The Committee means ‘Managing Committee’ or other governing body of a society to which the direction and control of the management of the affairs of a society are entrusted. The term of the elected members of the Managing Committee shall be five years from the date of election as provided in section 74C(2) of the Act. It is further clear that where the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of the society directly or through another society, or as per the circumstances enumerated in section 80(1) of the Act, the State Government is empowered to nominate three prescribed representatives on the Committee of the society and such members so nominated shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government, or for such period as may be specified in the order by which they are appointed. Similarly, section 80(2) of the Act empowers the State to appoint the representatives having regard to the public interest involved in the operation of a society as if the State Government had subscribed to the share capital of the society and the provisions contained in section 80(1) of the Act will be applicable to such nomination.
The petition was disposed of accordingly.
14 Benedict Denis Kinny vs. Tulip Brian Miranda & Ors. AIR 2020 Supreme Court 3050 Date of order: 19th March, 2020 Bench: Ashok Bhushan J. and Navin Sinha J.
Right to judicial review – Citizen has the right against any order of a statutory authority [Constitution of India, Art. 226]
FACTS
The respondent as well as the appellant contested the election for the seat of Councillor in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation reserved for backward class citizens. On 23rd February, 2017, the respondent No. 1 was declared elected. Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (Act) requires the candidate to submit his caste validity certificate on the date of filing the nomination papers. A candidate who has applied to the Scrutiny Committee for the verification of his caste certificate before the date of filing of nomination but who has not received the said certificate on the date of filing the nomination, has to submit an undertaking that he shall submit within a period of six months from the date of election the validity certificate issued by the Scrutiny Committee.
It is further provided that if a person fails to produce the validity certificate within the period of six months from the date of election, that election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and he shall be disqualified from being a Councillor. The period of six months was amended to 12 months by the Amendment Act, 2018.
The Scrutiny Committee, vide its order dated 14th August, 2017, held that respondent No. 1 does not belong to the East Indian category. Therefore, it refused to grant caste validity certificate in favour of the respondent. Writ Petition No. 2269 of 2017 was filed by the respondent challenging the above order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee.
The High Court, vide order dated 18th August, 2017, passed an interim order in favour of respondent No. 1. The High Court, vide its judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2019, allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 and quashed the order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 14th August, 2017 and remanded the matter to the Scrutiny Committee for fresh consideration.
By the judgment dated 2nd April, 2019, the High Court also directed that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to continue in her seat, since the effect of disqualification was postponed by the interim order and the impugned order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee had been set aside.
Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 2nd April, 2019, Review Petition (L) No. 20 of 2019 was filed by the appellant which, too, was rejected by the High Court by an order dated 2nd May, 2019. Both the orders, dated 2nd April and 2nd May, 2019, have been challenged by the appellant in this appeal.
HELD
The Court, inter alia, on the question of whether the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 can interdict the above consequences envisaged by section 5B of the Act by passing an interim or final judgment, held as under:
An interim direction can be passed by the High Court under Article 226, which could have helped or aided the Court in granting the main relief sought in the writ petition. In the present case, the decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committee having been challenged by the writ petitioners and the High Court finding prima facie substance in the submissions, granted interim order which ultimately fructified in the final order setting aside the decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committee. Thus, the interim order passed by the High Court was in aid of the main relief, which was granted by the High Court.
The interim order passed by the High Court was in exercise of judicial review by the High Court to protect the rights of the respondents. The appeal was dismissed.
15 Suo motu Public Interest Litigation No. 01 of 2021 Date of order: 11th June, 2021 Bench: Dipankar Datta CJI, A.A. Sayed J., S.S. Shinde J. and Prasanna B. Varale J.
Covid-19 – Extension of interim orders
FACTS
The Court On its Own Motion addressed matters wherein interim orders have been passed by the High Court of Bombay at its Principal Seat, and the Benches at Nagpur and Aurangabad, the High Court of Bombay at Goa, and the Courts / Tribunals subordinate to it, including the Courts / Tribunals in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and Daman and Diu, during the second wave of the Covid pandemic and for extending protection to those who are unable to access justice because of the restricted functioning of Courts / Tribunals.
HELD
Taking an overall view of the matter, which tends to suggest that resumption of physical hearings in all the Courts across Maharashtra is still at some distance, the protection granted by the interim orders passed on this PIL stand extended till 9th July, 2021 or until further orders, whichever is earlier, on the same terms.
Further, the Court held that the media has reported incidents of building collapses leading to loss of precious lives. Therefore, if indeed there are buildings / structures which are either dilapidated or dangerous / unsafe requiring immediate demolition and vacation thereof by their inhabitants, the particular Municipal Corporation / Municipal Council / Panchayat / Local Body within whose territorial limits such buildings / structures are located, may, considering the imminent need to have such buildings / structures vacated and demolished, bring the particular instance to the notice of the relevant Division Bench in seisin of suo motu Public Interest Litigation No. 1 of 2020 (High Court On its Own Motion vs. Bhiwandi Nizampur Municipal Corporation & Ors.) and seek appropriate orders for proceeding with the demolition process to take it to its logical conclusion.
16 Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI & Ors. Transferred case (Civil) No. 245 of 2020 Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Bench: L. Nageswara Rao J. and S. Ravindra Bhat J.
Personal guarantor – Liable under IBC Code [Constitution of India, Article 32; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 2(e), 31, 60, 78, 79, 239, 240, 249]
FACTS
The petition was preferred under Article 32 as well as transferred cases under Article 139A of the Constitution of India. The common question which arises in all these cases concerns the vires and validity of a Notification dated 15th November, 2019 issued by the Central Government (impugned notification). The petitioners contend that the power conferred upon the Union u/s 1(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) could not have been resorted to in a manner so as to extend the provisions of the Code only as far as they relate to personal guarantors of corporate debtors.
HELD
It is quite evident that the method adopted by the Central Government to bring into force different provisions of the Act had a specific design: to fulfil the objectives underlying the Code.
The Amendment of 2018 also altered section 60 of the Code in that insolvency and bankruptcy processes relating to liquidation and bankruptcy in respect of three categories, i.e., corporate debtors, corporate guarantors of corporate debtors and personal guarantors to corporate debtors, were to be considered by the same forum, i.e., the NCLT.
It is, therefore, clear that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by section 31 of the Code does not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor’s liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself.
Therefore, it is held that approval of a resolution plan does not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee.
The writ petitions were dismissed.
17 Urmila Devi & Ors. vs. Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited & Anr. (2020) 11 SCC 316 Date of order: 30th January, 2020 Bench: S.A. Bobde CJI, B.R. Gavai J. and Surya Kant J.
Scope of cross-objection – Even if appeal is withdrawn or dismissed – Cross-objection would survive [Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Or. 41. R. 22]
FACTS
On 2nd May, 2008, Sanjay Tanti, husband of appellant No. 1, father of appellant Nos. 2 to 4 and son of appellant No. 5, met with an accident while he was travelling from Ladma to Goradih by a Tata Maxi vehicle. The appellants filed a claim petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the M.V. Act). The owner of the vehicle was joined as Opponent No. 1; the driver of the vehicle was joined as Opponent No. 2; whereas, the National Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Insurance Company’) was joined as Opponent.
The claim of the Insurance Company was that the driver and the owner of the vehicle had breached the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and, as such, they are not liable for payment of compensation.
The Motor Vehicle Accidental Claim Tribunal (Tribunal) vide judgment and order dated 29th January, 2011, rejected the contention of the Insurance Company that the driver and owner of the vehicle had breached the terms and conditions, and while allowing the claim petition directed the Insurance Company to pay compensation of Rs. 2,47,500 to the claimants.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, the Insurance Company preferred Misc. Appeal No. 521 of 2011 before the High Court at Patna contending that the Tribunal had erroneously fastened the liability on it. In the said appeal, a cross-objection came to be filed by the appellants.
When the appeal came up for hearing, it was noticed that the appeal was dismissed for want of office objections and the counsel for the appellants (the Insurance Company) stated that they were not interested in reviving the appeal. The appeal was, as such, disposed of by the High Court. Insofar as the cross-objection of the appellants (the claimants) was concerned, the High Court held that when the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is only restricted to denial of its liability to make the payment of compensation, then in such case the cross-objection at the behest of the claimants in the shape of appeal would not be tenable. It, however, held that if the Insurance Company in the appeal challenges the quantum of compensation, in such a case the claimant(s) will have a right to file an objection.
Being aggrieved, the appellants filed the present appeal by special leave.
A conjoint reading of the provisions of section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC, would reveal that there is no restriction on the right to appeal of any of the parties. It is clear that any party aggrieved by any part of the award would be entitled to prefer an appeal. It is also clear that any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, apart from supporting the finding in his favour, is also entitled to take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal. When in an appeal the appellant could have raised any of the grounds against which he is aggrieved, a respondent cannot be denied the right to file cross-objection in an appeal filed by the other side challenging that part of the award with which he was aggrieved. The said distinction as sought to be drawn by the High Court is not in tune with a conjoint reading of the provisions of section 173 of the M.V. Act; Rule 249 of the Bihar Motor Vehicle Rules, 1992; and Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC.
