Allied Laws

21. Condonation of Delay – Delay of 3671 days – No reason to decline
benefit merely due to delay in filing of appeal when in similar cases benefit
was derived by similar concerns [Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Sections 4, 5, 18,
54]

K.
Subbarayudu and Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (2017)
12 Supreme Court Cases 840

The issue was
whether the lower authority could decline the benefit available to the
appellant only due to the reason of delay of 3,671 days in filing an appeal.

It was observed
by the Court that, when the concerned court has exercised its discretion either
condoning or declining to condone the delay, normally the superior court will
not interfere in exercise of such discretion. The true guide is whether the
litigant has acted with due diligence. Since the Appellants/claimants are the
agriculturists whose lands were acquired and when similarly situated
agriculturists were given a higher rate of compensation, there is no reason to
decline the same to the Appellants. Merely on the ground of delay, such benefit
cannot be denied to the Appellants. Accordingly, the delay was condoned.

22. Family Settlement Limitation – Suit challenging the deed of family
settlement after period of 9 years of deed of family settlement was held to be
barred by limitation. [Limitation Act (36 of 1963, Art. 157)]

Jose
Floriano Cristovam Pinto and Ors. vs. Michelle N. Pinto Souza and Ors. AIR 2017
BOMBAY 263

One of the
issues to be decided was whether a suit filed for repudiation of the deed of
family settlement after a gap of 9 years be allowed?

It was held
that there was substantial delay and laches on part of Respondents to
approach Court in seeking the repudiation of the Deed of Family Settlement of
2005 in a suit of 2014 and on that premise, could not have secured the
plaintiffs with the relief of injunction and also that the appellants could
well have disposed off other properties between this period of filing the suit
and the deed of settlement and in that context of apathy and inaction of the
plaintiffs did not entitle them to the relief of injunction, hence deed of
family arrangement cannot be held to be invalid.

23. Interpretation – Deed and documents – The terms of the contract will
have to be understood in the way the parties wanted and intended them to be.
[Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34]

Bharat
Aluminium Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2016) 4 Supreme
Court Cases 126

The only issue
was whether the parties, by agreement, express or implied, have excluded wholly
or partly, Part I of the Arbitration Act, where Art. 17 mentions that English
law would be applicable and Art. 20 mentions that Indian Law would be
applicable.

In the facts of
the present case, disputes arose out of an agreement which was executed. The
same were referred to arbitration in England where the arbitral Tribunal made
two awards in favour of the Respondent. The Appellant filed applications, u/s.
34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, Bilaspur, which were
dismissed. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed appeal before the High Court of
Chhattisgarh. The High Court dismissed the appeal.

It was observed
by the Supreme Court that the parties have agreed in expressed terms that the
law of arbitration would be English Arbitration Law. In the case before us,
being a contract executed between the two parties, the court cannot adopt an
approach for interpreting a statute. The terms of the contract will have to be
understood in the way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In that
context, particularly in agreements of arbitration, where party autonomy is the
grundnorm, how the parties worked out the agreement, is one of the
indicators to decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions and the use of the expressions at the proper places
in the agreement. Contextually, it may be noted that in the present case, the
Respondent had invoked the provisions of English law for the purpose of the
initiation of the unsettled disputes. In view of the above, the Supreme Court
held that the arbitration agreement was not governed by the Indian Law.

24. Jurisdiction – on jurisdiction is mandatory – At any stage of the
proceeding, issue of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter has to
be tried once it is brought to the notice of the court– Remanded. [CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908; ORDER I, RULE 8]

S.N.D.P.
Sakhayogam vs. Kerala Atmavidya Sangham (2017) 8 Supreme Court Cases 830

One of the
issues were whether the Plaintiff, who is a juristic person, i.e.,
“Society” is entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of
the Code for filing a suit in a “representative capacity” i.e.
whether the Lower authority had the jurisdiction to try such a suit.

The facts of
the present case deal with the fact that the Plaintiff treated their suit to be
in the nature of a “representative suit” within the meaning of Order
1 Rule 8 and, therefore, applied to the Trial Court under Rule 8 of the Code
seeking permission to prosecute the suit in the representative capacity. This
permission appears to have been granted to the Plaintiff by the Trial Court
without any objection from the side of the Defendants and, therefore, Issue No.
1 was answered in Plaintiff’s favour.

The Court held
that the Trial Court was expected to decide several material questions, namely,
whether the Plaintiff, who is a juristic person, i.e., “Society” is
entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code for filing a
suit in a “representative capacity”. In other words, the Trial Court
should have examined the question as to whether the expression
“person” occurring in Rule 8 also includes “juristic
person”. Secondly, if the Plaintiff is held entitled to file such suit,
whether the facts pleaded and the reliefs claimed in the plaint can be said to
be in the nature of representative character so as to satisfy the ingredients
of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code which are meant essentially for the benefit of public
at large for grant of any relief and lastly, if the facts pleaded and the
reliefs claimed in the plaint do not satisfy the requirements of Order 1 Rule 8
of the Code for grant of relief to the public at large then whether such suit
is capable of being tried as a regular suit on behalf of the Plaintiff for
granting reliefs in their personal capacity, because the suit relates to
ownership of land, namely, who is the owner of the suit land. Since there was
neither any discussion much less finding on any of the aforesaid issues by any
of the Courts below, though these questions directly and substantially arose in
the case, we are of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper and
in the interest of justice to remand the case to the Trial Court to answer
these issues and then decide the suit depending upon the answer in accordance
with law.

The Hon’ble
Court observed that the issue of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the
case if found involved has to be tried at any stage if the proceedings once
brought to the notice of the Court.

25. Nominee – Not entitled to withdraw from bank especially when dispute
raised by another legal heir [Banking Regulation Act, 1949, Section 45ZA]

Vishwanath
Yadav and Ors. vs. Kashinath Yadav and Ors. AIR 2017 BOMBAY 258

The questions
for consideration was whether a nominee can recover the amounts from the Bank
on behalf of all the legal representatives when the legal representatives
themselves have put up a claim to recover such amount from the concerned Bank and
whether such amounts can be claimed only after the Inventory Proceedings are
initiated.

It was observed
by the Court that it is clear that whenever a depositor appoints his nominee
and the depositor dies before the maturity of the fixed deposit for release,
the nominee so appointed would certainly be entitled to collect the amount
payable on such fixed deposit amount on its maturity for release. However, that
would not take away the right of the legal heirs of the deceased depositor from
claiming right to the amount standing to the credit of the deceased depositor
in accordance with the provisions of law of succession in force. This is so
because a nominee is merely a representative of the lawful successor of the
deceased depositor to receive the payment on the maturity of the deposit for
release. The nominee does not step in the shoes of the legal heirs merely on
account of nomination by a depositor.