Pepsi Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (Del); W. P. No. 1334 of 2015 dated 19/05/2015:www.itatonline.org:
The third proviso to section 254(2A) was amended by the Finance Act, 2008, with effect from 01/10/2008 to provide that the Tribunal shall not have the power to grant stay of demand for a period exceeding 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee”. The said amendment was inserted to overcome the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Narang Overseas Private Limited vs. ITAT 295 ITR 22(Bom). The Petitioners filed a Writ Petition to challenge the said amended third proviso to section 254(2A) on the ground that it is arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:
“i) U /s. 254, there are several conditions which have been stipulated with respect to the power of the Tribunal to grant stay of demand. First of all, as per the first proviso to Section 254(2A), a stay order could be passed for a period not exceeding 180 days and the Tribunal should dispose of the appeal within that period. The second proviso stipulates that in case the appeal is not disposed of within the period of 180 days, if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, the Tribunal has the power to extend the stay for a period not exceeding 365 days in aggregate. Once again, the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal within the said period of stay. The third proviso, as it stands today, stipulates that if the appeal is not disposed of within the period of 365 days, then the order of stay shall stand vacated, even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee.
ii) While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal. Take the case of delay being caused in the disposal of the appeal on the part of the revenue. Even in that case, the stay would stand vacated on the expiry of 365 days. This is despite the fact that the stay was granted by the Tribunal, in the first instance, upon considering the prima facie merits of the case through a reasoned order;
iii) The petitioners are correct in their submission that unequals have been treated equally. Assessees who, after having obtained stay orders and by their conduct delay the appeal proceedings, have been treated in the same manner in which assessees, who have not, in any way, delayed the proceedings in the appeal. The two classes of assessees are distinct and cannot be clubbed together. This clubbing together has led to hostile discrimination against the assessees to whom the delay is not attributable. It is for this reason that we find that the insertion of the expression – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– by virtue of the Finance Act, 2008, violates the non-discrimination clause of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The object that appeals should be heard expeditiously and that assesses should not misuse the stay orders granted in their favour by adopting delaying tactics is not at all achieved by the provision as it stands. On the contrary, the clubbing together of ‘well behaved’ assesses and those who cause delay in the appeal proceedings is itself violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and has no nexus or connection with the object sought to be achieved. The said expression introduced by the Finance Act, 2008 is, therefore, struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
iv) This would revert us to the position of law as interpreted by the Bombay High Court in Narang Overseas (supra), with which we are in full agreement. Consequently, we hold that, where the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, the Tribunal has the power to grant extension of stay beyond 365 days in deserving cases.”
