12 [2019] 111 taxmann.com 493 (Trib.)(Del.) D.D. Motors vs. DCIT (CPC – TDS) ITA No. 956/Del/2017 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 18th October, 2019
Sections 200A, 234E – Prior to amendment of
section 200A, with effect from 1st June, 2015, late fee leviable u/s
234E for default in furnishing TDS statement could not be effected in course of
intimation while processing TDS statement u/s 200A
FACTS
The assessee firm, formed in July, 2012, for
the first time deducted tax at source amounting to Rs. 34,486 in the fourth
quarter of the financial year 2012-13. The amount of tax so deducted was paid
before the due date. However, TDS return was filed on 12th
September, 2013 instead of before the due date of 15th May, 2013.
Vide intimation dated 11th February, 2014, u/s 200A of the Act, a
fee of Rs. 24,000 u/s 234E @ Rs. 200 for the delay of 120 days was charged.
Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
to the CIT(A) against the levy of the late fee but the appeal was dismissed. It was contended that prior to 1st June, 2015, late
fee u/s 234E could not be levied while processing u/s 200A.
The assessee filed an appeal to the
Tribunal.
HELD
The Tribunal noted that section 200A has
been inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2010 and section 234E w.e.f. 1st
July, 2012. It also noted that it is only w.e.f. 1st June, 2015 that
there is an amendment to section 200A permitting making of an adjustment of
fee, if any, u/s 234E. It observed that at the relevant time when the impugned
intimation u/s 200A was made there was no enabling provision therein for
raising a demand in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E.
The Tribunal held that while examining the
correctness of the intimation u/s 200A, it has to be guided by the limited
mandate of section 200A. Except for what has been stated in section 200A, no
other adjustments in the amount refundable to, or recoverable from, the tax
deductor were permissible in accordance with the law as it existed at that
point of time. The adjustment in respect of levy of fees u/s 234E was indeed
beyond the scope of permissible adjustments contemplated u/s 200A.
Further, the Tribunal observed that this
intimation is an appealable order u/s 246A (a) and, therefore, the learned
CIT(A) ought to have examined the legality of the adjustment made under this
intimation in the light of the scope of section 200A. The CIT(A) has not done
so. He has justified the levy of fees on the basis of the provisions of section
234E. But that is not the issue here. The issue is whether such a levy could be
effected in the course of intimation u/s 200A. The answer is clearly in the
negative. No other provision enabling a demand in respect of this levy has been
pointed out to us and it is, thus, an admitted position that in the absence of
the enabling provision u/s 200A, no such levy could be effected.
The Tribunal observed that a similar view
has been taken by the Coordinate Benches of Chennai, Ahmedabad and Amritsar.
The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed. The Tribunal deleted the fee levied u/s 234E.
