Guardian – Comatose state – No remedy under law – Wife appointed as guardian – Central Government directed to consider enacting an appropriate legislation [Constitution of India, Art. 21, Art. 226; Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, S. 7]
FACTS
Petitioner No. 1 is the wife of Sunil Kumar Mittal (SKM). The couple has four children (petitioner Nos. 2 to 5), three daughters and a son Raghav Mittal; petitioner No. 2 is a married daughter. However, petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 are unmarried daughters and petitioner No. 5 is the son.
SKM had a fall and suffered a severe head injury. After a series of medical procedures, Doctors opined that till his eventual demise SKM would remain in comatose condition.
SKM was carrying on business as a sole proprietor till December, 2018. He also had a few real estate properties and bank accounts.
Writ Petition was filed to appoint the petitioner No. 1 as the guardian of her husband to protect his interest, administer bank accounts, investments, proprietorship business, etc., and in the event of necessity, to sell the immovable property standing in the name of her husband and to use the proceeds towards medical treatment of her husband and family welfare expenses.
HELD
There appears to be no dispute that any of legislative enactments are applicable qua SKM, a person lying in a comatose state. Further, the petitioners are in dire need of money towards medical treatment of SKM and for the welfare of the family as they have exhausted their financial resources in the past one and a half years.
Further, since the petition has been filed jointly, there is no dispute amongst the legal heirs of SKM.
Petitioner No. 1, Uma Mittal, wife of SKM as the guardian of her husband who is in a comatose condition, is vested with the property of her husband to do all acts, deeds and things for the proper medical treatment, nursing care, welfare and benefit of SKM and his children and with power to do all acts, deeds and things with respect to his assets and properties.
Further, the Central Government to consider enacting an appropriate legislation pertaining to appointment of guardians qua persons lying in a comatose state, as no remedy is provided in any statute to persons in comatose / vegetative state.
2. N. Mani and Ors. vs. Babyammal AIR 2020 (NOC) 511 (Mad) Date of order: 19th September, 2019 Bench: T. Ravindran J.
Registration – Alleged relinquishment of property – Family arrangement – Instrument not registered – Agreement not sustainable [Hindu Succession Act, S. 14(1)]
FACTS
The properties in the plaint belonged to one Natesa Naicker and when it is admitted that the plaintiff and the defendants are the legal heirs of Natesa Naicker, it is found that on the demise of Natesa Naicker, the plaintiff and the defendants would be each entitled to equal share in the schedule properties.
However, the defendants have put forth the case that the defendants had effected a partition amongst the family members by a partition deed and further also put forth the case that in the family arrangement jewels and cash were given to the daughters including the plaintiff and thereby the daughters had relinquished their right in the family properties and accordingly the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share in the family properties.
HELD
The family arrangement and the alleged relinquishment said to have been made by the plaintiff in respect of her share in the family properties has been stoutly challenged by the plaintiff and despite the same the defendants have not placed any acceptable and reliable materials to establish that the so-called family arrangement said to have been effected between the family members is true and validly effected. When the defendants are unable to put forth the clear case that the daughters had been given jewels and cash in lieu of their shares in the family properties and when the defendants have not tendered clear evidence as to when actually the jewels and cash were given to the daughters, we cannot safely accept the case of the defendants that a valid family arrangement had been effected and the daughters had been given jewels and cash in lieu of their shares and that the daughters had thereby relinquished their right in respect of their family properties.
On a perusal, when such instruments are required by law to be compulsorily registered and when it is found that they are not registered, no safe reliance could be made on the abovesaid documents for sustaining the defence version and the Courts below had rightly rejected the said documents.
3. Food Corporation of India & Anr. vs. V.K. Traders & Anr. (2020) 4 SCC 60 Date of order: 6th March, 2020 Bench: S.A. Bobde C.J., B.R. Gavai J. and Surya Kant J.
Lease deeds – Unregistered lease deeds – Not admissible as evidence – No right in lease [Registration Act, 1908, S. 17; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 107]
FACTS
It was common practice in Punjab for different government agencies to allocate paddy for custom milling to hundreds of rice mills, which in turn would supply the rice, post-milling as per approved specifications, to the appellant FCI. Such allocation would take place through terms of a bipartite agreement and the same took place for the kharif marketing season (KMS) of 2004-05.
A dispute arose as to the quality of the milled rice stock for the aforementioned KMS, leading to an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Finding the quality to be defective, the CBI initiated prosecution against numerous rice millers and additionally recommended blacklisting of a total of 182 millers. Such ban was effected by the FCI vide a Circular dated 10th October, 2012.
The blacklisted rice mills, thus, were not allocated any paddy for purposes of custom milling in 2011-12. Allegedly with a view to wriggle out of the ban period, the mill owners leased out their rice mills to other similar partnership / proprietorship firms. Notably, all such lease deeds were unregistered.
These new lessees subsequently applied to the appellant FCI for allocation of paddy and asserted that none of them had committed any default or been blacklisted and that the disqualification attached to their lessors could not traverse onto their lawful entitlements. The FCI, on the other hand, declined to entertain such requests on the ground that the new lessees had simply stepped into the shoes of the earlier blacklisted lessors as the lease deeds were nothing but sham transactions to circumvent the ban.
HELD
No reliance can be placed upon the lease deeds allegedly executed between the defaulting rice miller(s) and the respondent(s), as they do not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908. These lease deeds thus cannot be accepted as evidence of valid transfer of possessory rights. The plea taken by the appellant FCI, that such documentation was made only to escape the liability fastened on the defaulting rice millers, carries some weight, though it is a pure question of fact. The appeal is allowed.
4. Apurva Jagdishbhai Dave vs. Prapti Apurva Dave AIR 2020 Gujarat 124 Date of order: 25th October 2020 Bench: A.P. Thaker J.
Electronic evidence – CD recording – Application dismissed – Certificate u/s 65B filed later – Admitted as primary evidence u/s 62 [Evidence Act, 1872; S. 62, S. 65B]
FACTS
The respondent raised an objection with regard to playing of the CD in the Family Court and filed a reply wherein she disputed the contents of the recording and stated that no such incident had occurred; after hearing both the parties, the trial Court rejected the application.
HELD
In view of the provisions of section 65B of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Anwar P.V. vs. P.V. Basheer, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473 has held that an electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements u/s 65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record is inadmissible. Although the aforesaid case clarified the position relating to certification to a large extent, it did not specify as to whether the certificate can be supplied at a later stage.
There are two decisions of the Delhi High Court and the Rajasthan High Court, i.e., Kundan Singh vs. State, 2015 SCC Online Delhi 13647 and Paras Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (2015) SCC Online Rajasthan 8331, respectively. Both the Courts have taken the view that section 65B certificate can be provided at a later stage and it is not an illegality going to the root of the matter.
Therefore, the impugned order of the Family Court regarding non-submission of the certificate at the time of production of electronic record is not legally sustainable. The document ought to have been permitted to be produced in the matter and after proper verification it could have been exhibited. Therefore, the impugned order of the trial Court is set aside and the electronic record is liable to be taken on record.