7. Sankalp Recreation Private Limited vs. Union of India and Ors. (2019) 418 ITR 673 (SC)
Purchase of immovable property by Central Government – In terms of an
auction where the Chief Commissioner reserves the right to reject any tender
form, including the highest bid, without assigning any reason – Cancellation
without reasons is not per se invalid especially when the Commissioner
had indicated the reasons for doing so to CBDT – So long as the auction process
is conducted in a bona fide manner and in public interest, a judicial
hands-off is mandated
A property admeasuring 1,053.5 square meters bearing Plot No. 27/A, Survey
No. 8, 9, 10, opposite Santacruz Police Station at the junction of Juhu Tara
Road and Linking Road, Santacruz (West), Mumbai 400054, although acquired by
the Union of India in 1994 u/s 269UD(1) of the Act, could only be sold in 2018.
Despite various attempts starting in 1994, several auctions conducted qua
the said property failed. Even an auction dated 27th March, 2017
with a reserve price fixed of Rs. 32.11 crores failed to elicit a response from
any buyer. This being the case, Sankalp Recreation Pvt. Ltd., the appellant,
then made an offer to the Central Board of Direct Taxes to purchase the
aforesaid property for a sum of Rs. 32.11 crores. But this offer could not be
accepted because the CBDT stated that accepting such an offer by a private
treaty would be beyond their jurisdiction.
In the meanwhile, a fresh valuation report of the aforesaid property was
called for which was submitted on 4th September, 2017 valuing the
property at Rs. 29,91,35,000. Pursuant to this, a brochure / catalogue was
circulated sometime in September, 2017.
The reserve price was fixed at Rs. 30 crores and the appellant was again
the sole bidder, offering Rs. 30.21 crores, or Rs. 21 lakhs above the reserve
price.In a letter dated 26th September, 2017, the CCIT-2 sent a
report to the CBDT stating that although the bid of Rs. 30.21 crores offered by
the appellant was above the reserve price, it was less than the sum of Rs.
32.11 crores that had been offered by the same bidder earlier. In view of this,
a clarification was sought as to the future course of action.
On 20th November, 2017, the CBDT directed that the auction
proceedings be kept in abeyance for the time being and appointed a valuer from
outside the State, viz., Mr. P. Ramaraj, District Valuation Officer, Chennai.
This valuer submitted a report on 23rd February, 2018 valuing the
property at Rs. 31.07 crores because on 23rd January, 2018 a cap had
been introduced in the TDR which would be available by way of FSI. Short of
this cap, the Chennai valuer valued the property at Rs. 36,51,59,000. Based on
this report, the property was put up for auction yet again.
Meanwhile, through a letter dated 4th May, 2018, the earlier
auction which had yielded the sum of Rs. 30.21 crores from the appellant, was
treated as cancelled. The said letter specifically called upon the appellant to
participate in the upcoming auction to be conducted shortly.
The appellant, by a communication dated 12th April, 2018,
referred to the return of the Demand Drafts of Rs. 7.5 crores and Rs. 5 lakhs
towards earnest money and caution money stating that the burden of interest
liability was continuing. The appellant made it clear that he would be
participating in a future auction and he was not exiting the auction
proceedings.
Pursuant to the valuation report, a notice for a public auction was
published on 10th May, 2018 with the reserve price this time fixed
at Rs. 31.10 crores. On 17th May, 2018 the Income tax Department
wrote to the appellant in which it intimated the fact that a fresh auction was
to be conducted on 30th May, 2018 and that the appellant should
participate in the same.
Meanwhile, the appellant, being aggrieved by the cancellation of the
auction process in which he was the highest bidder at Rs. 30.21 crores, filed a
writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on 21st May,
2018. Two days later, on the 23rd, the High Court permitted
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to conduct a fresh auction subject to refraining from
confirmation of the sale.
On 30th May, 2018 the fresh auction was conducted and another
person (auction purchaser) was the sole bidder, with the bid being equal to the
reserve price of Rs. 31.10 crores.
Ultimately, by the impugned judgment dated 27th July, 2018,
finding no infirmity in the auction process and finding that the cancellation,
though without reason, was not arbitrary, the High Court dismissed the writ
petition filed.
Before the Supreme Court, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant urged that the cancellation being without reason was per se invalid in law and, therefore, ought to
have been set aside by the High Court. He also argued that the process of
conducting yet another auction after so many auctions had failed was itself
arbitrary and that as he was the highest bidder at Rs. 30.21 crores, that is,
Rs. 21 lakhs above the reserve price, the auction sale ought to have been
confirmed in his favour. Further, after citing a number of judgments, he made a
‘with-prejudice’ offer stating that he was willing to abide by the earlier
offer made by him of Rs. 32.11 crores.
The learned senior counsel appearing for auction purchaser urged that
there was no infirmity whatsoever in the
entire process. He highlighted the fact that under Clause 16 of the
brochure / catalogue, the Chief Commissioner reserved the right to reject any
tender form, including the highest bid, without assigning any reason. He, inter
alia, also made a ‘with-prejudice’ offer that his client would pay a sum of
Rs. 35 crores with an adjustment qua the earnest money that had been
deposited and lying with the Union of India, with a reasonable rate of interest
thereon.
The Supreme Court, referring to its earlier judgments which held that so
long as the auction process is conducted in a bona fide manner and in
the public interest a judicial hands-off is mandated, concluded that the
reasons disclosed both in the report dated 26th September, 2017 and
the letter dated 6th April, 2018 from the Government of India,
Ministry of Finance, to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax made it clear that
there was no arbitrariness that was discernible in the entire auction process.
This being the case, the appeal had to be dismissed. The Supreme Court further
held that the offer made by the auction purchaser was very fair and directed
that from the figure of Rs. 35 crores, which would be paid within a period of
12 weeks directly to the Union treasury, a sum equivalent to interest of 9% on
the amount of Rs. 7.78 crores that was lying with the Union, calculated from
the date on which it was deposited with the Union till the date of the order,
be subtracted and the net figure be handed over as aforesaid.
8. Genpact India Private Limited vs. DCIT (2014) 419 ITR 440 (SC)
Appealable Orders – The contingencies detailed in (ii) and (iii) of section 246A(1)(a) arise
out of assessment proceedings u/s 143 or u/s 144 of the Act but the first
contingency is a standalone postulate and is not dependent purely on the
assessment proceedings either u/s 143 or u/s 144 of the Act – The expression
‘denies his liability to be assessed’ is quite comprehensive to take within its
fold every case where the assessee denies his liability to be assessed under
the Act
Alternative remedy – The High Court must not interfere if there is an
adequate, efficacious, alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he
has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out
an exceptional case warranting such interference, or there exist sufficient
grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 – It cannot
be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could
never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy
Out of the opening share capital of 25,68,700 shares held by its sole
shareholder and holding company Genpact India Investment, Mauritius, the
appellant bought back 2,50,000 shares in May, 2013 at the rate of Rs. 32,000
per share for a total consideration of Rs. 800 crores.
On 10th May, 2013, Chapter XIIDA consisting of sections
115QA, 115QB and 115QC was inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) by the Finance Act, 2013 which came into effect from 1st
June, 2013.
Some time later, on 10th September, 2013, a scheme for
arrangement was approved by the High Court of Delhi in Company Petition No. 349
of 2013. Pursuant thereto, the appellant bought back another tranche of
7,50,000 shares at the rate of Rs. 35,000 per share for a total consideration
of Rs. 2,625 crores from Genpact India Investment, Mauritius.
In the income tax return for A.Y. 2014-15 filed on 28th
November, 2014, the appellant stated that ‘Details of tax on distributed
profits of domestic companies and its payment’ were given in ‘Schedule DDT’
where the details of the aforesaid transactions were given but the liability to
pay any tax was denied.
A notice u/s 143(2) was issued to the appellant on 3rd September,
2015 seeking further explanation, pursuant to which requisite details were
furnished.
Vide his letter dated 28th December, 2016, the assessee
submitted that the buyback of shares had been done in pursuance of the ‘scheme
of arrangement’ u/s 391 of the Companies Act, 1956 approved by the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi and in such a manner that the same was not a buyback in terms of
section 115QA of the Act.
The matter was thereafter considered and an
assessment order was passed by the first respondent on 31st December,
2016. As many as ten additions were made by the first respondent, one of them
being in respect of liability u/s 115QA of the Act. According to the first
respondent, section 115QA was introduced to provide that where shares are
bought back at a price higher than the price at which those shares were issued,
then the balance amount would be treated as distribution of income to the
shareholder and tax @20% would be payable by the company. Section 115QA was
applicable only to domestic unlisted companies.
Insofar as nine additions made by the first respondent were concerned,
an appeal was filed by the appellant. The appeal was decided in his favour but
a further challenge at the instance of the Revenue was under consideration.
As regards the issue concerning tax u/s 115QA, the appellant filed a
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 686 of 2017 in the High Court submitting, inter
alia, that the order passed by the first respondent was without
jurisdiction as buyback of shares in the instant case was in pursuance of the
‘scheme of arrangement’ approved by the High Court.
The High Court disposed of the petition with the following directions:
(i) The Court declines to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the
impugned demand raised by the Revenue by way of the impugned assessment order
u/s 115QA of the Act against the assessee;
(ii) The assessee is granted an opportunity to file
an appeal u/s 246A of the Act before the CIT(A) to challenge the impugned
assessment order only insofar as it creates a demand u/s 115QA;
(iii) If such an appeal is filed within ten days
from today, it will be considered on its own merits and a reasoned order
disposing of the appeal will be passed by the CIT(A) on all issues raised by
the assessee, not limited to the issues raised in the present petition as well
as on the response thereto by the Revenue in accordance with law;
(iv) The reasoned order shall be passed by the
CIT(A) not later than 31st October, 2019. It will be communicated to
the petitioner within ten days thereafter. For a period of two weeks after the
date of such communication of order, the demand under the impugned assessment
order, if it is affirmed by the CIT(A) in appeal, will not be enforced against
the assessee;
(v) The
Court places on record the statement of the Revenue that it will not raise any
objection before the CIT(A) as to the maintainability of such an appeal and as
to the appeal being barred by limitation. The Court also takes on record the
statement of the Revenue that it will not enforce the demand in terms of the
impugned assessment order till the disposal of the above appeal. All of the
above is subject to the assessee filing the appeal before the CIT(A) within ten
days from today;
(vi) It is made clear that this Court has not
expressed any view whatsoever on the contentions of either party on the merits
of the case.
A challenge to the aforesaid view taken by the High
Court was raised by way of a Special Leave Petition No. 20728 of 2019 filed in
the Court on 26th August, 2019. Within the time limit of ten days as
afforded by the High Court, an appeal was also preferred by the appellant
‘without prejudice’ on 30th August,2019 against the ‘demand raised /
order passed u/s 115QA’. The aforesaid SLP came up before the Supreme Court on
6th September, 2019, whereafter the matter was adjourned on a few
occasions and then taken up for final disposal.
The Supreme Court after going through the appeal
provisions observed that one of the key expressions appearing in section
246(1)(a) as well as in section 246A(1)(a) is ‘where the assessee denies his
liability to be assessed under this Act.’
It noted that a similar expression occurring in section 30 of the
Income-tax Act, 1922 came up for consideration before it in Commissioner
of Income Tax, U.P., Lucknow vs. Kanpur Coal Syndicate (1964) 53 ITR 225,
wherein it was concluded that the expression ‘denial of liability’ is
comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also
the liability to tax under particular circumstances.
The Court noted that the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant,
however, was that ‘denial of the assessee’s liability to be assessed’ in
section 246A is confined to his liability to be assessed u/s 143(3) and the
same has nothing to do with the liability to pay tax u/s 115QA. According to
the appellant, tax payable in respect of buyback of shares u/s 115QA is not a
tax payable on ‘total income’.
The Supreme Court considered the kinds of orders or situations that are
referred to in section 246(1)(a) of the Act, which are:
(i) An order against the assessee, where the assessee denies his
liability to be assessed under this Act, or
(ii) An intimation under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1B) of section
143 where the assessee objects to the making of adjustments, or
(iii) Any order of assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or
section 144, where the assessee objects:
to the amount of income assessed, or
to the amount of tax determined, or
to the amount of loss computed, or
to the status under which he is assessed.
According to the Supreme Court, the contingencies detailed in (ii) and
(iii) hereinabove arise out of assessment proceedings u/s 143 or section 144 of
the Act but the first contingency is a standalone postulate and is not
dependent purely on the assessment proceedings either u/s 143 or u/s 144 of the
Act. The expression ‘denies his liability to be assessed’ as held by this court
in Kanpur Coal Syndicate was quite comprehensive to take within
its fold every case where the assessee denies his liability to be assessed
under the Act.
The Supreme Court held that section 115QA stipulates that in case of
buyback of shares referred to in the provisions of the said section, the
company shall be liable to pay additional income tax at the rate of 20% on the
distributed income. Any determination in that behalf, be it regarding
quantification of the liability or the question whether such company is liable
or not, would be matters coming within the ambit of the first postulate
referred to hereinabove. Similar is the situation with respect to provisions of
section 246A(1)(a) where again, out of certain situations contemplated, one of
them is ‘an order against the assessee where the assessee denies his liability
to be assessed under this Act’. The computation and extent of liability is
determined under the provisions of section 115QA.Such determination under the
Act would squarely get covered under the said expression. There was no reason
why the scope of such expression be restricted and confined to issues arising
out of or touching upon assessment proceedings either u/s 143 or u/s 144.
The Court therefore rejected the submissions advanced by the appellant
and held that an appeal would be maintainable against the determination of
liability u/s 115QA of the Act. It thereafter dealt with the question whether
the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition because
of the availability of adequate appellate remedy. According to the Supreme
Court, the law on the point was very clear and was summarised in Commissioner
of Income Tax and Ors. vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2014) 1 SCC 603 as
under:
‘…It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ
jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is
available is a Rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a Rule of
policy, convenience and discretion rather than a Rule of law. Undoubtedly, it
is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226
despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must
not interfere if there is an adequate, efficacious, alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without
availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such
interference, or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226…’
The Supreme Court, referring to its various other
decisions, observed that while it can be said that it has recognised some
exceptions to the Rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory
authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure,
or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order
has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.
However, the Court further stated that the proposition laid down by it in many
cases that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to
the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has
been taken, itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds
the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.
Therefore, the Supreme Court did not find any infirmity in the approach
adopted by the High Court in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The
submission that once the threshold was crossed (i.e., the petition is
admitted)despite the preliminary objection being raised, the High Court ought
not to have considered the issue regarding alternate remedy may not be correct.
The first order dated 25th January, 2017 passed by the High Court
did record the preliminary objection but was prima facie of the view
that the transactions defined in section 115QA were initially confined only to
those covered by section 77A of the Companies Act. Therefore, without rejecting
the preliminary objection, notice was issued in the matter. The subsequent
order undoubtedly made the earlier interim order absolute. However, the
preliminary objection having not been dealt with and disposed of, the matter
was still at large.
In State of U.P. vs. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti and Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 675 the Supreme Court dealt with an issue
whether, after admission, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the
ground of alternate remedy and held that it cannot be laid down as a
proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 
