By Tarunkumar Singhal, Raman Jokhakar, Chartered Accountants
fiogf49gjkf0d
Many recent reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) have highlighted grave discrepancies in government expenditure and deliberate distortions of stated policies. These reports and their aftermath demonstrate the true potential of the office of the CAG to force action against corruption. As the custodian of the public purse, it is one of the key actors in the system of checks and balances envisaged under our Constitution. In fact, today the CAG is likely the most important functionary responsible for ensuring accountability of the government.
However, the CAG can do justice to this role only if he is competent, independent and suitably empowered. Sadly, the current framework compromises this, leaving room for abuse in appointments, as well as limiting the CAG’s authority to effectively perform his constitutional duties. This is particularly important now, as the appointment of a new CAG looms on the horizon.
The CAG’s appointment process is a legacy from the pre-Independence ‘not-accountable-to-Indians’ mindset, whereby it is entirely at the government’s discretion. Given the governing coalition’s exasperation with the incumbent, it is probable that this time around it will look for someone who is likely to be favorably inclined towards the government, or at the least be ineffective.
To ensure that the independence of the CAG does not depend on the morals of the government of the day, his appointment should reflect real checks and balances. My formula would have the CAG appointed by a committee consisting of the Speaker, the prime minister and the two leaders of the opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. Their choice should be by simple majority and, in the event of a tie, it should be referred to the Chief Justice of India to cast the deciding vote.
Many infrastructure projects are now undertaken in the PPP mode, involving transfer of public assets (for instance, oilfields) and revenue sharing between the government and the private sector. Many of these newer structures are presently outside the ambit of the CAG. This reduces oversight and creates avenues for corruption. Therefore, the scope of the CAG’s powers must be expanded to include such arrangements.
