SUPREMACY OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or other or almost every day; however, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act of 2005 is a milestone for protection of women in the country. The purpose of its enactment, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias Nookala Shankar Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr. (2016) 11 SCC 774 was to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act has been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence. Considering the importance accorded to this law, let us understand its important facets.

WHO IS COVERED?

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that the Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which have taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential to find out who can claim shelter under this Act. An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges having been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?

Thus, economic abuse is also considered to be an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner and includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which a woman is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD

In S.R. Batra and Anr. vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the wife is entitled only to claim a right u/s 17(1) to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.

Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to again consider this very issue in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020 and it overruled the above two-Judge decision. The Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act. The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that household which is the household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved woman has a share. It held that shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living at the time when the application was filed or in the recent past had been excluded from its use, or she is temporarily absent. The words ‘lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship’ had to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of shared household as noticed in section 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or (has been) taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.

The Supreme Court also noted with approval the decisions of the Delhi Court in Preeti Satija vs. Raj Kumari and Anr., 2014 SCC Online Del 188, which held that the mother-in-law (or a father-in-law, or for that matter ‘a relative of the husband’) can also be a respondent in the proceedings under the DV Act and remedies available under the same Act would necessarily need to be enforced against them; and in Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur and Ors., 2014 SCC Online Del 7617, which held that the broad and inclusive definition of the term ‘shared household’ in the DV Act was in consonance with the family patterns in India where married couples continued to live with their parents in homes owned by the parents. However, the Supreme Court also sounded a note of caution. It held that there was a need to observe that the right to residence u/s 19 of the DV Act was not an indefeasible right of residence in a shared household, especially when the daughter-in-law was pitted against an aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. Senior citizens in the evening of their lives were also entitled to live peacefully and not be haunted by marital discord between their sons and daughters-in-law. While granting relief the Court had to balance the rights of both the parties.

LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

SEPARATED COUPLES

SENIOR CITIZENS ACT

The Senior Citizens Act provides for the setting up of a Maintenance Tribunal in every State which shall adjudicate all matters for their maintenance, including provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. Section 22(2) of this Act mandates that the State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of the life and property of senior citizens. To enable this, section 32 empowers it to frame Rules under the Act. Accordingly, the Maharashtra Government has notified the Maharashtra Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2010. Rule 20, which has been framed in this regard, provides that the Police Commissioner of a city shall take all necessary steps for the protection of the life and property of senior citizens.

Section 23 covers a situation where property has been transferred by a senior citizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transferee must provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. In such cases, if the transferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, the transfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercion or under undue influence and can be held to be voidable at the option of the transferor.

Eviction from house under Senior Citizens Act
One of the most contentious and interesting facets of the Act has been whether the senior citizen / parent can make an application to the Tribunal seeking eviction from his house of the relative who is harassing him. Can the senior citizen / parent get his son / relative evicted on the grounds that he has not been allowing him to live peacefully? Different High Courts have taken contrary views in this respect. The Kerala High Court in C.K. Vasu vs. The Circle Inspector of Police, WP(C) 20850/2011 has taken the view that the Tribunal can only pass a maintenance order and the Act does not empower the Tribunal to grant eviction reliefs. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Walia vs. Sneha Walia, 204 (2013) DLT 618 has held that for an eviction application the appropriate forum would be a Court and not the Maintenance Tribunal.

However, another single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Nasir vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2015 (153) DRJ 259 has held that the object of the Act had to be kept in mind and which was to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the parents and senior citizens who were in distress by a summary procedure. The provisions had to be liberally construed as the primary object was to give social justice to parents and senior citizens. Accordingly, it upheld the eviction order by the Tribunal. It held that directions to remove the children from the property were necessary in certain cases to ensure a normal life for the senior citizens. The direction of eviction was a necessary consequential relief or a corollary to which a senior citizen would be entitled and it accordingly directed the police station to evict the son.

A similar view was taken in Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania vs. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania, AIR 2013 Guj. 160. The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in J. Shanti Sarup Dewan vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, LPA No. 1007/2013 held that there had to be an enforcement mechanism set in place, especially qua the protection of property as envisaged under the said Act, and that the son was thus required to move out of the premises of his parents to permit them to live in peace and civil proceedings could be only qua a claim thereafter if the son so chose to make one, but that, too, without any interim injunction.

J. Dr. Chandrachud, speaking on behalf of the Bench, observed that the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act may have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy could be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.

The Bench observed that section 36 of the DV Act contained a non-obstante clause to ensure that the remedies provided were in addition to other remedies and did not displace them. The Senior Citizens Act was undoubtedly a later Act and also stipulated that its provisions would have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However, the Court held that the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act giving it overriding force and effect would not by themselves be conclusive of the intent to deprive a woman who claimed a right in a shared household under the DV Act. It held that the principles of statutory interpretation dictated that in the event of two special acts containing non-obstante clauses, the later law typically prevailed and here the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was the later statute. However, interestingly, the Apex Court held that in the event of a conflict between two special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would have to be analysed to ascertain which one should prevail over the other. In this case, both pieces of legislation were intended to deal with salutary aspects of public welfare and interest.

It held that a significant object of the DV Act was to provide for and recognise the rights of women to secure housing and to recognise the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the DV Act, 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens was intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the DV Act could not be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations had to be harmoniously construed.

Hence, it laid down a very important principle, that the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household could not be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act! It accordingly directed that, in deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act to grant only such remedies of maintenance that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes such as the DV Act. The Senior Citizens Act could not be deployed to override and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman’s right to a shared household u/s 17 of the DV Act.

CONCLUSION