Putting one to notice is one of the most
fundamental aspects of law and adjudication. As we are aware, in scrutiny
proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO), in order to ensure that the assessee
has not understated income or not claimed excessive loss, can call the assessee
to produce evidence to support the return of income filed. To assume proper
jurisdiction, the AO has to satisfy two conditions provided in section 143(2)
of the Income Tax Act (the Act). This section states that where a return of
income has been furnished, the AO shall, if he considers it necessary or
expedient to ensure that the assessee has not understated income or has
computed excessive loss, serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to
adduce evidence in support of his return of income. The proviso to
section 143(2) of the Act states that no notice under the sub-section shall
be served on the assessee after the expiry of six months from the end of
the month in which the return is furnished. It is pertinent to note that the
section, including the proviso, has not gone through any material
changes over the years.
It is clear from the above that it is
incumbent upon the AO to serve a notice u/s 143(2) and the proviso puts
a further limit on the AO to serve the notice within six months from the end of
the month in which the return of income was furnished. Now, one does not
require any authority to support the proposition that when the legislature has
used the word ‘shall’, it has not left any discretion with the AO and that it
is mandatory for him to follow such procedure. The issue eventually boils down
to interpretation of the word ‘serve’ and whether mere issuance of notice u/s
143(2) is sufficient compliance.
SECTIONS AND RULES
DEALING WITH SERVICE UNDER THE ACT
At this point it would be useful to go
through section 282 of the Act as it stood prior to the amendment brought in by
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009; it stated that ‘a notice or requisition under
this Act may be served on the person therein named either by post or as if it
were a summons issued by a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908’. Therefore,
notice could have been served either through post or as if it were summons
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). It would be pertinent to note
that Order 5 of the CPC deals with issue and service of summons. In Order 5 of
the CPC, Rules 9 to 20 are of relevance and Rules 17 and 20 are of some
importance for the discussion herewith.
Rule 17 of Order 5 of the CPC reads as
follows: ‘Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid
refuses to sign the acknowledgement… the serving officer shall affix a copy of
the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in
which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain, and shall then return the original to the Court from which it
was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he
has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name
and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in
whose presence the copy was affixed.’
The Rule
provides that if the defendant or his agent refuses to sign the
acknowledgement, then the serving officer can affix a copy of the summons on
the outer door or any conspicuous part of the house and shall return the
original to the Court (in our case the AO) with a report saying under what
circumstances he affixed the copy on the outer door.
Rule 20 of Order 5 of the CPC reads as
under: ‘(1) Where the Court is satisfied that there is reason to believe
that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding
service, or that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the
ordinary way, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing a copy
thereof in some conspicuous place in the Courthouse, and also upon some
conspicuous part of the house (if any) in which the defendant is known to have
last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain, or in such
other manner as the Court thinks fit.
(2) Effect of service substituted by
order of the Court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally.’
From a reading of the above Rule it is
evident that if the Court (in our case the AO) is satisfied that there is
reason to believe that the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose
of avoiding service, the Court shall order the summons to be served by affixing
a copy thereof in some conspicuous place. The aforesaid provisions are relevant
to appreciate the point that the Act sufficiently provides remedy to a
situation where the assessee is being evasive in receiving notices either in
order to frustrate the attempts of the AO to serve the notices within the time
limit prescribed under the Act and, as a consequence, to vitiate the entire
proceedings, or to stall the assessment proceedings. Further, the aforesaid
position will not change even under the amended provisions of section 282 of
the Act, as I will point out below.
The Act also deals with how the notice has
to be delivered to the person mentioned therein. Under the amended section
282(2) of the Act, the Board has been empowered to make rules providing for the
addresses to which a communication referred to in sub-section (1) may be delivered.
In view of the same, Rule 127 of the Rules was inserted. Further, the first proviso
states that if the assessee specifically intimates to the AO that notice shall
not be served on the addresses mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule
127(1) of the Rules (address in PAN database and return of income of the year
in consideration, or previous year, or in the MCA database) where the assessee
furnishes in writing any other address for the purpose of communication. The
second proviso states that if the communication could not be served on
the addresses mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 127(2) of the Rules as
well as the address mentioned in the first proviso as provided by the
assessee, then the AO shall deliver or transmit the document, inter alia,
to the address available with any banking company, or co-operative bank, or
insurance company, or post-master general, or address available in government
records, or with any local authority mentioned in section 10(20) of the Act. As
evident, the Rules have provided enough avenues to the AO to achieve the same.
The question which one would have to
consider is what would be the position when the assessee has not intimated the
AO of the new address and the notice issued on an old address comes back unserved
and, thereafter, the time limit to issue further notice has expired?
In my opinion, considering the sheer avenues
available with the AO in view of Rule 127 of the Rules, it was incumbent upon
the AO to serve or communicate the notice on any of the addresses provided
therein. The argument with respect to passing of time limit and, therefore, the
AO could not serve notice on the assessee, would not exonerate the AO from
making endeavours much before the passing of the time limit. If the assessee has
to be vigilant enough to meet deadlines, compliances and its rights and
contentions, equally, the AO, with all the resources at its disposal in today’s
technologically advanced environment, is expected to serve notices within the
time limit provided under the Act. If the AO issues a notice at the fag end of
the period of limitation and thereafter the service of the notice is called
into question, in my opinion, as stated above, it may not absolve the AO from
his duty to serve it within time for the simple reason that proceedings ought
to have been initiated a bit earlier on a conservative basis. Further, if, at
the same time, the conduct of the assessee is not forthcoming or is evasive,
the Courts, in my opinion, surely would step in to do justice.
Further, instances have come to light with
regard to E-assessment proceedings where the AO, rather than serving the
notices on the email address provided by the assessee, is merely uploading the
notices on the e-filing income tax portal of the assessee; this, in my opinion,
would also not be valid service of notice. The Rules mandate, as discussed
above, that the electronic record has to be communicated to the assessee on his
email address and not merely uploaded.
After dealing with the sections on modes of
service, it would be suitable to deal with sections mandating service of notice
in addition to section 143(2) of the Act. Section 292BB, which states that
where an assessee has appeared in any proceedings relating to an assessment,
then it shall be deemed that any notice which was required to be served upon
the assessee has been duly served upon him in time in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and such assessee shall be precluded from taking any
objection in any proceedings, inter alia, on the ground that the notice
was not served upon him on time. However, nothing contained in the section
would apply where the assessee raises that objection before the completion of
the assessment itself. The provision impliedly, or rather expressly, recognises
the fact that valid service of notice within the time limit prescribed under
the requisite provisions has been given utmost importance under the Act and
failure to service it within the stipulated time limit would vitiate the entire
proceedings.
Reference can also be made to section
153C(2) to demonstrate that the legislature has been emphasising the point of
service of notice u/s 143(2) and recognising a distinction between service and
issuance of notice. The section provides that where the incriminating material
as mentioned in 153(1) has been received by the AO of the assessee after the
due date of filing of return of the assessment year in which search was carried
out and no notice u/s 143(2) has been served and the time limit to serve the notice
has also expired before the date of receiving the incriminating material, then
the AO shall issue notice as per the manner prescribed u/s 153A.
Therefore, what the section provides is, all
other conditions remaining constant, if notice u/s 143(2) has been issued but
not served and the time limit for serving the notice has also expired, then the
AO can proceed as per the procedure provided u/s 153A. Therefore, the
legislature itself has again made a distinction between issue of notice and
service of notice u/s 143(2) and put beyond the pale of doubt that the
requirement as provided u/s 143(2) is of service of notice and not mere
issuance. It would also be relevant to take note of section 156, which also
puts an embargo of service of the notice of demand. Further, as I point out in
paragraph (vii) below, service of notice is a precondition to assume valid
jurisdiction.
A FEW DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT / THE COURT
The Supreme Court, in the context of section
156, dealt with the issue whether the subsequent recovery proceedings would
stand vitiated when no notice of demand had been served on the assessee. In the
case of Mohan Wahi vs. CIT (248 ITR 799), the Court, following
the decision in the case of ITO vs. Seghu Setty (52 ITR 528)
rendered in the context of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (1922 Act), held that the
use of the term ‘shall’ in section 156 implies that service of demand notice is
mandatory before initiating recovery proceedings and constitutes the foundation
for recovery proceedings and, therefore, failure to serve the notice of demand
would render the subsequent recovery proceedings null and void.
Reference can also be made to the Three-Judge
Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Narayana Chetty
vs. ITO (35 ITR 388) wherein the Court, dealing with section 34
(providing power to reopen an assessment) of the 1922 Act, held that service of
the notice is a precondition and it is not a procedural irregularity. A similar
analogy, in my submission, can be drawn with regard to section 143(2) as well –
that section 143(2) mandates service of notice on the assessee and the said
notice also forms the bedrock of assessment proceedings, therefore, mere
issuance is not sufficient.
Further, I would like to point out the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Upadhyaya vs. Shanabhai
P. Patel (166 ITR 163) where the
Court has made a distinction between issuance of notice and service of notice.
However, prior to dealing with the same it is appropriate to discuss the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bansari Debi vs. ITO (53 ITR
100). The controversy in that is as follows: Section 34(1)(b) of the
1922 Act provided that the AO may, at any time within eight assessment years
from the end of the assessment year of which reopening is sought to be done,
reopen the assessment by serving a notice on the assessee. The aforesaid
section was amended by section 4 of the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act, 1959
(Amending Act) which, inter alia, provided that no notice issued u/s 34(1)
can be called into challenge before any court of law on the ground that the
time limit for issuing the notice had expired. The assessee raised a plea that
when the notice is issued within a period of eight years but served beyond the
period of eight years, it would not be saved by the Amending Act, as it only
dealt with issuance of notice.
The Court, rejecting the argument of the
assessee, held that the purpose of bringing the Amending Act was to save the
validity of the notice; if a narrow interpretation of ‘issue’ is given, then
the Amending Act would become unworkable as the time limit prescribed in
34(1)(b) of the 1922 Act was only with regard to service of notice. Therefore,
to advance the purpose of the legislature, which was to save the validity of
notices beyond the time prescribed under the 1922 Act, the Court held that the
word ‘issue’ has to be interpreted as the word ‘service’. The Court held that a
wider meaning of the word ‘issue’ would be consistent with the provisions of
the Act as well. In conclusion, the Court in the aforesaid case held that
‘issue’ can be interchangeably used with ‘service’.
Thereafter, in the context of the 1961 Act,
the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Upadhyaya (Supra)
was again called upon to decide whether service and issue can be used
interchangeably. The controversy before the Court was that the notice u/s 148
was issued by registered post prior to the date of limitation; however, it was
served after the period of limitation. The assessee / respondent before the
Court argued that though section 149 states that the no notice shall be issued
beyond the period of limitation and section 148 provides that reassessment
cannot be done without service of the notice u/s 148, in view of the decision
of Bansari Debi (Supra), ‘issue’ used in section 149 shall be
interpreted to mean ‘serve’; therefore, service beyond the period of limitation
is not valid in law.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument by
holding that the scheme of the 1961 Act is materially different from the 1922
Act. A clear distinction has been made between ‘issue of notice’ and ‘service
of notice’ under the 1961 Act. The Court held that section 148 provides service
of notice as a condition precedent to making the assessment and section 149
provides for issuance of notice before the period of limitation; therefore,
there is a clear distinction between the two. The decision in the case of Bansari Debi (Supra) could not be applied for the purpose of
interpreting the provisions of reopening under the 1961 Act.
In my view of the aforesaid decisions as
well as the provisions of the Act, it can be contended that service of notice
u/s 143(2) is a condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction u/s 143. The
legislature has made a clear distinction between the term ‘issue’ and ‘service’
and it is manifested from sections 148 and 149 of the Act. Therefore, the two
terms cannot be used interchangeably.
CIRCULARS /
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE BOARD
Reference can also be made to Instruction
No. 1808 dated 8th March, 1989 which deals with the then
newly-inserted proviso u/s 143(2). The proviso is identically
worded as the new proviso, the only difference being the time limit for
service of the notice. The instruction which the Board gave to the authorities
is as follows:
‘4. It may be noted that, under the
aforesaid provision, it is essential that a notice under section 143(2) of the
Act is served on the assessee within the statutory time limit, and mere issue
of the notice within the statutory period will not suffice’. The instruction clearly states that mere issuance of notice within
the statutory period will not suffice, it has to be served. Similar
instructions have been given by the Board for selection of cases u/s 143(2)(i)
vide Instruction No. 5 dated 28th June, 2002. A similar instruction
has been given in the General Direction issued by the Board vide Notification
No. 3265 (E) 62/2019 dated 12th September, 2019 with regard to the
new scheme of E-assessment, which has been brought with much fanfare.
In view of the aforesaid interpretation
given by the Board through various circulars and instructions that notice u/s
143(2) has to be served, it would not be open to Revenue to contend otherwise
that mere issuance of notice would suffice the requirement of the section. Considering
the aforesaid provisions, the dictum of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid
decisions and the interpretation given by the Board itself, it would be safe to
conclude that issuance of notice u/s 143(2) will not meet the requirement of
assuming valid jurisdiction to initiate proceedings u/s 143.
RECENT DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT
However, the Supreme Court recently,
in the case of Pr. CIT vs. M/s I-ven Interactive Ltd. (418 ITR 662),
has apparently altered the aforesaid position. The Court has not only put a
burdensome finding on the assessee but has also given a distinctive
interpretation of law which I would like to discuss.
Facts
The assessee filed its return of income
online on 28th November, 2006 for 2006-07 and also filed a hard copy
on 5th December, 2006. In the return of income, the assessee had
mentioned its new address. Thereafter, a notice u/s 143(2) was issued on 5th
October, 2007 at the old address, picked up from the PAN database of the
assessee. Though it is not coming out very clearly from the facts as narrated
by the Court in its order, the question of law before the Bombay High Court as
well as the grounds of appeal raised before the Tribunal proceeds on the footing
that the notice was indeed served on the associate entity of the assessee
within the time limit prescribed under the proviso to section 143(2).
Another notice u/s 143(2) was issued on 25th July, 2008 at the
address available in the PAN database. The assessment order was passed u/s
143(3) on 24th December, 2008.
The assessee challenged the order before the
Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals) (CIT[A]), inter alia, on the ground
that the notice u/s 143(2) issued on 5th October, 2007 was not
served on the assessee and the subsequent notices were served beyond the time
limit prescribed u/s 143(2). The CIT(A), vide order dated 23rd December,
2010, allowed the appeal holding that the AO passed the order without assuming a valid jurisdiction u/s 143(2).
Revenue challenged the order of the CIT(A)
before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal) which, vide its order
dated 19th January, 2015, confirmed the order of the CIT(A). The
Tribunal, affirming the finding of the CIT(A), inter alia, held that the
assessee had, during the course of the assessment proceedings, brought to the
notice of the AO that the notice u/s 143(2) dated 5th October, 2007
was not served on the appellant, therefore, the proceedings u/s 143(3) were bad
in law.
Revenue challenged the order of the Tribunal
before the Bombay High Court in ITA No. 94 of 2016. The Bombay High Court,
dismissing the appeal, noted that the AO had, in fact, served at the new
address the assessment order u/s 143(3) on 30th November, 2006 for
assessment year 2004-05 which was very much prior to the notice u/s 143(2)
dated 5th October, 2007 and 25th July, 2008. The Bombay
High Court noted that the assessee, in the course of the assessment
proceedings, had raised the issue of valid service of notice u/s 143(2) and, therefore,
the Tribunal rightly held that in view of the proviso to section 292BB,
notice not being served within time was invalid.
Arguments before the Supreme Court
It was submitted that as there was no
intimation by the assessee to the AO of change of address, the notice u/s
143(2) was sent to the assessee at the available address as per the PAN
database. In view of these facts, the AO was justified in sending the notice
u/s 143(2) on the old address. Once the notice has been issued and sent to the
available address as per the PAN database, it is sufficient compliance of
provisions u/s 143(2).
The assessee argued that the AO was aware
about the new address and, therefore, the notice u/s 143(2) ought to have been
served at the new address only. But the notice u/s 143(2) was, in fact, served
on the old address and, therefore, the same was never served on the assessee.
Further, the subsequent notice was served beyond the time limit provided u/s
143(2). The assessee further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of ACIT vs. Hotel Blue Moon (321 ITR 362) to submit that
notice u/s 143(2) has to be served within the time limit prescribed under the proviso
to section 143(2).
The assessee further argued that the AO was
aware about the change of address, which is evident from the fact that the AO
had sent assessment orders for the assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06 to the
new address.
Conclusion of the Supreme Court
The Court held that as there was no
intimation of change of address to the AO, the AO was justified in issuing the
notice u/s 143(2) on the address available in the PAN database. The Court
further held that mere mentioning of the new address in the return of income
without specifically intimating the AO with respect to the change of address
and without getting the PAN database changed is not adequate. In the absence of
any specific intimation, the AO was justified in issuing the notice at the
address available in the PAN database, especially in view of the return being
filed under the e-filing scheme. The Court noted that the notices u/s 143(2)
are issued on selection of cases generated under the automated system of the
Department which picks up the address of the assessee from the PAN database.
The Court, thereafter, held that once a notice
is issued within the time limit prescribed as per the proviso to section
143(2), the same can be said to be sufficient compliance of section 143(2).
Actual service of the notice upon the assessee is immaterial. The Court gave
such an interpretation to the proviso because, in its wisdom, it felt
that in a case it may happen that though the notice is sent within the period
prescribed, the assessee may avoid actual service of the notice till the expiry
of the period prescribed. The Court further held that in the decision relied
upon by the assessee in the case of Hotel Blue Moon (Supra) also,
it was observed that issuance of notice u/s 143(2) within the time limit
prescribed under the proviso to section 143(2) is necessary.
With regard to the argument of the assessee
that the AO was aware of the change of address in view of the fact that the AO
himself had issued assessment orders for earlier assessment years, i.e. 2004-05
and 2005-06 on the new address, the Court held that the matter had been
adequately explained by the Revenue. In view of the aforesaid findings, the
Court set aside the order of the Bombay High Court and remanded the matter back
to the file of the CIT(A) to decide the issue on merits.
Analysis of the aforesaid decision
The Court came to the aforesaid conclusion
that issuance of a notice is sufficient and service is immaterial majorly on
the point that an assessee may deliberately avoid service of notice within the
time limit in order to stall the assessment proceedings. The remedy for the situation
envisaged by the Court has been adequately provided under the Act itself as
pointed out in paragraph (ii) above, that if the assessee is evasive then there
are various modes of effecting service which would be considered as valid forms
of service. Further, the Act has made clear the requirement of service of the
notice, and not mere issuance, as discussed in paragraph (vi) above. The Court
in its previous decisions has also opined that service of notice is a
precondition for assuming valid jurisdiction and also brought out distinction
between issue and service of notice and how it has been used distinctively
under the Act, which we have seen in aforesaid paragraph (viii). In fact,
Revenue itself has interpreted that service of notice is the most crucial point
of assuming jurisdiction u/s 143(2) which we have seen in paragraph (ix) above.
In my submission, it was not open to the
Revenue to contend otherwise. Further, reference can also be made to the
decision of the Supreme Court Three-Judge Bench in the case of UCO
Bank vs. CIT (237 ITR 889) in which the Court dealt with a somewhat
similar issue. To a previous Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, a CBDT
Circular was not pointed out which was in consonance with the provisions of the
Act and the concept of income. The Court held that circulars are issued for the
purpose of proper administration of the Act, to mitigate the rigours of the
application of provisions of the statute, in certain situations by applying
interpretation beneficial to the assessee, and circulars are not meant for
contradicting or nullifying any provision of the law. Such circulars are
binding on the Revenue and when one such circular was not put before the
earlier Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in a correct perspective, the
same would be contrary to the ratio laid down by the decision of the Constitutional
Bench in the case of Navnitlal Jhaveri vs. AAC (56 ITR 198). In
my opinion, this can be similarly submitted with regard to the aforesaid
circulars referred to in paragraph (vi) as well.
Obiter vs.
ratio of the decision
One more aspect
which I would like to highlight with regard to the aforesaid decision and that
can be kept in mind is that the notices were served on the associate of the
assessee within the time limit provided under the proviso to section
143(2) and that may have prompted the Court to reach the aforesaid conclusion.
Looking at it from another angle, we can wonder whether the interpretation
given by the Court is the ratio of the judgment or an obiter dictum?
It is well settled that even the obiter of the Court is binding
throughout the country and no authority is required to support that
proposition. The only point of distinction would be that when the obiter of
the Court contradicts the ratio of a previous decision, then the ratio
laid down in the previous decision has to be followed and not the obiter.
In this regard, I would draw attention to
the decision rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case
of Sirsa Industries vs. CIT (178 ITR 437). Even there, the High
Court was dealing with a question in which seemingly a Three-Judge Bench
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chowringhee Sales
Bureau vs. CIT (87 ITR 542) had taken a view contrary to the decision
of the Division Bench in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd.
vs. CIT (82 ITR 363). The facts of the case are noteworthy. The
assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and claimed
deduction of sales tax payable by taking a view that the liability had accrued
and therefore deduction could be claimed. The AO sought to reopen the
assessment to deny deduction claimed on mercantile basis by taking the view
that in the case of Chowringhee Sales (Supra), the Supreme Court
held, even though that party was following the mercantile system of accounting,
that ‘a party would be entitled to claim deduction as and when it passes it
on to the government’. The High Court held that the Supreme Court in the
case of Chowringhee Sales (Supra) was considering a different
issue and not the allowability or non-allowability of sales tax payable and,
therefore, it cannot be said that there is a conflict between the decision of
the Three-Judge Bench in the case of Chowringhee Sales (Supra)
and the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg.
(Supra), which allowed deduction of sales tax liability on the basis of
accrual of liability. In view of the same, the High Court quashed the reopening
notices.
The facts of the case before the Court in
the case of I-ven Interactive, as narrated above, show that the notice was
served on the associate of the assessee within the time limit provided under
the proviso to section 143(2). Therefore, it is possible to argue that
the Court was called upon to decide only on the point as to whether or not
notice u/s 143(2) served on the associate of the assessee on the old address of
the assessee was a valid service u/s 143(2). Consequently, mere issuance of
notice u/s 143(2) was sufficient compliance of the provision of section 143(2)
was merely an observation made by the Court.
Considering the aforesaid provisions of the
Act, the decisions of the Court itself which the Court did not have the
occasion to deal with sufficiently, as well as the CBDT Circulars, in my
opinion it is still an arguable case that mere issuance of notice u/s 143(2) is
not a sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 143(2). Inversely,
whether service of notice should have been read as issuance of notice has not
been foreclosed.
With regard to the second important finding
which the Court had given, that merely mentioning the new address in the return
of income would not suffice, a specific intimation has to be filed with the AO
bringing to his notice the change of address as well as an application for
change of address has to be made in the PAN database. From 2nd
December, 2015 (the date from which Rule 127 of the Rules was inserted), the
Act has implicitly recognised the fact that once an address is mentioned in the
return of income, the AO is aware about that address and, thereby, notice can
be served on the said address as well in a given scenario. The second proviso,
inserted from 20th December, 2017, sheds some light on the
controversy dealt with by the Court. Therefore, in my view, after insertion of
Rule 127 of the Rules, failure to specifically bring to the AO’s notice would
not enable the AO to shirk his responsibility of serving the notice to the
assessee.
I have tried to comprehensively deal with
the aspect of issue vs. service as well as what would be the consequences of a
notice coming back unserved. In future on account of electronic transmission of
notices as well as e-assessments, service of notice would throw up innumerable
fresh challenges. It would be interesting to see how the Courts deal with the
same.
