Allied Laws

1.      
Naina Kala Sharma and Ors. vs.
Deepak Kumar Rai AIR 2018 (NOC) 4 (SIK.)

Hindu Law – Coparcenary – Suit for
Partition – Cannot demand share in Father’s property when self acquired. [Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 S.6]

The case of the Appellants is that the
Appellant No. 1 was married to the Respondent in the year 1993 and Appellants
No. 2 and 3 were born from the wedlock. A property(suit land) was gifted to
Appellant no. 1 by her father.

The issue was whether the Appellants no. 2
and 3 have any right, title or interest over the Suit land and the building
constructed thereon?

It was argued that the Mitakshara concept of
coparcenary is based on the notion of the birthright of son, son’s son and
son’s son’s son.

It was observed by the Court that the
daughter has also been made coparcener by virtue of Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005.

It was held that the Law laid down in
Mitakshara in regard to father’s right of disposition of his self acquired
property, held that the father of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara
law has full and uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable
property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in any way.

Hence, no rights were conferred to
Appellants No. 2 and 3 for partition, in view of the property being the self
acquired property of the Respondent.

2.      
Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay Kumar
And Ors Civil Appeal No. 1427 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.18943 of 2016)
(SC)

Owner – As appearing on records – Liable to
pay compensation. [Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, S.2(30)]

In the present case, an accident had taken
place where the Tribunal had granted an award holding the first
respondent(original owner/first owner) responsible together with the driver. It
was contended that there were a series of transfers which took place, however,
the name in the records were not changed/altered.

It was observed by the apex court that the
expression ‘Owner’ in section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor
vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as
the ‘owner’. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor
would be treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be
reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the
vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability.

The principle underlying the provisions of
section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a
death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of
uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with
following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the
registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object
and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate
the fulfilment of the object of the law.

It was held that since in the present case,
the First respondent was the ‘owner’ of the vehicle involved in the accident
within the meaning of section 2(30), the liability to pay compensation stands
fastened upon him.

3.      
Gurbax Singh vs. Harminderjit
Singh AIR 2018 (NOC) 136 (P. & H.)

Registration – Period of Lease –
Admissibility. [Transfer Of Property Act, 1882, S.106, 107]

It was contended that since the lease
agreement was not specifically shown to be for a period of more than one year,
it was therefore not required to be compulsorily registered.

It was observed that a perusal of section
107 of the T. P. Act shows that any instrument by which a lease of immovable
property is created, either from year to year, or for any term exceeding one
year, or by which a yearly rent is reserved, must only be a registered
instrument.

Any other lease may either be by way of a
registered instrument or even by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of
possession. The proviso to section 107 does stipulate that the State Government
may by notification in the official gazette direct that leases of immovable
property other than leases from year to year or even for any term exceeding one
year or reserving an yearly rent, may be made by unregistered instrument, or
orally, even without delivery of possession. However, no notification issued by
the Government of Punjab has been brought to the notice of this Court by
learned counsel for the appellant, by which any lease as is required to be
registered u/s. 107, is exempted from being so registered.

In the facts of the case, since there was a
rent increase every 15 years by 3%, it was deemed that the lease agreement was
executed for a term exceeding 1 year and hence was supposed to be compulsorily
registered.

4.      
The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
vs. Lalita Devi Kejriwal and Ors. AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 7

Registration – Where properties are
situated. [Registration Act, 1908 (S.30)]

It was held that the registration of
properties in Mumbai, which were situated in Ranchi, was in utter violation of
section 30 of the Indian Registration Act 1908 as amended by Bihar Amended Act,
1991. By virtue of this amendment in Indian Registration Act, 1908, the
documents of sale or transfer of the properties must be registered at the place
where the immovable property is situated.

5.      
The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
vs. Lalita Devi Kejriwal and Ors. AIR 2018 JHARKHAND 7

Sale – Late mutation of name – Non-joinder
of co-sharer – Unregistered Letter – Invalid [Transfer of Property  Act, 1882, S.47]

It was observed that mutation of the names
after registration did not take place for as long as a period of 5 years.
Further, a letter written by the owner of the plots in question was also relied
upon, of which no evidence was provided. Neither the co-sharers joined as
parties to the suit. After taking into consideration the factual matrix as
above, it was held that the sale deed was not valid.