Synopsis
Recently, after the Companies Act, 2013 came into force, the SEBI has substantially revised its existing requirements for corporate governance of the listed companies by replacing the earlier Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement with a new one and also by inserting a new Clause 35B.
Against this backdrop of the Companies Act, 2013 and the new SEBI provisions – the overlapping and at times contradictory new requirements, the hurdles of complying with them, the problem of separate penal provisions in the cases of non-compliance of the said two directives calls for a detailed discussion. The Author analyses in depth the new requirements…
SEBI’s new requirements from 1st October, 2014
SEBI has brought into effect the comprehensively revised requirements for corporate governance for listed companies. The earlier Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement is now replaced with the new one. Further, a fresh new Clause 35B has also been put into effect that requires companies to provide e-voting for all shareholders.
To give a brief background recently, several provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, (‘the 2013 Act’) relating to corporate governance were notified to come into effect from 1st April, 2014. At the time when the Bill was close to being passed, SEBI had issued a Concept Paper proposing revised corporate governance requirements based on this Bill. The objective was to comprehensively revise its existing requirements taking into account provisions in the Bill and to initiate debate on the proposed requirements. Thereafter, recently, shortly after the provisions of the 2013 Act were notified, SEBI too brought into effect the new Clauses 49/35B. However, unlike the provisions in the 2013 Act, the SEBI requirements will come into force from 1st October, 2014.
Importance/implications of the new requirements
The new requirements of the two provisions need discussion for several reasons. Firstly, the changes made are substantial. Secondly, for reasons best known to legislators, two sets of overlapping and at times contradictory requirements have been brought into force. Thirdly, the consequences of non-compliance of these two norms will be dealt with in different ways. The penal and other consequences of violations under the 2013 Act are different from those under the Listing Agreement.
The penal consequences under the 2013 Act vs. the Listing Agreement
The consequences of violating the Listing Agreement are generally stated, in the form of a penalty upto Rs. 25 crore. (Note: As I write this article, SEBI has circulated draft provisions that could provide stricter punishments for violations, if brought into effect). This would be levied on the Company. However, SEBI often takes a fairly strong action against other persons like Independent Directors, Audit Committee members, etc. who fail in their duties by debarring them or, as a recent case showed, requiring them to compensate the company for huge losses allegedly caused by their acts/omissions. Even otherwise, SEBI has exercised its powers over the Board, directors, officers and even the Auditors and Courts have upheld these powers in several cases. The action taken may be in a variety of ways including debarment, requirement to compensate, etc.
In comparison, the consequences of violating the provisions of the 2013 Act are usually a fine on the Company and a fine or imprisonment for the officers in default. In some cases, it is possible that there may be class actions too, which can result in compensation to those who suffered loss. Another important difference is that considering that the requirements are contained in different provisions and there are generally different types of penal consequences provided, violation of different provisions of the 2013 Act can have different consequences.
Overlapping provisions
As will be seen later on, there is overlapping and an element of duplication. However, the provisions are often different too. In such a case, the logical recourse for a company seeking scrupulous compliance would be to, where possible and to the extent possible, comply with the stricter or narrower of the two provisions. For example, the 2013 Act provides for a lower number of independent directors while SEBI provides a higher number for certain companies. Thus, those companies would have to comply with the SEBI requirements which would automatically ensure that the provisions of the 2013 Act are also complied with.
Let us now consider a few important requirements.
Applicability
The SEBI requirements apply to all listed companies and certain other specified entities. The requirements under the 2013 Act apply in a varied manner. Generally, they apply to all listed companies. In addition, they apply to certain other companies too. For example, the requirement to have one woman director applies to public companies having a paid up share capital of Rs. 100 crore or more or having a turnover of Rs. 300 crore or more. The requirement relating to Independent Directors applies to public companies having (i) paid up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more (ii) turnover of Rs. 100 crore or more (iii) having total outstanding loans/debentures/deposits exceeding Rs. 50 crore. And so on.
Woman/Independent directors
SEBI companies require to have at least one woman director. It does not matter whether such director is part of the Promoter Group, an Independent Director, an executive or a non-executive director. The 2013 Act also has similar provisions.
SEBI requires at least one-third of the total number of directors to be Independent Directors. If the Chairman is an Executive Director or is a Promoter or related to the Promoter Group, then the Company 50% of the Board should constitute of Independent Directors. The 2013 Act requires companies to have at least one-third of the total number of directors to be Independent Directors. Any fraction would be rounded off to one. For specified nonlisted companies, there should be minimum two independent directors, irrespective of the size of the Board.
The definition of Independent Director under the two sets of provisions are substantially similar.
Tenure of Independent Director
This is one of the several contradictions between the requirements of SEBI Clause/the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act states that an Independent Director shall hold office for term of five consecutive years at a time and this term can be renewed, by a special resolution, for another period of five years. The SEBI Clause has substantially similar requirements.
The 2013 Act says that the tenure held as on 1st April, 2014 would not be counted. SEBI Clause, however, states that if an Independent Director has held tenure of five years or more as on 1st October, 2014, he shall be eligible for another tenure of five years only.
Audit Committee
The requirements under the 2013 Act and SEBI Clause are broadly similar. However, there are a few differences.
The 2013 Act requires that a majority of the Audit Committee should consist of Independent Directors, while SEBI has a higher requirement of two-thirds. SEBI, in addition, also requires that the Chairman of the Audit Committee should be an Independent Director.
The requirement under the 2013 Act is that a majority of the members of the Audit Committee should be “financially literate,” as defined. SEBI has extended this requirement to all the members. Thus, to ensure due compliance, the stricter requirement in such a case would apply and all the members of the Audit Committee of a listed company should be financially literate.
The role and functions of the audit Committee as prescribed by SEBI are far more elaborate and detailed. Considering the nature of the obligations, though, a listed company will have to ensure due compliance of both the sets of provisions.
Material subsidiary companies SEBI Clause has certain requirements relating to material, non-listed indian subsidiary companies and other subsidiaries. material subsidiaries are those subsidiaries incorporated in india,that are unlistedand whose income or net worth is more than 20% of the consolidated income or consolidated net worth respectively of the listed parent company. for such companies, there are certain at least one independent director of the parent company shall be a director of such subsidiary.
A statement of significant transactions and arrangements by an unlisted subsidiary shall be periodically brought to the attention of the Board of directors of the parent. “Significant,” in this context, means a transaction or arrangement that exceeds, or is likely to exceed 10% of total revenues/expenses/assets/liabilities of such subsidiary.
Selling, disposal or leasing of more than 20% of the assets of a material subsidiary shall require the approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution. it is not clear whether such requirement would be attracted if such sale, disposal or lease, is in one transaction or in one financial year or cumulative.
further, to reduce the holding or control of the parent to less than 50% in a material subsidiary, the approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution would be required.
The 2013 Act contains no corresponding requirements.
Related party transactions
SEBI Clause and the 2013 Act both have fairly detailed requirements relating to related party transactions. analy- sis of this topic even for one of the two sets would require a separate article by itself. however, there are some important features of difference between the two.
What constitutes a related party is defined in different manner under the two provisions. While the 2013 Act seeks to be specific and provides a defined set of relationship that would make a party a related party, the SEBI definition is qualitative. It includes all parties treated as related party under the 2013 Act and adds more.
As regards approval, the 2013 Act requires that the Board shall approve the specified related party transactions. Companies having paid up capital of at least rs. 10 crore, shall obtain the prior approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution. further, transactions beyond the specified amount as per specified formula would also be covered. at such meeting, members who are related parties cannot vote. the provisions do not apply to trans- actions in the ordinary course of business and at arm’s length, as defined.
SEBI however requires that the audit Committee should approve all related party transactions. however, in case of “material” related party transactions, special resolution shall be passed to take approval where the related parties should not vote. a transaction with a related party would be treated as “material” if such transaction individually or taken together with previous transactions during the financial year exceed 5% of the annual turnover or 20% of the net worth, whichever is higher, of the company.
Further, though SEBI Clause will come into force generally from 1st october, 2014, all those material related party transactions that are likely to extend beyond 31st march, 2015 are required to be placed for approval of the shareholders at the first meeting of shareholders after 1st october, 2014. a Company may even get such approval at a meeting prior to 1st october, 2014.
E-Voting
SEBI has introduced a new Clause 35B to make e-voting mandatory by listed companies for shareholder resolutions. all shareholder resolutions including resolutions to be passed by postal ballot should be capable of being voted through e-voting. The e-voting would be through an agency that provides such platform and complies with conditions as prescribed by the ministry of Corporate affairs.
The 2013 Act/Rules framed thereunder require all listed companies and companies having at least one thousand shareholders to provide facility of e-voting.
Conclusion
these are just some of the new requirements relating to corporate governance in the 2013 Act/SEBI Clauses. While the 2013 Act does not give much of a transition period, SEBI has given some time to implement. however, considering the overlapping requirements, significant provisions have become applicable. Considering the punitive and other consequences of non-compliance, the first full year of 2014-15 will require serious efforts to be compliant. at the same time, considering the manner in which they are introduced, there are likely to be several unintended violations. this will only get worse considering poor/loose drafting particularly in the 2013 Act. The fact that the requirements create substantial new requirements and even hurdles, make it even more difficult. One hopes that SEBI and the MCA takes a liberal approach during the year, gives relaxations where possible and takes a lenient view of unintended violations during the first full year of applicability.
