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November 2019

ALLIED LAWS

By DR.K. Shivaram
Senior Advocate| Rahul K. Hakani |Sashank Dundu
Advocates
Reading Time 12 mins

6.  Gift deed – Cancellation of registered gift
deed requires mutual consent of both the parties and their participation – Gift
deed cancellation not valid [Transfer of Property Act (1882), section126;
Registration Act (1908), section 17]

 

Kolli Rajesh Chowdary vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
and Ors. AIR 2019, Andhra Pradesh 40

 

A gift settlement deed was executed out of
love and affection by the respondent (grandmother) for the petitioner
(grandson) with a view to provide the said property for his livelihood. The
gift was accepted and possession of the property was delivered to the
petitioner on the same day. Thereafter, the petitioner made an online
application and paid the requisite fee and requested for mutation of the said
property in his name in the revenue records and for issuance of pattadar
passbook. Since the date of the gift settlement deed, the petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the property covered by the deed.

 

In the year
2019, the petitioner noticed that the respondent had executed a deed of
cancellation, dated 29th September, 2017, registered the same and
revoked the gift settlement deed executed by her in favour of the petitioner.
The petitioner also noticed that after execution of the cancellation deed, she
had further executed a sale deed, dated 28th October, 2017, in
favour of another person and registered it on 6th November, 2017.
Since the property in question was transferred in favour of the petitioner with
absolute rights by the respondent by executing the registered gift settlement
deed, she had no right to execute the deed of cancellation either cancelling or
revoking the gift settlement deed already executed by her in favour of the
petitioner. The reason for cancellation of the gift deed was mentioned by the
respondent to be deception and non-fulfilment of the word given by the
petitioner to the respondent.

 

It was observed
that there cannot be unilateral cancellation of registered sale deeds and that
a deed cancelling a sale deed can be registered only after the same is
cancelled by a competent civil court after notice to the parties concerned. In
the absence of any declaration by a competent court or notice to parties, the
execution of the deed of cancellation as well as its registration are wholly
void and non-est and such transactions are meaningless transactions.

 

Accordingly, it
was held that the said deed of cancellation / deed of revocation was null and
void and that it was of no effect. As a sequel to the said finding that the
cancellation deed or revocation deed was null and void and further, in view of
the settled legal position that no one can convey a better title than what he /
she has, it was further held that the subsequent sale deed executed by the
respondent was also not valid.

 

Further, it was
contended by the respondent that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the
cancellation or revocation deed he had to approach a civil court and seek the
common law remedy for setting aside the same but he could not approach the writ
court.

 

It was held
that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the cancellation or revocation deed
which was unilaterally executed and was null and void and meaningless, it was
just and fair to allow the writ petition leaving it open to the executants of
the cancellation deed or revocation deed to seek the common law remedy by
approaching the civil court.

 

7.  Lawyer’s statement – Client not bound by the
lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions
[Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, S. 11]

 

Central
Bank of India and Ors. vs. Beena Thiruvenkitam, AIR 2019 Kerala 164

 

A lease
agreement had been entered into between the bank and the then owners of the
building. After the respondent became the owner of the building, the appellant
(tenant-bank) paid the rent of the building to the respondent and she had
received it. After the lease period expired, the respondent informed the bank
that she was not willing to renew the lease. The bank informed the petitioner
that since a currency chest is attached to the branch, a suitable place will
have to be found by the bank to house its branch and as and when a suitable
place is found, they will surrender the tenanted premises. A writ petition was
filed alleging that despite the undertaking made, the bank is not making any
efforts to surrender the leased premises. The petitioner, therefore, sought
appropriate directions from the court. Before the court it was stated by the
learned senior counsel for the bank that the premises will be surrendered
immediately after the construction of the currency chest. However, the senior
counsel for the bank had not given any undertaking before the court that the
premises shall be vacated within any specific time.

 

The learned
single judge disposed of the writ petition by directing the bank to surrender
vacant possession of the building occupied by it to the respondent within four
months from the date of the judgement. The aforesaid judgement was under
challenge in the appeal.

 

The senior
counsel for the appellant bank contended that the writ petition filed by the
respondent was not maintainable. He contended that no direction could be issued
by the court to a tenant, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution, to surrender vacant possession of the building
occupied by the tenant to the landlord. The respondent landlord contended that,
when the writ petition came up for hearing (before the single judge) the
counsel who appeared for the bank had submitted that the bank was ready to
surrender possession of the premises to the respondent and it was on the basis
of such undertaking that the writ petition was disposed of. He submitted that
the appellants cannot now turn around and contend that the writ petition filed
was not maintainable.

 

As per section
11, a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or
otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act.

 

It was observed
by the court that neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s
statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. A lawyer
generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or
statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal
rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper
step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed.

 

8.  Foreign judgement and its implication on
residents of India [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, S. 13]

 

Jose Sousa vs. Ema Mata Fernandes and Ors. AIR
2019 (NOC) 644 (Bom.)

 

An application
under Article 1102 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code, 1939 (Code) was
filed seeking confirmation of the judgement and order passed by the Family
Court at Bradford, U.K., by which the marriage between the applicant and the
first respondent had been dissolved by a decree of divorce.

 

The applicant
and the respondent are Goans, citizens of India, and were married to each
other. Disputes and differences arose between the parties in the initial period
of the marriage and the parties separated; the applicant had been residing in
London since the year 2005, when he went there for the purpose of work. The
applicant has since acquired Portuguese citizenship in the year 2009, while the
first respondent continues to be an Indian citizen. The applicant and the first
respondent resided together in Goa as husband and wife until the year 2005 and
from the time the applicant left for the U.K. they have been residing
separately.

 

Matrimonial
petitions had been filed on two occasions for dissolution of the marriage.
However, the same were dismissed. Another petition was filed before the Family
Court at Bradford, U.K. A notice of the petition was served on the first
respondent who sent a detailed reply thereto inter alia taking exception
to the jurisdiction of the Family Court at Bradford to entertain the petition.
It was contended that the parties were Indian nationals of Goan origin at the
time of their marriage. Their marriage was solemnised at Margao, where it is
registered, and thus the Family Court at Bradford would lack jurisdiction to
entertain the petition only on the ground that the applicant has been residing
in the U.K. The Family Court in the U.K. granted the decree of divorce. The
application was filed for confirmation of the decree.

 

The only
question for adjudication was whether the judgement of the Family Court at
Bradford, U.K., could be confirmed.

 

The court held
that the applicant has not shown how the Family Court at Bradford, U.K., would
have jurisdiction to entertain the petition only on the basis of the residence
of the applicant in U.K. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnised at Margao as
per the family laws applicable in Goa, when both the parties were Indian
nationals and were governed by the said law, and their marriage was registered
in the office of the Sub-Registrar at Margao. Subsequently, the petitioner
acquired Portuguese citizenship in the year 2009 and had been staying in the
U.K. The parties last resided together at Margao. Even assuming that the U.K.
Family Court had jurisdiction, the judgement of such court makes absolutely no
reference to the specific ground raised of the absence of jurisdiction. Clauses
(a) and (b) of section 13 of the C.P.C. provide as to when a foreign judgement
is not conclusive. On the basis of these clauses the court stated that the
judgement of the Family Court in the U.K. cannot be said to be conclusive and
held that it was not possible to confirm the foreign judgement. In the result,
the civil application was dismissed.

 

9.  Natural guardian – Transfer of property
without the consent of minors u/s 8(3) – Suit for setting aside of document of
transfer being mandatory was time-barred [Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956, S. 8(3); Limitation Act, 1963, Art. 60]

 

Thankamoni
Amma Padmakumari Amma and Ors. vs. Ganapathi Suresh and Ors. AIR 2019 Kerala
170

 

A suit for
partition and fixation of boundary was filed. The defendant, i.e., the father
of the plaintiffs, had sold a property owned by the plaintiff’s mother after
the mother’s death. At the time of such sale of property, the plaintiffs were
minors. Seven years after attaining majority, a suit for partition and fixation
of boundaries was filed. No period of limitation is mentioned anywhere in the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act for exercising the option available to the
minor u/s 8(3) of the Act.

 

It was observed
by the court that no prayer for setting aside the document of transfer had been
made. The legal position can be summarised to say that it is necessary to seek
the relief of setting aside the document to exercise the option by a minor to
avoid the disposal of immovable property by the natural guardian.

 

It was held
that since the relief of setting aside the document of alienation cannot be
avoided in a suit exercising the option u/s 8(3) of the Act challenging the
disposal of immovable property by the natural guardian, the period of
limitation in such a case would be the one available for setting aside a
document of transfer under the Limitation Act. A separate provision is made under
Article 60 of the Limitation Act to set aside a transfer of property made by
the guardian of a ward as three years from the date of attainment of majority.
Accordingly, the maximum time available to institute a suit for exercising the
option u/s 8(3) of the Act is only three years from the date of attainment of
majority and hence the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation.

 

10.  Stamp Duty – Deputy Commissioner of Stamp
Duty cannot decide the validity of the document or the validity of the trust
deed for the purpose of determining the stamp duty payable [Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, S. 14; Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, S. 28, 33, 39]

 

B.R. Jagadish
vs. District Registrar and Deputy Commissioner for Stamps, Basavanagudi and
Ors. AIR 2019 Karnataka 129

 

A gift deed was
executed which was held to be insufficiently stamped. The reason for the
insufficiency was due to the Deputy Commissioner’s objection to the fact that
the gift of the immovable property was done by a trust and not by a family
member. The stamp duty payable in case of a trust and a family member are
different.

 

The facts of
the case suggested that a private trust was purported to have been formed by
one of the family members where certain conditions in violation of rules of
perpetuity as per section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act were laid down.
Hence, the trust became null and void and inoperative in the eyes of law, being
void ab initio. Thereafter, a gift deed was drafted for the purpose of
gifting the properties to children. However, the Deputy Commissioner impounded
the said gift deed stating that proper stamp duty had not been paid on the
instrument. It was alleged that the property belonged to the trust and not the
family members and that the gift deed was in the nature of conveyance and hence
a higher stamp amount was applicable.

 

The Court held that while deciding the stamp
duty under the provisions of sections 33 and 39 of the Stamp Act, the recitals
of the document have to be looked into. The Deputy Commissioner for Stamps
cannot decide the validity of the document or the validity of the trust deed.
It was for the person who disputes the gift deed or the trust deed to approach
the competent civil court. The authorities exercising powers under the
provisions of the Stamp Act have to consider the recitals to determine stamp
duty and they have no jurisdiction to decide the title between the parties.
Accordingly, the impugned order was quashed.

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