatory bodies and role of ICAI;

j)   Introduction of joint audit system;

k)  Recognition of qualifications under Clause (4)
of Part I of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 for the
purpose of promoting partnership with any persons other than the CA in practice
within India or abroad;

l)   Review the concept of exclusive areas keeping
in view the larger public interest involved so as to include internal audit
within it;

m) Conditionalities prescribed by certain
financial institutions/Governmental agencies insisting appointment of select few
firms as auditors/concurrent auditors/consultants for their borrowers.

 

Further allegations by the writ petitioners
directly filed in SC:

PricewaterhouseCoopers Private Limited
(PwCPL) and their network audit firms operating in India, apart from other violations,
have indulged in violation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy, Reserve
Bank of India Act (RBI)/Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) which requires
investigation. Firms operating under the brand name of PwCPL received huge sums
from abroad in violation of law and applicable policies but the concerned
authorities have failed to take appropriate action. M/s. Pricewater House,
Bangalore was the Auditor of the erstwhile Satyam Computer Services Limited
(Satyam) for more than eight years but failed to discover the biggest
accounting scandal which came to light only on confession of its Chairman in
January, 2009. The said scandal attracted penalty of US Dollars 7.5 Million
(approx. Rs.38 crores) from the US Regulators apart from other sanctions. Since
certification by Auditors is of great importance in the matter of payment of
subsidies, export incentives, grants, share of government revenue and taxes,
sharing of costs and profits in PPP (Public Private Partnership) contracts etc.,
oversight of professionals engaged in such certification has to be as per law
of the land. Accordingly, even though investigation was sought by the
petitioner vide letter dated 1st July, 2013, no satisfactory
investigation has been done.

 

ICAI Expert Group Report dated 29th July
2011 (Report made in the wake of Satyam scam):

 

The expert group constituted by the ICAI
also examined the issues concerning operation of MAFs in India. Issues
referred to the Expert Group
by the High Powered Committee group of the
ICAI are:

 

a)  Manner in which certain Indian CA firms, hold
out to public that they are actually MAFs in India, the manner in which
assignments are allotted, determination of nexus/linkage. The representatives
of certain Indian CA firms carry two visiting cards one of Indian CA firm and
another of a multinational entity. They represent the multinational entity and
seek work for Indian CA firm.

b)  Name used by auditor in his/her report – The
basic question was whether the auditors of M/s. Satyam had correctly mentioned the
name of their firm in the audit report.

c)  Terms and conditions and cost payable for use
of international brand name – No international firm will allow its name to be
used by all and sundry. The question is what is the consideration whether it is
determined as a percentage of fee or profits and whether it is within the
framework of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, Regulations framed, thereunder
Code of Conduct and Ethics.

d)  Nature of extra benefits accrued to the Indian
CA firms having foreign affiliation.

e)  How the MAFs placed their foot in India – Long
back in a meeting with RBI it was informed that the MAFs entered in India to
set up representative offices. No documents are available as regards the terms
and conditions set out while granting them permission to operate in India.
However, the RBI vide its letter No.Ref.DBS.ARS.No.744/08:91:008 (ICAI)/
2003-2004 dated 23rd March, 2004 inter alia, mentioned that
“RBI has not permitted any foreign audit firm to set up office or to carry out
any activity in India under the current exchange control regulations.

f)   Contravention of permission originally
granted by Government – What was the original permission given for these firms
to enter into India and subsequently whether they are adhering to the terms and
conditions of that permission? If contravention was found to take up with
Government/FIPB – for approaching Government or FIPB, ICAI must have
information as to the nature of permission given. As already mentioned, no
documents are available indicating the nature of permission granted. What is
the current position of international trade in accounting and related services?
The opening up of accounting and related services, can be linked to reciprocal
opening up by developed countries.

g)  Additional powers required by ICAI to curb the
malpractices – If under the existing legislation, ICAI does not have enough
powers to curb this practice, whether they would need more powers. A separate
proposal for amendment of Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 has been sent by the
Council to the Government seeking additional powers.

 

The Expert Group observed that MAF solicits professional work in an international brand name.
They have registered Indian CA firms with the ICAI with the same brand names
which are their integral part. There is no regulatory regime for their
accountability. Thus, the principle of reciprocity u/s. 29 of the CA Act,
Section 25 prohibiting corporates from chartered accountancy practice and Code
of Ethics prohibiting advertisement and fee sharing are flouted. The MAFs also
violate FDI policy in the field of accounting, auditing, book keeping, taxation
and legal services.

The Expert Group recommended that no person or entity and specially Chartered Accountants can
hold out to public that they are operating in India as or on behalf or in their
trade name and in any other manner so as to represent them being part of or
authorised by MAFs to operate on their behalf in India or they are actually
representing MAFs or they are MAFs office/representatives in India, except
those registered with ICAI in terms of clause (Hi) as a network, in accordance
with network guidelines as notified by ICAI from time to time.

 

Status Report by the ICAI

The Institute called for information from
171 Indian CA firms perceived to be having international affiliation to examine
whether they are functioning within the framework of CA profession. However,
the said firms were reluctant to submit copies of agreements with foreign
entities and their tax returns. Certain CA firms submitted the documents by
masking certain portions contained in their agreements, partnership deeds and
assessment orders/income tax returns claiming confidentiality and commercially
sensitive nature of the documents. Some of the firms did not provide the
details. Some of the findings from the data collected were as follows:

 

a)  The multinational entity has granted
permission to the participating firms in the network to use the brand name.
This is notwithstanding the fact whether the firms have signed the License
Agreement with the entity or not. The relationship between members and firms
and how these are governed from same offices under common management and
control is not disclosed. The data disclosed on the website, however, clearly
brings out the linkage.

b)  Though some of the firms participating in the
networks have not signed the Verein document of Name License Agreement, yet
while making remittances to the multinational entity, the revenue of the entire
network is taken into account.

c)  Firms received financial grants from non-CA
firms.  A member of the Institute is prohibited
from receiving any part of profits from a non-member of the Institute. Such an
act on the part of a member/firm seems to be in violation of Item (3) of Part I
of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act 1949.

d)  The networking firms have made remittances to
a multinational entity, sharing their revenue which they have claimed to be
towards subscription fees, technology cost and administration cost etc.
in violation of Code of Ethics and regulations under CA Act.

e)  Firms used the words such as “In Association
with ….”, Associates of ……..”, Correspondents of ……” etc. on the
stationery, letter-heads, visiting cards thereby violating provisions of Item
(7) of Part I of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act,1949.  The networking firms in Network and all their
personnel are using the domain name identical to the name of the multinational
entity in their email IDs and the same is displayed in their visiting cards.

f)   The obligations set out in respect of some of
the CA firms as per the sub-licensee agreement give a clear indication that the
CA firms are under the management and supervision of a non-CA firm for matters
such as admission of partners, merger, purchase of assets, etc.

g)  Some of the firms in Network have admitted
that the global network identifies broad market opportunities, develops
strategies, strengthens network’s internal products and promotes international
brand. The member firms in India also gain access to brand and marketing
materials developed by their overseas affiliate, thereby indirectly soliciting
professional work.

h)  Most of these firms have a name license
agreement to use International brand name. One of the terms of such agreement
is that apart from common professional standards etc., the Indian
affiliates shall harmonize their policies etc. with the global policies
of the network. In this manner, matters such as selection and appointment of
partners, acquisition of assets, investment in capital etc. are
regulated through the means of such agreements and at time even the
representative voting is held by an aligned private limited company rather than
the CA firms themselves. As a consequence of this, the control of the Indian CA
firms is effectively placed in the hands of non-members/companies/foreign
entities.

i)   The member firms are required to refer the
work among themselves. In respect of some firms, referral fee is payable and
receivable. Agreements also provided for use of name and logo. Payment/receipt
of referral fee is prohibited as per code of conduct applicable to CAs.

 

In the light of the aforesaid findings,
following recommendations were made to the Council:

 

a) The Council should consider action against the
firms which had not given the full information.

b) Consider action against the firms who are
sharing revenue with multinational entity/consulting entity in India which may
include cost of marketing, publicity and advertising as against the ethics of
CAs or receiving grants from them.

c) Action to be taken against the audit firms
distributing its work to other firms and allowing them access to all
confidential information without the consent of the client;

d) Require the CA firms to maintain necessary data
about the remittances made and received on account of networking arrangement or
sharing of fee;

e) Consider action against firms being paid or
offered referral fee;

f)  To disclose their international
affiliation/arrangement every year to the Institute;

g) Council should consider action against the
firms using name and logo of international networks and securing professional
business by means not open to CAs in India;

h) Only CAs and CA firms registered with ICAI
should be permitted to provide audit and assurance services. Wherever MAFs are
operating in India, directly or indirectly, they should not engage in any audit
and assurance services without ‘No Objection’ and permission from ICAI and RBI.

 

Directives issued by the court:

 

Important observations of the SC:

 

“Though the Committee analysed available
facts and found that MAFs were involved in violating ethics and law, it took
hyper technical view that non availability of complete information and the
groups as such were not amenable to its disciplinary jurisdiction in absence of
registration. A premier professionals body cannot limit its oversight functions
on technicalities and is expected to play proactive role for upholding ethics
and values of the profession by going into all connected and incidental
issues.” (Page 68)

 

“It can hardly be disputed that
profession of auditing is of great importance for the economy. Financial
statements audited by qualified auditors are acted upon and failures of the
auditors have resulted into scandals in the past. The auditing profession
requires proper oversight.”
(Page 69)

 

On the basis of various reports and findings
as discussed aforesaid, the Court issued the following directives:

 

a)   The Union of India may constitute a three
member Committee of experts to look into the question whether and to what
extent the statutory framework to enforce the letter and spirit of Sections 25
and 29 of the CA Act and the statutory Code of Conduct for the CAs requires
revisit so as to appropriately discipline and regulate MAFs.

b)  To consider need for appropriate legislation
on the pattern of Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 and Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 in US or any other appropriate mechanism for
oversight of profession of the auditors.

c)   Question whether on account of conflict of
interest of auditors with consultants, the auditors’ profession may need an
exclusive oversight body may be examined.

d)  It may also consider steps for effective
enforcement of the provisions of the FDI policy and the FEMA Regulations
referred to above.

e)   Such Committee may be constituted within two
months. Report of the Committee may be submitted within three months
thereafter.

f)   The Enforcement Directorate (ED) may complete
the pending investigation within three months.

g)  ICAI may further examine all the related
issues at appropriate level as far as possible within three months and take
such further steps as may be considered necessary.

 

(The above decision is a summery. Full
text of the decision may be read on the Supreme Court portal:
http://sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2013/35041/35041_2013_Judgement_23-Feb-2018.pdf
)


10 Section 142(2A) – Special audit – Direction for special audit without application of mind – Objection of assessee not considered – Order for special audit not valid

1.      
(2018) 401 ITR 74 (Kar)

Karnataka
Industrial Area Development Board vs. ACIT

A.Ys.:
2013-14 & 2014-15,

Date
of Order: 02nd January, 2018


The
petitioner is a Government of Karnataka undertaking, engaged in the activities
of development of industrial areas within the State of Karnataka. The relevant
period is A. Ys. 2013-14 and 2014-15. The petitioner is already subject to
audit at the hands of the Controller and Auditor General of India (C & AG)
as well as the independent chartered accountant, and also under the provisions
of the KIADB Act itself and had already produced these two audit reports for
the said two years before the Assessing Officer. For the relevant years, the
petitioner assessee had raised its objections for the proposal for special
audit u/s. 142(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, without application of
mind the Assessing Officer issued directions for the special audit.  

 

The
petitioner assessee filed writ petition and challenged the said directions for
special audit. The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as
under:

 

“i)   The purpose of section 142(2A) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 is to get a true and fair view of the accounts produced by
the assessee so that the special audit conducted at the instance of the Revenue
may yield more revenue in the form of income-tax and it is not expected to be a
mere paper exercise or a repetitive audit exercise. Therefore, the special
circumstances must exist to direct the “special audit” u/s. 142(2A) of the Act
and such special circumstances or the special reasons must be discussed in
detail in the order u/s. 142(2A) itself.

 

ii)    It prima facie appeared that the assessing
authority had not only directed the special audit in the case of the assessee,
a Government undertaking already subject to audit at the hands of the C &
AG as well as the independent chartered accountant under the provisions of the
Act under which it was constituted, rather mechanically, but at the fag end of
the limitation period, perhaps just to buy more time to pass the assessment
order in the case of the assessee, which admittedly for the period in question
enjoyed exemption from income-tax under section 11.

 

iii)  The orders neither disclosed the discussion on the
objections of the assessee to the special audit and at least in one case for
the A. Y. 2013-14, the assessing authority did not even wait for the objections
to be placed on record and before they were furnished on 29/03/2016,he had already passed the order on 28/03/2016 while the limitation for passing the
assessment order was expiring on 31/03/2016. The orders u/s. 142(2A) could not be sustained.

9 Section 264(4) of I. T. Act, 1961 – Revision – Scope of power of Commissioner – Waiver of right to appeal by assessee – Appeals filed on similar issue for other assessment years – Not ground for rejection of application for revision – Revision petition maintainable

1.      
(2018) 400 ITR 497 (Del)

Paradigm
Geophysical Ltd. vs. CIT

A.Y.:
2012-13,  Date of Order: 13th Nov.,
2017


The
assessee was a non-resident company and a tax resident of Australia. It
provided and developed software enabled solutions and annual maintenance
services to the solutions supplied by it. For the A. Y. 2012-13, the assessee,
inter alia applied the provisions of section 44BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961
and filed its return. Pursuant to the scrutiny assessment, the Assessing
Officer issued a draft assessment order treating the receipts as royalty or fee
from technical services. No objections were filed u/s. 144C(2) of the Act, by
the assessee and therefore, no directions were issued by the DRP. Consequently,
the Assessing Officer passed a final order dated 11.05.2015, u/s. 144C(3)(b)
r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act confirming the adjustments made in the draft
assessment order. He applied the provisions of section 44DA and computed the
total income of the assessee. The assessee did not file any appeal against the
order of the Assessing Officer.


On
01.02.2016, the assessee filed a revision petition u/s. 264 of the Act, before
the Commissioner on the ground that the Assessing Officer had wrongly not
applied section 44BB and had incorrectly invoked and applied section 44DA. The
assessee submitted that for the A. Y. 2012-13, it had not availed of the remedy
of appeal and had invoked the alternative remedy under section 264. The
Commissioner declined to interfere with the order primarily on the ground that
on similar issue which arose in the A. Ys. 2011-12 and 2013-14, the assessee
had filed appeals before the appellate authority, and therefore, the revision
petition u/s. 264 for A. Y. 2012-13 was not maintainable. 

The
assessee filed writ petition and challenged the order of the Commissioner. The
Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)   The Commissioner could not refuse to
entertain a revision petition filed by the assessee u/s. 264, if it was
maintainable, on the ground that a similar issue arose for consideration in
another year and was pending adjudication in appeal before another forum.

 

ii)    The time for filing appeal had expired. The
assessee had waived its right to file appeal and had not filed any appeal
against the order in question before the Commissioner (Appeals) or Tribunal.
Therefore, the negative stipulations in clause (a), (b) and (c) of section
264(4) were not attracted.

 

iii)   When a statutory right was conferred on an
assessee, it imposes an obligation on the authority. New and extraneous
conditions, not mandated and stipulated, expressly or by implication, could not
be imposed to deny recourse to a remedy and right of the assessee to have his
claim examined on merits. The Commissioner could not refuse to exercise the
statutorily conferred revisional power because the Assessing Officer was his
subordinate and under his administrative control.

 

iv)   The Commissioner while exercising power under
section 264 exercised quasi-judicial powers and he must pass a speaking and a
reasoned order. The reasoning could not be sustained for it was contrary to the
Legislative mandate of section 264.

 

v)   The matter is remanded to the
Commissioner to decide the revision petition afresh and in accordance with
law.”

 

Change before you get replaced!

On the occasion of the
launch of the Golden Jubilee year of the venerable BCAJ, I take the liberty of
doing a bit of crystal ball gazing on behalf of the tax professionals of the country.
The objective of this article is only to take a peek at what the future could
possibly have in store for us. Readers are therefore advised to not get into
technicalities. It is the message that counts and not the form.

Part I

The date is 31st
December, 2018. The time is 7.59 pm

Millions of Indians are
glued to their TV sets as their untiring and zealous Prime Minister Mr.
Narendra Damodardas Modi is about to address the nation. Several viewers are
ominously recounting his speech on the night of 8th November, 2016
when he broke the news about demonetisation. Everyone is wondering what will be
announced today.

At sharp 8.00 pm, the PM’s
face appears on TV channels. There is hushed silence as everyone strains to
catch the first words of the PM.

“Mitron”, he begins.

After the customary
pleasantries, he gets down to business and within a few seconds shocks the
nation by saying that “with effect from midnight of 31st December,
2018, there will be no tax on income. The Income-tax Act, 1961 will stand abolished
almost 57 years after it was enacted.”

For a few seconds, there
is stunned silence in all the living rooms in the country. The disbelief is
writ large on the faces of the millions glued to their television sets. But as
reality sinks in, there is chaos everywhere. As expected, people rush to their
mobile phones trying to send messages on all possible types of media. Whatsapp
crashes in a few seconds as millions of messages flood the system. Facebook
comes alive with all kinds of comments and remarks. Twitter suddenly reports
that #incometaxabolished starts trending at No. 1 spot.

As expected, television
news channels go berserk and excited reporters start shouting at the top of
their voices. There is a rush to interview Mr. Subramaniam Swamy who has been
one of the most vociferous proponents of the “abolish income-tax” suggestion.
Some of the business channels also start interviewing the stunned “tax experts”
and “tax gurus” of the country. Most questions revolved around finding out what
these experts/gurus would do once the Income-tax Act is abolished. How will
they keep themselves occupied going forward?

The new year eve parties
all over the country suddenly see a drop in attendance as thousands of affected
tax practitioners try and comprehend the impact of this huge announcement made
by the Prime Minister. The bolt from the blue which most people never expected
would ever come had actually been delivered. And what a timing!

Income-tax Act, 1961
repealed w.e.f. 1st January, 2019! Before becoming a senior citizen
the Act has been given euthanasia by the government. Chartered Accountants all
over the country suddenly open up their offices and start reviewing their
financials for past few years as well as current year. Everyone begins to
estimate how much he/she is likely to lose out in terms of gross revenues once
the Income-tax practice closes down.

There are thousands of
Chartered Accountants in India who have, over the decades, built up a large tax
practice. They have been heavily dependent on the compliance related tax
practice where thousands of tax returns, lakhs of TDS statements etc are filed
year after year. As we all know, in recent years, a large portion of the
traditional income-tax practice of Chartered Accountants has been reduced to a
compliance driven practice. With the advent of automation and e-governance,
e-filing and e-payments have become the order of the day. These have shifted
the focus of people from knowledge to data entry and computerisation. Many
Chartered Accountants who refused to see the writing on the wall,are woken up
from their self imposed slumber. The prospect of their sweat and toil of
several years being on the verge of disintegrating into nothing is real and
even closer to the present than ever imagined! Very few CAs realise that the
way technology is evolving, they could anyways be redundant. Globally, there is
greater acceptance of this fact and those of us who are not upgrading our skill
sets continually, risk being replaced by machines. The ‘routine’ tax practice
is clearly at risk.

Let us take a look at the
list of various categories of people who will be affected by this dramatic
announcement by the Prime Minister:

a)    Income-tax practitioners which would include
Chartered Accountants

b)   Employees of the Central Government posted in
the Income-tax departments across the country

c)    Middlemen who connive with the corrupt and
“fix cases” at the assessment and appellate stages

d)   Publishing houses who print thousands of
books every year on taxation

e)    Owners of several websites which provide tax
return filing services

f)    Lawyers and counsel who provide litigation
services to tax payers and their tax consultants at the various appellate
stages

g)   Television channels who spend hours discussing
the Budget and other tax matters alongwith “tax experts” and “tax gurus”

h)    Many of us at the Bombay Chartered
Accountants’ Society and other professional bodies who are part of the various
committees that spend so much time on income-tax related programs / articles
etc.

The objective of this
article is merely to prod you, our reader, into sitting up and thinking. Are
you ready for a disruption that threatens to completely change your work
profile? Are you doing anything to hone your skills towards an alternative area
of practice?
You have got a
Mediclaim policy to take care of a medical emergency and an insurance policy to
take care of your loved ones in case of the ultimate emergency. But have you
spent even one rupee on providing for a professional emergency – an emergency
of the type that artificial intelligence can bring upon you? Do you even
know that as blockchain technology becomes more and more prevalent and
pervasive, there may come a day when a taxpayer need not even have to file a
tax return? All the data that goes into the return today would anyways be
already available with the government?
Who will then come to you for filing
tax returns? What then?

Once e-assessments become
the order of the day, imagine how much time will be saved? Imagine a
possibility that the client will tell you that he does not need you to respond
to the notices.
He could sit on his laptop and respond directly to the
notices! You are not required for representing your client before a tax
officer. What then?

Today, almost every piece
of information under the sun is easily traceable on the internet with the help
of Google. For case laws, one does not need to remember citations. One does not
need to subscribe to costly magazines and/or websites. All this is virtually
floating around free of cost on the world wide web! Why would anyone call you
up to ask you about a case law? What then?

Quarterly TDS statements
are basically a compilation of data. Preparing them and filing them does not
require rocket science. All it requires is a reliable data entry operator and a
robust software. Why would a company or a partnership firm come to you for this
service? Can they not outsource this work to a BPO or to a freelance data entry
operator at a fraction of the fees that you would charge? What then?

Such simple examples are
enough to make us think hard about the harsh future ahead. The prospect of the
entire Income-tax Act, 1961 being repealed is definitely something that will
force us to think even harder.

Part II

I took the further liberty
of asking a few people known to me (and to most if not all of you) as to how
they would react to such a situation and how they would deal with this kind of
a change. Every effort has been made to speak to different categories of people
who are likely to be affected by such a change.Their interesting responses will
surely help our readers in understanding how others (who have a lot at stake in
the continuation of the Income-tax Act) would handle disruptive change that may
even do away with the Income-tax Act itself. If their thinking helps our
readers in being in a better state of preparedness for an “Apocalypse Now” type
of situation, this article would have served its purpose. Here’s what some of
the people I spoke to
have to say:

Menaka Doshi, Managing Editor, Bloomberg Quint

Question:The
citizens of India are very familiar with your face as we see you regularly in
the media. Your coverage of financial world is well appreciated by thousands. A
major chunk of the discussions that you spearhead in the media are related to
Income-tax. Surely, a lot of your own time as well as that of your team members
would be spent in researching on tax matters and in talking about it.

We want to
know what it would be like for you if the Income-tax Act, 1961 is suddenly
repealed one day! A big section of the content that you thrive on for your
career and your job would suddenly vanish. How would you adapt to this change?
If you were to start preparing for such a change in advance, what would you do?

Menaka Doshi: I can’t tell if your hypothesis is a dream or a
nightmare. Personally, what a pleasant surprise it would be to “take home” my
full salary. Professionally, yes I’d miss covering all the fiscal
ammunition.
The big retroactive landmines and the dense language of Section
9, the MAT missile and the LTCG bombs. But I wouldn’t worry about my job. After
all, there is still GST.

T. P. Ostwal (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question: As
someone who is very active on the international tax front, what would your
reaction be if, one fine day, we hear an announcement that the Income-tax Act,
1961 is abolished? Do you feel that tax professionals of India would be able to
survive by changing their home ground from India to other countries? Are we equipped
to provide truly international tax advice to foreigners engaged in
international trade even in those cases where the trade does not touch India?

T. P. Ostwal: The thought which you have brought about with this
question is very interesting and I wish that it should happen. I feel that it
would be a very bold decision by the Government to abolish the Income-tax Act.
The abolishment of the Income-tax Act has been immensely advocated by Dr.
Subramanian Swamy and I endorse his views. Unfortunately, neither the
Income-tax department nor the Government of India has the courage to do so. I
wish that they would do so for at least a short period on a trial and error
basis. During such period, they should abolish the Income-tax Act for 5 years
and clean up the whole system similar to the clean up being carried out under
the “Swachh Bharat Abhiyan”
. They should allow all the pending assessments
and appeals to be completed in this duration so as to start with a clean slate.
Subsequently they should introduce a simplified Income-tax law with a moderate
rate of tax. In this law, all the receipts should be treated as taxable and all
the expenditure should be allowed as a deduction. As such with the advent of
technology and with Aadhar being linked to everything, taxation of all the
transactions will be streamlined. This will give an opportunity to the people
of India to clean up their records and be straightforward in the future. It
would be pertinent to ensure that the new Income-tax Act is not being
complicated unlike the present system.

And as for your thought
that whether the professionals in India would be able to survive this
abolishment by changing their home ground and shifting to another country, this
thought is virtually an impossible task. Neither are Indian Chartered
Accountants equipped to handle international tax advices where India is the
subject matter of part of the transaction nor can they handle a transaction where
India is not a subject matter at all.
If you shift abroad on the premises
that Income-tax Act is abolished and you are going out of the country to advise
the foreigners, it is not an impossible task but we would definitely need to
gear up. There are professionals who have changed their home ground, gone
abroad and integrated themselves with the technical advancements in terms of
the laws of the world and as well advise on laws of the other countries. It is
not an unachievable task, but by and large 99% of our tax professionals are not
equipped to do that.

The Tax experts in India
can be classified in 3 categories

Domestic Tax Experts

Domestic – International
Tax Experts

International –
International Tax Experts

There are various tax
professionals in India who are well equipped to advise the clients and handle
matters within the domestic tax areas and a huge number of these professionals
are specialists. However, there are very few professionals who are specialists
on the Domestic – International tax front. Over a period of time, from 2001,
our tax professionals have gradually achieved proficiency in this field. Almost
10,000 professionals in India can handle Domestic – International tax
transactions. However, whether these 10,000 can handle International –
International tax transactions is questionable. Hardly 25-30 Chartered
Accountants may be in a position to handle international affairs entirely
outside India however, the rest of them may not be able to, in my personal
opinion.

By and large Indian tax
experts who have achieved the proficiency in advising international tax matters
can advise on the Domestic – International tax transactions as well, i.e.
application of Indian tax treaties with other countries. However, they are
neither efficient nor proficient in advising on the laws of the other
countries. This is because they are generally not expected to know the laws of
countries other than India and also practising on the laws of these other
countries may not be permissible. Consequently, they do not have expertise on
that subject.

Nevertheless,
theoretically it is quite possible to equip yourself with the knowledge of laws
of the other countries. Despite the fact that you know the laws of the other
country, the understanding of jurisprudence in that country is equally
important. Since the laws are interpreted in a particular manner by the judges
which could be different from the theoretical legal provision, this knowledge
is also extremely important. Those who keep abreast of the provisions of law
as well as the judicial interpretation in those countries can definitely embark
upon this idea of creating for themselves, professional opportunities abroad.

There are people from the large firms who have shifted abroad to their foreign
affiliates and thereby acquired that proficiency in foreign laws.
Unfortunately, if someone goes abroad for such opportunities they
settle there.

Therefore, if I am asked
this question today about the Indian experts practising in India and regarding
their ability to understand and work with these foreign laws with their current
skill set, I have my reservations. I doubt whether there are any people in a
position to do that except for the small number of 25-30 professionals I
mentioned earlier. A situation of abolishment of the Income-tax Act would
create challenges for the practitioners unless they take necessary steps. They
will have to look for other work opportunities, which fortunately, are ample in
a country like India. Taking an example of the recent case of Nirav Modi, a
forensic audit is required for such cases. There are specialists who undertake
such assignments and by becoming little more equipped, the tax professionals in
India can undertake such other assignments in India itself especially with the
ongoing Swachh Bharat Abhiyan of the Government of India, particularly Mr.
Narendra Modi.

Mr. Narendra Modi is
undertaking the responsibility of cleaning up everything and consequently the
entire system is being cleaned up as a part of the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan. I
must compliment and congratulate him and the Government for undertaking the
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in its true sense. Mr. Modi, is neither compromising nor
allowing anybody to compromise with any of the systems of the Government. For
achieving this, actions are necessary and he is undertaking such actions. Hence
the Chartered Accountants can definitely support the Government of India in its
endeavour for creating a Swachh Bharat by undertaking different and innovative
work rather than just getting bogged down to direct taxation related work. The
field of indirect taxation is humongous, wherein we can help the tax payers and
the Government of India. Further, there are multiple opportunities in the area
of company law and other system oriented work, which are substantial in the
country. We are barely around 2,50,000 Chartered Accountants. When a company
like Tata Consultancy Services has 3,00,000 employees, getting work
opportunities for 1,50,000 Chartered Accountants (assuming that they are
presently involved in direct tax work) in different fields is not at all a
difficult job.

Sonalee Godbole (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question:You
practice actively in income-tax matters and handle several large litigations
for your clients. You have also been regularly appearing in the ITAT on behalf
of your clients. What would be your reaction if the Income-tax Act, 1961 is
abolished one day? How would you spend your time once there is no litigation
left on tax matters and nothing is to be represented before the income-tax
authorities?If you had sufficient notice of such an event happening in future,
how would you prepare for it?

Sonalee Godbole: Government generates revenues from levy of
various taxes to meet demands of different stakeholders in the economy and also
to meet its economic development agenda like infrastructure development,
healthcare, education etc. Income tax revenues constitute a large portion of
the overall tax collections. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the income
tax will be abolished. If it was abolished, it shall be considered as one of
the most radical tax reforms.

If we assume that income
tax is abolished, then the consequential shortfall in income tax revenue will
have to be met through other sources like levy of some other taxes.
Introduction of new taxes will give opportunity and open new area of practice.
Knowing the past history – whenever new laws are introduced in India, due to
drafting inconsistencies, it is open field for litigation. All those who have
experience of litigation practice in the field of Income tax, will have edge
over new entrants. The introduction of new law/laws will keep us busy while we
understand, interpret and litigate.

Simultaneously,
Government will introduce several compliances for the citizens, in order to
ensure that relevant data is collected by the Government. The assignment of
doing compliances on behalf of clients will provide opportunities to
professionals.

If announcement for
abolition of income tax is made by the Government, I will start studying
various other laws which are presently applicable in the country, to look for
opportunities and also look at newly introduced laws. In our CA curriculum, we
are taught to tirelessly study and continuously update our knowledge. This will
certainly help while I explore newer areas of practice. Initially, it may cause
some hiccups but everything would fall in place in long term.

The citizen will bless the
Government for abolishing the income tax. But on a lighter note, students of CA
course will be most happy since, one of the most difficult and lengthy subjects
shall be removed from the curriculum of CA students. Such a relief!

Arun Giri, promoter, Taxsutra

Question:You
have co-founded a highly successful tax portal and have been able to create an
excellent network that goes beyond the cyber world and into the physical world.
Your business model revolves around income-tax related news. Although you do
have an indirect tax related section in your portal, the predominant brand that
you have created for your portal is in the world of income-tax. In this
scenario, how would you react to the abolition of the Income-tax Act by the
government in the near future? How would you deal with a sudden void created by
such an announcement?

Arun Giri: The abolition of income tax is an idea (better
described as ‘fantasy’) that has been advocated by some thinkers in the recent
past. It hasn’t taken off and for good reasons. Be that as it may, we enter the
fantasy land to answer this question!

A black swan event like
this gives one an opportunity to imagine and paint a different canvas … with
no scope of daily tax reporting except to the extent of past litigations, there
will be very little that will excite the Indian tax professional.That being
the case, tax professionals will have to look elsewhere… naturally they will
replace their Indian tax practice with a Asian or global tax practice. Several
hundred Indian tax firms may eye the GCC market, parts of Asian continent or
even Africa where tax laws are new/evolving, hence giving them an opportunity to
learn new tax laws and become proficient tax advisors for tax laws of other
jurisdictions.
Taxsutra will be happy to follow the customer and think
‘global.’ We would probably direct our focus towards global tax updates, with
focus on tax jurisdictions which would interest the Indian tax professional.

Associations like the
BCAS, with a glorious history, especially in tax, will also have to conduct
programs to re-skill the Indian tax advisors. Taxsutra shall probably be
partnering BCAS in this endeavour. If such a day were to ever pan out, it will
cause seismic changes in the tax world but what is life without being jolted
out of our comfort zones once in a while!

Kamlesh Varshney, Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation)-2
New Delhi

Question:
Sir – you have spent several years in the service of the income-tax department
and have, over the years, risen in rank. Today, you would be heading a team of
several hundred officers and other staff in the income-tax department. Like
you, there would be hundreds of other senior officers with thousands of staff
down the line. Basically, the work that all of you are doing is totally
dependent on what is laid down in the Income-tax Act, 1961. If we suddenly have
a situation where this Act is abolished, how would you and your team react?
Obviously, the government will either have to absorb such a large work force in
other jobs or will be left with no alternative but to seek large scale job
cuts. In either case, what do you think would be the reactions of the affected
people and how would they cope?

Kamlesh Varshney: First of all, I believe that this is a
hypothetical situation, which is unlikely to happen. However, if it happens it
would definitely be a disappointment for the tax administrators since the
wealth of experience they have gained over the years in tax matters and its
implementation would suddenly be lost. So far as job is concerned that would
not be an issue as being in government job, the work force would be absorbed
somewhere else. Having said that, I believe this situation would not arise
since direct tax has a special role to perform. Direct tax is one of the
major instruments for transfer payments (from rich to poor) meeting
socio-economic objective/principles enshrined in our constitution. Consumption
or transaction based tax, though easy to implement, fails to achieve transfer
payments.
They are also more burdensome for poor people as they spend
virtually everything that they earn. Hence, for a country like India which
believes in socio-economic objectives/principles, it is virtually impossible
for any Government to abolish
income tax.

Milin Mehta (a practicing Chartered Accountant)

Question:You
have been in tax practice for more than 30 years and are a partner in a firm
that was established several decades back. You have an established client base
to whom you are providing various tax services. Lately, this has become more
and more a compliance driven practice. There is already a challenge being faced
by such practitioners from the advent of automation – particularly
practitioners based in smaller towns of India. To add to this, if, one day, the
government decides to abolish the Income-tax Act, how would you react? What
steps do you think you need to take right away so that
if such a drastic decision is taken in the near future by the government, you
will be able to continue to practice
as a CA?

Milin Mehta: At the very outset I must state that it is a very
interesting thought. I am reminded of my own words a few years ago where I wanted
the participants of the regional conference of WIRC in Mumbai to imagine a
situation where three things happen: (1) No Tax Audits (2) No audit for Private
Limited Companies and (3) No scrutiny assessment. The purpose was to encourage
members to focus on purely “value added services” from compliance oriented. I
encouraged the members at that time to move to services where importance is
given more to the quality of service than merely stamp of being a CA.

I must admit that your
thought goes beyond what I had envisaged.

Let me analyse the
situation from a different angle. In the budget estimate of FY 2018-19, Income
Tax (personal tax, corporate tax and other taxes like STT, etc.) is estimated
at Rs. 11.39 lac crore out of gross revenue receipts (tax and non-tax and
without deducting the share of the state governments from the consolidated fund
of India) of Rs. 27.81 lac crore i.e. approximately 41% of the total gross
revenue. If you exclude the share of the Central Government (CG), this % goes
up to 57 % plus. Therefore, it is impossible to abolish the income tax, without
either substituting it with some other source of revenue or drastically
bringing down the expenditure of the CG.

I as a Chartered
Accountant very strongly feel that in either of the things, the CAs will have
enough work provided we are agile and flexible to re-train or re-orient
ourselves quickly enough to seize the opportunities. Considering the speed with
which our fraternity adapted to a framework change in the indirect taxes in a short
time shows distinctly that we as community are adept at the changes, though we
resist it a lot and many times unnecessarily.

I feel that one of the
reasons why we, as a firm, remained ahead of the pack is that we have adapted
with changes faster than other firms and have seized most of the opportunities.
As a firm, we have taken the principle (and I have been talking to younger
members and others entering the profession about this) that we must consider
that the changes are inevitable and it is only your ability to make yourself
relevant with the changes which would keep you ticking. Therefore, I feel that
I (and so also my fraternity of CAs) are ready to meet with the challenges that
would be thrown if the income tax is abolished and substituted with any other
source of revenues.

Let me look at this from a
further different angle. A large portion of the tax team of any CA office goes
in the area of compliance. Second in line will be representation and
litigation. Very little time is spent in advisory in true sense. Therefore,
majority of the time goes in completely “non-value added services”. The
services in these areas are like necessary evils and completely avoidable. The
question that I ask myself and my team is that “do we want to continue to do such
work?”. The answer is a clear “NO”. I would rather want to utilise my time more
creatively. I would want to devote my time in generating wealth and well being
and not in defending my position all the time.

The abolition of income
tax will free up time of a large number of very capable people, who I am sure
will devote their time in much more creative manner. It would be a shock at the
beginning but things would settle fast and my office and so will be most of the
agile CAs be more gainfully employed. I am not sure whether the income levels
of people will go up or not, but certainly their happiness quotient or their
quotient for contribution to the society will significantly go up.

I am not even slightly
afraid of this situation. In fact, I would welcome such situation as I do not
wish to be engaged in the work which does not produce anything.

Coming specifically to my
organisation, I feel that we are already ready for such challenges to face. The
culture is already developed to expect changes and many times initiate such
changes and challenge the situation and
be ready.

Before I end, I would
want to mention that success in our profession does not depend on what you know
but it completely depends on what is your capability of learning. I would
recommend my friends to create that capability and you will be able to face the
challenges of any change, no matter how significant it is, better than your
peers.
 

Anil Sathe (former editor of BCAJ & a practicing Chartered
Accountant)

Question:You
have been the editor of the BCAJ for several years and have been a member of
the Journal Committee of the BCAS for more than a decade. You are also a senior
tax practitioner. The BCAJ has a very strong coverage of articles and features
relating to income-tax. If, one day, the government decides to abolish the
Income-tax Act, how would you react? What steps do you think you need to take
right away so that if such a drastic decision is taken in the near future by
the government, you will be able to continue to practice as a CA? Also, if you
were to become the editor of BCAJ again, how would the journal look like
without any article or feature relating to income-tax?

Anil Sathe: If income tax is abolished! When I read this
hypothetical announcement, my first reaction was that of shock, then relief,
gradually giving way to concern. My relationship with tax laws is longer than
that with my wife. My tryst with income tax began in 1978 when I began my
articleship. Gradually the liking for tax law grew into a passion. When I started
practice, though I was involved in every traditional area of practice including
accounts and audit, my first love was tax. I still recall the heated
discussions/ deliberations with friends in our office, in BCA study circles and
RRCs. As I started public speaking and writing, tax was the subject that I
chose. In practice I would spend hours in the corridors of Aayakar Bhavan
attending assessments, later appeals and finally in the courtrooms of the
Tribunal. Of course tax practice did result in a significant amount of
frustration when I realised that knowledge, effort and skill had very little
relation with the result which was what the client desired. When I joined the
Journal Committee of the BCAS, meetings were lively with seniors discussing
various tax issues threadbare. As the editor of the BCAJ, I enjoyed reading the
material that was published in each issue. Even today, income tax constitutes
around 40% of the editorial content of the journal. Without knowing it, tax law
has occupied such a position in professional life that it is difficult to
imagine its absence. So what would I do if income tax was abolished?

Yes those long waits, in
the department and in courtrooms would no longer be there. I would not have to
miss family commitments because an important matter was coming up. There would
be sufficient time to spend for myself. But what would I do for a livelihood?
Of course, if Income tax was abolished, the government would have to
necessarily replace it with some other revenue generating mechanism. One would
then have to study that legislation and, if possible, develop expertise in that
area. But all of us have to realise that traditional tax practice in the form
that we have seen it is already on the decline. For more than a decade, we have
seen the change and those who have not had the foresight to change the practice
structure are already suffering. Pure compliance practice has already declined
or shifted to other service providers and this trend would accelerate in the
days to come. Therefore, though abolition of income tax would be a shock for
thousands, the change in the practice landscape has been visible for a long
time. In fact, as professionals, we need to realise that the value addition to
client is in advising about his economic activity rather than in regard to the
output thereof. To a client, a person who advises him on how to increase the
size of the pie is more important than the one who tries to save the pie that
has already been baked. Professionals will have to get into the area of
consulting. Litigation in tax law would undoubtedly continue but would become
so costly that only a few would be able to afford it. So on the personal front,
while even after abolition of tax law, the remaining litigation might suffice
to take me through upto the end of my professional career, my firm would have
to
reinvent itself and look to continuously develop the area of business
consulting.

As for the journal, its
contents are a reflection of the needs of readers. It’s information content is
already being challenged by the onslaught of technology with information
reaching the doorstep of the reader much before it is available in the journal.
Therefore, the journal itself will have to undergo a change, even if income tax
were to continue to exist. In its absence, new areas of practice will come to
the fore, and these will fill the void in the journal. In the next decade or
so, I expect the electronic media to completely overtake the print media. This
will have to be understood and appreciated and accepted by future editors of
the journal. The form and content of the journal will undergo a change, but if
it adapts itself to the changing scene in the profession it will retain its
place of eminence.

Part III

A new beginning!

Repeal of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 may or may not happen. Even if it does happen someday, it may be in
the very distant future. The point of this article is not about the
Income-tax Act but about the challenges thrown by disruptive technology that is
fast pervading every aspect of our lives. The objective of this article is to
spur our readers into thinking outside the box.

When we are faced with a
life changing situation, the one important question that stares at us is – “did
I do anything in the past to prepare myself to face such a situation”?

In the hypothetical
situation that I have written about in Part I of this article, we talked about
reactions of people who could be affected by such a situation. In this part of
the article I would like to talk about how we could start preparing ourselves
now so that if any part of our existing practice is disrupted suddenly, we are
not caught napping! The challenge that disruption poses must be converted into
an opportunity by us. Old baggage that has been carried on for many years can
be discarded using this opportunity.

We need to understand and
accept the fact that the practice area that sustained us over the decades will
not continue to do so in the decades ahead. We have to look at alternatives. We
need to spot opportunities around us and start working on them immediately.
There are several emerging areas of practice that are clearly making their
presence felt. We need to start taking interest in them and then start focusing
on a few of them. Some such exciting and interesting areas that one could
consider are:

u   Data analytics

u   Forensic audit

u   Blockchain technology

u   Transfer pricing in other countries

u   Financial planning and wealth management

u   Rehabilitation, insolvency, liquidation
services

u   Corporate governance

u   Valuation services

u   Business / Commercial laws services

u   International trade laws

u   Climate change and carbon credit

u   Inheritance and succession planning

All in all, the objective
of this article is to provoke the reader into action. Our profession needs
to be aware of the disruptive force of technology and change that is sweeping
the globe.
We cannot afford to remain in our cocoons any longer. If we are
to survive, we need to accept the change and before that change sweeps us away,
change our course. Just as a boatman regularly adjusts his sails with every
change in the wind, so must we.

I sincerely hope that
readers of BCAJ will contribute to making the golden year of the BCAJ memorable
and momentous by reading every article relating to this theme of “disruption”
and imbibing the spirit behind the articles in their professional and personal
lives and make themselves and their teams ready for change. Unless we change
really fast, we will soon get replaced. The time to act is NOW!
 

 

1 Section 147 – Reassessment – After the expiry of four years – No failure by assessee to truly and fully disclose all material facts – reopening is bad in law

ACIT vs. Kalyani Hayes Lemmerz Ltd.
ITA No: 802 of 2015 (Bom. HC)  
A.Y.: 2003-04      Dated: 29th January, 2018
[ACIT vs. Kalyani Hayes Lemmerz Ltd.
ITA No.2476/PN/2012;
Dated: 24th Aug., 2014 ; Pune.  ITAT]

The Assessee Company was
incorporated in 1996 with the Kalyani Group (Indian Partner), holding 75% and
Lemmerz Werke GMBH Germany (German Partner) holding remaining 25% share in it.
Thereafter, the share holding of the Assessee company, underwent a change with
the German Partners, increasing its share holding to 80% in the Assessee
Company by acquiring shares from M/s. Kalyani Group.

 

The Assessment was
completed u/s. 143 (3) of the Act after having discussed the shareholding
pattern, allowed the carried forward loss under section 79 of the Act.
Thereafter, the assessment was reopened on the point of shares holding pattern
of the company i.e  in the assessment
order, applicability of provisions of section 
79 of I.T. Act has not been considered by the AO.

 

Thereafter, the A.O passed
an order u/s.  143 read with 147 of the
Act, rejected the Petitioner’s objection, and thereafter, inter alia,
disallowed the carry forward of business losses u/s.  79 of the Act.

 

The CIT(A) allowed the
Assessee’s appeal, inter alia, holding that when all facts including the
change in shareholding pattern, had been disclosed during the regular
assessment proceedings, as is evident from the Assessment Order passed in the
regular assessment proceedings, then merely because the Assessing Officer
choose not to apply section 79 of the Act, it could not be said that the
Assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts, necessary
for assessment. This was a case where the first proviso to section 147 of the
Act will apply as the reopening notice is beyond a period of four years from
the end of the relevant AY.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue
filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that, where an assessment
order u/s. 143(3) of the Act was passed in regular assessment proceedings,
evidencing full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for the purpose
of assessment. Then mere non consideration of section 79 of the Act by the A.O
cannot lead to the conclusion that the Assessee had failed to disclose all
material facts truly and fully, which were necessary for Assessment. The
Tribunal  relied upon the Apex Court’s
decision in Calcutta Discount Company Ltd. vs. CIT 41 ITR 191wherein
it has been held that obligation of the Asssessee is to disclose all primary
facts truly and fully to the extent relevant for the purpose of Assessment. The
Assessee is under no obligation to inform the Assessing Officer of the
interference of fact or law to be drawn from the material facts which had been
disclosed fully and truly by the Assessee.

 

Being aggrieved, Revenue
filed an appeal to the High Court. The grievance of the Revenue is that it was
obligatory on the part of the Assessee to invite the attention of the A.O to
section 79 of the Act during regular assessment proceedings. Thus, not having
done so, it is submitted that the first proviso to section 147 of the Act, can
have no application.

 

The Hon. High Court
observed that it is an undisputed fact that the regular Assessment Order had
been passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act. The reopening notice has been issued beyond
the period of four years from the end of the relevant AY. Therefore, the first
proviso to section 147 of the Act is applicable and reopening notice can only
be sustained in cases where there is failure to disclose fully and truly all
material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons in support of the impugned
notice itself records the fact that the issue of shareholding pattern of the
company was discussed by the A.O in his Assessment order passed in the regular
assessment proceedings. The only basis of reopening is that the A.O in the
regular assessment did not apply provisions of section 79 of the Act, to
determine the taxable income. This non application of mind by the A.O while
carrying out assessment cannot lead to the conclusion that there has been any
failure on the part of the Assessee to truly and fully disclose all material
facts necessary for Assessment. The Tribunal correctly placed reliance upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Company Ltd., (supra) to
hold that not pointing out the inference to be drawn from facts will not amount
to failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts, necessary for
assessment. In view of the above the, Appeal of dept was dismissed.

8 Sections 69B and 147 – Reassessment – Undisclosed investment – Where as per rule 11UA, value of shares was less than Rs. 5, but assessee purchased same at Rs. 10 per share and disclosed all facts in return, reassessment notice for valuing these shares at Rs. 35 as per valuation by Government valuer was not justified

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 284 (Bom)
Shahrukh Khan vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 08th Feb., 2018

In the A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee had purchased 1,10,00,000 shares at the rate of Rs. 10 per share. The Assessing Officer received information that Government valuer has determined fair market value of the said shares at Rs. 33.35/- per share. Therefore, on the basis of the said information, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the reason to believe that 1,10,00,00 shares were purchased at an undervaluation of Rs. 25.69 crores. Objections filed by the assessee were rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the reassessment proceedings. The Bombay High Court admitted the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The assessment order itself mentions that the value of shares is less than Rs. 5 per share on application of Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules. There was a complete disclosure of all facts during regular assessment proceedings. Prima facie, the order disposing of the objections, while dealing with the objection of no reason to believe that income has escaped assessment on application of section 56(2)(vii), has completely ignored the Explanation thereto. The Explanation to section 56(2)(vii) states that the fair market value is to be determined in accordance with the Income-tax Rules. On application of Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, the value per share came to less than Rs. 5 per share.

ii)    In the circumstances, the impugned notice indicates a change of opinion, as this very issue namely – valuation of share was a subject matter of consideration during the regular assessment proceedings. Besides, on the application of method of valuation as mandated by the Explanation to section 56(2)(vii), prima facie, the Assessing Officer could not have had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

iii)    In the above view, prima facie, the impugned notice is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, there shall be interim relief in terms of prayer clause (d).”

7 Sections 80-IA(4), 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Where AO rejected claim of assessee of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) and, Commissioner (Appeals) allowed said claim of deduction in its entirety, thereafter AO could not reopen this very claim of deduction for disallowance u/s. 148

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 186 (Guj)
Gujarat Enviro Protection & Infrastructure Ltd. vs. DCIT
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 19th February, 2018    

For the A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee filed return of income after claiming deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). The return of the assessee was taken in scrutiny by the Assessing Officer. During such scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer examined the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA and disallowed the claim of deduction. On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim.

Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued reassessment notice u/s. 148 on grounds that on perusal of records, it was seen that the amount on which the assessee had claimed exemption u/s. 80-IA included the interest income assessable under the head ‘Income from other sources’. On verification of bifurcation of interest income, it was clear that this interest income was not derived from the infrastructure development activity of the undertaking. Hence, it was not to be considered for the purpose of deduction under section 80-IA. Thus, deduction so allowed on the interest income was not allowable. The objection filed by the assessee were rejected.

The assessee filed writ petition challenging the reopening. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    The assessee’s reply to the Assessing Officer would show that out of the total interest income, the assessee had attributed a sum of certain amount as business income. It is this claim of the assessee of the interest income of certain amount, as being part of its business income which is a focal point of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment. He contends that the interest income cannot be treated as arising out of the assessee’s business, and therefore, deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) would not be allowable. However, this is for later. For the present, one may record that the Assessing Officer passed an order of assessment in which he rejected the assessee’s claim of deduction under section 80-IA. He therefore had no occasion to separately comment on the assessee’s claim of interest income being eligible for such deduction. Be that as it may, the assessee carried entire issue in appeal before the Commissioner. The Commissioner (Appeals) by his order, allowed the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA in toto. Record is not clear whether the revenue has carried the order of Commissioner (Appeals) before the Tribunal or not. However, this by itself may not be a determinative factor.

ii)    At that stage, after the Commissioner allowed the assessee’s appeal, the Assessing Officer issued the instant reassessment notice. Since the notice was issued beyond the period of four years from the end of relevant assessment year, the requirement of the assessee to make true and full disclosure, and the failure to make such disclosures leading to income chargeable to take escaping the assessment becomes crucial. In this context, the record would show that the crucial requirement arising out of the proviso to section 147 is not satisfied. The Assessing Officer has, in fact, in the reasons recorded itself proceeded on the basis of ‘on verification of record’. Thus, clearly the Assessing Officer proceeded on the basis of disclosures forming part of the original assessment. Even otherwise, as noted, during the original assessment, the Assessing Officer had called upon the assessee to clarify on the interest income which include the assessee’s claim of certain amount as business income and, therefore, eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). There was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all relevant facts.

iii)    There is yet another and equally strong reason to quash the impugned notice. Before elaborating on this, it is recorded that the assessee’s contention of possible change of opinion cannot be accepted. The Assessing Officer had rejected entire claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4). He, therefore, had no occasion to thereafter comment on a part of such claim relatable to the assessee’s interest income. Had the Assessing Officer accepted in principle the assessee’s claim of deduction under section 80-IA(4) and thereafter, after scrutiny not made any disallowance for interest income forming part of such larger claim, the principle of change of opinion would apply. In the present case, once the Assessing Officer rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4) in its entirety, there was thereafter no occasion and any need for him to dissect such claim for rejection on some additional ground.

iv)    The second reason which it is referred to is of merger. The Assessing Officer having rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 80-IA(4), the issue may be recalled was carried in appeal by the assessee and the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claim in its entirety. It would thereafter be not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen this very claim for possible disallowance of part thereof. When the Commissioner (Appeals) was examining the assessee’s grievance against the order of Assessing Officer disallowing the claim, it was open for the revenue to point out to the Commissioner (Appeals) that even if in principle the claim is allowed, a part thereof would not stand the scrutiny of law. It was open for the Commissioner to examine such an issue, even suo motu. If one allow the claim in its entirety, the Assessing Officer thereafter cannot re-visit such a claim and seek to disallow part thereof. This would be contrary to the principle of merger statutorily provided and judicially recognised. Even after the Commissioner (Appeals) allow such a claim and the revenue was of the opinion that he has not processed it and committed an error, it was always open for the revenue to carry the matter in appeal. At any rate, reopening of the assessment would simply not be permissible. Reassessment carried an entirely different connotation. Once an assessment is reopened, the same gives wider jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer to examine the claims which had been formed part of the reasons recorded, but which were not originally concluded.

v)    In the result, impugned notice is quashed. Petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly.”

6 Section 43(6) – Depreciation – WDV – While computing written down value u/s. 43(6) for claiming depreciation, depreciation allowed under State enactment cannot be reduced

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 420 (Ker)
Rehabilitation Plantations Ltd. vs. CIT
A.Y.: 2002-03, Date of Order: 29th Jan., 2018

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of centrigued latex and rubber. For the A. Y. 2002-03, it claimed depreciation of the entire cost of the plant and machinery to the extent of 35 per cent treating it as the actual cost allowable on which the allowable deduction for depreciation is computed. The Assessing Officer found that the depreciation on assets used in the plantations, including for manufacturing activity, was found to have been claimed by the assessee-company for more than two decades. It was found that earlier the assessments had not been taken under the Income-tax Act, 1961, since the entire income was assessable under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1991 (AIT Act). It was found that as per section 32(1) of the IT Act, depreciation on building, machinery, etc. is to be allowed on the written down value of the assets, owned by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business. The written down value of the assets as per section 43(6) is the actual cost when the assets were acquired before the previous year. Otherwise the written down value shall be the actual cost of the assets less all depreciation actually allowed under the IT Act. The assessee had been claiming depreciation in computing the income from plantations, and if the actual cost of the assets is adopted it would lead to the assessee getting a double benefit on the same component of cost, to the extent of 35 per cent. Hence, the written down value for the previous year was only permissible to be claimed as depreciation, was the specific ground on which such claim was rejected. The Assessing Officer allowed depreciation on written down value after reducing the depreciation claimed under AIT Act from the actual cost.

The Tribunal held that there could be no claim for the assessee over and above the written down value as per the books of account and upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee, the Kerala High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    It is seen from the report filed by the Assessing Officer under the AIT Act that the assessee has claimed depreciation in the earlier years when filing returns under the AIT Act. The report of the Assessing Officer under the IT Act also indicates that the assets pertaining to the agricultural income has not been projected for depreciation under the IT Act for the previous years. The Assessing Officer points out that depreciation was claimed in the years 1998-99 to 2001-02 with respect to the building and plant & machinery of rubber sheeting factory, the income derived from which, being a manufacturing activity, however is not covered under the AIT Act. In such circumstances, one has to look at whether in allowing the depreciation on the basis of the written down value as available in section 43(6)(b), the entire cost of the building and plant and machinery for the purpose of generation of agricultural income has to be allowed or not.

ii)    There need not be any controversy raised on the interpretation of the provision of section 43(6) at sub-clause (b). What can be reduced from the actual cost to the assessee is all depreciation actually allowed under the IT Act, 1961 or the IT Act, 1922 or any Act repealed by that Act or any executive orders issued when the Indian Income-tax Act, 1886 was in force. The AIT Act having not been specifically noticed and the depreciation allowed with respect to the income assessed to tax under any other enactments having not been excluded, there is no reason for this Court to come to a different finding as to the written down value which could be claimed as depreciation on the first year in which the assessee is assessed under the IT Act. The assessee was earlier assessed under the IT Act, but for its manufacturing activity and not its agricultural operations, the income from which was assessed under the AIT Act. The assets employed for agricultural operations were never accounted for computing the depreciation under the IT Act, since that income, prior to rule 7A, was not exigible to tax under the IT Act.

iii)    The question arise since the entire income generated from the agricultural income was assessable to tax under the AIT Act, a State enactment. Only in the relevant assessment year i.e. 2002-03, the provision for a separate assessment under the AIT Act and IT Act came into force by virtue of the Income-tax Rules. Income from the manufacture of rubber which was earlier treated as agricultural income was made assessable under the IT Act to the extent of 35 per cent of the income derived from the business. Hence, the assessee would be entitled to claim only 35 per cent of the depreciation for the relevant assessment year. However, in computing such depreciation, should one adopt the entire cost of the plant and machinery or that shown as the written down value after reducing the depreciation allowed under the AIT Act, is the vexing question.

iv)    As noticed, the deeming provision is very clear and there is nothing to exclude from the computation of the cost of the assets; the depreciation allowed under the AIT Act. The revenue would contend that this Court has ample powers to iron out the creases and avoid a double benefit being conferred on the assessee. There is no doubt of such powers, but, whether it could be exercised in the present case is the question. In ironing out creases one should not be accused of burning the cloth, by adding words into the statute to digress from the essential unambiguous intention.

v)    The rule providing division of income to be assessed respectively under the AIT Act and the IT Act was brought in the year 2002. The Government was quite aware of the provision available in the IT Act, 1961 by which the depreciation in cases, where it was not being claimed under the enactments as specified in section 43(6)(b), can only be excluded and otherwise the written down value has to be deemed to be the cost of the assets. On apportioning the income from agriculture to be assessed under the respective enactments of the State and the Union; amendments ought to have been brought in accordingly to ensure that no double benefit accrues on an assessee.

vi)    Such amendments were brought in with prospective effect as is seen from Explanation 7 to section 43(6) of the IT Act which got inserted by the Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1-4-2010. The Explanation takes in the specific defect of double benefit being conferred on the assessee. The legislature thought it fit to give it effect from 1-4-2010. The assessment year herein is 2002-03 relating to the income of the previous year being 2001-02. The amendment does not apply to that year. The amendment brought in without any retrospective effect, further makes it clear that the legislature cured the defect, but however, did not do so for the years previous to the amendment and not for the relevant assessment year. This is not a situation in which casus omissus could be supplied.

vii)    On the above reasoning, the disallowance of the depreciation and the computation made of the written down value cannot be accepted. The Assessing Officer is directed to employ the deeming provision for computing the written down value de hors the depreciation granted under the AIT Act and take 35 per cent of the cost of the total assets as written down value, allowing the depreciation for the relevant assessment year to that extent. The Assessing Officer shall deem the written down value to be the cost of the assets and compute the depreciation allowable at 35 per cent of such deemed written down value and apply it to the portion of the income derived from the agricultural business, that is assessable under the IT Act. The appeal is allowed with the above observations.”

5 Section 32(2) – Unabsorbed depreciation – Law applicable – Effect of amendment to section 32(2) by Finance Act, 2001 – Removal of restriction of eight years for carry forward and set off – Unabsorbed depreciation or part thereof not claimed till relevant year – Carry forward and set off permitted

(2018) 400 ITR 569 (Delhi)
Principal CIT vs. British Motor Car Co. (1934) Ltd.
A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 09th January, 2018

The relevant period is the
A. Y. 2010-11. The assessee had the accumulated carried forward depreciation
u/s. 32(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 starting from the A. Y. 1998-99. In the
A. Y. 2010-11, the assessee claimed set off of the carried forward
depreciation. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim in respect of amounts
carried forward from the years prior to A. Y. 2002-03 on the ground that the
amendment to section 32(2) of the Act, which removed of eight years limit, was
prospective and effective only from 01/04/2002.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
reversed the order and his decision was upheld by the Tribunal.

 

In
appeal by the Revenue, on the question whether section 32(2) as amended by the
Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 01/04/2002 could be given effect beyond the period of
eight years prior to its commencement, the Delhi High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The rationale for the amendment of section
32(2) the restriction against set off and carry forward limited to eight years,
beyond which the benefit could not be claimed under the provisions of the 1961
Act, was for the reasons deemed appropriate by Parliament.

ii)    The limit was imposed in the year 1996
through the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996. Had the intention of Parliament been
really to restrict the benefit, of unlimited carry forward prospectively, there
were more decisive ways of doing so, such as, an express provision or an
exception or proviso. The absence of any such legislative device meant that the
provision had to be construed in its own terms and not so as to restrict the
benefit or advantage it sought to conform. No question of law arose.”

 

4 Section 54EC – Exemption of Capital gain – Time of six months from date of transfer for investment – Transfer effected only on transfer of physical possession of property and not on date of execution of development agreement – Investment made by assessee falling within time specified u/s. 54EC

(2018) 401 ITR 96 (Bom)
CIT vs. Dr. Arvind S. Phake
A.Y. 2008-09, Date of Order: 20th Nov., 2017

The assessee entered into a
registered development agreement dated 23/09/2017 in respect of certain
property. The total consideration agreed was Rs. 5,32,00,000/. Physical
possession was given on 01/03/2008. For the A. Y. 2008-09, a return was filed
by the assessee declaring his income on account of long term capital gain on
sale of the immovable property. The assessee claimed exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of investment of Rs. 50,00,000/- in bonds of
the NHAI made on 28/03/2008 and Rs. 50,00,000/- in bonds of RECL on 22/08/2008.
The Assessing Officer held that the investment of the bonds of NHAI was within
the period specified u/s. 54EC of the Act and the investment of Rs. 50,00,000/-
in the bonds of RECL was beyond the period provided in section 54EC in as much
as the investment made on 22/08/2008 was not within six months from the date of
transfer of assets.

The Tribunal found that on
the date of execution of the development agreement, i.e., on 13/09/2007, full
consideration was admittedly not paid, and therefore the transfer was not
effected on 13/09/2017. Therefore, taking the date of transfer as 01/03/2008 on
which date physical possession of the property was delivered, the investment made
on 22/08/2008 was well within the time specified under section 54EC of the Act.
The Tribunal, accordingly allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal considered
various clauses in the development agreement. Sub clause (d) of clause (3) of
the agreement provided that after full payment of consideration, the
construction would be undertaken by the developer. Admittedly, on the date of
execution of the development agreement, the entire consideration was not
received by the assessee.

ii)    Physical possession of the property, the
subject matter of development agreement was parted with by the assessee on
01/03/2008. It was on that day that complete control over the property was
passed on to the developer.

iii)   After having perused the various clauses in
the agreement and the factual aspects, the Tribunal rightly took 01/03/2008 as
the date of transfer and the investment made on 22/08/2008 was well within the
time specified u/s. 54EC of the Act. Therefore, no substantial question of law
arose.”

3 Section 14A – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Assessing Officer cannot attribute administrative expenses for earning tax free income in excess of total administrative expenditure

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 29 (Guj)
Principal CIT vs. Adani Agro (P.) Ltd.
Date of Order: 05th February, 2018

The assessee incurred administrative expenses amounting to Rs. 30 lakhs. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the assessee failed to fully disclose the expenditure for earning the exempt income and based on the format provided under rule 8D, made the disallowance to the tune of Rs. 60 lakhs.

The Tribunal noted that the entire administrative expenses of the assessee was Rs. 30 lakhs, out of which, the assessee had offered Rs. 10 lakhs i.e., 1/3rd of the total administrative expenditure for earning income covered u/s. 14A. The Tribunal was of the opinion that even after completing the format, the disallowance cannot exceed the total administrative expenditure incurred by the assessee.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)    Under no circumstances, can the Assessing Officer attribute administrative expenses for earning tax free income in excess of the total administrative expenditure incurred by the assessee.

ii)    If it is a case where Assessing Officer disputes, question and disallow the very declaration of the assessee regarding total administrative expenditure, the issue can be somewhat different. Nevertheless, when the Assessing Officer has in the present case did not disturb the assessee’s declaration that total administrative expenses incurred by the assessee for all its activities was Rs. 30 lakhs, there was no question of disallowing administrative expenses to the tune of Rs. 60 lakhs u/s. 14A with the aid of rule 8D.”

2 Sections 40(a)(ia), 194H and 194J – Business expenditure – Disallowance – Payments subject to TDS – Compensation paid to joint venture partner under MOU – Finding that agreement not sham – Payment cannot be treated as expenditure required to deduct tax at source – Disallowance for failure to deduct tax not attracted

1.      
(2018) 400 ITR 521 (Cal)

Principal
CIT vs. Entrepreneurs (Calcutta) Pvt. Ltd.

A.Y.:
2006-07, Date of Order: 13th Sept., 
2017


For the A. Y. 2006-07, the
assessee claimed as expenditure a sum of Rs. 5,17,48,439 paid to company A, as
compensation in connection with a land transaction. The assessee’s explanation
was that the amount was paid in performance of its obligation under a
memorandum of understanding with A under which A and the assessee were to share
the profit on sale of land in the ratio of 75% to A and 25% to the assessee,
that the services to be rendered by A included identifying the buyer and also
carrying out various other tasks in respect of the sale of the landed property
involved. The Assessing Officer was of the view that A was a sham company. He
treated the entire sum of compensation paid to A as the assesee’s income
chargeable to tax, on the grounds that the transaction was a sham, and that the
assessee had not deducted tax at source on the amount, invoking the provisions
of section 40(a)(ia).

 

The Tribunal held that the
transactions were made by a valid written contract on various terms and
conditions between the parties, which were essential for a joint venture
project. Such facts were not denied nor were any defects found in the agreement
by the Assessing Officer. It further held that the transaction was in lieu of
the agreement and the Assessing Officer was not justified in treating the
payment of compensation as an expenditure and that no tax at source was
required to have been deducted on the profit so shared between the two joint
venture partners and deleted the addition.   

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   Whether a transaction was sham or not was a
question of fact. The Commissioner (Appeals) had found the Assessing Officer’s
conclusion that it was sham transaction between assessee and A to be in direct
conflict with the Assessing Officer’s own acceptance that the services rendered
by A were of specialised, professional and technical in nature. Upon analyzing
the memorandum of understanding and other materials on record, the Commissioner
(Appeals) had accepted the contention of the assessee that the compensation paid
was not an expenditure incurred so as to attract the provisions of sections
194H and 194J requiring tax deduction at source. As a consequence, the question
of disallowance of the payments applying the provisions of section 40(a)(ia)
could not have arisen.

 

ii)   The findings of the Commissioner (Appeals),
concurred with by the Tribunal, were based on appreciation of material on
record. Further, the Tribunal had recorded that the Assessing Officer did not
point out any defect in the “settlement/contract”. There was no perversity in
the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. No question of law
arose.”

1 Section 143(3) – Assessment – Construction business – Estimate of cost of construction – Reference to DVO – Books of account maintained by assessee not rejected – AO cannot refer matter to DVO

(2018) 401 ITR 285 (Mad)
CIT vs. A. L. Homes
A.Y.: 2009-10, Date of Order: 20th Sept., 2017    


The assessee was in
construction business. In the course of the assessment for the relevant year,
the Assessing Officer made a reference to the District Valuation Officer (DVO)
for estimation of the cost of construction. The estimated cost of construction
by the DVO was higher than that found according to the books of account of the
assessee. The valuation report was objected to by the assessee, on the ground
that it had been maintaining regular books of account and that reference could
not have been made to the DVO without rejecting the books of account. However,
the Assessing Officer added the difference in the cost of construction, as
unaccounted investment to the income of the assessee.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
deleted the addition and held that the Assessing Officer could not have made a
reference to the DVO for estimation, when the books of account of the assessee
had not been rejected. He further held that the difference between the cost
shown in the books of account and the estimation by the DVO was only 6.85%,
whereas, statutorily a reference for valuation could be made only if, in the
opinion of the Assessing Officer, the difference would have exceeded 15%. The
Tribunal found that the assessee had sold the flats and that most of the
purchasers had occupied the flats and that the cost improvements made had to be
considered as income of the purchasers. It upheld the deletion made by the
Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)   The appellate authorities had concurrently
found that the books of account of the assessee had not been rejected by the
Assessing Officer and therefore, the matter ought not to have been referred to
the DVO for estimation of the cost of construction.

 

ii)    The reliance placed on the report of the DVO
for making the addition was misconceived. No question of law arose.”

The Journey of the Journal

Decades ago a handful of professionals did
something extraordinary. Bound by a common vision, they conceived and evolved
the idea of a Journal for Chartered Accountants. Those committed volunteers,
embarked on an uncharted journey to bring knowledge – which was scarce in those
days – to the desks of their fellow professionals. That journey of the Bombay
Chartered Accountant Journal – is entering its 50th Volume this month. I
feel honoured to extend my delightful thanks to you – the reader – our
consistent focus, motivation and inspiration on this journey.

BCAJ demonstrates what independent
volunteers connected by a common vision can accomplish to serve a larger
professional community.
So many professionals have
contributed to make the BCAJ what it is today. The innumerable writers,
contributors, poets, cartoonists, well wishers, our publishers and the editors
have given their time – a part of their lives – for a cause larger than
themselves.  BCAJ will remain ever so grateful
to all of them.

The journal over the years has been a part
of many a professionals’ journey. BCAJ has strived to present depth and breadth
of themes and topics to a Chartered Accountant. What started off with giving
economic news and then tribunal judgments is now covering a broad spectrum of
topics to make complete professional reading every month. Despite the wave of
‘specialisation’, BCAJ has remained relevant due to the quality of its content
and detailed analysis by experienced practitioners. In an interlocked world,
every professional will need to read about developments that could influence
his domain. Today, no area of practice can remain an island which cannot be
approached without crossing the waters of other spheres of influence.

The early years of the BCAJ, were times of
scarcity and restrictions. Today things have swung to the other extreme – we
are surrounded by a deluge of information seeking our attention – from a lack
of access
to clutter of excess. 
However, a professional is still faced with the same fundamental
problem – how to find a dependable, comprehensive and balanced source of
professional reading?
This problem and its solution are expressed in this
verse:

 

Endless
is the material to read; Time is short and difficulties many.

One
should therefore absorb the essence,

like
a swan who discerns between water and milk.

The BCAJ, then and now, strives to answer
that question. I wish and pray that BCAJ will serve its readers by curating the
essence and giving them balanced, succinct, comprehensive and dependable
technical reading every month. The reader is and always will be at the heart of
the BCAJ.

Over the years, the BCAJ has evolved its website
www.bcajonline.org which contains digitised issues of last 17 years. Many
subscribers read the digital version of BCAJ in flipbook format. We would like
more engagement, feedback and conversation with the subscribers to allow the
contributors to enhance their offering. Reader expectations matter the most,
especially now. Do write to us at journal_feedback@bcasonline.org.

The 50th Volume, starting this
month, will contain Golden Contents – pages with special articles, interviews,
musings, nostalgia, and more. This issue covers all of these to make it a
special one. The rest of the 50th Volume will continue to have such
Golden Contents. The usual monthly features and articles will of course
continue. I hope, you the discerning reader will relish this labour of love and
catch the essence. 


Every journey
has milestones and a destination. And every milestone and destination stirs you
to take another journey. The journey of the journal is one such journey, where
every milestone inspires us to reach higher and every destination will open up
a new vista to look farther. 

 

Learnings from Ramayana


The meaning of this shloka (verse) is that:-

There was a herculean task of conquering the mighty kingdom of Lanka, the ocean was to be crossed on foot, the opponent was the most powerful demon Ravana; and the only assistance available was that from monkeys. Despite this, Shree Ram alone killed all the demons. The moral is – the success of true heroes is attributable to their own valour and qualities; and does not depend on assistants and equipment.

In this series of a few articles, I intend to bring out the noteworthy aspects from Valmiki-Ramayana that are useful for all human beings at large and for professionals in particular. Shree Ram is believed to be an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. In that sense, he is worshipped as God. He had divine qualities, but never wielded divine powers. He never performed any Leela, Chamatkar, magic or super-human feats. He was and always acted as a human being. Valmiki is believed to be a contemporary of Shree Ram and Valmiki Ramayana which is believed to be the first and most ancient epic, is nothing but the narration of Shree Ram’s life-story. The sole objective of Shri Valmiki seems to be to project Shree Ram as an ideal, duty conscious king or ruler. Shree Ram demonstrates all emotions of a human mind but ultimately the duty consciousness prevails – duty as a king rather than in any other relation.

Many intellectuals criticize him for being too idealistic. They say it is not possible to emulate him in today’s practical life. They feel, Shri Krishna was more practical and that everyone should be like Shree Ram at home; but act as Shri Krishna outside. A few others blame him for abandoning his wife Seeta at the comment made by a dhobi. However, very few people know that after abandoning Seeta, Shree Ram lived as a Brahmachari.

I am not going to enter into any controversies as such. My aim is to tell the secret of Ramarajya –the state of most ‘ideal governance’, what made him a true leader. He is described as Maryada Purshottam. – i.e. the height or ultimate of any virtue. Be it honesty, be it bravery, be it modesty, be it leadership – whatever good qualities one can think of Shree Ram was the ‘Maryada’ or boundary. No one can surpass him in any quality. Ramayana is also popular in many countries outside India – such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Mauritius.

In the next few months, I will try to deal with this theme with practical relevance to today’s life.

2 Article 12 of India-USA DTAA; Section 9(1)(vi), 40(a)(i), 195 of the Act – payments made to the parent company on a cost to cost basis for availing lease line services from third party service provider does not qualify as royalty; it qualifies as a reimbursement, not subject to tax in India.

TS-70-ITAT-2018
T-3 Energy Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT
ITA No.826/PUN/2015
A.Y- 2010-11;
Date of Order: 2nd February, 2018
 

Facts

Taxpayer, an Indian company, was an affiliate of FCo. FCo had entered
into an agreement with a third party service provider for providing
bandwidth/lease line services for the global business of the FCo’ group
including the Taxpayer. FCo raised back to back invoices on Taxpayer in respect
of Taxpayer’s share of lease line charges.

 

The Taxpayer contended that payment made to FCo was not in the nature of
royalty but in the nature of reimbursement and hence there was no obligation to
withhold taxes on such payments.

 

AO contended that the amount remitted to the third party was not a
reimbursement of expenses but was in the nature of payment made to the service
provider for lease line services through its associated enterprise (AE).
Further, it contended that such lease line charges constituted royalty under
the Act as well as the DTAA basis the amended definition of royalty under the
Act and hence would be subject to withholding u/s. 195 of the Act.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A). CIT(A)
observed that in case payments were directly made to third party service
provider, it would have been taxable in the hands of the service provider and
would attract withholding obligations for the Taxpayer. Merely because the
payment is routed through FCo on back to back basis, it cannot be treated as
reimbursement of expenses. Payment made by Taxpayer is taxable in India and
will be subject to withholding.

 

Aggrieved, the Taxpayer appealed before the Tribunal

 

Held

The
agreement with the service provider was a commercial transaction, in terms of
which FCo contracted the service provider to provide lease line services for
global business of FCo group and was not limited to the Taxpayer alone.

 

   The understanding
was between FCo and the service provider. Though the Taxpayer benefited from
the negotiated price under the agreement, it was not a party to the agreement.

 

  The
privity of the agreement was between FCo and service provider, whereby FCo obtained
the services from the service provider and passed it to its affiliates
including the Taxpayer on cost to cost basis. Thus there was no income element
involved in payments made by Taxpayer to FCo.

 

   Without
prejudice, the contention of AO that it is not case of reimbursement but a case
of payment to third party through its AE and hence qualifies as royalty, cannot
be accepted. This is because the term ‘royalty’ is defined under the DTAA and
it does not cover payments made towards lease line charges.

 

  Further,
the amended definition of royalty u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act cannot be read into
the DTAA. Reliance in this regard was placed on Delhi HC decision in the case
of New Skies Satellite BV.

 


1 Article 5(4), 7 & 8 of India-Mauritius DTAA –When place of effective management is not situated in one of the contracting states but in a third country, Article 8 of DTAA (shipping income) does not apply where an agent has more than one principal, he cannot be treated as an exclusive agent for the purposes of Dependent Agent PE (DAPE)

TS-73-ITAT-2018(Mum)
ADIT (IT) vs. Baylines (Mauritius)
I.T.A. No. 1181/Mum/2002
A.Ys: 1998-99 to 2012-13,
Date of Order: 20th February, 2018

Facts

Taxpayer, a company incorporated in Mauritius carried on the shipping
business in India. Taxpayer held a TRC indicating that it was a resident of
Mauritius for the relevant financial year. Taxpayer had an agent in India (ICo)
who concluded the contracts on behalf of the Taxpayer in India.

 

Taxpayer filed its return of income in India and claimed that the income
from shipping business was exempt from tax by relying on Article 8 of the India
Mauritius DTAA dealing with taxation of shipping income.

 

Article 8 of the India-Mauritius DTAA provides that income from shipping
business is taxable in the contracting State in which the POEM of the Taxpayer
is located. AO noted that the place of effective management (POEM) of the
Taxpayer was situated in UAE, a third country. Consequently AO held that
Article 8 of the DTAA was not applicable to the Taxpayer. Further AO held that
ICo created a dependent agent PE (DAPE) for the Taxpayer in India and
accordingly taxed the income from shipping business as per Article 7 of the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved by the order of AO, Taxpayer appealed before CIT(A).

 

CIT(A) upheld AO’s contention that Article 8 of the DTAA was not
applicable to the Taxpayer. CIT(A) however, held that ICo did not create a DAPE
of the Taxpayer in India. Accordingly, in the absence of PE, shipping income
was held to be exempt from tax in India under the DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, both the Taxpayer and AO appealed before the Tribunal.

 

Held 1

  On
the basis of following observations, it was held that merely holding of two board
meetings in Mauritius is not sufficient to support that the POEM was in
Mauritius.

  Only two Mauritian directors
attended the first board meeting in person, while the remaining two UAE
directors of the Taxpayer attended these meeting via phone. The only business
transacted in that meeting was the appointment of the auditors.

    The business transacted in the
second board meeting was with regard to approval of accounts. It is surprising
how the annual accounts a company could be approved on telephone. This
indicates that the directors of Mauritius were on the Company’s Board only to
satisfy the conditions of the regulatory requirements of Mauritius Government.

 

   The
fact that ICo was appointed as an agent on a letter head showing its UAE
address and a letter addressed by Taxpayer to AO also originated from UAE
indicated that the major policy decisions were taken in UAE.

 

  In
case where the POEM is not in one of the contracting States, Article 8 becomes
inapplicable. Reliance in this regard was placed on the commentary by Professor
Klaus Vogel

 

Thus
whether or not shipping income is taxable in India will have to be evaluated
basis Article 7 of the DTAA.

 

Held 2

  For
the following reasons it was held that ICo qualified as an agent of independent
status and hence did not create a DAPE for the Taxpayer in India:

 

    ICo carried on the activities
of the Taxpayer in the ordinary course of its business.

    Article 5(5) of DTAA between
India and Mauritius requires that when the activities of the agent are devoted
exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of the foreign enterprise, the
agent will not be considered to be an agent of an independent status.

    The dictionary meanings of the
term ‘exclusively’ clearly suggests that the agent should earn 100% or something
near to 100% from the principal to qualify as its dependant agent. Reliance in
this regard was also placed on the decision of Mumbai ITAT in case of Shardul
Securities Ltd. vs. JCIT (115 lTD 345
).

    In the facts of the case, ICo
worked on behalf of other principals as well, apart from the Taxpayer and
earned a substantial part of its income from them. Thus ICo’s activities were
not devoted exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf of the Taxpayer.

    Reliance was placed on the
decision of Mumbai ITAT in the case of DDIT(IT) vs. B4U International
Holdings Ltd. (137 lTD 346)
which was upheld by Mumbai High Court in
support of the proposition that for the determination of independence for the
purpose of DAPE, one should look at the activities of the agent and whether or
not the agent works exclusively for one principal.

 

   The
fact that the principal has only one agent in India who undertakes all the
activities for the principal is not relevant in determination of independence
or otherwise of the agent.

 

  Thus,
in absence of a PE in India, the income from shipping business is not taxable
in India.

Royalty–The Digital Taxation Debate

1.  Background

Characterisation
of payments for digital goods and services has been a contentious issue,
especially in Indian context. Taxation of payments in the digital economy
segment has been a subject matter of considerable litigation for quite some
time now in India and even globally. In digital economy, delivery of services
can be easily done from overseas without necessitating any part of the activity
being performed or any employees being hired in the country where customers are
located, thereby avoiding taxable presence.

 

The BEPS
Action 1 Report ‘Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy’ states
that because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy
from the rest of the economy for tax purposes. The digital economy and its
business models present however some key features which are potentially
relevant from a tax perspective.

 

In India, with respect to online advertising, we have following ITAT
decisions:

 

a) Yahoo India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2011] 11 taxmann.com 431 (Mumbai-Trib)

b) Pinstorm Technologies (P.) Ltd.
vs. ITO [2012] 24 taxmann.com 345 (Mumbai-Trib)

c) ITO vs. Right Florists (P.)
Ltd. [2013] 32 taxmann.com 99 (Kolkata-Trib.)

In
these decisions, the ITAT has held that payments made for online advertising
would not constitute “royalty” and in absence of any Permanent Establishment
[PE] in India of the foreign companies, the same would not be taxable in India.

In
the earlier decision of Yahoo India, the ITAT had held that services rendered
by Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd. for uploading and display of the banner
advertisement of the Department of Tourism of India on its portal would not
amount to ‘royalty’. In that decision, the ITAT had observed that advertisement
hosting services did not involve use or right to use by the Indian company of
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Further, the Indian company had
no right to access the portal of Yahoo Hong Kong. Based on these facts, the
ITAT concluded that the payment made to Yahoo Hong Kong would be in the nature of business income and not royalty income.

Similar findings have been arrived at in the case of Pinstorm and Right
Florists.


In para 21 of the decision in Right Florist (supra), it
was held as under:


“21. That takes us to the
question whether second limb of Section 5(2) (b), i.e. income ‘deemed to accrue
or arise in India’, can be invoked in this case. So far as this deeming fiction
is concerned, it is set out, as a complete code of this deeming fiction, in
Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and Section 9(1) specifies the incomes
which shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India. In the Pinstorm
Technologies (P.)
Ltd.’s case (supra) and in Yahoo India (P.)
Ltd’s case (supra), the coordinate benches have dealt with only one
segment of this provision i.e. Section 9(1) (vi), but there is certainly much
more to this deeming fiction. Clause (i) of section 9(1) of the Act provides
that all income accruing or arising whether directly or indirectly through or
from any ‘business connection’ in India, or through or from any property in
India or through or from any asset or source of income in India, etc. shall be
deemed to accrue or arise in India. However, as far as the impugned receipts
are concerned, neither it is the case of the Assessing Officer nor has it been
pointed out to us as to how these receipts have arisen on account of any
business connection in India. There is nothing on record do demonstrate or
suggest that the online advertising revenues generated in India were supported
by, serviced by or connected with any entity based in India.
On these
facts, Section 9(1)(i) cannot have any application in the matter. Section
9(1)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) deal with the incomes in the nature of salaries,
dividend and interest etc, and therefore, these deeming fictions are not
applicable on the facts of the case before us. As far as applicability of
Section 9(1)(vi) is concerned, coordinate benches, in the cases of Pinstorm
Technologies (P.) Ltd.
(supra) and Yahoo India (P.) Ltd. (supra),
have dealt with the same and, for the detailed reasons set out in these erudite
orders – extracts from which have been reproduced earlier in this order,
concluded that the provisions of Section 9(1)(vi) cannot be invoked. We are in
considered and respectful agreement with the views so expressed by our
distinguished colleagues.”

 

2.  Recent Decision in case of Google India- ITAT
Bangalore


Recently,
ITAT Bangalore in the case of Google India Pvt. Ltd. [Google India] vs.
ADCIT [2017] 86 taxmann.com 237 (Bengaluru-Trib)
dealt with the issue as to
whether payment by Google India to Google Ireland Ltd. [Google Ireland] under
‘Adwords Program’ Distribution Agreement is royalty. The ITAT held that the
said payment is taxable as royalty under the provisions of the Income-tax Act,
1961 [the Act] as well as under the India-Ireland tax treaty [DTAA] and treated
the Indian company as an assessee in default for not complying with the
withholding tax provisions.


A. Google AdWords


Google
AdWords is an online advertising service developed by Google, where advertisers
pay to display brief advertising copy, product listings, and video content
within the Google ad network to web users. The program uses the keywords to
place advertisements on pages where Google thinks they might be most relevant.
Advertisers pay when users divert their browsing to click on an advertisement.
AdWords enables an advertiser to change and monitor the performance of an
advertisement and to adjust the content of the advertisement.

The
advertisers get their advertisement uploaded into Adword program and log on the
Adword program website owned by Google. It follows the various steps to create
the Adword account for itself. The advertisers select the key words, content
and presentation related to its ads and place a bid on the online system for
the price it is willing to pay every time its user clicks on its advertisement.
Once the advertiser creates the account and uploads advertisement, the same
automatically gets stored on Adword platform owned by Google on the servers
outside India and the ads are displayed in the manner determined by the
programs running on automated platform. Google India periodically raises the
bill on advertisers for advertising spend incurred by the advertiser on clicks
through the users.


B. Brief Facts


a. Google India is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Google International LLC, USA. Google India was providing following services
to its overseas associate Google Ireland, under 2 separate agreements:

i.    Information technology (IT)
and IT enabled services (ITES) [Service Agreement]

ii.   Marketing and
distributorship services under a non-exclusive distributor agreement for resale
of online advertising space under the Adwords program to advertisers in India [Distribution
Agreement]
. In addition to marketing and distribution services provided to
Google Ireland, under the Distribution Agreement, Google was also required to
provide pre-sale and post-sale / customer support services to the advertisers.

b. For the purpose of sales and marketing the
space, work wise flow of activities of the Google India and advertiser were as
under:

 i. Enter into resale agreement with Google Ireland and resale on
advertising space under the Adword program under the Indian advertisers.

 ii.   Perform marketing related
activities in order to promote the sales of advertising space to Indian
Advertisers. After training to its own sale force about the features/tools available
as part of Adword program, to enable them to effectively market the same to
advertisers.

 iii.   Enter into a contract with
Indian advertisers in relation to sale of space under the Adword program.

 iv.  Provide assistance/training
to Indian advertisers if needed in order to familiarize that with the
features/tools available as part of Adword product.

 v.   Resale invoice to the above
advertisers.

 vi.  Collect payments from the
aforesaid advertisers.

 vii.  Remit payment to Google
Ireland for purchase of advertising space from it under the resale agreement.

c. Under the distribution agreement, Google
India made a payment aggregating to Rs. 1,457 crore for the period from F.Y.
2005-06 to F.Y. 2011-12. On the premise that it is merely a reseller of advertisement
space, Google India had categorised this payment as Google Ireland’s business
income and in the absence of a PE of Google Ireland in India, the payment was
made without withholding any tax at source. Neither Google India nor Google
Ireland had obtained any order from the tax department for Nil tax withholding.

d.  As
Google India had not complied with the provisions of section 195, the tax
authorities started the proceedings u/s. 201 of the Act. Before the Assessing Officer [AO], Google India
filed the detailed reply for all the years. However, not convinced with the
reasoning of Google India, the AO, on a conjoint reading of Adword program
distribution agreement and service agreement, treated the payment as ‘royalty’
under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act as well as DTAA between
India and Ireland and determined the withholding tax liability.

e. The findings of the AO were as under:

i.    The `distribution rights`
were `Intellectual Property’ [IP] rights covered by `similar property` under
the definition of royalty and the distribution fee payable was in relation to
transfer of distribution rights.

ii.   Google Ireland had granted
Google India the right access to confidential information and intellectual property rights.

iii.   Google India had been
allowed the use or the right to use of a variety of specified IP rights and
other IP rights covered by “similar property”.

iv.  Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of right in copyright.

v.   By exercising its right as
the owner of copyright in the software, Google Ireland had authorized Google
India to sell or offer for sale, i.e., marketing and distribution of Adwords
Software to various advertisers in India.

vi.  The consideration paid by
Google India was for granting license/authorization to use the copyright in the
AdWords program and not for purchase of such software.

vii.  Google India had been given
right to use Google Trademarks and other Brand Features in order to market and
distribute of Adwords program.

viii. Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of know-how.

ix.  Google Ireland was obliged to
train the distributor so that Appellant could market and distribute AdWords
program.

x.   Referring to Non-Disclosure
Agreement [NDA] clauses forming part of Distribution Agreement, it was held
that Google Ireland, being the copyright holder of the AdWords program, was in
a position to share confidential information whenever required with Google
India.

xi.  Grant of distribution right
also involved transfer of process.

xii.  Without access to the
back-end, Google India could not perform its marketing and distribution
activities. Google India had access to the processes running on the data
centres, based on the distribution rights granted to it by Google Ireland.

xiii. Google India was granted the
use or the right to use the process in the Adwords platform for the purpose of
marketing and distribution.

xiv. Grant of distribution right
also involved use of Industrial, commercial and scientific equipment.

xv. Adwords program, in one way,
was also commercial cum scientific equipment and without having access to
servers running the AdWords platform, Google India could not perform its
functions as per the Distribution Agreement.

f. 
Aggrieved by the order of the AO, Google India preferred an appeal
before CIT(A). However, even the CIT(A) concurred with the view of the AO and
treated the payment to be in the nature of ‘royalty’. Aggrieved by the CIT(A)’s
order, Google India preferred an appeal before ITAT.


C. Main Issue for
consideration before ITAT


The
main issue before ITAT was whether the amounts credited in Google India’s books
to Google Ireland’s account constituted business income or royalties for use of
software, trademarks and other intellectual property rights.


D. Google’s Arguments


Before
the ITAT, Google India extensively argued that the said payment merely
represented purchase of advertisement space and it does not amount to ‘royalty’
and is in the nature of ‘business income’. Google India’s main arguments were
as under:

a)   It
was merely a reseller of advertising space. It only performed market related
activities to promote the sales of advertising space. No right or intellectual
properties were transferred by Google Ireland to Google India or to the
advertiser.

b)   The
brand features were predominantly commercial rights and were incidental to the
distribution activity and did not involve transfer of any separate right.

c)   Google
India had no control or access to the software, Algorithm and data centre. The
server on which the Adword program runs were located outside India over which
it was not having control. Google India or the advertisers did not have any
right of any use or exploitation or the underlying IP and software. None of
these parties were concerned with the back end functioning of the Adwords
program which was solely carried out by Google Ireland. Their objective was to
benefit from the services of Google and they were not interested in the use of
search service.

d)   Reliance
was also placed on the reports of High Powered Committee of the CBDT as well as
Technical Advisory Group of the OECD which had concluded that the payments in
relation to advertisement fees were not in the nature of royalty. Accordingly,
when the payments made directly by advertisers to Google Ireland could not be
regarded as royalty, the payments made by the distributor for the same ad space
also could not be characterised as royalty.

e)   Clauses
containing protection of confidential information and non-disclosure were
generic and these clauses per se could not establish that there was grant of
right to use any IP.

f)    Also,
what was envisaged in the exhibits of the agreement pertaining to after sales
services were that Google India responded to all routine queries of customers
and Google Ireland was to respond to the advertisers issues or technical
issues. Thus, no right to use any IP was granted to Google India.

g)   The
Google brand features are predominantly commercial rights and are incidental/
consequential to the distribution activity and does not involve transfer of any
separate right. In this regard, reliance was placed by Google India on the
decisions in the case of Sheraton International Inc vs. DDIT [2009) 313 ITR
267 (Delhi HC)
and Formula One World Championship Ltd. vs. CIT [2016]
176 taxmann.com 6 (Delhi HC)
.

h)   Google
India relied upon the decisions of the coordinate bench in Right Florist
(P.) Ltd. (supra), Pinstorm Technologies (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO (supra) and Yahoo
India (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT
(supra) to prove that the issue of online
advertisement had been considered in all the decisions and it was held that the
payment made by the advertiser to the website owner was business profit and in
the absence of any business connection and PE in India and not the Royalty.


E. Tax Authorities’ Arguments


The
tax authorities argued that the payments to Google Ireland constituted
royalties on the following grounds:

a)  Google India’s marketing and
distribution functions involved the sale of certain rights in the AdWords
Program, for which Google India required a license to use the AdWords Program.
The distribution rights granted to Google India under the Distribution Agreement
were therefore in effect a license to use Google Ireland’s IP i.e., inter
alia
the copyright in the underlying software code of the AdWords Program.

b)  The tax authorities concluded
that the license of Google Ireland’s IP to Google India under the Services
Agreement was actually for the purpose of providing the post-sale services
under the Distribution Agreement, and therefore the payments made to Google
Ireland constituted royalties.

c)  The Non-Disclosure Agreement
which is Exhibit-B of the distribution agreement clearly demonstrated that by
virtue of the disclosure of the confidential information and access provided to
the confidential information to the Google India by Google Ireland, the sums
payable by Google India to Google Ireland is for information, know-how and
skill imparted to Google India.

d)  Google India has been
permitted to use Google Ireland’s trademarks and brand features in order to
market and distribute the AdWords Program.

e)  The grant of distribution
rights involves transfer of rights in ‘similar property’ (Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vi)). The grant of distribution rights also involves the transfer
of right to use Google Ireland’s industrial, commercial and scientific
equipment i.e., the servers on which on which the Ad Words Program runs.

f)   The grant of distribution
rights also involves transfer of right in processes, including Google Ireland’s
databases software tools etc., without which it would not be able to perform
its marketing and distribution functions.


 F. ITAT Decision


The
ITAT, to get an understanding as to how Google AdWord program works, relied on
the information obtained through the written submission of Google India, the
books available in public domain on Google AdWord and Google analytics and also
through the website of the Google and the AdWords links therein. Based on its
understanding, the ITAT observed that:

a)  The entire agreement was not
merely to provide the advertisement space but was an agreement for facilitating
the display and publishing of an advertisement to the targeted customer.

b)  The arrangement was not
confined to use of space but also for the use of patented tools and software of
Google Ireland.

c)  Google India got an access to
various information and data pertaining to the user of the website in the form
of their name, age, gender, location, phone number, IP address, habits,
preferences, online behavior, search history etc. and it used this information
for the purpose of selecting the ad campaign and for maximising the impression
and conversion of the customers to the ads of the advertisers.

d)  By using the patented
algorithm, Google India decided which advertisement was to be shown to which
consumer visiting millions of website/search engine.

e)  The ITAT held that there is no
sale of space, as concluded hereinabove rather it is a continuous targeted
advertisement campaign to the targeted and focused consumer in a particular
language to a particular region with the help of digital data and other
information with respect to the person browsing the search engine or visiting the
website.

 f)   The ITAT did not agree that
advertisement distribution agreement and the service agreement were two
independent arrangements. According to the ITAT, both the agreements were
connected with the naval chord with each other.

 g)  The ITAT further held that the
payments made by the assessee under the agreement was not only for marking and
promoting the Ad Word programmes but was also for the use of Google brand
features. Needless to add that the said Google brand features were used by the
appellant as marketing tool for promoting and advertising the advertisement
space, which is main activity of Assessee and is not incidental activities.

The
use of trademark for advertising marketing and booking in the case of Hotel
Sheraton
(Supra) as well as in the case of Formula 1 were
incidental activities of the assessee therein as the main activities in the
cases were providing Hotel Rooms and organizing Car Racing respectively whereas
in the present case the main activity of the assessee is to do marketing of
advertisement space for Google Adwords Programme. Therefore, these two
judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, for this
reason also the payment made by Google India to Google Ireland also falls
within the four corners of royalty as defined under the provisions of Act as
well as under the DTAA.

h)  The ITAT has held that the
findings of the High Powered Committee would not be applicable here as this was
not case of placement of the advertisement simpliciter but there was a module
for targeted advertisement/focus marketing campaigns using the Google software
and algorithm, patented technology, secret process, use of trade mark etc.

i)   The reliance placed by Google
India on the decisions of Pinstorm, Yahoo India, Right Florists have been
brushed aside since the ITAT felt that the facts relating to the working of the
AdWords program stood on a different footing.

j)   The ITAT held that IP of
Google vested in the search engine technology, associated software and other
features, and hence, use of these tools by Google India, clearly fell within
the ambit of ‘Royalty’. The ITAT held that as no tax was withheld by Google
India on payments to Google Ireland, Google India was an assessee in default.

k)  The ITAT was of the view that
the Ad Words Program gives an advertiser a variety of tools to enable it to
maximize attention, engagement, delivery and conversion of its advertisements.
The tools are provided using Google’s IP, software and database with Google
India acting as a gateway.

l)   The ITAT was of the view that
the use of customer data for providing services under the Service Agreement was
also utilized for marketing and distribution functions under the Distribution
Agreement. It concluded that the use of customer data and confidential
information should be regarded as the use of Google Ireland’s intellectual
property by Google India.

m) The ITAT concluded that it is
through use of Google’s intellectual property that the AdWords tools for
performing various activities are made available to Google India and the
advertisers. Therefore, payments made to Google Ireland for use of its intellectual
property would therefore clearly fall within the ambit of “Royalty”.


3.  Observations


a)     The ITAT appears to have
undertaken an intensive fact-finding mission to unearth the technological
workings of the Google AdWords Program on the basis of which it has concluded
that the distribution rights involved a grant of license to IP and
advertisements fees were in the nature of royalties.

b)    The ITAT’s ruling is clear
break with earlier positions taken on the characterization of advertisement
revenue, and payments made under distribution arrangements. Where it ruled the
payments to be in the nature of business income. In these cases, the question
is usually whether the foreign entity has a PE in India for income to be
taxable in India. In fact, the issue in such cases has been on the
determination of a PE on account of a fixed place or dependent agent rather
than whether such an arrangement will result in royalty income.

c)     In fact, it was for this
very reason that the equalization levy was introduced to capture advertising
fees within the Indian tax net, in cases where the non-resident does not have a
PE in India.

d)    The ITAT has taken an
aggressive approach where it has read two independent agreements in relation to
services provided by two different units of Google India together to show that
there was utilization of IP by the Indian entity and re-characterized the
nature of income. The decision does not provide for reasons of tax avoidance
for clubbing the two agreements.

e)     The ITAT’s decision could
have far reaching implications from businesses across the board. Utilization of
IP such as customer data, confidential information for performing services is a
fairly common industry practice and the decision raises concerns on these type
of arrangements.

f)     The above decision is very
crucial and is going to impact many cases which have the similar structure and
in such cases issue would arise as to whether such payment is in the nature of
‘royalty’.

However, one could still examine and contend that ultimately the
objective was to place the advertisement and Google India or the advertisers
were not interested in the back end process of Google Ireland and hence such
payment should constitute business income.

g)    It appears that ITAT in
Google’s case has tried to distinguish the earlier decisions by holding that
Google was not only a simpliciter provider of advertisement space but it also
provided access to software, patented tools, information, etc. which helped
Google India in targeting the customers. The ITAT has also gone into
considerable depth to understand as to how these advertisements are placed on
the website of Google, how it was ensured that large number of customers visit
those advertisements, how the bidding by the advertisers take place etc. and
based on this it came to conclusion that Google India plays a pivotal role in
all these and it was not merely placing the advertisement simpliciter.


4.     Equalisation Levy [EL]


a)     The Finance Act, 2016 has
introduced an ‘Equalisation Levy’ (Chapter VIII) in line with the
recommendation of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting [BEPS] project to
tax e-commerce transactions. It provides that the equalisation levy is to be
charged on specified services (online advertising, any provision for digital
advertising space or facilities/service for the purpose of online
advertisement, etc.) at 6% of the amount of consideration for specified
services received or receivable by a non-resident payee not having a PE in
India. The Equalisation Levy Rules, 2016 have also been issued by CBDT to lay
down the compliance procedure to be followed for such levy. The Rules came into
effect from 1st June 2016.

b)    Further income from such
specified services shall be exempt u/s. 10(50) of the Act. Accordingly, with
effect from 1st June, 2016, such income will not be taxed as royalty
or business income but it would be subject to equalisation levy.

An
interesting issue would arise as to whether payments made after 1st June
2016 would be liable to EL or would it still attract withholding tax treating
it as royalty based on Google India’s decision. It is notable that withholding
tax may be creditable in the country of residence of the payee but no credit is
available for EL.


5. Proposed
amendments in Section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Bill, 2018 – ‘Business Connection’
to include ‘Significant Economic Presence’


Currently,
section 9(1)(i) provides for physical presence based nexus for establishing
business connection of the non-resident in India. A new Explanation 2A to
section 9(1)(i) is proposed to inserted to provide a nexus rule for emerging
business models such as digitised businesses which do not require physical
presence of the non-resident or his agent in India.

This
amendment provides that a non-resident shall establish a business connection on
account of his significant economic presence in India irrespective of whether
the non-resident has a residence or place of business in India or renders
services in India. The following shall be regarded as significant economic
presence of the non-resident in India.

    Any transaction in respect of
any goods, services or property carried out by non-resident in India including
provision of download of data or software in India, provided the transaction
value exceeds the threshold as may be prescribed; or

    Systematic and continuous
soliciting of business activities or engaging in interaction with number of
users in India through digital means, provided such number of users exceeds the
threshold as may be prescribed.

In such cases, only so much of income as is attributable to above
transactions or activities shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India.


 6. Conclusion


The
Google India’s decision will have a significant impact on how other digital
economy related payments are characterised for tax purposes in India. It would
also influence other pre 1st June 2016 cases that relate to online
advertising.

In
view of the ITAT’s observation that both the Associated Enterprises are trying
to misuse the provision of tax treaty by structuring the transaction with the
intention to avoid payment of taxes, and in view of General Anti Avoidance
Rules provision under the Income-tax Act and India’s commitment to implement
Multilateral Instrument under the BEPS initiative, the taxpayers should take
appropriate caution before entering into any arrangement/structure especially
if it is to avail any tax benefit.

It
appears that the law on this issue will continue to remain somewhat unsettled
until resolved by the higher judiciary.

The
understanding of modern day developments around digital space, the complexities
surrounding it and tax implications on such transactions need a holistic
review. It is time for India to develop a framework for digital transactions.
This would be one important aspect in India’s attempts in its endeavour of ease
of doing business. 

 

Sale In Course Of Export U/S. 5(3) – An Update

Introduction

Under
VAT era, import and export transactions were exempted from levy of sales tax
(Vat). The export transaction is defined in section 5(1) of the CST Act.
However, section 5(1) granted exemption to direct export sale. Therefore, the
sale prior to export i.e. penultimate sale was deprived of exemption as export.

 

To
mitigate the said issue section 5(3) was inserted. The said sub-section is
reproduced below for ready reference.

 

“S.5.   When is a sale or
purchase of goods said to take place in the course of import or export. –

 

(3) 
Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the last sale or
purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of
those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the
course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was
for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to
such export.”

 

Thus
one sale prior to export is also exempt. However, the real issue is
interpretation of the scope of said sub-section.

 

Till
today, there are a number of judgements on this issue. However, still it cannot
be said that the issue is fully resolved.

 

Recent judgement

Recently
Hon. Kerala High Court had an occasion to decide one such issue about scope of
section 5(3) in case of Gupta Enterprises vs. Commercial Tax Officer,
Munnar and Ors. [2018] 48 GSTR 252 (Kerala).

The
petitioner was purchasing goods in auction and was objecting to charging of tax
on him by seller on ground that his purchase i.e. corresponding sale by seller
to him is covered by section 5(3) and no tax is applicable. Not able to
succeed, this petition was filed.  

 

Facts
of case, as narrated by High Court, are as under:

 

“3. The appellant filed
W.P. (C). No. 6210/2005 inter alia contending that he is an exporter of
sandalwood and on receipt of prior orders and satisfying the same, he attended
the auction held by the respondents. The sale was eventually confirmed in his
favour. He was called upon to pay the entire sales tax along with the balance
amount. He replied that the transaction is exempted u/s. 5(3) of the Central
Sales Tax and sought for release of the goods against his furnishing bank
guarantee. The authorities refused to release the goods. But the respondents
insisted on payment of tax before the goods are released. Placing reliance on
the decision of the Madras High Court in W.A. Nos. 94 to 96/2000 it was
contended that the demand is against the dictum laid down in the said decision
and being aggrieved by the insistence of the Sales Tax Authorities, writ
petition was filed for the following reliefs:

 

(i)    Issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents 3 and 4 to release the goods purchased vide Ext. P. 3
without collecting sales tax and on the petitioner furnishing documents in
support of claim of exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act and on the petitioner
paying the amount due under the auction,

(ii)   Direct respondents 3 and 4
to release the goods without collection of sale tax land on the petitioner
furnishing bank guarantee for the entire tax amount pending adjudication on
sales tax exemption by the 2nd respondent and other consequential
reliefs.”

 

The
issue which arose was, whether the purchase of sandalwood was in course of
export u/s. 5(3). If goods purchased are exported in same form then the
exemption is invariably allowable. However, where goods purchased are processed
then question of integrated connection between export and prior purchase
arises. If no integrated connection or inextricable link is proved, the prior
transaction cannot fall u/s. 5(3). Hon. Kerala High Court referred to
historical background about interpretation of this section and then arrived at
conclusion.

 

The
observations of High Court are as under:    

 

“7.  The learned Single Judge after referring to the relevant provisions of
the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, (FDTR Act), held that
while export of sandalwood can be only in such forms permitted by the DGFT,
there can be no export of sandalwood in any other form. Any export of
sandalwood except in the forms permitted by the DGFT would be an illegal export
contravening the provisions of the FTDR Act and the Customs Act. Placing
reliance on Ext. R. 3(a) addressed by the Zonal Joint DGFT to the Conservator
of Forests and Ext. R. 3(b) public notice issued by the DGFT in exercise of the
powers under “exim policy” show that sandalwood is not covered by
open General Licence, but one falling under the restricted list for which an
exporter has to make specific request for licence to DGFT, who releases quota
from time to time and that the categories of Sandalwood allowed for export are
“sandalwood chip class” in the form of heart wood chips upto 50
grams, mixed chips upto 50 grams, flakes upto 20 grams of the sandalwood
classes (Jajpokal I class, Jajpokal II class, Antibagar, Cheria Milvanthilta,
Basolabjukni, saw dust, charred billets), sandalwood chips/power sandalwood
dust obtained as waste after the manufacturing process and sandalwood in any
other form as approved by the Exim Facilitation Committee in the Directorate
General of Foreign Trade. Ext. P. 18 export licence was also issued to the
petitioner under the FTDR Act and licence to export is granted only for the
categories mentioned therein. The learned Single Judge also entered a positive
finding after referring to Ext. P. 18 export licence issued to the petitioner
under the FTDR Act that licence to export is granted only for the categories
mentioned therein, namely, sandalwood in the form of heart wood chips upto 50
grams, mixed chips not exceeding 30 grams and flakes upto 20 grams of the
sandalwood classes, Jajpokal I class, Jajpokal II class, Antibagar, Cheria
Milvachilta, Basolabukhi, saw dust, charred billets, sandalwood power, dust,
chips and flakes.

 

The
petitioner placed reliance on Ext. P. 17, the rules regarding selection,
cleaning, classification and disposal of sandalwood etc. issued by the
Tamil Nadu Forest Department and it was contended based on Ext. P. 17 that
various classes of sandalwood are described in Ext. P. 17 and it will be seen
therefrom that the classification is purely on the basis of weight of billets,
defects noticed in the billets and the length of the billets etc. and
these are not different types or varieties of sandalwood. The learned Single
Judge exhaustively referred to various items in Ext. P. 17 and found that the
classification of sandalwood as per Ext. P. 17 when juxtaposed with the
documents evidencing the items bid by the petitioner, as evidenced by different
documents and were put in a tabular form in paragraph 22 of the judgement. It
was concluded that export orders of foreign buyers produced by the petitioner
evidenced that they were only sandalwood chips, below 50 grams.

 

After
referring to the various materials as noticed above, the learned Single Judge
found that on facts the sandalwood as purchased by the petitioner from the
Forest Department is in the form of billets, roots, or even chips weighing over
50 grams, could not have been exported in consonance with exim policy and the
export licence, without converting the same into chips of the description
covered by the export licence.

 

There
is a prohibition, in law, for export of sandalwood in any form, other than that
permitted under the exim policy and the export licence, with an order releasing
quota for the export. So much so, the sandalwood purchased form the Forest
Department as billets, roots etc. had to be converted into flakes, power
etc. weighing below not more than 50 grams to make them exportable
goods. In commercial parlance, the goods prohibited from being exported stood
converted to exportable goods. It is also held that for the purpose of section
5(3), what is relevant for consideration is whether the goods that formed the
subject matter of the penultimate sale or purchase are the self-same goods that
are exported and in the light of the decision in Sterling Foods vs. State of
Karnataka (MANU/SC/0423/1986
:

 

(1986)
3 SCC 469) of the Apex Court, the words “those goods” in section 5(3)
are clearly referable to “any goods” mentioned in the preceding part
of that sub-section and it is, therefore, obvious that the goods purchased by
the exporter and the goods exported by him must be the same. On the other hand,
in the present case the goods purchased by the assessee from the Forest
Department are those which were incapable of being exported in terms of the
relevant laws. The only types of goods that can be exported as sandalwood are
those which fall under the categories permitted for export. Hence, the goods
purchased by the petitioner from the Forest Department had to undergo the
change from the commercial status of non-exportable goods to that of exportable
goods, by change in its form from billets, roots etc. to flakes of the
dimension or as dust, permitted for export, in terms of the laws relating to
export. Thus, there occurs a conversion of the goods purchased so as to facilitate
the export and as such ceased to be “such goods” which were purchased
from the Forest Department. Hence, the claim for exemption u/s. 5(3) of the CST
Act was negatived.

 

Though
the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Consolidated
Coffee vs. Coffee Board, Bangalore (AIR 1980 SC 1403)
, the learned Single
Judge accepted that merely on the  basis
of the condition of sale notice, one could not be compelled to pay tax provided
the exemption applies. But the decision in W.A. Nos. 94 to 96/2000 of the
Madras High Court, which in turn referred to the case of Consolidated Coffee’s
case (supra) did not support the case of the petitioner on the issue
regarding the identity of the goods to be found among that purchased and those
exported. In the Madras decision the goods purchased by the appellant therein
(petitioner herein) were contended to be different from the goods sought to
export. But the said contention was not pursued further by the Tamil Nadu
Government.

 

The
different varieties of sandalwood purchased by the appellant were reduced to
small pieces for the purpose of export, though noticed by the court in the said
decision, none of the decisions on which reliance was placed by the learned
Single Judge, were referred to and there was no serious argument raised by the
State of Tamil Nadu in that regard and it was in such circumstances that the
Court accepted the assessee’s case therein.”

 

Further
para 9 reads as under:

“9. It was then contended by the learned
counsel that the Apex Court in the decision reported in State of Karnataka
vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt. Ltd. (MANU/SC/8024/2006

: (2006) 145 STC 176), has
doubted the correctness of the decision in Sterling Food’s case
(MANU/SC/0423/1986 : (1986) 3 SCC 469) and also the decision in Vijayalaxmi
Cashew Company’s case ((MANU/SC/1015/1996 : (1996) 1 SCC 468), and has referred
the case to a larger Bench. It is true, the Court observed, that the said
decisions need reconsideration and the matter is placed before the larger
Bench. In the above case M/s. Tata the exporter and also a manufacturer of
chassis had a pre-existing order of export of ‘Buses”. The chassis were
moved under customs bond for body building and export to the premises of the
assessee (Bus body builder).

 

The
assessee then delivers the completed bus which is moved under the bond directly
to the port and exported, so that chain never breaks. The question arose was
whether in such circumstances the bus body builder is entitled to claim the
benefit u/s. 5(3) of the CST Act. It is in that context the Apex Court
considered the expression “in relation to such exports” which did not
get due weightage in the earlier decision.

 

But
even in the said case, the assessee only contended that the test of “the
same goods” is evolved only to explain that the exporter should not have
undertaken any process to change the identity of the goods brought by him in
order to confer the benefit of exemption on the penultimate sale. Thus there
was no dispute that if the goods undergo changes in the hands of the exporter
after the purchase and before export, he will not be entitled to claim the
benefit of section 5(3) of the CST Act, which is the main issue in the present
case. Be that as it may until a final decision is rendered by the Apex Court pursuant
to the reference order in State of Karnataka vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt.
Ltd. (MANU/SC/8024/2006 : (2006) 145 STC 176)
, the decision in Sterling
Food’s case and Vijayalaxmi Cashew Company’s case beholds the field as a
binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.”

 

Observing
as above Hon. High Court rejected claim of section 5(3).

 

Conclusion     

The
judgement is well reasoned to understand the scope of section 5(3) of CST Act
and more particularly, the effect of judgment of Supreme Court in case of State
of Karnataka vs. Azad Coach Builders Pvt. Ltd. (145 STC 176)(SC
).

We
hope above will be a guiding judgement for deciding further cases.
 

 

Place Of Supply – Immovable Property Based Services

Introduction

In the previous article, we had examined the Integrated Goods and
Service Tax (‘IGST’) framework in the backdrop of the provisions of the
Constitution. The IGST framework dealt with the concept of location of supplier
and place of supply (‘POS’) which aids in determining whether a supply is to be
treated as intrastate or interstate and accordingly, helps in determining the
applicable tax (CGST + SGST in case of intra-state and IGST in case of
interstate).

There are specific provisions prescribed for determination of place
of supply for both goods as well as services under Chapter V of the IGST Act.
Sections 10 & 11 thereof deal with goods while Section 12 deals with
services where both the supplier as well as recipient are located in India and
section 13 deals with services where either the supplier or recipient is
located in India.

The general rule for determination of place of supply is that the
location of the recipient is to be treated as POS except for cases where the
recipient is unregistered and his address on record is not available, in which
case location of supplier is treated as the POS.

This general rule
is subject to various exceptions where the POS is to be determined in a
different manner. One such exception pertains to cases where services relate to
immovable property and the same is covered u/s. 12 (3) in cases where both the
service provider and the service recipient are located in India. In cases where
either the service provider or the service recipient is located outside India,
Section 13(4) is applicable. In this article, we shall specifically deal with
the said exception and the issues revolving around it.

 

Relevant
Provisions

Section 12
of the IGST Act

(3) The
place of supply of services–

(a) directly in relation to an immovable
property, including services provided by architects, interior decorators,
surveyors, engineers and other related experts or estate agents, any service
provided by way of grant of rights to use immovable property or for carrying
out or co-ordination of construction work; or

(b) by way of lodging accommodation by a
hotel, inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite, by whatever name called,
and including a house boat or any other vessel; or

(c) by way of accommodation in any
immovable property for organising any marriage or reception or matters related
thereto, official, social, cultural, religious or business function including
services provided in relation to such function at such property; or

(d) any
services ancillary to the services referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c),
shall be the location at which the immovable property or boat or vessel, as the
case may be, is located or intended to be located:

Provided
that if the location of the immovable property or boat or vessel is located or
intended to be located outside India, the place of supply shall be the location
of the recipient.

Explanation.––Where the immovable
property or boat or vessel is located in more than one State or Union
territory, the supply of services shall be treated as made in each of the
respective States or Union territories, in proportion to the value for services
separately collected or determined in terms of the contract or agreement
entered into in this regard or, in the absence of such contract or agreement,
on such other basis as may be prescribed.

 

Services directly in relation to Immovable
Property

The practice of treating the place of supply as the location of
property in case of transactions involving immovable property is not new. Even
under the service tax regime, Rule 5 of the Place of Provision of Service
Rules, 2012 which dealt with the determination of place of provision of service
was similarly worded. However, with the concept of dual GST, this provision has
its’ own ramifications. This is because GST is a state specific law. Therefore,
deciding the type of GST applicable (CGST + SGST vs. IGST) is very important.
More importantly, in cases where the recipient of supply is not registered in
the State where the immovable property is located, the credit is lost even if
the recipient uses the services in the course of his business.

For instance, if a supplier is providing services of renting of
immovable property, in such a case, he will have to consider the Place of
Supply as the state in which the immovable property is located, whether or not
the recipient is registered in that state. Same position will apply even in
case of other transactions such as supply of maintenance and repair services
relating to immovable property. All these services apparently have a direct
relation with an immovable property and therefore, would rightly get classified
under this particular rule.

While in general, the recipient of renting service would be
registered in the state where the immovable property is located if he is into
business, the challenge may arise in case of hotels. Most companies use hotel
facilities in other states for the stay of their executives while on business
trips. Such companies may not have any branches or fixed establishments in
other states and therefore may be unregistered. This results in loss of credit
since the hotel would charge CGST & SGST relevant to that State in view of
the place of supply provision mentioned above.

Moving forward, what is meant by the phrase “directly in relation to
immovable property” needs to be analysed, as there are many other transactions
where the services involve use of immovable property as well, but there are
other factors which are also related with the supply of service and hence,
classification under this rule might not be applicable. Let us understand this
with the help of following examples:

Example 1 – ABC is a container freight
station located in Nhava Sheva. DEF, a manufacturer exporter has received an
order for export of goods from Nhava Sheva and has accordingly dispatched the
goods from his factory. When the goods reach Nhava Sheva, the exporter is
informed that the ship in which the goods are to be exported out of India will
berth at the port after 15 days and hence, DEF is required to make temporary
arrangements to store his goods. DEF enters in to a contract for the same with
ABC. The issue in this case would be whether the POS is Maharashtra, being the
location of immoveable property or Gujarat, being the location of recipient? If
ABC, taking a conservative view, classifies the service under this clause, it
would impact the credit availment for DEF as they are registered only in
Gujarat and hence, the credit of taxes for supplies consumed in Maharashtra
would not be available to them. Therefore, they are contending that the
exception clause is not applicable as the services provided by DEF are not
directly in relation to the immovable property.

Example 2 – An advertising service provider provides service in the
context of Out Of Home Advertisements. Under this model, the advertiser takes
on rent advertising space across the country by entering into agreements with
various landlords. Subsequently, the service provider enters into advertising
contract with various clients to allow the display of the advertisements from
such locations. In this context, while the services supplied by the landlords are
directly in relation to an immovable property, can the same be said for the
second leg of the transaction since the service is in relation to advertising
activity, which is distinct from leasing of an immovable property?

Before actually
analysing the above issues, we shall first discuss the following two terms,
which form the crux of this particular entry:

Scope of the phrase
in relation to

Directly in relation to – to be applied to what extent

The scope of the phrase “in relation to” has been dealt with by the
Supreme Court in the case of Doypack Systems Private Limited vs. Union of
India [1988 (036) ELT 0201 SC]
in the context of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co.
Limited (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1966. The issue was
whether the investments owned by the undertaking were also covered under the
provisions of the said Act and liable for acquisition? The Act provided that on
the appointed day “every textile undertaking” and “the right, title and
interest of the company in relation to every textile mill of such textile
undertakings” were transferred to and vested in the Central Government and such
textile undertakings would be deemed to include “all assets”. The contention of
the Appellants was that the investment in shares of the company were not in
relation to textile mills/undertakings and hence, they were not liable for
nationalisation.

The Supreme Court in the above case held that the expression “in
relation to” is a very broad expression which pre-supposes another subject
matter. These are words of comprehensiveness which might both have a direct
significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the context. The
Court also referred to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 620 and 621
where it is stated that the term “relate”’ is defined as meaning to bring into
association or connection with. It has been clearly mentioned that “relating
to” has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning
with” and “pertaining to”. The expression “pertaining to” is an expression of
expansion and not of contraction.

From the above, it is more than evident that the term “in relation
to” has to be given a very wide interpretation. This however gives rise to the
next issue, and that is when a service is said to be in relation to immovable
property. While the GST law is silent about this respect, under the service tax
regime, the Education Guide issued by CBEC at the time of introduction of
negative list-based taxation explained that for a service to be considered in
relation to immovable property, the same should consist of lease, right to use,
occupation, enjoyment or exploitation of an immovable property or service
should have to be performed on the immovable property.

In this background, let us try to understand the above clarification
with an example. A lawyer, having his office in Delhi, provides chamber
consultancy in the form of discussion with client (based in Mumbai) on a legal
matter concerning a real estate in his Delhi Office. The client had travelled
from Mumbai for the specific meeting. Can it be said that the services in this
case are in relation to immovable property and not legal advisory?

Taking a more practical approach to the above aspect, let us take
another example of a supplier providing document management services.
Generally, this service includes receiving the documents from the customer,
scanning & storing them at supplier location. Only when the customer
requires them, they are retrieved from the respective warehouse and provided to
the customers. The customer is not aware about the location where his documents
are stored. In this context, can it be said that the services are in relation
to an immovable property merely because in supplying the services, there is an
element of immovable property involved. Both the above situations clearly
demonstrate that the service in none of the cases is in relation to immovable
property, if the interpretation of the Education Guide is accepted.

In fact, this distinction was applied even under the service tax
regime wherein Rule 4 specifically dealt with the aspect of place of provision
for performance-based services in the context of which, the Education Guide had
provided that the service of storage of goods is actually in relation to goods
and not immovable property. Relevant extracts are reproduced for reference:

5.4.1 What are the services that are provided “in respect of goods
that are made physically available, by the receiver to the service provider, in
order to provide the service”? – sub-rule (1):

Services that are related to goods, and which require such goods to
be made available to the service provider or a person acting on behalf of the
service provider so that the service can be rendered, are covered here. The
essential characteristic of a service to be covered under this rule is that the
goods temporarily come into the physical possession or control of the service
provider, and without this happening, the service cannot be rendered. Thus, the
service involves movable objects or things that can be touched, felt or possessed.
Examples of such services are repair, reconditioning, or any other work on
goods (not amounting to manufacture), storage and warehousing, courier service,
cargo handling service (loading, unloading, packing or unpacking of cargo),
technical testing/inspection/certification/ analysis of goods, dry cleaning
etc. ….

The above interpretation has been followed even in the context of EU
VAT which contains similar provision for determination of place of supply of
services. In this context, reference to the decision of the First Chamber Court
in the context of EU VAT in Minister Finansow vs. RR Donnelley Global
Turnkey Solutions Poland (RRD)
is also relevant. The issue in the said case
was that RRD was engaged in providing a complex service of storage of goods
involving storage, admission, packaging, loading / unloading, etc. The issue
was whether the service could be classified under Article 47 or not, which deal
with supply of services connected with immovable property. The same is
reproduced below for ready reference:

The place of
supply of services connected with immovable property, including the services of
experts and estate agents, the provision of accommodation in the hotel sector
or in sectors with a similar function, such as holiday camps or sites developed
for use as camping sites, the granting of rights to use immovable property and
services for the preparation and coordination of construction work, such as the
services of architects and of firms providing on-site supervision, shall be the
place where the immovable property is located.

From the above, it is evident that Article 47 is worded similarly to
section 13 (4). In the context of Article 47, the Court had held as under:

Article 47
of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of
value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008,
must be interpreted as meaning that the supply of a complex storage service,
comprising admission of goods to a warehouse, placing them on the appropriate
storage shelves, storing them, packaging them, issuing them, unloading and
loading them, comes within the scope of that article only if the storage
constitutes the principal service of a single transaction and only if the
recipients of that service are given a right to use all or part of expressly
specific immovable property.

In fact, Article 47 has been amended w.e.f 1st
January 2017 to specifically provide transactions which shall be treated as
being in connection with an immovable property and transactions which shall not
be treated as being in connection with an immovable property. Some specific
inclusions and exclusions are tabulated below:

 

 

 

 

 

In Connection with Immovable Property

Not in connection with Immovable property

u Drawing up of plans for a building /
parts of a building designated for a particular plot of land

u On site Supervision / Security services

u Survey and assessment of risk and
integrity of the immovable property (Title search by advocates)

u Property management services (other than
REITs)

u Estate agent services

u Drawing up of plans for a building /
parts of a building not designated for a particular plot of land

u Storage of goods in an immovable
property if no specific part of immovable property earmarked for the
exclusive use of the said customer

u Provision of advertising, even if
involves use of immovable property (Out of Home Advertising)

uIntermediation in the provision of hotel
accommodation services acting on behalf of another person

uBusiness exhibition services

uPortfolio management of investments in
real estate (REIT)

 

 

One another issue that is being faced
is from the view point of location of supplier where the services are in
relation to an immovable property. For example, ABC is a property investment
company which has acquired commercial / residential property across the country
and provides the same on lease basis to various customers. ABC has physical
presence only in Mumbai. All the lease agreements specifically provide that the
agreement has been entered into with ABC, Mumbai and the customer for leasing
the respective property which may be located anywhere across India. While
admittedly the POS in case of transactions entered in to by ABC will have to be
the location where the immovable property is situated, the issue that arise is
whether ABC is required to bill the customer from the locations where the
immovable property is located or can they continue to bill from Mumbai treating
Mumbai as the location of supplier of service?

In this regard, reference to Section 22 of the CGST Act might be
necessary which provides that registration has to be taken in each state from
where the taxable supply is being made. Therefore, it needs to be analysed as
to whether the location of supplier of service in this case will be Mumbai or
the respective locations where the property is situated? To analyse the same,
let us refer to the definition of location of supplier of service which
provides that the location of supplier of services shall mean:

(a) where a supply
is made from a place of business for which the registration has been obtained,
the location of such place of business;

(b) where a supply
is made from a place other than the place of business for which registration
has been obtained (a fixed establishment elsewhere), the location of such fixed
establishment;

(c) where a supply
is made from more than one establishment, whether the place of business or
fixed establishment, the location of the establishment most directly concerned
with the provisions of the supply; and

(d) in absence of such places, the location of the usual place of
residence of the supplier;

As can be seen from the above, location of supplier of service has
to be either a Place of Business or a Fixed Establishment, which have been
defined under the GST law as under:

Place of Business

Fixed Establishment

(85) “place of business” includes––

(a) a place from where the business is
ordinarily carried on, and includes a warehouse, a godown or any other place
where a taxable person stores his goods, supplies or receives goods or
services or both; or

(b) a place where a taxable person
maintains his books of account; or

(c) a place where a taxable person is
engaged in business through an agent, by whatever name called;

(50) “fixed establishment” means a place (other than the
registered place of business) which is characterised by a sufficient degree
of permanence and suitable structure in terms of human and technical
resources to supply services, or to receive and use services for its own
needs;

 

 

 

While there is no concern in treating the
Mumbai office of ABC as its Place of Business, the issue arises in the context
of other locations where ABC owns immovable property. Whether they can be
classified as POB/ FE? Evidently, ABC does not carry out any business from such
locations. The business continues to be carried out from Mumbai, only the
underlying service is delivered at such locations and hence, it can be
concluded that clause (a) of the definition of POB will not be applicable.
Similarly, clause (b) and (c) shall also not be applicable. Therefore, the only
question that needs to be determined is whether such locations can be treated
as FE or not? Even that seems improbable because for a place to be classified
as FE, the same needs to be characterised by
a sufficient degree of permanence and suitable structure in terms of human and
technical resources to supply services, or to receive and use services for its
own needs
. While one can say that the locations have a sufficient
degree of permanence, the second limb, that is human & technical resources
to make the supply will not get satisfied. That being the case, such locations
cannot be even classified as FE.

Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that such locations, since
not classifiable as either POB/ FE, the question of the same being classifiable
as Location of Supplier of Service may not arise.

In this context,
one may even refer to the FAQ issued by the CBEC in this context where in one
of the questions, it was clarified that there can be interstate billing for
rental services as well.

 

Service by
way of lodging accommodation

This clause applies to lodging accommodation services provided by a
hotel, inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat.
This rule makes lodging accommodation costly as in cases where the supplier and
recipient are located in different states, it makes the transaction tax
ineffective. For example, if a hotel in Maharashtra provides accommodation
service to an employee of Gujarat based company, even if the transaction is B2B
in nature, yet the company in Gujarat will not be able to claim the credit of
taxes as the POS will be Maharashtra. In fact, the businesses are in a losing
situation as credit was eligible under the pre-GST regime.

However, one particular issue for this kind of transaction is where
transactions are routed through online portals / agents. As stated above, this
entry is applicable only in cases where the services are provided by hotel,
inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat.
Therefore, in cases where the transaction is routed through online
portals/agents, the rule may not apply. Let us try to understand with the help
of following example.

A Hotel in Goa has entered into a contract with two selling agents,
one located in Bangalore and another in Mumbai. The arrangement with the
Bangalore selling agent is on a Principal to Principal basis wherein the Hotel
blocks specified number of rooms for the Bangalore based agent to sell and
whether or not the Bangalore agent is able to sell the rooms, the charges are
recovered from the agent. However, the terms of the transaction with the Mumbai
based agent are different. In that case, it is provided that the Mumbai based
agent shall merely facilitate the supply on behalf of the hotel for which they
would charge service charges.

The issue arises in the case of transactions through Bangalore
agent. The reason being:

In case of billing by Hotel to Agent – whether the supply is to be
treated of lodging / accommodation service or some other service? In case the
same is treated as lodging / accommodation, the POS will be Goa, and since the
agent is located in Bangalore, credit will not be eligible resulting in a tax
inefficient structure. Further issue arises when the agent bills to the
customer. The agent is not registered in Goa. Will he treat the place of supply
as Goa or will he treat the place of supply to be that of the recipient of the
service? Will one consider the service as directly in relation to an immoveable
property and covered under sub clause (a) or will one believe that sub clause
(b) is applicable? If sub clause (b) and not subclause (a) should be the
correct classification, the issue is that the service provider is not a hotel,
inn, guest house, home stay, club or campsite including a house boat though the
actual provision of service might be by a hotel and in such a case, one can
take a view that since the supply is not by the specified class of supplier,
the exception is not applicable and accordingly, POS may have to be determined
as per the general rule. This position will have to be tested at judicial
forums.

Similarly, in the
case of second set of transactions routed through Mumbai agent, since the Hotel
will be billing directly to customer, the POS will be determined as per the
exception. The Mumbai agent billing to Hotel / Customer for arrangement fees
will be as per the applicable rule and may not get classified under this
basket.

There is one more aspect on credit front in case of B2B transactions
involving lodging accommodation. Let us take an example of a company having
operations in two states, say Maharashtra & Gujarat and hence, registered
in the two states. An employee working with Gujarat office travels to Mumbai
for a client meeting and stays in hotel. Since the company is registered in
Maharashtra, he provides the company with the GSTIN of Maharashtra and asks the
hotel to issue invoice to Mumbai office. Is there any issue in this practice?

The probable answer
to the above question may be found in section 16 of the CGST Act, which
provides that every registered person shall be entitled to take credit of input
tax charged on supply of goods / services which are used / intended to be used
in the course or furtherance of his business. The issue that can be raised here
is whether the credit can be denied on the grounds that the invoice pertained
to a different registered person (being Gujarat) and was used in the course or
furtherance of a different registered person. If this conservative view is
accepted, the credit claim might be in danger. However, to counter this view,
can it be argued that while the GST law provides for deeming branches in
different states as distinct person, the same does not apply for business? That
is, the concept of business will have to be considered at entity level and not qua
the registration and accordingly, credit should be available.

 

Immovable property in multiple states –
Determining POS

There can be transaction for supply of services wherein under a
single contract, services for multiple immovable properties located across
multiple states might be provided. Lets’ take an example of Clean Ganga
initiative undertaken by the Central Government and awarded to an engineering
company. The river passes through multiple states.

The Government has entered into a single contract with the company
for undertaking the task of cleaning the river. Evidently, there is no issue
with respect to whether the services are in relation to an immovable property
or not? The only issue here that arises is how the POS has to be determined as
one can say that the POS is all such states through which the river flows.

While the proviso to section 12 (3) does deal with such a scenario,
it merely provides that the supply shall be treated as made in each of the
respective States / UT in proportion to the value for service separately
collected / determined in terms of the contract or agreement and in absence of
such contract/ agreement, the POS shall be determined on such other basis as
may be prescribed.

Therefore, in cases where the agreement provides for breakup of
consideration basis the work done in each state, the POS shall be determined
accordingly. However, in case the agreement is silent, one needs to be
determined in the prescribed manner. Unfortunately, no such manner has been
prescribed as on date for determining POS for such supplies. Even if the manner
for determination of POS is prescribed, even then it has to be noted that there
is no provision under the GST law for splitting of value / supply itself. The
provisions exist only for splitting of POS.

Therefore, the
issues that arise is whether the levy will sustain in the absence of proper
provision for determination of value of supply, even if the notifications are
issued in this regard? In this context, reference can be made to the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Shetty wherein
it was held that the charging sections and the computation provisions together
constitute an integrated code and the transaction to which the computation
provisions cannot be applied must be regarded as never intended to be subjected
to charge of tax.

 

Conclusion

While there are
specific provisions for determining the place of supply in the context of
property-based services, the same has its’ own share of interpretation issues
as well as interlinkages with other aspects of the law, viz., valuation,
credits, registration, etc. and such exception rules can result in breaking the
credit chain and the intent of the GST Law to enable free flow of credit and
open up trade and commerce amongst the States.
 

 

1 Section 54 – Two separate contracts for purchase of flat viz. one for house property and the other for furniture, etc. considered, in substance, as the one only and deduction allowed in full.

Rajat B. Mehta vs. Income Tax Officer
(Ahmedabad)
ITA No. 19/Ahd/16
A.Y: 2011-12. Date of Order: 9th February, 2018
Members: Pramod Kumar (A.M.) and S. S.
Godara (J.M.)Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:  Urvashi Shodhan / V. K. Singh


FACTS

The assessee is a non-resident who sold off a house for a consideration of Rs 2.46 crore and earned long term capital gain of Rs. 1.9 crore. He invested a portion of the sale proceeds, Rs. 78 lakhs, in another residential unit and claimed a deduction u/s. 54. The AO noted that the assessee had entered into two separate contracts viz., for purchase of house property and another for purchase of furniture and fixtures therein. The payment of Rs. 60 lakhs was for the purchase of house property and Rs. 18 lakhs was for the purchase of furniture and fixtures. The AO was of the opinion that the assessee had executed two separate deeds to save stamp duty on it, (and) now the assessee is trying to evade income tax. He was further of the view that most of the furniture items are removable, and, that it cannot be said that furniture was purchased to make the house habitable. Therefore, the AO declined deduction u/s. 54 F to the extent of Rs 18 lakhs paid under a separate agreement for furniture and fixtures in the residential property purchased by the assessee.

HELD
Analysing the provisions of section 54, the Tribunal noted that the expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” which according to it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. Further, it noted that there are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well. In such circumstances, what is to be treated as cost of the residential house is the entire cost of house, and it cannot be open to the AO to treat only the cost of only civil construction as cost of house and segregate the cost of other things as not eligible for deduction u/s. 54.

However, from the arrangement in which the transaction was entered into, the Tribunal noted that in substance and in effect the house was sold for Rs 78 lakhs. Even if the assessee was to buy the house, without the furniture, it would have been for Rs 78 lakhs – as was clearly specified in the agreement to sell. The cause or trigger for the splitting of the consideration was not relevant and it had no bearing on de facto consideration for purchase of house property. The two agreements, according to it, cannot be considered in isolation with each other on standalone basis, and have to be considered essentially as a composite contract, particularly in the light of the undisputed contents of the agreement to sale. Given these facts, the Tribunal held that the cost of the new asset has to be treated as Rs 78 lakhs. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the disallowance of deduction u/s. 54 to the extent of Rs 18 lakhs.

4 Section 54 – The exemption u/s. 54 cannot be denied even in a case where the assessee has utilised the entire capital gain by way of making payment to the developer of flat but could not get possession of the flat as the new flat was not completed by the developer. Section 54(2) does not say that in case assessee could not get possession of property, he was not entitled for exemption u/s. 54.

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 11 (Chennai-Trib.)
ACIT vs. M. Raghuraman
ITA No. : 1990/Mds/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14                               
Date of Order: 08th February, 2018

FACTS

The assessee, in his return
of income, claimed exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.  The claim for exemption was made on the basis
of payments made to the developer for sale consideration. The flat, however,
was not completed even though payment was made to the promoter. The possession
was not yet given to the assessee.

 

The Assessing Officer (AO)
denied deduction on the ground that construction is not completed and
therefore, the assessee is not eligible to claim exemption.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the claim of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved, the revenue
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD 

A bare reading of section
54 clearly says that in case the assessee purchased a residential house in
India or constructed a residential house in India within a period stipulated in
section 54(1), the assessee is eligible for exemption u/s. 54. Section 54(2)
clearly says that in case the capital gain, which is not appropriated by the
assessee towards purchase of new asset or which is not utilised in purchase of
residential house or construction of residential house, then it shall be
deposited in a specific account. It is not the case of the revenue that capital
gain was not appropriated or it was not utilised. The fact is that the entire
capital gain was paid to the developer of the flat. In other words, the
assessee has utilised the entire capital gain by way of making payment to the
developer of the flat.

 

Section
54(2) does not say that in case the assessee could not get the possession of
the property, he is not entitled for exemption u/s. 54. The requirement of
section 54 is that the capital gain shall be utilised or appropriated as
specified in section 54(2). The assessee has complied with the conditions
stipulated in section 54(2). Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly
allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal held that it did not find any
reason to interfere with the order of the lower authority and accordingly, it
confirmed the same.

 

The appeal filed by the Revenue
was dismissed.

 

3 Section 47(iv) – Transaction of transfer of shares by a company to its second step down 100% subsidiary cannot be regarded as ‘transfer’ in view of the provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act. A second step down subsidiary company is also regarded as subsidiary of the assessee company under Companies Act, 1956 as the term ‘subsidiary company’ has not been defined under the Act.

[2018] 91 taxmann.com 62 (Kolkata-Trib.)
Emami Infrastructure Ltd. vs. ITO
ITA No. : 880/Kol/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11: Date of Order: 28th February, 2018

FACTS
The assessee filed its return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 88,79,544. In the return of income, the assessee also claimed that it has incurred a long term capital loss of Rs. 25,05,20,775 which it carried forward. The Assessing Officer (AO), assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 29,99,30,657.

During the previous year under consideration, on 31.3.2010, the assessee sold 2,86,329 shares of Zandu Realty Ltd., at the rate of Rs. 2100 per share, to Emami Rainbow Niketan Pvt. Ltd., a 100% subsidiary of the assessee’s subsidiary viz. Emami Realty Ltd. The sale was in accordance with the decision taken by the Board of Directors on 23.3.2010 and also in accordance with the valuation report of SSKM Corporate Advisory Pvt. Ltd.

The Assessing Officer found that the assessee had sold shares of Zandu Realty Ltd. at a price ranging from Rs. 6200 per share on 23.12.2009 to Rs. 4390 per share on 11.2.2010. He asked the assessee to show cause why the sale price per share of Zandu Realty Ltd. should not be taken at Rs. 3989.80 being the average price traded at NSE as on 31.3.2010 against the sale price of Rs. 2100 per share taken by the assessee.

The AO held that he found the explanation of the assessee to be not acceptable. Considering the huge price variance between the quoted price in NSE and the off-market selling price shown by the assessee he held that when the shares are traded in stock exchange the best way to determine the selling price of a share is the price quoted in the stock exchange. Accordingly, he determined the long term capital gain to be Rs. 29,05,83,769, by considering the sale price to be Rs. 3989.80 per share as against Rs. 2100 per share taken by the assessee, as against the claim of loss of Rs. 25,05,20,775 shown by the assessee in the return of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO by relying on the ratio of the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Kalindi Investments Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (256 ITR 713)(Guj.)

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the assessee sold equity shares of Zandu Realty Ltd. to Emami Rainbow Niketan Pvt. Ltd based on price of shares determined by Corporate Advisory Pvt. Ltd.  It also noted that the buyer Emami Rainbow Niketan is a 100% subsidiary of Emami Realty Ltd. Emami Realty Ltd. is a 100% subsidiary of Emami Infrastructure Ltd, the assessee. The Tribunal observed that the two issues which arise for its adjudication are –

(i)    whether there is a transfer of shares in view of the provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act; and

(ii)    if the transaction in question is not covered by section 47(iv) of the Act, then whether the computation of capital gains as made by the AO and confirmed by the CIT(A) is correct or not and whether the AO can substitute the sale consideration of the shares sold with FMV as determined by him?

The Tribunal observed that if it comes to the conclusion that this is not a transfer then the assessee’s claim that it had incurred a long term capital loss and same has to be carried forward cannot be allowed. Similarly, capital gain computed by the AO based on fair market value computed by him and substituted for the sale consideration agreed to by the seller and buyer has to be cancelled.

The Tribunal noted that the transfer is to a second step down 100% subsidiary of the assessee. The issue is whether provisions of section 47(iv)(a)(b) are applicable to a second step down subsidiary. It noted the following two divergent views on this issue –

(i)    the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (236 ITR 220)(Bom.) has, in the context of provisions of section 108 of the Act, held that a 100% owned sub-subsidiary of a 100% owned subsidiary would be a subsidiary within the meaning of section 4(1)(c) of the Companies Act and also within the meaning of section 108(a) of the Act;

(ii)    the Gujarat High Court has in the case of Kalindi Investments Pvt. Ltd. (256 ITR 713)(Guj) held that there is no justification for invoking clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the 1956 Act while interpreting the provisions of clauses (iv) and (v) of section 47.

Applying the decision of the Bombay High Court (supra), the transaction in question cannot be regarded as a transfer in view of provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act, as it is a transfer of a capital asset by a company to its subsidiary company and as a second step down 100% subsidiary company is also a subsidiary of the assessee company under the Companies Act, 1956 as the term ‘subsidiary company’ has not been defined under the Income-tax Act.

Upon going through the two judgments, the Tribunal held that it prefers to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. (supra) as in its view a second step down 100% subsidiary is also covered by the provision of section 47(iv) of the Act, as this is the letter and spirit of the enactment.

Following the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Petrosil Oil Co. Ltd. (supra), the Tribunal held that the transaction of sale of shares of Zandu Realty by assessee to Emami Rainbow Niketan Ltd. is not regarded as transfer in view of section 47(iv) of the Act. Hence, the question of computing either the capital loss or capital gain does not arise. The Tribunal held that the assessee is not entitled to carry forward the capital loss of Rs. 25 crore as claimed.

This ground of appeal of assessee was dismissed.

2 Sections 2(29A) r.w.s. 2(42B) and 251 – Gain arising on sale of shares of a private limited company, offered in the return of income as `short term capital gain’ can be claimed, for the first time, to be `long term capital gain’ before appellate authority even without filing a revised return of income.

 .       2018] 91 taxmann.com 28 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Ashok Keshavlal Tejuja vs. ACIT

ITA No. : 3429 (MUM.) of 2016

A.Y.: 2011-12: Date of Order: 15th
February, 2018


FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2011-12, the assessee had sold shares of a private
limited company. Gain arising on sale of these shares was shown in the return
of income, filed by the assessee, as short term capital gains. In the course of
assessment proceedings, the assessee, without having revised the return of
income, filed a letter and also a revised computation of income thereby making
a claim that the gain arising on sale of shares of private limited company need
to be considered as `long term capital gains’. This additional claim was denied
to the assessee.

Aggrieved by the assessment
made, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and in the course of
appellate proceedings the assessee raised the said claim before the CIT(A). The
CIT(A) did not entertain the claim made by the assessee on the ground that it
was made otherwise than by filing a revised return of income.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where the assessee brought to
the notice of the Tribunal the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Goetze
(India) Ltd. vs. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323 (SC)
and also the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders
[2012] 349 ITR 336 (Bom
.).

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the
Supreme Court in the case of Goetze India Ltd. (supra) and also the
Bombay High Court in the case of Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders (supra)
has clearly held that the additional claim can be filed before the appellate
authorities even if the same is not filed by way of revised return of income.
Since the assessee had filed the claim before the AO as well as before the
CIT(A) to bring to tax the capital gains as long term capital gains on sale of
share of private limited company instead of short term capital gain as declared
in the return of income, the Tribunal admitted the claim filed by the assessee.

The Tribunal remitted the
matter to the file of the AO for considering the aforesaid additional claim
raised by the assessee on merits after hearing the contention of the assessee
and evaluating the evidences filed / to be filed by the assessee on merits in
accordance with law.

 This ground of appeal filed
by the assessee was allowed.

1 Section 253 – An erroneous disallowance made by the assessee in its return of income on account of non-deduction of tax at source which disallowance was not contested before CIT(A) can be challenged by the assessee, for the first time, before the Tribunal.

[2018] 90 taxmann.com 328 (Kolkata-Trib.)
Allahabad Bank vs. DCIT
ITA No. : 127/Kol/2011
A.Y.: 2007-08 and 2009-10                  
Date of Order:   07th February, 2018

If the stand of the
assessee is found to be correct and if it results in income being assessed
lower than returned income, that would be the true and correct income of the
assessee and it would be the duty of the revenue to assess the correct tax
liability of the assessee.

 

FACTS 

The assessee, in his return
of income for AY 2007-08, disallowed a sum of Rs. 3,17,32,735 u/s. 40(a)(ia) of
the Act.  Since this disallowance was
made voluntarily in the return of income, the assessee did not contest it in an
appeal filed before CIT(A) against the assessment order. 

 

In Assessment Year 2008-09,
the deduction was claimed in the return of income and same was disallowed by
the Assessing Officer (AO). This disallowance was contested in an appeal before
CIT(A) who allowed the deduction to the extent of Rs. 96,38,366 after
examination of copies of challans and other documents.

 

Subsequent to the passing
of the order by CIT(A), the assessee bank observed that in respect of
disallowance amounting to Rs. 99,32,277 out of Rs. 3,17,32,735, the provisions
of TDS are not applicable at all and consequently the provisions of section
40(a)(ia) are not attracted.

 

For the first time in an
appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee took an additional ground that the AO
be directed to allow deduction of Rs. 99,32,277 after verification of all
necessary documents in support of the claim of the assessee.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was
contended that the assessee never had an occasion to address this issue before
the lower authorities and hence had no option but to file an additional ground
before the Tribunal. It was also submitted that since the issue has not been
examined by the lower authorities, in order to appreciate the contentions of
the assessee, it could be remanded to the file of the AO. The revenue had no
objection except that it would result in an assessment being framed at lesser
than returned income.

 

HELD 

As regards the contention
of the revenue that the assessment would be framed at lesser than returned
income, the Tribunal noted the observations of the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Mayank Poddar (HUF) vs. WTO [2003] 262 ITR 633 (Cal.) and
observed that it is now well settled that there is no estoppel against the
statute. It observed that the assessee is only pleading for claim of deduction
which had been erroneously disallowed by it in the return of income and
considered as such by the AO in the assessment. Though there was no occasion
for the revenue to adjudicate this issue on merits, the revenue could not take
advantage of the mistake committed by the assessee. The scheme of taxation is
primarily governed by the principles laid down in the Constitution of India and
as per Article 265 of the Constitution of India, no tax shall be levied or
collected unless by an authority of law. When a particular item is not to be
taxed as per statute, then taxing the same would amount to violation of
constitutional principles and revenue would be unjustly enriched by the same.
Hence, in the process of verification by the AO, if the stand of the assessee
is found to be correct and if it results in income being assessed lower than
the returned income, that would be the true and correct income of the assessee
and it would be the duty of the revenue to assess the correct tax liability of
the assessee.

 

Having made the aforesaid
observations, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice and fair play, remanded
the issue to the file of the AO for adjudication of merits.

 

The additional ground of
appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

4 Section 4 – Charge of income-tax – Interest on advance – if the income does not result at all – then the same cannot be taxed – even though an entry is made in the books of account about such a hypothetical income – which has not been materialised.

1.      
CIT vs. Godrej Realty Pvt.
Ltd.

ITA
No.: 264 of 2015  (Bom High Court)

AY:
2008-09 Dated: 11th December, 2017 

[Godrej
Realty Pvt. Ltd v. ITO; ITA No.: 4487/Mum/2012; 
Dated: 04th June, 2014; Mum. ITAT]


The Assessee Company had
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with M/s. Desai & Gaikwad
to develop residential project on a plot of land, belonging to M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad at Pune. In terms of the MoU, the Assessee had given an advance to M/s.
Desai & Gaikwad and the assessee was entitled to receive from M/s. Desai
& Gaikwad interest at 10% p.a. on the aforesaid project advance. However,
the obligation to pay interest on M/s. Desai & Gaikwad to the assessee, was
from the date of execution of the development agreement. In its return for the
subject AY, the assessee did not offer to tax any interest on the aforesaid
advance with M/s. Desai & Gaikwad.

 

However, the A.O, brought
to tax the amount of interest on advance. This on the basis of M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad’s ledger account showed an aggregate of advance and interest, as
payable by it to the assessee. Thus, concluding that interest had accrued to
the assessee, as it follows the mercantile system of accounting. Therefore,
interest is includable in its total income.

The CIT(A) dismissed the
assessee appeal. Thus, upholding the view of the A.O that as M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad had shown interest liability to the assessee as expenditure in its
books of account, it follows that interest has accrued to the assessee.
Therefore, the interest was includable in the total income subject to tax.

 

The Revenue case is that,
assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting. Therefore, it was
obligatory on its part to account for its accrued interest, which had so
accrued in terms of MoU. This accrual of interest is further supported,
according to him by the fact that M/s. Desai & Gaikwad has shown in its
books the above amount as a liability to the assessee. In support of the
proposition that in a mercantile system of accounting, the income is said to
accrue, when it becomes due and the postponement of the date of payment or non
receipt of the payment, would not affect the accrual of interest, he places
reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Morvi Industries Ltd.
vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 835.

 

The Tribunal records the
fact that in terms of MOU, M/s. Desai & Gaikwad was liable to pay interest
at 10% p.a. on the advance from the date of the execution of the development
agreement and the undisputed position is, it has not been executed. The debit
note sent by the assessee to M/s. Desai & Gaikwad towards the interest chargeable
on the advance was returned by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad, denying its liability
to pay any interest as demanded. Moreover, the board of directors of the
assessee had recording the no acceptance of the debit note towards the interest
payable, decided to waive the interest chargeable which is to be recovered from
M/s. Desai & Gaikwad.

Being aggrieved, the
Revenue carried the issue in appeal to the High court. The Hon. Court observed
that, in fact, there was no accrual of income in the present case. This for the
reason that there was no right to receive income of Rs.1.98 crores as interest
as admittedly development agreement has not been executed. The interest in
terms of the MoU would only commence on development agreement, being executed.
Admittedly, this is not done. Further, the return of the debit note by M/s.
Desai & Gaikwad was also an indication of the fact that M/s. Desai &
Gaikwad did not accept that interest is payable to the Assessee. Consequently,
there was no amount which had become due to the Assessee.

 

The entire grievance of the
Revenue before us is that the entries made by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad in its
ledger account, indicating that interest was payable, by itself, lead to the
conclusion that interest had accrued to the assessee is not correct.
Particularly, in the context of the MoU and return of debit note. Moreover, the
board of directors of assessee had passed a resolution, waiving the interest
receivable from M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. This, on account of non acceptance of
liability to interest by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. Therefore, it was not an
unilateral giving up of accrued income but acceptance of the rejection of debit
note by M/s. Desai & Gaikwad. Moreover, the reliance upon Morvi Industries
Ltd., (supra) is inapplicable for the reasons on facts, the accrual of
income in this case would only arise after the execution of the development
agreement. Undisputedly, it has not taken place. Thus, as no income i.e.
interest has accrued or has been received, the occasion to levy tax on such
hypothetical income, cannot arise. Accordingly, Revenue appeal was dismissed.
 


3 Income in respect of sale of flats – accrued when possession of the flat was given – not when allotment letter was issued.

CIT vs. Millennium Estates Private Ltd.
ITA No.: 853 of 2015 (Bom. High Court)
A.Y.: 2007-08      Dated: 30th January, 2018
[Millennium Estates Private Ltd. v. DCIT; ITA No. 517/Mum/2011;  Dated: 16th May, 2012; Mum.  ITAT]

The assessee carries on
business as a contractor and developer. During the scrutiny proceedings the A.O
found that an amount was shown under the head current liabilities i.e. as
advances received from it buyers. The A.O did not accept the contention of the
Assessee that the aforesaid amounts from M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt.
Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates Pvt. Ltd. were received as advance at the time of
allotment on 14 & 15 March 2007 and that further consideration was received
on 1 April 2007, when the possession of the flats was given, thus chargeable to
tax in the next AY. The A.O made addition the aggregate amount received from
M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Manomay Estates Pvt. Ltd. as
accrued income in the subject Assessment Year. 

 

Being aggrieved, the
assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT (A). The CIT (A) dismissed the
Assessee appeal.

 

On further Appeal, the
Tribunal  allowed the Assessee appeal.
Thus  after being examined all the
clauses of the allotment letter as well as the clauses of the possession letter
concluded that the sale of the flats took place only in the subject Assessment
Year i.e. on 1 April 2007 i.e. when the possession of the flats was given and
the balance amount was paid. The accrual of income took place in the next year.
Till then, the amount received was only in the nature of advances. The Tribunal
also records the fact that it was not the case of the Revenue that the possession
letter dated 1 April 2007 was not genuine. Nor has the Revenue brought on
record any evidence to show that the possession was given to M/s. Siddhi
Vinayak Securities (P.) Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates (P.) Ltd. prior to 1
April 2007. In the above view the addition was made by the A.O and upheld by
the CIT (A) was deleted.

 

The Tribunal also records
the fact that in the next AY , the Assessee has offered the income on the sale
of the flats to M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Manomay
Estates Pvt. Ltd. to tax. The same has also been accepted by the Revenue as
taxable income for the next AY.

 

The grievance of the
Revenue is that the sale of the flats under consideration had in fact taken
place on 14 and 15 March 2007 when they were allotted under an allotment
letters to M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Securities Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Manomay Estates
Pvt. Ltd.

 

Being aggrieved, further
Revenue filed an appeal to the High Court. The Hon. High Court observed that
the Tribunal has reproduced the relevant clauses of the allotment letter dated
15 March 2007 which is similar to the allotment letter dated 14 March 2007 and
the relevant clause. The Tribunal, held that the amount of Rs.2.14 Crores was
an advance during the subject AY. It thus held that part of the above amount
had accrued as income during the AY 2007-08. From the above clauses of the
allotment letter and clause 9 of the possession letter referred to by the
Tribunal it is very evident that the possession of the flats was given on
receipt of total consideration only on 1 April 2007. The Tribunal records as a
matter of fact that there is no dispute about the genuineness of the letter of
possession dated 1 April 2007. Moreover, no statement of the buyers or other
evidence, even circumstantial in nature, was brought on record to indicate that
the facts are different from what has been recorded in the possession letter
dated 1 April 2007. In the aforesaid facts, the view taken by the Tribunal on
the self evident terms of allotment and possession letter does not give rise to
any substantial question of law. Accordingly, Appeal of dept was  dismissed.

 

2 Section 271D – Penalty – Accepting/ repaying loans/ advances via journal entries contravenes section 269SS & 269T – Penalty cannot be levied if the transactions are bona fide, genuine & reasonable cause u/s. 273B

CIT vs. Lodha Properties Development Pvt. Ltd.
ITA No: 172 of 2015 (Bom High Court)
A.Y.: 2009-10,  Dated: 06th February, 2018  
[Lodha Properties Development Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT; ITA No. 476/Mum/2014;  
Dated: 27th June, 2014 Mum.  ITAT]

The assessee who belongs to the Lodha group , was engaged in the business of land development and construction of real estate properties. Assessee filed the return of income declaring the total income at Rs. NIL and the same was subsequently revised to adjust carry forward losses. Assessment was completed determining the total income of Rs. 26,69,084/- under the special provisions of section 115JB of the Act. In the assessment, vide para 6, the AO, mentioned about “Accepting / repayment of loans other than account payee cheques / draft”. Eventually, AO mentioned that such accepting / repayment of loans other than account payee cheques / drafts (through journal entries) amounts to violation of the provisions of section 269SS and 269T of the Act.

The assessee submitted that the loans received are by way of “journal entries? and there is no acceptance of cash by any method other than the one prescribed in the statute. The core transactions were undertaken by way of cheque only and however, the assessee resorted to the journal entries for transfer / assignment of loan among the group companies for business consideration. In case of journal entries, as per the assessee, the liabilities are transferred / assigned by the group companies to the assessee or to take effect of actionable claims /payments/ received by group companies on behalf of the company. The journal entries were also passed in the books of accounts for reimbursement of expenses and for sharing of the expenses within the group.

The assessee further submitted during the period when journal entries were passed, the assessee company was under the bona fide belief that there is no breach of provisions of income tax Act considering recognized method of assigning credit / debit balance by passing journal entries.

In such cases, the provisions of section 269SS of the Act have no application and for this, the assesse relied on the judgement of the Honble Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Idhayam Publications Ltd [2007] 163 Taxman 265 (Mad.) which is relevant for the proposition that the deposit and the withdrawal of the money from the current account could not be considered as a loan or advance. It is the contention of the assessee that there is no cash transactions involved and relied on the contents of the CBDT Circular No.387, dated 6th July, 1984 and mentioned that the purpose of introducing section 269SS of the Act is to curb cash transactions only and the same is not aimed at transfer of money by transfer / assignment of loans of other group companies.

Addl. CIT  mentioned that even bona fide and genuineness of the transactions, if carried out in violation of provisions of section 269SS of the Act, the same would attract the provisions of section 271D of the Act .

The ld. CIT(A)  confirmed the findings recorded by the A.O.

The Tribunal held  that there is no finding  in the order of the AO that during the assessment proceedings the impugned transactions constitutes unaccounted money and are not bona fide or not genuine. As such, there is no information or material before the AO to suggest or demonstrate the same. In the language of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Triumph International (I) Ltd, 345 ITR 370 (Bom), neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries carried out in the ordinary course of business has been doubted in the regular assessment. Admittedly, the transactions by way of journal entries are aimed at the extinguishment of the mutual liabilities between the assessees and the sister concerns of the group and such reasons constitute a reasonable cause.

In the present case, the causes shown by the assessee for receiving or repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by account-payee cheque/bank draft, was on account of the following, namely: alternate mode of raising funds; assignment of receivables; squaring up transactions; operational efficiencies/MIS purpose; consolidation of family member debts; correction of errors; and loans taken in case. In our opinion, all these reasons are, prima facie, commercial in nature and they cannot be described as non-business by any means. Further, it was observed that why should the assessee under consideration take up issuing number of account payee cheques / bank drafts which can be accounted by the journal entries.

Further, there is no dispute that the impugned journal entries in the respective books were done with the view to raise funds from the sister concerns, to assign the receivable among the sister concerns, to adjust or transfer the balances, to consolidate the debts, to correct the clerical errors etc. In the language of the Hon?ble High court, the said “journal entries? constitutes one of the recognised modes of recording the loan/deposit. The commercial nature and occurrence of these transactions by way of journal entries is in the normal course of business operation of the group concerns. In this regard, there is no adverse finding by the AO in the regular assessment. AO has not made out in the assessment that any of the impugned transactions is aimed at non commercial reasons and outside the normal business operations. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Hon. High Court observed  that the Tribunal has on application of the test laid down for establishment of reasonable cause, for breach of section 269SS of the Act by this Court in Triumph International Finance (supra) found that there is a reasonable cause in the present facts to have made journal entries reflecting deposits.

In the above circumstances, the view taken by the Tribunal in the impugned order holding that no penalty can be imposed upon by the Revenue as there was a reasonable cause in terms of section 271B of the Act for having received loans / deposits through journal entries is at the very least is a possible view in the facts of the case. Accordingly appeal of dept was dismissed.

Reduction in Sale Price Due To Discount Given By Issue of Credit Notes Subsequent To the Invoice

INTRODUCTION
Under Sales Tax Laws, tax is payable on the ‘sale price’ of goods. Sale price is normally defined in respective State Acts. For example, under MVAT Act, term “sale price” is defined in section 2(25) as under.  
 
“2(25) “sale price” means the amount of valuable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof, other than the cost of insurance for transit or of installation, when such cost is separately charged….”

There is a separate mention about discount given from the original sale price.

Discounts are generally given in the invoice itself. There may not be much difficulty in claiming reduction for such discount amount from the sale price.  

However, discount can also be given after the invoices are issued. There may be discount schemes like turnover discount, early payment discount, where discount will be eligible on happening of a given event. In such cases, invoices would be at original price. The subsequent discount will be required to be given by issue of credit note.

In some of the States, there are provisions providing that discount mentioned in the invoices will be eligible
for reduction.

The issue that arises is whether such type of provisions requires strict interpretation or can be interpreted liberally so as also to include discounts given by credit note/s issued separately after the issue of invoice/s.  

Recent judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in case of Southern Motors vs. State of Karnataka (Civil Appeal Nos.10955-10971 of 2016 dt.18.1.2017)

In this case, the issue before the Hon. Supreme Court was from Karnataka VAT Act, 2003. The facts leading to the litigation, as mentioned in the judgment, can be noted as under:

“3. The foundational facts, albeit not in dispute present the required preface. The appellant is a dealer in the motor vehicles and registered under the Act. Its version is that during the years in question i.e. 2007-2008 and
2008-2009, it raised tax invoices on the purchasers as per the policy of manufacturers of vehicles to maintain uniformity in the price thereof. After the sales were completed, credit notes were issued to the customers granting discounts, in order to meet the competition in the market and for allied reasons.

Consequentially, it received/retained only the net amount that is the amount shown in the invoice less the sum of discount disclosed in the credit note. Accordingly, the net amount, so received was reflected in his books of account and returns were filed …..”

The assessing authority took a view that as per the Karnataka VAT Rules, 2003, only such discount which is mentioned in the invoices is allowable. Since the discount was given post issue of invoices, it was held that it is not deductible from the sale price. Karnataka High Court upheld the claim of State Government. Before Hon. Supreme Court the main argument of the dealer was as under:

“7. The emphatic insistence on behalf of the appellant is that the combined reading of section 30 and Rule 31 demonstrates in clear terms that the assesses are entitled to claim deduction of the discount allowed to their customers by credit notes, from the total turnover to quantify their taxable turnover. The learned counsel have urged that as some discounts, especially those linked to targets to be achieved in a particular period are not comprehend able at the time of sale, these logically cannot be reflected in the tax invoices.

They have maintained that such discounts actualise through credit notes at the end of the prescribed period for which the target is fixed and are thus governed by section 30 of the Act and Rule 31 of the Rules. They have asserted that in no view of the matter, Rule 3(2)(c)can be conceded a primacy to curtail or abrogate Section 30 or Rule 31 of the Rules, lest the latter provisions are rendered otiose. Such an explication would also be extinctive of the concept of the well ingrained concept of turnover/trade discount which is indefensible.”

The department stuck to the stand that rule is to be applied strictly. The arguments of the sales tax department are noted as under:

“9. In refutation, the learned counsel for the respondents, has argued that a discount to qualify for deduction to compute the total and eventual taxable turnover, as contemplated in Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules has to be essentially reflected in the tax invoice or the bill of sale issued in respect of the sales.

According to them, section 30 and Rule 31 deal with a situation where after a tax invoice is issued, it transpires that the tax charged has either exceeded or has fallen short of the tax payable for which a credit/debit note, as the case may be, would be issued. As these two provisions do not regulate the computation of a taxable turnover, there is no correlation thereof with Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules which has been assigned an independent role to determine the tax liability. In absence of any specific provision in the parent statute granting tax exemption based on deduction founded on post sale trade discount, section 30 and Rule 31 are of no avail to the assesses, he urged. It is maintained that in any view of the matter, a taxing statute has to be construed strictly and any exemption is permissible only if the legislation permits the same. Reliance in buttress of the above has been placed on the decisions of this Court in A.V. Fernandez vs. The State of Kerala 1957 SCR 837, IFB Industries Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (2012) 4 SCC 618 and Jayam & Co. vs. Assistant Commissioner and Another (2016) 8 SCALE 70.”

The Supreme Court referred to a number of precedents on the issue. Ultimately, the Supreme Court came to conclusion that the sale price means what is actually received by the vendor. Therefore, the Supreme Court observed that rules cannot be interpreted to disallow reduction where actual discount is passed on and the amount is not receivable to the dealer. The pertinent observations of the Supreme Court are as under:

“37. On an overall review of the scheme of the Act and the Rules and the underlying objectives in particular of Sections 29 and 30 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules, we are of the considered opinion that the requirement of reference of the discount in the tax invoice or bill of sale to qualify it for deduction has to be construed in relation to the transaction resulting in the final sale/purchase price and not limited to the original sale sans the trade discount. However, the transactions allowing discount have to be proved on the basis of contemporaneous records and the final sale price after deducting the trade discount must mandatorily be reflected in the accounts as stipulated under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Rules. The sale/purchase price has to be adjudged on a combined consideration of the tax invoice or bill of sale as the case may be along with the accounts reflecting the trade discount and the actual price paid.

The first proviso has thus to be so read down, as above, to be in consonance with the true intendment of the legislature and to achieve as well the avowed objective of correct determination of the taxable turnover. The contrary interpretation accorded by the High Court being in defiance of logic and the established axioms of interpretation of statutes is thus unacceptable and is negated.”  

CONCLUSION
Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided a very important issue. The discounts are part and parcel of business activity. It will not be just to levy tax on an amount, which is neither received nor receivable as per the understanding of the parties. Therefore, the above judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court will be guiding judgment including in the forthcoming GST era.

Pre-Deposit At First Stage Appeal – Whether Adjustable At The Second Stage?

BACKGROUND:
As announced by Hon. Finance Minister, Goods and Services Tax is likely to be effective from July 01, 2017. Indirect tax litigation is yet to become a story of the past considering pendency of the matters before various Benches of CESTAT and first appellate authorities, which is further topped up by enthusiasm demonstrated by officers of the department of service tax in particular of initiating proceedings for all and sundry, decided or undecided issues. Since service tax law underwent an ‘overhaul’ on account of introduction of “negative list” based taxation from 01/07/2012, various issues closed under the earlier regime are routinely initiated for the legal testing under the “negative list” based period as well, even though those issues do not remain open on account of the new law having taken care of the shortcomings in interpretation of the earlier provisions of service tax law.

ISSUE OF PRE-DEPOSIT OF DUTY OR TAX IN TWO-STAGE APPEAL
In the scenario, pre-deposit of duty or tax payable while filing appeals is quite a concern of many assessees under service tax considering huge demands initiated and routinely confirmed by adjudicating authorities at all levels and especially in vexatious cases. In a recent decision, Ahmedabad Tribunal in ASR Multimetals Pvt. Ltd. 2017 (345) ELT 294 (Tri.-Ahmd) had an occasion to examine whether pre-deposit made while filing the first appeal can be adjusted against the quantum of deposit required to be made while filing the appeal before the Tribunal.

Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 laying down provisions in this regard (as amended with effect from August 06, 2014) also applicable to service tax vide section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 is reproduced below:

“35F. Deposit of certain percentage of duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal.- The Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be shall not entertain any appeal,-
(i)     under sub-section (1) of section 35, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of Central Excise lower in rank than the Commissioner of Central Excise

(ii)     against the decision or order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against;

(iii) against the decision or order referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against.

Provided that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores.

Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include.-

(i)     amount determined under section 11D
(ii)    amount of erroneous CENVAT credit taken;
(iii)    amount payable under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2001 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 or the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.”
[emphasis supplied]

In three cases under appeal before the Tribunal, the Appellants paid 7.5% duty at first appellate stage before Commissioner (Appeals). Against the orders passed by Commissioner (Appeals), when the appeals were filed before the Tribunal, they deposited 2.5% in terms of clause (iii) of the above section 35F / section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962*).

(*Since the provisions of the Customs Act in this regard are identical, they are not reproduced here for the sake of brevity).

They adjusted thus the amount paid at the first appellate stage and considered that the requirement of 10% payment towards pre-deposit thus stood fulfilled. The Revenue objected to this as according to them, such interpretation was incorrect and thus additional 10% was required to be paid in place of 2.5% to comply with the provisions laid down in applicable clause (iii) of the above section 35F for the appeal to be entertained by
the Tribunal.

The Tribunal found that the provisions were in no way ambiguous to interpret that the amount paid under clause (ii) at the time of filing appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) was adjustable/considered paid for the purpose of clause (iii) as well.

The Tribunal in this context relied on the ratio of decision in the case of Greatship (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I 2015 (39) STR 754 (Bom) wherein principles of interpretation of taxing statutes were discussed at significant length, at the end of which, the following conclusion was drawn at para 34 relied upon by the Tribunal in the present case.

“34. It would thus appear that it is settled position of law that in taxing statute, the Courts have to adhere to literal interpretation. At first instance, the Court is required to examine the language of the statute and make an attempt to derive its natural meaning. The Court interpreting the statute should not proceed to add the words which are not found in the statute. It is equally settled that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. It is further settled that an equitable construction, is not admissible in a taxing statute, where the Courts can simply adhere to the words of the statute. It is equally settled that a taxing statute is required to be strictly construed. Common sense approach, equity, logic, ethics and morality have no role to play while interpreting the taxing statute. It is equally settled that nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied and one is required to look fairly at the language used and nothing more and nothing less. No doubt, there are certain judgments of the Apex Court which also holds that resort to purposive construction would be permissible in certain situation. However, it has been held that the same can be done in the limited type of cases where the Court finds that the language used is so obscure which would give two different meanings, one leading to the workability of the Act and another to absurdity.”
[emphasis supplied].

In view of the above, the Tribunal upheld the Revenue’s contention that the interpretation by the appellants would not be possible without inserting the words not present therein and therefore it was incorrect to interpret that the amount paid at the first stage-appeal could be adjusted. In effect, the pre-deposit amount required for two-stage appeals would be 7.5% in the first instance and 10% of the confirmed duty/tax at the time of filing the Tribunal appeal.

Having had unambiguous decision/interpretation as above, the fact that monetary limits for adjudication of Show Cause Notice have been revised vide Circular No.1049/37/2016-CX dated 29/09/2016, all cases adjudicated after this date where the amount of duty/service tax/penalty confirmed is below two crore rupees involve two-stage appeals and aggregate amount of 17.5% has to be provided towards mandatory pre-deposit. Indeed this was also clear otherwise on reading of the provisions. Further, TRU letter 10th July, 2014 in Annexure-IV also provided clarification on identical lines both in respect of section 129E of the Customs Act and section 35F of the Central Excise Act. Nevertheless, it must be noted here that vide its Circular No.984/08/2014-CX dated 16/09/2014, CBEC has clarified that payment made during investigation or audit, prior to filing the appeal can be considered to the extent of 7.5% or 10% subject to the limit of Rs.10 crore as deposit towards fulfillment of requirement u/s. 35F of Central Excise Act or section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Welcome GST – Input Tax Credit Provisions under the Model GST Act (Revised Nov 2016)

1.    Introduction

“Goods and Services Tax” popularly known as ‘GST’ will soon be a new face of indirect tax legislation in India. It is a concept which will subsume various indirect taxes that are currently being imposed on goods and services under various Central and State laws and will lead to imposition of a single levy namely “goods and service tax” on all goods and services purchased or consumed anywhere in India. The idea is to convert the whole of India into one single uniform market, by eliminating differential tax treatments under different laws and different States. The concept of Value Added Tax is an inherent feature of GST. Whenever a commodity changes hand, there is a value addition. GST will be imposed in respect of every value addition made to goods and services from its origination till its final consumption.Needless to say, being an indirect tax, the ultimate burden of taxes on the entire value of the commodity/service will be transferred onto the final consumer of such commodity/service. To illustrate, if ‘A’ sells goods worth Rs.100 to ‘B’, A will pay tax of say 10% i.e. Rs.10 to Government and recover the same from ‘B’ by loading the same onto value of that commodity. ‘B’ will therefore pay Rs.110 to ‘A’. When ‘B’ further sells the commodity to ‘C’ by adding his profit margin of Rs.40, then he will pay tax @10% on the said value addition of Rs.40 say Rs.4 to Government and recover the entire amount from ‘C’ i.e. 110 paid by him to ‘A’ and Rs.44 being his value addition and taxes paid by him to Government on his value addition. In short he will recover Rs.154 from ‘C’ which comprises of Rs.140 as total value and Rs.14 as taxes. The bill issued by ‘B’ to ‘C’ will also clearly show Rs.140 as the value of commodity and Rs.14 as the taxes. Therefore, in a transparent value added system, the customer knows how much amount he has paid for a commodity as its economic value and how much by way of taxes.

The example looks very simple, when Rs.10 paid by ‘A’ and Rs.4 paid by ‘B’ are taxes under the same statute and are paid to same Government. However, the economics of commodity pricing will change, if these taxes are paid under different statutes and to different governments. To illustrate, let’s assume that in the above example Rs.100 is value addition by ‘A’ for sale of goods and Rs.40 is value addition by ‘B’ in the nature of service. In other words supply made by ‘A’ to ‘B’ is in the nature of ‘sale of goods’ and supply made by ‘B’ to ‘C’ is in the nature of provision of service. In this case, A will pay Rs.10 to State Government as VAT. Although value addition made by ‘B’ is only Rs.40, since the Authority recovering the taxes from ‘B’ is a Central Government, it will recover service tax on entire Rs.140 by taxing the entire value once again under different statute (‘double taxation’). Not only that, but it will also levy tax on Rs.10 which is in fact a tax paid to State Government (‘tax on tax’). The final outcome would be that, an economic supply having aggregate value addition of Rs.140 will be loaded with VAT of Rs.10 (Rs.100 x 10%), Service Tax of Rs.14 (Rs.140 x 10%) and a tax on tax (recovered as service tax) Rs.1 (VAT of Rs.10 x 10%), thereby making total price of the commodity Rs.165. (Rs.140 as Value addition and Rs.25 as taxes) as against Rs.154 computed earlier. Another most disturbing factor in this scenario would be that, ‘B’ will raise a bill on ‘C’ showing Rs.150 as the value addition and Rs.15 as service tax. The customer will therefore be under the impression that, he has paid only Rs.15 as taxes whereas in reality he pays Rs.25 towards taxes.

GST thus endeavours to reduce cascading effect of taxes i.e. eliminating double taxation (saving of Rs.10) and tax on tax (i.e. Rs.1). It also encourages transparency by separating economic value of a commodity from taxes. The concept of “value addition based taxation” is enshrined in provisions governing Input Tax Credit(‘ITC’). This article deals with the said provisions contained in Revised Model GST law (November 2016). The provisions dealing with eligibility of CENVAT credits or tax credits under the earlier laws in GST regime (i.e. transitory provisions) are not explained in this article.

2.    Definitions:

As per section 2(52), ‘inputs’ means any goods other than capital goods used or intended to be used by a supplier in the course or furtherance of business.

As per section 2(19) “capital goods” means goods, the value of which is capitalised in the books of accounts of the person claiming the credit and which are used or intended to be used in the course or furtherance of business.

As per section 2(53) “Input service” means any service used or intended to be used by a supplier in the course or furtherance of business.

As per section 2(55) “input tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the Integrated Goods and Service Tax (IGST), including that on import of goods, Central Goods and Service Tax (CGST) and State Goods and Service Tax (SGST) charged on any supply of goods or services to him and includes the tax payable under sub-section (3) of section 8 [i.e. tax payable under reverse charge], but does not include the tax paid under section 9 [i.e. tax payable under composition scheme].

As per section 2(71) “output tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the CGST/SGST chargeable under this Act on taxable supply of goods and/or services made by him or by his agent and excludes tax payable by him on reverse charge basis

As per section 2(54) “Input Service Distributor” means an office of the supplier of goods and / or services which receives tax invoices issued u/s. 28 towards receipt of input services and issues a prescribed document for the purposes of distributing the credit of CGST (SGST in State Acts) and / or IGST paid on the said services to a supplier of taxable goods and / or services having same PAN as that of the office referred to above.

3.    Principal Eligibility Test:

The concept of ITC, presupposes that the preceding supply (i.e. inwards supply) as well as the subsequent supply (i.e. outward supply’) both are charged with GST. If inward supply is not charged with GST, the question of ITC does not arise. Similarly, if outward supply is not charged with GST (Nil rated or fully exempted supply, non-taxable supplies), the ITC gets accumulated and eventually becomes a part of the cost. However in certain cases, due to policy reasons, refund of ITC is permissible. Under GST, there are only two cases where refund of ITC is permissible viz. exports including zero rated supplies and cases involving inverted duty structure i.e. where the credit is accumulated on account of rate of tax on inward supplies being higher than the rate of tax on outward supplies (other than Nil/ fully exempted supplies). Except for the said two cases, if the outward supply does not attract levy of GST, then ITC of corresponding inward supply cannot be allowed and therefore necessarily forms the part of cost. This may be taken as principal eligibility test under GST.

For instance, the outward supply of goods and services which is not made by a supplier in the course of his business or commerce, is not treated as ‘supply’ for the purpose of levy of GST. There is thus no GST on such ‘non-business outward supplies’. A supplier may have been charged GST on goods and services procured and used by him for the purpose of making a ‘non-business outward supply’. However, ITC in respect of such goods/services is not allowed. What is ‘non-business outward supply’ is therefore important for the purpose of determining eligibility of ITC of corresponding goods/ services. Definition of ‘business’ is contained in section 2(17) of the GST Act. A ‘non-business’ outward supply is therefore to be interpreted accordingly.

Section 16(1) provides that, entitlement of ITC is subject to certain conditions relating to restrictions, time and manner. These conditions, restrictions and the manner, to the extent they are contained in section 16 and section 44 of the GST Act are mentioned below. In addition thereto certain additional conditions may be contained in rules which are yet to be prescribed.

4.    ITC Eligibility Conditions:

As per section 16(1) of the Model GST Act, the ITC can be taken only by a registered taxable person. In other words, registration under GST is a pre-condition for availing ITC.

As per section 16(2) of the Model GST Act, the ITC shall not be allowed if the fulfillment of following conditions is in question.

–    possession by claimant dealer of a tax invoice or debit note or such other prescribed taxpaying document(s) issued by a supplier registered
under this Act, against inward supply made by claimant dealer.

–    The supplier issuing such documents has actually paid to the account of appropriate government, tax charged in respect of such supply, either in cash or through utilisation of ITC availed by such supplier. 
–    receipt of goods and/or services by claimant dealer. [The purpose of this clause is to prevent misuse of ITC provision by indulging into practices like issuing ‘accommodation bills’].
–    the claimant dealer has furnished the returns u/s. 34.

Considering the provisions of ‘time of supply’ a question may arise that whether a claimant dealer would be eligible for ITC on advance payments made by him for inward supply. In this respect, it may be noted that the conditions mentioned in section 16(2) are anti-avoidance provisions. Hence as long as a supply (past or future) underlying any tax paid document (tax invoice, debit note etc.) is not doubted, ITC cannot be denied. Besides, as per Explanation 1 to Section 12 (2) the supply shall be deemed to have been made to the extent it is covered by the invoice or, as the case may be, the payment. It’s also worthwhile to note that, provisions of section 16(2) are subject to provisions of section 36 of the GST Act. As per section 36(1) credit shall be allowed to the registered taxable person on provisional basis as self-assessed in his return. It may further be noted that, Table 11 of the GSTR-1 (statement of outward supply) requires supplier to disclose the cases where tax is paid on advance basis and identifying such tax payment qua a person from whom the advance is received. However, the identification of such advance qua invoices given in Table 12 of GSTR-1 may happen in the subsequent tax period. Till the time such invoice identification takes place, it is doubtful whether ITC will be available in GSTR-2 of the receiver.

Another issue which may arise as regards receipt of goods/services will be, whether ‘actual receipt’ of goods is essential or ‘constructive delivery’ can be said to be enough as a fulfillment of aforesaid condition. For example, ‘A’ located in Maharashtra directs ‘B’ located in Gujarat to supply goods to ‘C’ located in Delhi. In such case, although there is a single movement of goods from ‘B’ to ‘C’ and goods are never actually received by ‘A’,explanation to section 16(2) provides that, ‘A’ shall be deemed to have received goods.
Similarly, in case of job work transactions, section 20 provides that, the “principal” shall be entitled to take credit of input tax on inputs and capital goods even if the inputs/capital goods are directly sent to a job worker for job-work without their being first brought to his place of business.

In case of input service distributor (ISD) also, section 16(2)(b) may not be applicable, for such ISD is not a receiver of service, but only a distributor of credit. Conditions of section 16(2) are therefore required to be fulfilled by the respective units under the same PAN at which such credit is distributed.
   
5.    Reduction in ITC Set off
In following cases, ITC is not allowed fully, but is reduced to certain extent.

–    Where the goods and/or services are used by the registered taxable person partly for the purpose of any business and partly for other purposes. [As discussed above, the amount of credit shall be restricted to so much of the input tax as is attributable to the purposes of his business only] – section 17(1). The manner of computation is yet to be prescribed.
–    Where the goods and / or services are used by the registered taxable person partly for effecting taxable supplies and partly for effecting exempt supplies. In such case, the amount of credit shall be restricted to so much of the input tax as is attributable to the said taxable supplies- section 17(2). In this case, ‘zero rated’ supplies are treated as taxable supplies and supply on which recipient is liable to pay tax on reverse charge are regarded as exempt supply. For Example: ‘A’ supplies commodity X which is taxable at 5% (Turnover = Rs.50 Lakh), commodity ‘Y’ which is exempt from tax (Turnover = Rs.20 Lakh), Commodity ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are supplied to SEZ unit (Turnover = Rs.15 Lakh) and supply of commodity ‘Z’ on which the receiver is liable to pay tax under RCM (Turnover = Rs.10 Lakh). In this case, for the purpose of section 17(2) Taxable supply and Exempt supply shall be computed as under:

Taxable Supply = Rs.50 Lakh + Rs.15 Lakh = Rs.65 Lakh
Exempt Supply = Rs.20 Lakh + Rs.10 Lakh = Rs.30 Lakh.

If there is any inward supply in the hands of ‘A’ on which he is liable to pay tax under reverse charge, then such inward supply shall not be considered for the purpose of aforesaid calculation. The manner of computation u/s. 17(2) is yet to be prescribed.

–    A banking company, or a financial institution including a non-banking financial company, engaged in supplying services by way of accepting deposits, extending loans or advances shall have the option to either comply with the provisions of section 17(2), or avail of, every month, an amount equal to 50% of the eligible ITC on inputs, capital goods and input services in that month.

6.    Ineligible / Negative List Items
In respect of inward supply of following goods/ services specified in section 17(4), the ITC shall not be allowed.

Sr

No

Negative List Goods/Services

Exceptions,
if any

1

motor vehicles and other conveyances

Motor vehicles
and conveyances used for making following taxable supplies

   Further supply of vehicles and conveyances.

   Transportation of passengers

   imparting training on driving, flying,
navigating such vehicles or conveyances

   Transportation of goods.

2

supply of food and
beverages, outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and
plastic surgery

Where such inward
supply of goods or services of a particular category is used by a registered
taxable person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of
goods or services

3

membership of a
club, health and fitness centre

NA

4

rent-a-cab, life
insurance, health insurance

Where it’s
obligatory for an employer to provide these services to its employees as
Government notified services under any law for the time being in force

5

travel benefits
extended to employees on vacation such as leave or home travel concession

NA

6

works contract
services when supplied for construction of immovable property,

However, works
contract services availed for construction of plant and machinery is allowed.

 

For these
purposes, the word “construction” includes re construction, renovation,
additions or alterations or
repairs, to
the extent of capitalization, to the said immovable property.

 

‘Plant and
Machinery’ means apparatus, equipment, machinery, pipelines,
telecommunication tower fixed to earth by foundation or structural
support  that are used for making
outward supply and includes such foundation and structural supports but
excludes land, building or any other civil structures

Sr

No

Negative List
Goods/Services

Exceptions, if
any

7

goods or services
received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property on his
own account, even when used in course or furtherance of business

The goods or
services received by a taxable person for construction of plant and machinery
as defined above, is allowed.

8

goods and/or
services on which tax has been paid under composition scheme

NA

9

goods and/or
services used for personal consumption

NA

10

goods lost,
stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples

NA

As regards the aforesaid goods and services, following observations may be noted:-

–    There is a need to expand the relaxation given against services mentioned in Sr. No.4 above, to all government notified services. Presently, supply of food and beverages, outdoor catering and health services (Sr. No.2) would not be eligible for ITC, even if it’s obligatory for an employer to provide these services to its employees as Government notified services under any law for the time being in force.
–    Presently, ITC of membership of a club, health and fitness centre, will also be denied to film and media industry, actors, sportsman, agencies providing personal security services etc., for whom inward supply of such services is a business necessity.
–    The term ‘construction’ includes capitalised expenditure, even though expenditure is incurred on renovation, additions or alterations or repairs. A business man may have to face a situation, where after the year end, at the time of audit the auditor may require him to capitalise certain expenses, which have been earlier debited to revenue accounts. In such case, he may be required to reverse the ITC availed earlier.

In addition to aforesaid cases, the ITC is also not available in following cases:

–    Where the registered taxable person has claimed depreciation on the tax component of the cost of capital goods under the provisions of the Income- tax Act, 1961(43 of 1961), the ITC shall not be allowed on the said tax component.

–    Where any tax is paid in terms of section 67, 89 or 90, such tax shall not be regarded as eligible ITC. Section 67 of the Act deals with payment of taxes as a result of determination by the tax authorities, in cases involving non-payment/ short payment by reason of fraud or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax. Section 89 deals with payment of taxes by any person who transports any goods or stores any goods while they are in transit in contravention of the provisions of this Act. Section 90 deals with payment of taxes in circumstances leading to confiscation of goods/ conveyance.

7.    Timing for the purpose of Taking ITC

–    As mentioned above, as per section 36, the ITC can be claimed by the assessee (‘Tax Payer’) in his tax returns on provisional basis and can be used for payment of self-assessed output tax liability. Section 37 deals with provisions relating to Matching, reversal and reclaim of ITC. The matching takes place, by comparing the details of inward supplies and tax credit furnished by assessee (as a receiver of supply) with the details furnished by his supplier in his return. The claim of ITC that match with the details of corresponding supplier’s returns are finally accepted and communicated to the assessee. Where the ITC claimed by a recipient in respect of an inward supply is in excess of the tax declared by the supplier for the same supply or the outward supply is not declared by the supplier in his valid returns, the discrepancy is communicated to both such persons. Similarly, duplicate claims of ITC are also communicated to receiver. The amount in respect of which any discrepancy is not rectified by the supplier in his valid return for the month in which discrepancy is communicated shall be added to the output tax liability of the recipient, in his return for the month succeeding the month in which the discrepancy is communicated. However, as regards duplicate claims, the excess ITC claimed shall be added to the output tax liability of the recipient in his return for the month in which the duplication is communicated.

    For Example: A return for the month of July 2017 is filed on 20th August 2017. The discrepancies are communicated in August 2017. Such discrepancy will be required to be rectified in return pertaining to month of August 2017, which will be filed on 20th September 2017. If discrepancy is not rectified, then demand pertaining to excess ITC claimed will be added in the tax liability for the month of September 2017. However, if this was a case of duplicate claim, then such demand will be added in the tax liability for the month of August 2017 itself.

    It is important to note that, recipient shall be entitled to reclaim the credit only if the discrepancies communicated to suppliers are subsequently rectified by him in his valid returns within the time limit specified in section 34(9) i.e. earlier of due date for furnishing of return for the month of September following the end of the financial year or the actual date of furnishing of relevant annual return.

–    As per section 16(4), A taxable person shall not be entitled to take ITC in respect of any invoice or debit note for supply of goods or services after furnishing of the return u/s. 34 for the month of September following the end of financial year to which such invoice or invoice relating to such debit notepertains or furnishing of the relevant annual return, whichever is earlier. In other words, if debit note pertaining to invoice is issued by the supplier after the aforesaid period, the benefit of ITC pertaining to such debit note may not be available to the receiver.
–    Where the goods against an invoice are received in lots or instalments, the entire credit becomes eligible only upon receipt of the last lot or installment.
–    Where a recipient fails to pay to the supplier of services, the amount towards the value of supply of services along with tax payable thereon within a period of three months from the date of issue of invoice by the supplier, an amount equal to the ITC availed by the recipient shall be added to his output tax liability, along with interest thereon. This condition is applicable only in respect of inward supply of services and not in respect of goods.
–    The credit of input tax in respect of pipelines and telecommunication tower fixed to earth by foundation or structural support including foundation and structural support thereto is allowed in staggered manner over a period of not less than 3 years. The claim in the first year not to exceed 1/3rd of the total credit and claim in second year not to exceed 2/3rd of the total credit.

8.    Availability of ITC in special circumstances – Section 18.

In following cases, a registered taxable person shall be allowed to take credit subject to certain prescribed conditions and provided that the ITC is claimed within the expiry of one year from the date of issue of tax invoice relating to such supply.

–    If a person applies for registration under the Act within 30 days from the date on which he becomes liable to registration, after registration, he shall be entitled to take credit of ITC in respect of inputs held in stock and inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock on the day immediately preceding the date from which he becomes liable to pay tax under the provisions of this Act. For Example: if threshold turnover exceeds Rs.20 Lakh on 2nd October 2017. The person applies for registration on 17th October 2017 and is granted registration on 24th October 2017, then he shall be entitled to take ITC in respect of inputs held as on 1st October 2017. The provision does not cover the ITC in respect of capital goods held in stock.
–    If a person applies for voluntary registration, he shall be entitled to take credit of input tax in respect of inputs held in stock and inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock on the day immediately preceding the date of grant of registration. For Example: if a person applies for voluntary registration on 17th October 2017 and is granted registration on 24th October 2017, then he shall be entitled to take ITC in respect of inputs held as on 23rd October 2017. The provision also does not cover the ITC in respect of capital goods held in stock.
–    Where any registered taxable person ceases to pay tax under composition scheme, he shall be entitled to take credit of input tax in respect of inputs held in stock, inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock and on capital goods on the day immediately preceding the date from which he becomes liable to pay tax under normal levy. This provision covers the credit ITC in respect of capital goods held in stock reduced by such percentage as may be prescribed.
–    Where an exempt supply of goods or services by a registered taxable person becomes a taxable supply, such person shall be entitled to take ITC in respect of inputs held in stock and inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock relatable to such exempt supply and on capital goods exclusively used for such exempt supply on the day immediately preceding the date from which such supply becomes taxable. The credit of such capital goods is allowed on percentage reduction method.

9.    Transfer of ITC in certain situations.

Section 18(6) provides for transfer of ITC, where there is a change in the constitution of a registered taxable person on account of sale, merger, demerger, amalgamation, lease or transfer of the business with the specific provision for transfer of liabilities. In such case, the said registered taxable person shall be allowed to transfer the ITC that remains unutilised in its books of accounts to such sold, merged, demerged, amalgamated, leased or transferred business in the manner prescribed. It is however surprising to note that, there are no similar provisions for transfer of credit, when business is succeeded as a going concern by legal heir or representative of a deceased taxable person.

10.    Payment of amount of ITC in respect of goods held in stock, or payment of higher amounts in certain cases:

–    Cancellation of Registration: As per section 26(7), every registered taxable person whose registration is cancelled shall pay an amount, equivalent to the ITC in respect of inputs held in stock and inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock on the day immediately preceding the date of such cancellation or the output tax payable on such goods, whichever is higher. In case of capital goods, an amount equal to the ITC taken on the said capital goods reduced by the percentage points as may be prescribed in this behalf or the tax on the transaction value of such capital goods, whichever is higher shall be paid.
–    Supply of capital goods: As per section 18(10), in case of supply of capital goods or plant and machinery, (other than refractory bricks, moulds and dies, jigs and fixtures are supplied as scrap) on which ITC has been taken, the registered taxable person shall pay an amount equal to the ITC taken on the said capital goods or plant and machinery reduced by the percentage points as may be specified in this behalf or the tax on the transaction value of such capital goods or plant and machinery, whichever is higher.
–    From Normal Levy to Composition Scheme or From Taxable to Exempt Supply: As per section 18(7), where any registered taxable person, who has availed ITC, switches over as a taxable person for paying tax under composition scheme or, where the goods and / or services supplied by him become exempt absolutely u/s.11, he shall pay an amount, by way of debit in the electronic credit or cash ledger, equivalent to the credit of input tax in respect of inputs held in stock and inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock and on capital goods, reduced by such percentage points as may be prescribed, on the day immediately preceding the date of such switch over or, as the case may be, the date of such exemption.

11.    Lapse of ITC in certain situations

If after making such payment u/s. 18(7) above, any amount remains in the electronic credit ledger, then such balance amount shall lapse.

12.    Input Service Distributor (ISD)

The concept of ISD is applicable only in case of inward supply of services and not in case of goods. The ISD is not an actual supplier, but he is merely a distributor of credit. For instance, A has administrative office in Maharashtra and factories at Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. In such case, it may happen that all the input services are paid from administrative offices at Maharashtra and bill for such services will be raised by the supplier of services in the name of Administrative office, although the actual services are performed at Gujarat, or that the benefit of service is received at factories located at Maharashtra, Gujarat as well as Tamil Nadu. In such case, administrative office will work as ISD, and distribute all the ITC to all the beneficiary units in a prescribed manner. The manner in which ISD can distribute the credit is given in section 21 of the Act. Where the ISD and units to which the ITC is to be distributed are located in the same State, then credit of CGST shall be distributed as CGST and Credit of SGST shall be distributed as SGST. The credit of IGST shall be distributed as CGST as well as SGST, in a manner prescribed. If the ISD and units to which the ITC is to be distributed are located in the different States, then the credit of CGST shall be distributed as IGST or CGST and the credit of SGST shall be distributed as IGST or SGST. (However, it is not clear as to how the credit of CGST/SGST of one State shall be distributed to unit located at other State as CGST/SGST of that State).

As per Explanation 2 to section 21, recipient of credit means the supplier of goods and / or services having the same PAN as that of Input Service Distributor. Therefore, unless the job worker’s premises is registered as additional place of business of the Principal, the distribution of ISD to a job-worker seems difficult.

13.    Payment of Tax using ITC

–    As per section 44 of the Act, the ITC as self-assessed in the return of a taxable person shall be credited to his electronic credit ledger on provisional basis. The amount available in the electronic credit ledger may be used for making any payment towards output tax payable in such manner and subject to such conditions and within such time as may be prescribed. It, therefore, appears that, there may be rules for utilisation of ITC within a specific time period. Under the current tax regime, there is no limit of utilsation of Cenvat Credit under Central Excise/Service Tax laws. However, in State laws, there is time limit for carry/forward of tax credits subject to provisions for refund of unutilised credits.
–    The amount of IGST-ITC shall first be utilised towards payment of IGST and the amount remaining, if any, may be utilised towards the payment of CGST and SGST, in that order. The amount of CGST-ITC shall first be utilised towards payment of CGST and the amount remaining, if any, may be utilised towards the payment of IGST. Similarly, the amount of SGST-ITC shall first be utilised towards payment of SGST and the amount remaining, if any, may be utilised towards the payment of IGST. The ITC on account of CGST shall not be utilised towards payment of SGSTand vice versa.
–    The amount in electronic credit ledger shall not be used for the purposes of making payment of interest, penalty, fees, or any other amount. Similarly, such amount shall not be used for making payment of liability under reverse charge or composition tax.
–    It may be noted that, in case of excess claim due to mismatch of ITC, taxable person shall be liable to pay interest on such excess claim at the prescribed rate for the prescribed period. In cases mentioned in section 37(8), interest shall be payable, from the date of availing of credit till the corresponding additions are made. If however, any excess claim of ITC added earlier is later on found to be correct due to acceptance of additional liability by the supplier of such goods/services, then such interest paid by the assessee shall be refunded to him to the extent it does not exceed the amount of interest paid by the said supplier.
 
14.     Conclusion:

    ITC and its eligibility are the key constituents of Value Addition Based Taxation Regime on which the concept of GST is designed. It is desirable that there should not be any undue restrictions on its eligibility and admissibility. The seamless flow of ITC credit will result in lower commodity price and  the prices so arrived at will be better indicators of economic value of a particular commodity. The ‘matching concept’ demands highly sophisticated and very responsive Information Technology software tools and facilities. With a tax base of around 70-80 Lakh tax payers, there will be hundreds of crores of invoices which will be required to be processed every month by the GST network. Although ‘failure of matching concept’, faulty place of supply rules, composition taxes, restricted or negative list goods and services, reverse charge etc are some of the hindering factors, the Revised Model GST law has made an attempt to facilitate better credit flow as compared to the existing tax laws. But, finally, it is the implementation which will  determine whether the effect of cascading of taxes on price will be minimised and reduction in prices will be achieved or not. Let us hope for the best.