The
Plaintiffs are mother and three children. They have entered into an
agreement for sale with Defendant No.1 on 3rd December 1988. On the date
of the execution of the agreement Plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 were minors.
Their mother Plaintiff No.1 signed the agreement on behalf of herself
and her minor children. Plaintiff No.2 has signed for herself. The
consideration under the agreement was Rs.2.5 lakhs. Rs.1 lakh has been
admittedly paid. The sale was to be completed within one month from the
date the title was clear by the permission of the competent authority
and the permission of the Court was obtained for sale of the minors’
share. An Irrevocable General Power of Attorney was also executed
similarly by the Plaintiffs along with the agreement for sale. The
Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 have also executed a declaration and indemnity on
6th December 1989, showing the possession of the property was handed
over to Defendant No.1. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that thereafter only
in the year 2007 the Defendants sent to the Plaintiffs a draft Deed of
Conveyance and draft Irrevocable General Power of Attorney to be
executed along with a declaration cum indemnity bond.
It is the
case of the Plaintiffs that the consideration under the document is not
paid. It is the case of the Defendants that it is. The consideration is
receipted in the Deed of Conveyance itself. The Defendants have shown
the amount debited to their bank account. The Defendants have, however,
not shown that the amounts are credited to the bank account of the
Plaintiffs.
However, the document remained to be registered. The
Defendant No.1 has sought to register a conveyance in February 2007
under a Deed of Confirmation executed by him as a Constituted Attorney
of the Plaintiffs under the Irrevocable General Power of Attorney
executed by the plaintiffs in 1989.
The Court observed that
there are no disputes shown between the mother and the children. The
minors who attained majority alleged that the transaction was against
their interest and was not for legal necessity and could not have been
entered into by their mother.
It may be mentioned that u/s. 8(3)
of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, the disposal of an
immovable property by a natural guardian is voidable at the instance of a
minor. It is for the minor to avoid the contract. The contract can be
avoided within the prescribed period of Limitation. Article 60 of
Schedule I to the Limitation Act 1963 provides the period of 3 years
from the time the minor attains majority to set aside a transfer made on
his behalf by his guardian.
Defendant Nos. 3 & 4 attained
majority in 1994 and 1996. They could have voided the contract in 1997
and 1999 respectively. They failed to do so. They must be taken to have
acquiesced in the transfer. In fact in 2008, the minor Plaintiff No.4
affirmed the transaction. Though the most determinative aspect is the
payment and the receipt of consideration and though the payment is
sought to be shown, the receipt has not been shown by any
contemporaneous evidence of the banking transaction, the fact that the
tenants have been attorned and Defendant No.1 has been collecting rents
show knowledge on the part of the Plaintiff that the Defendant No.1 had
become the owner. That aspect was accepted. Plaintiff No.4 confirmed the
transaction on attaining the majority. Plaintiff No.2 never sought to
avoid the transaction entered into by her guardian. It is only because
the conveyance was not registered in 1993 itself, that the Plaintiffs
sought to claim rights upon the registration made years thereafter, when
the construction on the suit land became rife. In that case, it is
observed that the Plaintiffs who are minors would not have been bound by
the agreement entered into, they being minors, if they have not chosen
to standby it. It is open to them either to standby it or renounce it.
It is observed in that case, that it was reasonable to assume that the
minors therein were aware of their rights upon the facts of that case.
They did not deny the agreement. They continued to enjoy the properties.
They went on alienating items of those properties. They were taken to
have ratified the agreement entered into by their guardian, as they
elected to stand by that agreement. In this case, the benefit that they
would have obtained is only the consideration, but the circumstantial
evidence about the allowance to receive rents by the purchaser in the
agreement for sale shows that they stood by the agreement for sale even
after Plaintiff Nos. 3 & 4 attained majority. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2
in any event stood by the said agreement at all times by attorning
tenancies. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief of injunctions.