An agreement was entered to sell a house by all co-owners except one. As the parties failed to execute the sale deed, a suit for specific performance by the plaintiff purchaser was filed. The co-owner who was not party to the agreement proposed to purchase shares of other co-owners. The counsel for the plaintiff gave consent to such purchase by the co-owner, not party to agreement, at reasonable market value within a stipulated period. The valuation of property at reasonable market value was agreed to, by both parties. Order was passed to execute sale deed in favour of the co-owner not party, by a consent order. Against this, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
The Court observed that apart from both parties including the plaintiff-appellant had agreed for a reasonable market valuation. The statement made by the counsel before the High Court, as recorded in the impugned judgment and order, cannot be challenged before this Court. It was also clear that the High Court had recorded in the impugned judgment that the counsel agreed with instructions from the plaintiff. A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding.
It is a consent order. As per section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. For all the reasons, more particularly, the statement of fact as noted in the impugned judgment under Article 136, the Apex Court would not interfere with the order of the High Court which has done substantial justice.