Revision u/s 264 – Offering income inadvertently – Not liable to be taxed – Revision provisions are meant for the benefit of the assessee and not to put him to inconvenience – Commissioner should have examined the existing material in the light of Circular No. 14 (XL – 35) of April, 1955 and Article 265 of the Constitution of India
The petitioner challenged the order dated 12th February, 2021 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, rejecting the revision petition filed by it u/s 264.
For the A.Y. 2018-19, the assessment year under consideration, the petitioner, who is an individual, declared a total income of Rs. 27,05,646 and after claiming deductions and set-off on account of TDS and advance tax, the refund was determined at Rs. 34,320. However, while filing the return of income on 20th July, 2018 for A.Y. 2018-19, the figure of long-term capital gain of Rs. 3,07,60,800 was purported to have been wrongly copied by the petitioner’s accountant from the return of income filed for the earlier A.Y., i.e., 2017-18, which had arisen on surrender of tenancy rights by the petitioner for that year. It is submitted that the assessment for A.Y. 2017-18 was completed u/s 143(3) vide assessment order dated 24th December, 2019. The petitioner has not transferred any capital asset and there can be no capital gains in the assessment year under consideration and therefore no tax can be imposed on such non-existent capital gains for A.Y. 2018-19.
The returns filed by the petitioner for A.Y. 2018-19 were processed u/s 143(1) vide order dated 2nd May, 2019 and a total income of Rs. 3,34,66,446, including long-term capital gains of Rs. 3,07,60,800 was purported to have been inadvertently shown in the return of income, thereby leading to a tax demand of Rs. 87,40,612. It is the case of the petitioner that the Central Processing Centre (‘CPC’) of the Department at Bengaluru accepted the aggregate income for the year under consideration at Rs. 25,45,650 as presented in column 14; however, the taxes were computed at Rs. 87,40,612 on the total income of Rs. 3,33,06,450 as described above. It is submitted that upon perusal of the order u/s 143(1) dated 2nd May, 2019, the petitioner realised that the amount of Rs. 3,07,60,800 towards long-term capital gains had been erroneously shown in the return of income for the year under consideration.
Realising the mistake, the petitioner filed an application u/s 154 on 25th July, 2019 seeking to rectify the mistake of the misrecording of long-term capital gains in the order u/s 143(1) as being an inadvertent error as the same had already been considered in the return for the A.Y. 2017-18, assessment in respect of which had already been completed u/s 143(3). It was submitted that the application for rectification was still pending and Respondent No. 1 had not taken any action with respect to the same, although it appears that the same has been rejected as per the statement in the Respondent’s affidavit in reply.
In the meanwhile, the petitioner also made a grievance on the E-filing portal of the CPC on 4th October, 2019 seeking rectification of the mistake where the taxpayer was requested to transfer its rectification rights to AST, after which the petitioner filed various letters with Respondent No. 1, requesting him to rectify the mistake u/s 154.
In order to alleviate the misery and bring to the notice of higher authorities the delay being caused in the disposal of the rectification application, the petitioner approached Respondent No. 2 u/s 264 on 27th January, 2021 seeking revision of the order dated 2nd May, 2019 passed u/s 143(1) narrating the aforementioned facts and requesting the Respondent No. 2 to direct Respondent No. 1 to recalculate tax liability for A.Y. 2018-19 after reducing the amount of long-term capital gains from the total income for the said year.
However, instead of considering the application on merits, vide order dated 12th February, 2021 the Respondent No. 2, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-19, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the same was not maintainable on account of the alternate effective remedy of appeal and that the assessee had also not waived the right of appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) as per the provisions of section 264(4).
Being aggrieved by the order of rejection of the application u/s 264, the petitioner moved the High Court.
The Court observed that in the petitioner’s return for A.Y. 2018-19, the figure of long-term capital gains of Rs. 3,07,60,800 on surrender of tenancy rights in respect of earlier A.Y. 2017-18 had inadvertently been copied by the petitioner’s accountant from the return for A.Y. 2017-18. The assessment for A.Y. 2017-18 was completed u/s 143(3) vide assessment order dated 24th December, 2019. In the financial year corresponding to A.Y. 2018-19, the petitioner declared a total income of Rs. 27,05,646 and after claiming deductions and set-off on account of TDS and advance tax, a refund of Rs. 34,320 was determined. No capital asset transfer had taken place during A.Y. 2018-19, therefore no tax on capital gains can be imposed. The error had crept in through inadvertence. There is neither any fraud nor malpractice alleged by the Revenue. The rectification application u/s 154 filed earlier was stated in the Respondent’s affidavit to have been rejected. The application u/s 264 has been dismissed / rejected on the ground that the application was not maintainable as an alternate effective remedy of appeal was available and there was no waiver of such appeal by the assessee.
The Court referred to the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Vijay Gupta vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [2016] 386 ITR 643 (Delhi), wherein the assessee in his return of income had erroneously offered to tax gains arising on sale of shares as short-term capital gains, instead of the same being offered as long-term capital gains exempt from tax, where the section 154 application of the assessee was refused / not accepted and when the assessee filed a revision application u/s 264, the same was rejected on the ground that section 143(1) intimation was not an order and was not amenable to the revisionary jurisdiction u/s 264. The Delhi High Court negated these contentions of the Revenue and further held in Paragraph 39 as under:
‘39:- When the Commissioner was called upon to examine the revision application u/s 264 of the Act, all the relevant material was already available on the record of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner instead of merely examining whether the intimation was correct based on the material then available should have examined the material in the light of the Circular No. 14(XL-35) of 1955, dated April, 1955 and article 265 of the Constitution of India. The Commissioner has erred in not doing so and in failing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him on mere technical grounds.’
The Court observed that in the facts of the present case, the Commissioner has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him on fallacious grounds which cannot be sustained. In the facts of the present case also, the Commissioner has not considered the petitioner’s case on merits and simply on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy of filing appeal had rejected the application u/s 264. Therefore, on the basis of the above decision, the Commissioner’s order was liable to be set aside.
Under section 264, the Principal Commissioner is mandated not to revise any order in two situations: first, where an appeal that lies to the Commissioner (Appeals) but has not been made and the time within which such appeal may be made has not expired, and second, where the assessee has not waived his right of appeal. What emerges from this is that in a situation where there is an appeal that lies to the Commissioner (Appeals) and which has not been made and the time to make such an appeal has not expired, in that case the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner cannot revise any order in respect of which such appeal lies. The language is quite clear, that the two conditions are cumulative, viz., there should be an appeal which lies but has not been made and the time for filing such appeal has not expired; in such a case, the Principal Commissioner cannot revise. However, if the time for making such an appeal has expired, then it would be imperative that the Principal Commissioner would exercise his powers of revision u/s 264.
The other or second situation is when the petitioner assessee has not waived off his right of appeal; even in such a situation, the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers of revision u/s 264(4)(a). In clause (a) of section 264(4), in the language between filing of an appeal and the expiry of such period and the waiver of the assessee to his right of appeal, there is an ‘or’, meaning thereby that there is an option, i.e., either the assessee should not have filed an appeal and the period of filing the same should have expired, or he should have waived such right. Therefore, there are two situations which are contemplated in the said sub-section(4)(a) of section 264. The section cannot be interpreted to mean that for the Principal Commissioner to exercise his powers of revision u/s 264 not only that the time for filing the appeal should have expired but also that the assessee should have waived his right of appeal. In the facts of the case, the petitioner has not filed an appeal against the order u/s 143(1) u/s 246-A and the time of 30 days to file the same has also admittedly expired.
The Court held that a plain reading of the section suggests that it would not then be necessary for the petitioner to waive such right. That waiver would have been necessary if the time to file the appeal would not have expired. The Court also observed that in matters like these, where the errors can be rectified by the authorities, the whole idea of relegating or subjecting the assessee to the appeal machinery or even discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court was uncalled for and would be wholly avoidable. The provisions in the Income-tax Act for rectification, revision u/s 264 are meant for the benefit of the assessee and not to put him to inconvenience. That cannot and could not have been the object of these provisions.
The order dated 12th February, 2021 passed by Respondent No. 2 was set aside. The Writ Petition was allowed, directing the Pr.CIT to decide the application on merits.