Introduction Adoption of children is becoming a common feature in modern India with several people either not capable of having or not willing to have biological children. In a country such as India where there are a large number of orphans this is a welcome phenomenon. However, adoption too comes with its unique share of problems. As always the root cause of most disputes relates to inheritance. However, in the case of adoption there can be not one but two inheritance disputes – one relating to the adopted child’s adopted parents and the other relating to those of his biological parents. Recently, the Supreme Court has cleared the air on one such issue. Let us analyse some of the facets of inheritance in the context of an adopted child!
Law
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (“the Act”) is a codified law which overrules any text, custom, usage of Hindu Law in the context of adoption by a Hindu. All adoptions by a Hindu male or female must be in accordance with the provisions of the Act or else the shall be void. The consequences of a void adoption are:
(a) it does not create any rights in the adoptive family in favour of the adopted child; and
(b) his rights in the family of his natural birth also subsist and continue.
Thus, it naturally follows that in a case of a void adoption, the adopted child would not be entitled to any inheritance or succession benefits in his adopted family.
On the other hand, the effect of a valid adoption is that from the date of adoption the adopted child will be considered to be the natural child of the adoptive family and all his ties with the original family are severed. However, section 12 provides an important exception that the adopted child is not deprived of the estate vested in him or her prior to his/ her adoption when he/she lived in his/her natural family.
The Supreme Court in Chandan Bilasini vs. Aftabuddin Khan, (1996) 7 SCC 13, has held as follows:
“Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act clearly provides that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.”
Inheritance in Adopted Father’s Property
The wordings of section 12 make it clear that an adopted child shall become the child of the adopted parent for all purposes. Hence, it stands to reason that he would also become entitled to inherit the properties of his adopted parents. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this issue in Pawan Kumar Pathak vs. Mohan Prasad, CA 4456/2016. The brief facts of this case are interesting. There was a succession dispute after the death of a person between his brother and the deceased’s adopted son. The adopted son claimed he was the natural heir and hence entitled to property of his father. This plea was contested by the uncle. Thereafter the son tried amending his plaint to add that he was the adopted son of the deceased and even tried producing an adoption deed to prove the same. However, all the lower courts until the High Court refused to take this document on record stating it was nowhere pleaded initially that he was the adopted son and hence, now the plea could not be amended to include the same. Thus, the issue travelled up to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court set aside the ruling of the High Court. It held that the appellant had in no uncertain terms claimed that he was the only son and the only legal heir who was alive after the demise of his parents. The only controversy according to the Court was that the appellant has never claimed that he was the adopted son, which claim was now sought to be made by amending the plaint.
The Court opined that once the plaintiff had mentioned in the plaint that he was the only son of the deceased, it was not necessary for him to specifically plead that he was an adopted son. For this it relied upon section 3(57) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which defined a ‘son’ as under:
“’son’ in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, shall include an adopted son;”
The Apex Court further observed that once the law recognised an adopted son to be known as a son, it failed to understand why it was necessary for him to specifically plead that he was the adopted son. His averment to the effect that he was the only son, according to the Court, was sufficient to lay the claim of his inheritance on that basis. In fact, it was not even necessary for the appellant to move an application with an attempt to take a specific plea that he was the adopted son as, his plea to the effect that he was the son of the deceased was an adequate plea and to prove that he was the son. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the lower Court rulings. An important ruling that the Court gave was that an adopted son can claim inheritance of his parents’ property.
This decision, would assist one in taking a stand that an adopted son would be a son even for the purposes of the definition of a relative u/s. 56(2)(vii) of the Income-tax Act or even concessional stamp duty of Rs. 200 in case of gift of residential property under Art. 34 of Schedule-I to the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.
Inheritance in Natural Father’s Property
Section 12 of the Act provides that the adopted child is not deprived of the estate vested in him or her prior to his/her adoption when he/she lived in his/her natural family. Thus, any property of his natural family vested in the adopted child prior to adoption would continue to be available to him even after adoption. This would be so even though he is deemed to have severed all ties with his biological family and becomes a part of the adopted family. Thus, the Act makes it perfectly clear that a person even after adoption, takes the property along with him which was earlier vested in that person.
Inheritance in Natural Family’s Coparcenary Property
While the law is well settled on inheritance in the vested property belonging to the adopted child’s natural family, there is a judicial controversy over whether he can claim inheritance in the coparcenary property belonging to his natural family. The moot question is whether he can claim to have a vested interest in HUF property or is his share ambulatory and fluctuating and hence, not vested? There are decisions of the High Courts both for and against this question.
The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Yarlagadda Nayudamma vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1981 AIR(A.P.) 19 has held that an adopted son continues to have a right in coparcenary property belonging to his natural family. It opined that the property vests in a coparcener by birth and hence he gets a vested right in that property by virtue of inheritance. All property vested in the son in his natural family whether self-acquired, obtained by will or inherited from his father or other ancestor or collateral (which is not coparcenary property held along with other coparcener or coparceners) including property held by him as the sole surviving coparcener would not be divested on adoption but would continue to be vested and to belong to the son even after adoption. The Court considered whether it be denied that the interest of a coparcener in the joint family property, though fluctuating, is a vested interest, whatever may be the extent of that interest? It observed that the interest of a deceased coparcener can devolve upon his heirs mentioned in the proviso to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act and not by survivorship. Similarly, then why can it not be said that by virtue of the provision of Clause (b) of section 12 of the Act, the undivided interest of a person in a Mitakshara coparcenary property will not, on his adoption, be divested but will continue to vest in him even after adoption? It further held that property in the HUF estate is by birth. The coparcener had got every right u/s. 30 of the Hindu Succession Act to will away his property or to dispose of or alienate in whichever way he desired, which he is entitled by birth. It ultimately concluded that a person in Mitakshara family had a vested right even in the undivided property of his natural family and even on adoption he continued to have a right over it.
This decision was followed by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shivaji Anantrao Deshmukh vs. Anantrao Deshmukh, 1990 (1) Mh. LJ 598. It further held that it was clear that so far as the coparcener is concerned, his right accrued on his birth. For this it relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Controller of Estate Duty, Madras vs. Alladi Kuppuswamy, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2069. In every coparcenary, therefore, the son, the grandson or great grandson obtained an interest by birth in the coparcenary property so as to be able to control and restrain improper dealings with the property by another coparcener. Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly showed that undivided share of coparcener can be disposed of by testamentary disposition and this was one of the aspects leading to the conclusion that the right of the coparcener in the undivided share is a right of the owner. This legal sanction had thus strengthened the concept of the undivided share of a coparcener being vested in him as the full owner on birth. Such vesting was not divorced or deferred by any contingency or event. Birth and vesting were simultaneous processes and integrally connected, and nothing could intervene in that process so as to indicate that vesting had been postponed. The Court therefore, concluded that the undivided interest in the coparcenary property continued to vest in the adopted son even after the adoption. Section 12 read along with proviso (b) also clearly laid down that on adoption, there was virtually a severance of the adopted child from the coparcenary. There was thus a partition between the adopted son and other members.
However, a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in a latter decision in the case of Devgonda Raygonda Patil vs. Shamgonda Raygonda Patil, 1991 (3) Bom. CR 165 has held that on adoption an adopted son ceases to lose his right in the family property of his natural family. It considered and dissented from the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court discussed above. It observed that a coparcener got a right by birth in coparcenary property. However, the said right or interest of coparcener was liable to fluctuation, increasing by the death of a coparcener and decreasing by birth of a new coparcener. A coparcener had right to partition of the coparcenary property. On such partition, the shares of coparceners were defined and then specific property was vested in him. Till partition took place, he was having a right of joint possession and enjoyment. There was community of interest between all members of the joint family and every coparcener was entitled to joint possession and enjoyment of coparcenary property and to be maintained. It was well established that the essence of coparcenary under Mitakshara Law was unity of ownership. The ownership of the coparcenary property vested in the whole body of coparceners. According to the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remained undivided could predicate that he had a definite share in the joint and undivided property. His interest was a fluctuating interest, capable of being enlarged by deaths in the family and liable to be diminished by births in the family. It was only on a partition that he became entitled to a definite share. Considering this, according to the Court, there was no vested property in a coparcener and therefore proviso (b) to section 12 could not be attracted. It was only those properties which were already vested in the adoptee prior to adoption by inheritance or by partition in the natural family or as sole surviving coparcener which could pass on to him after the adoption. Therefore the properties which had already become vested in him before adoption as absolute owner were not forfeited by the adoption and the adoptee continued to hold them in the new family. But in the case of coparcenary property it cannot be said that a coparcener had a right to a particular part of it so as to get it vested. It held that section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act supported the view that coparcenary property was not vested in the coparcener. The legislature therefore included section 30 with a view to enable a coparcener to dispose of his interest in the coparcenary property by Will or other testamentary disposition. Ultimately, the Single Judge concluded that if there was coparcenary or joint family in existence in the family of birth on date of adoption, then the adoptee could not be said to have any vested properly. The property did not vest and therefore provision of section 12(b) were not attracted. Vested property meant where indefeasible right was created i.e., on no contingency it can be defeated in respect of particular property. In other words where full ownership were conferred in respect of a particular property. But this was not the position in case of coparcenary properly. The coparcenary property was not owned by a coparcener and never any particular property. All the properties vested in the joint family and were held by it.
Subsequently, another Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the case of Somanath Radhakrishna More vs. Ujjawala Sudhakar Pawar, 2013 (6) Bom. C.R. 397 has also taken a view that on adoption an adopted son ceases to lose his right in the family property of his natural family. This decision has not considered any of the decisions explained above. It held that on adoption a son’s rights in ancestral property were extinguished. He would no longer be a coparcener in law. He did not have any legal right in the joint property of his natural family. Due to adoption those rights ceased. Even if he continued to stay with his natural family and look after their property his rights could not be rejuvenated.
It is humbly submitted that the two decisions of the Bombay High Court in Devgonda (supra) and Radhakrishna (supra) require a reconsideration for they suffer from judicial impropriety. They have both been issued without notice of an earlier favourable decision of a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Shivaji’s case on the same issue and hence, they are rendered per incuriam. It is a settled principle of law that a Single Judge of a High Court cannot give a decision contrary to an earlier judgment of a Single Judge of the same High Court – Food Corporation of India vs. Yadav Engineer and Contractor AIR 1982 SC 1302. Moreover, these contrary Single Judge decisions have even gone against the Division Bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. This is against a second principle of law that a Single Judge Ruling of one High Court cannot go against the Division Bench Ruling of another High Court. The correct procedure for the Single Judge in both these adverse rulings, If he did not find himself in agreement with the earlier favourable Rulings, was to refer the binding decision and direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to enable him to constitute a Division Bench to examine the question. This approach finds favour in the Rulings of CIT vs. BR Constructions, 202 ITR 222 (AP FB) and CIT vs. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd, 202 ITR 727 (Bom).
On a separate note, notwithstanding the judicial impropriety, it is submitted that the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh Division Bench and the Bombay High Court in Shivaji appear to be more correct.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision has helped clear a major issue in inheritance of adopted children. One only wishes that the other issue relating to inheritance in HUF property of the natural family is also settled quickly. This would go a long way in reducing several succession disputes.
