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June 2019

ALLIED LAWS

By DR. K. SHIVARAM
Senior Advocate
RAHUL K. HAKANI | SASHANK DUNDU
Advocates
Reading Time 11 mins

10

Agricultural Land –
Preferential rights of heirs over immovable property applies to agricultural
properties also [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Sections 4, 14, 22]

Babu Ram vs. Santokh
Singh (deceased) through his L.R.s and Ors. AIR 2019, Supreme Court 1506

 

A dispute arose over the
question whether one of the heirs would have a preferential right over the
intestate property devolved upon them at the time of transferring such
property. Whether section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to
agricultural lands also?

 

Section 22 of the Act
provides that any immovable property of an intestate person, or any business
carried on by him or her, whether solely or in conjunction with others,
devolves upon two or more heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule, and if
any one of such heirs proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property
or business, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the
interest proposed to be transferred. However, the Act does not say anything in
the case of agricultural land.

 

It was observed that when
the Parliament thought of conferring the rights of succession in respect of
various properties, including agricultural holdings, it put a qualification on
the right to transfer to an outsider and gave preferential rights to the other
heirs with a designed object. Under the Shastric Law, the interest of a
coparcener would devolve by principles of survivorship to which an exception
was made by virtue of section 6 of the Act. If the conditions stipulated
therein were satisfied, the devolution of such interest of the deceased would
not go by survivorship but in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Since
the right itself in certain cases was created for the first time by the
provisions of the Act, it was thought fit to put a qualification so that the
properties belonging to the family would be held within the family, to the
extent possible, and no outsider would easily be planted in the family
properties. It is with this objective that a preferential right was conferred
upon the remaining heirs in case any of the heirs was desirous of transferring
his interest in the property that he received by way of succession under the Act.

 

In view of the above, it
was held that the preferential right given to an heir of a Hindu u/s. 22 of the
Act is applicable even if the property in question is agricultural land.

 

11

Co-operative Society – Premium for Transfer –
Supreme Court upholds the direction of the State Government putting a ceiling
limit of Rs. 25,000 on the premium charged by a society on transfer of a
property by a society’s member [Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960;
Section 79A]

The New India
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. the State of Maharashtra and Anr., WP No.
4567 of 2007 (HC)(Bom), Dated: 01.02.2013

 

The New India
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. the State of Maharashtra and Anr., Civil
Appeal No. 10683/2017 (SC), Dated: 23.04.2019

 

The main ground in the
challenge was whether rejection of application of respondent No. 2 was valid on
the premise of non-payment of Rs. 2 crore as demanded by the society for the
purpose of transferring the property.

 

The said applications,
undisputedly, were made in the requisite form annexed to the Maharashtra
Co­operative Societies Rules, 1961, along with a demand draft of Rs. 25,000. It
was informed that on the face of it the application was not acceptable since
the transfer fee offered of Rs. 25,000 was inadequate in view of regulation 6A
of the society and the amount demanded was Rs. 2 crore.

 

The Hon’ble High Court in the case of Mont Blanc
Co­-operative Housing Society Limited vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (2) Bom.
C.R. 533
considered the validity of a similar government notification
dated 1st August, 2001 issued u/s. 79A of the said Act thereby
imposing a ceiling of 10% of non­-occupation charges. The Court observed that
they were satisfied that the notification was issued to secure the proper management
of the business of the co-­operative housing societies in general and for
preventing the affairs of such societies being conducted in a manner
detrimental to the interests of the members of such societies. The order does
not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and it cannot be termed as an unfair
or unjust act by the state government so as to deprive the societies of their
legal, just and proper levies. It is a bona fide exercise by the state
to avoid litigations / disputes and to bring in a uniform levy of
non­-occupancy and to prevent the exploitation of minority members. To bring in
an orderly situation, the government stepped in and exercised its statutory
powers u/s. 79A by issuing directions to levy non-­occupancy charges at 10% of
the service charges.

 

The Court observed that in
the present case also, the government vide notification dated 9th
August, 2001 has directed uniform rates to be charged for effecting transfer of
the tenements / flats. Insofar as municipal corporations are concerned, the
premium has been determined as Rs. 25,000. It is to be noted that clause (2) of
the said notification specifically provides that the said charges are towards
transfer of a member’s tenement / flat and his share and rights in the share
capital / property in the said society. The perusal of the said notification
would reveal that it is applicable to all co­-operative housing societies. In
order to grab exorbitant sums of money from the new members who are trying to
become members of the society, they are being subjected to exploitation at the
hands of the society.

 

The Court held that the
petitioner was bound to comply with the directions issued by the state
government u/s. 79A of the said Act and could not have charged premium higher
than Rs. 25,000.

 

12

Environment – Duty of State as well as the
Citizens to prevent pollution and improve the environment [Constitution of
India; Article 21, 51-A]

Rajesh Madhukar Pandit
and Ors. vs. the Nashik Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 2019 (NOC)129 (Bom)

 

A PIL was filed concerning pollution of the Godavari
which is the second longest river in India after the Ganges. The Godavari is
one of the main sources of water supply to the city of Nashik. Several steps
are required to be taken for rejuvenation of the river and for preventing
pollution of the said river.

 

It was observed that the
scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India gives a right to live in a
clean and pollution-free environment. Moreover, the right to have clean
drinking water is also a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21. This is in
the context of the fact that the Godavari is a source of water supply to the
said corporation area and nearby villages. The right to live a dignified and
meaningful life is also an essential part of the bundle of rights guaranteed by
Article 21. If the rivers are polluted and pollution is created in and around
the rivers, the fundamental right of living a dignified and meaningful life of
the citizens is defeated. The fundamental right to live in a pollution-free atmosphere
is also violated.

 

Article 48A of the
Constitution of India is a Directive Principle of State Policy which enjoins
the State to protect and improve the environment. Clause (g) of Article 51A
casts a duty on the citizens to protect and improve the natural environment,
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for
living creatures.

 

In view of the above, the
Court held that for protecting the fundamental rights of citizens under Article
21, the State is duty-bound to take all steps to prevent pollution of rivers
and to initiate measures for cleaning and rejuvenation of the rivers. It is the
obligation of the State to keep rivers clean and free from pollution. The
citizens owe a duty to protect and improve the environment, including rivers.

 

13

Notice – Service of notice
by ordinary Post – Dispatch register does not prove fact of service of notice
[General Clauses Act 1897, Section 27]

Agrofab vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 2019 Rajasthan 34

The petitioner firm
contended that the showcause notice was never received by it.

 

The Court observed that the
respondents by way of additional affidavit tried to justify the service of the
said notice by producing a photocopy of the dispatch register and postage
register on record.

It was held that sending of
notice by showing any dispatch register through ordinary post does not prove
the fact of service of such notice on the petitioner firm. Further, it was held
that since the terms of the contract provided that rate contract and supply
orders and any discrepancy with regard to the conditions, specifications,
nomenclature, delivery period, etc., if the same were not as per the agreed
terms, conditions and specifications, such letter to the Direct Demanding
Officer and Chief Engineer was to be sent by registered post / AD. Hence, when
the communication is required to be made by the parties by way of registered
post / AD, the plea of the respondents that the showcause notice was sent by
ordinary post is not to be believed by the Court.

 

14

Will or Codicil attested
by a legatee as a witness – Examination of the legatee alone not valid [Indian
Succession Act, 1925, Sections 63, 67; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section
3; Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 68]

Raveendran Nair vs.
Raman Nair, AIR 2019 Kerala 91

 

The dispute concerned a
Will and its genuineness. There were two attesting witnesses to the Will. One
of the witnesses is the first defendant. The Will was executed in favour of the
children of the first defendant by giving a major portion of the property to
them and only a minor portion was given to other legatees.

 

The questions which arose
in the course of hearing were regarding the legal effect of an unprivileged
Will attested by the legatees alone left out by a Hindu. Whether the
examination of a legatee under a Will who is an attesting witness to the Will
or Codicil would be a sufficient compliance of the requirement as mandated u/s.
68 of the Indian Evidence Act?

 

The Court observed that
though there is no prohibition in the Act to stand as an attesting witness by a
legatee, the mandate both u/s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act and section 68
of Indian Evidence Act would convey the meaning that what is required is the
attestation by two or more witnesses, since the question of genuineness of
execution of a Will or Codicil would arise only after the death of the
testator. The attesting witness must have and should have the necessary animus
testandi
or intention to attest the Will or Codicil. The word “attesting”
stands for something more than mere signing of a document as a witness.
Attestation means signing of a document with the intent and purpose to testify
the signature of the executant rather than mere witnessing the affixing of
signature by the executant or its due execution. Necessarily, the attesting
witness must display the necessary competence and the quality of an independent
witness. The word “attested” is defined u/s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act
which is exactly pari materia with that of the third requirement as
enumerated in clause (c) of section 63 of the Indian Succession Act.

 

The Court held that a Will
or Codicil attested by legatees alone or the person interested with the
legatees who holds a fiduciary relationship with the legatee / legatees would
itself amount to suspicious circumstance attached to its execution. The absence
of an independent attesting witness to the document is fatal to the bequest
under the document. It would destroy the legislative intention demanding compliance
of mandate incorporated both u/s. 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 63
of the Indian Succession Act. The evidence or attestation of such witness would
stand as self-serving, though there is no provision debarring attestation by a
legatee as far as an unprivileged Will of a Hindu is concerned. At least one of
the attesting witness should be an independent witness and his examination
cannot be avoided if he is capable of giving evidence and amenable to the
process of the Court for proving the Will or Codicil in accordance with the
mandate u/s. 68 of the Evidence Act.

 

In short, a legatee under the Will or a person who is
interested in the bequest cannot be an independent witness for the purpose of
attestation to a last testament either as a Will or Codicil; and hence mere
examination of a legatee who stands as one of the attesting witness would not
be a sufficient compliance of the mandate u/s. 68 of the Evidence Act.

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