Ignorantia Juris

2. The rationale behind the doctrine is that if ignorance of
law is taken as an excuse, it would be conveniently used by any person charged
with criminal offence or subjected to civil lawsuit without any conceivable
basis to decide on such ignorance. The law, therefore, imputes such knowledge to
all within the jurisdiction, no matter how transiently.

3. The maxim is juxtaposed to ignorance of facts relevant to
the charge of violation of law or commission of offence which is contained in
the maxim ‘ignorantia facit excusat’. While the ignorance of facts
excuses, ignorance of law does not. If the heir pleads ignorance of the
death of his ancestors, he is ignorant of fact but ignorance of rights vested in
him on the death of ancestor is ignorance of law which does not generally afford
an excuse.

4. In order, however, for the maxim to apply it is necessary
that the law in question is properly published and distributed. In Harla v.
State of Rajasthan, 1951 AIR 467 where Jaipur Opium Act 1923 was passed by
Council of Ministers but not promulgated or published in gazette, the Supreme
Court observed that natural justice requires that before a law can become
operative, it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some
recognisable way so that all men may know what it is, or at very least, there
must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which
such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable
diligence. In the absence of any special law, or custom, it would be against the
principle of natural justice to permit the subjects of a state to be punished or
penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not,
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. The
court referred to the decision in Johnson v. Sargent, ILR 1944 Karachi
107 where such a publication or publicity was held to be necessary particularly
in regard to orders of empowered authorities as compared to Acts of British
Parliament which are publicly enacted. The debates in the case of Parliamentary
legislation are open to the public and the Acts are passed by accredited
representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that the
constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers
and now, on wireless.

5. The maxim based on presumed knowledge of law, however,
stands considerably diluted with heavily increasing corpus of national
legislation which works more in favour of lawyers rather than citizens for whom
it is enacted. Taking a practical view, the Courts in genuine cases of ignorance
take account of total facts and circumstances including the object of
legislation, nature of default, its impact and its social cost. In cases
involving penal action, particularly in fiscal matters, where the determinative
issue is existence of reasonable cause or deliberate, contumacious conduct on
the part of the defaulter, ignorance of law is taken as a material factor. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa,
(1972) 83 ITR 26 (SC) and similar other decisions could be taken as suggestive
of ignorance of law being taken as relevant to establish absence of guilty
intention when it lays down two basic requirements for imposition of penalty,
viz. deliberate defiance of law and conscious disregard of obligation. Both
these mental states presuppose knowledge of law and obligations flowing
therefrom.

6. The Courts in taking such liberal view have even gone to
the extent of excusing defaults arising out of wrong legal advice given by
eligible legal consultants. In Shyam Gopal Charitable Trust v. DIT
(Exemption), 290 ITR 99, 105, Delhi High Court, while deciding appeal
against order of imposition of penalty u/s.272A(2)(e), recalled the observations
of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup,
AIR 1971 Ker 211, which was approved and extracted by the Supreme Court in
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 507.

"I am of the view that legal advice given by the members of
the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even as pronouncement on questions
of law by Courts are sometimes wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in such
cases for, to err is human and laymen, as litigants are, may legitimately lean
on expert counsel in legal as in other departments, without probing the
professional competence of the advice".

The Court, however, made it clear that it cannot be taken as
laying down a general proposition that in all cases where the failure is
attributed to legal advice, it should be taken as constituting sufficient cause.

7. Such dilution in the application of ‘ignorantia juris
non excusat’ even though justified on grounds of modern day multiplicity and
complexity of litigation coupled with standard of education, is to be
resorted to with utmost caution and subjected to the satisfaction that such a
plea is without any taint of malafide or element of recklessness, gross
negligence or a mere ruse. Willful or deliberate default or disregard of
obligation should not be camouflaged as bonafide mistake caused by ignorance of
law. In V. G. Paneerdas & Co. P. Ltd. v. CWT, 284 ITR 444, the Madras
High Court while commenting on the plea of ignorance of the provisions of
Finance Act 1983 bringing closely held companies into the ambit of wealth tax
observed "Going beyond the well known principles that the ignorance of law is no
excuse, it has to be pointed out that the assessee could not point out any
material fact showing that it was prevented from getting to know the relevant
provisions of the Finance Act 1983." In the facts of the case, the court held
that the provision was well published and a much discussed affair, it is clear
and unambiguous and the assessee was assisted in tax matt