Allied Laws

20. 
Appeal pending – Till order of court is varied or modified, it remains
valid and subsisting and has to be complied with [West Bengal Municipal Act,
1993, S.96]

Subrata Sen vs. The Kolkata Municipal
Corporation and Ors. AIR 2019 Calcutta 32

The issue before the court was whether an
appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus could be issued against the order of
the municipal assessment tribunal, when a revision application had been filed
against such order.

It was held by the court that it was a
well-settled law that till an order passed by a competent court or forum is set
aside and / or stayed and / or varied and / or modified, the said order remains
valid and subsisting and is required to be complied with, both in law and in
spirit. If a stand is taken by any person that he / she is unable to comply
with a valid and subsisting order simply because an appeal is pending before a
higher forum, it would render the concept of adherence to due process of law to
a state of absolute farce. This is neither desirable nor acceptable, nor
permissible.

If one has to accept the stand taken on
behalf of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, it would mean that no order passed
by any competent legal forum will ever be complied with till the person
aggrieved by the said order has exhausted all further remedies even if such
remedies are essentially discretionary in nature. This is certainly not in
conformity with the scheme for rendering effective justice in the matter.

Accordingly, it was decided that the order
of the Municipal Assessment Tribunal would be implemented and the same shall
not cause any prejudice to the rights of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation in
respect of the revision application, which shall be decided on its own merit
without being influenced in any manner by any observation
made herein.

21. 
Dishonour of cheque – Prosecution launched against directors quashed by
High Court set aside – Court would have to look into whether directors had any
role in the business activities of the company [Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, S.138, 141, 482]

A.R. Radha Krishna vs. Dasari Deepthi and
Ors. AIR 2019 Supreme Court 2518

The appellant had entered into an investment
agreement with accused No. 1, i.e., the company on the basis of representations
made by the directors of the company. Later, the company agreed to repay the
amount invested by issue of seven cheques. The cheques were returned
dishonoured as ‘payment stopped by drawer’.

Consequently, proceedings were initiated u/s
138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. During the pendency of the
proceedings, the directors filed an application before the High Court for
quashing of the proceedings initiated against them. The High Court allowed the
criminal petitions filed by the directors and quashed the proceedings against
them. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

The complaint specifically mentioned that
the directors, who actively participated in the day-to-day affairs, in active
connivance, intentionally issued cheques and later issued instructions to the
bank to stop the payment.

But it was contended on behalf of the
directors that both the respondents / directors were non-executive directors of
the company, neither playing any role in the day-to-day activities of the
business nor in charge of the affairs of
the company.

It was observed that the High Court, in
deciding a quashing petition u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, must consider
whether the averment made in the complaint is sufficient or if some
unimpeachable evidence has been brought on record which leads to the conclusion
that the director could never have been in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. While the role of
a director in a company is ultimately a question of fact, and no definite
formula can be fixed for the same, the High Court must exercise its power u/s
482, Code of Criminal Procedure when it is convinced from the material on
record that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process
of the Court.

In the present
case, the appellant had specifically averred in his complaint that the
directors were actively participating in the day-to-day affairs of the company.
The complaint also specified that all the accused, in active connivance,
mischievously and intentionally issued the cheques in favour of the appellant and
later issued instructions to the bank to ‘Stop Payment’. No evidence of
unimpeachable quality had been brought on record by the directors to indicate
that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of
the Court. In view of the same, the appeals were allowed and the order passed
by the High Court was set aside and that of the trial court restored.

22. 
Mahommedan Law – Bequest of property can only be done after taking
consent of all heirs [Mulla’s Principles of Mahommedan Law, S.117]

Ayyub and Ors. vs. Llahi Baksh and Ors. AIR
2019 Chhattisgarh 113

A property was
bequeathed to one heir without consent of the other heirs who were the
respondents / plaintiffs. Accordingly, a suit was filed by the latter for
declaring the Will void.

It was held by
the Court that section 117 of Mulla’s Principles of Mahommedan Law deals with
bequest to an heir and provides that a bequest to an heir is not valid unless
the other heirs consent to the bequest after the death of the testator. Any
single heir may consent so as to bind his own share. Accordingly, the verdict
of the trial court that the Will was void ab initio and illegal was
affirmed.

23. 
Service of notice to employee – Employee holding the seal of the company
must be taken to be duly authorised by the company to receive summons on behalf
of the company [Code of Civil Procedure; Order 29, Rule 2]

Frost International Ltd. vs. Five Star
Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2019 (NOC) 325 Calcutta

An application
was filed for recalling an ex parte order. It was stated that the reason
for non-appearance before the court by the applicant was that there was no
proper service of notice on the company. It was argued that the applicant’s
office was totally closed. The applicant did not have any employee by the name
of Manab Basu who accepted the service of the writ of summons on behalf of the
defendant. If anything was received on behalf of the defendant, the same could
not reach the defendant and as a result the writ of summons cannot be treated
to have been served upon the applicant company. The applicant further mentioned
that it had an excellent defence on merits.

It was submitted on behalf of the
respondents that the application for recalling the order was barred by
limitation. It was further contended that there was a document which showed
receipt of the writ of summons by one Manab Basu on behalf of the defendant and
the defendant’s official seal was there next to the signature of Manab Basu.

The court observed that the said Manab Basu
while acknowledging receipt of the writ of summons put the defendant company’s
seal next to his signature. An employee of a limited company who has in his
custody the company’s seal must be deemed to be authorised by the company to
accept service of notices, summons etc. Order 29 Rule 2 of the CPC provides
that an employee of a corporation / company holding the seal of the company
must be taken to be duly authorised by the company to receive summons on behalf
of the company.

In view of the above, the court dismissed
the application for recalling the ex parte order.

24.  Unpublished public records – The citizens
have a right to demand information even in respect of matters such as security
of the country and matters relating to relations with a foreign state where
proper reasons are established [Right To Information Act, 2005, S.24, 123;
Evidence Act, 1872, S.124; Official Secrets Act, 1923, S.3, 5]

Yashwant Sinha and Ors. vs. CBI and Ors.
2019 (25) G.S.T.L. 161 Supreme Court

Reliance was placed on three additional
documents unauthorisedly removed from the office of the Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, that had been appended to the review petition and relied
upon by the review petitioners. The main contention was whether such documents,
being covered u/s 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which states that no
public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in
official confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer
by the disclosure, could be placed in the open.

It was argued that u/s 8(1)(a) of the Right
to Information Act, information, the disclosure of which will prejudicially
affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security and strategic
security and strategic scientific or economic interests of the state, relations
with a foreign state or information leading to incitement of an offence, are
ordinarily exempt from the obligation of disclosure.

It was held by the Court that even in
respect of matters relating to state or other prohibited information, Parliament
has advanced the law in a manner which can only be described as dramatic by
giving recognition to the principle that disclosure of information could be
refused only on the foundation of public interest being jeopardised. Section
8(2) recognises that there cannot be absolutism even in the matter of certain
values which were formerly considered to provide unquestionable foundations for
the power to withhold information. The RTI Act through section 8(2) has
conferred upon the citizens a priceless right by clothing them with the right
to demand information even in respect of such matters as security of the
country and matters relating to relations with a foreign state. No doubt,
information cannot be given for the mere asking. The applicant must establish
that withholding of such information produces greater harm than disclosing it.